



Who Consults?

Expert Groups in the European Union

Åse Gornitzka and Ulf Sverdrup

Working Paper

No. 12, August 2007

Working Papers can be downloaded from the ARENA homepage:

<http://www.arena.uio.no>

Abstract

The EU is frequently understood as a special kind of governance system characterized by its strong degree of interpenetration of different levels of government and a plethora of interactions between EU institutions, administrations from national and subnational levels, as well as organized non-state interests. Nowhere is this kind of multi-level governance as evident as in the committees system of the EU. This article examines and explains a crucial property of this system, the committees and experts groups organised by the European Commission. Based on new data we answer some basic questions related to this aspect of the EU multi-level system. What is the extent of the expert consultative system? What is the distribution of expert groups? Are these groups best understood as loose networks or do they constitute a stable, well-established consultative system? We observe a proliferation over time and across sectors of this mode of governance. The use of Expert group has developed into a routinized practice of the European Commission and a great share of the Expert groups has become permanent and lasting properties of the governance system. Our data also shows that Expert groups are remarkably unevenly distributed among different policy domains and areas. The high degree of sectoral differentiation is accentuated by the fact that we observe weak horizontal coordinating structures between the Directorates-General (DGs) in their use of Expert groups. We argue that the heterogeneity in modes governance across policy fields is partly a result of deliberate design attempts and differences in policy tasks, but also to a large extent the result of different institutional and organizational factors, such as legal and administrative capabilities, as well as the gradual development of different routines and norms among the DGs for connecting to their environment.

Reproduction of this text is subject to permission by the author.

© Arena 2007

Simple, but not so trivial questions

This article examines a crucial property of the European governance system. The EU is frequently understood as a governance system characterized by its strong degree of interpenetration of different levels of government, and a plethora of interactions between EU institutions, national and sub-national administrations as well as organized non-state interests. The ubiquity of different kinds of public policy networks or expert groups for consultation, bargaining, deliberation and decision making is believed to be a prominent feature of the European governance system (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999; Kohler-Koch 1997; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006). Nowhere is this kind of multi-level governance system as evident as in the numerous Expert groups and committees of the EU. Such committees are in some sense the epitome of the European multi-level governance system at work. EU committees encompass an array of bodies that vary considerably in what they do, how they are organized, what role they play in EU policy making and to what EU institution they are anchored. Several specific and detailed studies have provided information and insights regarding the functions and dynamics of these public policy networks (Beyers & Trondal 2004; Christiansen & Larsson 2007; Egeberg et al 2003; Larsson & Murk 2007; Wessels 1997). Scholarly attention has in particular been paid to the role of committees in overseeing the execution of EU rules by the Commission (Dehousse 2003; Dogan 1997; Franchino 2000; Pollack 2003) and there have been attempts to assess the extent to which committees and consultative organs affect the democratic quality of the European Union (Joerges & Neyer 1997; Rhinard 2002; Vos 1997).¹

The focus in this article is on the committees and groups organized by the European Commission, i.e. its Expert groups. New data are now available that enables us to examine more critically the use of such committees in the EU and answer some basic questions related to this aspect of the EU multi-level system. What is the *extent* of the expert consultative system? What is the distribution of Expert groups: Are Expert groups distributed equally across different policy fields, or is this form of multi-level governance concentrated in some specific policy fields? Are these groups best

understood as loose networks, in the sense that they are informal, flexible, dynamic, temporary and ever changing, or are they part of a more formalized, organized, routinized and well established consultation system? Previous studies have not given clear answers to such question. For instance,² Larsson and Trondal (2006) claim that not even the European Commission itself have adequate knowledge of the scale and activities of the Expert groups. In the absence of good data, scholars have been engaged in making “guestimates”, ranging from 800 to 1300 groups (Larsson & Trondal 2006), or vague statements like ‘there are probably more than 1,000 committees’ (van Schendelen 1998). The new quantitative data also allows us to examine some rudimentary hypotheses that can shed light on the pattern of distribution, and the factors involved in creating, changing and maintaining this part of the EU governance system. This paper is a first report from a larger and ongoing research project on the role of the Expert groups in the EU, in which we will also examine the participation and sociometrics of this consultative system (Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2007).

Our approach is consistent with two recent calls in the literature on European governance. First, the call by Johan P. Olsen arguing that better understanding of the levels and forms of European integration, requires the building of more detailed knowledge about institutional variations across sectors (Olsen 2007). Secondly, the recent calls for gradually changing the research focus from explorative and descriptive case studies, to larger N studies and a stronger focus on empirical studies (Broscheid & Coen 2007; Coen 2007; Franchino 2005). In addition to supporting such calls, we believe that a systematic and structured cross-sector analysis of the consultative system might contribute to provide meaning to the diverse and competing statements that are being made about the qualities and functions of the EU governance system.

Our argument is that the Expert groups play an increasingly important role in the EU . We can observe a proliferation across sectors of this mode of governance. We find that the use of Expert group have developed into a routinized practice of the European Commission in order for it to connect to its environment and bring together various

state and societal actors. Moreover, a great share of the Expert groups has become permanent and lasting properties of the governance system. However, our data also shows that the Expert groups are remarkably unevenly distributed along different policy domains and areas. Distinct policy segments have different modes of connecting to their environment. While some areas are clearly multi-level in their governance structure, others are not. The high degree of sectoral differentiation is accentuated by the fact that we observe weak horizontal coordinating structures between the Directorates-General (DGs) in their use of Expert groups. We argue that the heterogeneity in modes governance across policy fields is partly a result of deliberate design attempts and differences in policy tasks, but also to a large extent the result of different institutional and organizational factors, such as legal and administrative capabilities, as well as the gradual development of different routines and norms for connecting to the environment.

The article is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss two theoretical perspectives that might explain the use of Expert groups in the EU and make some notes on our data and methodology. We then present an empirical analysis of the distribution of the Expert groups across time and discuss factors that can explain the segmented pattern of consultation. Towards the end of the paper we show how our observations are further strengthened by analyzing the degree of specialization and the degree of institutionalization of the consultative system.

Theoretical approaches and expectations

Expert groups are one of the three main types of committees organized by EU institutions. Together with the Council Working Parties and Committees, and the Comitology Committees they make up the EU's committees system (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006). Formally, an Expert group is a consultative entity comprised of public- or private-sector experts and the Commission is in control over its composition. Expert groups are composed of members from national governments, academia and various interests groups. The main task of the groups is to advise the

Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives as well as in its tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the Member States. Expert groups do not formally make political decisions, but feed the decision-making processes by giving expert advice, providing scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information and well as being forums for exchange of information. The groups can be either permanent or temporary. The Commission creates its Expert groups itself, which is also a characteristic that set them apart from both Comitology and Council Committees. A Commission Expert group may be created in two different ways, either by a Commission Decision or other legal act establishing the group, or by a Commission service with the agreement of the Secretariat-General. Officially the Expert groups' task is to assist the Commission as a whole, but in practice the Expert groups that are run by the DGs that are most implicated with the relevant field.

In sum the Commission's committees constitute a highly complex system that defies any easy categorizations³ and does not have a well-articulated set of rule to regulate its operations. Hence we can expect to see multiple factors that come into play in creating, changing and maintaining this part of the EU governance system, some of which are singled out for analysis in this article. Here we approach the issue of Expert groups in the EU from two perspectives; one emphasizing the role of choice and design, and one emphasizing the role of routines and institutional factors (March & Olsen 1998; Olsen 1997; 2001; 2002; 2007).

Design Perspectives

From a design perspective, Expert groups are basically viewed as instruments for increasing effectiveness in decision making. The European Commission is often faced with tasks that have considerable technical, political, or legal uncertainty, and is therefore in need of assistance. By using Expert groups, the European Commission is able to extract knowledge, expertise and information from actors in its task environments and potentially improve the quality of its decisions and reduce uncertainty. The participants in these groups bring relevant topics to the discussions,

indicate potential risks, and sometimes suggest modes for easing transposition and implementation. Expert groups can be used in direct linkage to decision making situations, or as a tool for surveying and monitoring the environment. The setting up of Expert groups can be regarded as a relatively risk free strategy when entering into new or difficult territory. Typically one could expect that, the more uncertainty, the more room for a problem solving logic based in expertise (Radaelli 1999). From this perspective, it is assumed that the European Commission would design and shape its Expert groups so that they fit tightly with its preferences and tasks. In addition, we expect that the Expert groups are flexible and easily adaptable to new and changing tasks and preferences. Once “mission is accomplished” the Expert groups would be dismantled.

The policy task argument

It follows from this approach, that as long as we know and are able to identify the nature of the policy problem facing the DGs we should be able to predict the organizational solution to decision-making and thus the presence of Expert groups. Although the idea is simple, defining and operationalizing the type of policy and nature of the policy good is notoriously difficult (Lowi 1964). We take as a starting point the distinction between regulatory versus distributive policies. This has had a recurring significance for explaining the shape of EU decision-making arenas and the relative power of EU institutions generally (Burns 2005; Majone 1994). The main idea we pursue is an assumption that redistributive and provisional policies would be more subjected to consultations than other policy types. The following underlying mechanism creates the rationality for such a relationship.

When the Services are engaged in managing large resources they would have a particularly strong informational needs stemming from their tasks to secure good design of its redistributive policy, sound management of the funds, and to ensure proper implementation. These needs cannot easily be fulfilled by internal sources of information; hence the Commission services will pursue an extrovert information

strategy. Previous studies have also shown that the European Commission often uses financial resources for stimulating cooperation with member states governments and to mobilize sub-national and non-state actors in transnational networks around joint problem-solving activities, particularly in areas like R&D, Trans-European Networks, and in order to build a “People’s Europe”, that are aimed towards complementing market integration (Laffan 1997). Majone, for instance, argues that the Commission faces stronger constraints for its actions in distributive and redistributive policy areas compared to regulatory policy (Majone 1994), and organizing Expert groups could be seen as one way of overcoming such constraints. It has also been argued that the EU distribution that takes place under the Common Agricultural policy has also been particularly prone to control by Member States and affected interests (Burns 2005). In order to find the concentration of Expert groups one should therefore “follow the money”. *In principle we should expect that policy areas or Commission Services that are responsible for managing large sections of the budget would generate more Expert groups, than Services that are in charge of managing less budgetary means (Hypothesis 1)*. In order to test hypothesis 1, we separated different policies by their share of the EU budget in 2006. In the EU most of the redistributive element of the budget is devoted to three policy areas, that is, agriculture, regional policy as well as the various social cohesion programs.

Supply side argument

Another, but related, version of this model is to view the Expert groups, not as a result of careful design by the European Commission, but rather as an instrument resulting from specific *supply* side pressures. The more the EU gets involved in a policy area and in particular in shaping policies, the more the actors tend to react by organizing in order to promote, protest or defend their interests. And by doing so they demand participation, compete for formulating problems and solutions, and engage themselves in the production of new rules in consultative organs, like the Expert groups. Such processes of growth in involvement, in turn, contribute to the creation of new initiatives, and new areas of participation, and thereby a dynamics of steadily increasing institutionalization (Stone Sweet et al. 2001). From this perspective, the emergence of

expert groups is seen as resulting from distinct pressures from different interest organizations or national interests who perceive of the Expert groups as their instrument for influencing and controlling EU decision making. We would expect a close relationship between the profile of the expert group system, and the supply side capacities. This kind of supply side mechanisms fits well with ideas of lobbying in the EU (Broscheid & Coen 2007; Coen 2007; Mahoney 2004), and the observation made by Broscheid and Coen (2007) on an independent effect of the number of interests groups in a certain policy field and establishment of consultative fora in different DGs. Their underlying argument is that the Commission creates the largest number of Expert groups in areas overloaded by interests groups. In order to manage this overload, DGs create Expert groups and privilege a limited set of actors who have access to them. Hence we expect to find that *the more interest groups are organized at the European level in a policy area, the more the relevant DG will tend to create Expert groups (Hypothesis 2)*. In order to test this claim we included data on interest groups gathered from the so-called CONNECS base and compared this with the number of Expert Groups per DG.

Institutional Perspectives

An institutional perspective, by contrast, puts particular emphasis on the importance of historical developments, path-dependencies and routines when explaining the patterns of distribution of the Expert groups. It is assumed that the expert system in the EU, like other institutions in political life, depends not only on satisfying current environmental pressures and political concerns, but it also reflects an institution's origin, history and internal dynamics (March & Olsen 1998). Rather than seeing Expert groups as carefully designed to meet specific tasks, the presence of Expert groups are regarded as reflecting local rationality, sectoral specialization and differentiated traditions and histories for relating to the environment. Changes and developments often occur through multiple learning processes, but not always in consistent ways (March & Olsen 1998). Rather than expecting a smooth and well planned distribution of Expert groups, a patchy picture is expected. This argument folds in nicely with Kohler-Koch's observation that the EU is functionally segmented. She argues that the governance system in the EU is

to a large extent a result of processes of incrementally adding bits and pieces to the functional responsibilities of the Community. The result of such processes is not close co-operation to assure coherence, but instead patch-work policies in a highly segmented system (Kohler-Koch 1997), as well as marked difference between DGs in their mode of policy making (Christiansen 1997).

From this perspective, Expert groups are seen as mirroring the long term patterns of interactions between sectorally specialized DGs and their equally specialized and differentiated environments, as well as reflecting internal factors such as internal capacity, age of certain policy domains as well as different norms, routines and experiences from consultation and cooperation that has evolved across time. In addition, it follows from this perspective that the use of Expert groups over time has developed into a routinized activity with a high degree of institutionalization. With the present data we cannot make a meaningful operationalization of historical path dependency and local administrative cultures, yet, we incorporate into our analysis two fundamental institutional conditions that determine an organization's characteristics and that can be expected to account for the differences in density of DGs set of Expert groups according to an institutional perspective. First, we explore the significance of the legal competencies that DGs operate under and, second, the importance of their administrative capabilities.

The legal competence argument:

A common-sense interpretation we retrieve in some of the literature on EU governance is that the density of Expert groups is to a large extent a function of the allocation of competence in the EU. For instance, according to Nugent (2003:130-131): "One factor making for variation is the degree of the importance of the policy within the EU's policy framework – it is hardly surprising, for example that there should be many more agricultural advisory committees than there are educational advisory committees." If we define the degree of importance of a policy area, as the legal competence of the EU in the specific area, we can consider this mechanism more

in detail. In a simple version of this story, we can expect this relationship to be linear: the more exclusive legal competence for the EU, the more Expert groups (Hypothesis 3).

The underlying idea is that the level and intensity of activity of the Commission is determined by the legal competence of the EU. Increased activity in turn triggers the activation of expertise bodies. When competence is being transferred from the national level to the European level, new opportunity structures are created at the European level, and new patterns of consultation emerge. The competence attributed to different policy areas is the fundamental legal parameters within which the DGs operate, independently of the budgetary means at the Commission's disposal for pursuing its policies. These competencies are unevenly distributed over the DGs' activity areas and have accrued to the European level in different points in the history of European integration. In order to operationalize this variable we have coded the policy fields according to treaty competence, ranging from 1 to 4. The treaties differentiate between areas of exclusive competence for the EU (coded as 1), areas of shared competence (coded as 2), areas where the EU have coordinating competences (coded 3), areas of supporting and complimentary competences (coded 4).⁴

The administrative capability argument:

From an institutional perspective we also expect that the administrative capacity of DGs should feature as a possible explanation for the variation in the use of Expert groups. The European Commission is a small administration with staff and limited administrative capabilities and number of staff, particularly if compared with the size of national governments. Still, there has been a continuous growth of new tasks that has been delegated to the European Commission and there has been a de facto extension of the basis for Community action. The levels of expectation regarding its ability to manage new responsibilities and deliver the results have also increased. Balancing task expansion with limited administrative resources has been an enduring theme in European governance. The Expert groups can be seen as a form of outsourcing and coping with limited administrative capabilities. Participants in the Expert groups can

increase the capability of the European Commission in developing policies and monitoring implementation, by bringing in their administrative resources, provide information, knowledge and expertise. Compared to establishing permanent, specialized organizations capable of fact-finding, rule-making and/or enforcement, for instance through establishing European Agencies or Commission Joint Research Centers, using Expert groups incurs less cost for Community budgets. Although expenses are reimbursed by the Commission, participating experts are unpaid. Consequently, the existence of Expert groups does not require long term budgetary commitments. It follows, from such a perspective, that we should expect a relationship between internal administrative resources and the use of Expert groups. The less internal administrative staff the DG has at its disposal, the more Expert groups it will create (Hypothesis 4). In order to test this hypothesis we have gathered data on size and distribution of the European Commission staff.

Data and methodology

The empirical analysis presented in this article relies data from our data base of Commission Expert groups. Our data base provides information on key properties of these groups such as the lead services in the Commission, policy area and composition of the group in general terms as well as the group's tasks and missions and their formal status. It classifies the participants in broad categories (scientists, academics, practitioners, industry, NGOs) but it does not contain any information on individual experts. Nor does it contain information on the number of meetings and participation rates of the Expert groups. When constructing the data base we have used the European Commission's register of Expert groups. Information was downloaded from the register, coded and entered in our data base in January 2007.⁵

The register's reliability as a source of information on Expert groups is underpinned by the formal rules of the register. The register is partly a result of a commitment made by the Commission President Barroso, to the European Parliament in November 2004 to increase the transparency of the Commission's operations and give a public overview of

the advisory bodies that assist it in preparing legislative proposals and policy initiatives. According to 'Framework Agreement on relations between the European parliament and the European Commission' (art 16) "The Commission shall inform Parliament of the list of its Expert groups set up in order to assist the Commission in the exercise of its right of initiative. That list shall be updated on a regular basis and made public."⁶ The importance attached to the registry, illustrated by its codification in the framework agreement, in securing a constructive dialogue and flow of information between the European Commission and the European Parliament, increases the reliability of the data. The Commission is formally obliged to enter reliable information and to update the register and these functions are performed by permanent staff in the Secretariat General. The unit responsible for the register of Expert groups was consulted in the creation of our data base.

Distribution of Expert groups

The growth of Expert groups

Our analysis shows that there were 1237 Expert groups organized by the European Commission in January 2007. This is a high number and it is clearly in the upper range of previous estimates. The expert group system is without doubt a considerable supplementary administrative resource of the European Commission. In fact, there is about one expert group per eight persons working as an official in the European Commission.⁷ By comparison there are 250 Comitology Committees and 162 Council committees/working parties⁸, hence Commission Expert groups far outnumber the other parts the EU committee system.

There has been a significant increase in the number of Expert groups across time. In 1975 it was reported that there were 537 groups, in 1990 the number had increased to 602 (Wessels 1998), and by 2000 the number had reached 851 (Larsson 2003). These measures indicate a gradual and steady growth during the twenty five year period, as new competences and tasks have been added to the European Commission and the

European Union. It is noteworthy that this gradual growth has been replaced by a more rapid and radical increase since 2000. In this period the number of Expert groups has increased by more than forty per cent.⁹ The large number and the strong growth of the use of Expert groups in the European Commission contribute to make this mode of interaction a significant element of the European governance structure, and a routinized and rather standardized mode of consultation. The extensive consultative structure also contribute to give an impression of the European Commission as an open, extrovert and accessible administrative body, which is engaged in numerous consultations with a huge number of actors from multiple levels of governance.

Uneven distribution across policy domains and Commission Services

Although we observe extensive presence of Expert groups in the European Commission there are significant differences in the extent of consultation in different policy areas. In fact, we observe in the EU, as observed in studies of public administration in the member states, that different polities and policies also elicit different types of participation and generate different patterns of interaction (Dahl 1961; Lowi 1964). In our data, we find three clear patterns regarding the distribution of the Expert groups.


Firstly, the Expert groups are primarily operating in the EU public policy domains (Table 1). There are hardly any Expert groups in the field of internal administrative services, and there are few Expert groups that are engaged with the general services. Hence, the DGs related to administrative affairs, budget and financial control, and the General Services such as the Legal Service, General Secretariat and Press and Communication, which are typically regarded as horizontally coordinating Directorates General and Services in the EU (Stevens & Stevens 2001), score low on coordination and co-operation with external experts. We also observe that very few (less than five percent) of the total numbers of Expert groups are related to external relations policies.

Table 1 Commission Expert groups according to policy domain. N=1237

		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Policies	1076	87,0	87,0
	General Services	99	8,0	95,0
	External relations	54	4,4	99,4
	Internal Services	8	,6	100,0
	Total	1237	100,0	

Secondly, the distribution of Expert groups is biased and unevenly distributed across the different DGs (Figure 1). More than 75 per cent of all the Expert groups in the Commission are related to ten DGs. The data falls into three broad categories: DGs organizing many, (more than 70 Expert groups), DGs in the mid section (between 70–20), and the ones with few (less than 20). Within the first group we find three “super users”, consisting of DG Research, DG Environment and DG Enterprise, all having 120 or more Expert groups. Taken together these three organize approximately 30 percent of all Expert groups. In addition, DG Taxation and Customs, DG Energy and Transport, DG Health and Consumer Protection, Eurostat and DG Education and Culture all have more than 70 Expert groups each. In the second category we find the DGs that are responsible for what we might label ‘classic’ European affairs, such as economic and social policy, agriculture policy, internal market, fishery and regional policy. This biased distribution of Expert groups clearly indicates strong sectoral differentiation between different DGs in their mode of governance. While extensive use of consultation with Expert groups is a prominent characteristic of some policy areas, like research, environment, energy and transport, this mode of governance is much more rarely found in areas, like trade, competition, economic and financial affairs.

Figure 1 Commission Expert groups across service and time.



Source: Own data from 2007, data on 2000 based on Larsson (2003). Some Services with less than five Expert groups are excluded.

A third striking feature regarding the distribution of the Expert groups is the changes in the number of Expert groups across time.¹⁰ As illustrated by Figure 1, the overall trend is that there are more Expert groups attached most of the various DGs now than seven years ago. Very few DGs are deviating from this pattern. In 2007 the median value was 27 Expert groups per Service, compared to 19 in 2000. During a seven year period the number of DGs with more than 80 Expert groups has increased by more than a hundred percent, and four of the DGs have more than doubled their number of Expert groups. The DGs that have the highest number in 2000 still remain at the top in 2007 and we still observe considerable variation between the various DGs. But there is also a clear move towards less differentiated distribution, indicating that this method of consultation and interaction between the Commission and its environment is becoming more widespread and standardized.


Explaining uneven distribution

What we have seen here is a strong sectoral differentiation in the DGs use of Expert groups. Why are there more Expert groups in some policy domains? What are the relevant dimensions of the policy sectors and political organization that make such a difference for the way in which the Commission relates to external expertise? Let us now assess how and to what extent the four hypothesis can help to explain this pattern.

Task matching – policy type argument

Our data shows that the Services that are engaged in redistribution do not have a high number of Expert groups. As we can see from Figure 2, the DGs that are most involved in redistributive policies, DG Agriculture, DG Regional Policy, DG Employment and Social Affairs, and DG Research, which together account for more than 85 per cent of the total EU budget, have only about 25 per cent of the total number of Expert groups, of which DG Research accounts for half of these. We can therefore conclude that our hypothesis 1 is not supported.

Figure 2 Relationship between EU budget per Service and number of Expert groups per Service.



However, the lack of support for our hypothesis could in fact be a misspecification of the nature of the policy task. When we fail to see the effect of distributive policy, it should not lead us to dismiss the idea that the nature of the policy domain significantly affects the pattern of expert group distribution.

In particular one could argue that the Commission's choice for establishing a group is conditioned by the technical versus the political nature of the task, rather than whether or not the DGs are tackling redistributive or regulatory problems. One could also argue that varying intensity of political conflict in policy-specific interest constellations impinges on the capacity for the Commission to act (Scharpf 1999), and that international cooperation and integration are easier to achieve in fields seen as being technical with low intensity in political conflict. Technical issues typically require expertise, and expertise tend to subordinate national boundaries to shared professional concerns and epistemic communities (Haas 1992; March & Olsen 1998). The literature on international co-ordination has showed the crucial role of experts in political integration and transnational governance in general, and in the EU in particular. It can be argued that regulatory policy rather than redistributive policy is based on knowledge as a resource and aims at efficiency rather than fair distribution. Consequently regulatory policy areas sit better in the realm of technocracy and the world of Expert groups, that is relatively insulated from political conflict (Radaelli 1999)¹¹.

Although we recognize the significance of this distinction for explaining the variation in forms of consultation, we find it hard to operationalize and use policy type as an independent variable. First, coding the policy types according to its degree of technical specialization requires detailed knowledge of the activities of each expert group, which is unavailable in our data base. Using DG types as proxy for "type of task" is inadequate in this respect. Second, additional substantive challenges are posed by the fact that what is regarded as technical versus political issues changes over time. Politically salient issues can be decentralized into technical arenas in order to avoid politically sensitive conflicts. Sometimes policy labels shift as a result of deliberate choice, for instance when an issue

is being “decentralized” to a technical level in order to avoid political conflicts (Olsen 1983:208-209), or the other way around, when a rather technical issue becomes highly politicized, for instance regarding stem-cell research in the EU 7th Framework Program, or statistical measures in the case of EMU. In other instances, the label attached to a policy can change rapidly as a result of external events or sudden crisis, like in the case of BSE and Creutzfeld-Jacobs disease. Studies of EU committee governance, in particular working groups under the Council (Fouilleux et al 2005), also report that this distinction is continuously blurred and putative technical working groups are heavily involved in dynamic processes of politization and depolitization of public policy issues. If this is indeed the case, the distinction between technical versus political policy domains cannot be used as an independent variable for explaining the variation in the presence of expert group.


Supply side argument

As we see from figure 3, the strong correlation between the number of interest groups and density of Expert groups gives support to supply side explanations. Nevertheless, we are uncertain how plausible it is to make conclusions about the causal mechanism of interest groups overload based on this significant correlation.

An alternative argument would be to say that it is the general level of Union activity that generates both the presence of interest groups *and* expert group density in different policy domains. It should also be noted that a large share of Commission Expert groups *do not* include interest group participation (Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2007) and therefore their creation can hardly be seen as the Commission’s means for managing interest group overload. Rather it might be the case that the creation of Expert groups creates participatory overload as it opens up a “can of worms” of potential participants that are deemed relevant and legitimate, from 27 member states and their respective national administrations, regional authorities, candidate countries, EEA-members, interests groups and academics. Furthermore there are some important DGs that deviate from the overall pattern. For DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs and Eurostat and DG

Regional policy this correlation is not present. Rather than seeing the proliferation of interest group organizations as the main trigger of establishment of Expert groups, we would argue that number of interest groups at the European level reflects more general sectoral differences in political organization in Europe, as well as the fact that some policy areas are considered more receptive for influence and inputs than others.

Figure 3: Relationship between number of interest groups and Expert groups in different policy fields




Legal competence argument:

In Figure 4 we present a scatter plot of the distribution of competences and the number of Expert groups. As we can see, our data does not support the argument of a linear relationship, where increased EU competence in a policy field would lead to increased involvement of Expert groups. In fact, we observe that most of the Expert groups are operating in policy areas where competences are shared. The number of Expert groups is rather low in policy areas of exclusive EU competence, like agriculture and fishery policy. We also find relatively few Expert groups in DGs where primacy is given to market building and legal aspects, trade, competition and internal market issues (cf. also Table 4). This supports the argument that consultations have not developed in

traditional areas of EU integration where the DGs can operate with high European legal capacity for action and correspondingly low national capacity (Scharpf 1999). These are all areas where the Commission DGs act in a management role with the day-to-day operation of policy areas where the European level has *replaced* the nation state level (Shore 2000). The uneven integration (Olsen 2007) is reflected in an uneven distribution of consultations across levels of governance.

It follows from this discussion that there is no simple linear relationship between the quality of EU legal competence and the number of Expert groups. If there is a relationship between legal competence and the density of Expert groups in policy fields, it seems to be more like a hump shaped curve. This observation is consistent with a view of the Commission as the defender of the Treaty and an organization that seeks to maximize its autonomy within the conditions set by the Treaty. In areas of exclusive competencies the DGs can operate as a relatively independent actor in its day-to-day operations, whereas areas of mixed competencies are the realm of multi level policy making and implementation where the Commission practices would involve the joint exercise of coordination and authority. These areas have developed issue specific constituencies across multiple levels, involving multiple types of actors (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999). At the other end of the scale, i.e. areas where there is very limited or no Treaty basis for Commission action, there is no room for a structured interaction between levels of governance organized by the Commission.

Figure 4 Relationship between legal competences and the number of Expert groups. (1= exclusive, 2=shared, 3=coordinating, 4=supporting/complementary)




The administrative capability argument:

In Figure 5 we present a scatter plot of the relationship between the administrative resources of a DG, defined as the size of the administrative staff, and the number of Expert groups at its disposal. As we can see from the plot, we observe a relationship, but its direction is opposite to what we expected. The more internal administrative capacities a DG has at its disposal, the more Expert groups it will create. Rather than being a substitute for own administrative resources, the use of Expert groups is supplementing own capacities. This is not consistent with a view that DGs systematically will pursue a “self-reliance” strategy and only organize multi-level administrative structure to compensate for lack of in-house administrative capacity. Rather it seems so that internal administrative capacity is a *prerequisite* for organizing a large number of Expert groups. None (with one exception) of the DGs with a dense set of Expert groups (i.e., with more than 70 groups) have less than 500 hundred officials.

This observation suggests that Expert groups are perhaps best seen as a tool for extending the DGs' capacity for action, and not limiting the DGs' autonomy *vis-à-vis* member states and interest groups.

Figure 5: Relationship between administrative capabilities in the Commission DGs and the number of Expert groups. N=1233



Note: DG for Translation and the Joint Research Centres are excluded

However, we also see different types of relationship between internal administrative staff and the use of external Expert groups. In the lower right section, low degree of internal resources but a high degree of Expert groups, we find DG Environment and DG Taxation and Customs. In these policy areas the outsourcing hypotheses seems to fit the data very well. In the upper right section we find the policy areas that are mobilizing many internal resources and many external resources. Unsurprisingly we find policy areas that have increased in importance during the last few years and areas that are of crucial importance to the current EU agenda, such as DG Research, DG Energy and Transport. In the upper left section we find the DGs with a relatively high level of internal resources and relatively few Expert groups, like DG Agriculture, DG

Information Society and DG External Relations. In the lower left quadrant, we find policy areas that have relatively few internal resources and that make use of few external resources, including DG Justice and Home Affairs, DG Development and DG Fish and Maritime. In the centre and almost on the trend line we find DGs related to traditional EU activities like regional policy, employment as well as health and consumer affairs.

Strong sectoral specialization and weak horizontal coordination

So far our analysis has clearly documented the heterogeneity and functional specialization of the expert group system, and how this system has developed according to logic of sectoral specialization. We have identified dimensions of the policy types and institutional characteristics that can account for some of this heterogeneity. We argue from this that we have pin-pointed a part of the EU governance system where centrifugal forces are at play. The sectoral differentiation we have observed speaks directly to an enduring tension in the organization of governments between specialization and horizontal coordination (Gulick 1937). In a purely functionally differentiated decision-making structure, the internal specialization is matched by highly specialized external contacts and there are few horizontally integrating forces and structures that ensure cross-sectoral coordination. Our findings fit well with the EU administrative history, where the organization has been based primarily upon the sectoral and functional principle, that is on the purpose and nature of the subject area (Egeberg 2006). We observe this strong sectoral and functional differentiation throughout the whole EU governance system, in the Commission Services, in the Council secretariat, in the various Council configurations, as well in the European Parliament, with its functionally differentiated standing committees. In this respect our findings confirm that Expert groups are contributing to this sectoral and functional specialization.

However, in order to move our analysis further we also want to examine the degree of horizontal coordination and the degree of institutionalization. An indicator of cross-sectoral coordination in relation to the Expert groups is if we find that the various Expert groups are associated with other DGs apart from its host DG. If so, expertise provided by a group in one field is more likely to be used to influence policy making processes also in other fields and DGs, and possibly also contribute to increase the likelihood for developing cross-sectoral politics in the Commission. The extent to which Expert groups are set up in collaboration with other DGs and report back to different DGs is therefore also a measure of the (horizontal) permeability of organizational boundaries between the various Commission services.

We observe (*Table 2*) that only a small fraction of the Expert groups are formally linked to other DGs than their host Service. Four out of five of the Expert groups have a single DG ownership, and do not have any other associated DG. Moreover, in cases where there is coordination across DGs, the number of DGs that are associated is very limited. Of the Expert groups that are associated with other DGs in addition to their host DG, a majority is linked to one or two DGs; leaving the total number of more broadly, cross-sectorally anchored Expert groups to only 85. We can therefore conclude that the Commission Expert groups are not a key part of the horizontal coordinating mechanisms of the Commission. The sectoral and functional differentiation, which is a hallmark of the administrative history of the Commission (Cram 1994; 1997; Egeberg 2006; Stevens & Stevens 2001), seems to be further accentuated by the practice of interacting with extramural expertise structures through Expert groups.

Table 2 Cross sectoral coordination of Expert Groups. Number of Commission Expert groups associated with other DGs in addition to their host DG

		No	Yes	... of which DG	... of which DGs	... of which more DGs
Valid	N	1006	231	96	54	85
	Per cent	81	19	8	4	7

A high degree of stability and institutionalization

Growth and distribution across policy domains and DGs bear witness of how widespread this consultative system has become. However, this does not necessarily imply that these are stable and predictable structures that are unsusceptible to short term fluctuations and shifts in attention and legitimacy or governance fads. What is this system's degree of institutionalization?

The more formal and permanent a group is, the more it is institutionalized. Our data allows us to measure the degree of institutionalization in two ways. Firstly, we make a distinction between Expert groups that are formal and informal. Formal Expert groups are established by a Commission decision or other legal acts, while informal groups are established by the DGs themselves in agreement with the Secretariat General and without reference to such a formal legal act. In principle, formal groups can be regarded as more institutionalized than informal groups. Secondly, we make a distinction between temporary and permanent groups. Expert groups that are either explicitly defined as permanent, and groups that have been in operation for more than five years, are coded as permanent groups. The rest of the groups are coded as temporary.

Our analysis shows that (Table 3) $\frac{3}{4}$ of the Commission's Expert Groups are informal and half are temporal. In some sense we can view the expert group system as a rather flexible part of the administrative space where groups can be established and dismantled without going through elaborate formal decision-making procedures, and therefore contribute to create a dynamic, flexible and adaptive administrative system. However,

our findings also show that a considerable part of this system has become institutionalized and is an important element of a routinized and rather stable administrative structure. The close to 400 Expert groups that have become a permanent fixture of the EU without having been created by a formal legal act together with the number of formal Expert groups are indications of a rather high degree of institutionalization of the expert group system.

Table 3 Commission Expert groups by type and status. N=1237

			Status P/T		Total
			Temporary	Permanent	
Type F/I	Informal	Count	557	389	946
		%	88,6 %	64,0%	76,5%
	Formal	Count	?	219	291
		%	%	36,0 %	23,5%
Total		Count	629	608	1237
		%	100 %	100 %	100,0%

Most DGs balance between temporariness and permanence in their consultative system. Yet some DGs organize a strikingly stable set of Expert groups, this is especially the case for Eurostat, DG Agriculture and DG Fisheries. At the other end of the scale we find DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs and DG Information Society whose expertise system is predominantly temporary.

In sum, we find some striking and robust findings about the distribution, and the degree of institutionalization of the Expert groups. The high number of Expert groups clearly shows that multi-level consultation is an important feature of the European governance system, and our data also shows that this mode is becoming a gradually even more important across time. *Table 4* provides an overview of the distribution of the groups and the degree of institutionalization. The obvious conclusion of these findings is that the extent and quality of the EU multi-level governance is radically different across different functional policy areas. While multi-level consultation is a dominating and routinized feature of some policy areas and in some Services, it is a

rather rare event or used as a much more flexible tool in other policy areas and Services.

Table 4 Distribution of Expert groups and their institutionalization (Number of EGs per DG, and percentage of permanent EGs in parenthesis)

		Number of Expert groups		
		Few (Less than 20)	Medium (21-70)	Many (71 or more)
Degree of institutionalization	Low (0-33,3%)	RELEX (11, 0,27)	INFSO (38, 0,24)	RTD (129, 0,25)
		TRADE (7, 0,29)		TAXUD (95, 0,16)
		COMP (7, 0,29)		
		BUDG (3, 0,33)		
		ELARG (1, 0)		
		DGT (1, 0)		
	Medium (33,4-66,6%)	BEPA (5, 0,40)	EMPL (62, 0,48)	ENV (127, 0,43)
		SG (4, 0,50)	REGIO (58, 0,40)	ENTR (120, 0,43)
			JLS (33, 0, 39)	TREN (94, 0, 51)
			DEV (30, 0,40)	EAC (71, 0,37)
	High (66,7 -100 (%))	ECFIN (10, 0,80)	AGRI (64, 0,94)	SANCO (89, 0,76)
		OLAF (5, 0,80)	MARKT (51, 0,53)	ESTAT (85, 0,99)
		AIDCO (5, 1,0)	FISH (25, 0,84)	
		JRC (3, 1,0)		
		ADMIN (3, 0,67)		
		COMM (1, 1)		

The pattern we see in Table 4 has both unsurprising and puzzling traits. The position of internal administrative DGs in the left column does not represent much of a theoretical puzzle to be solved. The fact that we find DG Trade and DG Competition in this group on the other hand, is not that self-evident. In the middle column we find many of the main traditional areas subject to European integration and with relatively high

level of capacity to act at a European level, in particular agriculture, internal market and regional policy. We also see that many of the policy areas associated with “New Europe” or the European Knowledge Economy, such as research and education, place themselves in the right column, along with high attention areas, such as energy and environmental policy. The degree of institutionalization on the other hand also pairs policy areas that usually are not thought of as having much in common – such as taxation and research policy. Placing the policy areas in a two-dimensional space, points us in the direction that both the nature of the policy area and institutional differences are factors that encourage, facilitate and restrain the Commission’s use of Expert groups

Conclusions

Our analysis substantiates the idea that the European Union should be understood as a governance system, characterized by interpenetration of different levels of government and non-state actors. We see this in the ubiquity of Expert groups at the European level. The Commission’s 1237 Expert groups are a key element in the multi-level European administrative space, outnumbering by far other types of committees in the EU system. Over time this particular mode of consultation has become more widespread and institutionalized. The number of Expert groups has increased considerably, especially after 2000. Although the formal rules system regulating the creation and operation of Expert groups is weak this has become a standard way for a large part of the DGs to interact with their environment. We also see some convergence in consultative system(s) in the various DGs, as all, with the exception of two, have increased the number of Expert groups they organize. While $\frac{3}{4}$ of the Expert groups are informal, half of them are permanent. These findings clearly support the claim that the EU can be understood as a relatively stable multi-level governance system.

The density and durability of the population of Expert groups, on the other hand vary considerably between different Commission services. Some DGs are clearly engaged in governance of this kind, while other DGs are not involved in this mode of governance.

As to the factors that can explain the observed heterogeneity in the organization of Expert groups across policy fields we find some support for the design perspective. On the one hand, parts of the Commission set of Expert groups are deliberate attempts to match information systems and consultation to policy tasks. This is especially the case when we differentiate between internal/general services and sectorally oriented DGs. Most of the Expert groups are found in areas of substantive European policy areas, especially in task areas related to research, environment and enterprise policy. In issue areas related to internal administration, general services, and external relations, there are few – if any – Expert groups. The distinction between regulatory versus distributive policy can also account for some of the heterogeneity in the Commission’s use of Expert groups – contrary to our expectations distributive policies do not entail more use of Expert groups. We also find that external pressures in terms of number of interest groups are significantly correlated with the Commission’s DG propensity to establish Expert groups. Moreover much of the variation results from different institutional and organizational factors such as *legal and administrative capabilities*, as well as the gradual development of different routines and norms for connecting to the environment. Experts groups are typically established and drawn into the policy process in policy areas where legal competence is shared between the European and national level of governance. And the density of organized Expert groups is highest in the policy areas where administrative and policy making capacity has been amassed in the Commission.

A main pattern we observe is that Expert groups contribute to the sectoral differentiation of EU decision making, amplifying the sectoral organization of the European administrative space. Cross-sectoral coordination of expert group activities is at a very low level. The world of Expert groups unveils the Commission as a multi-organization that is part of structured multi-level governance within sectorally defined boundaries. This underlines the significance of the basic organizational structure of the Commission, its institutional traditions and routines, as well as the legal parameters and administrative capacity of the various DGs for the way in which European multilevel governance is structured.

We therefore argue that the EU is best understood as a functionally differentiated system with very different *modus operandi*. Different policy areas form issue and policy specific constituencies that evolve according to different logics. We have described the empirical variance in the Commission's expert group system and pointed to causal mechanisms and differentiating factors that can account for these differences. The findings underline the need to do justice to the heterogeneity of European multi-level governance in the study of European integration and its institutions and to specify the institutional conditions and actor constellation involved in governing Europe.

Acknowledgements

Draft versions of this article have been presented at the Arena seminar 8 May 2007 and at the CONNEX Conference: Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe, Barcelona 7-9th June 2007. We would like to thank Michael Bauer, Jeff Checkel, Thomas Christiansen, Pieter de Wilde, Morten Egeberg, Johan P. Olsen and participants at the ARENA seminar and Connex workshop for helpful comments.

Notes

¹ Note that these studies are focusing specifically on Comitology Committees.

² To our knowledge, the most comprehensive overview hitherto is provided by a Swedish governmental report prepared by Torbjörn Larsson (2003).

³ See Larsson (2007) for a discussion of the defining characteristics of Commission's expert advisory groups.

⁴ For reasons of simplicity we here use the terms found in the unratified Draft Constitutional Treaty.

⁵ It does not cover all expert groups and committees that are linked to the Commission. The following broad categories of entities are excluded from the Commission's register and thus also from our data base: 1) independent experts charged with assisting the Commission in the implementation of framework programmes for research and development; 2) Sectoral and cross-industry social dialogue committees, whose work is particularly aimed at the conclusion of agreements implemented by the Council or autonomous agreements implemented by the social partners themselves and at adopting frameworks for action. There were about 70 such committees in 2004; 3) Comitology committees which are established by the legislator to assist the Commission in policy areas where the Commission is empowered to implement legislation (about 250 such committees in 2004). 4) Joint entities arising from international agreements (a total of 170 joint entities in 2004). These entities differ from expert groups in terms of their creation and competence: they are created in accordance with methods laid down in international agreements and their role is to supervise their implementation <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/faq/faq.cfm?aide=2>

⁶ See full agreement here: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/docs/framework_agreement_ep-ec_en.pdf

⁷ Data on the European Commission was found in the Statistical Bulletin of Commission staff http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/bs_dg_category_en.pdf

⁸ Data for Comitology Committees from 2006 and for Council Committees from 2005, in addition there were 121 sub-groups under the Council working parties and committees Hayes-Renshaw F, Wallace H. 2006. The Council of Ministers. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan

⁹ Since there is uncertainty attached to the accuracy of the data from the years prior to the establishment of the register, some of this increase might reflect more rigorous methods for reporting.

¹⁰ As noted earlier, there is some uncertainty regarding the accuracy of the measure from 2000.

¹¹ A similar argument is voiced in theory by Broscheid and Coen as they expect to see more expert groups in regulatory policies as the nature of the policy good in these policy areas are affecting limited sets of societal actors in combination with high demand for technical information. However, they fail to find support for this hypothesis in their data on expert fora creation, rather they find (insignificantly) more Expert Groups in distributive policy domains (Broscheid A, Coen D. 2007. Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU: empirically exploring the nature of the policy good. *Journal of European Public Policy* 14:346-65.

References

- Beyers, J. and J. Trondal 2004. How nation states 'hit' Europe: Ambiguity and representation in the European Union. *West European Politics* 27:919-42
- Broscheid, A. and D. Coen 2007. Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU: empirically exploring the nature of the policy good. *Journal of European Public Policy* 14:346-65
- Burns, C. 2005. Who pays? Who gains? How do costs and benefits shape the policy influence of the European parliament? *Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies* 43:485-505
- Christiansen, T. 1997. Tensions of European governance: Politicized bureaucracy and multiple accountability in the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy* 4:73-90
- Christiansen, T. and T. Larsson eds. 2007. *The Role of Committees in the Policy-Process of the European Union - Legislation, Implementation and Deliberation.* : Edward Elgar
- Coen, D. 2007. Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying. *Journal of European Public Policy* 14:333-45
- Cram, L. 1994. The European Commission as a multi-organization: social policy and IT policy in the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy* 1:195-217
- Cram, L. 1997. *Policy-Making in the European Union.* London: Taylor & Francis
- Dahl, R. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press
- Dehousse R. 2003. Comitology: who watches the watchmen? *Journal of European Public Policy* 10:798-813
- Dogan, R. 1997. Comitology: Little Procedures with Big Implications. *West European Politics* 20:31
- Egeberg, M. 2006. Balancing Autonomy and Accountability: Enduring Tensions in the European Commission's Development. In M. Egeberg ed. *Multilevel Union Administration. The Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe*, pp. 31-50. Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan
- Egeberg, M, G.F.Schaefer and J. Trondal 2003. The many faces of EU committee governance. *West European Politics* 26:19-40
- Eising, R. and B. Kohler-Koch 1999. Governance in the European Union: A Comparative Assessment In B. Kohler-Koch and R Eising eds. *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union* pp. 3-13. London: Routledge
- Fouilleux, E, J. de Maillard and A. Smith 2005. Technical or political? The working groups of the EU Council of Ministers. *Journal of European Public Policy* 12:609-23

- Franchino, F. 2000. The commission's executive discretion, information and comitology. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12:155-81
- Franchino, F. 2005. The study of EU public policy: a survey. *European Union Politics* 6:243-52
- Gornitzka, Å and U. Sverdrup 2007. The sociometrics of EU governance. Forthcoming
- Gulick, L. 1937. Science, Values and Public Administration. In L Gulick and L Urwick eds..*Papers in the Science of Administration*. New York: Institute of Public Administration.
- Hayes-Renshaw, F. and H. Wallace 2006. *The Council of Ministers*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan
- Haas, P. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination *International Organization* 46:1-35
- Joerges, C. and J. Neyer J. 1997. From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology. *European Law Journal* 3:273-99
- Kohler-Koch, B. 1997. Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament. *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 1:1-14
- Kohler-Koch, B and B. Rittberger 2006. The Governance Turn in EU Studies. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44:27-49
- Laffan, B. 1997. *The Finances of the European Union*. London: Macmillan
- Larsson, T. 2003. *Precooking in the European Union – The World of Expert Groups*. Rep. Ds 2003:16, Stockholm
- Larsson, T. and J. Murk. 2007. The Commission's relations with expert advisory groups. In T Christiansen and T Larsson eds. *The Role of Committees in the Policy-Process of the European Union*, pp. 64-95. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
- Larsson, T. and Trondal 2006. Agenda setting in the European Commission: how the European Commission structure and influence the EU agenda. In HCH Hoffmann, AH Türk eds. *EU Administrative Governance*, pp. 11-43. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
- Lowi, T. 1964. American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory. *World Politics* 16:677-715
- Mahoney, C. 2004. The power of institutions – State and interest group activity in the European Union. *European Union Politics* 5:441-66
- Majone, G. 1994. The European Community. An “Independent Fourth Branch of Government”? In G Brüggemeier ed. *Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa*, Baden-Baden: Nomos

- March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen 1998. The institutional dynamics of international political orders. *International Organization* 52:943-69
- Olsen, J.P. 1997. Institutional Design in Democratic Contexts. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 5:203-29
- Olsen, J.P. 2001. Organizing European Institutions of Governance: A Prelude to an Institutional Account to European Integration. In H Wallace ed. *Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration*, pp. 323-53. Houndmills: Palgrave
- Olsen, J.P. 2002. Reforming European Institutions of Governance. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:581-602
- Olsen, J.P. 2007. *Europe in Search of Political Order. An institutional perspective on unity/diversity, citizens/their helpers, democratic design/historical drift, and the co-existence of orders.* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Pollack, MA. 2003. Control mechanism or deliberative democracy? Two images of comitology. *Comparative Political Studies* 36:125-55
- Radaelli, CM. 1999. The public policy of the European Union: whither politics of expertise? *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:757-74
- Rhinard, M. 2002. The democratic legitimacy of the European Union committee system. *Governance—an International Journal of Policy and Administration* 15:185-210
- Scharpf, F.W. 1999. *Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?* New York: Oxford University Press. VIII, 243 s. pp.
- Shore, C. 2000. *Building Europe: the cultural politics of European integration.* London: Routledge. XII, 258 s. pp.
- Stevens, A. and H. Stevens 2001. *Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the European Union.* Houndmills: Palgrave
- van Schendelen, M.P.C.M. 1998. Prolegomena to EU Committees as Influential Policy Makers. In M.P.C.M van Schendelen ed. *EU Committees as Influential Policymakers*, Aldershot: Ashgate
- Vos, E. 1997. The Rise of Committees. *European Law Journal* 3:210-29
- Wessels, W. 1997. An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration processes. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35:267-99
- Wessels, W. 1998. Comitology: Fusion in action. *Politico-administrative trends in the EU system.* *Journal of European Public Policy* 5:209-34

Appendix

Service	Service	Expert g (N)	Budget 2006 mill Eu	Connecs	Legal	Staff (web side)
Personnel and Administration	ADMIN	3	660	0	1	670
Agriculture and Rural Development	AGRI	64	54455	30	1	887
Europe Aid	AIDCO	5	0,1	0	2	583
Bureau of European Policy Advisors	BEPA	5	0,1	0	1	25
Budget	BUDG	3	1160	0	1	382
Directorate General for Communication	COMM	1	205	0	1	492
Competition	COMP	7	99	0	1	593
Directorate General for Development	DEV	30	1301	1	2	245
Directorate General for Translation	DGT	1	0	0	1	2113
Education and Culture	EAC	71	1008	12	4	482
Economic and Financial Affairs	ECFIN	10	468	0	1	441
Enlargement	ELARG	1	2205	0	2	226
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities	EMPL	62	11934	36	3	559
Enterprise and Industry	ENTR	120	400	23	4	727
Environment	ENV	127	346	17	2	492
Eurostat	ESTAT	85	133	0	2	578
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs	FISH	25	1074	1	1	250
Information Society and Media	INFSO	38	1425	2	3	820
Justice, Freedom and Security	JLS	33	605	0	4	328
Joint Research Centre	JRC	3		0		1710
Internal Market and Services	MARKT	51	75	1	1	376
European Anti-Fraud Office	OLAF	5	66	0	1	290
Regional Policy	REGIO	58	28629	1	2	523
External Relations	RELEX	11	3476	1	4	651
Research	RTD	129	3526	0	2	1150
Health and Consumer Protection	SANCO	89	559	3	2	625
Secretariat General/Legal Service	SG	4	0	0	1	778
Taxation and Customs Union	TAXUD	95	130	0	3	354
Trade	TRADE	7	83	1	1	398
Energy and Transport	TREN	94	1462	4	3	863
Directorate General Informatics	DIGIT	0	0	0	1	359
Humanitarian Aid	ECHO	0	515	0	2	154
European Personnel Selection Office	EPSO	0	0	0	1	106
Internal Audit Service	IAS	0	12	0	1	71
Office for Infrastructure and Logistics in Brussels	OIB	0	0	0	1	415
Office for Infrastructure and Logistics in Luxembourg	OIL	0	0	0	1	160
Publications Office	OPOCE	0	0	0	1	595
Paymasters Office	PMO	0	0	0	1	234
Directorate General for Interpretation	SCIS	0	0	0	1	667
Legal Service	SJ	0	215	0	1	321
Total		1237	116226,2	133		21693
