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The Demands of ‘Unity in Diversity’

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Abstract

How does the current state of union accommodate the concurrent demands for ‘unity in diversity’? What of its ambivalent claims to ‘demos-formation’? What kind of theorising can grasp the larger picture in the late 2010s? In tackling these questions, the paper revisits the concept of ‘organised synarchy’, draws from republican political theory and argues that Europe has preserved a balance between unity and plurality through an advanced system of codetermination reflective of a general view of the whole: an evolutionary state of ordered symbiosis among codetermined units which is not about their subordination to a superior centre, but rather about their preservation as distinctive but constituent units: distinctive, in retaining their constitutional qualities; constituent, in reaching higher levels of shared rule. It is about a common association which retains its character as an ordered plurality.

Keywords

Demos Formation – EU Polity – Political Liberty – Republican Theory
1. Two hypotheses\textsuperscript{1,2}

As the acclaimed booming of Europe’s once fashionable post-statist projections finds itself in retreat, there emerges a state-centric rationale, albeit of a more refined nature compared to conventional realist takes. Given the field’s ‘multitheoretical’, to quote Taylor,\textsuperscript{3} state of play—a reflection of its growing interdisciplinary nature—the question is raised whether a wider imaging of the whole can be drawn at this critical juncture. A related concern is what kind of theorising can grasp the ‘big picture’ and what it would entail for Europe’s—enduring for some, fading for others—claims to ‘demos formation’ and its ambivalent, if not contested, conception(s) of it.

One may draw, schematically, at least from two hypotheses. The first takes the polity as an ordered public community and argues that ‘demos’, or an identifiable sense of it, precedes ‘cracy’: civic belonging comes prior to forms of shared rule. This hypothesis is presented only to emphasise the role of civic identity in the making of a demos as opposed to more procedural or instrumental aspects of the process. Yet, a notable reason for the hypothesis’ flaws is that ‘demos’ (the civic body) and ‘cracy’ (how it rules) need a ‘polity context’ (and a specific institutional content too). Demos, taken as a normative claim or as a living condition, manifests itself constantly, often dialectically, in the experience of being part of a whole whose constitutive values and practices—a polity’s essential ‘constitution’—cultivate bonds of civic attachment to a common life. A demos preceding its polity but still being a demos—shaped by the ethics of a self-conscious citizenry—is rather contradictory as no polity exists without a form, an architecture, even a method of governing or being governed. Tsatsos notes:

The term ‘demos’ starts its erratic historical course as a characterization of a particular form of legally organized co-existence. Hence, demos is not a concept with a pre-defined and historically unwavering content, one that is irrelevant to, or pre-existing, the changing historical conditions. On the contrary, the

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demos, like every historical concept, followed the creation of a particular legal order, in our case the ancient Greek city-state. The term did not precede — this would be unthinkable — the institutional occurrence, but the other way round, the term discursively and theoretically reflected the historical occurrence. According to the same logic, we should underline that the institutional meaning of the demos is adapting to the evolving legally ordered societies that sought to legitimize power by their people, or, more concretely, those societies which ‘were ruled by the many’.  

The second hypothesis draws from the complexities of (late-)modern polities and argues that demos, in the sense of a self-identifying civic body, comes later, even much later, into the picture. What you need first is a set of inclusive public institutions which can foster a sense of belonging to a polity or, less demandingly, to a ‘political association’, which can hold previously separate polities within a discernible whole. To quote Tsatsos again:

The demos never constituted a totally homogenous unity of its members. Demos as a source of power in democratic regimes rarely nowadays appears as a true political unit, but mainly as a complex aggregate with geographical, linguistic, national and institutional subgroups, which, however, belong to the same power structure.

We have seen this pattern of polity evolution in federations made up of diverse publics or in transnational units aspiring to democracy like the European Union (EU). Here, the polity, defined as the public architecture of ordered symbiosis or, in Tsatsos’ words, as ‘the sum total of social rules that govern a society’, precedes demos or accompanies the latter’s collective propensity towards civic belonging.

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5 ‘In the most general sense’, writes Weale, ‘a political association has the ability to make rules that are treated as authoritative for the members of a collectivity. Democratic political association, in this general sense, arises when those binding rules are the product, according to some recognised process, of the expressed opinions of the members of the collectivity, either directly or through representatives’. See A. Weale, *Democratic citizenship and the European Union*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 51. The EU meets the general criterion, but if ‘democratic’ is added, assessments present a variety of takes. From Kinnas and Groom: ‘Associations, then, as a “fraternal family of nations” — both governments and peoples — have both an internal dimension in the pursuit of a wide range of goals by a variety of actors at and across different levels within the ambit of the association. They also have an external dimension in offering a helping and healing hand to others beyond the confines of the association’. They conclude: ‘Association is a flexible, open, decentralized and collaborative system which enables governments and peoples, states and IGOs to work together to the extent and in the form which suits them best individually. It is a useful tool in a world in which identity is a key value, but one in which complex interdependence accounts for a substantial part of the general well-being’. See J. Kinnas and A. J. R. Groom, ‘Association’, in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds), *Frameworks for International Co-operation*, London: Pinter, 1990, pp. 74 and 75, respectively.

6 Tsatsos, *The European Sympolity*, pp. 48-49.

7 Ibid, p. 1, in contradistinction to the ‘state’ which he defines as ‘the legal ordering of state authority’; with reference, as he explains, to ‘the two terms to describe “the legal order” of a society in the Greek language’: ‘πολιτεία’ (‘polity’) and ‘κράτος’ (‘state’). See p. 1.
Whatever the preferred or prevalent hypothesis, ‘demos’ and ‘cracy’ do not necessarily have to fall in love with each other as classical Roman or renaissance—notably, Florentine—republicanism would have us believe; they only have to become ‘symbiotes’ in Althusius’ sense of the term: ‘participants or partners in a common life’. Keeping in mind Nikolaidis’ and Tsatsos’ definitions of ‘demos’ as ‘a group of individuals who have enough in common to want to and to be able to decide collectively about their own affairs’ and as ‘the collective subject that arises out of the diversity, the dynamics, and the particularities, of the sum total of the social base that organized itself under the auspices of an institutional power’, respectively, an EU demos in the demanding sense of the first hypothesis is lacking. As Weiler et al. put it: ‘In the case of Europe we cannot presuppose demos. After all, an article of faith of European integration has been the aim of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Demoi, then, rather than demos’, As put by Grimm: ‘The European level of politics lacks a matching public’. A plural civic body may be said to exist, but not in the compelling sense of a self-standing public celebrating its civic union.

But following Tsatsos’ syllogism, demos is ‘a historically evolving concept’ and ‘the derivation of power from the demos refers to every historical form of the demos, with no exceptions’.

The claim that there is no such thing as a ‘European demos’ presupposes the acceptance of an absurd conceptual positivism, which denied the historicity of concepts and assigns to the terms ‘demos’ or ‘public opinion’ a definite and perpetual, that is to say a-historical, content, which is not affected by the evolution of the historical spaces of their application or by their adaptation to discrete historical terms.

He explains: ‘Concepts do not create history. History either creates new concepts, or assigns new meaning to existing ones’. In the more instrumental but also more plausible second hypothesis, democracy does not require a fully formed demos to function as a working governing regime. Arguably, this accords with Lijphart’s ‘consociational democracy’, an elite-driven polity which combines the autonomy of the parts with conditions of stable democratic rule for the whole. But what of

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13 Tsatsos, The European Sympolity, p. 89.

14 Ibid, p. 47.

15 Ibid, p. 91.

Europe’s present condition? What would it take for Europeans to develop a shared sense of ‘demos-hood’ out of their own civic traditions? Or, as Nikolaidis put it: ‘What should a Europe for all, an EU that most of us can like, if not love, look like?’ How to accord the common association, wherever situated in the federal/confederal, polity/organisation or demos/demoi axis, a viable equilibrium?

2. Normative premises

Democracy, defined by Tsatsos as ‘an honest deduction of power to the will of the people’, organises the political constitution of public life in ways which reflect the concerns of the demos. Respect for liberty and a sense of responsibility towards one’s polity and fellow citizens’ concerns are democracy’s long-standing premises. Also:

Democracy, among other things, requires that each citizen is provided with equal means not only to deliberate, but to deliberate freely. Thus the meaning of Democracy as a process of reduction of power to the demos, has, apart from a regime dimension […] a subject-dependent legal dimension, since it presupposes the guarantee of the political freedom of the citizen as member of the primary political subject in the function of the demos.

Whether one draws from a republican or liberal view of political association, a contemporary dilemma is whether to enhance ‘positive liberty’ which, in Berlin’s words, ‘derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master’, or opt for what Scharpf calls ‘output-oriented legitimacy’. Yet, democracy is ultimately about citizens themselves caring for their polity. Moreover, as asserted by Dewey: ‘A
democracy is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience’; a view reminiscent of Althusius’ account of ‘politics’ as

the art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called ‘symbiotics’. The subject matter of politics is therefore association (consociatio), in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the harmonious existence of social life.

Life (and thus living) in the democratic polity points to an osmosis between a mental/ideational and a procedural/working condition; between ‘a state of mind’ and an institutional ordering, to recall Schattschneider and Schumpeter, respectively. But encouraging the demos to reflect on the demands of collective symbiosis requires a core set of virtues (and values) and the means for embodying them in the workings of public institutions. As Maynor notes, ‘citizens must learn about the substantive nature of the institutions of the republic, how they work, how to use them, and, importantly, how to challenge them’. This accords with Pettit’s ‘contestatory democracy’ which, as he writes, ‘will have to be deliberative, requiring that decisions are based on considerations of allegedly common concern, if there is to be a systematically available basis for people to challenge what government does’ and ‘inclusive, making room for people from every quarter to be able to press challenges against legislative or executive or judicial decisions’ as well as ‘responsive to the contestations that are brought against government decisions’. This notion, he adds, connects with the emphasis in premodern republicanism on the virtue of having laws that have stood the test of time and that are part of an ancient constitution. And it connects also with the traditional view that the people have the right to challenge and resist laws that are arbitrary in character: that this indeed is what constituted the people as sovereign.

As to the attachments that make for a viable demos, P. J. Taylor notes:

By splintering the imagined community through multiple identities, is the depth of allegiance—the essence of the concept—lost? With solid community attachments replaced by shallower, multiple attachments, is this a cacophony

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29 Ibid, p. 278.
politics of lowest common denominators? In short, does the effective operation of a demos assume a dominant scale or focus of allegiance? The historical evidence suggests this to be the case.\textsuperscript{30}

Although building instruments of democratic rule is crucial for the viability of the EU, it does not require a radical reordering of pre-established orders and cultures or a compromise of the democratic autonomy of the parts, but rather a structured plurality of diverse but constituent publics.\textsuperscript{31} The aim is for a ‘Republic of Europeans’, whose democratic vitality and ‘civility’\textsuperscript{32} draw from claims to ‘civic unity in polycultural diversity’;\textsuperscript{33} it is about capturing the dialectic of that plurality. Hence the need to connect EU civic strategies to evolutionary forms of authority-sharing, indicative of a future orientation, but not necessarily of an end state. Related to that is how to move from an EU-type of association termed ‘organised synarchy’\textsuperscript{34} to one founded on Pettit’s ‘freedom as non-domination’ thesis,\textsuperscript{35} ‘permitting’, in Bowman’s words, ‘multiple forms of political membership and overlapping sites of pooled sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{36} A sense of ‘demos-hood’ may be needed, but along the lines of Tsatsos’ ‘sympolity’,\textsuperscript{37} Dobson’s ‘multipolity’\textsuperscript{38} or MacCormick’s ‘mixed commonwealth’;\textsuperscript{39} at best, a ‘res publica composita’;\textsuperscript{40} at least, a structured plurality of codetermined polities; as Nikolaidis put it, a ‘European “demoi-crazy” founded on the persistent plurality of its component peoples but not reducible to a set of complex bargains among sovereign states’ and ‘predicated on the mutual recognition, confrontation and ever more demanding sharing of our respective and separate identities, not on their merger’;\textsuperscript{41} or,
from Taylor’s optic, a ‘symbiotic consociation’ but with a normative twist: a propensity towards a more civic-oriented association whose publics can transfer their democratic claims to and via the central institutions.

This is also attuned to an imaging of the EU as a ‘confederal consociation’. This term was coined back in the mid-1990s in an attempt to build on Taylor’s consociational analogy of the then Community system and account for its state-centric, yet evolutionary, nature as a consensual union of polities retaining a key role in managing the affairs of their common association. The general point to make is that, although systemic growth may well release pressures towards centralisation, even towards a federalist-inspired order, these do not in themselves make for a ‘federal republic’ or any other superior centre; rather, they can be taken as an indication of states adjusting to the collective terms of their common association without negating their own orders.

3. Republican takes

As citizenship encourages the demos, however thinly or thickly defined, ‘to shape and sustain’, in Bellamy’s terms, ‘the collective life in the community’, the idea of ‘civic competence’, defined by Soltan as ‘a combination of attitudes and ideals with skills’, enhances civic propensity towards what Titus Livius called ‘caritas rei publicae’: ‘a caring (or affection) for all things public’. It means, as Viroli writes, ‘a charitable love of the republic’ and amounts to the highest, perhaps finest, form of ‘republican patriotism’. This is sustained, as he adds, by ‘acts of service (officium) and care (cultus) for the common good’ and ‘giving citizens the strength to perform their civic duties.

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49 I am grateful to Dario Castiglione for a clarification of the term and for the above conceptualisation.
and rulers the courage to meet the onerous obligations that defense of the common liberty demands’.

In Crick’s words:

The Romans had their version of *arete*, which they called *virtus*, a word misleading if translated as ‘virtue’ in a modern moral sense: it was the specific virtue or element that a citizen should possess to do whatever was needed for the preservation, expansion, and glory of the state.

As Viroli asserts,

republican patriotism is first of all a political passion based on the experience of citizenship, not on shared pre-political elements derived from being born in the same territory, belonging to the same race, speaking the same language, worshipping the same gods, having the same customs. The political experience of republican liberty, or the memory or hope thereof, makes the spaces, buildings, and streets of the city meaningful. Republican theorists knew well that the kind of commonality generated by inhabiting the same city or nation, speaking the same language and worshipping the same gods is hardly sufficient to generate patriotism in the hearts of citizens: a true fatherland, they claimed, can only be a free republic. They also claimed that love of country is not a natural feeling but a passion that needs to be stimulated through laws or, more precisely, through good government and the participation of the citizens in public life.

In Mouritsen’s words:

In the republican tradition, patriotism is connected with civic activities in two ways, one primarily concerned with the future, the other with the past. Both involve the idea that, to be virtuous, a motivation must be aided by identification. On the other hand they become values in themselves, as affective attachments and as links to shared ideals of what constitutes a good citizen.

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52 Viroli, *Republicanism*, p. 18 and 80. Nanz summarises the ‘civic-republican’ idea: ‘The common good is seen as a substantive conception of the good life, which defines the community’s way of life’. From Schumpeter’s account, however: ‘There is [...] no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals the common good is bound to mean different things’. See respectively, P. Nanz, *Europolis: Constitutional patriotism beyond the nation-state*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006, p. 34 and Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, p. 251.


From a similar prism, Salvadori takes ‘republican patriotism’ as
the sense of the value of liberty as a good of all and for all; fidelity and loyalty
toward institutions deriving from equal participation; a system of rights that bases
citizenship in a republic on respect for the individual on the one hand and for
groups on the other […]; a political system that derives from a common pact,
demands a tireless defense of the established rules in order to define relations be-
tween those who govern and those who are governed, between the state and
civil society; a civic conscience nourished by love of the fatherland which, in the
grab of virtue, requires one to fight against the degeneration of power and the evil
of corruption; a way of experiencing politics that is manifest on the public stage
and that rejects the arcana imperii; a public ethics that demands loyalty to public
institutions above and beyond any private loyalties; a spirit that conceives of
the fatherland as an ideal, not a physical, place, and therefore considers terri-
toriality as implementing the universal values of humanity in a specific space.56

‘Republican liberty’ is about the cives taking an active part in the ‘common liberty’57 and,
as in the Roman phrase ‘Omnia reliquit servare rem publicam’ inspired by Cincinnatus’
patriotism, defending it.58 Also, as Viroli writes, ‘it accepts the idea of liberty as an ab-
sence of impediment, but it adds the requirement that liberty be an absence of domi-
nation (of the constant possibility of interference), ‘understood as the condition of the indi-
vidual who does not have to depend on the arbitrary will of other individuals or insti-
tutions that might oppress him or her with impunity if they so desired’.59 He explains:

The source of this interpretation of political liberty was the principle of Roman
law that defines the status of a free person as not being subject to the arbitrary
will of another person—in contrast to a slave, who is dependent on another
person’s will.60

As Skinner asserts,

if a state or commonwealth is to count as free, then laws that govern it—the
rules that regulate its bodily movements—must be enacted with the consent of
all its citizens, the members of the body politic as a whole. For the extent that

56 M. L. Salvadori, ‘La tradizione repubblicana nell’Italia dell’800 e del 900’, in M. Viroli (ed), Libertà
politica e virtù civile: Significati e percorsi del repubblicanesimo classico, Torino: Fondazione Agnelli, 2004,
p. 229, quoted in Viroli, Republicanism, pp. 88-89.
57 Viroli, Republicanism, p. 80. See also Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge
58 See M. J. Hillyard, Cincinnatus and the Citizen-Servant Ideal: The Roman Legend’s Life, Times, and Legacy,
59 Viroli, Republicanism, pp. 43 and 35. See also Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. II, Renaissance Virtues:
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 6-7. Pettit defines ‘domination’ as ‘a power of
interference on an arbitrary basis’. See Pettit, Republicanism, p. 52.
60 Viroli, Republicanism, p. 8.
this does not happen, the body politic will be moved to act by a will other than its own, and will to that degree be approved of its liberty.\textsuperscript{61}

‘Caritas rei publicae’, together with the conjoint ideal of ‘caritas civium’,\textsuperscript{62} offers a response, even an antidote, to the persistence of the ‘res privata’ as opposed to the virtuous civic purpose of the ‘res publica’, defined by Viroli as ‘a community of individuals in which no one is forced to serve and no one is allowed to dominate’.\textsuperscript{63} After all, ‘politics’, which Heywood rightly reminds us ‘literally, means “what concerns the polis”’,\textsuperscript{64} is about ways of sustaining a commonly shaped order; how we, as ‘πολίτες’ or ‘cives’, and how the ‘πόλις’ or ‘civitas’, perform(s) our/its functions and promote(s) certain values and forms of rule. Thus, ‘politics’ is seen as that which affects the constitution of public life; as the very ‘soul’ of commonly shared lives. From Viroli’s prism: ‘Republicanism should propose itself in democratic multicultural countries as a new political vision of a civic ethos that reconnects the words “liberty” and “responsibility”’.\textsuperscript{65} Keeping in mind Bellamy and Castiglione’s assertion that ‘a future multinational European polity could be a “Republic, if you can keep it”’\textsuperscript{66} and Honohan’s view that, ‘[s]ince Europe is notoriously marked by diversity of nationality and views of history, interdependence of fate and future can come to be seen as the basis of political community’,\textsuperscript{67} a ‘civic plurality’, to quote Avnon and Benziman,\textsuperscript{68} gives rise to the idea of ‘many peoples, one demos’. Honohan notes: ‘The substance of republican politics is based on interdependence rather than commonality, is created in deliberation, emerges in multiple publics to which all can contribute, and is not definitive but open to change’.\textsuperscript{69} Thus a pluralist-republican view of ‘a public’: ‘The republican public may be seen in plural terms, as it is disengaged from total identification with the legislative and coercive state […] Rather than demanding a “unified public”, it thus lends itself more easily to multiple centres’.\textsuperscript{70} Thus also the promise of diverse but interactive demoi shaping together their collective association.

\textsuperscript{61} Skinner, \textit{Liberty before Liberalism}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{62} Viroli, \textit{Republicanism}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{69} Honohan, \textit{Civic Republicanism}, p. 281, quoted in Lavdas and Chryssochoou, \textit{A Republic of Europeans}, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, pp. 231-232, quoted in Lavdas and Chryssochoou, \textit{A Republic of Europeans}, p. 72.
4. Still a states’ affair?

But what of a more pragmatic imaging? Recent changes in the workings of the EU\textsuperscript{71} have not affected its character as a ‘synarchy of co-sovereigns’\textsuperscript{72} whose parts combine different visions of shared rule. This is key to acknowledging changes in sovereignty without ascribing to its complete transmutation into a post-statist order. For all its late-modern predicaments, sovereignty cannot be convincingly detached from the parts. Rather, the EU is about strengthening the latter through, not despite, a polity-building exercise that enhances their collective capacity to combine skills, resources and authority, inviting a qualitative, even transformative, evolution. Taylor writes: ‘The states became stronger through strengthening the collectivity’.\textsuperscript{73} In Krasner’s words:

The European Union is an example of an institutional arrangement that has transgressed conventional sovereignty rules so successfully that it is hardly seen as being a transgression at all. The member states of the EU have used their international legal sovereignty, their right to sign treaties, to create supranational institutions and pooled sovereignty arrangements that have compromised their Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty […] The European Union has been so successful because it has created over time a set of self-enforcing equilibria. Individual states may have not been entirely happy with specific decisions that were taken, but their leaders still decided that adhering to the Union was better than departing from it.\textsuperscript{74}

Despite the mutual concessions taken by states to meet the realities and to deal with the antinomies of shared rule, they did not lose sight of their own autonomy. This is premised on the idea that their collective capacity to accommodate varying degrees of diversity and subsystem autonomy has invited respect for their own integrities, confirming that they may codetermine issues of mutual interest in ways which make sovereignty still valid but not equated to classical self-rule. It confirms Lijphart’s principle that ‘on all issues of common interest, the decisions are made jointly by the segments’ leaders, but on all other issues, decision-making is left to the segments’.\textsuperscript{75} As to the EU’s confederal — treaty-based — attributes, states retain control over the

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\textsuperscript{72} See Chryssochoou, \textit{Theorizing European Integration}, p. 139 and Lavdas and Chryssochoou, \textit{A Republic of Europeans?}, pp. 48-50.


extension of powers to the centre; they can still determine their future, for all the profound impact large-scale institutionalisation has on their domestic orders.

Thus the German Constitutional Court’s view of the EU as a ‘Staatenverbund’ in both its Maastricht and Lisbon rulings. As it stated in the latter case:

The concept of Verbund covers a close long-term association of states which remain sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis of a treaty, whose fundamental order, however, is subject to the disposal of the Member States alone and in which the peoples of their Member States, i.e. the citizens of the states, remain the subjects of democratic legitimisation.

As von Beyme writes: ‘It has the drawback of being practically untranslatable, except into Swedish (statsförbunder). In all the major languages, the most readily accepted translation would be federation or confederation’. However, this does not prevent the ‘centre’ from exercising authority; rather, it challenges the assumption, often contention, that it is becoming all the more ‘state-like’. True, the ‘centre’ retains a key role in regional management and there are good reasons for states to enhance the centripetal dynamics of the general system. But the latter is still bound by state-controlled rules, the result being that the ‘ever closer union’ rests on states’ capacity to invest in the common rewards of shared rule; it is not driven by those who envisage a federal end condition. As Taylor writes, ‘the interests of the collectivity and the states had to be compatible and symbiotic’.

‘Organised synarchy’ projects a general image of the whole: an ordered political association whose working condition rests on codetermination and evolves alongside its component orders. The concept makes us think of a union called upon to reconcile the quest for ordered symbiosis with a polity-building exercise which allows the parts

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79 Taylor, The European Union in the 1990s, p. 181.
to retain their status as constitutional polities in their own right. This may be far from a post-statist condition replacing the constituent sovereignties, but it has a discernible post-statecentric quality: it rests beyond the exclusive control of states; it is about the constitution of a collective order, not only a reflection of legal/institutional synergies; it is an expression of ordered symbiosis among publics. Conceptual and empirical resemblances with Althusius’ complex ‘commonwealth’ construct become apparent:

For Althusius, the ownership of sovereignty is shared by the narrower and wider political communities constituting the universal commonwealth. It is, in other words, a kind of co-sovereignty shared among partially autonomous collectivities consenting to its exercise on their behalf and within the general confines of this consent requirement. The only modern political system coming somewhat close to this notion of confederal sovereignty may be the European Union, the supranational powers of which ultimately rest on negotiated agreement.  

As Taylor puts it: ‘Something remarkable had happened: sovereignty was now a condition, even a form, of participation in the larger entity […] It was even possible to imagine states which were sovereign but which normally exercised no exclusive competences’. In the EU, itself a paradigmatic instance of states codetermining their future, sovereignty is still alive, but it is also attuned to the demands of a common association. After all: ‘Membership in the European Project had always been sought in order to restore the nation states of Europe […] It was necessary to understand this to see that further integration need not lead to the creation of an overweening superstate’. Answering the question of whether the whole still represents a states’ affair, should take stock of its essential character as an ‘organised synarchy’ which escapes the rigidities of cultural and civic homogeneity that served the nation-building (hi)stories of the parts. It may thus still be taken as a states’ affair, but one in which states interact with a plurality of forces, actors, spaces and conditions which make them increasingly aware of the realities of their association.

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80 See Althusius, *Politica*, especially chapter 1.
83 Taylor, *The End of European Integration*, p. 7.
5. Reflective overview

EU polity expectations are rather limited today, given the unfolding crises in the daily management of the general system, not to mention the uncertainties caused by the Brexit vote and the all-alarming rise of the far-right in domestic and EU arenas. Of relevance too are the new sovereignty restrictions which, as in the Eurozone, project a kind of intergovernmentalism combining what Puetter calls a ‘deliberative’ twist. And so are Teague’s ‘cooperative intergovernmentalism’: ‘the belief that policy coordination is required between the member states to ensure that the economic and political interdependencies that exist between them do not generate tensions or block the integration process’, and Bellamy’s ‘international association of democratic states’, inspired by what he calls ‘republican intergovernmentalism’ which ‘provides a picture of the EU in which democratic states negotiate an ever closer union of mutual benefit to their peoples while preserving the civic freedom of their citizens’. But is ‘organised synarchy’ — the ordered symbiosis of codetermined sovereignties — a more permanent condition, if not a mirroring of what the end state might look like? Or is it yet another passing reflection of an evolving state of play? Arguments can be made for both takes, but the transition ‘from sovereignty to synarchy’ confirms states’ disposition to transcend some of their traditional attributes of sovereignty; most notably, the right to be involved in their partners’ affairs. This is, after all, Europe’s greatest cultural, rather than merely legal or institutional achievement. Yet, its future design will most likely refer less to the subordination of states to a superior centre and more to their preservation as distinctive but constituent units: distinctive, in retaining their own constitutional qualities; constituent, in reaching higher levels of collective symbiosis.

In a troubled but promising Europe, ‘organised synarchy’ seems to capture the dialectic of a structured plurality which extends the sharing of authority and brings about a new form of unit(y); a progressively state-centric order with a transcendental quality: sovereignty’s emancipation from the classical attribute of self-rule. It can also

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87 R. Bellamy, “‘An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe’: Republican Intergovernmentalism and Democratic Representation within the EU’, in R. Bellamy and S. Kröger (eds), Special Issue: ‘Representation and Democracy in the EU: Does one come at the expense of the other?’, Journal of European Integration, 35(5), 2013, p. 507.
be taken as a possible end state, signalling a normative departure from a set of coordinated polities towards an ordered whole that retains its pluralism. Thus the claim to study EU polity evolution without assuming that the parts are losing their ‘soul’ as polities in their own right, while keeping in mind that the key issue is how to sustain a viable whole, given its ascending levels of heterogeneity. As state-centrism persists, those who sought a constitutional or even a more constitutionalised union find themselves in retreat; but perhaps this is not all there is to it. Whether a functionally inspired association of gradually uniting states or a constitutional order writ large, Europe is now part of states’ everyday life and of citizens’ everyday parlance. Furthermore, it is part of a culture in dealing with pressing realities, although these may shake the level of trust as in the different accounts of solidarity, or the limitations to it.\(^88\) While not as grandiose as federalists had hoped for, this is an accomplishment in its own right. It may act as an indication, even a conviction, of change in the general dispositions of states: that for all their differences in incentives or aspirations, they are now conscious of their collective predicament—that more is to be achieved by joining forces. This accords with Nikolaidis’ view of the EU as being ‘more than a particularly strong version of a confederation of sovereign states, in that its people are connected politically directly and not only through the bargains of their leaders’.\(^89\) It is also in line with Tsatsos’ account of the qualitative properties of the larger order:

> The shift from the pure logic of international law to a new rationale that partly resembles the European constitutional culture, signifies an evolution, perhaps a change, or, at least, an expansion of the traditional discipline of general theory of the state, to a novel and original field of legally regulated coexistence of human beings. The issue at hand is therefore an approach to the European Sympolity on the basis of a post-statist theory.\(^90\)

The European project has come a long way since its inception. It now stands for the ordered symbiosis of codetermined polities. Keeping Puchala’s prophecy that ‘European integration will for the foreseeable future continue to be an ongoing social scientific puzzle’,\(^91\) its theory evolution seems to support Rosamond: ‘European integration may well be a totally unique enterprise without either historical precedent or contemporary parallel, but it is a ready source for comparative study in some of the most emerging and lively social science currently going on’.\(^92\) Still though: can Europeans form a larger political community, given that, as Castiglione writes, ‘our destiny in a political community remains linked to that of others, with whom we live in an inclusive relationship of relative familiarity and identity and on whose solidarity

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\(^{88}\) In view of the ‘flexible solidarity’ proposed by the V4. See Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, Bratislava, 16 September 2016.

\(^{89}\) Nikolaidis, ‘The New Constitution as European Demoi-cracy?’, pp. 82-83.

\(^{90}\) Tsatsos, *The European Sympolity*, pp. 30-31.


we rely’?\(^3\) As he phrases the question, ‘in what sense can the European Union be a society of strangers (even more so than a nation-state would be) and at the same time a “political community”?\(^4\) It all comes down to how Europeans think of themselves; how they value their polities in relation to collective aspirations; and how to inspire a vision for diverse but fellow citizens within a politically structured plurality. This does not require an integrated, nation-like identity or a shared view of an end state; it is about citizens constituting a polity of their own and in its own right. Lavdas writes:

Does the EU of today appear to guarantee, or at least encourage, republican freedom? Getting in touch with the rich Euro-Atlantic traditions of republicanism may reinvigorate the motivations of commitment and the reasons for precommitment. Of course, discovering republican virtues in a post-national edifice and internalizing those in a way that strengthen Ulysses’ constraints is no easy task. Yet it is not far-fetched to suggest that the current juncture calls for nothing less: the EU will either emerge as a locus of a minimal but shared set of republican commitments or disintegrate to states or groups of states. Ulysses’ constraints weaken without a degree of republican commitment to the European project: they are in doubt at the domestic level and they also appear increasingly untenable as view from abroad.\(^5\)

6. Conclusion

Politically incomplete as it may be—and, as the unfolding ‘Future of Europe’ debate reveals, ‘architecturally’\(^6\) too—the EU has gained a fair share of authority over time. But can it inspire a shared sense of ‘res communis’? True, Europeans still live their lives in multiple polities, and they may not eventually amount to a federal demos, but remain part of what Eriksen calls ‘a polity without a nation and a state’.\(^7\) They may also fail to acquire their own constitution, but they can and should aspire to a common future. As Castiglione convincingly writes,

the European Union must cultivate its political identity neither in the heroic form of the ‘ultimate sacrifice’, nor in high-principled forms of constitutional patriotism, but in the more banal sense of citizens’ growing perception that the

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\(^4\) Ibid.


\(^6\) As notably illustrated in Emmanuel Macron’s reformist ‘Sorbonne speech’ of 26 September 2017. In stark contrast, but no less consequential for Europe’s architectural design, comes Theresa May’s ‘Brexit speech’ of 2 March 2018, laying out a framework of choices for a prospective ‘partnership’.

Union contributes to a fundamental (though multilayered) institutional and legal order within which they can exercise their liberty.\textsuperscript{98}

To conclude that:

the solution may lie more in imagining how an interlocking political space may need interlocking systems of trust, solidarity, and allegiances—none of which may need to be absolute—than in the assumption that we can reproduce the absolute demands of national citizenship at a European level.\textsuperscript{99}

From Lavdas’ prism:

Ultimately, the challenge to contemporary republicans […] is to develop a pluralist, rather than a populist republicanism, in which tolerance would be guaranteed in diverse, multicultural societies. Fear is not the price of imagination in this version; diversity \textit{per se} and the need to imagine variation in difference and to comprehend ‘the other’ do not cause anxiety and do not invoke hostile responses […] citizens ‘need to become aware of multiply reiterated interdependencies’ and to develop civic self-restraint.\textsuperscript{100}

What conclusion might be drawn, even implied, from these pluralist takes? A plausible one is that the EU should invest in a civic strategy for uniting, not unifying, Europeans, whose \textit{caritas} towards their common association, this foundational quality of any polity’s essential architecture, respects their diversity and invites them to lead their lives as fellow citizens. After all, even a late-modern liberal project may aspire to a virtuous civic cause; provided those at the receiving end navigate their diverse but common association into higher levels of collective symbiosis – with freedom!

\textsuperscript{98} Castiglione, ‘Political identity in a community of strangers’, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
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