Images of Europe
How Commission officials conceive their institution's role in the EU

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Abstract

How do Commission officials conceive the Commission's role in the European Union? Should the Commission be the government of Europe or the servant of member states? Is there a third possibility, the Community method, whereby Commission and member states share authority? This article lays out institutional options and role conceptions adopted by Commission officials, and estimates their relative incidence using a 2008 large-scale survey among Commission officials (N=1901). Pluralism reigns, and in explaining variation, national background shapes views much more than professional background.

Introduction

The role of the European Commission in Europe's institutional architecture is uncertain. Politicization, enlargement, and management failures have shaken an elitist, technocratic EU polity. A functionalist system for interstate collaboration has evolved in a polity in which decision rules and objectives are contested (Bauer ed. 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Peterson 2008). The transformation of European governance affects Commission officials directly. As strategic actors in European decision making – equipped with expertise, located at the heart of the EU's policy networks, and entrusted with authority over several policies – Commission officials have become involved in contentious political decisions. As non-elected professionals they have a weak claim to political accountability. How do Commission officials reconcile decision power with political vulnerability?

This study draws on a large online survey among a representative sample of Commission officials (N=1901) to examine how these people conceive Europe's institutional future and their role in a changing European Union.[1] EU institutional options are often boiled down to a choice between a supranational/federal Europe and an intergovernmental/state-centric Europe, and European Commission officials are usually assumed to be partisans of the former. This article formulates a third possibility, the Community method, and finds that it captures the views of a large minority of Commission officials.

The first section discusses the sources of cohesion and differentiation among Commission officials. The second section lays out the institutional options and role conceptions adopted by Commission officials, and the third section estimates their relative incidence. The final section hypothesizes sources of variation for role definition and tests these expectations against survey data.

Cohesion and context

Bureaucracies are never a cross-section of their society. But the extent to which they constitute a separate 'caste' – a relatively distinct social system of class,

beliefs and attitudes, and power – varies from society to society.[2] British and French civil servants, particularly the higher echelons, were, until recently, almost exclusively drawn from the traditional upper classes, and attended elite schools – Oxford, Cambridge, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, the Polytechniques. The extent to which a civil service forms a caste matters because an internally united body has greater capacity to shape decision making, and it can more easily lock out third parties (Page 1995; Suleiman 1984).

There are reasons to expect Commission officials to be relatively distinct in class, beliefs, and power, but there are also serious impediments to caste formation. Commission officials work in the world's most powerful international executive. The majority of Commission officials has lived or worked abroad before, is polyglot, has at least one postgraduate degree, is interested in European integration, and is committed to Europe or the European Union. These features are quite uncommon among national civil servants, national politicians or Europe's citizens.

However, Commission officials come from 27 national societies, have diverse educational backgrounds and professional experiences, and are recruited through multiple channels. Moreover, the EU's institutional open-endedness is a severe impediment to caste formation. Since the early days of European integration, leaders (and recently political parties and citizens) have disagreed on whether the EU should be supranational or intergovernmental. There are competing institutional options with different roles for the Commission, member states, European Parliament. These options matter to Commission officials because each implies different expectations on how they should define their role. The EU institutional environment is far more ambiguous than that in most EU member states, where professional bureaucracies play the role of a Weberian servant. It is also more ambiguous than that in most international governmental organizations, where the role of international officials is heavily circumscribed.

Several contextual challenges amplify differences. First, the Commission serves multiple principals, including regional and local governments, societal stakeholders, as well as European institutions and national governments. Commission officials are sometimes compelled to choose between incompatible demands, and directorates-general may deal with different principals, thus nurturing diverse governance views within the Commission.

Second, public skepticism in state institutions has made bureaucrats targets of

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[2] Caste is derived from the Latin word *castus*: pure, segregated, cut off.

public discontent. The European Commission also has to contend with national politicians (and national bureaucrats!) who shift blame for unpopular policies to the European level. Commission officials are crosspressured between incentives to retreat in a non-political administrative role and incentives to justify their role in political terms (Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2007).

Third, new public management reform in the Commission has sought to align organizational methods in the public sector with those of the private sector. The reform weakens traditional work principles in the Commission such as specialist expertise, seniority and tenure, political initiative, hierarchy. It promotes generalist skills, performance-related criteria, loyalty to political masters, and network-type organization (Bauer and Knill 2007; Bouckaert 2008; Cini 2007; Suleiman 2003). The objective appears to be to 'normalize' the Commission into a bureaucracy where career officials prepare and implement political decisions that are taken elsewhere.

These contextual challenges are in sharp tension with longstanding and durable institutional rules, laid down in the Treaties, embedded in the practices of European institutions, and reinforced in the rule book of the Commission, that permit, and indeed instruct, Commission officials to take initiatives on behalf of and for Europe (Cini 1996; Ross 1995). In conjunction with the College of commissioners, the officials of the European Commission have a constitutional obligation to set the legislative agenda, at least to the extent that the Commission has exclusive formal competence to draft EU legislation. This competence sets Commission officials apart from their counterparts in national administrations, but it also exposes them to the criticism that they are 'a run-away bureaucracy' (Pollack 1997).

Finally, the addition of twelve countries since 2004, including ten former postcommunist regimes, has changed the make-up of the European Commission by accelerating replacement of 'Western' officials with those from Central and Eastern Europe. This personnel change dilutes the dominance of 'Western European' beliefs and attitudes, and it weakens institutional memory and habit. As of 1 March 2010, 21.5 per cent of Commission policy makers (AD grades) came from the EU-12 member states.[3]

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[3]   Commission DG for personnel website: <http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/bs_sexe_nat_grade_en.pdf>.

Institutional options and role conceptions

What are the institutional options that Commission officials support, and do these inform how Commission officials define their role as European bureaucrats?

The debate about Europe's institutional future is often portrayed as one-dimensional. Parties and public opinion pit those who want 'more Europe' against those who want 'less Europe', occasionally sharpened to mean 'in' or 'out' of the European Union. Among elites and public office holders the debate runs within narrower parameters. EU membership itself is rarely at stake, and contestation centers on the balance of power among Commission, member states, European Parliament. EU academic research reflects this by simplifying the institutional options along a single dimension: federal/supranational vs. intergovernmental/state-centric (e.g. Fischer 2000; Jörges et al. 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). The end-points are defined by a proto-federal European Union with the Commission as primary holder of authority, and a state-centric Union where that role is reserved for the member states.

In *The Uniting of Europe* (1958), Ernst Haas analyzes a third institutional option which departs from the notion that authority is balanced between Commission and Council, and among member states. The Commission represents the general interest and is equipped with the monopoly of initiative and powers to oversee implementation; member states voice particular interests through their role as legislators in the Council and implementors of EU policy. These are interlocking and complementary institutions. One consequence is that decision making should protect smaller member states against the dominance of one or several large member states by giving the Commission the monopoly of initiative and by overrepresenting smaller states in decision making. Haas (1958: 526-7) described the emerging system as 'a hybrid in which neither the federal nor the intergovernmental tendency has clearly triumphed'. The result is designed to be a pragmatic partnership around concrete common problems whereby the end-form of European integration recedes to the background. Commission monopoly of initiative, majority voting in the Council, member state equality and incremental problem-solving are the kernels of what later became known as the Community method (Dehousse 2005; Dehousse forthcoming; Devuyst 1999, 2008; Weiler 1991).[4]

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[4] Some observers distinguish the Community method from the functional or Monnet method. Dehousse (2000) defines the functional method as a political strategy that makes use of the legal framework to set up *ad hoc* cooperation schemes and consciously avoids discussion of the ultimate (political) objectives of European integration. Majone makes a distinction between the Community method, a legal concept, and the functional method which he baptizes the Monnet method or 'integration by stealth', and which is executed by a

The Community method is regularly defended in Commission documents, including the Commission's 2000 White Paper on Governance:

> La méthode communautaire garantit à la fois la diversité et l'efficacité de l'Union. Elle assure le traitement équitable de tous les Etats-membres, des plus grands aux plus petits. Elle fournit un moyen d'arbitrer entre divers intérêts au travers de deux filtres successifs: le filtre de l'intérêt général, au niveau de la Commission; le filtre de la representation démocratique, européenne et nationale, au niveau du Conseil et du Parlement, qui constituent ensemble le pouvoir législatif de l'Union.[5]

Figure IA represents the classic debate between supranationalism/federalism and intergovernmentalism/state-centrism. Figure IB provides an alternative conceptualization in which the Community method escapes the supranational/intergovernmental dimension. The Community method option conceives of European integration as pragmatic problem solving; the supranational and state-centric option as an institutional power struggle. However, the particular views embedded in the Community method resemble those underlying supranationalism or state-centrism. With supranationalism it shares the notion that the Commission is the policy initiator; state-centrism conceives of the Commission as manager. With state-centrism the Community

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meritocratic-scientific elite out of sight of the national publics (Majone 2007: 12). He cites contemporaries of Monnet to give support to his claim that Monnet masterminded this strategy. It is interesting to note that Haas did not interpret Monnet's role in the same way. According to Haas (1958: 455-6), Monnet was openly federalist whose 'emphasis throughout his tenure in Luxembourg was on the federal nature of ECSC institutions, as being superior in actual power to those of the member governments. He barely acknowledged the existence of the Council of Ministers, never tired of stressing the need for the immediate creation of additional federal institutions, fought publicly for EDC and EPS, and held that Britain's joining the federal movement was only a question of time'.

[5] In his commentary on the Commission's White Paper, Dehousse (2005: 16) argues that the Community method is fundamentally different from the federal option because it allocates the power to decide with the member states:

> […] la Commission souligne que la méthode communautaire s'appuie également sur la possibilité, pour le Conseil, de prendre des décisions à la majorité. La précision est importante, car elle met en évidence un aspect essentiel du système politique mis en place par les traités européens, à savoir le fait que les Etats – et plus précisément leurs gouvernements – y tiennent une place centrale, ce qui distingue, par exemple, l'Union européenne d'un modèle fédéral, ou les liens entre les composantes et le pouvoir central sont plus ténus.

It also parts ways with state-centrism by virtue of the fact that the Commission's sole power of initiative is central to the Community method (Dehousse 2005: 41, 43; Wallace 2000: 3-37).

method emphasizes that national interests should be accommodated; supranationalism emphasises independence from national interests.

Unidimensional conception of EU debate

Supranational/ federal ◄━━━━━━━━━━━━━► **Intergovernmental/ state-centric**

Two-dimensional conception of EU debate

Supranational/ federal

Intergovernmental/ state-centric

| Institutional power struggle |
| Commission as initiator |
| Independent of national |

| Institutional power struggle |
| Commission as manager |
| Accommodate national |

Community method

| Pragmatic problem-solving |
| Commission is initiator |
| Accommodate national interests |

Figure I: Conceptualizing views on EU governance

These institutional options imply distinct role conceptions for Commission officials:

- **Supranational governance**: Authority is vested in the College of Commissioners, which provides political guidance. The primary role for Commission officials is to be loyal servants of the College, defend the Commission's role as Europe's executive and help to usher in a federal Europe.

- **State-centric governance**: Member states provide political guidance through the Council. As in the previous model, Commission officials are loyal civil servants, but this time of the Council, and they are sensitive to national differences. Member states remain in the driver's seat.

- **Community method governance**: Neither Commission nor member states monopolize political guidance. The Commission exercises a monopoly of initiative; member states legislate and implement EU decisions. The role of Commission officials is to identify shared needs and propose European solutions that transcend ideological, national or cultural differences, and to safeguard equal treatment of all member states.

Operationalizing role conceptions

These conceptions of EU governance can be tapped by combining answers to the following two items in the Commission survey. The first item taps supranationalism, and the second echoes Charles de Gaulle's famous call for intergovernmentalism:

- 'Some people want the College of Commissioners to become the government of the European Union. What do you think?'

- 'Some argue that member states–not the Commission or European Parliament–should be the central players in the European Union. What is your position?'

Supranationalists agree with the first and disagree with the second statement, while state-centrists agree with the second and disagree with the first statement. But these are not the only plausible options. An official who rejects both statements believes that *neither* the College of Commissioners *nor* the member states should be the kernel of European government, which

characterizes proponents of the Community method.[6] Figure II shows the distribution of role types in today's Commission: 13.5 per cent state-centrists, 36.6 per cent supranationalists, and, surprisingly in light of the conventional literature, 28.9 per cent Community method proponents.

Note: N=1698. Five-point scales ranging from 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neither disagree nor agree; 4=agree; 5= strongly agree.

Figure II: Conceptions of EU governance and Types of Commission Officials

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[6] Answers range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Supranationalists are respondents who agree strongly or agree with the first statement and disagree strongly or disagree with the second statement. State-centrists are respondents who disagree strongly or disagree with the first statement and agree strongly, agree or neither agree nor disagree with the second statement. I draw the boundaries around the state-centric type more liberally to account for the fact that the meaningful divide is likely to be between those rejecting intergovernmentalism and those who do *not*.

ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMISSION INITIATIVE (1a, b, c)

ACCOMODATING NATIONALITY IN THE COMMISSION (2a, b)

LOYALTY TOWARDS THE COMMISSION (3a)

BELIEFS ON COMMISSION POWER VERSUS OTHER INSTITUTIONS (4a, b, c)

Note: Standardized variables. Mean values and 95% confidence interval by type. Values higher than zero indicate that a type supports the statement more than the average official does; values below zero indicate the opposite. The full wording of the items is presented at the end of the appendix.

Figure III: Attitudes and Beliefs by Type

These types are consistent with attitudes and beliefs presented in Figure III, whereby the dots represent for each type mean attitudes/beliefs and the whiskers mark a 95 per cent confidence interval. Values are standardized around the mean to enhance comparability. Supranationalists and state-centrists tend to be antithetical. Supranationalists value the Commission's role in policy initiative – state-centrists emphasize managerial responsibility; supranationalists are suspicious of national quota in services or College – state-centrists endorse them; supranationalists are ardent Commission loyalists – state-centrists are much more circumspect. Interestingly, views concerning EU governance color beliefs about how the world *is*, as well as attitudes about how the world *should* be. Supranationalists are significantly more likely to say that the Commission is less powerful than it used to be, has lost power to national capitals and to the European Parliament. State-centrists hold markedly different beliefs.

Where do Community method proponents fit in? Like supranationalists they value policy initiative over management and Commission loyalty over DG loyalty, and they also believe that the power of the Commission has declined. Like state-centrists they are more willing to accommodate nationality in the Commission: they take a middle position on national quotas and find it desirable to maintain one Commissioner per member state even if this means a less efficient Commission. However, Community method supporters are distinctive from both state-centrists and supranationalists in one critical respect: they are deeply reluctant to share the Commission's power of initiative with the European Parliament. The Commission's monopoly of initiative is the alpha and omega of the Commission's separate-but-equal role in the European Union's system of interlocking governance.

Who are these supranationalists, state-centrists and Community method proponents? What makes someone more likely to be one or the other?

Explaining variation in type

Attitudes of elite actors are more consistent than those of ordinary people and yet more difficult to explain as a function of structural or demographic characteristics (Putnam 1973; Searing 1994). Elites tend to be both coherent and ideosyncratic. Years of education, mobility, and leadership mold and meld background features into a singular capacity to think coherently, critically, and autonomously. One should not expect to find considerable structure, though the structure detected here appears robust and explicable.

Past research has responded to the question whether European officials bring

their views from their home context to Brussels or instead acquire them on the job in Brussels (or Luxembourg) (Beyers 2005; Egeberg 2001; Hooghe 2005). Is national background or professional European background shaping attitudes and beliefs on Europe? Consistent with prior work I find that attitudes on EU governance and EU role perceptions are more strongly influenced by where the official comes from than by her current experiences in the Commission.

National background

The strongest expectation is that an official's nationality shapes the way a person thinks about EU governance. The challenge is to theorize the underlying properties of these proper names. Four lines of theorizing appear fruitful.

First, the structure of EU government can be conceived as an extension of how the national government functions. Individuals from federal or regionalized countries are more familiar with sharing authority. Extending shared rule to the European level should encounter fewer habitual barriers in a multilevel system (Risse 2005), and should be less costly to implement since it builds upon, rather than challenges, the status quo. Supranationalists who favor a federal Union are most likely to hail from multilevel systems. Officials who support a state-centric Union should come disproportionately from state-centric systems. Community method proponents should come from moderately decentralized countries.

A second line of theorizing conceives EU government as an instrument for the production of public goods by internalizing externalities and reaping economies of scale by virtue of its size (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2009). Countries vary in their need for EU government. The smaller the country, the greater the benefits. Providing European solutions for shared problems is the core rationale of the Community method, and so one would expect Community method proponents to come disproportionately from smaller countries.

European government can also substitute for national government if the latter is ineffective in delivering public goods (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Member states differ widely in their governing capacity, and the expectation is that officials from countries where government is less effective should put more faith in an autonomous European government.

A final line of argument builds on Stein Rokkan (Rokkan and Urwin 1983), who examines how religious strife split Europe centuries ago into territories that rejected the supranational power of Rome and those that embraced it.

Scholars have picked up on this to theorize that supranationalism and the Community method have a natural habitat in Catholic societies and state-centrism in protestant societies (Boomgaarden and Freire 2009; Madeley 2008; Minkenberg 2009; Nelsen et al. 2001).

Professional background

It is reasonable to expect Commission officials' career experiences to affect attitudes and beliefs on EU governance. After all, Commission officials are people who run Europe (Page 1997).

The simplest expectation is that the longer an official has worked in the Commission, the more likely he or she supports supranationalism or the Community method (Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; Trondal 2007; Trondal, Van den Berg and Suvarierol 2008). Utility and socialization point in the same direction. Bureaucrats may have an interest in expanding positional power (Franchino 2007; Niskanen 1994; Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002). This is reinforced by the fact that Commission work is organized along sectoral or functional lines, which induces Commission officials to de-emphasize territorial or national principles (Egeberg 2001). Commission officials may also be socialized into the norms laid down in the Treaties which prescribe them to put the general interest of the Union first (Art. 17.1, TEU), use the power of initiative to be the engine of Europe (Art. 17.2, TEU), and be independent from national pressures (Art. 17.3, TEU).

Attitudes may also differ systematically across DGs, policy field, or policy network on the assumption that officials self-select for areas that reinforce their views, or conversely, that DG practices shape the views of those who work within. In either case, one should find a systematic association between DG location and type of official. Officials in competition or trade, areas with decades-long powerful Commission initiative, should be supranationalist. Officials in areas with extensive routinized member state involvement, such as justice, foreign affairs, defense, education, agriculture, or labour market policy, should be state-centrist. Officials in areas where the demand for technical expertise is high and where interinstitutional conflict is detrimental to European cooperation, e.g. fisheries, environment, development, information society, should support the Community method.

There are at least two ways in which prior career experience could interfere with that in the Commission. Commission officials who worked in a national administration or as diplomat prior to joining the Commission should be primed towards state-centric governance (Egeberg 2001; Hooghe 2002). National bureaucrats often develop a sense of national public service, adopt

particular national administrative styles, and are keyed into national networks (Page 1995; Suleiman 1984). Those who wish to keep their national career options open may defend national prerogatives. Conversely, individuals who previously worked in an international organization should be primed to supranationalism or the Community method (Beyers 2005; Trondal 2007). Life abroad tends to attenuate links with one's home country while it can forge a community of fate with other expats and reinforce preferences for international governance (Fligstein 2008; for a skeptical view, see Favell 2008).

The literature suggests that several other factors could have a bearing on Commission officials' views on EU governance. These serve as controls.

Ideological background

Left-of-center officials should favor supranationalism to correct the EU institutional bias in favor of market-making (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). Right-of-center officials should favor state-centrism to preserve the separation between EU market-making and national social regimes. Community method proponents are problem-solvers and should eschew ideology (Dehousse 2005). One should also expect officials with cosmopolitan-libertarian views to be more comfortable with European authority than conservative-nationalist individuals (Inglehart 1970; Marks et al. 2006; Risse 2010).[7]

Motivation and self-selection

Knowledge of what motivated respondents to join the Commission provides insight in their views on EU governance. Individuals who select the Commission because of a pre-existing commitment to Europe are more likely to be supranationalist or Community method and less likely to be state-centrist; individuals with a commitment to a particular policy area should support the Community method.

Gender and multinationality

Public opinion studies suggest that women are more reluctant to embrace European integration. Women tend to occupy positions in the labor market

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[7] A competing anti-postmodern European project has been taking shape. It emphasizes Europe's Christianity, Europe's national traditions and a selective interpretation of enlightenment values that motivates an exclusionary rhetoric hostile to non-EU foreigners and immigrants. Radical right parties are most vocal, but this vision is also espoused by minorities on the conservative right and in some populist hard-left parties (Buruma 2006; de Vries and Edwards 2009; Holmes 2009).

that make them more vulnerable to economic competition, tend to be less interested in foreign policy, and have more compassionate and less competitive values (Gelleney and Anderson 2000; Nelsen and Guth 2000), but it is not known whether this holds among elite actors. To the extent that women are more circumspect about power battles they might also be more inclined to support the Community method. Finally, people with dual or multiple nationality (just under seven per cent of respondents) should be less inclined to support state-centrism.[8]

Table I summarizes these theoretical expectations. The appendix details the operationalization of dependent and independent variables. [9] Table II displays binary logistic regressions for state-centrists and supranationalists vis-a-vis their counterparts.[10] The first column for each type introduces national background and controls. The second column adds professional background to assess the causal effect of career context.[11]

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[8] Age has high multicollinearity with several key variables (in particular length in Commission and national administrative career), and is therefore not included in the models.

[9] Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, binary logistic regression or logit is the simplest and most appropriate technique to explore causality (Agresti 2002; Hilbe 2009). Logistic regression is useful for situations in which one seeks to predict the presence or absence of a characteristic or outcome, and logistic regression coefficients can be used to estimate odds ratios for the independent variables in the model. Logistic regression has many analogies to OLS regression: the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta weights, and a pseudo R^2 statistic summarizes the strength of the relationship. Unlike OLS regression logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship between dependent and independent variables, does not require normally distributed variables, does not assume homoskedasticity, and in general has less stringent requirements. It does, however, require that observations be independent and that independent variables be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable.

[10] Since the purpose is to compare the three types, the population consists of state-centrists, supranationalists, and Community method proponents and excludes the 20.1 per cent 'non-categorized' respondents. The results are very similar if non-categorized are included. These models are available from the author upon request.

[11] Models using the reverse sequence of professional background and controls followed by national background confirm that national background has a much stronger effect than professional background. These models are available from the author upon request.

Table I: Explaining Types – Expectations

	State-centric type	Community method type	Supranational type
National background			
Multilevel governance	**–**	**0**	**+**
Country size	**+**	**–**	**0**
Government effectiveness	**+**	**+**	**–**
Protestantism	**+**	**–**	**–**
Professional background			
Length in Commission	**–**	**+**	**+**
Policy DG with strong Commission initiative	**–**	**+**	**+**
Policy DG with technical content	**0**	**+**	**0**
Length in national administration	**+**	**–**	**–**
International career	**–**	**+**	**+**
Ideological background			
Left-Right ideology	**+**	**0**	**–**
Gal-Tan ideology	**+**	**0**	**–**
Motivation			
Commitment to Europe	**–**	**+**	**+**
Commitment to a policy area	**–**	**+**	**–**
Personal characteristics			
Gender	**+**	**+**	**–**
Dual or multiple nationality	**–**	**+**	**+**

Note: **–** stands for an expectation that the relationship is significant and negative, **+** stands for the expectation that the relationship is significant and positive, and **0** stands for a weak and/or indeterminate relationship.

Table II: Who is State-centrist? Who is Supranationalist?

	State-centrists				Supranationalists			
	B-value	*Wald's χ^2*	B-value	*Wald's χ^2*	B-value	*Wald's χ^2*	B-value	*Wald's χ^2*
National background								
Multilevel governance	***-.51***	17.10	***-.50***	15.84	***.52***	35.31	***.51***	33.68
Country size	***.34***	11.31	***.35***	11.83	***-.25***	11.74	***-.25***	11.92
Government effectiveness	.15	1.36	.14	.97	***-.32***	12.01	***-.31***	9.84
Protestantism	***.34***	10.81	***.35***	10.86	-.19	4.77	***-.18***	4.33
Professional background								
Length in Commission			-.04	.15			.00	.00
Policy DG with Commission initiative			.06	.07			-.02	.01
Policy DG with technical content			***-.64***	10.89			-.07	.24
Prior national administrative career			***.17***	4.92			***-.16***	6.47
Prior international career			-.14	2.01			.05	.73
Controls								
Left-Right ideology	***.19***	5.14	***.21***	6.07	-.11	3.3	-.11	3.23
Gal-Tan ideology	***.21***	7.35	***.21***	7.15	-.11	3.16	-.10	2.76
Commitment to Europe	***-.90***	29.16	***-.92***	29.55	***.51***	13.56	***.47***	11.32
Commitment to a policy	.09	.24	.11	.33	***-.46***	10.25	***-.40***	7.71
Gender (woman)	***.38***	5.28	***.44***	6.58	***-.60***	20.20	***-.58***	19.04
Dual nationality	-.03	.01	.00	.00	.25	1.06	.22	.83
	-2 Log Likel.= 1031.2 H & L X^2 =5.86, with 8 df and p=.66 Cox & Snell R^2= .10; Nagelkerke R^2 =.16		-2 Log Likel. = 993.3 H & L X^2 =1.72, with 8 df and p=.99 Cox & Snell R^2= .11; Nagelkerke R^2 =.19		-2 Log Likel. = 1592.0 H & L X^2 =6.19, with 8 df and p=.63 Cox & Snell R^2= .11; Nagelkerke R^2 =.15		-2 Log Likel.= 1584.0 H & L X^2 =5.74, with 8 df and p=.68 Cox & Snell R^2= .12; Nagelkerke R^2 =.16	

Note: N=1258 (three types). B is standardized since all non-dichotomous variables are standardized around the mean. The Wald's Chi-square is a conservative parametric statistic to test the significance of the true value of the parameter based on the sample estimate. Associations significant at the 0.05 level are bolded italicized. H & L X^2 stands for the Hosmer and Lemeshow Chi-square statistic which is a measure of the overall goodness of fit of the model, as is the -2 log-likelihood statistic. Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke are conservative and liberal measures of pseudo-R-square. Results are similar when correcting for clustered standard errors by nationality.

National background is more powerful than professional background in differentiating state-centrists and supranationalists. State-centrists and supranationalists are nearly exact mirror images. State-centrists are most likely to come from countries with limited multilevel governance, countries with larger populations, and from protestant countries. Supranationalists come from countries with multilevel governance, smaller population size, from non-protestant countries, and from polities with less effective governance.

National background is the bedrock of the state-centric/supranational contrast. What does professional experience add? The most robust influence is whether, and how long, officials worked in a national administration. State-centrists are likely to have done so; supranationalists unlikely to have done so. There is also some indication that views over EU governance vary across DGs. State-centrists are less likely to work in DGs that require technical expertise, but the effect is not significant for supranationalists.

There are also some interesting non-findings. DGs with strong Commission initiative (e.g. competition or trade) do neither attract supranationalists nor deter state-centrics. There is no evidence of a power struggle across different directorate-generals. Nor is there evidence that an international career in the Commission, or beyond, breeds supranationalism.

The strongest control variable is motivation to join the Commission. This cues attitudes over EU governance. Seventy-two per cent of respondents claim commitment to Europe, but only 55 per cent of state-centrists do against 79 per cent of supranationalists and 71 per cent of Community method supporters. Supranationalists are less likely than others to mention a policy commitment – e.g. to help developing countries, to combat climate change. Ideology matters for state-centrists: they are to the right of the average Commission official on both economic left/right ideology and non-economic gal/tan ideology. Women turn out to be less supranational and more state-centric. And dual nationals are not significantly more inclined to supranationalism or to the Community method.

State-centrists and supranationalists in the Commission have distinctive national, professional, ideological, motivational and even demographic profiles. To see the distinctiveness of the Community method type one needs to conduct two-way comparisons, as in Table III.

Table III: Community Method Supporters and Their Counterparts

| | Community method supporters compared to | | | | | | | |
| | State-centrists | | | | Supranationalists | | | |
	B-value	Wald's χ^2	B-value	Wald's χ^2	B-value	Wald's χ^2	B-value	Wald's χ^2
National background								
Multilevel governance	*.25*	3.60	.25	3.65	**-.48**	25.83	**-.46**	24.24
Country size	-.17	2.45	-.20	3.25	**.22**	7.73	**.23**	8.14
Government effectiveness	-.03	.05	-.01	.00	**.33**	10.49	**.33**	9.50
Protestantism	**-.33**	8.22	**-.33**	7.77	.08	.70	.07	.49
Professional background								
Length in Commission			.02	.04			.01	.01
Policy DG with Commission initiative			-.04	.02			-.02	.01
Policy DG with technical content			**.70**	11.55			**.30**	4.28
Prior national administrative career			-.07	.80			**.13**	3.70
Prior international career			.12	1.53			-.02	.06
Controls								
Left-Right ideology	-.17	3.56	-.17	3.55	.07	.94	.07	1.03
Gal-Tan ideology	**-.21**	5.80	**-.21**	5.81	.05	.61	.04	.40
Commitment to Europe	**.79**	18.56	**.80**	18.71	-.25	2.73	-.24	2.31
Commitment to a policy	.04	.03	-.01	.00	**.49**	10.11	**.45**	8.17
Gender (woman)	-.12	.44	-.18	.88	**.53**	14.54	**.54**	14.17
Dual nationality	-.17	.22	-.19	.25	-.27	1.00	-.23	.73
	-2 Log Likel.= 779.73 H & L X^2 =10.40, with 8 df and p=.24 Cox & Snell R²= .09; Nagelkerke R² =.12		-2 Log Likel. = 764.9 H & L X^2 =12.47, with 8 df and p=.13 Cox & Snell R²= .11; Nagelkerke R² =.15		-2 Log Likel. = 1353.2 H & L X^2 =10.86, with 8 df and p=.21 Cox & Snell R²= .07; Nagelkerke R² =.10		-2 Log Likel.= 1345.2 H & L X^2 =6.84, with 8 df and p=.55 Cox & Snell R²= .08; Nagelkerke R² =.11	

Note: N=662 (state-centric + community method) and 1050 (supranationalists + community method). B is standardized since all non-dichotomous variables are standardized around the mean. The Wald's Chi-square is a conservative parametric statistic to test the significance of the true value of the parameter based on the sample estimate. Associations significant at the 0.05 level are bolded italicized. H & L X^2 is the Hosmer and Lemeshow Chi-square statistic which is a measure of the overall goodness of fit of the model, as is the -2 log-likelihood statistic. Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke are conservative and liberal measures of pseudo-R-square. Results are similar when correcting for clustered standard errors by nationality.

One way to describe Community method proponents is to say that their national and demographic background is similar to that of state-centrists, but their ideological and motivational outlook is similar to that of supranationalists. Like state-centrists, Community method proponents come from less decentralized, larger, more effectively run polities, are often former national civil servants, and are disproportionately female. Like supranationalists, Community method proponents are left-of-center ideologically and strongly committed to Europe.

Community method proponents differ from state-centrists in that they tend to come from non-protestant countries, and they differ from supranationalists in their strong commitment to a particular policy area. Community method proponents are distinctive from *both* state-centrists and supranationalists in where they work: they can be most readily found in policy DGs with high technical content.

Conclusion

The European Commission has been buffeted. Treaties and rules of procedure have always prescribed a pro-active Commission which sets the agenda for Europe. That prescription is based on particular assumptions: that there is a durable consensus on European integration, that the Commission can be trusted to lead the process, and that Commission officials embrace a coherent mission. Over the past two decades, each of these balloons has been pricked. The Commission faces a contentious European policy environment that is skeptical of its Treaty role as agenda setter. Its capacity to inculcate a coherent mission in its employees has been weakened by NPM reforms, which prioritize management over initiative, and by EU enlargement, which has triggered unprecedented turnover in Commission personnel.

The upshot is pluralism. Our survey detects considerable variation in conceptions of about the Commission's role in Europe–a far cry from the notion that the Commission is a bureaucratic caste. Supranationalists and state-centrists bring the debate among national and European party leaders into the Commission: should the European Union be federal or intergovernmental? Nearly half of Commission officials take sides in this partisan debate. Sociologically they are each other's mirror image. The typical supranationalist is motivated by a commitment to Europe, is a moderate left-libertarian male, and comes from a small, decentralized, non-protestant country or a polity with a less effective government. The typical state-centrist comes from a large, centralized, protestant country, is a former national civil servant, works in a policy area with low technical content, and is right of center.

Three of every ten Commission officials reject primacy for one or the other institution. They are tolerant of national quotas but critical of reducing the Commission to a manager. They are loyal to the Commission but less committed to supporting the College's political stances. And most importantly, they are reluctant to give up the Commission's power of initiative to the European Parliament. Community method proponents defend the first and oldest conception of EU governance, one where the European Union is a unique experiment in overcoming national sovereignty through 'engrenage' rather than weakening national institutions; through problem solving rather than electoral competition. And so Community method proponents defend a view that is unfamiliar to Europe's current leaders, parties, citizens. It is an insiders' view.

The Community method proponent comes mostly from larger, less decentralized, more effective, non-protestant polities; she works in policy areas with high technical content; and leans to the left on gal/tan issues, though, if given a choice, finds her personal ideology not relevant to her job. The Community method proponent is strongly committed to Europe, and even more so to a particular policy, and that differentiates such a person both from supranationalists and state-centrists. The Community method proponent is a policy entrepreneur, not a politician.

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Appendix: Operationalization

DEPENDENT VARIABLES	
State-centric type	Dichotomous variable, whereby value=1 when respondent disagrees strongly or tends to disagree with item A <u>and</u> agrees strongly, tend to agree or neither agree nor disagree with item B.
Community method type	Dichotomous variable, whereby value=1 when respondent disagrees strongly or tends to disagree with both item A and item B.
Supranational type	Dichotomous variable, whereby value=1 when respondent agrees strongly or tends to agree with item A <u>and</u> disagrees strongly or tends to disagree with item B.
Item A	"Some people want the College of Commissioners to become the government of the European Union. What do you think?" (5-point scale)
Item B	"Some argue that member states—not the Commission or European Parliament—should be the central players in the European Union. What is your position?" (5-point scale)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	
Multilevel governance	Regional authority index for each member state in 2006, a measure of the extent of self rule and shared rule for each intermediate tier of regional government. Standardized around the mean. *Source*: RAI dataset by Hooghe, Marks, Schakel (2010), accessible on <http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe>.
Country size	Country's population in 2008 (in '000s). Standardized around the mean.
Government effectiveness	Country average for 1996-2006; standardized around the mean. Government effectiveness is one of six measures developed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators Program by the Worldbank. These aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, public opinion and firm surveys. *Source:* Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2009) (accessible from the Worldbank <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.).
Protestantism	Percentage of protestant population for each member state in 2008; standardized around the mean. *Source:* US State Department's *International Religious Freedom Report 2008* (accessible from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/>.*).*

Length in the Commission	Years of service in the Commission; standardized around the mean. *Source:* survey.
Policy DG with strong Commission initiative	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a policy area that meets certain criteria on level AND scope of EU authority, whereby level and scope are estimated by Tanja Börzel through a reading of formal Treaty rules. Policies score 3 or higher on a five-point scale on level of authority (whereby 3=shared EU and national competences) and 3.75 or higher on a five-point scale (whereby 3.75=exclusive right of Commission initiative+full judicial review+ codecision) on scope of authority. Policy scores are averaged across the Amsterdam, Nice and Constitutional treaties and then allocated to the most closely corresponding DG. Non-policy DGs (e.g. legal service, Secretary General) are scored 0. *Source:* own calculations derived from Börzel (2005).
Policy DG with technical content	Dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if a respondent works in a policy DG that demands above average technical expertise, i.e. agriculture, development, environment, EuropeAid, fisheries, information society and media, internal market, joint research centre, taxation and customs union. *Source:* own coding.
National administrative career	Years of prior service in national /regional /local administration; standardized around the mean. *Source:* survey.
International career	Years of prior service in an international organization (non-EU) or other EU institution; standardized around the mean. *Source*: survey.
Left-right ideology	Individual responses on an 11-point scale tapping personal philosophy; standardized around the mean. "People often think of themselves in terms of their personal philosophical stance on economic issues. Some favour an active role for government on economic policy questions. Others look primarily to markets. Where would you place yourself in terms of economic philosophy?" *Source:* survey.
Gal-tan ideology	Individual responses on an 11-point scale tapping personal philosophy; standardized around the mean. "People often think of themselves in terms of their personal philosophical stance on social and cultural issues. Many people who consider themselves liberal tend to favour expanded personal freedoms on (for example) abortion, same-sex marriage and so on People on the conservative side tend to favour more traditional notions of family, morality, and order. Where would you place yourself in terms of social-cultural philosophy?" *Source*: survey.

Motivation: • **Commitment to Europe** • **Commitment to policy**	"Why did you choose to follow a career in the European Commission? (Please choose as many as are relevant). Options: 1. Job stability; 2. Promising career prospects; 3. Competitive renumeration; 4. Commitment to Europe; 5. Commitment to a particular policy area; 6. Quality of the work; 7. I was asked to apply." Options 4 and 5 were used to construct dichotomous variables. *Source*: survey.
Gender	Dichotomous variable whereby 0=male and 1=female. *Source*: survey.
Dual nationality	Dichotomous variable where 0=if respondent has one nationality and 1=if respondent has dual or multiple nationality. *Source*: survey

Items in Figure III (5-point scales)

	Commission initiative
1a	The Commission should primarily focus on managing existing policies rather than developing new ones.
1b	The more member states the EU has, the more important is the Commission's role as policy initiator.
1c	The Commission should share its sole right of initiative with the European Parliament.
	Accommodating national interests
2a	Some argue that posts in the Commission should be distributed on the basis of geographical balance.
2b	It is more important to have one Commissioner per member state than to have a smaller and more efficient College.
	Loyalty to Commission or to DG
3a	Commission officials work for their DG first, then for the Commission.
	Beliefs about the role of the Commission in EU governance
4a	The Commission is more powerful today than ever before.
4b	The Commission is losing power to national capitals.
4c	The Commission is losing power to the European Parliament.