Accountability through mutual attunement
How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected? Read Andreas Eriksen and Alexander Katsaitis a new article in Public Policy and Administration.
The increased authority delegated to independent agencies raises questions about the conditions of politically accountable governance, and specifically parliament’s role as a representative institution. Focusing on committee hearings as an accountability mechanism, we ask: How can a parliament employ hearings to ensure that the ends pursued by agencies have a democratic foundation? We propose a model of “mutual attunement” where accountability relations presuppose a process of working-out shared understandings of the ends, means and circumstances of policy needs. We test our argument through a case study assessing the interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on agency accountability and European governance, while providing a novel conceptual model and the first analysis of its kind.
Andreas Eriksen and Alexander Katsaitis
Accountability through mutual attunement: How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected?
In: Public Policy and Administration, 2020