Alexander Katsaitis

Following the Money: Exploring Business Financial Contributions to the European Union's Political Parties. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2020, Early View).

Deliberative layering: Explaining diverse interest mobilization across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle (with Wilhelm Lehmann & David Coen). Journal of Public Affairs (2020, Early View).

Legislative Efficiency & Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament (with David Coen). Journal of Legislative Studies 25 (2): 278-294.

Between cheap talk and epistocracy: The logic of interest group access in the European Parliament's committee hearings (with David Coen). Public Administration 97 (4): 754-769.

Parliamentary procedures & interest group mobilization: evidence from the European Parliament's committees (with David Coen). European University Institute Working Papers, 2017/ 16. 

EU Democratic Deficit(s) and Legitimacy; System vs. Sub-System Level”. In K. Demetriou (ed.) The European Union in Crisis: Explorations in Representation and Democratic Legitimacy. Springer Verlag (2015).

Institutional and Constitutional Aspects of Special Interest Representation (with David Coen). For European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Study (2015).

Chameleon Pluralism in the EU: an empirical study of the European Commission interest group density and diversity across policy domains (with David Coen). In Journal of European Public Policy, 20 (8): 1104-1119.

• Coen, David; Lehmann, Wilhelm & Katsaitis, Alexander (2020). Deliberative layering: Explaining diverse interest mobilization across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle. Journal of Public Affairs.  ISSN 1472-3891. . doi: 10.1002/pa.2139 Vis sammendrag

  Drawing from work on deliberation and information‐access, this paper conceptually frames why and when different types of interests mobilize across the parliamentary policy cycle. We posit that each policy stage holds its own deliberative purpose and logic, leading to a variation in the type and volume of information demanded. The legitimacy of the expertise interest groups provide is affected by their organizational characteristics. To ensure the smooth flow of the policy process, members of parliament encourage groups that legitimately hold relevant information to mobilize at each policy stage, while lobbyists choose to mobilize when their expertise allows them to better influence policy‐makers' debates. We test our argument in the context of the European Parliament, following a unique survey of the 8th legislature (2014–2019). The responses lend support to our model. In a policy process that contains various stages of deliberation, different organizations hold an information‐expertise key that gives them access at different stages. Significantly, less studied groups, such as think tanks and consultancies, mobilize well ahead of others in the cycle's initial phases; while lobbyists representing public constituencies dominate in the final stages. The paper contributes to broader theoretical discussions on pluralism, bias, and deliberation in policy‐making.

• Eriksen, Andreas & Katsaitis, Alexander (2020). Accountability through mutual attunement: How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected?. Public Policy and Administration.  ISSN 0952-0767. . doi: 10.1177/0952076720977606 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  The increased authority delegated to independent agencies raises questions about the conditions of politically accountable governance, and specifically parliament’s role as a representative institution. Focusing on committee hearings as an accountability mechanism, we ask: How can a parliament employ hearings to ensure that the ends pursued by agencies have a democratic foundation? We propose a model of “mutual attunement” where accountability relations presuppose a process of working-out shared understandings of the ends, means and circumstances of policy needs. We test our argument through a case study assessing the interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on agency accountability and European governance, while providing a novel conceptual model and the first analysis of its kind.

• Katsaitis, Alexander (2020). Following the Money: Exploring Business Financial Contributions to the European Union’s Political Parties. Journal of Common Market Studies.  ISSN 0021-9886.  58(5), s 1342- 1351 . doi: 10.1111/jcms.13032 Vis sammendrag

  Do business groups donate to the European Union's (EU) political parties? Does the party's ideology influence the donations it receives? Since 2008, the EU's political parties can receive financial contributions from private actors. This paper systematically maps and analyses the entire population of donations given to EU political parties from 2008 to 2015. The results show that business interests follow a selective strategy targeting with their donations right‐wing parties; with Eurosceptic parties performing better than pro‐integration parties. Conceptually, this study provides a hard resource for conceptualizing EU lobbying beyond information‐access models, and potentially opens a path for comparatives with the US literature. Furthermore, it reveals that some parties have moved away from the public utility paradigm, raising question over donations impact on EU politics and policy‐making. Empirically, it provides a unique image of interest group donations to EU parties over time.

• Coen, David & Katsaitis, Alexander (2019). Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies.  ISSN 1357-2334.  25(2), s 278- 294 . doi: 10.1080/13572334.2019.1603251 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Katsaitis, Alexander & Coen, David (2018). Between cheap talk and epistocracy: The logic of interest group access in the European Parliament's committee hearings. Public Administration.  ISSN 0033-3298. . doi: 10.1111/padm.12406 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Improving policy deliberation is a central objective for theEuropean Union's institutions. Focusing on the European Parlia-ment's committee hearings as an understudied area of Europeangovernance, we aim to understand their role, and their capacity toimprove its procedural legitimacy. Building on theoretical work oninterest group access and deliberation we argue that hearings canserve three purposes: (i) coordinative; (ii) epistemic; (iii) enhancingpublic participation. We construct a set of measures and assess anentire population of participants in hearings (2009–14), concentrat-ing on three committees. Our analyses show that hearings serve ahybrid purpose between coordinative and epistemic. At the topend, we observe a core group of gatekeepers representing thedominant constituencies. Simultaneously, research organizationsare granted unique access as experts that de-politicize debates.Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on interest group accesswhile providing an innovative set of tools for its measurement, andthe first dataset of its kind.

Se alle arbeider i Cristin

• Eriksen, Andreas & Katsaitis, Alexander (2019). Accountability through Mutual Attunement.
• Eriksen, Andreas & Katsaitis, Alexander (2019). Accountability through Mutual Attunement: Parliamentary Hearings & Agency Oversight in the European Union.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (2019). Economic Governance & Parliamentary Hearings in the EU: Building Political Legitimacy in the Committee of Economic & Monetary Affairs.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (2019). Following the Money: Exploring Business Financial Contributions to the European Union’s Political Parties.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (2019, 31. mai). Hvordan fungerer EU-parlamentet, og hva har forandret seg etter valget. [Radio].  Radio Nova.
• Katsaitis, Alexander & Eriksen, Andreas (2019). Accountability and the Forging of Agency Ends: The European Security and Markets Authority in the European Parliament’s Committee Hearings.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (2018). Assessing Interest Groups’ Financial Donations to the European Union’s Political Parties & Foundations.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (ed.) (2018). The European Union – between Scylla and Charybdis? Conference Report.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (2017). Legitimizing the European Union’s Economic Governance Through Political Accountability? The European Parliament & Post-Crisis Deliberative Democracy.
• Katsaitis, Alexander (2017). Politicization across the European Parliament’s Policy Domains.
• Katsaitis, Alexander & Coen, David (2017). Parliamentary procedures & interest group mobilization: evidence from the European Parliament's committees. European University Institute Working Papers. 2017/16.
• Katsaitis, Alexander & Coen, David (2017). The Inner Circle? Interest Groups & Committee Hearings in the European Parliament.
• Katsaitis, Alexander; Coen, David & Lehmann, Wilhelm (2017). How the Policy Conveyor Belt Impacts Interest Group Access; Diverse Lobbying Across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle.

Se alle arbeider i Cristin