RTV Trend Report 2020
Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990 - 2019

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Preface

C-REX would like to thank all the research assistants involved in the present update of the Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence (RTV) dataset: Sofia Lygren (team leader), Madeleine Thorstensen and Hanna Steffenak. In addition, we would like to thank all international experts who have contributed through reporting and data.

Key point summary

- In 2019, there were four fatal and 112 severe, but non-fatal, right-wing violent events in Western Europe. The four fatal events resulted in five fatalities.
- From a long-term perspective (since the 1990s), these are low figures. From a short-term perspective, 2019 is the second most deadly of the past six years, only surpassed by 2016, which had nine fatal attacks resulting in 17 fatalities.
- While two of the fatal attacks in 2019 targeted single persons, the remaining two attacks were intended to kill as many as possible. Attacks intended to cause mass casualties have been rare in Western Europe since 1980.
- In absolute terms, most RTV attacks took place in Germany, followed by Italy, the UK, Spain and Greece. In most countries, there were few or no known severe violent attacks.
- In 2019, lone actors were responsible for all fatal attacks and about one third of severe, but non-fatal, attacks. Organized groups and affiliated members acting on their own initiative were behind a considerable proportion of severe violent attacks, most notably in Italy and Spain, followed by Germany.
- The most common victims of right-wing violence continue to be ethnic and religious minorities, being the primary target group in two thirds of all severe violent events in 2019.
- Although one fatal attack in 2019 – the Halle attack – targeted the Jewish community initially, Muslims were the most frequently attacked religious minority in Western Europe.
- Violent attacks were most commonly carried out through beating and kicking, but many perpetrators also used blunt instruments, firearms, explosives and knives. Three of the four fatal attacks involved firearms.
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Introduction

Right-wing terrorism and violence were on the agenda in many Western countries in 2019. The annual report from the Munich Security Conference, the world’s largest gathering of international security policy makers and analysts, presented ‘right-wing extremism’ as a key issue alongside ‘space security’, ‘climate security’ and ‘the technology race’. In an interview with the Washington Post, the secretary general of Interpol warned of a dramatic increase in right-wing terrorism globally. In many countries, the security services pointed to the growing threat of right-wing extremism. The Dutch security services (AIVD), for example, called 2019 “the year of attacks by far-right extremists worldwide”. In other countries, such as Norway, the security services considered terrorist attacks from the extreme right to be as likely as terrorist attacks from Islamist extremists.

The main reason behind the increasing attention was an apparent emerging global trend of lone-actor terrorists carrying out, or trying to carry out, mass-casualty attacks, inspired by the terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019. Several similar attacks and plots took place across the globe in the subsequent months, including in the US (Poway and El Paso), Germany (Halle), Norway (Bærum) and the UK (Luton), though none were nearly as deadly as the one in Christchurch. Rather than being part of an organized transnational terrorist network, these lone actors seem to have been connected only by reputation, through online platforms in which perpetrators of mass killings are celebrated as heroes and role models, most notably 4chan/8chan and Telegram.

While this new trend is indeed worrying, not only because the perpetrators intend to kill as many as possible, but also because it is difficult to assess the intentions and capabilities of internet-based subcultures, this report shows that the year 2019 in Western Europe was neither very violent in terms of fatal attacks, nor particularly deadly in terms of fatalities. Moreover, the trend report shows that most (severe) right-wing violence is not related to internet-inspired lone actors committing or trying to commit mass murder using bombs or firearms. In fact, lone actors are behind only a minority of (severe) violent events, and the most common ‘weapons’ used are not firearms, but fists, feet and blunt instruments.

Basis for the analysis

In this report, which is the second of its kind, we present an overview of right-wing terrorism and severe violence in Western Europe in 2019, including the number of violent events, the perpetrator types, the targeted groups and the weapons used. Looking at fatal events only, we
also discuss important long-term and short-term trends in (severe forms of) right-wing violence since 1990. The report also includes snapshot case studies of three countries with relatively high levels of violence (i.e. Germany, Greece and Spain), as well as more detail on two selected topics: online-inspired terrorism and attacks against politicians.

As in the previous trend report, we rely on the Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence (RTV) dataset, which covers severe forms of right-wing violent attacks and plots in Western Europe since 1990 (for more information, see Box 1). The reason for including only severe types of events is not that less severe violence is unimportant, but rather that such attacks are too many to be covered systematically and exhaustively. Moreover, any overview of less severe forms of violence is likely to reflect variation in the availability and reliability of source material as much as real differences in levels of right-wing violence between countries. In fact, these biases in media reporting, police data and non-governmental organization statistics are most likely also a problem with severe, but non-fatal, attacks, which is why we only use fatal events when comparing levels of violence across time and between countries.

The 2019 update includes 122 new events. Of these, 116 events occurred in 2019, while 5 events from 2018 and one from 2016 have been added to the period covered in the previous version of the dataset (1990–2018) and the trend report for 2019. In addition, one fatal event from 1998 has been removed. After closer examination, the event can better be described as a fatal football brawl than as a far-right attack. After the 2019 update, the dataset includes 877 events in total. Of these, 208 events had a fatal outcome, resulting in 330 people being killed by right-wing terrorism and violence between 1990 and 2019 in Western Europe.

While fatal RTV events can be assumed to have been covered exhaustively by the RTV dataset, the 2019 update covers severe, but non-fatal, events in 2019 more extensively than in previous years, due to methodological improvements. Most importantly, we have developed and applied a search string in Factiva and Retriever, two media databases covering all but three of the RTV-country languages (i.e. Greek, Flemish and Icelandic language newspapers are not covered). Because right-wing violence is covered using different terms in different countries, we developed unique search strings for each country, in cooperation with our RTV country experts. For instance, while ‘far-right’ is a frequently used term in the UK, ‘fascists’ is the term more commonly used in Italy. In addition, the country strings also include names of known extreme-right militant organizations in specific countries.
**Box 1: The RTV dataset**

The RTV dataset was built following the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. By offering a systematic assessment of *severe* forms of violent attacks and plots in 18 West European countries since 1990 where the *target selection* was based on *right-wing beliefs*, it aims to overcome the limitations of available police statistics and of the widely used terrorism datasets, which suffer from problems of availability, representativity, measurement validity, comparability and replicability.7

**Inclusion criteria**

By ‘right-wing’, we mean those who regard social inequality as inevitable, natural or even desirable.8 Most perpetrators of right-wing violence adhere to a far-right mix of anti-egalitarianism, nativism and authoritarianism.9 These ideological constructs – and beliefs that are strongly associated with them, such as racism and conspiratorial thinking – produce a set of political and social groups considered as enemies of and legitimate targets for the far right. Most notably, but not exclusively, these include ethnic minorities, religious minorities, sexual minorities, political opponents, state institutions and vulnerable groups. By ‘severe forms of violent attacks and plots’, we mean cases in which the perpetrator(s) appear determined or willing to inflict deadly or physically disabling injury on the victim(s). More specifically, the dataset aims to include (1) all events with fatal or near fatal outcomes; (2) events in which potentially lethal weapons, such as knives, guns or bombs, have been used offensively; (3) severe beatings leading to hospitalization, coma, unconsciousness or other disabling injuries; (4) terrorist attack plots; and (5) discoveries of large weapons caches belonging to right-wing extremists.

**Sources**

The RTV dataset is based exclusively on open sources, including, but not limited to, media coverage and openly available information from non-governmental organizations, anti-fascist groups and other organizations. To ensure full coverage of the most important cases, national experts in most countries have been consulted in order to identify relevant events and source material.

In addition to more systematic screening of media sources, this update relies on more extensive consultation with our national RTV experts. This improves not only the interpretation of specific events, but also the general understanding of the social and political context for right-wing violence in each country. Since 2016, research assistants have also been used to strengthen
resources for background research and coding. Therefore, we argue that the information for the 2016–2019 period, and in particular for 2019, fairly accurately reflects the characteristics of perpetrator types, target groups, and the types of weapons used in the severe violent attacks, although some relevant attacks may be missing due to lack of information.

Key findings

The following pages provide insights on some key findings derived from the latest update of the RTV dataset. However, much more information is available in the dataset. Note that a limited version of the RTV dataset is available for anyone to download, while access to the full version can be requested for research purposes, also free of charge.

**Fatal attacks and fatalities in 2019**

In 2019, there were four fatal right-wing attacks in Western Europe, which were all committed by lone actors. At least two of the attacks unmistakably qualify as terrorism, as the perpetrators intended to live stream their use of massive violence to instil fear in a wider population and affect a political outcome. Whether the murder of Lübke also qualifies as terrorism depends on the function the perpetrator intended the attack to have, i.e. whether he primarily intended to communicate with a wider audience to affect a political outcome, or whether he simply wanted to punish Lübke because of his pro-immigration stance, the answer to which – at the time this report was written – remains unclear. In addition, three of four attacks were premeditated, meaning that that they were planned in advance and that the perpetrators actively pursued a predefined person or target group. While premeditated attacks are quite common when we look at fatal right-wing violence more generally, the terrorist nature of (two of) the attacks is a less frequent occurrence.

In June, the district president of the German Kassel region Walter Lübke, representing the mainstream right party *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU), was shot dead in his house at night. According to the police, the perpetrator, whose DNA was found at the crime scene, was a 45-year-old man formerly active in the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) (for more information on the Walter Lübke murder, see page 24).

In July, an immigrant originally from Guinea was beaten and killed by a lone actor on the streets of Canteleu, France. The perpetrator, a recurring psychiatric patient, insulted the victim, who was sitting in his car with his wife. There was a football match between Algeria and Senegal that night, and the perpetrator had allegedly said “you dirty blacks, we’re going to f*** you
tonight”. The victim got out of the car to talk to the perpetrator when he was beaten in the face. The victim fell to the ground and later died in hospital.

In August, a 21-year-old man first shot and killed his stepsister (adopted from China) in Bærum, Norway, before driving to the Al-Noor Islamic Centre with the aim of killing as many Muslims as possible. Armed with a shotgun and a hunting rifle, he used four of the five bullets in the rifle to get through the locked side-entrance door of the mosque. Entering the mosque, he was immediately charged and overpowered by two elderly worshippers. Several shots were fired inside the mosque, but no one was hit or severely injured. Instead, the perpetrator was beaten up and restrained by the two elderly men until the police arrived and arrested him. He immediately proclaimed his racist and national socialist views and motivations to the police, further expressed in police interviews and the trial (still ongoing in May 2020). Although his far-right and Nazi views had developed gradually during the previous two years, it was – according to the testimony of the perpetrator – only after he read the Christchurch terrorist’s manifesto that he decided on his own initiative to carry out a terrorist attack, which took place only eight days later. The short time span for planning and preparations contributed to the failure of the mosque attack. He justified the killing of his adopted stepsister by claiming that she was of non-white race and that he wanted to protect his father and stepmother in case there was a future race war. He tried but failed to live stream his mosque attack but posted a meme on Endchan, which is one of several similar websites composed of user-created message boards.

In October, a 27-year-old German from Saxony-Anhalt, who was live streaming his actions on the gaming platform Twitch, tried to enter the synagogue in Halle, Germany, but failed to get through the solidly locked door. He eventually shot and killed a woman who had happened to walk by. He then attempted to shoot a second person who had stopped to help the first victim, but his weapon jammed. The perpetrator drove away from the scene and randomly came across a Turkish kebab restaurant. According to the live stream, which only had five viewers in real time, it appears as if he then decided to stop and continue the attack, shooting and killing the restaurant owner. The police arrived at the scene and engaged in a firefight, during which the perpetrator received a minor neck injury but was able to escape. He then tried to change to another car and shot and seriously injured two victims who had refused to give up their vehicle to him. Unable to use the victims’ car, he stole a taxi and tried to flee towards Munich, until he caused a traffic accident with a truck and was arrested without further resistance. The guns he used were homemade 3D-printed guns, including a pistol made from widely available material such as steel and wood.
Fatal attacks per year
From a long-term perspective, the number of fatal attacks per year has been declining in Western Europe, with 2019 being among the ten least deadly years since 1990 (see Figure 1). However, from a more short-term perspective, 2019 is the second most deadly of the past six years, only surpassed by 2016, which had nine fatal attacks. Overall, the number of fatal attacks per year has been quite stable since 2001, with an average of five fatal attacks per year, thereby placing 2019 as slightly below average.

Fatalities per year
In terms of fatalities, 2019 is in the lower half of the distribution with five fatalities in total, which is just below the median of six fatalities per year for the entire period, and equal to the median for the past ten years (see Figure 2). The year 2011 was by far the deadliest during the entire period covered by the RTV dataset, with 80 fatalities, of which 77 resulted from the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway.

Fatalities per attack
Almost all fatal RTV attacks between 1990 and 2019 resulted in one fatality only (186 of 208), while only four attacks resulted in five or more fatalities (see Figure 3). Two of these were arson attacks targeting immigrants in Germany, one in 1993 with five fatalities and one in 1996 with ten fatalities. The remaining two were the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011 with 77 fatalities and the shooting in Munich on 22 July 2016, partly inspired by the 22 July attacks in Norway, with nine fatalities.

While two of the fatal attacks from 2019 targeted single persons, the Bærum and Halle attacks were intended to kill as many as possible. Such intentional mass-casualty attacks are rare in Western Europe and may thus indicate a new trend if they continue to be carried out in the near future.10
Figure 1: Number of RTV cases with fatal outcomes, 1990–2019. N=208

Figure 2: Number of dead in RTV violence per year, 1990–2019. N=330

Figure 3: Number of fatal events, 1990–2019, according to number of fatalities. N=208
**Comparing countries**

Taking fatal and non-fatal events in previous versions of the RTV dataset together, six countries stood out as having experienced considerably more RTV than others: Sweden, Germany, Italy, the UK, Greece and Spain.\(^{11}\) Data from 2019 shows that the same countries figure as those with the highest records of RTV events (see Figure 4). The exception is Sweden, which had only two severe events in 2019, neither of them fatal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4: All cases, 2019, by country. N=116**

Although the same countries continue to struggle with relatively high levels of right-wing violence, the nature of this violence varies considerably from country to country. For example, in Southern Europe right-wing violence tends to be more organized, whereas in Northern Europe lone actors are the most common perpetrator type. Moreover, attacks in Southern Europe have historically targeted political opponents (most notably anti-fascists) more than ethnic and religious minorities. In recent years, however, this difference seems to have been less pronounced, as there have been numerous attacks on ethnic minorities in both Italy and Greece. However, in Spain, political opponents remain the primary target group.

**Perpetrator types**

The RTV dataset distinguishes seven perpetrator types according to their type of commitment, degree of organization and the number of people involved: organized groups; affiliated members; autonomous cells; gangs; unorganized; lone actors; and shadow groups. There is also an ‘unknown’ category, which is used in cases where there is too little information to determine the perpetrator type (see Box 2 for more information).
The most common perpetrator type in 2019 was ‘lone actor’ (see Figure 5). A little above one third of all attacks were carried out by lone actors. These include not only relatively well-known cases such as the mosque and synagogue attacks, in Bærum and Halle respectively, but also severe cases such as the 50-year-old German who drove his car into a group of Syrian and Afghan citizens on New Year’s Eve in Bottrop, injuring four, and the Italian perpetrator who shouted “*** gypsies, I'll kill you all” before he set fire to a caravan of a Sinti family and shot one family member with a hunting rifle.

Although being coded as ‘lone actor’ means the perpetrators prepare and carry out attacks alone at their own initiative, many of these perpetrators have been inspired by others (e.g., Brenton Tarrant) and/or influenced by socio-political developments. For example, several ‘lone actors’ have been affiliated to organizations (e.g. CasaPound) or less structured movements (e.g., Reichbürger). In this sense, many of these actors are ‘lone’ only in a relative sense. They are – to various degrees – part of national or transnational extreme-right subcultures or networks, online and sometimes also offline. They often refer to these communities as sources of inspiration and recognition, and as audiences for their actions. At the same time, research suggests that the profiles and radicalization paths of lone actors are sufficiently different from those of organized militants to treat them as a separate category.

The second most common perpetrator type was ‘organized groups’, but only if we include ‘affiliated members’ acting on their own initiative. Organized groups were associated with almost a quarter of the registered events in 2019 (27 events). While some of the groups have a long and well-known history of being involved in right-wing violence, such as CasaPound and Forza Nuova in Italy and Golden Dawn in Greece, others have emerged more recently and are much less known, such as the Nationalist Socialist Knights of the Ku-Klux-Klan Deutschland, Nordkreuz in Germany and Breizh Firm in France.

Violence by gangs and unorganized groups, including violence with a fatal outcome (see below), was more common in the 1990s but only accounted for nine of the attacks in 2019. Autonomous cells were behind only one event.

As in previous years, many events from 2019 (43 events) were carried out by ‘unknown’ perpetrators. Many of these attacks involved arson and throwing Molotov cocktails at inhabited refugee accommodation. The perpetrators were not identified and were therefore coded as ‘unknown’.
Box 2: RTV perpetrator types

**Organized groups** – known entities with five or more members whose association primarily relies on a strong commitment to right-wing politics

**Affiliated members** – two or more members of organized groups acting on their own initiative

**Autonomous cells** – clandestine entities of two to four members whose association primarily relies on a strong commitment to right-wing politics

**Gangs** – informal groups of three or more acquaintances with a general right-wing commitment, but whose association primarily relies on social bonds

**Unorganized** – two or more perpetrators with no known association to any specific right-wing group, cell, or gang

**Lone actors** – single perpetrators who prepare and carry out attacks alone at their own initiative

**Shadow groups** – unresolved attacks claimed by formerly unknown groups

**Unknown** – unidentified perpetrator(s), but where targeting or other factors strongly indicate a far-right motivation.

*Figure 5: Perpetrator type of all incidents in 2019, including both fatal and non-fatal events, and including affiliated members acting on their own initiative in ‘Organized groups’. N=116*

If we look at the distribution of perpetrator types over time for fatal events, the most notable trend is that the numbers of (skinhead) gangs and unorganized perpetrators are decreasing, both in absolute terms and relative to other perpetrator types (Figure 6). Such gangs were responsible for around half of all fatal attacks during the 1990s and early 2000s. The gradual decline of the very violent skinhead subculture therefore partly explains the decrease in extreme-right
violence since the 1990s. The number of autonomous cells is also decreasing, but they never constituted a significant perpetrator type in the (fatal) RTV context.

The proportion of fatal RTV attacks carried out by organized groups, including affiliated members acting on their own initiative, continues to be very low. Finally, the number of lone actor attacks has increased in recent years, from only five attacks between 2010 and 2014 to 15 between 2015 and 2019. Most of the recent attacks took place in either 2016 (seven events) or 2019 (four events). Given that fatal violence by other typical perpetrators types (e.g., unorganized and gangs) has decreased, lone actors have been responsible for almost all fatal attacks since 2015.

Figure 6: Perpetrator types in fatal events, 1990–2019. Note that the categories ‘Organized groups’ and ‘Affiliated members’ are merged in this figure. N=208.

Incident and perpetrator type

Do different perpetrator types commit different types of violence? RTV events are categorized according to four incident types: premeditated attacks, spontaneous attacks, plots and preparation for armed struggle (see Box 3 for more information).

Table 1 shows all RTV events from 2019, fatal and non-fatal, categorized according to perpetrator and incident type. Notably, spontaneous attacks outnumber premeditated attacks for all perpetrator types except attacks by ‘unorganized’ perpetrators. This is the first year that spontaneous attacks outnumber premeditated attacks in the RTV data. This shift may, however, result from better coverage of non-fatal events, due to this year’s use of systematic search strings in Factiva and Retriever, as well as continuous improvements in available online sources.
Six attack plots were registered in 2019, four by lone actors and two by organized groups, one by Nordkreuz in Germany, who were plotting to kill politicians engaged in accepting refugees in 2015 (for more information see country report on Germany on page 19), and one by a nameless group of 12 Italians plotting to blow up a mosque.

The 2019 data continues a trend of an increasing number of plots and of preparation for armed struggle. This is especially the case for preparation for armed struggle. While there were 11 cases of preparation for armed struggle between 2016 and 2018, there were 14 in 2019 alone. Eight of these events were attributed to lone actors, four to organized groups, and one to an autonomous cell.

**Red dots indicate fatal attacks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator type</th>
<th>Premeditated</th>
<th>Spontaneous</th>
<th>Attack plot</th>
<th>Preparation for armed struggle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lone actors</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unorganized</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous cells</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: All events for 2019, perpetrator type and incident type. Note that the categories ‘Organized groups’ and ‘Affiliated members’ are merged in this table. N=116

Increased activity is one way of interpreting this trend. However, it may also result from increased attention from the police and intelligence services. Intelligence services have in recent years increased their focus on right-wing terrorism, resulting in greater surveillance and enhanced capacity to intercept plots before they were carried out. In addition, previous
intelligence scandals, such as the one relating to the NSU case in Germany, where the intelligence services were unable to prevent a string of murders, partly due to problems of information-sharing, gave the intelligence services the incentive to demonstrate that they were paying sufficient attention to this threat. Notably, five of the 14 cases of preparation for armed struggle occurred in Germany, while four of the six plots occurred in the UK. Whether this reflects a rise in activity in Germany and the UK, or just increased focus from the police and intelligence services, it is too early to determine.

Finally, the plot versus premeditated attack ratio is relatively low (6/38), suggesting that relatively few planned attacks are intercepted by the police, notwithstanding the increased attention from the police and intelligence services. One reason may be that most attacks are now carried out by lone actors whose attack plans are difficult to uncover. Another reason could be that many intercepted plots are never reported in the media. However, having read hundreds of news articles about potential RTV events, our impression is the opposite: that the police success in intercepting suspicious behaviour on the extreme right is currently rather low, particularly in Northern Europe, and that the likelihood that the police will announce any successes is relatively high.

**Target groups**

Who are the victims of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe? The RTV dataset includes more than 15 different target groups grouped into five main categories, reflecting common enemies of the far right: (1) ethnic and religious minorities (e.g. immigrants, refugees, blacks, Jews, Muslims and Roma); (2) political opponents (e.g. left-wing activists, the media, separatists, pro-immigration activists and separatists); (3) state institutions (e.g. police and government representatives at the national and local level); (4) sexual minorities (LGBT+); and (5) vulnerable groups (e.g. people who are homeless or mentally or physically disabled).

While these categories are analytically distinct, perpetrators may target multiple groups (e.g., as in the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway) and/or the victim might belong to multiple categories, often referred to as ‘intersectionality’ (e.g., Owen Jones, who is left-wing, gay and a columnist). In our coding of the cases, we deal with these issues by allowing for multiple target groups and by distinguishing between primary and secondary target categories. It should be noted, however, that, in almost all cases, it is relatively straightforward to determine the target group.

We have merged ethnic and religious minorities into one category because several victims are members of multiple target groups, e.g. Muslim refugees, and therefore difficult to distinguish
meaningfully. In addition, different target groups have different identification thresholds. For instance, we code attacks as targeting Muslims only if the perpetrator explicitly expresses anti-Muslim sentiments or the targeting is unquestionably anti-Muslim, such as a mosque bombing. By contrast, all attacks against refugees by extreme-right activists with no further motive expressed will be coded as targeting refugees, regardless of the victims’ religious identity.

The primary target group for fatal attacks in 2019 was ethnic and religious minorities, with one of the attacks targeting an immigrant, one a mosque, and one a synagogue. The fourth fatal attack targeted state institutions with the murder of Walter Lübke. The pattern is quite similar for non-fatal events for 2019. A large majority of all the events (76 of 116 events) primarily targeted ethnic and religious minorities (Figure 7).\textsuperscript{15} Political opponents were the second most frequently targeted group, with a majority of events targeting left-wing and anti-fascist activists. In addition, violence against separatists has re-emerged with the ongoing conflicts in Catalonia, Spain, and Northern Macedonia, Greece (for more information, see the country reports on Spain and Greece on pages 20-21). One reason why this target group is less pronounced in our data for fatal attacks is that many of these events emerge from street-level brawls between right- and left-wing activists, which rarely result in fatalities.

By breaking the category ‘ethnic and religious minorities’ into its sub-components (Figure 8), we see that immigrants/foreigners/refugees are most frequently targeted, followed by Muslims and Blacks. Jews are rarely severely attacked by right-wing extremists in Western Europe (two attacks only), though the Jewish community was the primary target in one of the events with a fatal outcome.

Figure 9 shows the distribution of target groups in fatal events clustered into five-year periods. The relative share represented by attacks against ethnic and religious minorities has grown over time, but only because attacks against other target groups have decreased. Attacks against state institutions have increased during the last five-year period, both in relative and in absolute terms. We treat this trend in more detail in our discussion of attacks against politicians below.
Figure 7: Target groups, all cases, 2019. N=116. Note: All but two of the events with ‘unknown’ target group concern ‘preparations for armed struggle’.

Figure 8: Target groups within the ‘ethnic and religious minorities’, all cases, 2019. N=75

Figure 9: Target groups, fatal events, 1990–2019. N=208. Note: Only two fatal cases from 1994 and 1995 are coded as ‘unknown’.
**Weapon types**

What kinds of weapons do extreme-right activists in Western Europe use in severe attacks? The RTV dataset codes for more than 15 different weapon types that can be grouped into six main categories: explosives (including letter bombs); firearms (including handgun, shotgun/rifle and automatic firearms); arson (including Molotov Cocktails/petrol bombs/fire bombs); knives; blunt instruments; and beating and kicking. There is also an ‘other’ category, which is used for less common weapons, such as car attacks.

Figure 10 shows that, in 2019, the largest number (44) of severe attacks by the extreme right in Western Europe used beating and kicking. The most deadly weapons, i.e. explosives and firearms, were used in 25 of the attacks, while blunt instruments and knives were used in 27 of the attacks.

![Figure 10: Weapon types, all events, 2019. N=116](image)

If we look at weapons used in fatal attacks over time (Figure 11), we see that the share of attacks using firearms has grown considerably over the past five years, while knife attacks with fatal outcomes have become less common during the same period. In addition, fatal attacks resulting from arson or use of blunt instruments were more common during the 1990s and early 2000s than during the past 15 years. These patterns correspond closely to changes in the perpetrators of fatal attacks, with fewer attacks by gangs and unorganized groups, who typically use knives or blunt instruments, and a larger share of attacks by lone actors, who typically use explosives and firearms.
Country case studies

This section comments on a selection of countries that experienced noteworthy RTV events in 2019.

Germany

Germany continues to be the country in Western Europe with the highest level of RTV violence in absolute terms (see Figure 4 on page 8). In 2019, severe and fatal right-wing violence seems to a large extent to be related to the immigration issue. Several attacks and plots targeted either those considered by the far right to be ‘traitors’ (i.e. politicians with pro-immigration views) or ‘foreigners’ (i.e. asylum-seekers and religious minorities). This is in line with research suggesting that, in Northern Europe, right-wing terrorism and violence since the early 1990s have been largely related to rates of, and political responses to, immigration.  

Two of the most noteworthy events were the Halle terrorist attack and the murder of Walter Lübke, both of which are treated more in detail under selected topics below. Besides Lübke, two other politicians were severely attacked or plotted against in Germany in 2019. In July, a bomb was detonated outside the house of Ramona Gehring, a left-wing politician who had received threats from the extreme right in Zittau prior to the incident. She was unharmed. The second event was a large-scale plot targeting politicians who had been involved in accepting refugees into the country back in 2015. Around 30 plotters associated with the Nazi/prepper-group Nordkreuz were arrested for planning this attack. The members, among them several with close ties to the police and the military, had collected the names and addresses of 25 000
local politicians from police computers. During the raid, the German police found unspecified weapons stores, 2000 body bags and quicklime, an agent for speeding up the decomposition of bodies.

In addition to 28 attacks and one major attack plot, five of the 13 preparations for armed struggle incidents from 2019 occurred in Germany. One of these events was a direct consequence of the murder of Walter Lübke, following which the German police cracked down on the extreme right, resulting in a number of arrests of individuals for illegal possession of weapons. Furthermore, a formerly unknown group called the National Socialist Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Germany was uncovered in 2019, leading to the arrest of its 12 members. The group had been operational since the summer of 2016, and the police confiscated a total of 100 weapons.

It is important to note that the high numbers of RTV incidents in Germany is not unique to 2019, and the numbers reflect the size of Germany’s organized extreme-right scene compared to those of other Western European countries. Thus, one should refrain from using the German case to generalize about trends in right-wing extremism in Western Europe, due to Germany’s particular history and political landscape.

Spain

In 2019, a considerable proportion of RTV events in Spain could be ascribed to the conflict in Catalonia. While a majority of targets in Spain have traditionally been anti-fascist activists and immigrants, six of the 16 registered (non-fatal) events for 2019 targeted separatists. The conflict in Catalonia escalated with frequent clashes between separatists and anti-separatists, following the referendum on independence from Spain in October 2017. This separatist conflict follows a traditional left–right conflict, with a number of separatists also involved in left-wing or anti-fascist activism. In addition, a number of far-right activists in Spain identify as anti-separatists and engage in their activities. Consequently, all but one of the RTV separatist victims are also registered as left-wing or anti-fascist activists as a secondary target group in the RTV dataset.

Two of the separatist-related events occurred during demonstrations. In the first, a woman was seriously injured after being hit by a flare while standing on her balcony with the Catalonian flag. In the second, a pro-independence demonstrator was brutally attacked by 12 people from ultra-right groups during a protest. The remaining four events occurred in situations unrelated to protests. One perpetrator attempted to stab activists at a pro-independence and leftist house, while another man was seriously beaten up by two right-wingers while hanging up electoral posters for Front Rebublicà. The perpetrators shouted “Viva España” and gave the Nazi salute
after the attack. In a similar attack, about eight right-wingers attacked and beat up a victim they recognized as a member of the left-wing separatist party Causa Galia. Finally, two young people were injured after being attacked by 20 hooded right-wing activists during the celebrations for the three-year anniversary of the pro-independence and left-wing organization Assaciació de Joves de Sant Celoni.

**Greece**

Greece has historically been a country with high levels of RTV activity. In 2019, three trends were particularly noteworthy: escalating violence relating to the conflict over the naming of the Republic of Northern Macedonia; the ongoing refugee crisis; and continuous violent activity by extreme-right militant groups.

In January 2019, large-scale protests erupted after the naming of what is today known as the Republic of Northern Macedonia. Mass violence took place during some of these protests, culminating in three journalists being seriously wounded by Golden Dawn affiliates when they were covering one of the rallies. In addition, four policemen and one civilian protester were injured when 50–60 people from the far-right group *Ptolemy's of Macedonia* attacked a graduation ceremony, in which the Syriza cabinet minister Olga Geravosili was participating. She was targeted, due to Syriza’s involvement in the naming treaty between Greece and North Macedonia.

Second, the ongoing refugee crisis continued to spark violent reactions from the Greek extreme right. Seven of the ten events registered for Greece in 2019 targeted refugees and migrants. This is particularly striking on the islands close to the Turkish border. In one event, a mob of several dozen people attacked a refugee facility, kicking inhabitants, among them children, in the head and beating them with a fire extinguisher. There are few reports of the incidents on the islands, and there may be more events than the ones discovered by the RTV team in cooperation with Greek country experts.

Third, organized groups continued to be involved in severe violent attacks in Greece. In 2019, we registered four attacks committed by organized groups and their affiliates, of which three can be ascribed to Golden Dawn. However, the general activity by Golden Dawn has been low compared with previous years. This seems to be partly due to the ongoing trial that may lead to the banning of the organization, and the election in July 2019, which resulted in them not getting enough votes to remain in parliament. Furthermore, the Greek police ramped up arrests of activists from extreme-right militant organizations such as AME-Combat18, Apella and
Krypteria in 2018 and 2019, which has reduced the attraction of organizing violent acts clandestinely. From 2016 to 2018, these three groups were behind nine of the 25 registered RTV events in Greece.

**Selected topics**

*Online-inspired terrorism*

A few events from 2019, including two of the fatal attacks, form part of an emergent trend that cannot be understood without looking outside Western Europe. On 15 March 2019, the Australian extreme-right terrorist Brenton Tarrant killed 51 Muslims in two separate shooting attacks against mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. In his manifesto, Tarrant claimed to have been inspired by Anders Behring Breivik, who carried out a massive car bomb attack and a mass shooting in Norway in 2011, killing 77. Tarrant put out a manifesto entitled “The Great Replacement” and streamed his attack on Facebook. While Tarrant was not the first terrorist to emulate Breivik’s mass shootings, he was far more successful in inspiring others. During the remaining months of 2019, four attacks with the intention of causing mass murder were carried out, all clearly echoing the Christchurch shooter and the online chan-subculture to which Tarrant tailored his manifesto. This digital eco-system thus seems to have fuelled a momentum that has lowered ‘thresholds’ to violence for those engaged in this space.19

On 27 April, there was a shooting attack in a synagogue in Poway, California, which killed one person and wounded three before the perpetrator’s gun jammed. In his manifesto published on 8chan, the perpetrator said that he had been inspired by Tarrant. A few months prior to the attack, he also attempted to set fire to a mosque and left graffiti on the wall referring to the Christchurch attacks. On 3 August, a second attack inspired by Tarrant occurred in a shopping mall in El Paso, Texas, killing 22 and wounding 24. Seven days later, on 10 August, a young man tried to kill worshippers at a mosque in Bærum, Norway, but was subdued by two elderly Muslims. Before the attack, he had shot to death his stepsister, adopted from China. He published self-portraits and a meme online before the attack, portraying himself as “Saint Tarrant’s third disciple”. Then, on 9 October 2019, an attacker failed to shoot his way through the door of a synagogue in Halle, Germany, and instead killed a random woman in the street and a person in a kebab restaurant, as well as injuring two persons. He used self-made 3-D-printed weapons, streamed his attack, and produced a three-part manifesto with instructions on how to build self-made weapons. In addition to these attacks, at least one plot inspired by Christchurch was intercepted by the police in the UK.
As illustrated by Figure 3, these types of (intended) mass-casualty attacks have been rare in Western Europe. As such, they may represent a new trend if they continue to be carried out in the near future. Notably, the perpetrators from Christchurch, Poway, El Paso and Bærum all pre-announced their attacks on 8chan or related forums. Some also uploaded their manifestos in these forums and even provided links to live streams of the attacks so that fellow forum users could watch the atrocities live as they unfolded (the Poway and Bærum attackers tried this but failed due to technical difficulties). In fact, what was unique about Tarrant’s attack—at least insofar as extreme-right terrorism is concerned—is that he live streamed his atrocity on Facebook and, in doing so, highlighted the Achilles heel of such platforms when faced with the viral dissemination of extremely violent content.

By pre-announcing their attacks, uploading manifestos and live streaming the atrocities, the perpetrators, who all seem to have accepted the possibility of dying during the attack, appear to be at least partially motivated by a desire to excite and gain recognition from fellow forum users and gain martyr status for their common cause. However, while many users celebrate the acts of some of these attackers and rank them according to how many people they managed to kill, many also claim to do so in a deeply ironic fashion, meaning that they do not truly support their cause or actions. Thus, in doing so, they take part in a dark and morbid subcultural practice that has become a trademark for these forums, leading vulnerable people to commit atrocities for the ‘lulz’ of others (i.e. fun, laughter, or amusement, especially that derived at another’s expense).

**Attacks against politicians**

The murder of Walter Lübke in June 2019 suggests that we should take a closer look at violent attacks and plots against politicians by the extreme right. Politicians are regularly targeted because they serve as primary representatives of ‘the Government’—one of the main target groups of the far right.

In far right ideology, the Government is typically associated with conspiracy theories about ‘the System’, understood as secret but well-organized lies and conspiracies meant to ensure those in power stay in power. A related conspiracy theory—often called ‘The Great Replacement’—concerns how Western governments deliberately facilitate large-scale immigration from non-Western races or cultures in order to weaken the racial or cultural cohesion of the people and to get cheap labour, thereby strengthening the government’s position vis-à-vis the people. According variations of these theories, Western governments are also—knowingly or
unknowingly – serving the interests of the Jews or Islam, facilitating malicious strategies for achieving world dominance. Such anti-government ideas and conspiracy theories have perhaps been most pronounced in the US, but they certainly exist in Western Europe as well. But to what extent have such conspiracy theories been associated with severe violent attacks against West European politicians?

According to the RTV dataset, there have been three fatal events and 25 non-fatal but severe attacks or disrupted plots by far-right perpetrators against politicians in Western Europe between 1990 and 2019. While the list of fatal attacks can be assumed to be exhaustive, there are reasons to believe that the list of non-fatal events is not, and that the further we go back in time, the more likely it is that relevant events have not been registered due to missing data.

The three fatal events are the shooting of Walter Lübke in 2019, the killing of Jo Cox in the UK in 2016, and the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011. Notably, all three events occurred during the 2010s, and, in all cases, the perpetrators seemed to accuse these politicians of having allowed for mass-immigration of people of different races or cultures.

Lübke, who had served as district president of the German Kassel region since 2009, representing the mainstream right CDU, was shot and killed in his house. He had received numerous death threats after he made strong public statements in support of receiving refugees during the refugee crisis in 2015. The suspected perpetrator, who first confessed he had committed the murder and later retracted the confession, has a long history within the extreme right in Germany, with ties to Combat 18 and the extreme-right NPD. He had previously been convicted for knife and bomb attacks against targets connected to ethnic minorities in Germany and had made threatening statements against politicians on social media.

In 2016, the British Labour Party Member of Parliament Jo Cox was shot and stabbed in the street by a 52-year-old man inspired by extreme right views and yelling “Britain First” while carrying out the attacks. The perpetrator would later describe himself as a ‘political activist’ and explain that he targeted Cox because he considered her a defender of the European Union and immigration, and a “traitor to the white people”. When appearing before the court in London two days after the attack, he shouted “Death to traitors, freedom for Britain!”

The second most deadly terrorist attack from the extreme right in Europe post-World War II (WWII) is the 22 July 2011 bombing of the government building in Oslo and subsequent mass-shooting at the Labour Party youth wing camp at the Utøya island, killing a total of 77 people and injuring many more. The perpetrator considered members of the Labour Party and their
youth wing as legitimate targets, because they had facilitated large-scale Muslim immigration to Norway during their many years in government. Notably, the exact date of the attack was decided by a visit to Utøya by Gro Harlem Brundtland, a highly regarded former prime minister for the Labour Party, whom the perpetrator planned to behead while videoing the event, having been inspired by watching Al-Qaida videos.

Besides these fatal attacks, a further 25 non-fatal but severe attacks are registered in the RTV dataset. Germany stands out as the country with the highest number of events, followed by France. Other countries on the list include Sweden, Italy, Finland and Spain.

In Germany, there was a near-fatal stabbing of Henriette Reker in 2015, one day before her election to become Cologne's mayor. The perpetrator had xenophobic views and attacked the politician (independent) due to her pro-refugee policies. In 2017, the mayor of the German city of Altena Andreas Hollstein (CDU) was also stabbed due to his refugee-friendly policies. Several other mayors and politicians at local and state levels have also been attacked, or targeted in disrupted plots, by lone actors or more organized groups, in some cases with the rather ambitious aim of overthrowing the entire political ‘System’. The Nordkreuz plot against politicians is described in the country report on Germany above.

France has had a long history of plots to assassinate presidents (and, before that, kings). At least twice, extreme-right activists have been arrested for plotting to assassinate President Emmanuel Macron: in 2017 a lone actor inspired by the 22 July attacks, and in 2018 a small autonomous cell. There was also an attempt to shoot President Jacques Chirac during a Bastille Day parade in 2002, but the assassin missed his target and was then overwhelmed by bystanders. He had been involved with a range of extreme-right groups.

Finally, low-scale violence, vandalism, threats and harassment against national and local politicians appear common in most countries. Only a small fraction of these incidents reach the severity-threshold for being included in the RTV dataset. Surveys of parliamentarians and cabinet ministers in Norway show that most top politicians have experienced harassment and threats, and 40 percent have experienced serious threats such as direct assaults, death threats to themselves or their families or vandalism of property. Similar patterns have been found in Great Britain and among local politicians in Sweden. It is difficult to assess the motive behind the harassments and threats, but explicit far-right motives seem present in only a minority of the cases. According to the self-reported accounts of Norwegian politicians in 2017, there was a racist or extreme-right motive in eight and six percent, respectively, of the cases they had experienced.
An alarming finding is that such threats and harassment have severe impacts on the democratic process. In Norway, around 10 percent of top politicians considered quitting politics or abstaining from engaging publicly on controversial issues due to fear of threats and harassment. However, it should be kept in mind that violence and harassment against politicians by far-right actors are just one part of a broader problem. Research from several countries documents that such behaviour is motivated by a broad range of issues, and politicians from the entire political spectrum receive threats – with far-right politicians being among the most targeted.

**Conclusion**

To sum up the year 2019, we may conclude that right-wing terrorism and violence still constitute significant problems in Western Europe. However, despite widespread concern about a growing terrorist threat from the extreme right globally, 2019 was not a very violent year in Western Europe in terms of fatal attacks, nor particularly deadly in terms of fatalities. Moreover, the nature of right-wing violence, including frequency, perpetrator types and target selection, suggest that the *national*, and sometimes *local*, political context still plays an important role. That said, two of the four fatal attacks from 2019 were indeed (failed) mass-casualty attacks inspired by *global* trends. While such mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by extreme-right actors have been very rare in Western Europe since 1980, it may signal an emergent trend if such attacks continue to be carried out in the near future. Considering that both perpetrators were highly influenced by online subcultures, there is a need to pay particular attention to risk factors associated with vulnerable individuals’ interaction with extremist ideologies found on websites and social media.

A second trend that has been unfolding while this report has been drafted is the far right’s reaction to the coronavirus crisis, which currently poses a much more imminent threat to Western societies than right-wing terrorism does. However, the revolutionary wing of the far right is already trying to exploit this crisis by spreading disinformation and ‘fake news’ to feed existing and emerging far-right conspiracy theories and thereby to ‘accelerate’ polarization and ultimately a break-down of the current ‘System’.

Whether or not terrorism and violence will be used as means to this end, however, remains an open question. Lower-scale violence targeting people of Asian descent because of their alleged responsibility for spreading the coronavirus has already been observed in several countries in Western Europe (e.g., France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and the UK) and beyond (e.g., the US, Australia and Canada). While today’s revolutionary right lacks the resources, organization and capabilities to mount a systematic campaign of terrorism and violence, large-scale attacks by lone actors or small
autonomous cells influenced by conspiracies relating to the corona crisis cannot be ruled out. Therefore, there is a need to monitor these conspiracies as they unfold in order to better predict and protect likely targets of such attacks.

C-REX will continue to collect data systematically in order to document and monitor the development of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe. Should you have any information of relevance about past or present events, please contact the RTV team using this online form.
Endnotes

5 For a more detailed introduction to the RTV dataset, see Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset”, Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 3 (2016).
6 Unlike most other terrorism datasets, the RTV dataset also codes retrospectively, including information about previously unknown events, editing errors in already included events and eliminating events that should not have been included in the light of new information, thereby always aiming towards better representativity.
10 There have been several mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by extreme-right activists outside the 1990–2019 period, including the Vitré-Le-Francçois train bombing in 1961 with 28 fatalities; the Piazza Fontana bombing in 1969 with 17 fatalities; the Italicus express-train bombing in 1974 with 12 fatalities; the Bologna train station bombing in 1980 with 85 fatalities; and the Oktoberfest bombing in 1980 with 12 fatalities.
14 A high number of unknown perpetrators may also result from a somewhat stricter coding practice for the 2019 update, which required stronger evidence to apply other perpetrator labels, in particular the “unorganized” label.
15 It should be noted that the dataset may be underrepresented in the case of groups producing solo terrorist attacks, as the “unorganized” label may be applied in such cases. References to the motive(s) of the perpetrator may be lacking in these instances. In 2019, there were ca. 15 cases, mostly from the UK, which were not included, primarily due to lack of information about the motive.
17 German right-wing extremists are not allowed to possess weapons, including hunting weapons.
20 Graham Macklin, “The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age”, CTC Sentinel, 12, no. 6 (2019).
21 The deadliest attack was the Bologna train station bombing in 1980 with 85 fatalities. The third most deadly attack was the Vitré-Le-François train bombing in 1961 with 28 fatalities. The 22 July and the Bologna attacks represent extreme outliers for the entire post-WWII period in terms of casualty rates.