The Case of the European Central Bank
Christopher Lord analyses whether independent central banking removes an important area of policy-making from the process of mass political representation in the article in the special issue of European Politics and Society.
I argue the European Central Bank shows how mutually defining are i) the epistemic assumptions of independent central banking; ii) the powers of a central bank; iii) the political order in which it operates and iv) representative claims. I identify three ‘representative turns’ whose effects have cumulated over the history of the ECB: the first towards including representative claims in justifications for independent central banking; the second, towards a monetary dialogue between the ECB and the European Parliament; the third, towards providing the ECB with some means of discussing with parliaments how it should act in emergencies.
No Epistocracy without Representation? The Case of the European Central Bank
European Politics and Society, online 2018, Pages 1-15
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