Alessandro Lizzeri, New York University. "Rules and Commitment in Communication: an Experimental Analysis"
Department webinar. Alessandro Lizzeri is a Professor at NYU Stern. He will present the paper: "Rules and Commitment in Communication: an Experimental Analysis". Coauthored by Guillaume Frechette and Jacopo Perego.
We investigate models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persua- sion, in a unified experimental framework. Our umbrella design permits the analysis of models that share the same structure regarding preferences and information, but differ in two dimensions: the rules governing communication, which determine whether infor- mation is verifiable; and the sender’s commitment power, which determines the extent to which she can commit to her communication strategy. Commitment is predicted to have opposite effects on information transmission, depending on whether informa- tion is verifiable. Our design exploits these variations to explicitly test for the role of rules and commitment in communication. Our experiments provide general support for the strategic rationale behind the role of commitment and, more specifically, for the Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). At the same time, we document significant quantitative deviations. Most notably, we find that rules matter in ways that are entirely unpredicted by the theory, suggesting a novel policy role for information verifiability.
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