Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute: Matching with Partners and Projects
Department seminar. Arunava Sen is a Professor at the Indian Statistical Insititute. He will present a paper entitled "Matching with Partners and Projects", co-authored by Antonio Nicolò and Sonal Yadav.
Arunava Sen. Photo: The World Academy of Sciences.
We study a matching model in which agents have to be matched in pairs to undertake a project. Each agent partitions the set of partners into friends and outsiders, and the set of possible projects, into good and bad ones (dichotomous preferences). The overall preference ordering on partner, project pairs is separable. Friendship is mutual and preferences over projects among friends exhibit value homophily in the following sense: when comparing two friends, the set of good projects for one individual is included in the set of good projects for her friend. We propose appropriate notions of stability and non-manipulability in this model and propose an algorithm, the minimum demand priority algorithm that generates stable assignments ,satisfies a limited notion of Pareto efficiency called friendship efficiency and has good strategic properties. Finally we show stable assignments may not exist if the homophily and dichotomous preferences assumptions are relaxed.
Host: Paolo Piacquadio