

Under what conditions does Euroscepticism flourish? An evaluation of different approaches and empirical findings

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Today, I will present to you a lecture on the topic of Euroscepticism. To be more precise, it concerns the conditions under which Euroscepticism flourishes. My aim is to provide you with an overview of different scientific approaches to the topic of Euroscepticism. Each of these different approaches draws our attention to different causes of Euroscepticism. Also, I will argue that alternative causes are hotly debated within several of the four approaches, whereas the debate on causes does not go much across the boundaries of the four approaches. The biggest challenge today, however, lies in the conditions of Euroscepticism, rather than its causes. It is here, that my lecture will become more speculative and hopefully also most stimulating.

OVERVIEW

If we are to say anything about conditions of Euroscepticism, we first need to be clear on the definition of the concept. The lecture therefore starts out with a discussion on definitions of Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism remains an illusive concept, I will argue, not only because the four different approaches to Euroscepticism do not engage sufficiently in debate with each other, but also because Euroscepticism is not just a term used by us political scientists, it is also used in politics itself, often in a way to delegitimize others. As I will point out, this has led to the creation of a number of alternative terms.

After providing an initial overview of what Euroscepticism is, I will outline the four different scientific approaches to this topic, as I see them. Each of them studies a different 'place' of Euroscepticism and, as a result of this, also come with different causes. We find clear debate within at least three out of four approaches on what the causes of Euroscepticism are. As a result of lack of agreement within each group and

lack of discussion among groups, we are still quite far from a scholarly consensus on how Euroscepticism can be explained. This makes the identification of conditions all the more difficult.

For the sake of argument, I'm not going into a detailed philosophy of science debate about the difference between causes and conditions or the applicability of these terms in specific cases. After all, the main aim of today's lecture is not a philosophical one, but to give you some further understanding of the empirical phenomenon of Euroscepticism. Suffice it to say here, I will understand a cause as something that precedes and brings about Euroscepticism. A condition, in contrast, is a situation that must be in place for this causal relationship to function. Put as a simple formula 'A leads to B, but only when C'. In the explanation of Euroscepticism (B), A is a cause where C is a condition. Interestingly, the academic literature on Euroscepticism has spent much more time debating causes of Euroscepticism, than it has to debating conditions. As a result, my discussion of conditions is also much more tentative than my discussion of causes. It should be seen as a starting point for thought and further discussion.

Having provided you with my personal answer on what the conditions are under which Euroscepticism flourishes, I will end this lecture with a personal critical reflection on where I think further challenges are in the study of Euroscepticism. For those interested, I will finally make a few suggestions for further reading.

WHAT IS EUROSCEPTICISM?

What is Euroscepticism? Before providing an answer to this question, I will first confuse you a bit. You may have a clear initial idea of what Euroscepticism is now, but hopefully, after my brief exercise in confusion, your interpretation of the term is less clear, but also richer. First, let's consider some alternative labels. Eurocriticism, Europhobia, Eurorealism and Anti-Europeanism. The term 'Eurocriticism' can be seen as relatively specified. The Eurocritic sees merits in Europe and European integration, she just doesn't like all of it. In the usage of the term, a certain knowledge is implied. The Eurocritic knows what she is talking about, and makes an informed distinction between what she does like and what she does not like. This is even more the case for a Eurorealist. This person, in contrast to a Eurofantasist, sees Europe for what it 'really' is. This stands in sharp contrast to the Europhobe. As implied in the term phobia, The Europhobe has some irrational fear about Europe. Finally, I would ask you to consider the term Anti-Europeanism. An Anti-Europeanist is more radical than the Eurocritic. This person doesn't like anything about Europe. All these four terms are actively used in both political debates and in scientific studies.

There is a political struggle over the use of these terms. Say you oppose Europe in some matter or form. Then it is much more attractive to call yourself a Eurorealist than a Europhobe, as than at least, you imply that you know what you are talking about and that those who disagree with you live in a fantasy world. If, on the other hand, you like Europe, it is much more attractive to label those who disagree with you as Europhobes. Somewhere in the middle of all this lies Euroscepticism. All this goes to show that the term Euroscepticism itself is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because the exact extent or degree of opposition to Europe is unknown, and it is ambiguous to what extent the implied opposition to Europe is based on knowledge or rather on irrational fear. This is not just a scientific debate, but also a political debate about what it means to be Eurosceptic and the term is often used in a pejorative manner by non-Eurosceptics to discredit others.

FAMOUS EUROSCEPTICS

It might be easier to say who the Eurosceptics are. Let's consider these four individuals. Most observers would have little difficulty identifying them as Eurosceptics. Geert Wilders here on the top left fiercely opposes Turkish EU membership. So does Jean-Marie Le Pen, on the top right. But then again, so does Angela Merkel and we wouldn't say she is a Eurosceptic. It gets more confusing. Whereas Wilders wants to weaken the EU, that might not be the case for Le Pen, who – at least when it comes to stopping immigration – wants a stronger EU. Václav Klaus, here on the bottom left is also considered a Eurosceptic though, to be precise, he is best known for his opposition to the Lisbon Treaty, rather than to the EU as a whole. Finally, on the bottom right, we find Margaret Thatcher, famous for exclaiming that European integration is 'socialism through the back door'. Yet, unlike the two men on top, she would very likely support Turkish Membership of the EU if she were British Prime Minister today. Interestingly, none of these four 'Eurosceptics' actually oppose the EU in its entirety or even their own nation's membership thereof.

CAMPAIGNS IN BRITISH TABLOIDS

But Euroscepticism is not a monopoly of politicians. British tabloids are well-known for their anti-Europe campaigning. Here, you see on the left a picture of The Sun criticizing steps towards monetary union in 1990. 'Up yours Delors'. At the time, Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission. On the right you see the reaction of the Daily Express to the creation of Europol, Europe's agency of police cooperation. 'New EU Gestapo to spy on Britons'.

Yet, again, like the four politicians before, there are ambiguities. Although it is clear that these two Tabloids oppose something about European integration, it remains unclear just how deep and far reaching this opposition is. It would help us scientific observers a lot, if Eurosceptics would say more clearly what it is they DO want, rather than what it is they do NOT want. But it is in the nature of politics that mobilization against is easier than mobilization in favour. This latter characteristic we also find in the pro-Europeans, or let's just call them anti-Eurosceptics. Rather than presenting arguments in favour of Europe or European integration, we find arguments against opposition to Europe, like in the following examples.

PARODIES OF EUROSCEPTICISM

Eurosceptics are regularly discarded as being irrational, narrow-minded and as playing up unjustified fears. 'Men Kissing?', 'Your Childrens' Sand Castles Aren't Safe'. These are parodies on a campaign by COIR, an Irish organization that actively campaigned against the Lisbon Treaty during the Irish referendum.

WHAT IS EUROSCEPTICISM?

After this exercise in confusion, what can we say about Euroscepticism? First, we might say that there does not seem to be an overarching ideology or much '-ism' in Euroscepticism. We find Eurosceptics in different political backgrounds. Rather, it is used as a rather vague term regarding the ideas and opinions of 'Eurosceptics'.

Secondly, we may note a particularly pejorative tone. Euroscepticism has been used by non-Eurosceptics to denounce those with some form of opposition to Europe. This has furthermore fed alternative concepts of which I have only briefly discussed a few.

Still, we may conclude that Euroscepticism is some form of opposition to the principle of European integration and/or its current institutional form in the European Union and/or future plans for further integration. Either as a whole, or targeting specific aspects thereof.

Clearly, this discussion on Euroscepticism has opened up the question of what degree of opposition is involved in Euroscepticism, what the specific targets of opposition are and on which ideas and information such opposition is founded.

CONFUSING AND CONTESTED

All in all, we may conclude that we are dealing here with a fuzzy and laden concept. In Euroscepticism, initial looks may be deceiving. Like this picture here, were one of the best known Eurosceptics – Margaret Thatcher – is wearing a sweater with all the flags of the European Community countries.

FOUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES: Citizens' Attitudes

Despite remaining ambiguity concerning the concept of Euroscepticism itself, there is a large existing body of scientific studies aimed at mapping and explaining Euroscepticism. As already mentioned in the introduction, these can broadly be characterized into four different approaches: those understanding Euroscepticism as citizens' attitudes, those studying positions of political parties, those studying Euroscepticism as an aspect of political discourse and those locating Euroscepticism in the EU itself.

The first and arguably most prominent and influential approach is that of understanding Euroscepticism as citizens' attitudes. Throughout the post-war history of European integration, there have been opinion polls to ask what citizens think of it.

This has been particularly institutionalized in Eurobarometer research. These surveys are held biannually in all EU member states. Questions asked that are of particular interest to Euroscepticism include: Do you think membership of your country of the EU is a good thing? And do you think your country has benefited from EU membership? This dataset is highly attractive due to its comparative data across time and countries.

But there are also more qualitative approaches mapping citizens' attitudes through focus groups. Haesly (2001), for example unpacked the United Kingdom as one of the most 'Eurosceptic countries' and found out through detailed interviews that Scotsmen and Welshmen are considerably less Eurosceptic than Englishmen since they less often have exclusive national identity perceptions. They consider themselves Scottish, British and European, for example.

As makes sense when understanding Euroscepticism as a characteristic of citizens' attitudes, causes are sought also in individual characteristics. For example, the extent to which factors as age, gender, education, occupation and individual identity perceptions influence the extent to which people have Eurosceptic attitudes has been extensively researched.

FOUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES: Political Party Positions

The second approach looks at the positions of political parties, instead. Here, efforts have been made to map the positions of many different national political parties in EU member states as well as the party federations in the European Parliament.

Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a; 2008b) have made an important contribution in classifying political parties opposing Europe into soft Eurosceptics and hard Eurosceptics. Here, soft Euroscepticism refers to parties criticizing some particular aspects of the EU or specific EU policies without challenging the EU as such or membership thereof. In contrast, hard Eurosceptic parties are fundamentally opposed to the existence of the EU and/or membership thereof.

Students of party positions on Europe have made extensive use of expert surveys and party manifesto analysis. In the first case, experts – often us political scientists – are asked to locate parties on a scale from pro-European to anti-European. Party manifesto analysis focuses on the content of manifestos and statements about European integration therein.

Finally, this approach draws attention to intra-party dissent. Many of Europe's larger mainstream parties have factions within them that disagree on issues related to European integration. This, for example, is the case for both the British Labour and Conservative parties.

FOUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES: Discourse

The third approach focuses on discourse. That is, how is European integration debated in public? Such studies incorporate speeches by politicians, media reporting and even more symbolic and less political portrayals of Europe, such as in literary novels, school books and art.

Key in this line of research is the identification of national narratives about European integration. How the nation state relates to Europe differs from country to country, depending on dominant stories about national history and the country's relationship to Europe. One of the most famous studies here to date is that of Diez Medrano (2003): *Framing Europe*. He studied national narratives about European integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. In Germany, Diez Medrano argues, a frame of European integration as redemption for the horrors of World War II is strong. Being part of Europe is seen as a definitive break with the 'Alleingang' of the past. A way to not only redeem Germany in the eyes of other Europeans, but also to

find a new legitimate own identity in contrast to the militarist past. Spain's perception of European integration, is heavily associated with the authoritarian past of Franco. European integration in Spanish discourse is a way towards democracy and economic modernization. In the UK, like in Germany, the memory of World War II is vivid, but this time in negative terms. European integration and the EU are often portrayed as a threat to UK independence, just like Nazi Germany was in WWII. War language is regularly invoked in the UK around European summits, for example, where British Prime Ministers continue to be likened to Churchill or Chamberlain depending on how well they are perceived to defend British interests. Words like 'invasion' are used when discussing new EU legislation. Yet, at the same time, EU membership is supported as a means to open markets for British exports. Especially since the 1960s, when economic growth in Germany and France outpaced that of Britain, this discourse entered into British public debates.

Euroscepticism, from the discourse perspective, may be a function of how well national myths fit with the reality of European integration. Euroscepticism may flourish in countries that pride themselves on military neutrality – Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Austria – when the EU starts to develop a common defence polity. A more powerful EU may be welcomed in countries where dominant discourse portrays European integration as strengthening the nation state – such as Germany and Spain - while at the same time being rejected in countries where discourse portrays European integration as a threat to the nation state, such as in the UK.

There are also justifications of European integration common throughout Europe. 'Peace' has long been a powerful justification for European integration. Reconciliation between France and Germany has been a key driving force behind integration from the beginning. Yet, as the threat of war recedes and a younger generation without first hand experience in the war comes to power, such a justification loses force. The same may be said for 'Economic prosperity' when other regions in the world clearly outpace Europe in terms of economic growth.

FOUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES: EU Political System

Finally, the fourth approach may actually be the most logical or intuitive one. It is certainly the one used by most 'real Eurosceptics' out there. It locates Euroscepticism in inherent flaws in the EU polity itself.

A powerful scientific strand here argues the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. Too many of the important decisions are taken by non-elected officials. Elected officials, such as Members of the European Parliament have insufficient powers. As a result, European citizens do not have the power to hold the European political elite

to account and they lack the possibility to 'throw the rascals out'. The EU thereby doesn't meet a key part of modern European understanding of democracy. Peter Mair (2007) argues that political opposition shifts from targeting individual elected politicians to the system as a whole when citizens feel they cannot influence decision-making through elections. Euroscepticism is then a form of polity opposition generated by a lack of democracy.

More 'political' and less 'scientific' arguments concerning flaws in the EU system are clearly present too. Just to mention briefly, the EU has been criticized by the political left for being neoliberal. Its focus on the market and competition is argued to hurt national welfare states and profit big capital and the well-off only. On the other hand, right wing politicians such as Thatcher have argued the EU equals socialism through the backdoor! Here the EU is accused of imposing all kinds of market regulations and corrections, including by now a substantial social policy that hinders economic growth. Liberals particularly take issue with the Common Agricultural Policy which is seen as distorting markets and fostering corruption. Partially in line with this is the political accusation that the EU is too bureaucratic. Infamous examples of EU regulations on how bended cucumbers are allowed to be stimulate this perception. In more than one of the new Member States, finally, the likening of the EU to former forms of authoritarian oppression are invoked. We haven't won back our independence from the Soviets, only to give it back straight away to Brussels - the argument goes. There are clearly concerns here with the extent to which EU policy is not neutral from a left-right point of view as well as with the distribution of power between the supranational institutions and national governments.

CAUSES: Citizens' Attitudes

Having discussed each of the four different approaches to Euroscepticism, I would like to point out debates on causes. As mentioned earlier, discussions on what causes Euroscepticism predominantly take place within each of the four approaches, rather than across them. There are, however exceptions.

In the analysis of citizens' attitudes, initial attention was drawn to information and education. Early theorists of European integration and pollsters identified cognitive factors as important. Citizens who were better educated and more knowledgeable about the EU tended to be more in favour of integration. What you know is what you love. Such findings have stimulated a strong push by the European Commission to engage in public communication and build educational programs in an effort to educate citizens.

Alternative and more recent explanations of citizen Euroscepticism draw attention to economic benefits. European integration has disproportionately benefited the economically flexible, the argument goes. Through opening up markets, integration benefits those willing and able to move for work. Yours truly for example. Neil Fligstein (2008) identifies a 'Euro-clash' where the 10% economic elite are in favour of integration, the 30 or 40% economically weak are against and the future of integration will be decided by the extent to which the middle class can be convinced of either side to form a majority.

In contrast to this, a group of researchers such as Liesbet Hooghe (Hooghe and Marks 2007) argue that identity factors are more important than economic ones. It is those who consider themselves nationals only, in contrast to feeling European, that oppose European integration, irrespective of their economic position.

Finally, the extent to which citizens oppose Europe may be a function of the extent to which they mistrust politics in general. Most member states show a clear correlation of trust in national political institutions and trust in European ones. Thus, citizens who do not trust their national politics, tend not to trust European ones either. In a few Member States, though, the EU is considered a safeguard against corrupt national politicians. A positive alternative, if you will. Italy is a famous example of this.

CAUSES: Political Party Positions

In the study of party-based Euroscepticism, the debate on explanation addresses the question of how much party ideology explains. Some, like Gary Marks (Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 2002), point out similar positions of political parties belonging to the same party family throughout Europe. Thus, Communist parties all over Europe tend to be Eurosceptic, and so do extreme right parties. They furthermore note a shift in the opinion of social democratic parties towards a more favourable position on Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. This is the result of the EU starting to develop a social policy of its own to balance out the internal market.

Others, like Taggart (1998), argue instead that there is not much ideological foundation to party-based Euroscepticism. Rather, what is important is party strategy. Mainstream parties in the political middle who aim to enter government or are in government tend to be more supportive of European integration. Parties on the extreme who are more or less permanent opposition parties tend to be more critical. Furthermore, these scholars argue, smaller fringe parties are often less internally divided on EU issues than big mainstream parties and their positions are closer to

that of the average voter. They thus have a strategic incentive to campaign on EU issues in order to embarrass bigger mainstream parties.

CAUSES: Discourse

The discourse approach directs our attention to the power of justifications of European integration. Justifications such as 'securing peace in Europe' may lose potency, creating a need for new justifications for European integration if the project is not to grind to a halt.

The extent to which European integration is considered colliding or conducive to national myths may affect the extent to which positive narratives about European integration are constructed.

Finally, developments in the evolution of discourse about European integration may stagnate in times when the EU is not on the political agenda. On the other hand, critical moments in European history – whether it is a major continental war, financial crisis, enlargement or a referendum on Treaty change – can provide stimulus for the rapid solidification or alteration of dominant narratives. Such moments in history may shape discourse on European integration for years afterwards.

CAUSES: EU Political System

The EU's democratic deficits are identified as causes for Euroscepticism in the fourth approach. In particular, various scholars have pointed out lack of meaningful elections in the EU, insufficient deliberation on EU policies as the EU is not often debated publically and there is little evidence of Europe-wide debates on the EU. Increasing participation of civil society organizations may increase EU legitimacy, and the Commission has made strong efforts to stimulate civil society involvement. Yet, it remains questionable how representative European umbrella organizations are and to what extent citizens may perceive their participation as added value. A fourth component of democratic legitimacy is the extent to which decision-making in Brussels is transparent. Who is responsible for what? Obscure procedures behind closed doors may be detrimental to democracy in the EU and foster Euroscepticism.

Besides suffering from a democratic deficit. The EU is regularly accused of being inefficient, and unresponsive to changes in its environment. Adaptations are hard to make in a system with multiple veto-players who can each block proposals. The

image that the EU lacks strong leadership (doesn't have a single phone number) contributes to the image of an inefficient polity.

Supranational institutions with significant powers over people's lives inevitably invoke counter reactions. Such power is bound to be experienced as limiting every now and then.

And, partially in line with the inefficiency argument, the EU is inherently a compromise. Between those who want a federation and those who want a free market only, for example. Or those who want liberal and those who want social policies etc. etc. Where there are heterogeneous demands, a culture of consensus and multiple veto players, no one will be entirely satisfied. The criticism of the EU being too neoliberal for some while others find it 'socialism through the back door' illustrates this very well.

CONDITIONS

So far, we know the literature has spent considerable resources discussing causes of Euroscepticism. What has received much less attention are the conditions for Euroscepticism. Recall that these are here understood as situational requirements for the causes to operate. That omission in the literature inevitably makes the coming discussion on conditions tentative. For the sake of discussion, I'm thus going to stick my neck out a bit.

As a first condition, and in my eyes one of the most important, I would nominate the unfinished nature of the EU. It remains unclear what the EU today is and what it will become in the future. This not only feeds uncertainties and fears about what it might be/become, it also presents a clear invitation to reflect on and contest what we want it to be. In that respect, the past 25 years in which European integration has developed very rapidly through multiple Treaty changes, enlargements and developments of new policies has opened up a window of opportunity for contestation. It remains to be seen whether that window can be closed and will close, but I wouldn't be surprised to see a significant drop in Euroscepticism if it becomes clearer what exactly the EU is and if developments in European integration slow down.

Economics are important and as long as European integration not only creates winners, but also losers, there will likely be Euroscepticism. Even relative deprivation (meaning: winning less than others do) can provide the breeding grounds for Euroscepticism. Since an unequal distribution of resources is more or

less inherent in modern market economies, I do not see any realistic end to this condition for the time being.

The next one might be a bit surprising, or maybe superfluous to some of you, but I still think it is necessary to explicitly identify this one. From the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, we may derive that a prerequisite for this is democratic party competition. As long as different political parties compete with each other for office in European countries, they will try to differentiate themselves from their competitors. There will be parties representing opinions that other do not and they will jump on opportunities to bring themselves to the limelight and embarrass others. The issue of European integration may not be the most important one to the majority of voters and parties, but in the nature of party competition lies at least the opportunity for parties to pick this issue up and start campaigning on it.

More broadly speaking, there may be a widely shared idea that democracy is the only legitimate form of government in Europe, but there are widely differing ideas on what exactly democracy is and how this should be organized in practice. Some may put greater weight on majority rule, while others emphasize minority protection. Some may stress the need that voters can hold decision-makers to account through periodic elections while others argue that some decisions should be made outside the grasp of party politics to safeguard such things as efficient monetary policy and human rights.

Yet another condition is the potency of European Nation States. Most European nation states still have a strong capacity to provide public goods and generate allegiance through national identity. Welfare is still largely nation based. Factors such as language, sports, art and history continue to support national identity and national myths. We should remember that the EU is not built in a political vacuum and that the pre-existence of nation states restricts the potential for political reorganization at European level. As long as the nation states remain potent, they are likely to engender loyalty that interprets European integration as a threat to this cherished potency.

As already briefly stated before, the compromises that are made in EU policy-formulation and in shaping the EU polity provide a breeding ground for Euroscepticism. Since the EU is a very heterogeneous polity with large differences in ideology, ethnicity, religion etc. these compromises are far from the ideal preferences of most Europeans, if not all. A heterogeneous polity that engages in making collectively binding decisions creates the stage for polity opposition.

Finally, we may identify a contested rationale for integration to be a condition. What is the reason behind European integration? Why do we do this? As long as there is no simple answer to these questions, justifications for European integration are likely to

be challenged. One might argue that this 7th condition is already captured by conditions 1 and 6. Again, this exercise in formulating conditions for Euroscepticism should be seen as tentative, since, to my knowledge, it isn't comprehensively done yet.

As you can see, these conditions are fundamental and serious. Informing citizens better about the EU, as has been the strategy of a number of leading European politicians and the European Commission, in my opinion is not likely to remove Euroscepticism.

A CRITICAL REFLECTION

Besides further reflection on the conditions of Euroscepticism, what challenges remain? Here, I would like to conclude this lecture with some critical remarks about the state of the art of knowledge.

Coming forth from the discussion on the definition of Euroscepticism, a prime question is whether we are here dealing with a single dimension ranging from completely pro-European to completely anti-European in which Euroscepticism reflects a range of values. Alternatively, the different degrees, targets and knowledge base for Euroscepticism actually create a group of different Euroscepticisms that we cannot simply locate on a single dimensional space. This question has direct consequences for the discussion on causes and conditions. If we were to conclude that there is a group of different Euroscepticisms, then each of these Euroscepticisms may have its own causes and conditions.

Secondly, can we be more precise about what exactly is opposed by Eurosceptics? What are the targets of opposition, what is the extent of this opposition and to what extent is this opposition informed, rather than based on fears? Recall the discussion on alternative labels, such as 'Eurocriticism', 'Eurorealism', 'Europhobia' and 'Anti-Europeanism'. This directly relates back to the first question, on the definition of Euroscepticism.

The third critical question is whether there is something unique about Euroscepticism that makes it applicable only to the EU, or that we are rather faced with a specific manifestation of more general polity opposition. Is there something in the EU itself that fosters Euroscepticism, or are the causes and conditions for Euroscepticism part of more general phenomena. Could we, for example, say that Euroscepticism is simply polity opposition applied to the EU. Can we just as well speak of 'Belgiumscepticism' in Flanders, 'Spainscepticism' in Catalonia, 'UK-

scepticism' in Scotland and maybe even 'US-scepticism' among hardcore American liberalists and anarchists?

In the end, I guess the key point about Euroscepticism is not its causes or conditions, but rather its meaning and solution. What does the fact that there is at least some form of Euroscepticism in most European countries mean? Does it make the EU less legitimate? Does it put a break on further steps in integration, whether in the form of Treaty changes, enlargements or something else. What is actually the impact of Euroscepticism?

Finally, the question remains whether there is a solution to Euroscepticism? And whether we should at all be looking for one. Eurosceptics have regularly been criticized for only saying what they do not want, rather than what they do want. It is also much easier in politics to mobilize against something than in favour. This is also illustrated by the parodies on Euroscepticism I showed you earlier. The counter movement of Euroscepticism in turn stimulates a counter-counter movement of anti-Euroscepticism. But this negative mobilization leaves the question open of a solution. Is there anything we could actually do, that will take away the grievances experienced by Eurosceptics? With that question, I would like to end this lecture.

THANK YOU!

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