



Beyond Principles vs. Politics ***Humanitarian Aid in the European Union***

Charlotte Dany



ARENA Working Paper 11
November 2014

**Beyond Principles vs. Politics:
Humanitarian Aid in the European Union**

Charlotte Dany

*ARENA Working Paper 11/2014
November 2014*

*ARENA Working Paper (print) | ISSN 1890-7733
ARENA Working Paper (online) | ISSN 1890-7741*

Reproduction of this text is subject to permission by the author
© ARENA 2014

ARENA Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo
P.O.Box 1143, Blindern, N-0318 Oslo

Working papers can be downloaded from ARENA's website: www.arena.uio.no

Abstract

Against a background of a generally perceived trend towards the politicization of humanitarian aid, this paper reviews recent policies by the European Commission as one of the biggest donors of humanitarian aid worldwide. It aims to show how the European Union's (EU's) Comprehensive Approach and the Resilience Strategy, in particular, contribute to the politicization of humanitarian aid. The paper contributes a new perspective on the politicization of humanitarian aid with a focus on contestation about fundamental humanitarian principles - neutrality, impartiality and independence - in policy-making. It therewith challenges the common wisdom that the EU's humanitarian aid is void of any political or security interest. Contestation between different stakeholders reveals that humanitarian aid is being politicized, despite the EU's strong commitment to humanitarian principles, as its policies blur the lines between humanitarian aid, security and development cooperation. The paper also highlights the role of non-governmental organizations in challenging and influencing this particular part of EU foreign policy.

Keywords

EU Foreign Policy - Humanitarian Aid - Non-Governmental Organizations - Norm Contestation - Politicization

Introduction

With humanitarian aid the European Union (EU) seeks 'to provide *ad hoc* assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or manmade disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations' (TFEU 2012: 143). The EU is the biggest contributor of humanitarian aid worldwide, taking its own as well as bilateral aid by the Member States into account. The European Commission (hereafter 'Commission') itself spends more than 1 billion Euros annually on this. In 2012 it assisted 122 million people in over 90 non-EU countries (European Commission 2014a: 3–4). While not operating in the field, it finances and coordinates projects implemented by partners, mostly non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It also formulates the main tenets of international humanitarian aid policy and acts as norm entrepreneur, spreading its particular normative view on humanitarian aid (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 28).

There is rising awareness of the EU's role as global humanitarian actor and a strong sense among EU citizens that this is an important field of activity. But still, one third of the respondents in a recent *Eurobarometer* survey were not aware of the EU's activities in this field at all, and more than half of them did not feel well informed (European Commission 2012a: 5). Also in the academic discussion humanitarian aid is an often overlooked field of EU foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 12–13). This is usually equated with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This ignorance contravenes the centrality of humanitarianism for the EU, as a distinct identity-marker for its role as civilian or normative power (Orbie 2008: ch.1). It is also at odds with the rising need for humanitarian aid, in light of an increasing number and intensity of natural disasters as well as a rise in armed conflicts and wars. The Central African Republic, Syria or the Ukraine are only three among many places around the world where humanitarian aid is currently the last thread of hope for countless people.

To reach these people, to save lives and to alleviate suffering, humanitarian aid is not supposed to be used as a common foreign-policy tool. It must adhere to certain fundamental principles, in particular neutrality, impartiality and independence, which were formulated by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 1965. Neutrality is retained by not taking sides in hostilities and not engaging in controversies of a political, radical, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality is ensured by focusing on saving lives and reducing suffering for everybody, regardless of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinion. Independence is guarded by acting autonomously from governments or other authorities (ICRC 1979). Humanitarian aid should thus

be provided on a strict needs basis and it should focus on the short term. These principles distinguish humanitarian from other kinds of aid – for example, development aid. They also guarantee best access to the victims, even in complex conflict-ridden circumstances.

The EU has strongly emphasized these principles, as outlined in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (hereafter ‘Consensus’) in 2008. Currently, the EU revisits its strategies to meet humanitarian needs in the light of the increasing number of disasters, wars and displaced persons, which demands that humanitarian aid becomes more effective. This paper asks whether the EU contributes to a politicization of humanitarian aid with these policy-making processes.

This question follows up on an existing discussion on the politicization of humanitarian aid, which has basically diagnosed a trend towards a more political approach to humanitarian aid at the cost of fundamental humanitarian principles. Yet this discussion suffers from an ambiguous use of politicization as a buzzword for quite different developments. Also, the EU’s activities in this field are hardly reflected; when politicization is confined to ‘policy decisions that aid agencies make when faced with hard ethical choices’ (Duffield 2001: 96), it is not applicable to the EU, as it does not operate directly in the field. The EU also does not obviously instrumentalize humanitarian aid to pursue foreign policy goals, in the sense that governments, in particular when they are a party to a conflict, would do. If at all, the EU Member States are accused of ‘attuning their national humanitarian aid policies to foreign policy objectives’ (Versluys 2008: 109).

However, differentiating between three forms of politicization – instrumentalization, militarization and developmentalization – an analysis of controversial discussions among stakeholders in recent policy-making processes on humanitarian aid reveals that the EU, indeed, contributes to a politicization of humanitarian aid. This sheds light on some problematic aspects of policies such as the Comprehensive Approach or Resilience, which are often overlooked. These policies challenge fundamental principles of humanitarian action, which are currently being contested and thus prone to change. While contestation does not necessarily reinforce a politicization of humanitarian aid, it opens up space for these developments and increases the major tension between the EU’s roles as security actor and humanitarian actor.

The article is structured as follows. It first provides some background on the specificities of humanitarian aid by the EU. In a conceptual section it clarifies what is meant by politicization of humanitarian aid and explains how it can be studied focusing on conflicts among stakeholders in policy-making. The

empirical section carves out these conflicts on the Consensus, the Comprehensive Approach, and Resilience. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and discusses the benefits and restrictions of this approach, as well as some open questions for future research.

Humanitarian Aid as Multi-Level EU Foreign Policy

As a field of EU foreign policy, humanitarian aid is situated within the complexity of a multi-level context, 'reflecting the interconnectedness of multiple governance levels and policy arenas in the policy process' (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 17). A great variety of actors are involved in agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making and implementation.

In the Commission, Kristalina Georgieva is currently Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response¹. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was founded in 1992 as the central body for provision and coordination of humanitarian aid in the EU. Since 2004 it has been a Directorate General (DG), headed by Claus Sørensen. It works together with, but is institutionally separate from, the DG Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid) as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS). The European Parliament (hereafter 'Parliament') and the European Council (hereafter 'Council') negotiate and decide on policy proposals by the Commission. The Parliament also monitors the Commission's actions and the delivery of aid, and sometimes it advocates certain policy issues. Within the Parliament, these tasks are fulfilled by the Committee on Development (DEVE).

Humanitarian aid is a field of parallel competencies between the EU and the Member States (De Baere 2014: 722), and the Commission is mandated to coordinate these multiple activities 'in order to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures' (TFEU 2012: 143). At the same time, the Member States oversee ECHO via the comitology system through the Humanitarian Aid Committee. However, this committee has never disapproved of any ECHO proposal, which underlines ECHO's autonomy. Nevertheless, while this may be true, the influence of Member States on humanitarian policies of the EU should not be underestimated:

¹ From 2014 onwards it will be Christos Stylianides from Cypress.

Multilateral aid is technically defined as channeled through intergovernmental organizations, which supposedly have discretion over how the money is spent – although it would be naïve to think that [...] ECHO would turn a deaf ear to its major European member states.

(Barnett and Weiss 2011: 30–31)

Last but not least, a plethora of NGOs are involved and accepted as important implementing partners by the EU. With ECHO they engage in a kind of symbiotic relationship. ECHO needs them to actually deliver humanitarian aid. At the same time, the implementing partners need to win ECHO's favour, as it is their most important source for funding (Versluys 2008: 99). Partnership with ECHO secures their organizational survival as well as granting them legitimacy for their difficult work in the field.

NGOs are also active in policy-formulation. Most of the input into the negotiations is channelled through *Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies* (VOICE), a network of more than 80 humanitarian NGOs based in Brussels. It aims to arrive at common positions, share information, and lobby the EU and Member States on humanitarian aid issues. Additionally, single NGOs are also engaged in advocacy at the EU level, including Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)², EU-CORD, the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Global Justice Center. Their representatives in Brussels aim to shape EU policies on humanitarian aid.

In this setting the EU must tackle 'the key challenge (...) to engage and influence all the key actors involved so as to promote a more humanized politics and more effective humanitarian action' (Collinson and Elhawary 2012: 4). A basic tenet in this endeavour is a strong commitment to fundamental humanitarian principles. The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes 'the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination' (TFEU 2012: 143). The Consensus highlights 'humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence' (European Council 2008, para. 10). Acting as a political entrepreneur, ECHO also explicitly seeks to strengthen the principled approach of other humanitarian actors. It envisages that the EU should 'encourage other humanitarian donors to implement effective and principled humanitarian aid strategies', which means that it 'leads the way in ensuring that humanitarian aid allocations are needs based and that no humanitarian crisis is overlooked in the international humanitarian response' (European Commission 2014b: 11). Politicization of humanitarian aid would entail the EU diverting from this strong self-commitment to humanitarian principles and a

² Strictly speaking a hybrid between NGO and International Organization.

focus on needs. Mostly, it has sought to achieve this so far by studying patterns of aid distribution and looking for any hidden political agenda.

In this regard, evaluations of ECHO's work over the past years have found that, overall, it succeeds in following this principle-driven, neutral approach to humanitarian aid. A study in 2006 concluded:

DG ECHO is neither formally guided by, nor subject to, any foreign policy when managing the implementation of humanitarian aid. This allows DG ECHO to act throughout the world, including in many regions where there are underfunded crises, or so-called "forgotten" crises – regions and situations, where bilateral aid only finds its way with difficulty.

(Daldrup et al. 2006: 2)

The EU could, therefore, be the world's most important humanitarian actor, not only because of the amount of money it annually transfers to affected regions, but also because of its 'respect for the traditional core European humanitarian values' (Daldrup et al. 2006: 3). The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) later confirmed this assessment and found that the Commission performed clearly above-average on the criterion *responding to needs* (DARA 2010a), as opposed to following foreign policy interests. Others are more sceptical about the application of the commitment to neutrality in practice; in a textbook on International Relations and the EU it is asserted that: 'like most other EU foreign policy tools, ECHO spending is also intended to mesh with the EU's broader normative or political goals, such as democracy and human rights' (Smith 2011: 185). Others declare that the EU and its member states have political objectives, just like any other donor (Pontiroli et al. 2013).

However, I propose to answer the question of politicization of humanitarian aid in the EU by analysing controversial discussions on EU policy-making. This will reveal how the norms underlying humanitarian aid – its basic principles – are being contested among different stakeholders.

Politicization of Humanitarian Aid

Politicization is ultimately an opaque term, given its various meanings and applications in literature on humanitarian aid, and in international institutions more generally. While sharing the focus on contentious policy-making with an existing broader debate about politicization in the EU, this study proposes to

apply the term more narrowly.³ Politicization is here reserved for substantial policy changes that divert humanitarian aid away from its principled character. However, even this more narrow application comes in different forms.

Forms of politicization: Instrumentalization, Militarization and Developmentalization

That humanitarian aid is being politicized does not mean that something hitherto unpolitical is suddenly becoming political. Humanitarian aid is necessarily political, as 'it is a political project in a political world' (Slim 2003). And, indeed, humanitarian aid has always been related to the political environment in which it is provided. In the 1970s many humanitarian aid organizations were founded in response to crises in third countries, such as the Biafran conflict. At the time aid workers often took on a partisan stance over oppressed groups. The mid-1980s saw a brief period of generally neutral and impartial aid, when access was negotiated to alleviate suffering in areas such as Sudan, Angola or Ethiopia, but in the 1990s a closer connection again developed between humanitarian aid and politics, along with expanding UN peacekeeping missions. The idea of *humanitarian intervention* took hold, orchestrating and blurring actions by humanitarian and international organizations, states and military actors. However, the implementation of this approach faced severe problems, such as in Rwanda and Kosovo. And at the beginning of the 21st century humanitarian aid is again used by states in the fight against terrorism in an attempt not only to reduce suffering, but also to secure their home territories by reducing migration and democratizing entire regions (see Collinson and Elhawary 2012: 5-11).

Politicization of humanitarian aid has mostly been used to describe situations in which the principles of humanitarian action are compromised at the cost of more political rationales, due to ethical dilemmas faced by humanitarian aid organizations. Humanitarian organizations had to grapple with the criticism that aid is ineffective, is not able to save people and even – in the most severe cases – has aggravated suffering and even killed people, such as after the

³ A general trend of politicization of international institutions has been identified across different policy fields and institutions, including the EU (Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013). In this context, politicization means open reflection processes and exchanges of conflicting arguments on issues with a salient tension in the EU. This leads to increasing protest and public debate, in particular with regard to issues such as European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hutter and Grande 2014) or the European Constitutional Treaty (Statham and Trez 2013). Yet this notion is not actually applicable to humanitarian aid in the EU: although some aspects, such as outside actors challenging the EU, reflection processes and conflict within international negotiations, do play a role, other elements of this broader notion are missing here, in particular publicity, protest and mobilization of the wider public.

Genocide in Rwanda in 1994: 'However diplomatically stated, the charge was that humanitarianism had contributed to an *unnecessary loss of life*' (Barnett 2011: 213, original emphasis; see also Terry 2002). This led them to animated discussion of the possibility and desirability of a pure, principle-driven, humanitarian approach to aid, although even in this debate the term 'politicization' is still used in a number of different ways. I propose to differentiate in the following between politicization as instrumentalization, militarization and developmentalization, whereby combinations of these uses are certainly possible and common.

1. Instrumentalization means that humanitarian aid is used to advance political, economic or security interests. Some studies have shown that many donors thus depart from a strict needs-approach, for example, by providing aid mainly to those regions that are of strategic interest to them (DARA 2010b: 2; Drury et al. 2005; Eberwein and Runge 2002: 26). This compromises the principle of impartiality.
2. Militarization of humanitarian aid means that the actions of humanitarian and military actors become blurred, most obviously when aid becomes part of a counter-insurgency strategy, as happened in Afghanistan with the war on terror (Krähenbühl 2011). Militarization can also be seen when members of the armed forces or private military companies protect the delivery of humanitarian aid against attack (Schneiker 2011; Singer 2010; Vaughn 2009). This compromises the principle of neutrality and also independence.
3. Developmentalization means that humanitarian aid broadens its scope, adopting longer-term and more political tasks. Many humanitarian agencies have incorporated, for example, human rights or democracy promotion into their activities (Barnett 2009: 623). This reduces the difference between humanitarian and development aid and it diverts attention away from the narrow focus on saving lives and alleviating suffering. This compromises the principles of neutrality, impartiality and even independence, as it often means working more closely with governments.

But how do these politicization processes play out in the EU? How are the basic humanitarian principles judged and interpreted by different stakeholders? Answering these questions, this study ultimately observes processes of norm contestation.

Politicization of Humanitarian Aid as a Case of Norm Contestation

Understanding the principles of humanitarian aid as norms which are necessarily contested broadens the perspective beyond what aid agencies and governments do, to the activities of the EU as humanitarian actor, namely policy-making and advocacy on humanitarian aid. Social constructivism in the discipline of International Relations (IR) not only emphasized the importance of norms as standards of behaviour that guide practices, but also showed their inherent flexibility. Norms are contested through practices and discursive interventions, so their meaning is able to change. Norms thus understood are 'constitutional principles, world-views and routinized practices' (Wiener 2004: 192).

The principles that guide humanitarian action belong to these kinds of flexible social norms and they are currently being contested. This may be, for example, due to the fact that they clash with other norms, such as witnessing crimes against humanity or securing the lives of aid workers. As a result, their meaning might eventually change which opens up space for a politicization of humanitarian aid. Norm contestation on humanitarian aid involves politicians of the Member States, NGOs, lobby groups, social movements, international organizations and individuals close to the representatives and bureaucrats of the EU. The EU enables contestation by inviting stakeholders to participate in discussions about humanitarian aid; it encourages the expression of competing claims within its institutions.

In the analysis I proceeded as follows: I first identified policies in which the role of humanitarian aid was contested; – next to the Consensus, this has most recently been the Comprehensive Approach and the Resilience Strategy. Conflicts were delineated by a close analysis of how different actors discuss and decide upon these policies, drawing on data from policy documents by the European Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Further evidence was collected from stakeholder consultations and individual NGO statements on the issues, and from a video sequence of a Parliamentary hearing involving different stakeholders on the role of humanitarian aid in the EU's external action in early 2014.

Conflicts on Humanitarian Aid in EU Policy Making

Policy-making of the Consensus, the Comprehensive Approach, and the Resilience Strategy is accompanied by political debate on, basically, the best approach to principled humanitarian aid. A tension arises because of the EU's appearance as a political actor in its external relations and, at the same time, the need to deliver clearly neutral and principle-driven humanitarian aid.

More concretely, a blurring of the humanitarian and military fields of activity, as well as of humanitarian and development aid, is at stake.

Implementing the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid: Principles vs. Practices

Conflicts about the Consensus reveal a divide between the principles and the practice of humanitarian aid in the EU. On the one hand, the document itself is evidence of the significance the EU assigns to humanitarian principles as fundamental guideposts for humanitarian action. It entails a common perspective on the future of humanitarian aid and formulates concrete measures to implement this perspective. It was formulated by the Commission, which made an effort to take into consideration the views of other stakeholders. The consultation process involved the participation of 22 Member States, 10 international organizations and the International Committee of the IFRC, as well as 112 NGOs (European Commission 2007: 6). NGO input came not only from implementing partners, who were asked to respond directly, nor merely from VOICE; the Commission received an additional 41 responses spontaneously from other NGOs (European Commission 2007: 7). This great response demonstrates the interest in the policy. As the document was signed by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, the Consensus represents the first comprehensive and fundamental declaration by the EU on humanitarian aid, and provides an authoritative basis for the policies of EU Member States.⁴ It is also widely referred to in all issue-related policy papers by the EU, the Member States and the implementing partners.

Nevertheless, NGOs and Member States disagree about whether the EU enacts the humanitarian principles adequately. While Member States think that the EU does place sufficient emphasis on humanitarian principles, both in general and in specific crisis contexts, most of the NGOs consider that the EU (and particularly individual Member States) should do more to keep humanitarian aid away from politics, 'pushing MS [Member States] to apply the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid in national policies' (European Commission 2013c: 4).

Similarly, a mid-term evaluation by the Parliament stressed a lack of implementation of this guiding document in practice. The Parliament

⁴ German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Humanitäre Hilfe der EU, Generaldirektion für Humanitäre Hilfe und Katastrophenschutz der EU-Kommission (ECHO), 15 April 2013. Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/HumanitaereHilfe/WieHelfenWir_node.html (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

criticized 'insufficient awareness' of the Consensus, 'and calls for the introduction of specific training about the Consensus, particularly for the European External Action Service (EEAS), for diplomats from the Member States and for military bodies' (European Parliament 2010: 6-7). These actors, which are involved in the EU's humanitarian aid, appear to be prone to softening the principled approach and the ideas put forward in the Consensus. For this reason, the Parliament is 'concerned to defend the independence of DG ECHO, preventing it from becoming part of the EEAS and thus avoiding any possible instrumentalization of humanitarian aid' (European Parliament 2010: 14). The Parliament further identified a lack of funds as a basic problem for implementation. For humanitarian aid and civil protection to remain purely civilian tasks, more funds and the development of further capabilities and resources are necessary (European Parliament 2010: 7). It fears that military and humanitarian bodies lose their distinct roles; a fear that is even more strongly emphasized in discussions about the effects of the Comprehensive Approach on humanitarian aid.

Comprehensive Approach: Using Humanitarian Aid as a Security-Enhancing Tool

While promoting a Comprehensive Approach is not new, the EU currently strives for a more systematic application of this concept as a coherent strategy for crisis management and prevention (European External Action Service 2013; European Parliament 2013a). In a joint communication, the European Commission and the European External Action Service propose the Comprehensive Approach to improve the EU's crisis management. EU instruments and resources should be bundled, 'spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields', (European Commission/High Representative 2013: 3). The Commission and the EEAS state that it would also help to defend and promote European interests and values. Not merely would the lives of people affected be improved, and conflicts prevented, but the Comprehensive Approach would 'mitigate the negative effects - for the EU, its citizens and its internal security - of insecurity and conflict elsewhere' (European Commission/High Representative 2013: 3).

Despite these many advantages, the Comprehensive Approach is also contested, in particular due to the close connection between the security and humanitarian agendas, which could have a detrimental impact on humanitarian aid. This fear has already prevented EUFOR Libya being implemented. The EU put this military operation in support of humanitarian action in place in 2011. It was supposed to ensure the security of humanitarian aid convoys, aid workers and displaced people, but it was never activated by

the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), whose consent was necessary. Their reluctance can be explained in parts by fear of a blurring of lines between humanitarian and military spheres and a related, anticipated negative impact on humanitarian assistance (Bommier 2011; Brattberg 2011: 1; Koenig 2012: 3). This fear popped up again in the discussions about the Comprehensive Approach.

The joint communication was preceded by an online stakeholder consultation which was hosted by the Commission, the so-called 'Fit for Purpose' consultations. Between December 2012 and March 2013 stakeholders were invited by the Director-General of ECHO to exchange 'views on the challenges, objectives and options to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Union's humanitarian aid' by responding to an online questionnaire. He promised that the 'input gathered will feed into the Commission's future initiatives on increasing the impact of the Union's humanitarian aid' (Sørensen 2012). ECHO received 55 responses from Member States, partners, academia, think-tanks, individuals, campaign and lobby groups and consultancies (European Commission 2013c: 2). At the following Stakeholder Conference on the future of EU humanitarian aid in Brussels the results of the online consultations were discussed among 82 participants, again coming from different backgrounds and stakeholder groups.

While this broad participation and the joint authorship of the communication between ECHO and EEAS was underlined by a great deal of rhetoric on how it represented a unique and much-needed agreement between all stakeholders, nobody could hide the severe conflicts that still had to be overcome, even between the two institutions that formulated the approach. As EEAS representative Maciej Popowski explained, writing the communication took some time, 'because it touches on some sensitivities' and 'there are some irritations that have to be overcome'.⁵ More explicitly, Sørensen from the DG ECHO hinted at problems in formulating the Comprehensive Approach and implementing it:

It's full of difficult issues that we are dealing with every day. So, it is not to say that we are all in agreement. Yes, we are in agreement about the Comprehensive Approach, about holding hands, about working together, but each situation is different and has to be analysed on its own merit. (...) It's not harmony; it's a battleground for how do we actually make sure that we keep this independence, while at the same time ensuring the security.⁶

⁵ Maciej Popowski, EEAS, 20 January 2014, Transcript of Parliamentary Hearing by C.D.

⁶ Claus Sørensen, DG ECHO, 20 January 2014, Transcript of Parliamentary Hearing by C.D.

Finally, the stakeholder consultations also revealed contestation about how to balance the need for better coordination between different kinds of actors, with the risk of humanitarian aid becoming subordinated to a security agenda.

The questions relevant for humanitarian aid are: whether it should be part of the Comprehensive Approach at all and, if so, how this can be realized so as not to affect the humanitarian principles. While the joint communication promises to respect the Consensus (European Commission/High Representative 2013: 4), the non-state partners especially find that the Comprehensive Approach inherently contradicts the principled approach to humanitarian aid. At the ECHO Annual Partners Conference in 2012, VOICE president Nicolas Borsinger warned explicitly about the pitfalls of the Comprehensive Approach:

The danger of politicization of humanitarian aid is unfortunately embedded in the concept (...). Including humanitarian aid as just another tool of crisis management would be a disaster, and unfortunately certain to impact on the needs-based approach towards affected populations and the principle of impartiality.

(Borsinger 2012: para. 4)

In a later resolution, the NGO network requested that ‘the humanitarian objective – to save lives and reduce suffering – should not be undermined by the inclusion of humanitarian action in a comprehensive approach’ (VOICE 2013: 1). While VOICE does not object to humanitarian aid being a part of the Comprehensive Approach, it puts up clear warning signs and proposes safety arrangements against what it perceives to be a likely contribution to the politicization of humanitarian aid. VOICE also proposes that the EU should learn a lesson from the application of the Comprehensive Approach in other contexts, e.g. the United Nations (UN) (VOICE 2013: 1) – for example, that the Comprehensive Approach is, by definition, a political tool – and ensure that humanitarian actors keep a safe distance. As Antoine Gérard of UN OCHA explained in a Parliamentary Hearing in January 2014: ‘To be fully incorporated into a comprehensive approach to crisis management would in fact for the humanitarian actors be counterproductive and might actually cause a great deal of harm’.⁷ He went on to state that humanitarian assistance might be refused for this reason. UN OCHA would, therefore, rather define its approach ‘more as constitutive approach towards the political and peacekeeping agenda, rather than comprehensive’. According to Gérard, this would mean defining the roles of the different actors more clearly, to leave

⁷ This and the quotation in the following paragraph are taken from Antoine Gérard UN OCHA, 20 January 2014, Transcript of Parliamentary Hearing, C.D.

humanitarian actors the opportunity to step out, and to clearly state what exactly is meant by a Comprehensive Approach – all of which he obviously missed in the joint communication by the EC and the EEAS.

Furthermore, most implementing partners want to keep ECHO institutionally distinct from the EEAS (European Commission 2013c: 4). Oxfam demands: ‘Humanitarian aid must remain part of a separate budget, while decision-making must be fully independent from political or security interests, in accordance with humanitarian principles and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’ (Oxfam 2012: 4). In the context of reviewing the achievements of the EEAS after its first year, it worries about ‘the risk of politicizing development co-operation and humanitarian aid. These trends betray a clear danger that “coherence” could just become a cover for the instrumentalization of soft power for politically motivated security gains’ (Oxfam 2012: 2). Next to jeopardizing the distinctive character of humanitarian aid as neutral, this would also put more lives at risk. Not only are affected populations harder to access, when EU-financed projects are (mis-)perceived as crisis management or foreign policy tools, but the lives of aid workers are also put in jeopardy. This is why most of the stakeholders involved in the EC consultation process requested ‘ECHO to take measures to both de-link EU humanitarian aid from wider EU foreign policy and to step-up its advocacy of humanitarian principles, particularly in the case of emerging powers and non-traditional donors’ (European Commission 2013c: 3). For this reason also the Parliament makes clear that the ‘difference between military and humanitarian bodies must be maintained’ (European Parliament 2010: 7, 10).

On the other hand, for some time Member States have tried to establish a closer connection between humanitarian aid and conflict resolution. ‘The Dutch, Canadian, Swedish and British governments have all reorganized their aid departments to foster better links between humanitarian action and conflict resolution’ (Duffield 2001: 94). In the discussion about the Comprehensive Approach, Member States therefore sought to enhance synergies between military, state and humanitarian actors, for example, by demanding that civil protection actors should be allowed to use ECHO field offices, and that their efforts should be organizationally merged in a ‘one-shop stop’. Yet, in line with the arguments above, most NGOs object to this closer institutional cooperation between humanitarian and civil protection actors (European Commission 2013c: 10). In sum, institutional independence and sufficient financial means are seen as decisive to avoid “mission creep” – a watering-down of the distinction between humanitarian and security issues. Yet, the Comprehensive Approach is suspected of contributing to mission creep, as much as the EU’s Resilience Agenda, to which we now turn (European Commission 2013a: 4).

Resilience: On the Interface Between Humanitarian and Development Aid

The EU currently puts a strong focus on Resilience, which is defined as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks’ (European Commission 2012b: 5). Individuals should be better prepared to cope with disasters, as much as they should be enabled to recover from the drawbacks of disasters more easily. The concept emphasizes the need to integrate humanitarian and development aid and to target the underlying causes of crisis more effectively (European Commission 2012b: 5). Humanitarian, developmental and political actors should work together more effectively (European Commission 2013b: 4).

These ideas build on communications of the Commission on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) from 1996 and 2001, yet, with Resilience, the EU is currently pursuing a broader agenda to improve disaster management, as a number of documents show (European Commission 2012b; European Commission 2013b; European Commission 2014c). There is broad international support for the concept, and the ideas and documents issued by the Commission are also strongly endorsed by both the Council and the Parliament (European Parliament 2013b; European Council 2013; 2014).

Notwithstanding the fact that all these documents frequently refer to the Consensus and highlight the need to safeguard the humanitarian principles, the idea of Resilience ‘challenges the very nature and role of emergency relief’ (Levine et al. 2012: 3). The concept deviates from a strict needs-approach, as resilience should be put into practice mainly in those ‘areas, both in terms of sectors and geographic regions, where an enhanced resilience approach could have the most impact’ (European Commission 2012b: 10) – not in areas where people have the highest needs. It also blurs the line between humanitarian and development aid, which can be regarded as a form of politicization of humanitarian aid. Finally, the EU does not follow a genuinely humanitarian ethic with this concept, as it mainly stresses the money to be saved: ‘Investing in resilience is cost effective. Addressing the root causes of recurrent crises is not only better, especially for the people concerned, than only responding to the consequences of crises, it is also much cheaper’ (European Commission 2012b: 3). These issues create tensions and fuel fears of a politicization of humanitarian aid.

With its scarce resources and limited purpose, ‘a strong case would be needed to address long-term needs, or for believing that the short-term horizons, tools and skills of emergency response are appropriate for bringing about structural

change' (Levine et al. 2012: 4). So far, the concept seems to be 'at odds with a core humanitarian approach to crises' as MSF members complain (Whittall et al. 2014). They emphasize three problems in particular: the concept would be inadequate as it targets states which are often a party to a conflict themselves; resilience could become an excuse for not fulfilling basic humanitarian tasks, such as saving lives and alleviating suffering; there would be little evidence that resilience is indeed more effective than other measures (Whittall et al. 2014). The absence of a great controversy about this concept is therefore astonishing, as it is very prominent and has a possible impact on the EU's strong commitment to neutrality in humanitarian aid.

Summary: Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the EU

EU policies indeed seem to challenge the principles of humanitarian action, which leads to a process of contestation around these issues. But in what way does this amount to a politicization of humanitarian aid? Three possible forms of politicization have been distinguished above. To recap: instrumentalization means a retreat from a strict focus on needs, as humanitarian aid is also used to advance political and/or security interests; militarization involves a blurring of lines between humanitarian and military actors; and developmentalization means a blurring of lines between humanitarian aid and development cooperation.

Some humanitarian actors are afraid that a close cooperation with military actors – that is, a militarization of humanitarian aid – would be triggered by a comprehensive security agenda, as this would lead to misperceptions of their work. An even stronger criticism is that the Comprehensive Approach would instrumentalize humanitarian aid; a focus on needs would be abandoned and humanitarian aid would become just another tool for crisis management. Similarly, the Comprehensive Approach is directly conceived as a political tool, which makes it difficult for humanitarian actors to focus strictly on needs once they are a part of it. Finally, the close institutional cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission is observed suspiciously by critics. The Commission replies to these charges by stating that ECHO and its partners would be 'in-but-out'⁷, but the conditions under which humanitarian aid stays in or out of the Comprehensive Approach have not become sufficiently clear in the policies so far.

The new focus on Resilience, on the other hand, seems to reinforce a blurring of lines between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. It contributes to the developmentalization of humanitarian aid by following broader objectives than those that humanitarian aid usually pursues, namely a focus on longer-term needs and on the empowerment of individuals,

households and communities before and after disasters. Resilience also targets governments. All this changes what humanitarian aid stands for, and is thus another potential contributor to the politicization of humanitarian aid.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that the politicization of humanitarian aid is more pervasive than is often assumed, and that the EU's stance towards humanitarian aid is inherently contested, much like any other part of its foreign policy. Humanitarian aid is politicized in the EU through recent policy-making processes, such as the Comprehensive Approach and Resilience. This article has found significant tensions and conflict among different stakeholders about how the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence should be perceived, and how they should be applied in practice. It also found norm contestation on the humanitarian principles, which triggered the politicization of humanitarian aid.

What effects does this have on EU humanitarian aid? Norm contestation can be a driver of change. First, change at the level of policies, and therewith also of practices. At this level, it seems that the EU's commitment to the fundamental humanitarian principles, expressed in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, is difficult to uphold, due to the strong tensions between principles and the practical challenges of humanitarian aid. With current policies, the EU seems to rather opt for adjusting the principles in a way that better adapts them to an increasing number, and an increasing complexity, of disasters and wars. But this is a worrying trend: the convergence of humanitarian aid with security issues and other foreign policy goals puts people at risk, as this kind of politicization might induce governments to deny aid workers' access to affected areas and to the victims of disasters. It also seems to increase the insecurity of aid workers, who themselves increasingly become targets. However, at the same time, the EU needs to react to challenges, and it is a welcome development that it invites different kinds of stakeholders to discuss controversial issues related to humanitarian aid.

Second, norm contestation can lead to institutional change. At this level, contestation on humanitarian aid indicates an increasing openness of this specific part of EU foreign policy to external actors, in particular to NGO partners. EU institutions have offered arenas for the discussion of controversial policies on humanitarian aid, and they have also stimulated this discussion by actively reaching out to other stakeholders. For example, the EC

and the EEAS included stakeholders in consultation processes and conferences when formulating the communication on the Comprehensive Approach. They also discussed the outcome with diverse representatives from NGOs and international organizations within the Parliament, and while a heated debate with the audience was missing, this nevertheless provided an opportunity to discuss how to best implement a Comprehensive Approach to crisis prevention and management, and what exactly the role of humanitarian aid should be. This is a welcome trend and one that might lead to transnationalization of EU foreign policy; a trend that has so far been rather neglected (but see Joachim and Dembinski 2011). More research is necessary to grasp the whole potential for change that norm contestation on humanitarian aid represents – not least that the norms themselves might change in the process.

In particular, given the potential for institutional change, this study could be a starting point for investigating the relationship between norm contestation and politicization. Although this article does not directly contribute to the broader debate about politicization of the EU, there *is* a connection with, and a possible contribution to, this strand of literature. Contestation on humanitarian principles might eventually lead to a politicization of the EU in the broader and more procedural sense of the term, when conflicts that are identified in the future stimulate greater and more public debate on the role of humanitarian aid in the EU's external relations in different settings. Norm contestation may be a step in a politicization process, but at the same time it can also *prevent* this kind of politicization. For example, when the EU invites NGOs to express competing claims and to bring in their expertise on humanitarian aid, this process can reduce the NGO's potential for protest and further mobilization (Imig and Tarrow 2001: 8; for the case of the relationship between VOICE and ECHO, see Egger 2013: 18). The potential for politicization might thus be constrained. Whether norm contestation on humanitarian aid enables or constrains the politicization of the EU is thus an interesting topic for future research.

References

- Barnett, M. (2009) 'Evolution Without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt', *International Organization*, 63(4): 621–663.
- (2011) *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Barnett, M. and Weiss, T. G. (2011) *Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread*, London: Routledge.
- Bommier, B. (2011) 'The Use of Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and Beyond', *International Review of the Red Cross*, 93(884): 1063–1083.
- Borsinger, N. (2012) 'Speaking Points for Address of Nicolas Borsinger, VOICE President, to ECHO Annual Partner Conference', 17 October 2012. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian_aid/conferences/2012/VOICE_President_speaking_points.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- Brattberg, E. (2011) 'Opportunities Lost, Opportunities Seized: The Libya Crisis as Europe's Perfect Storm', Policy Brief, European Policy Center, June 2011. Available at: <http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1310_opportunities_lost.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- Collinson, S. and Elhawary, S. (2012) *Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues*, HPG Report 32, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Daldrup, U., Grünewald, F., Maij Weggen, H. R. H. and White, G. (2006) Evaluation of the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) 2000–2005, GFE Consulting worldwide. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2006/dg_echo.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- DARA (2010a) Humanitarian Response Index 2010. Donor Assessment 'European Commission'. Available at: <http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/EC-Donor-Assessment_HRI-2010.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

- (2010b) Humanitarian Response Index 2010. Overview Fact Sheet. Available at: <<http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/HRI-overview-fact-sheet.pdf>> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- De Baere, G. (2014) 'EU External Action', in Barnard, C. and Peers, S. (eds) *European Union Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 704–750.
- Drury, A. C., Olson, R. S. and van Belle, D. A. (2005) 'The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995', *Journal of Politics*, 67(2): 454–473.
- Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books.
- Eberwein, W.-D. and Runge, P. (2002) *Humanitäre Hilfe statt Politik? Neue Herausforderungen für ein altes Politikfeld*, Münster: Lit Verlag.
- Egger, C. (2013) L'Union européenne est-elle une source de coopération inter-organisationnelle? Le cas du réseau VOICE, *Revue Etudes internationales* XLIV(1).
- European Commission (2007) Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, SEC (2007) 782, Brussels, 13 June 2007.
- (2012a) Report on Special Eurobarometer 384 'Humanitarian Aid', conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, June 2012.
- (2012b): The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, COM (2012) 586 final, Brussels, 13 October 2012.
- (2013a) Meeting Report: Stakeholder Conference on the Future of EU Humanitarian Aid, DG ECHO, Brussels, 5 June 2013. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consultations/FFP_stakeholder_conference_report_en.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- (2013b) Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013–2020, SWD (2013) 227 final, Brussels, 19 June 2013.
- (2013c) The Union's Humanitarian Aid: Fit for Purpose? Summary of Responses to the Stakeholder Consultation, 25 June 2013. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consultations/Fit-for-purpose_summary_en.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

- (2014a) The European Union Explained: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection: Helping Victims of Disasters and Conflicts, and Protecting those at Risk, February 2014. Available at: http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/humanitarian-aid_en.pdf (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- (2014b) DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Management Plan 2014. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/echo_mp_en.pdf (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- (2014c) The Post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing Risks to Achieve Resilience, COM (2014) 216 final, Brussels, 8 April 2014.

European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013) The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crisis, JOIN (2013) 30 final, Brussels, 11 December 2013.

European Council (2008) Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission (2008/C 25/ 01): The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, *Official Journal of the European Union* C 25, 30 January 2008: 1-2. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:025:0001:0012:EN:PDF> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

- (2013) Council Conclusions on EU Approach to Resilience, 3241st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 28 May 2013.
- (2014) Council Conclusions on the Post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing Risks to Achieve Resilience, Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 5 and 6 June 2014.

European External Action Service (2013) *EEAS Review*, Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf (Last accessed 11 November 2013).

European Parliament (2010) Report on Implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid: The Mid-Term Review of its Action Plan and the Way Forward, A7-0375/2010, 15 December 2010.

- (2013a) Recommendation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European

Commission, to the Council and to the Commission on the 2013 Review of the Organisation and the Functioning of the EEAS: Recommendation to the EEAS, A7-0147/2013, 26 April 2013.

- (2013b) Draft Report on the EU Approach to Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries: Learning from Food Security Crisis, 2013/2110(INI), 26 September 2013.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1): 1–23.

Hutter, S. and Grande, E. (2014) 'Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970–2010', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(5): 1002–1018.

ICRC (1979), *The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary*, 1 January 1979. Available at: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/fundamental-principles-commentary-010179.htm> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

Imig, D. R. and Tarrow, S. G. (2001) *Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Joachim, J. and Dembinski, M. (2011) 'A Contradiction in Terms? NGOs, Democracy, and European Foreign and Security Policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(8): 1151–1168.

Keukeleire, S. and Delreux, T. (2014) *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 2nd edition, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Koenig, N. (2012) 'Libya: A Wakeup Call for CSDP?', TEPSA Brief, 15 March 2012. Available at: <http://www.tepsa.eu/download/TEPSA%20brief%20by%20Nicole%20Koenig%20March%202012%282%29.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

Krähenbühl, P. (2011) 'The Militarization of Aid and its Perils', ICRC Resource Center, 22 February 2011. Available at: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/editorial/humanitarians-danger-article-2011-02-01.htm> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

Levine, S., Pain, A., Bailey, S. and Fan, L (2012) *The Relevance of 'Resilience'?*, HPG Policy Brief 49, London: Overseas Development Institute.

Orbie, J. (2008) *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Oxfam (2012) 'Fit for Purpose? The European External Action Service One Year on', 159 Oxfam Briefing Paper – Summary, 23 January 2012. Available at: <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp159-fit-for-purpose-eeas-230111-summ-en.pdf> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

Pontiroli, A., Ponthieu, A. and Derderian, K. (2013) 'Losing Principles in the Search for Coherence? A Field-Based Viewpoint on the EU and Humanitarian Aid', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 29 May 2013. Available at: <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2010> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

Schneiker, A. (2011) 'Sicherheitskonzepte deutscher Hilfsorganisationen: Zwischen Identitätswahrung und Pragmatismus', *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 4(4): 627–644.

Singer, P. W. (2010) 'Private Military Contractors and Humanitarians', in Lakoff, A. (ed.) *Disaster and the Politics of Intervention*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, pp. 70–99.

Slim, H. (2003) 'Is Humanitarianism Being Politicised? A Reply to David Rieff', The Dutch Red Cross Symposium on Ethics in Aid, The Hague, 8 October 2003.

Smith, M. (2011) 'Implementation: Making the EU's International Relations Work', in Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds) *International Relations and the European Union*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 171–193.

Statham, P. and Trenz, H.-J. (2013) 'How European Union Politicization Can Emerge through Contestation: The Constitution Case', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(5): 965–980.

Sørensen, C. H. (2012) 'Stakeholder Consultation on the Union's Humanitarian Aid: Fit for Purpose?' (Letter), 14 December 2012, Brussels, ECHO. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consultations/20121213_CSorensen_letter_Fit-for-Purpose.pdf (Last accessed 11 November 2014).

Terry, F. (2002) *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- TFEU (2012) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, *Official Journal of the European Union* C 326, 26 October 2012: 47–199.
- Vaughn, J. (2009) 'The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness', *Security Dialogue*, 40(3): 263–285.
- Versluys, H. (2008) 'European Union Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?' in Orbie, J. (ed.) *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 91–115.
- VOICE (2013) General Assembly Resolution 'Humanitarian Aid and the EU Comprehensive Approach: Recommendations', May 2013.
- Whittall, J., Philips, M. and Hofman, M. (2014), *Opinion and Debate: Building Resilience by Deconstructing Humanitarian Aid*, Doctors without Borders, 7 February 2014. Available at: <<http://www.msf.org.uk/article/opinion-and-debate-building-resilience-deconstructing-humanitarian-aid>> (Last accessed 11 November 2014).
- Wiener, A. (2004) 'Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(2): 189–234.
- Zürn, M. and Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2013) *Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik: Umkämpfte Internationale Institutionen*, Berlin: Suhrkamp.

ARENA Working Papers

| | | |
|-------|--|--|
| 14/11 | Charlotte Dany | Beyond Principles vs. Politics: Humanitarian Aid in the European Union |
| 14/10 | Asimina Michailidou and Hans-Jörg Trenz | Eurocrisis and the Media: Preserving or Undermining Democracy? |
| 14/09 | Guri Rosén | A Budgetary Advance: The European Parliament's Growing Role in EU Foreign Policy |
| 14/08 | Tatiana Fumasoli, Åse Gornitzka and Peter Maassen | University Autonomy and Organizational Change Dynamics |
| 14/07 | Hans-Jörg Trenz | The Saga of Europeanisation: On the Narrative Construction of a European Society |
| 14/06 | Morten Egeberg, Jarle Trondal and Nina M. Vestlund | Situating EU Agencies in the Political-Administrative Space |
| 14/05 | Sergio Fabbrini | After the Euro Crisis: A New Paradigm on the Integration of Europe |
| 14/04 | Marianne Riddervold | A Geopolitical Balancing Game? EU and NATO in the Fight Against Somali Piracy |
| 14/03 | Claudia Landwehr | Deliberative Democracy and Non-Majoritarian Decision-Making |
| 14/02 | Erik Oddvar Eriksen | The Normative Implications of the Eurozone Crisis |
| 14/01 | Guri Rosén | Secrecy versus Accountability: Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Security and Defence Policy |
| 13/08 | Jarle Trondal and Frode Veggeland | The Autonomy of Bureaucratic Organisations: An Organisation Theory Argument |
| 13/07 | Helene Sjørnsen | A Mere Irrelevance? Assessing the EU's Foreign and Security Policy |
| 13/06 | Erik Oddvar Eriksen | Reason-Based Decision-Making: On Deliberation and the Problem of Indeterminacy |
| 13/05 | Espen D. H. Olsen and Hans-Jörg Trenz | The Micro-Macro Link in Deliberative Polling: Deliberative Experiments and Democratic Legitimacy |
| 13/04 | Bruno De Witte | Using International Law in the Euro Crisis: Causes and Consequences |
| 13/03 | Mai'a K. Davis Cross and Xinru Ma | EU Crises and the International Media |
| 13/02 | Johanne Døhlie Saltnes | The EU's Human Rights Policy: Unpacking the Literature on the EU's Implementation of Aid Conditionality |
| 13/01 | Zuzana Murdoch, Jarle Trondal and Stefan Gänzle | The Origins of Common Action Capacities in EU Foreign Policy: Observations on the Recruitment of Member States' Diplomats and Officials to the European External Action Service (EEAS) |

ARENA Working Papers

| | | |
|-------|--|--|
| 12/06 | Nina Merethe Vestlund | Changing Policy Focus through Organisational Reform? The Case of the Pharmaceutical Unit in the European Commission |
| 12/05 | Falk Daviter | Framing Biotechnology Policy in the European Union |
| 12/04 | Morten Egeberg | Experiments in Supranational Institution Building: The European Commission as a Laboratory |
| 12/03 | Cathrine Holst | Equal Pay and Dilemmas of Justice |
| 12/02 | Helene Sjørnsen | From Fly in the Ointment to Accomplice: Norway in EU Foreign and Security Policy |
| 12/01 | Jarle Trondal and B. Guy Peters | The Rise of European Administrative Space: Lessons Learned |
| 11/14 | Jarle Trondal | Bureaucratic Centre Formation in Government Institutions: Lessons From the European Commission |
| 11/13 | Guri Rosén | Can You Keep a Secret? How the European Parliament got Access to Sensitive Documents in the Area of Security and Defence |
| 11/12 | Espen D. H. Olsen and Hans-Jörg Trenz | From Citizens' Deliberation to Popular Will Formation: Generation Democratic Legitimacy Through Transnational Deliberative Polling |
| 11/11 | Daniel Gaus | The State's Existence Between Facts and Norms: A Reflection on Some Problems to the Analysis of the State |
| 11/10 | Morten Egeberg, Åse Gornitzka, Jarle Trondal and Mathias Johannessen | Parliament Staff: Backgrounds, Career Patterns and Behaviour of Officials in the European Parliament |
| 11/09 | Irena Fiket, Espen D. H. Olsen and Hans-Jörg Trenz | Deliberations under Conditions of Language Pluralism: Insight from the Europolis Deliberative Polling Experiment |
| 11/08 | Daniel Gaus | The Dynamics of Legitimation |
| 11/07 | Ian Cooper | A "Virtual Third Chamber" for the European Union? National Parliaments After the Treaty of Lisbon |
| 11/06 | Martin Marcussen and Jarle Trondal | The OECD Civil Servant between Scylla and Charybdis |
| 11/05 | Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum | Representation through Deliberation: The European Case |
| 11/04 | Espen D. H. Olsen | European Citizenship: With a Nation-state, Federal or Cosmopolitan Twist? |
| 11/03 | John Erik Fossum | Nationalism, Patriotism and Diversity: Conceptualising the National Dimension in Neil MacCormick's Post-sovereign Constellation |

ARENA Working Papers

| | | |
|-------|--|--|
| 11/02 | Agustín José Menéndez | United They Diverge? From Conflicts of Law to Constitutional Theory? On Christian Joerges' Theory |
| 11/01 | Agustín José Menéndez | From Constitutional Pluralism to a Pluralistic Constitution? Constitutional Synthesis as a MacCormickian Constitutional Theory of European Integration |
| 10/16 | Cathrine Holst | Martha Nussbaum's Outcome-oriented Theory of Justice: Philosophical Comments |
| 10/15 | John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez | The Theory of Constitutional Synthesis: A Constitutional Theory for a Democratic European Union |
| 10/14 | Pieter de Wilde, Hans-Jörg Trenz and Asimina Michailidou | Contesting EU Legitimacy: The Prominence, Content and Justification of Euroscepticism during 2009 EP Election Campaigns |
| 10/13 | Espen D. H. Olsen and Hans-Jörg Trenz | Deliberative Polling: A Cure to the Democratic Deficit of the EU? |
| 10/12 | Morten Egeberg and Jarle Trondal | EU-level Agencies: New Executive Centre Formation or Vehicles for National Control? |
| 10/11 | Jarle Trondal | Bureaucratic Structure and Administrative Behaviour: Lessons from International Bureaucracies |
| 10/10 | Morten Egeberg | EU-administrasjonen: Senterdannelse og flernivåforvaltning |
| 10/09 | Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum | Bringing European Democracy Back In – Or How to Read the German Constitutional Court's Lisbon Treaty Ruling |
| 10/08 | Liesbet Hooghe | Images of Europe: How Commission Officials Conceive their Institution's Role in the EU |
| 10/07 | Erik O. Eriksen | European Transformation: A Pragmatic Approach |
| 10/06 | Asimina Michailidou and Hans-Jörg Trenz | 2009 European Parliamentary Elections on the Web |
| 10/05 | Åse Gornitzka and Ulf Sverdrup | Enlightened Decision Making: The Role of Scientists in EU Governance |
| 10/04 | Christer Gulbrandsen | Europeanization Of Sea-Level Bureaucrats: A Case of Ship Inspectors' Training |
| 10/03 | Morten Egeberg and Jarle Trondal | Agencification and Location: Does Agency Site Matter? |
| 10/02 | Pieter de Wilde | Contesting the EU Budget and Euroscepticism: A Spiral of Dissent? |
| 10/01 | Jarle Trondal | Two Worlds of Change: On the Internationalisation of Universities |

For older issues in the series, please consult the ARENA website: www.arena.uio.no