

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

Matthew Stenberg and Jarle Trondal

ARENA Working Paper 1/2026

ARENA Centre for European Studies



Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

Matthew Stenberg is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Future of Higher Education program at the University of California, Berkeley.

Jarle Trondal is Professor at the ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, Professor at the Department for Political Sciences and Management at the University of Agder and Senior Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, Institute of European Studies.

ARENA Working Paper 1/2026
January 2026

Reproduction of this text is subject to permission by the authors
© ARENA 2026

ARENA Working Paper (online) | ISSN 1890-7741

ARENA Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo
P.O.Box 1143, Blindern
N-0318 Oslo Norway
www.arena.uio.no

ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo promotes theoretically oriented, empirically informed studies analysing the dynamics of the evolving European political order. The research is multidisciplinary and organized along four key dimensions: A European democratic order; the EU's executive order; expertise and knowledge in the EU; and European foreign and security policy.



**UNIVERSITETET
I OSLO**

 facebook.com/arena.uio

 [linkedin.com/company/
arena-centre-for-european-studies/](https://linkedin.com/company/arena-centre-for-european-studies/)

 <https://bsky.app/profile/unioslo-arena.bsky.social>

Summary

The fifty U.S. states are commonly thought of as policy laboratories, where the institutional structures of federalism allow states to experiment independently. As such, we theorize that considerable variation in bureaucratic autonomy is likely among public administrators across U.S. states. Moreover, given the increasing partisan politicization of administration in the U.S. over the past forty years, differences could emerge between the states in bureaucratic autonomy, a vital tenet of public administration in advanced democracies. Using data from the American State Administrators Project by Yackee and Yackee (2021) ($n \approx 11,500$), we examine perceptions of autonomy on several measures over four decades (1964–2008). We find that bureaucratic autonomy does not seem to be profoundly affected by partisanship. Despite partisan politics, the paper observes that administrators' perceptions of autonomy are largely stable over time and space and not subject to significant partisan dynamics. Bureaucrats thus feel insulated from external political pressures. Consequently, we identify consistent and robust trends across states, with less variation in perceptions of autonomy than one might expect given broader political variation within the U.S. federal system.

Keywords

Bureaucratic autonomy – Public administration – Federalism – Partisanship – State governance

Introduction

The American bureaucracy has become increasingly politicized since 2016. Republican Party rhetoric about “draining the swamp” has focused heavily on public administration, perceived corruption among bureaucrats, and administrators as barriers to implementing President Trump’s agenda. In President Trump’s first term, this rhetoric may have contributed to considerable bureaucratic turnover; this turnover was particularly concentrated among those in administrative positions with more authority over the direction of policymaking (Doherty et al. 2019) and from agencies heavily hit by presidential cutbacks (Libgober and Richardson 2023). Trump also made concrete moves against the civil service, escalating to an October 2020 executive order to reduce employment protections for members of the civil service (Moynihan 2022). Prior to the 2024 election, the Heritage Foundation wrote “Project 2025” as a Republican plan to fundamentally reshuffle federal administration, including independent agencies, by slashing regulations and government budgets, eliminating job protection for government employees, and placing the federal administration under direct presidential control. These intentions were supported with the establishment of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) under the second Trump Administration, which intended to reduce the size of the federal workforce, number of federal contracts, and spending on the federal budget (Kukec et al. 2025, Section 6.1).

Similar politicization of bureaucracy has occurred over recent years in a range of states around the globe, including Italy, Brazil, and Mexico, among many others (Bauer et al. 2021; Lotta et al. 2023). This has put the autonomy of public bureaucracies under unprecedented pressure and spurred academic interest in the conditions of bureaucratic autonomy, particularly in democracies facing democratic backsliding (e.g. Bauer et al. 2021). Attempts by executives to exert control over public administration, however, are not a new phenomenon, either internationally or in the United States (U.S.). In recent years there has been a near universal call for the desirability of increased executive control and government steering over public administration (OECD 2021). This has amplified the inherent tension between the executive control and bureaucratic autonomy of public administration. Moreover, it reflects the long-established scholarly conversation on the relationship between administration and democracy: “If administration is indeed ‘the core of modern government,’ then a theory of democracy...must embrace administration, and vice-versa” (Waldo 1952, 81).

This tension can be illustrated by the increasing reliance in the U.S. from executive orders issued by the president. These executive orders – directives issued by politicians in the U.S. – are clear manifestations of the general involvement by political leaders in the everyday conduct of public administration and bureaucratic staff. Executive orders and presidential memoranda, among a range of other direct actions taken by Presidents, have been widely used by all administrations since World War II (Kagan 2001; Lowande 2014; Potter et al. 2022). While much attention has focused on

this phenomenon at the national level, recent years have also brought about widespread use of gubernatorial executive orders at the subnational level (Seifter 2017), replicating national trends at the state level. While there has been scholarly discussion of political implications of increasing use of gubernatorial executive orders in the U.S. (e.g. Bernick and Wiggins 1984; Ferguson and Bowling 2008; Cockerham and Crew 2017; Seifter 2017; Weissert et al. 2021), we know little about how this increased centralized and partisan dynamic might intersect with bureaucratic autonomy.

An expansion of executive control often necessarily entails a reduction in bureaucratic autonomy, as the capacity for public administrators to make independent policy decisions may be reduced (Waldo 1952; Trondal 2023). When coupled with increasing federal control of sub-state administration, bureaucratic autonomy may be considered under increased and persistent pressure over time (Easton 1965; Miller 1971; Ansell et al. 2017, 1; Bauer et al. 2021). While this tension is also a recognized element in studies of federal–regional relations (e.g. Halberstam and Hills 2001; Pierre and Peters 2005; Fenna 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 2016), this study goes one step further by examining this tension *within* subnational jurisdictions in U.S. states. Subnational public administration remains understudied in extant literature, especially given that changes to subnational administrative policies, budgets, and rules attract less scholarly and general attention than similar changes at the national level (Krause and Meier 2003; Jakli and Stenberg 2021).

Autonomy refers to discretion or room for maneuver that actors are granted to formulate and execute their own will – e.g. when making rules, budgets, or policies (Carpenter 2001, 4; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2). To better study how bureaucratic autonomy varies across time and space (here across U.S. states), we offer a novel study of an earlier period in American politics, *before* the most recent acceleration of the politicization of the administrative state. Given that federalism allows states to develop different policies and procedures for public administration, and that states have different political cultures and partisan preferences, we hypothesize significant variation in the autonomy that civil servants perceive they have across different U.S. states. We also hypothesize variation over time both within and between states as partisan makeups of state leadership change and as public administration was affected by increasing partisan polarization.

To examine these differences, we use novel longitudinal data on U.S. subnational bureaucratic autonomy to illuminate the challenges of combining executive control, such as political intervention, with the bureaucratic autonomy of government administration. These data (n=11,529) come from the American State Administrators Project (ASAP), which surveys public officials across all fifty U.S. states over a 44-year period (1964–2008) (Yackee and Yackee 2021). Using these data allows us to address the need for more longitudinal data in public administration research by providing studies of bureaucratic elites over time (Murdoch et al. 2023) as well as for a greater focus on bureaucratic perceptions (Stritch 2017).

Following Palus and Yackee (2016), we use different self-reported measures of perceived autonomy, which measure the frequency of and level of influence of communication from political actors on state administrators (see below). We do this within *subnational* public administration in the U.S., focusing on the aggregate perceptions of these administrators.

Despite the major political and policy differences across states and time, we find a remarkable degree of temporal continuity and consistency as well as territorial similarity with respect to public administrators' perceptions of autonomy in U.S. states. These findings are surprising given the perceptions of U.S. states as policy laboratories (e.g. Brandeis' "Laboratories of Democracy"),¹ where we might reasonably expect greater variation in where administrators feel more or less autonomous within the U.S. federal system. Although previous studies show that U.S. agency leaders orient their party identification towards their direct political principals (Geys et al. 2024), our findings suggest that perceptions of administrative autonomy in U.S. states are a robust and systemic characteristic and not subject to significant partisan dynamics. These findings also support recent studies showing the robustness of bureaucratic autonomy in advanced democratic states as well as organizational conditions for robustness (e.g. Ansell and Torfing 2014; Ansell and Trondal 2017; Trondal 2023). Moreover, these findings may imply that domestic politics are less threatening to U.S. public administrators' autonomy than is sometimes assumed (Bauer 2024) and that administrative actors can leverage resources to achieve substantial autonomy from legislators and partisan politics (e.g. Moe 2012). This is an important finding given the 2025 change of federal government in the U.S.

The paper proceeds in three parts: first, we review extant literature on bureaucratic autonomy and outline testable hypotheses for how these perceptions may be contingent on subnational variation across jurisdictions within the U.S. Second, we outline our data and empirical strategy. Finally, we discuss our findings and descriptive observations on U.S. state administrators across time.

Reviewing and theorizing bureaucratic autonomy

Public administration plays a crucial and semi-autonomous role in advanced democracies and is an essential opportunity structure in such systems (Vibert 2007; Orren and Skowronek 2017). Among other things, it filters "the beliefs and demands coming from society" into public governance processes (Heper 1987, 4). Moreover, impartial public administration is essential for 'good' and 'living' political orders (March and Olsen 1995; Rothstein 2012). Consequentially, one long-standing enquiry in public administration research pertains to its autonomy, including conceptually specifying autonomy, causally determining autonomy, and studying varied consequences of autonomy. Being a multidimensional and multifaceted analytical concept which is measured in various ways in extant literature (see Bersch and Fukuyama 2023), e.g., encompassing *de jure* autonomy, *de facto* autonomy, and perceptual autonomy, there is no scholarly agreement about the precise meaning and desirable scope of the concept of *autonomy* (Olsen 2010; Verhoest et al. 2010).

Administrative autonomy has been conceptualized as the discretionary balancing-act pursued by bureaucratic institutions and actors – encompassing political loyalty, legality, epistocracy, stakeholder involvement, and past decisions. When conducting these balancing acts, autonomy may refer to the discretion or room of maneuver actors are granted to formulate and execute their own will – e.g. when making rules, budgets, or policies (Carpenter 2001, 4; Huber and Shipan 2002, 2).

The opposite of autonomy (subordination) implies that requisite room of maneuver for actors to formulate and execute their will is lacking based on procedural limitations, ex post reviews, appointment and promotion powers, removal powers and ad hoc interventions by political authorities (Bersch and Fukuyama 2023). These interventions could also simply come in the form of more frequent interaction and communication, increasing awareness of the political principal over the bureaucratic agent (Choi et al. 2004; Carpenter et al. 2012); existing empirical work considers frequency of formal and informal communication as a means of principals exerting control over agencies.² In the words of Eisenstadt, “the opposite of such autonomy is not necessarily the nonexistence of different specialized tasks but rather their absorption into broader ascriptive collectivities or networks” (Eisenstadt 1987, 178) . In the context of public administration, autonomy is mostly used to understand the ability of administrative institutions and actors to use their discretion when implementing policies made by political leadership (Bersch and Fukuyama 2023), while also guarding against potential corruption of and by that leadership (Yesilkagit et al. 2024).

Autonomy has been useful for studying macro-level dynamics of state-building as the “permeation of the periphery by the center” (Eisenstadt 1987, 176) as well as mundane meso-level dynamics of regulatory agenda-setting and enforcement in public bureaucracies (Hammond 1986). Following the latter stand of literature, autonomy has been useful for studying bureaucratic actors facing complex interdependences since it recognizes that such actors may be reliant on others and yet pursue autonomous interests and courses of action. (Hammond 2003; May et al. 2008; Olsen 2010). In the context of this study, we study the autonomy of subnational administrators in the U.S. vis-à-vis both partisan political principals: governors and state legislators. We do not study autonomy vis-à-vis other actors in the democratic system, such as federal actors, stakeholder groups, or international organizations.

Lipsky (1980, 19) asserted that bureaucratic autonomy is driven by administrators’ conspicuous desire for maximizing their autonomy (see also Krause and Meier 2003; Katznelson and Weingast 2005; Gilardi 2008). Literature on discretionary behavior of public administrators, however, also shows that endogenous structural characteristics of public administration both enable and constrain their autonomy (Hammond 2003; May et al. 2008; Olsen 2010). Supplementary to Lipsky (e.g. Krause and Meier 2003; Katznelson and Weingast 2005; Gilardi 2008), this study theorizes that bureaucratic autonomy is shaped by the organizational structuring of governing institutions and systems (Schattschneider 1960; Hammond 1986; Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Fligstein 2021). We apply organization theory to account for this structuring effect. Organization theory is a partial theory that captures endogenous organizational

elements of administrative life. Compared to the bureaucratic politics literature, organization theory account for micro-level agential dynamics (e.g. actors' perceptions of autonomy) by the organizational design of institutions rather than the preferences of the actors (see Simon 1947; Allison 1969; Bach 2025). Actors' preferences and decision-making are seen as shaped and biased by the organizational embedding of those actors. Similar mechanisms are discussed in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, where the former argues that cognitive ambiguity leads actors to rely on simple cues and heuristics while the latter argues that actors base their choices on probabilistic heuristics and cognitive shortcuts to make new evidence fit preexisting beliefs (Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Kahneman et al. 2021). An organizational theory approach may thus account for variation in bureaucratic autonomy across subnational jurisdictions (between U.S. states), as well as by different political actors (between legislators and governors).

Although few would deny that organizations generally matter to politics, organization theory is not used extensively in contemporary political science research (Krause and Meier 2003, 12; Olsen 2010; Döhler 2020; Hattke and Vogel 2023) or in literature on bureaucratic autonomy (Bersch and Fukuyama 2023). This neglect may reflect growing scholarly specialization and ensuing fragmentation of political science scholarship and organizational studies (Peters et al. 2022; Capano and Verzichelli 2023). An organizational theory approach posits that the organizational design of bureaucracies may shape administrative life in specific ways, such as patterns of interaction and coordination, senses of loyalty among staff members, mutual patterns of trust and legitimacy, as well as information processing - which in turn may automatize decision-making processes of such institutions (Egeberg and Trondal 2018; Olsen 2007). In the classical study of decision-making, organizational structures were understood as "complex information processing" systems permitting stable premises for the scarce attention of actors (Simon 1947; Axtell 2024).

An organizational theory approach is useful in at least two respects. First, organizational theory may add knowledge on how bureaucratic structures systematically shape both individual perceptions of autonomy and the systemic autonomy of government (Axtell 2024). In this way, organization theory serves to connect macro- and micro-level dynamics in "which groups of agents form and interact, intermediate between micro and macro levels" in public administration (Axtell 2024, 318). Second, since organization structures are available to deliberate design, empirical lessons may add practical value for administrative policy (Hattke and Vogel 2023). Because organization structure is subject to *deliberate intervention and reform*, it may serve as a design instrument in public administration (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). If significant relationships are observed between elements of the organizational structure and bureaucrats' perceptions of autonomy, this subsequently serves as a knowledgebase for practical design of autonomy in public administration (Egeberg 2003; Meier 2010; Egeberg and Trondal 2018; Krause and Jin 2020).

Consequently, we may hypothesize that re-designing the organizational structures of bureaucracies will systematically change the perceptions of autonomy of staff members in public administration.

An organizational theory approach thus posits that the organizational structure of U.S. states is likely to systematically influence or shape state administrator's perceptions of autonomy. Organizations and decision-makers live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent information that may be attended to in decision situations (Simon 1947). Being "complex information processing" systems, organizational characteristics of administrative systems will guide behavior of staff in such situations (Klahr and Kotovsky 1989). Contemporary studies in organization theory particularly emphasize the effect of organizational *structure* (Egeberg 2003; Egeberg and Trondal 2018). An organization structure is a normative structure composed of rules and roles specifying who is expected to what, when, and how (Scott and Davis 2007). It suggests how roles, power and responsibilities are distributed, controlled, and coordinated (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 2018). It may thus influence the perceptions of bureaucratic autonomy by providing actors with "a systematic and predictable selection of problems, solutions and choice opportunities" (March and Olsen 1976, 12). In effect, this argument leads us to reasonably expect that perceptions of bureaucratic autonomy among state administrators are systematically influenced or shaped by the organizational structures of the government system. As these vary at the state level, we might reasonably expect great variation in where administrators feel more or less autonomous across U.S. states.

In a federal system, such as the U.S., with a minimalist notion of central authority (Glassman 1987, 28), we see a great number of policy portfolios distributed territorially. In federal systems, sub-state units form distinct and more-or-less cohesive political communities (Keating 2017, 629). If, for example, organizations are specialized according to the geographical area served, we might reasonably expect that spatial perspectives are mobilized among office holders and that bureaucrats pay attention primarily to particular territorial concerns and the need for 'intra-territorial' policy coherence (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2003). These communities, therefore, may influence perceptions among bureaucrats about how government institutions works and ought to work. In the context of this study, the U.S. federal structure reflects the territorial composition of the political system, which is likely to influence or shape the perceptions of autonomy among bureaucrats along *territorial lines of cleavage*, which will lead to territorial variation in perceptions of bureaucratic autonomy. Consequently, we should reasonably expect to see jurisdictional variation in public officials' perception of autonomy *between* states, which may remain fairly consistent over time.

Building on the above general theoretical propositions, we outline two testable hypotheses for how variation in perceptions of autonomy among public administrators is likely to manifest *between* and *within* U.S. states.

Variation between U.S. states

From an organization theory approach, variation in perceptions of autonomy may arguably be contingent on the vertical organizational design of a polity (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). The American political system was founded on profoundly decentralized principles (e.g. Skowronek 1982; Dobbin 1994). While the states of the

U.S. exist under one national government, the decentralized organizational design of the U.S. federal system is likely to lead to considerable subnational variation in bureaucratic autonomy. Similar observations have been made in the quasi-federal polity of the European Union, in which perceptions of autonomy among state-level administrators are profoundly influenced and shaped by the decentralized organizational design of the multilevel European administrative state (Trondal 2025). Bach et al. (2015) show that national agencies that are engaged in EU-level politics are autonomized from state-level executives. In short, vertical organizational designs of federal polities increases the likelihood of state-level variation in bureaucratic autonomy, which also increases the leeway for policy experimentation among state-level administrators.

At the same time, state politics in the U.S. have become more polarized, leading to increased policy differentiation among states (Jordan and Bowling 2016; Grumbach 2018; 2022). Because of this increase in polarization on the state level which bring about different policy outcomes, we might reasonably expect similar variation over time with respect to perceptions of autonomy among the state administrators involved in making that policy. While the space for policy experimentation in different territorial jurisdictions is commonly thought of positively in both domestic and international contexts as enabling policy learning (e.g. Volden 2006; Gilardi et al. 2009), it also may create space for policy experimentation that leads to outcomes that are bad for democratic governance (Rocco 2021; Grumbach 2022; Stenberg and O'Dwyer 2023). Because of this space for experimentation, different states may have different leeway for experimentation, which may impact bureaucratic autonomy and provide greater or less insulation from encroaching executive order (Johnson 2013). Generally, more independent administrative institutions are able to perform tasks relatively independently from outside influence, which may allow for increased perceptions of autonomy among incumbents (Page 1992).

H1: We should see significant between-state variation in perceptions of bureaucratic autonomy from respondents in different U.S. states.

Variation within U.S. states

In a multilevel polity such as the U.S., we might expect to see variation in aggregate trends across two dimensions: jurisdiction (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2003) and policy domain (e.g. Orren and Skowronek 2017). Much of the extant literature on bureaucratic autonomy in multilevel contexts pertains to the vertical relationship between intergovernmental units. In the U.S., there is a considerable literature on the ability of states to act autonomously from the federal government (e.g. Conlan 1991; Walker 1995; Hills 1998; Cho and Wright 2001; Smith, Jr. 2021), including in comparative contexts (Erk and Koning 2010). An additional body of literature examines the influence of state governments on the autonomous actions of local governments through either questions of structure (Marando and Reeves 1993; Nelson 2011) or policy preemption (e.g. Riverstone-Newell 2017; Barber and Dynes 2023). Another body of literature discusses the autonomy of the federal bureaucracy in the U.S. vis-à-

vis national level actors (e.g. Hammond and Knott 1996; Carpenter 2001). We also see a similar literature emerging in comparative politics and comparative public administration (Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008; Groenleer 2009; Verhoest et al. 2010). However, there is limited literature examining variation in state autonomy *within* the administration of meso-level jurisdictions in either the U.S. or comparative contexts. Huber and Shipan's work examining *de jure* bureaucratic autonomy is a notable exception to this. They not only do interstate comparison of the differential impacts on partisanship within the U.S. across 48 states (Huber et al. 2001) but also extend a cross-national comparison to look at the broader impact of institutions on autonomy (Huber and Shipan 2002). Additionally, Lillvis (2017) describes reasons why bureaucratic professionalism may vary between U.S. states,³ including the level of professionalization of the state legislature, gubernatorial control over appointments, and the frequency of divided partisan control of government. Fisher (1988) examines the continued reduction in institutional autonomy afforded to public higher education institutions in five separate states, concluding that the trends moved uniformly to less autonomy from 1900 to 1979. In comparative literature, Kirkhaug and Mikalsen (2009) examine perceptions of autonomy among county-level bureaucrats in the unitary state of Norway; however, their analysis does not analyze variation between the counties as much as between individual administrators. Studies also show that the more national agencies engage in federal policy-making, the more autonomy they are likely to gain vis-a-vis ministerial departments at state level (Bach and Ruffing 2013).

While this literature suggests that variation within states may exist, it does not, however, clearly indicate a *direction*. Jacobs et al. (2019, 453) discuss national politics in the U.S. as a partisan "struggle for the services of national administrative power." Further research finds impacts on national regulatory rulemaking from both executive and legislative partisan transitions (O'Connell 2011). As state-level administration governs a great deal of substantive policymaking in federal systems such as the U.S., we can replicate similar patterns at the subnational (state) level (e.g. Merriman and Pacewicz 2022). Divided state governments do result in greater rulemaking from state agencies (Boushey and McGrath 2020), implying that bureaucrats may perceive greater autonomy to enact policy when partisan gridlock impedes political control.

Although a good deal of the work of state administration is likely to be either genuinely routine, highly technical, broadly popular with the public, and/or guided by administrative ethos that emphasize meritocratic bureaucracy and thus not susceptible to politicization, extant literature suggests that the direction of variation within states might be shaped by executive partisanship (Bauer 2024). A vast literature shows partisan influence on the U.S. federal administration, e.g. politicization of appointments of top civil servants by the political parties in which political criteria for appointment substitute merit-based criteria (e.g. Brown 1982; Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Peters and Pierre 2025). Using ASAP data, Geys et al. (2024) show that U.S. state government agency leaders display a pattern of reorienting their partisan leaning toward shifting political principals, while Palus and Yackee (2016) identify an association between partisan alignment and reduced perceptions of autonomy among those state agency leaders. Moreover, literature on bureaucratic autonomy show that

perceptions of autonomy among public administrators are sensitive to policy and politics issued by political leaders. Bersch and Fukuyama (2025) show that perceptions of bureaucratic autonomy in government agencies in Brazil are associated with administrators' perceptions of governance quality by said agencies, mediated by agency capacity. Studies from U.S. Cabinet departments suggest that political (mis)alignment between a bureaucrat and its political leadership affects perceptions of autonomy among federal administrators (Bertelli 2016).

Given the increasing partisan polarization over our period of study, we might expect there to be variation in strategies among Republican and Democratic politicians within states over time – and those strategies may subsequently shape how bureaucrats perceive their operational environment. Although extant literature identifies partisan effects on bureaucratic autonomy (e.g. Grady and Simon 2002), it does not identify systematic variation between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party in support for bureaucratic autonomy in U.S. states. Both parties deploy a range of different mechanisms to implement measures to affect bureaucratic autonomy when in power, albeit with somewhat different levels of emphasis across them. These include political appointments to control agencies (Yackee 2024),¹ bureaucratic leadership appointments (Berkowitz and Krause 2020),² specific policy measures (Miller et al. 2012),³ and sectoral resource allocation (Beland and Oloomi 2017). In sum, we both parties concretely seek to influence bureaucratic autonomy in their own interests and, we should therefore not expect partisan variation in how bureaucrats perceive their autonomy. This leads to H2:

H2: We should not see significant within-state variation in how bureaucrats perceive their autonomy when Republicans or Democrats hold the governor's mansion.

Data and empirical strategy

To understand subnational variation in bureaucrats' perception of autonomy, the empirical analysis descriptively examines two plausible areas of variation. To analyze the evolution of perceived autonomy over time, we rely on data from the American State Administrators Project's most recent release (Yackee and Yackee 2021). These data include 11,529 individual-level survey responses from all fifty U.S. states covering the period from 1964 to 2008. The survey was conducted in periodic waves (1964, 1968, 1974, 1978, 1984, 1988, 2004, 2008), with responses are from agency heads from subnational (state-level) public administrative bodies as identified by the Council of State Governments' *State Directory*. From these data, we use a series of questions from two batteries within the survey that ask public administrators about their level of autonomy vis-à-vis other actors in their political system. These separate batteries help us to understand autonomy from several different angles.⁴ Our analysis focuses on jurisdictional variation between and within U.S. states and variation between functional administrative policy domains.

The first battery asks administrators about their perceptions of autonomy from both the state governor and from the state legislature (and their staffs) in three different domains: policy content, budget, and applicable administrative rules and regulations.

Each domain is analyzed in isolation, as autonomy can substantively differ across domains; aggregating all four into a single analysis would risk losing substantively interesting variation. Our use of perceptual data is motivated by organization theory, which argues that observed behavior is driven by the perceptions of actors. In abstract, “behavior is the consequence of minds interacting with their environments” (Gigerenzer et al. 2024, 2). This implies that, to the extent that actual bureaucratic autonomy exists, its impact in practice is fundamentally shaped and influenced by actors’ perceptions of autonomy. Existing research from this data collection moreover identifies a positive relationship between institutional and perceptual dimensions of administrative autonomy (Choi et al. 2004). Data for these questions begin in 1974. More information regarding the text of these questions as well as the measurement scales can be found in Appendix A.

To examine trends over time, we use the data in two ways. First, we use OLS regression to examine trends in perceptions of autonomy among individual administrators. Second, we aggregate data at the level of the state-year. The first battery of questions uses a clear 0-3 scale, where responses of 0 are indicative of greater autonomy and responses of 3 are indicative of less autonomy. An alternative specification of the individual administrators model using ordinal probit regression is available in Appendix H.

Specific language in the questions asks about the “degree of influence” on these different domains by a range of actors (see Appendix A for complete language). Existing literature suggests that we can reasonably apply a question focusing on “influence” (of political principals on bureaucrats) to our conceptualization of autonomy. For example, Yesilkagit and van Thiel (2008) find that political influence limits policy autonomy in the public sector. Christensen and Lægreid (2007, 508) consider specifically how “influence from above” is analogous with political control and could be a reasonable (or not) limit on bureaucratic autonomy. Wynen et al. (2014) find that external control mechanisms on managerial autonomy can inhibit public organizations from achieving their objectives. Meanwhile, Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2012) use an inverted measure – legislators’ perceptions of bureaucratic influence – as a measure of legislative autonomy. Altogether, the literature suggests that measuring political principals’ influence on administrators is a reasonable proxy for how they would perceive their autonomy across domains.

The second battery of questions examines the frequency of contact, as a second proxy of autonomy, between administrators and political actors in the executive and legislative branches. We include data on governors, legislators, and their staffs. Data on governors and legislators are collected from 1974 onward; data for staffs begin in 1978. Frequency of contact with administrators has been used in other measures of bureaucratic autonomy as a key indicator (Choi et al. 2004; Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2011). This battery uses an inverted 1-5 scale; for our analysis, we invert this scale for ease of interpretation. As such, in our analysis, responses of 5 are indicative of more frequent contact, and thereby less autonomy. Responses of 1 indicate greater autonomy (no contact). Similarly, we examine these questions in two forms:

individually using OLS and in aggregate, creating state-level panel data. We again calculate the mean by state-year, with a higher number indicating that public administrators in the given state self-reported more contact from the relevant political actors.

Table 1. Proxy Dependent Variables in Models.

Battery	Influence						Communication			
Measure	Policy		Rules		Budget		Gov. Freq.		Leg. Freq.	
Actor	Gov	Leg	Gov	Leg	Gov	Leg	Gov	Gov Staff	Leg	Leg Staff

In the OLS models analyzing individual respondents, the primary independent variable in gubernatorial models is the partisanship of the governor. In the models relating to autonomy from legislative actors, we include a dummy variable indicating if there was split legislative control and a dummy variable indicating if there was unified Republican control in a given year. If this variable is significant, it indicates that partisan control of both houses would systematically affect bureaucratic autonomy. Given the state's unicameral legislature, respondents from Nebraska are dropped from legislative models. These data on gubernatorial and legislative partisanship come from Klarner (2013). Standard individual-level controls for age, political ideology, race, gender, and level of education are included to better account for variation in respondents correlated with personal characteristics, as is a control for the size of a respondent's agency budget (in 2018 dollars), given that their budget may clearly influence their level of autonomy. Year and state fixed effects are also included, both to control for other factors as well as to test for systematic differences between respondents from different states, which we might expect from hypothesis 1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Full statistical tables including controls and fixed effects are available in the Appendices.⁵

While there are limitations to inferences that we can draw from aggregate analysis using state panel data, the data do allow us to illustrate variable trends in state-level autonomy over time. Additionally, our data are all self-reported indicators of autonomy (however, see the above discussion). As such, we are measuring the perception of public administrators of their own autonomy vis-à-vis political actors (see Stritch 2017), as opposed to any objective indicator of bureaucratic autonomy. As argued above, since we may reasonably assume that actual behavior is shaped and facilitated by behavioral perceptions among public administrators, *perceptual data* may serve as a valid proxy for actual bureaucratic autonomy. Moreover, by measuring these perceptions using several variables, several surveys across time, and fairly large number of observations, we are able to detect robust patterns. Finally, this aggregate method allows us to bring in other variables that might systematically influence administration at the state level that existing research in political science might suggest plays a role in the expansion of executive control vis-à-vis bureaucratic autonomy (such as partisanship of governors and state legislatures).

In bringing these variables into our discussion, we also cautiously aim to contribute toward a reconciliation of the split between public administration research and political science (Kettl 2022).

Analysis

The analysis discusses both general trends in the data as well as statistical analysis of our hypothesis regarding how these trends may operationalize in the U.S. context.

To better examine H1, we turn to descriptive analysis. Figures 1-3 examine larger trends in the degree of influence played by legislators and governors on state administration. As with before, we continue to show broad subnational variation by illustrating all fifty states. To examine if partisanship could play a role, given the increasing politicization of the civil service over the period of study (Peters and Pierre 2004), we show both the governor's party as well as unified legislative control on each figure. Previous research has found that both factors can impact policy making processes in state-level public administration (Woods 2004; Krause and Melusky 2012).

Figure 1. Influence on Budget Changes.





Figure 1 examines budgetary changes. Existing research shows a link between partisan ideology and budgetary priorities (Bräuninger 2005; Epp et al. 2014), including at the subnational level (Alt and Lowry 2000; Potrafke 2011). There is also a wide literature

on the political budget cycle, which suggests that politicians actively intervene in the budgetary process to increase their electoral prospects (e.g. Blais and Nadeau 1992; de Haan and Klomp 2013; Bostashvili and Ujhelyi 2019). Despite the broad findings about the politicization of budgets – which might suggest some variation over time, depending on individual actors, the timing of elections, and partisanship – in large part we see a remarkable degree of temporal continuity across most U.S. states in Figure 1. All figures are organized alphabetically by state. For alternate orderings by either the maximum gap on a variable within a state at any point, or the largest shift over time within a state, please see Appendix G.

Across most states over time, we see a high degree of perceived political influence on the administrative budget process from both legislators and governors. These patterns are surprisingly stable. There are some exceptions to this – in several southern states, including Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas, we see that governors exert considerably less influence in the process than do legislators, and there tend to be more year-to-year variability than in most regions. This is in line with the broad literature on comparative gubernatorial power (Schlesinger 1965; Beyle 1968; Dometrius 1979; Mueller 1985), which has generally found governors in southern U.S. states to be systematically weak in formal power (see also Highsaw 1959). In Mueller (1985), these three states in question rank the lowest in his gubernatorial power index. At the same time, that literature suggests that governors have steadily increased in power over time (see also Seifter 2017), but we do not see a great deal of evidence of that it impacts public administrators' perceptions of gubernatorial influence.


In California, we see the level of political influence on the budgetary process drops noticeably after 1994 for both governors and legislators. This could be for any number of reasons but could potentially relate to the increasing economic strength of California during the first internet boom. In general, though, trends for political influence on budget show remarkable continuity within the considerable majority of U.S. states and, for the most part, little variation between them. This is surprising considering that existing research has found influence of U.S. state political cultures on budgeting priorities (Koven and Mausolff 2002), which might suggest that political actors engage with public administrators differently with respect to budgets. Regression analysis (see Appendix B) does not find that partisanship, split legislative control, region, population, or yearly/state fixed effects play a significant role in explaining variation. Altogether, these trends show a remarkably limited degree of variation, and thus a high degree of consistency, between states despite considerably different institutional structures, political histories, and policymaking priorities, with a small number of exceptions.

Figure 2 examines the degree of perceived influence on major policy shifts in the respondents' respective agencies. We know governors (Gross 1989; Heidbreder 2012) and legislators (Webber 1985) enter office with political agendas and policy goals, so it is not surprising to find that both often seek to influence the political process (Geys et al. 2024). In general, much like with levels of influence on budgets, in Figure 2 we see a moderate-to-high degree of influence across most states that remains relatively stable over time or does not show a consistent trend.

Figure 2. Influence on Major Policy Changes.


While these general trends of stability and consistency hold across most states, there is some variation worth discussing. Two of the same states discussed with respect to perceived influence on the state budget – Texas and Mississippi – again stand out. While in both states state legislators retain a similar level of influence on major policy changes as legislators do in other states, we see that governors seem to have considerably less influence in each case. This pattern holds over time, with governors of both parties, and with governors of the same and of different parties as the legislative majority. This suggests that in Texas and Mississippi, again in line with the literature on formal gubernatorial powers, there are organizational or institutional features that give governors systematically less policy influence in state administration. While a small amount of existing research examines gubernatorial influence on legislative policymaking in these states (e.g. van Assendelft 1995; Stallings III 2010), further studies into such influence on bureaucratic policymaking and bureaucratic autonomy is needed since it is one of the only consistent associations we see across the temporal data.

Finally, we examine perceived political influence on administrative rules and regulations. The broad trends in Figure 3 (below) are still towards continuity over time; however, in general we see that there is less political encroachment on bureaucratic autonomy in this domain. Average responses are more likely in the slight to moderate range. Much as in the other two functional domains we discuss – budget and policy change – we see a fair amount of within-state and between-state continuity.

Figure 3. Influence on Administrative Rules and Regulations.

While the broad trends suggest temporal continuity, there does appear to be more variation with respect to rules and regulations versus the other substantive domains. In most states, however, there is not a clear trend in one direction and instead greater year-to-year variance. Influence on rules and regulations could, therefore, be more contingent on personnel than influence in these other domains. We also, in general, see similar levels of influence between governors and legislators in most states, though with some exceptions – again, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas show systematically less gubernatorial influence. New Hampshire also exhibits this pattern with respect to rule making.

Finally, Figure 4 shifts to our second battery of questions, pertaining to the frequency of contact from governors, legislators, and their respective staffs. While we saw considerable continuity in perceptions of influence among bureaucrats, their self-reported levels of contact with political actors demonstrate considerably more change over time. There are a few points in common. Most administrators report the least frequent contact with governors as opposed to other actors. This is unsurprising: governors are individuals, while the other three roles have many potential points of contact. In some states, such as California and Texas, we see clear downward trends in frequency of contact from governors – this means that the average respondent in the ASAP survey has less than monthly contact with their respective governors in these states.

Figure 4. Frequency of Communication.

Although previous research using ASAP data (using the 1978 survey responses) emphasizes the frequency of gubernatorial contact (Hebert and Brudney 1988), we can see clearly that it is considerably less than contact from either legislators or staffs. We also see that there is no uniform trend of more frequent communication with governors in spite of (i) broad trends toward the expansion of gubernatorial powers (Seifter 2017) (which might increase attempts to exert influence over state agency heads) and (ii) increasing ease of contact over time, as e-mails became widely used during our study period (Davis 1999).

Second, we discuss the OLS regression, which considers the responses of individual administrators. Table 2 below examines the role of gubernatorial partisanship over our entire period of study on several types of administrative change and shows our key variables of interest (full tables with controls available in Appendix B). Consistent with H2, we find no substantial, consistent effect for partisanship across U.S. states over the entire period of study. The model below includes state-level and annual fixed effects and does show significant effects for specific U.S. states; these full results are reported in Appendix B.

Appendix C provides a robustness test only on respondents after the 1994 Republican Revolution, which increased partisan polarization broadly (Hacker and Pierson 2005; Levendusky 2009) and specifically focused on public administration (e.g. Shanahan 1997; Hedge and Johnson 2002); results broadly hold and we similarly see no consistent nationwide partisan effect. These results support H2, and the state-level fixed effects offer some very qualified support for H1.

Table 3 examines the effect of partisanship on our second battery of questions, which assess the frequency of communication from the state-level executive and legislative branches. As with Table 2, the underlying models in Table 3 include individual controls and state-level and annual fixed effects. We again see support for H2, which predicted no consistent partisan differences over time; full tabular results are available in Appendix D. Appendix E offers an alternative specification of the model, again only considering the post-1994 period, and we see no substantively different results.

As predicted, these models show no consistent evidence for the influence of partisan politics on perceived bureaucratic autonomy (H2). Outside of independent governors, who do show a consistent partisan effect but are a very small sample size, only one model suggests a potential partisan effect. Although the effect is only significant at the .05 level, linear models examining frequency of communication from legislatures suggests a plausible partisan impact from unified Republican control. This effect does increase in the post-1994 period; however, it fades (and even reverses sign) in the ordinal models, so appears to be an outlier; we see no impact from a unified Republican legislature in any policy domain. Altogether, these results do offer qualified support for H2, that we would not expect to see within-state partisan effects. Although not typically analyzed, fixed effects for states across again offer some qualified, non-specified support for H1, which predicted consistent state level differences over time (although these findings are not clearly interpretable, and should only suggest this as a relevant topic for future research).

Table 2. Partisanship and Administrative Domains (1974-2008).

	Major Policy Shifts from Leg.	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Leg.	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Leg.	Budget Shifts from Governor
Split Leg.	-0.041 (0.036)		-0.036 (0.056)		-0.030 (0.029)	
Unified R Leg.	-0.029 (0.030)		-0.021 (0.058)		0.019 (0.028)	
Rep. Governor		-0.014 (0.033)		-0.004 (0.036)		0.005 (0.025)
Ind. Governor		-0.059* (0.029)		-0.076* (0.034)		0.050 (0.037)
Observations	6575	6737	6521	6676	6640	6785

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 3. Partisanship and Communication Frequency (1974-2008)

	Frequency of Contact with Legislators	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact with Governor	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
Split Leg.	0.084 (0.051)	0.046 (0.058)		
Unified R Leg.	0.100* (0.045)	0.073 (0.062)		
Rep. Governor			-0.011 (0.032)	0.060 (0.040)
Ind. Governor			-0.397*** (0.052)	-0.283** (0.107)
Observations	7854	6594	8003	6784

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Conclusions

The findings of the study show a great deal of temporal continuity and territorial similarity with respect to public administrator's perceptions of autonomy. In the clear majority of states over the period between 1974 and 2008 (when the relevant survey questions were fielded), administrators report relatively consistent levels of perceived influence from both governors and legislators with respect to budgetary influence, major policy changes, and agency rules and regulations. We also see that partisanship appears to be inconsequential. The level of continuity is somewhat surprising given the period under analysis includes the partisan realignment of the American South,⁶ which we might have expected could lead to shifts in perception, as well as some greater variability with respect to gubernatorial and legislative partisanship. However, our findings clearly indicate that partisanship does not significantly affect administrators' perceptions of autonomy, and thus perceived autonomy seems to be a robust feature of state-level administration. While Geys et al. (2024) finds that U.S. agency leaders have specific partisan identities, our finding suggests that perceptions of administrative autonomy in U.S. state are a robust and systemic characteristic which is not subject to significant partisan dynamics. Similarly, Glassman (1987, 34) observes that "bureau heads see presidents come and go, politics wax and wane. They become resistant to change and not committed to their own programs." While our findings are based on empirical evidence from 1974 to 2008, prior to more recent threats to independent public administration due to rule of law backsliding in the U.S., our findings suggest that administrative autonomy among U.S. state administrators is less vulnerable to democratic politics than is sometimes assumed (Bauer 2024). This finding is supported by a substantial literature on agencies in American federalism that suggests that in a complex institutional landscape, public administrators achieve substantial autonomy from political actors (both legislators and other partisan actors) by leveraging resources available to them (e.g. Moe 2012).

These findings are surprising given the great deal of institutional, political, and policymaking variation across U.S. states. Our organizational theory approach led us to expect profound territorial variation (H1); however, the findings suggest much less variation across subnational domains than predicted, even considering the territorial organization of the U.S. federal system. While there are some statistically significant differences between states, descriptive analysis of the finding does not offer strong support for hypotheses about state-level variation. Future research – building on Tarr (2001), Tyler and Gerken (2022), and Grumbach (2022) – can begin to disentangle the reasons for this consistency across states and to examine why varying state level rhetoric about administration has not led to greater variation in perceived autonomy in practice. One potential source of variation is political culture.

Political culture is extremely difficult to effectively instrumentalize as a variable (e.g. Reisinger 1995), and our descriptive findings here suggest stability across U.S. states, suggesting that cultural impacts could be smaller than we may expect. It is, however, potentially a rich area for further in depth qualitative and quantitative analysis.

By using measures of perception, we are able to get at some of the tensions between formal and informal power among the U.S. states (Dometrius 1987). We do find that some of the states that are generally considered to be “weak” governorships do seem to have more limited influence on public administration. At the same time, extant literature suggests that governorships have been strengthening over time (Mueller 1985; Seifter 2017), and we find that perceptions of gubernatorial power in most states are relatively stable and consistent. It is thus *possible* that the power to substantially influence administration is more grounded in *informal* structures and thus its stability remains uncaptured by the standard measures of gubernatorial strength.

These findings also raise questions about *why* public administrators perceive such consistent autonomy across space and time, even as political circumstances change around them. While public administration in the U.S. has a reasonable degree of insulation from political interference, many of the respondents, as agency heads, are political appointees and are structurally vulnerable to political pressure. While, consequently, we might expect many of these appointees to have partisan or otherwise relevant political connections to governor’s who may control their appointment, which could limit any negative feeling of being “interfered” with, this is hypothetical. Future research should more thoroughly examine which types of actions make administrators feel their autonomy is more impinged on. Additionally, questions about which institutional features in the U.S. do manage to maintain this autonomy across states even considering the great deal of variation between them, are worthy of future study. Certainly, one potential avenue worth exploring would be political culture, tying bureaucratic autonomy to the literature on state political cultures that emerged in the 1960s to 1980s, which posited that U.S. states political cultures could have policy and institutional effects (e.g. Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 1969; Johnson 1976; Hanson 1980; Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988). If these cultures were linked to institutional design (LaCombe 2021), this could impact autonomy (and perceptions thereof) towards both administrative and legislative policymakers.

Finally, these findings also suggest the importance of larger scale comparisons of subnational public administration. As Peters et al. note (2022), studies of public administration often rely on small N comparative cases. While this allows for in-depth knowledge of individual cases, a comprehensive comparison of all subnational jurisdictions in a country can illuminate broader trends. While there are equally pitfalls to relying exclusively on “50-state studies” (Stonecash 1996, 569–70), this method can be helpful when engaging with the public administration literature, provided that analysts do not overgeneralize conclusions. We consider many of the individual states and domains here to be cases worthy of further study, which should examine specific organizational features. This can lead to insights about the more specific causes of state-level disparities in the degree of bureaucratic autonomy – or indeed for reasons why so many measures of perceived autonomy seem to be stable across both time and space.

¹ See Gardner (1996) for extensive discussion.

² Other work further examines the ways that frequency of communication can influence the behavior of public officials (e.g. Brehm et al. 2003).

³ Lillvis distinguishes professionalism from bureaucratic autonomy explicitly; however, her focus on state-level variation is nevertheless valuable for our discussion.

⁴ Other possible measures of autonomy in the broad ASAP dataset, for example budgetary data on federal aid as used by Cho and Wright (2007) offer more insight on federal-state autonomy but do not offer as much leverage on within state autonomy of public administrators.

⁵ Additionally, in Appendix F we test if the governor's gender impacts any gubernatorial models; we find no significant effect.

⁶ For more on partisan realignment following the Civil Rights Movement, see Miller and Schofield (2003), among others.

References

- Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 689–718. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1954423>.
- Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. 2000. "A Dynamic Model of State Budget Outcomes under Divided Partisan Government." *The Journal of Politics* 62 (4): 1035–69. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00045>.
- Ansell, Christopher K., and Jacob Torfing. 2014. *Public Innovation through Collaboration and Design*. Routledge.
- Ansell, Christopher K., and Jarle Trondal. 2017. "Coping with Turbulence." In *Governance in Turbulent Times*, edited by Christopher K. Ansell, Jarle Trondal, and Morten Øgård. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739517.003.0013>.
- Ansell, Christopher K., Jarle Trondal, and Morten Øgård, eds. 2017. *Governance in Turbulent Times*. Oxford University Press.
- Assendelft, Laura van. 1995. "Gubernatorial Agenda Setting and Divided Government in the South." *Journal of Political Science* 23 (1): 29–63.
- Axtell, Robert. 2024. "Simon Said: Herb's Research Rules and Life Lessons." In *Elgar Companion to Herbert Simon*, edited by Gerd Gigerenzer, Shabnam Mousavi, and Riccardo Viale. Edward Elgar.
- Bach, Tobias. 2025. "The Functional Politicisation of the Merit Civil Service: From Responsive to Subservient Bureaucracy?" In *Futures for the Public Sector*, edited by Geert Bouckaert, Annie Hondeghem, Trui Steen, and Steven Van de Walle. Leuven University Press.
- Bach, Tobias, and Eva Ruffing. 2013. "Networking for Autonomy? National Agencies in European Networks." *Public Administration* 91 (3): 712–26. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02093.x>.
- Bach, Tobias, Eva Ruffing, and Kutsal Yesilkagit. 2015. "The Differential Empowering Effects of Europeanization on the Autonomy of National Agencies." *Governance* 28 (3): 285–304. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12087>.
- Barber, Michael, and Adam M. Dynes. 2023. "City-State Ideological Incongruence and Municipal Preemption." *American Journal of Political Science* 67 (1): 119–36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12655>.
- Bauer, Michael W. 2024. "Administrative Responses to Democratic Backsliding: When Is Bureaucratic Resistance Justified?" *Regulation & Governance* 18 (4): 1104–17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/regg.12567>.

- Bauer, Michael W., B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, Kutsal Yesilkagit, and Stefan Becker, eds. 2021. *Democratic Backsliding and Public Administration: How Populists in Government Transform State Bureaucracies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Beland, Louis-Philippe, and Sara Oloomi. 2017. "Party Affiliation and Public Spending: Evidence from U.S. Governors." *Economic Inquiry* 55 (2): 982–95. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12393>.
- Berkowitz, Daniel, and George A. Krause. 2020. "How Bureaucratic Leadership Shapes Policy Outcomes: Partisan Politics and Affluent Citizens' Incomes in the American States." *Journal of Public Policy* 40 (2): 305–28. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X18000405>.
- Bernick, E. Lee, and Charles W. Wiggins. 1984. "The Governor's Executive Order: An Unknown Power." *State and Local Government Review* 16 (1): 3–10.
- Bersch, Katherine, and Francis Fukuyama. 2023. "Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26 (1): 213–32. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102914>.
- Bersch, Katherine, and Francis Fukuyama. 2025. "Calibrating Autonomy: How Bureaucratic Autonomy Influences Government Quality in Brazil." *Governance* 38 (1): e12865. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12865>.
- Bertelli, Anthony M. 2016. "Bureaucratic Autonomy in the U.S. Separation of Powers: Evidence from Cabinet Departments." *Public Organization Review* 16 (1): 139–51. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-014-0300-0>.
- Beyle, Thad L. 1968. "The Governor's Formal Powers: A View from the Governor's Chair." *Public Administration Review* 28 (6): 540–45. <https://doi.org/10.2307/973331>.
- Blais, André, and Richard Nadeau. 1992. "The Electoral Budget Cycle." *Public Choice* 74 (4): 389–403.
- Bostashvili, David, and Gergely Ujhelyi. 2019. "Political Budget Cycles and the Civil Service: Evidence from Highway Spending in US States." *Journal of Public Economics* 175 (July): 17–28. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.04.004>.
- Boushey, Graeme T, and Robert J McGrath. 2020. "Does Partisan Conflict Lead to Increased Bureaucratic Policymaking? Evidence from the American States." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 30 (3): 432–47. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muz030>.
- Bräuninger, Thomas. 2005. "A Partisan Model of Government Expenditure." *Public Choice* 125 (3–4): 409–29. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x>.
- Brehm, John, Scott Gates, and Brad Gomez. 2003. "Donut Shops, Speed Traps, and Paperwork: Supervision and the Allocation of Time to Bureaucratic Tasks." In *Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy*, edited by George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier. University of Michigan Press.

- Brown, Roger G. 1982. "Party and Bureaucracy: From Kennedy to Reagan." *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (2): 279–94. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2149479>.
- Capano, Giliberto, and Luca Verzichelli. 2023. *The Fate of Political Scientists in Europe: From Myth to Action*. Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24643-2>.
- Carpenter, Daniel, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay, Susan Moffitt, and Clayton Nall. 2012. "The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion: FDA Review Deadlines and Postmarket Drug Safety." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1): 98–114. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00544.x>.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton University Press.
- Cho, Chung-Lae, and Deil S. Wright. 2001. "Managing Carrots and Sticks: Changes in State Administrators' Perceptions of Cooperative and Coercive Federalism During the 1990s." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 31 (2): 57–80. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004896>.
- Cho, Chung-Lae, and Deil S. Wright. 2007. "Perceptions of Federal Aid Impacts on State Agencies: Patterns, Trends, and Variations Across the 20th Century." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 37 (1): 103–30. <https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjl018>.
- Choi, Yoo-Sung, Chung-Lae Cho, and Deil S. Wright. 2004. "Administrative Autonomy Among American State Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of Fragmentation and Functionalism." *International Journal of Public Administration* 27 (6): 373–98. <https://doi.org/10.1081/PAD-120028816>.
- Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2007. "Regulatory Agencies—The Challenges of Balancing Agency Autonomy and Political Control." *Governance* 20 (3): 499–520. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00368.x>.
- Cockerham, Alexandra G., and Robert E. Crew. 2017. "Factors Affecting Governors' Decisions to Issue Executive Orders." *State and Local Government Review* 49 (1): 6–14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X17702702>.
- Conlan, Timothy J. 1991. "And the Beat Goes On: Intergovernmental Mandates and Preemption in an Era of Deregulation." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 21 (3): 43–57. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037957>.
- Dahlström, Carl, and Victor Lapuente. 2017. *Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government*. Cambridge University Press.
- Davis, Richard. 1999. *The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System*. Oxford University Press.
- Dobbin, Frank. 1994. *Forging Industrial Policy*. Cambridge University Press.

- Doherty, Kathleen M, David E Lewis, and Scott Limbocker. 2019. "Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (2): 159–74. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy069>.
- Döhler, Marian. 2020. "The Architecture of Organizations as Missed Opportunity in Political Research." *Public Administration* 98 (4): 891–904. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12669>.
- Dometrius, Nelson C. 1979. "Measuring Gubernatorial Power." *The Journal of Politics* 41 (2): 589–610. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2129780>.
- Dometrius, Nelson C. 1987. "Changing Gubernatorial Power: The Measure vs. Reality." *The Western Political Quarterly* 40 (2): 319–238. <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298704000208>.
- Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Egeberg, Morten. 2003. "How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective." In *Handbook of Public Administration*, edited by B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. SAGE.
- Egeberg, Morten, and Jarle Trondal. 2016. "Why Strong Coordination at One Level of Government Is Incompatible with Strong Coordination Across Levels (And How to Live with It): The Case of the European Union." *Public Administration* 94 (3): 579–92. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12236>.
- Egeberg, Morten, and Jarle Trondal. 2018. *An Organizational Approach to Public Governance: Understanding and Design*. Oxford University Press.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 1987. "Strong and Weak States: Some Reconsiderations." In *The State and Public Bureaucracies*, edited by Martin Heper. Greenwood Press.
- Elazar, Daniel Judah. 1966. *American Federalism: A View from the States*. Crowell.
- Epp, Derek A., John Lovett, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2014. "Partisan Priorities and Public Budgeting." *Political Research Quarterly* 67 (4): 864–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914550045>.
- Erk, Jan, and Edward Koning. 2010. "New Structuralism and Institutional Change: Federalism Between Centralization and Decentralization." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (3): 353–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009332143>.
- Fenna, Alan. 2012. "Federalism and Intergovernmental Coordination." In *The Sage Handbook of Public Administration*, 2nd ed., edited by B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. SAGE.
- Ferguson, Margaret R., and Cynthia J. Bowling. 2008. "Executive Orders and Administrative Control." *Public Administration Review* 68 (S1): S20–28. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00975.x>.
- Fisher, Lois A. 1988. "State Legislatures and the Autonomy of Colleges and Universities: A Comparative Study Legislation in Four States, 1900-1979." *The Journal of Higher Education* 59 (2): 133–62. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1981690>.

- Fitzpatrick, Jody L., and Rodney E. Hero. 1988. "Political Culture and Political Characteristics of the American States: A Consideration of Some Old and New Questions." *The Western Political Quarterly* 41 (1): 145–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129880410011>.
- Fligstein, Neil. 2021. "Organizations: Theoretical Debates and the Scope of Organizational Theory." In *Handbook of Classical Sociological Theory*, edited by Seth Abrutyn and Omar Lizardo. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78205-4_22.
- Gardner, James A. 1996. "The States-as-Laboratories Metaphor in State Constitutional Law." *Valparaiso University Law Review* 30 (2): 475–92.
- Geys, Benny, Per Lægreid, Zuzana Murdoch, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2024. "I'm a Survivor: Political Dynamics in Bureaucratic Elites' Partisan Identification." *American Political Science Review*, September 19, Online first. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000844>.
- Gigerenzer, Gerd, Shabnam Mousavi, and Riccardo Viale, eds. 2024. *Elgar Companion to Herbert Simon*. Edward Elgar.
- Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2008. *Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe*. Edward Elgar.
- Gilardi, Fabrizio, Katharina Füglistner, and Stéphane Luyet. 2009. "Learning From Others: The Diffusion of Hospital Financing Reforms in OECD Countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (4): 549–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008327428>.
- Glassman, Ronald M. 1987. "The United States: The Anti-Statist Society." In *The State and Public Bureaucracies*, edited by Martin Heper. Greenwood Press.
- Grady, Dennis O., and Kathleen M. Simon. 2002. "Political Restraints and Bureaucratic Discretion: The Case of State Government Rule Making." *Politics & Policy* 30 (4): 646–79. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2002.tb00139.x>.
- Groenleer, Martijn. 2009. *The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of Institutional Development*. Eburon Uitgeverij B.V.
- Gross, Donald A. 1989. "Governors and Policymaking: Theoretical Concerns and Analytical Approaches." *Policy Studies Journal* 17 (4): 764–87.
- Grumbach, Jacob M. 2018. "From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970–2014." *Perspectives on Politics* 16 (2): 416–35. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700425X>.
- Grumbach, Jacob M. 2022. *Laboratories against Democracy: How National Parties Transformed State Politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Haan, Jakob de, and Jeroen Klomp. 2013. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Evidence." *Public Choice* 157 (3–4): 387–410. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0106-6>.

- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2005. *Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy*. Yale University Press.
- Halberstam, Daniel, and Roderick M Hills. 2001. "State Autonomy in Germany and the United States." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 574 (1): 173–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271620157400113>.
- Hammond, Thomas H. 1986. "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (2): 379–420. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111102>.
- Hammond, Thomas H. 2003. "Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems." In *Politics, Policy, and Organizations. Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy*, edited by George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier. University of Michigan Press.
- Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott. 1996. "Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 12 (1): 119–66. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023355>.
- Hanson, Russell. 1980. "Political Culture, Interparty Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 10 (2): 17–36.
- Hattke, Fabian, and Rick Vogel. 2023. "Theories and Theorizing in Public Administration: A Systematic Review." *Public Administration Review* 83 (6): 1542–63. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13730>.
- Hebert, F. Ted, and Jeffrey L. Brudney. 1988. "Controlling Administrative Agencies in a Changing Federal System: Avenues of Gubernatorial Influence." *American Review of Public Administration* 18 (2): 135–47.
- Hedge, David, and Renée J. Johnson. 2002. "The Plot That Failed: The Republican Revolution and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 12 (3): 333–51. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003537>.
- Heidbreder, Brianne. 2012. "Agenda Setting in the States: How Politics and Policy Needs Shape Gubernatorial Agendas." *Politics & Policy* 40 (2): 296–319. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00345.x>.
- Heper, Martin. 1987. "Introduction." In *The State and Public Bureaucracies*, edited by Martin Heper. Greenwood Press.
- Highsaw, Robert B. 1959. "The Southern Governor- Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme." *Public Administration Review* 19 (1): 7–11. <https://doi.org/10.2307/973853>.
- Hills, Roderick M. 1998. "The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and 'Dual Sovereignty' Doesn't." *Michigan Law Review* 96 (4): 831–944. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1290080>.

- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2003. "Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance." *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 233–43.
- Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2): 330–45. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2669344>.
- Jacobs, Nicholas F., Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis. 2019. "Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power." *Perspectives on Politics* 17 (2): 453–69. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718003511>.
- Jakli, Laura, and Matthew Stenberg. 2021. "Everyday Illiberalism: How Hungarian Subnational Politics Propel Single-party Dominance." *Governance* 34 (2): 315–34. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12497>.
- Johnson, Charles A. 1976. "Political Culture in American States: Elazar's Formulation Examined." *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (3): 491–509. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2110685>.
- Johnson, Tana. 2013. "Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control." *The Journal of Politics* 75 (1): 183–97. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381612000953>.
- Jordan, Soren, and Cynthia J. Bowling. 2016. "Introduction: The State of Polarization in the States." *State and Local Government Review* 48 (4): 220–26. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X17699527>.
- Kagan, Elena. 2001. "Presidential Administration." *Harvard Law Review* 114 (8): 2245–385. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1342513>.
- Kahneman, Daniel, Oliver Sibony, and Cass R. Sunstein. 2021. *Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment*. Little Brown.
- Katznelson, Ira, and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 2005. *Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Keating, Michael. 2017. "Europe as a Multilevel Federation." *Journal of European Public Policy* 24 (4): 615–32. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1273374>.
- Kettl, Donald F. 2022. "Public Administration and Political Science: Can This Marriage Be Saved?" *Governance* 35 (4): 983–90. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12724>.
- Kirkhaug, Rudi, and Knut H. Mikalsen. 2009. "Coping with Autonomy: Antecedents of Interaction between Bureaucrats and Politicians." *Public Management Review* 11 (2): 137–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030802685735>.
- Klahr, David, and Kenneth Kotovsky, eds. 1989. *Complex Information Processing: The Impact of Herbert A. Simon*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

- Klarner, Carl. 2013. "State Partisan Balance Data, 1937 - 2011." <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LZHM3>.
- Koven, Steven G., and Christopher Mausolff. 2002. "The Influence of Political Culture on State Budgets: Another Look at Elazar's Formulation." *The American Review of Public Administration* 32 (1): 66-77. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074002032001004>.
- Krause, George A., and Roger Qiyuan Jin. 2020. "Organizational Design and Its Consequences for Administrative Reform: Historical Lessons from the U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921." *Governance* 33 (2): 365-84. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12435>.
- Krause, George A., and Kenneth J. Meier, eds. 2003. *Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy*. University of Michigan Press.
- Krause, George A., and Benjamin F. Melusky. 2012. "Concentrated Powers: Unilateral Executive Authority and Fiscal Policymaking in the American States." *The Journal of Politics* 74 (1): 98-112. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001149>.
- Kukec, Marko, Julia Simon, and Matthew Stenberg. 2025. "Rule of Law Backsliding across Regime Types: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Party Cohesion in Shaping Backsliding Dynamics." *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, ahead of print, August 11. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-025-00645-y>.
- LaCombe, Scott J. 2021. "Measuring Institutional Design in U.S. States." *Social Science Quarterly* 102 (4): 1511-33. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12986>.
- Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans*. University of Chicago Press.
- Libgober, Brian, and Mark D. Richardson. 2023. "Identifying Bureaus with Substantial Personnel Change during the Trump Administration: A Bayesian Approach." *PLoS ONE* 18 (1): e0278458. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0278458>.
- Lillvis, Denise F. 2017. "Not Immune: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Limits of Professional Autonomy." PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan.
- Lipsky, Michael. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lotta, Gabriela, Gustavo M. Tavares, and Joana Story. 2023. "Political Attacks and the Undermining of the Bureaucracy: The Impact on Civil Servants' Well-being." *Governance*, May 11, gove.12792. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12792>.
- Lowande, Kenneth S. 2014. "After the Orders: Presidential Memoranda and Unilateral Action: Presidential Memoranda and Unilateral Action." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 44 (4): 724-41. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12157>.
- Marando, Vincent L., and Mavis Mann Reeves. 1993. "County Government Structural Reform: Influence of State, Region, and Urbanization." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 23: 41-52. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038054>.

- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1976. *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Universitetsforlaget.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1995. *Democratic Governance*. Free Press.
- May, Peter J., Samuel Workman, and Bryan D. Jones. 2008. "Organizing Attention: Responses of the Bureaucracy to Agenda Disruption." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18 (4): 517–41. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun015>.
- Meier, Kenneth J. 2010. "Governance, Structure, and Democracy: Luther Gulick and the Future of Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 70 (s1): S284–91. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02288.x>.
- Merriman, Ben, and Josh Pacewicz. 2022. "The Great Interstate Divergence: Partisan Bureaucracies in the Contemporary United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 127 (4): 1221–66. <https://doi.org/10.1086/719256>.
- Miller, Edward Alan, Lili Wang, Zhanlian Feng, and Vincent Mor. 2012. "Improving Direct-Care Compensation in Nursing Homes: Medicaid Wage Pass-Through Adoption, 1999–2004." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 37 (3): 469–512. <https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-1573094>.
- Miller, Eugene F. 1971. "David Easton's Political Theory." *The Political Science Reviewer* 1: 184–235.
- Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. 2003. "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 245–60. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000650>.
- Moe, Terry M. 2012. "Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy." *The Forum* 10 (2): Article 4. <https://doi.org/10.1515/1540-8884.1508>.
- Moynihan, Donald P. 2022. "Public Management for Populists: Trump's Schedule F Executive Order and the Future of the Civil Service." *Public Administration Review* 82 (1): 174–78. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13433>.
- Mueller, Keith J. 1985. "Explaining Variation and Change in Gubernatorial Powers, 1960–1982." *The Western Political Quarterly* 38 (3): 424–31.
- Murdoch, Zuzana, Muiris MacCarthaigh, and Benny Geys. 2023. "It's about Time! Temporal Dynamics and Longitudinal Research Designs in Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 83 (6): 1727–36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13758>.
- Nelson, Kimberly. 2011. "State-Level Autonomy and Municipal Government Structure: Influence on Form of Government Outcomes." *The American Review of Public Administration* 41 (5): 542–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074010382134>.
- Nicholson-Crotty, Jill, and Susan M. Miller. 2012. "Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Influence in the Legislature." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22 (2): 347–71. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur054>.

- O'Connell, Anne Joseph. 2011. "Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions." *Northwestern University Law Review* 105 (2): 471–534.
- OECD. 2021. *Government at a Glance 2021*. Government at a Glance. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en>.
- Olsen, Johan P. 2010. *Governing Through Institution Building: Institutional Theory and Recent European Experiments in Democratic Organization*. Oxford University Press.
- Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 2017. *The Policy State: An American Predicament*. Harvard University Press.
- Page, Edward C. 1992. *Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative Analysis*. Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Palus, Christine Kelleher, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2016. "Clerks or Kings? Partisan Alignment and Delegation to the US Bureaucracy." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 26 (4): 693–708. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw001>.
- Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre, eds. 2004. *The Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective: A Quest for Control*. Routledge.
- Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre. 2025. "'You're Gonna Need a Bigger Boat': Understanding Politicization in the Populist Era." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 91 (2): 202–19. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00208523251318600>.
- Peters, B. Guy, Jon Pierre, Eva Sørensen, and Jacob Torfing. 2022. "Bringing Political Science Back into Public Administration Research." *Governance* 35 (4): 962–82. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12705>.
- Pierre, Jon, and B. Guy Peters. 2005. *Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Potrafke, Niklas. 2011. "Public Expenditures on Education and Cultural Affairs in the West German States: Does Government Ideology Influence the Budget Composition?" *German Economic Review* 12 (1): 124–45.
- Potter, Rachel Augustine, Andrew Rudalevige, Sharece Thrower, and Adam L. Warber. 2022. "Not by the Numbers: Evaluating Trump's Administrative Presidency." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 52 (3): 596–625. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12794>.
- Reisinger, William M. 1995. "The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture as Concept and Theory." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 7 (4): 328–52. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/7.4.328>.
- Riverstone-Newell, Lori. 2017. "The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 47 (3): 403–25. <https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjx037>.
- Rocco, Philip. 2021. "Laboratories of What?: American Federalism and the Politics of Democratic Subversion." In *Democratic Resilience*, edited by Robert C. Lieberman,

- Suzanne Mettler, and Kenneth M. Roberts. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108999601.012>.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2012. "Good Governance." In *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*, edited by David Levi-Faur. Oxford University Press.
- Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1965. "The Politics of the Executive." In *Politics in the American States*, edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines. Little Brown.
- Scott, W. Richard, and Gerald Fredrick Davis. 2007. *Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural, and Open System Perspectives*. Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Seifter, Miriam. 2017. "Gubernatorial Administration." *Harvard Law Review* 131 (2): 483–542.
- Shanahan, John. 1997. "Regulating the Regulators: Regulatory Process Reform in the 104th Congress." *Regulation* 20 (1): 27–32.
- Sharkansky, Ira. 1969. "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note." *Polity* 2 (1): 66–83. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3234089>.
- Simon, Herbert Alexander. 1947. *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. Macmillan Company.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Jr., Fred O. 2021. "Federalism in the States: What States Can Teach About Commandeering." *Wisconsin Law Review* 2021 (5): 1257–82.
- Stallings III, Dallas T. 2010. "The Governors' Club: Examining Gubernatorial Power, Influence and Policy-Making in the Context of Education Reform in the South." PhD Dissertation, University of North Carolina.
- Stenberg, Matthew, and Conor O'Dwyer. 2023. "When Do Local Governments Discriminate? Lessons from the Spread of 'LGBT Free Zones' in Poland." Preprint, SocArXiv. <https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/8e7wh>.
- Stonecash, Jeffrey M. 1996. "The State Politics Literature: Moving beyond Covariation Studies and Pursuing Politics." *Polity* 28 (4): 559–79. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3235346>.
- Stritch, Justin M. 2017. "Minding the Time: A Critical Look at Longitudinal Design and Data Analysis in Quantitative Public Management Research." *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 37 (2): 219–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0734371X17697117>.
- Tarr, G. Alan. 2001. "Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Management." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 31 (1): 37–46. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004880>.

- Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2009. *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. Penguin.
- Trondal, Jarle. 2023. "'Let's Organize': The Organizational Basis for Stable Public Governance." *Public Administration* 101 (1): 201–20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12858>.
- Trondal, Jarle. 2025. "The Multilevel Administrative State and the Future of Public Administration Research." *International Journal of Public Administration* 48 (5–6): 321–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2024.2412273>.
- Tyler, Charles W., and Heather K. Gerkin. 2022. "The Myth of the Laboratories of Democracy." *Columbia Law Review* 122 (8): 2187–240.
- Van Thiel, Sandra, and Kutsal Yesilkagit. 2011. "Good Neighbours or Distant Friends?: Trust between Dutch Ministries and Their Executive Agencies." *Public Management Review* 13 (6): 783–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2010.539111>.
- Verhoest, Koen, Paul G. Roness, Bram Verschuere, Kristin Rubecksen, and Muiris MacCarthaigh. 2010. *Autonomy and Control of State Agencies: Comparing States and Agencies*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vibert, Frank. 2007. *The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers*. Cambridge University Press.
- Volden, Craig. 2006. "States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance Program." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 294–312. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00185.x>.
- Waldo, Dwight. 1952. "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration." *American Political Science Review* 46 (1): 81–103. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1950764>.
- Walker, David Bradstreet. 1995. *The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching Toward Washington*. Chatham House Publishers.
- Webber, David J. 1985. "State Legislators' Use of Policy Information: The Importance of Legislative Goals." *State & Local Government Review* 17 (2): 213–18.
- Weissert, Carol S., Matthew J. Uttermark, Kenneth R. Mackie, and Alexandra Artiles. 2021. "Governors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 51 (3): 396–428. <https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab013>.
- Woods, Neal D. 2004. "Political Influence on Agency Rule Making: Examining the Effects of Legislative and Gubernatorial Rule Review Powers." *State and Local Government Review* 36 (3): 174–85. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X0403600302>.
- Wynen, Jan, Koen Verhoest, and Kristin Rübecksen. 2014. "Decentralization in Public Sector Organizations: Do Organizational Autonomy and Result Control Lead to Decentralization Toward Lower Hierarchical Levels?" *Public Performance & Management Review* 37 (3): 496–520. <https://doi.org/10.2753/PMR1530-9576370307>.

- Yackee, Jason Webb, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2021. "The American State Administrators Project: A New 50-State Data Resource for Scholars." *Public Administration Review* 81 (3): 558–63. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13334>.
- Yackee, Susan Webb. 2024. "Executive Policymaking Influence via the Administrative Apparatus." *Public Administration Review*, November 21, Online first. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13899>.
- Yesilkagit, Kutsal, Michael Bauer, B. Guy Peters, and Jon Pierre. 2024. "The Guardian State: Strengthening the Public Service against Democratic Backsliding." *Public Administration Review* 84 (3): 414–25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13808>.
- Yesilkagit, Kutsal, and Sandra van Thiel. 2008. "Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy." *Public Organization Review* 8 (2): 137–53. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-008-0054-7>.

Appendix A.

We include the text of the most recent (2008) formulation of the relevant questions, as well as the ASAP code. To compare the precise language of the question over time, please refer to the ASAP codebook.

The first battery of questions examines influence from state-level intergovernmental relationships. These questions are measured according to the scale indicated in Table A1. Larger values indicate greater influence of external actors, and therefore *less* autonomy.

Table A1. Influence Scale

Response	Level
0	None
1	Slight
2	Moderate
3	High

For all of the following questions, respondents used the scale in Table A1.

“In making agency decisions it is usually possible to identify and weigh several major sources of influence. Please indicate below (by circling) the degree of influence each has on decisions your agency makes in the following decision areas.” (S. W. Yackee 2020, 75–91).

D_5a: Total Agency Budget Level (Governor)

D_6a: Total Agency Budget Level (Legislators)

D_15a: Major Policy Changes (Governor)

D_16a: Major Policy Changes (Legislators)

D_20a: Agency Rules/Regulations (Governor)

D_21a: Agency Rules/Regulations (Legislators)

The second battery of questions examines the frequency of contact from different state-level intergovernmental relationships – a separate measure of autonomy. These questions are measured according to the scale indicated in Table A2. This scale is inverted: Smaller values indicate greater influence of external actors, and therefore *less* autonomy.

Table A2. Frequency of Contact Scale

Response	Level
1	Daily
2	Weekly
3	Monthly
4	Less than Monthly
5	Never

Respondents used this scale for the following questions: “On the average, how often do you personally have phone or face to face contacts with the following persons during the course of carrying out your official duties?” (S. W. Yackee 2020, 123–26).

E_1a: Governor

E_1b: Governor’s Staff

E_1c: Legislators

E_1d: Legislative Staff

Appendix B. State Fixed Effects for Individual Respondents for Administrative Domain Models.

Although fixed effects are not commonly reported, given the specific nature of our research question and its focus on variation between states, we provide full state-level fixed effects results for models in these appendices.

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
Intercept	1.956*** (0.122)	2.275*** (0.126)	1.793*** (0.151)	2.063*** (0.144)	2.673*** (0.106)	2.594*** (0.114)
Split Leg.	-0.041 (0.036)		-0.036 (0.056)		-0.030 (0.029)	
Rep. Leg. Control	-0.029 (0.030)		-0.021 (0.058)		0.019 (0.028)	
Ind. Gov		-0.059* (0.029)		-0.076* (0.034)		0.050 (0.037)
Rep. Gov		-0.014 (0.033)		-0.004 (0.036)		0.005 (0.025)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Female	-0.003 (0.026)	-0.043 (0.028)	-0.035 (0.034)	-0.053+ (0.032)	0.037+ (0.022)+	0.019 (0.026)
Non- White	0.070+ (0.041)	0.113** (0.037)	0.158*** (0.045)	0.161** (0.050)	-0.015 (0.033)	0.060* (0.028)
Republican	-0.041 (0.032)	0.058 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.031)	0.073+ (0.037)+	-0.046+ (0.025)	-0.023 (0.028)
Ind. Lean Dem	0.013 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.033)	0.068+ (0.040)	-0.000 (0.037)	0.007 (0.031)	0.005 (0.035)
Ind. Lean Rep.	0.027 (0.045)	0.026 (0.046)	0.062 (0.052)	0.055 (0.052)	0.002 (0.034)	0.026 (0.030)
Ind. Lean Neither	0.020 (0.028)	0.039 (0.033)	0.006 (0.038)	-0.025 (0.038)	0.009 (0.029)	-0.049+ (0.025)

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
Some College	-0.068 (0.104)	-0.001 (0.109)	-0.194 (0.127)	-0.130 (0.115)	-0.013 (0.080)	0.034 (0.087)
College Graduate	-0.025 (0.088)	0.038 (0.108)	-0.093 (0.107)	-0.143 (0.101)	-0.050 (0.077)	0.025 (0.089)
Some Graduate School	0.019 (0.096)	0.145 (0.103)	-0.122 (0.108)	-0.121 (0.106)	-0.032 (0.079)	0.054 (0.087)
Graduate Degree	-0.023 (0.085)	0.042 (0.104)	-0.192+ (0.107)	-0.230* (0.104)	-0.032 (0.074)	0.060 (0.082)
Agency budget in mill. (2018)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
AK	0.419*** (0.027)	0.419*** (0.014)	0.147*** (0.044)	0.480*** (0.015)	0.167*** (0.023)	0.307*** (0.010)
AZ	0.367*** (0.032)	0.160*** (0.016)	0.079 (0.057)	0.234*** (0.017)	0.116*** (0.029)	0.025* (0.013)
AR	0.316*** (0.013)	0.368*** (0.017)	0.371*** (0.014)	0.396*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.010)	0.095*** (0.013)
CA	0.410*** (0.011)	0.371*** (0.012)	0.122*** (0.013)	0.411*** (0.013)	-0.108*** (0.009)	0.144*** (0.010)
CO	0.484*** (0.033)	0.113*** (0.021)	0.033 (0.058)	-0.196*** (0.023)	0.162*** (0.030)	-0.469*** (0.015)
CT	0.412*** (0.013)	0.344*** (0.018)	0.431*** (0.016)	0.118*** (0.020)	-0.122*** (0.009)	0.076*** (0.012)
DE	0.404*** (0.028)	0.406*** (0.014)	0.105* (0.043)	0.168*** (0.016)	0.011 (0.022)	0.190*** (0.009)
FL	0.499*** (0.020)	0.216*** (0.017)	0.318*** (0.033)	0.215*** (0.017)	0.145*** (0.018)	-0.052*** (0.011)
GA	0.311*** (0.015)	0.308*** (0.018)	0.133*** (0.019)	0.178*** (0.019)	-0.023* (0.011)	0.285*** (0.014)
HI	0.328*** (0.034)	0.329*** (0.035)	-0.100** (0.036)	0.450*** (0.042)	-0.123*** (0.026)	0.144*** (0.024)
ID	0.334*** (0.034)	0.261*** (0.014)	0.365*** (0.062)	0.158*** (0.015)	0.058+ (0.031)	0.121*** (0.011)
IL	0.244*** (0.018)	0.310*** (0.012)	0.155*** (0.026)	0.230*** (0.014)	-0.161*** (0.014)	0.064*** (0.010)
IN	0.268*** (0.032)	0.351*** (0.012)	0.125* (0.052)	0.580*** (0.013)	-0.096*** (0.027)	-0.015 (0.009)

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
IA	0.389*** (0.016)	0.257*** (0.012)	0.454*** (0.025)	0.271*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.014)	0.336*** (0.007)
KS	0.495*** (0.033)	0.404*** (0.012)	0.479*** (0.057)	0.246*** (0.012)	0.019 (0.030)	0.268*** (0.009)
KY	0.285*** (0.018)	0.358*** (0.024)	0.525*** (0.021)	0.515*** (0.025)	-0.246*** (0.014)	0.200*** (0.019)
LA	0.128*** (0.012)	0.222*** (0.016)	0.269*** (0.013)	0.288*** (0.017)	-0.156*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.011)
ME	0.556*** (0.013)	0.411*** (0.015)	0.228*** (0.018)	0.046** (0.017)	-0.069*** (0.011)	0.146*** (0.014)
MD	0.283*** (0.015)	0.437*** (0.021)	0.309*** (0.016)	0.221*** (0.023)	-0.167*** (0.011)	0.299*** (0.016)
MA	0.124*** (0.012)	0.186*** (0.014)	-0.053*** (0.014)	0.242*** (0.017)	0.021* (0.009)	0.122*** (0.009)
MI	0.193*** (0.030)	0.436*** (0.013)	0.489*** (0.048)	0.383*** (0.015)	-0.074** (0.025)	0.242*** (0.010)
MN	0.576*** (0.013)	0.283*** (0.013)	0.086*** (0.016)	-0.102*** (0.014)	0.188*** (0.009)	0.214*** (0.009)
MS	0.414*** (0.006)	-0.280*** (0.009)	0.216*** (0.008)	-0.203*** (0.010)	0.085*** (0.006)	-0.809*** (0.008)
MO	0.259*** (0.013)	0.160*** (0.013)	0.110*** (0.017)	0.012 (0.014)	0.060*** (0.010)	0.052*** (0.010)
MT	0.353*** (0.032)	0.202*** (0.012)	0.056 (0.054)	0.121*** (0.014)	0.179*** (0.027)	0.130*** (0.009)
NE		0.295*** (0.014)		0.362*** (0.015)		0.091*** (0.010)
NV	0.420*** (0.026)	0.328*** (0.017)	0.179*** (0.043)	0.212*** (0.018)	0.039+ (0.022)	0.215*** (0.014)
NH	0.545*** (0.030)	0.324*** (0.011)	0.450*** (0.052)	0.014 (0.012)	0.032 (0.027)	0.105*** (0.008)
NJ	0.343*** (0.017)	0.457*** (0.012)	0.208*** (0.027)	0.486*** (0.014)	-0.203*** (0.015)	0.237*** (0.009)
NM	0.330*** (0.018)	0.334*** (0.020)	-0.113*** (0.024)	0.174*** (0.023)	0.070*** (0.015)	-0.058*** (0.013)
NY	0.324*** (0.039)	0.518*** (0.019)	0.103+ (0.061)	0.532*** (0.021)	-0.246*** (0.031)	0.365*** (0.012)
NC	0.378*** (0.017)	0.215*** (0.020)	0.241*** (0.022)	0.180*** (0.022)	0.047** (0.015)	-0.139*** (0.015)
ND	0.386*** (0.030)	0.201*** (0.006)	0.133* (0.052)	0.122*** (0.009)	0.022 (0.026)	0.196*** (0.005)
OH	0.219*** (0.023)	0.275*** (0.010)	0.324*** (0.039)	0.200*** (0.011)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.113*** (0.008)

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
OK	0.500*** (0.012)	0.024 (0.015)	0.415*** (0.015)	0.254*** (0.017)	0.147*** (0.011)	-0.402*** (0.011)
OR	0.624*** (0.016)	0.263*** (0.018)	0.091*** (0.026)	0.061** (0.019)	0.136*** (0.014)	0.090*** (0.012)
PA	0.087** (0.027)	0.291*** (0.019)	0.126** (0.044)	0.448*** (0.019)	-0.352*** (0.024)	0.187*** (0.014)
RI	0.163*** (0.013)	0.366*** (0.014)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.259*** (0.017)	-0.210*** (0.010)	0.207*** (0.009)
SC	0.360*** (0.015)	-0.118*** (0.015)	0.537*** (0.025)	0.005 (0.017)	0.132*** (0.013)	-0.442*** (0.009)
SD	0.148*** (0.035)	0.322*** (0.013)	0.048 (0.058)	0.237*** (0.014)	-0.293*** (0.030)	0.134*** (0.012)
TN	0.171*** (0.011)	0.228*** (0.016)	0.406*** (0.014)	0.285*** (0.017)	-0.319*** (0.009)	0.052*** (0.012)
TX	0.487*** (0.014)	-0.364*** (0.012)	0.261*** (0.022)	-0.250*** (0.013)	0.179*** (0.012)	-0.830*** (0.008)
UT	0.427*** (0.032)	0.339*** (0.007)	0.224*** (0.057)	0.327*** (0.008)	0.256*** (0.028)	0.160*** (0.007)
VT	0.387*** (0.021)	0.421*** (0.014)	0.385*** (0.034)	0.331*** (0.016)	-0.075*** (0.018)	0.306*** (0.009)
VA	0.438*** (0.014)	0.406*** (0.013)	0.211*** (0.021)	0.567*** (0.016)	-0.075*** (0.013)	0.192*** (0.009)
WA	0.403*** (0.014)	0.233*** (0.018)	-0.029 (0.020)	0.065*** (0.020)	0.040*** (0.012)	0.145*** (0.013)
WV	0.261*** (0.010)	0.206*** (0.015)	0.521*** (0.011)	0.225*** (0.016)	-0.112*** (0.008)	-0.071*** (0.011)
WI	0.418*** (0.018)	0.495*** (0.011)	0.475*** (0.031)	0.318*** (0.011)	-0.063*** (0.016)	0.281*** (0.008)
WY	0.302*** (0.034)	0.184*** (0.022)	0.203** (0.062)	0.432*** (0.022)	-0.013 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.016)
year1984	-0.002 (0.033)	0.069 (0.042)	-0.132** (0.043)	-0.038 (0.053)	-0.140*** (0.033)	-0.025 (0.038)
year1988	-0.012 (0.032)	0.033 (0.045)	-0.114* (0.046)	-0.114* (0.051)	-0.099*** (0.028)	-0.058 (0.041)
year1994	0.072+ (0.042)	0.178*** (0.051)	0.014 (0.048)	0.111* (0.052)	-0.085** (0.027)	-0.009 (0.038)
year1998	0.104** (0.036)	0.214*** (0.044)	0.050 (0.050)	0.166** (0.051)	-0.111*** (0.032)	0.045 (0.040)
year2004	0.013	0.090+	-0.132*	-0.080	-0.142***	-0.042

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
year2008	(0.038) 0.057	(0.050) 0.145**	(0.056) 0.063	(0.060) 0.099+	(0.037) -0.150***	(0.041) -0.030
Obs.	(0.047) 6575	(0.051) 6737	(0.059) 6521	(0.058) 6676	(0.040) 6640	(0.045) 6785
R2	0.034	0.061	0.050	0.062	0.055	0.120
R2 Adj.	0.024	0.051	0.040	0.053	0.045	0.111
AIC	15299.6	16220.8	16711.3	17982.0	13248.1	14522.0
BIC	15775.0	16704.6	17186.1	18465.3	13724.2	15006.4
Log.Lik.	-7579.798	-8039.376	-8285.652	-8920.016	-6554.065	-7190.015
RMSE	0.77	0.80	0.86	0.92	0.65	0.70

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix C. Partisanship and Administrative Domain Models (1994-2008).

Given that increases in partisan polarization are especially concentrated following the 1994 Republican Revolution (Hacker and Pierson 2005; Levendusky 2009), and prior to the 1980s there was less clear ideological division between parties, we might expect to see that a partisan difference only appears in surveys conducted after 1994. This seems especially plausible among administrators, given the particular focus on public administration within the Republican Revolution (e.g. Shanahan 1997; Hedge and Johnson 2002). Findings are largely consistent with the longer time period, though we do see a reduction in influence over major policy shifts from state legislatures under unified Republican control, albeit significant only at the .05 level.

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
Split Legislature	-0.091+		-0.027		-0.003	
	(0.055)		(0.090)		(0.039)	
Unified R Legislature	-0.111*		0.005		0.055	
	(0.055)		(0.083)		(0.036)	
Republican Governor		-0.035		-0.059		0.034
		(0.034)		(0.044)		(0.035)
Independent Governor		-0.066		-0.230**		0.025
		(0.058)		(0.083)		(0.032)
Age	-0.000	-0.004*	0.001	-0.004*	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.028	-0.001	-0.056	-0.051	0.028	0.041
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Non-White	0.038	0.124**	0.075	0.188**	-0.041	0.043
	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.039)
Republican	-0.006	0.101+	0.029	0.092+	-0.042	0.008
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Ind. Lean Dem	0.038	-0.032	0.023	-0.039	0.006	0.027
	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Ind. Lean Rep.	0.032	0.094+	0.024	0.066	-0.017	0.063
	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.041)	(0.040)

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Legislature	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Legislature	Budget Shifts from Governor
Ind. Lean Neither	0.081+	0.034	0.011	-0.033	0.018	-0.091*
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Some College	0.240	0.056	0.130	0.140	0.256+	0.068
	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.138)	(0.107)
College Graduate	0.267+	0.144	0.335*	0.188	0.226+	0.077
	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.147)	(0.157)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Some Graduate School	0.297+	0.231	0.335*	0.181	0.261+	0.105
	(0.163)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.143)	(0.125)
Graduate Degree	0.252	0.134	0.196	0.045	0.231+	0.101
	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.147)	(0.154)	(0.137)	(0.129)
Agency budget in millions (2018)	0.000	0.000***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	3286	3360	3265	3339	3313	3384
R2	0.056	0.079	0.070	0.091	0.068	0.135
R2 Adj.	0.037	0.061	0.051	0.073	0.049	0.118
AIC	7518.6	7759.4	8239.2	8741.7	6600.9	7070.4
BIC	7927.1	8175.6	8647.3	9157.4	7010.0	7487.0
Log.Lik.	-3692.309	-3811.721	-4052.613	-4302.852	-3233.465	-3467.205
RMSE	0.74	0.75	0.84	0.88	0.64	0.67

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix D. State Fixed Effects for Individual Respondents for Frequency of Communication Models (1974-2008).

Although fixed effects are not commonly reported, given the specific nature of our research question and its focus on variation between states, we provide full state-level fixed effects results for models in these appendices as the consistent statistically significant variation at least provides some very preliminary, albeit relatively weak and not well specified, statistical evidence for the relevance of between-state geographic variation in bureaucratic autonomy.

	Frequency of Contact with Legislators	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact with Governor	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
Intercept	2.261*** (0.123)	2.855*** (0.161)	2.904*** (0.117)	1.942*** (0.154)
Split Leg.	0.084 (0.051)	0.046 (0.058)		
Rep. Leg. Control	0.100* (0.045)	0.073 (0.062)		
Ind. Gov			-0.397*** (0.052)	-0.283** (0.107)
Rep. Gov			-0.011 (0.032)	0.060 (0.040)
Age	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Female	0.092* (0.036)	0.031 (0.034)	0.110** (0.034)	0.051 (0.038)
Non-White	0.281*** (0.044)	0.170*** (0.033)	0.072 (0.047)	0.040 (0.047)
Republican	-0.010 (0.026)	0.015 (0.035)	-0.040 (0.042)	-0.084 (0.055)
Ind. Lean Dem	0.166*** (0.040)	0.089* (0.045)	0.337*** (0.042)	0.295*** (0.041)
Ind. Lean Rep.	0.185*** (0.045)	0.089* (0.044)	0.267*** (0.052)	0.208** (0.070)
Ind. Lean Neither	0.142*** (0.036)	0.058 (0.045)	0.303*** (0.038)	0.223*** (0.052)
Some College	0.043	0.094	0.019	0.128

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

	Frequency of Contact with Legislators	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact with Governor	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
	(0.081)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.131)
College Graduate	-0.068	0.031	0.042	0.154
	(0.103)	(0.123)	(0.094)	(0.127)
Some Graduate School	-0.115	-0.007	-0.008	0.037
	(0.104)	(0.130)	(0.093)	(0.135)
Graduate Degree	-0.113	-0.006	0.012	0.044
	(0.093)	(0.121)	(0.091)	(0.130)
Agency budget in millions (2018)	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
AK	-0.121**	-0.698***	0.219***	0.087***
	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.012)	(0.016)
AZ	-0.143**	-0.469***	0.371***	0.079***
	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.012)	(0.019)
AR	-0.310***	-0.389***	0.067***	-0.319***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.020)
CA	-0.113***	-0.572***	0.849***	0.507***
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)
CO	-0.170***	-0.302***	0.240***	0.243***
	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.013)	(0.023)
CT	-0.178***	-0.304***	0.501***	0.296***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.026)
DE	-0.131***	-0.104*	0.223***	0.424***
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.014)
FL	0.097***	-0.529***	0.547***	0.420***
	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.015)	(0.022)
GA	-0.327***	-0.343***	0.275***	0.190***
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.021)
HI	0.184***	-0.017	0.410***	0.693***
	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.045)
ID	-0.006	-0.213**	-0.094***	-0.304***
	(0.048)	(0.068)	(0.013)	(0.016)
IL	-0.228***	-0.318***	0.472***	0.066**
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.021)
IN	0.052	-0.088	0.203***	-0.080***
	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.012)	(0.016)
IA	-0.026	-0.270***	0.191***	0.110***
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.015)
KS	-0.294***	-0.565***	0.169***	0.201***

	Frequency of Contact with Legislators	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact with Governor	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.010)	(0.014)
KY	0.206***	-0.275***	0.402***	0.343***
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.031)
LA	-0.300***	-0.447***	0.381***	0.220***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)
ME	-0.324***	-0.375***	0.334***	0.124**
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.038)
MD	-0.180***	-0.410***	0.391***	0.125***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.028)
MA	-0.362***	-0.574***	0.512***	0.244***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)
MI	-0.475***	-0.817***	0.438***	0.224***
	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.013)	(0.017)
MN	-0.237***	-0.599***	0.447***	0.409***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.016)
MS	-0.191***	-0.213***	0.093***	0.207***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)
MO	-0.304***	-0.458***	0.501***	0.419***
	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.015)
MT	0.163***	-0.143*	0.163***	0.084***
	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.016)
NE			0.027*	0.172***
			(0.012)	(0.018)
NV	0.386***	-0.168***	0.213***	0.189***
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.014)	(0.022)
NH	-0.436***	-0.419***	0.169***	0.065***
	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.013)	(0.014)
NJ	0.103***	-0.206***	0.490***	0.298***
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.012)	(0.015)
NM	0.213***	-0.168***	0.059***	0.175***
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.023)
NY	0.052	-0.310***	0.722***	-0.111***
	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.016)	(0.020)
NC	-0.014	-0.190***	0.435***	0.397***
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.028)
ND	0.210***	0.278***	-0.108***	-0.016
	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.008)	(0.011)
OH	0.010	-0.294***	0.422***	0.283***
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.009)	(0.014)
OK	-0.383***	-0.549***	0.280***	0.328***
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)
OR	0.066***	-0.352***	0.145***	0.075***
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.021)

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

	Frequency of Contact with Legislators	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact with Governor	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
PA	-0.218*** (0.040)	-0.547*** (0.048)	0.720*** (0.016)	0.557*** (0.024)
RI	0.092*** (0.013)	0.157*** (0.014)	0.098*** (0.015)	-0.076*** (0.019)
SC	-0.580*** (0.018)	-0.727*** (0.026)	0.217*** (0.014)	0.050* (0.019)
SD	0.408*** (0.041)	0.134* (0.066)	-0.070*** (0.016)	0.012 (0.022)
TN	-0.133*** (0.011)	-0.303*** (0.014)	0.429*** (0.011)	0.456*** (0.018)
TX	-0.126*** (0.016)	-0.776*** (0.024)	0.712*** (0.012)	0.462*** (0.016)
UT	0.290*** (0.045)	-0.167** (0.062)	0.090*** (0.008)	0.257*** (0.010)
VT	-0.424*** (0.034)	-0.230*** (0.036)	-0.056*** (0.014)	0.005 (0.016)
VA	0.050** (0.016)	-0.235*** (0.023)	0.403*** (0.011)	0.173*** (0.016)
WA	0.026+ (0.016)	-0.374*** (0.022)	0.269*** (0.013)	0.305*** (0.020)
WV	0.224*** (0.010)	-0.042** (0.013)	0.269*** (0.011)	0.200*** (0.019)
WI	-0.260*** (0.031)	-0.673*** (0.033)	0.132*** (0.008)	0.150*** (0.013)
WY	0.393*** (0.048)	0.170* (0.066)	-0.130*** (0.015)	-0.002 (0.026)
year1978	0.241*** (0.051)		0.313*** (0.058)	
year1984	0.215*** (0.044)	0.028 (0.044)	0.317*** (0.049)	-0.048 (0.055)
year1988	0.133** (0.049)	-0.091+ (0.047)	0.382*** (0.043)	-0.124* (0.051)
year1994	0.161** (0.055)	-0.123* (0.058)	0.354*** (0.045)	-0.027 (0.053)
year1998	0.292*** (0.051)	0.046 (0.057)	0.521*** (0.050)	0.096 (0.059)
year2004	0.397*** (0.053)	0.193** (0.064)	0.536*** (0.053)	0.115+ (0.067)
year2008	0.382*** (0.066)	0.100 (0.072)	0.582*** (0.057)	0.121+ (0.062)
Obs.	7854	6594	8003	6784
R2	0.113	0.095	0.103	0.076
R2 Adj.	0.106	0.085	0.095	0.067

	Frequency of Contact with Legislators	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact with Governor	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
AIC	21569.5	18172.3	22401.4	20176.7
BIC	22064.3	18647.8	22904.5	20661.0
Log.Lik.	-10713.744	-9016.131	-11128.678	-10017.329
RMSE	0.95	0.95	0.97	1.06

$p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix E. Individual Respondents for Frequency of Communication Models (1994- 2008).

Given that increases in partisan polarization are especially concentrated following the 1994 Republican Revolution (Hacker and Pierson 2005; Levendusky 2009), and prior to the 1980s there was less clear ideological division between parties, we might expect to see that a partisan difference only appears in surveys conducted after 1994. This seems especially plausible among administrators, given the particular focus on public administration within the Republican Revolution (e.g. Shanahan 1997; Hedge and Johnson 2002). Findings are largely consistent with the longer time period, though we do see an increasing level of communication from legislators and their staffs under unified Republican control, which could be consistent with an increase in politicization of public administration in the party.

	Frequency Contact Legislators	of with	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency Contact Governor	of with	Frequency Contact Gubernatorial Staff	of with
Split Legislature	0.124**		0.093+				
	(0.047)		(0.051)				
Unified R Legislature	0.183**		0.143+				
	(0.057)		(0.073)				
Republican Governor				-0.034		-0.023	
				(0.055)		(0.067)	
Independent Governor				-0.402***		-0.112	
				(0.066)		(0.154)	
Age	0.006*		0.006**	-0.004		0.003	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Female	0.131**		0.066	0.106*		0.082+	
	(0.041)		(0.044)	(0.050)		(0.049)	
Non-White	0.232***		0.142***	0.004		-0.033	
	(0.046)		(0.041)	(0.050)		(0.061)	

	Frequency of Contact Legislators	of with	Frequency of Contact with Legislative Staff	Frequency of Contact Governor	of with	Frequency of Contact Gubernatorial Staff	of with
Republican	-0.051 (0.051)		-0.077+ (0.047)	-0.155* (0.061)		-0.219** (0.079)	
Ind. Lean Dem	0.228*** (0.055)		0.087+ (0.052)	0.317*** (0.051)		0.273*** (0.059)	
Ind. Lean Rep.	0.140** (0.050)		0.020 (0.056)	0.124 (0.078)		0.107 (0.093)	
Ind. Lean Neither	0.091 (0.063)		-0.060 (0.058)	0.233*** (0.069)		0.186* (0.080)	
Some College	0.352 (0.225)		0.337 (0.288)	0.385+ (0.205)		0.493* (0.229)	
College Graduate	0.214 (0.235)		0.110 (0.262)	0.263 (0.214)		0.272 (0.250)	
Some Graduate School	0.145 (0.234)		0.037 (0.271)	0.292 (0.225)		0.200 (0.256)	
Graduate Degree	0.191 (0.228)		0.088 (0.259)	0.287 (0.214)		0.213 (0.249)	
Agency budget in millions (2018)	-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)	
Num.Obs.	3284		3278	3341		3355	
R2	0.124		0.109	0.105		0.093	
R2 Adj.	0.106		0.091	0.087		0.075	
AIC	8751.9		8915.3	9313.2		10018.7	
BIC	9160.4		9323.7	9728.9		10434.7	
Log.Lik.	-4308.966		-4390.653	-4588.587		-4941.346	
RMSE	0.90		0.92	0.96		1.06	

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix F. Impact of Gender on Gubernatorial Models.

Data on gubernatorial gender from 1964 to 2004 is from Klarner's (2013) "femgov" variable, a dichotomous variable indicating 1 if the governor identifies as female, and 0 if male. These data were updated to include 2008, and partial years were recoded as 1 or 0 based on who was in power the majority of the year, instead of as a fractional variable as in the original dataset. The governor's gender has no independent significance when included in our models and does not substantively impact our variables of interest. These models do include the full suite of controls and fixed effects; while not reported here, those tables are available on request.

Table F1. Partisanship and Administrative Domains (1974-2008)

	Program Shifts from Governor	Major Policy Shifts from Governor	Rule Shifts from Governor	Budget Shifts from Governor
Intercept	0.444*** (0.070)	2.275*** (0.126)	2.063*** (0.144)	2.594*** (0.114)
Ind. Governor	0.139*** (0.014)	-0.059* (0.030)	-0.072* (0.031)	0.051 (0.037)
Rep. Governor	0.015 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.002 (0.036)	0.006 (0.025)
Female Governor	-0.030 (0.032)	0.008 (0.056)	0.049 (0.061)	0.013 (0.047)
Observations	6777	6737	6676	6785
R2	0.064	0.061	0.062	0.120
R2 Adj.	0.054	0.051	0.053	0.111
AIC	9523.7	16222.7	17983.1	14523.9
BIC	10014.8	16713.4	18473.1	15015.1
Log.Lik.	-4689.852	-8039.360	-8919.541	-7189.959
RMSE	0.48	0.80	0.92	0.70

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table F2. Partisanship and Communication Frequency (1974-2008)

	Frequency Contact Governor	of with	Frequency of Contact with Gubernatorial Staff
Intercept	2.905***		1.943***
	(0.117)		(0.154)
Ind. Governor	-0.395***		-0.278*
	(0.051)		(0.111)
Rep. Governor	-0.010		0.063
	(0.031)		(0.040)
Female Governor	0.022		0.057
	(0.050)		(0.060)
Observations	8003		6784
R2	0.103		0.076
R2 Adj.	0.095		0.067
AIC	22403.2		20177.7
BIC	22913.3		20668.9
Log.Lik.	-11128.589		-10016.840
RMSE	0.97		1.06

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix G. Alternative Figures.

Figures 1-4 in the main text order states alphabetically for consistent reference points. However, we also want to draw clearer attention to alternative features in the model, so alternative versions of each figure are available here. The first version of each figure orders states by the maximum range between values in any one year. The second version orders states by the size of the net shift in the gap between the first year of responses and the last year of responses. The maximum range graphs are all labeled A, and the net shift graphs are all labeled B. Each figure from the main text has two alternates here. For alternative versions of Figure 4, ranking is ordered based on the gaps between governors and legislators, not either staff.



Figure G1A. Influence on Budget Changes (Maximum Range).**Figure G1B. Influence on Budget Changes (Net Shift).**

Figure G2A. Influence on Policy Changes (Maximum Range).




Figure G2B. Influence on Policy Changes (Net Shift).




Figure G3A. Influence on Administrative Rules and Regulations (Maximum Range).




Figure G3B. Influence on Administrative Rules and Regulations (Net Shift).




Figure G4A. Frequency (Maximum Range).





Figure G4B. Frequency (Net Shift).



Appendix H. Ordinal Probit Models.

Appendix H provides an alternative specification to the OLS models in the paper using ordinal probit regression, to better account for the fact that distance is not necessarily equal between the ordered categories in either the domain or frequency models. Model convergence was inhibited by limited (or no) responses in particular categories across a fairly large range of state-years. Findings are broadly similar; the only difference worth noting is with the frequency of communication from legislators under unified Republican control. Given the limited model convergence, and limited significance to this variable in the original models, we think this is worth noting as an area for potential future study, but we do not believe this difference is substantively interpretable.

Table H1. Ordinal Probit Models for Domains.

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature (oprobit)	Major Policy Shifts from Governor (oprobit)	Rule Shifts from Legislature (oprobit)	Rule Shifts from Governor (oprobit)	Budget Shifts from Legislature (oprobit)	Budget Shifts from Governor (oprobit)
Split Legislature	-0.061 (0.056)		-0.050 (0.071)		-0.055 (0.059)	
Unified R Legislature	-0.047 (0.048)		-0.032 (0.072)		0.023 (0.060)	
Republican Governor		-0.008 (0.048)		-0.002 (0.041)		0.022 (0.045)
Ind. Governor		-0.014 (0.035)		-0.112* (0.044)		0.106 (0.079)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)
Female	0.011 (0.039)	-0.061 (0.039)	-0.042 (0.041)	-0.063+ (0.037)	0.081+ (0.042)	0.036 (0.048)
Republican	-0.069 (0.046)	0.092 (0.056)	-0.012 (0.039)	0.087* (0.044)	-0.095* (0.046)	-0.049 (0.048)
Ind. Lean Dem	0.022 (0.060)	-0.038 (0.048)	0.089+ (0.050)	0.001 (0.042)	0.008 (0.062)	-0.016 (0.070)
Ind. Lean Rep.	0.044 (0.068)	0.049 (0.068)	0.076 (0.067)	0.064 (0.061)	0.001 (0.067)	0.049 (0.059)
Ind. Lean Neither	0.041 (0.041)	0.051 (0.048)	0.003 (0.047)	-0.031 (0.044)	0.021 (0.059)	-0.095* (0.046)
Some College	-0.139 (0.151)	-0.025 (0.152)	-0.257 (0.163)	-0.154 (0.141)	-0.054 (0.169)	0.049 (0.148)
College Graduate	-0.084 (0.131)	0.042 (0.151)	-0.132 (0.137)	-0.178 (0.125)	-0.117 (0.167)	0.039 (0.152)

Bureaucratic Autonomy Across Laboratories of Democracy

	Major Policy Shifts from Legislature (oprobit)	Major Policy Shifts from Governor (oprobit)	Rule Shifts from Legislature (oprobit)	Rule Shifts from Governor (oprobit)	Budget Shifts from Legislature (oprobit)	Budget Shifts from Governor (oprobit)
Some Graduate School	-0.014	0.196	-0.166	-0.149	-0.080	0.086
	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.168)	(0.150)
Graduate Degree	-0.102	0.039	-0.253+	-0.276*	-0.098	0.095
	(0.127)	(0.144)	(0.138)	(0.129)	(0.162)	(0.142)
Agency budget in millions (2018)	0.000**	0.000***	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	6575	6737	6521	6676	6640	6785
AIC	14034.3	13685.8	16114.2	17045.2	10945.4	11347.3
BIC	14516.5	14176.5	16595.8	17535.2	11428.3	11838.5
RMSE	2.02	2.05	1.74	1.76	2.10	2.07

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table H2. Ordinal Probit Models for Frequency.

	Legislators (oprobit)	Legislative Staff (oprobit)	Governor (oprobit)	Gubernatorial Staff (oprobit)
Split Legislature	-0.113* (0.055)	-0.037 (0.065)		
Unified R Legislature	-0.130** (0.048)	-0.081 (0.071)		
Republican Governor			0.014 (0.035)	-0.060 (0.041)
Independent Governor			0.488*** (0.094)	0.290** (0.112)
Age	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
Female	-0.097* (0.040)	-0.009 (0.038)	-0.127*** (0.038)	-0.050 (0.038)
Republican	0.060* (0.030)	-0.029 (0.039)	0.041 (0.047)	0.085 (0.055)
Ind. Lean Dem	-0.136** (0.044)	-0.091+ (0.049)	-0.357*** (0.048)	-0.291*** (0.040)
Ind. Lean Rep.	-0.106* (0.051)	-0.110* (0.050)	-0.282*** (0.058)	-0.212** (0.069)
Ind. Lean Neither	-0.100* (0.041)	-0.076 (0.051)	-0.330*** (0.043)	-0.221*** (0.051)
Some College	0.130 (0.096)	-0.096 (0.115)	-0.017 (0.102)	-0.094 (0.132)
College Graduate	0.247* (0.118)	-0.050 (0.136)	-0.057 (0.098)	-0.116 (0.132)
Some Graduate School	0.326** (0.121)	-0.028 (0.144)	-0.009 (0.096)	0.002 (0.138)
Graduate Degree	0.310** (0.110)	-0.016 (0.134)	-0.013 (0.093)	-0.007 (0.134)
Agency budget in millions (2018)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Num.Obs.	7854	6594	8003	6784
AIC	20805.1	17665.7	21366.2	19191.9
BIC	21313.8	18154.9	21883.3	19689.9
RMSE	3.13	3.02	2.39	3.30

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001