PARTIES AND CLEAVAGES IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SPACE

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What kind of political system is the European Union and what will it be like in the future? Questions about the present and the future are hard to keep apart as the EU is an evolving project, currently engaged in the twin processes of enlargement and constitution making. When discussing the prospects of Europarties it therefore makes sense to deal with both – this is at least the implicit basis for the paper.

‘Democratic regimes’ in the traditional sense presuppose a state structure, and the EU is not a state in the sense of exercising exclusive control of authority within a specific territory. All the old themes of state- and nation-building, the rise of citizenship, democracy and social welfare rights do not apply, at least not in the traditional sense. Still the EU is ‘a densely organized economic, social and political space’ (Keating 2001:137), aspiring to operate state-like policies, staging identity-building projects and working to create a democratic structure for decision-making.

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Democratic aspirations are central to the EU project. How to make a democratic polity – without creating political instability and still providing efficient decision-making – is the main task of the Convent. Put together after the Nice accord this was established to propose a new constitutional arrangement for an enlarged Union. The focus of the Convent is necessarily institutional. But democratic systems cannot rely on institutions alone. It’s a truism that state and civil society interact to shape political processes, meaning that institutional analysis must go alongside studies of voters, parties, interest groups etc. to capture how regimes work and what keeps them going.

In order to make a working democracy, the regime needs a competitive party system, i.e. parties competing for votes in order to achieve a mandate to implement particular political programs. Is there such a party system in the EU today? Are there EU-level parties competing for the voters within a EU-level political space? Do they receive a mandate from the people to implement policies? Questions like these mostly get negative answers in the literature. What about the prospective trends for future developments? What kind of party system could be expected to emerge under a new EU constitution? How many and what types of parties? Will they be cleavage based? Would they be competitive within a European Union political space?

In this paper I argue that we should not only survey internal EU trends – institutional as well as at party developments – to make judgements about democratic potential. We could also benefit from looking at historical experiences, and not only in the West European arena as these countries evolved into competitive party democracies during the 19th and 20th centuries. The histories of competitive party systems in large-scale, multi-ethnic, federal states like for example U.S.A and India could be equally suggestive. The purpose here is to bring forward some speculations on the potential future party system of the European Union. The theme also invites reflections on the mechanisms creating and sustaining cleavage-based parties, i.e. parties deeply entrenched in territorial, cultural or economic interests. Non-cleavage based party systems would not by any means exclude a competitive party system, but it would be a different type of competitive system.
**The EU party project**

Romani Prodi, the leader of the EU Commission, spoke to the leaders of the European Parliament party groups in January 2001 on the proposal to finance European political parties:

> ‘The (Maastricht) Treaty makes clear the importance of the European parties in advancing democracy and expressing the will of the citizens. (…) We need a decentralised, open and democratic system of governance. Civil society and local government must be more closely and actively involved in shaping and monitoring European policies.’ (DN: Speech/01/31)

Two years later (February 2003) the Commission presented a detailed proposal and Prodi elaborated:

> ‘Strong and independent European parties are essential for improving democracy in the European Union. They will ensure that European elections are fought on European rather than national issues.’ (DN: IP/03/260)

To create a more democratic EU, parties are seen as instruments to transcend its current top-down character and to integrate ‘citizens’ beyond the level of the nation-state. ‘Top-down’ union-building has happened before in European history as the nation-states developed from the 16th century onwards, driven by state-building elites working to break sub-state power and loyalties and to create new national institutions, cultures and identities. The process of ‘nation-building’ and democratization was about including by broadening citizens’ rights – among them the franchise and the right to form political parties. These rights regrouped political, economic and cultural collectives within a wider territorial space. Can new Europarties today serve to widen inclusion? Or will national entrenchment make these parties ‘empty vessels’\(^1\) at the European level? Will emerging Europarties become top-heavy bureaucratic institutions at a safe distance from civil society, or will they develop linkages and extra-parliamentary competitive arenas sustaining democratic processes?

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\(^1\) In the text I shall use ‘EU’ and ‘European’ interchangeably for stylistic reasons. That does not imply that I – as a Norwegian – do not know the difference.

\(^3\) The expression is from Katz and Kolodny (1994) in their discussion on U.S. parties
In the first part we discuss the state of current Europarties and ask if they qualify as ‘genuine’ parties, meaning parties as we know them from national, competitive democracies. In searching for practical and theoretical guidance on emergent competitive party systems, we then turn to two – very different – non-European settings for guidance. Both the U.S. and the Indian parties operate in large, multi-ethnic and federal states. In the third part we turn to the debate on the potential for a EU-level, cleavage-based party system. The question is whether the cleavage concept, and the theories that goes with it, is at all useful in debates about an emerging European political space. Lastly we discuss implications for the debate on a democratic, competitive EU-level party system.

EUROPEAN LEVEL ‘SECOND ORDER’ PARTIES

The ambitions of the Euro-politicians seem clear: The ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU must be remedied through constitution making, identity building and ‘partyfication’. Thomas Jansen, general secretary of the European People’s Party for eleven years, has argued that the EU can only develop successfully if the EU is made ‘politically vibrant’. To achieve this, the political parties ‘have to organize themselves so that they can articulate across Europe the will of that section of the Union’s population which they seek to represent’ (Jansen 1998:177).

Research on Europarties tells us that the ‘Europe des partis’ has so far not materialized. We find of course both federations of European parties and organized party groups inside the European Parliament (EP). Moreover, during the 1980s and 1990s important developments took place in terms of party organizational change. Still, the literature basically agrees that there are no ‘genuine’ Europarties, although the authors differ on the prospect of building them. The problem being, of course, that without real parties it is difficult to envisage a competitive European party system.

Karl Heinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt’s (1980) described for more than two decades ago the elections to the European Parliament as ‘second-order’, meaning that they are

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primarily fought on national issues. In the party debate Rudy Andeweg (1995) echoes this, arguing that the party system is ‘absent’ on the European level, the transnational parties are organizationally weak, not involved in the nomination of candidates, they are unstable and heterogeneous. National parties and national politics define the electoral context: ‘neither the transnational party system, nor the 12 national parties systems provide the link between voter choice and MEP behaviour that is crucial for political representation’ (Andeweg 1995:67). Mogens Pedersen concludes that the Europarties of the EP are not ‘genuine parties’. By that he mean ‘organizations that span and control the electoral linkage’ (Pedersen 1996:16). The existing ‘party system’ in the European Parliament (Pedersen’s quotation marks) is ‘a far cry from being a supra-national structure’ (1996:17). Europarties have three deficiencies: They lack an electorate, they lack an organization to carry out the decisions of its leaders and they lack cohesion in the European Parliament (16). Although the latter has somewhat improved since Pedersen article appeared (Raunio 2002), there is no reason to dispute the fact that the Europarties are very different in character and operation than the constituent national parties. Kreppel (2002) argues that although the EP party groups vote increasingly more uniform, the party leadership has no sanctions if national fractions dissent. That usually means that their national party supports them, and it is they that decide on re-nominations.6

Should Europarties be labelled ‘parties’ at all? They pass the definitional minimum of presenting candidates at elections. The problem is that it is the national parties that ‘present’ these candidates. They fight in principle on the basis of a Europarty political manifest, increasingly wordy, but without much substance – at least when it comes to implementation. Inside the European Parliament the parliamentary groups operate – at the most – as confederate structures. They work within the EP to form policies, to a large extent at the discretion of the national parties. The Europarties could therefore, pace Reif, qualify as second-order parties. The Europarties do not form a competitive system – establishing voter linkages – as found at the national level. To borrow Mair’s description: ‘the Europarties that emerge in the European Parliament are much

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6 Kreppel also argue, however, that the EP party leadership of the EPP and the PES tries to circumvent this by controlling the institutional processes of the EP – just as the Democratic party elite did within the US Congress (Kreppel 2002:220).
more akin to the notion of the basket of parties, being juxtaposed to one another rather than competing with one another in any predictable sense” (2000:39).

Juan Linz gives an illustrating example of what is lacking. Differentiating between ‘state-wide parties’ and ‘national or regional parties’ he argues that the latter can undermine the competitive linkage of federal party systems (Linz 1997). When the FDP was the ‘king-maker’ in the German ‘two and one-half’ party system, their choice of coalition partner – and in consequence the dominant government party – could be rewarded or punished by the voters at the next election. However, ‘a national or regional party will not be rewarded or punished on the same basis but in its role as representative of the interests of the subunit in relationship to the center, on the basis of the extent to which it can obtain advantages for that subunit, of its capacity to obtain further devolution of powers to the subunit and to oppose actions by the government at the center (aimed at limiting the power of those governing the subunit) even in preventing initiatives of the central government to question the constitutionality of those decisions’ (Linz 1997:26).

Some authors take a slightly less ‘sceptical’ view on the prospects of Europarties. They emphasise that – although Europarties are weak organizationally – EU decision-making is ‘systematically affected’ by them (Hix and Lord 1997:18). No doubt the party character appears different if we look at their operations in the EP or if we concentrate on how they operate in the EP elections. The weak and indirect influence of the EP party groups (or the European party federations for that matter) on EU policies does not amount to the ‘linkage instrument’ generally required for democratic, competitive systems. Current Europarties are somewhere on the scale between ‘privileged lobby groups’ with institutionalised access to decision-makers – at the one extreme – and competitive parties fighting other parties for privileged and institutionalised positions of political power – at the other. On this continuum Europarties are closest to the lobby end of the scale. Similarly, Simon Hix and Christopher Lord point out that a transition from what they label ‘nascent Euro-parties’ to true ‘parties at the European level’ has so far not taken place (197).

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7 Linz argument is about the ‘relevance’ and ‘blackmail potential’ of parties, but the point here is the crucially difference between party systems in multinational societies with federal structures and party systems in unitary states.
On the causal arguments, there is broad agreement on how these second-order Europarties came to be formed and on how they have evolved. The main input came from the rise of the EU-institutions, meaning basically the European Parliament and the direct election of MEPs (Hix and Lord 1997, Kreppel 2002, Ladrecht 2002). The EP, the gradual extension of the powers to the EP and the organizational and financial incentives of the EU institutions have shaped the work both of MEPs and the general development of the parliamentary party groups. Kreppel, to take one example, is looking in particular at the voting pattern of the EP party groups and she argue that the party system has changed significantly over the 15 years leading up to 1996 (2002:151). The changing pattern was ‘a direct result of the institutional transformation of the European Parliament from a chamber of debate to a legislative body’.

**Prospective developments**

There are numerous scenarios for potential European-level party developments. Andeweg suggests three: The ‘transnational’, the ‘truly European’ and the ‘split-level’ (Andeweg 1995:67). The transnational option implies parties that continue to reflect national politics at the European level, and Andeweg considers this the most likely alternative (either in its confederate of supra-national form). The truly European would represent a cleavage based, European-level political system, while the split-level would ensure similar party labels, but different policies in national and European elections. The ‘truly European’ scenario would require a major change of the national party systems. Mair (2000:38) puts forward two arguments why this development is not likely. The first is that national parties naturally will fight any development detrimental to their own power. The second is that ‘the only way’ in which a competitive party system could emerge at the European level is through competition for executive office, in other words a European parliamentarian or presidential system (Mair 2000:38).

Although the EU today has no operating ‘party system’ in the usual ‘textbook’ sense, none of the authors referred to has ruled this out as a future possibility, although

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For a description of the trends in ‘party viewing’ from the predictions in the 1970s of ‘a new era of party democracy at the European level’ and its ‘renaissance’ in the late 1980s, early 1990s, see Hix 2002.
estimates on likelihood vary. Some (like Jansen) believe that this will actually happen in the future ‘new Europe’. Obviously the time horizon vary, but in spite of the fact that a ‘genuine’, a ‘competitive’ or a ‘linking’ party system at the European level looks remote at present, speculations on the character of such a future is finding an outlet in the literature. This discussion is linked to the work of the Convent and the prospective institutional changes of the EU as changes in the institutional incentive structure bears closely on the likelihood of a future competitive European-level party system. What issues would form the basis of a competitive EU party system? Would a ‘truly European party system’ necessarily be cleavage based? We first turn to U.S.A. and India to extract some practical experience on the evolution of competitive party systems.

PARTY SYSTEMS IN U.S.A. AND INDIA

Both the U.S.A and India are federal, multi-ethnic and have different religious denominations among their voters. India is also significantly multi-lingual. The first story deals with the rise of the heterogeneous U.S. two-party system. Here national ‘catch-all’ parties emerged from a federal polity with strong sub-national states. The other story deals with India – a federal but nevertheless a more centralized country. During the 1990s the powerful ‘catch-all’ Congress party declined at the same time as India experienced the rise of a Hindu-religious party to position of government. The Indian party system changed from having a dominant, non-cleavage party at the centre to including a religious, cleavage party as the largest party in government. This development was contrary to the general ‘western’ trend towards more catch-all parties. Both U.S.A. and India succeeded in creating federal-level competitive party systems. Our main question is how they emerged. Another query is whether the message is that heterogeneous, catch-all parties is actually the inevitable trend. Or if the Indian example – in spite of the massive differences to the EU countries – tells us that we have not seen the end of cleavage parties? These two countries are not singled out because their experience is ‘crucial’ or ‘typical’. The pragmatic reason is that U.S.A often is used in the literature to illustrate potential EU development. India is selected because it is so different and because a cleavage party rising to government
also makes it different in terms of party system development. But no doubt there are more to learn from surveying other federal countries.  

**The rise of the U.S. party system**

The standard description of U.S. parties is that they are heterogeneous and weak. Terms used are ‘super-PACs’, ‘large campaign consulting firms’ (Fiorina and Peterson 1998:258) and also – as mentioned – ‘empty vessels’ (Katz and Kolodny 1994). The U.S. party system is sometimes referred to in the plural at the national level – one system associated with the two congressional parties, another with the two presidential parties. Compared to parties in Western Europe, the Democrats and Republicans do not have effective extra-parliamentarian, national party organizations. Furthermore, these parties do not have members in the usual sense and there is no effective policy-making machinery that bonds the party representatives elected under the party label – apart from the bonds forged upon the representatives by the institutional machinery found within the Congress itself. Crucially, nominations are removed from party control through the primary elections. In one standard textbook on American politics we read that historically, ‘what passed for national organizations were temporary associations of state parties that briefly joined together every fourth years to work for election of a president’ (Fiorina and Peterson 1998). They have ‘not been terrible cohesive’ in government, they have ‘suffered from regional splits’ and ‘incorporated conflicting interests’. Commentators have ‘discussed parties primarily in a third sense, not as organizations, nor as a united body of elected officials, but as adherents of a party in the electorate’ (253). It must be added though that some studies argue that parties have been more significant in Congress than presented in the traditional literature (Cox and McCubbin 1993). In some ways the U.S. parties look like the parties found at the EU level today. The difference is that the Europarties lack the adherence within the national electorates that is created by the U.S. presidential elections. When speaking about EU parties one usually mean the parliamentary groups within the EP. European parties – possibly with the exception of Denmark –

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9 Terminology as nations, states, etc. is of course awkward in these cases as concepts and words intermingle, but the meaning should nevertheless be sufficiently clear.
10 An obvious additional source of learning would be the Swiss experience, see for example Government and Opposition, vol. 23 (1988) that includes a special issue on Switzerland as a ‘European Model’. Canada of course would also be an obvious place to look.
11 Their conclusion is that ‘whether or not the old saw that American parties are like two bottles on a shelf, one labelled ‘whiskey’ and the other labelled ‘milk’, but both empty, accurately describes the policies of the Democrats and the Republicans, it surely fits their organizations’, p. 47.
cannot be found within national electorates in the way ‘republicans’ and ‘democrats’
can be found among the U.S. voters.

The U.S. two-party system emerged during the first years of the republic. The
Federalists – representing commercial interests and especially located in the New-
England area – stood against the Jeffersonian agrarian interest. The Jeffersonians –
also called the Democratic-Republicans – were especially strong in the south and
west. In the first part of the century the rights of states v. the federal government was
the overarching political issue. During the 1850s the Republican Party came to oppose
the Democrats in the presidential elections. Later in the century the economic issues
again became dominant. Two-party politics prevailed. Significant ‘Third Parties’ have
at various intervals contested the Republican – Democrat national dominance, starting
with the ‘Populist Party’ that won 8,5 % of the vote in 1892. From the 1896 election
the Republican Party dominated U.S. politics and the central cleavages were region,
religion and ethnicity. Finally, the ‘New Deal’ coalition of the early 1930s made the
economy and the ‘left—right politics’ the major cleavage, although the regional and
state-level strength of the parties still made national level, ‘presidential’ parties
heterogeneous coalitions. The southern conservative democrats were for a long time
uneasy partners with the more liberal (U.S.) and redistributive ‘New Deal’ democrats.
Today the New Deal coalition is more or less gone and parties mix class interests with
those of region, race and state powers. The U.S. is still a two-party system, but issue-
based and catch-all prone. In a classic attempt to find the cleavages of U.S. electoral
politics from the early 1970s Walter Dean Burnham stressed the importance of race
and ethnicity ‘at the level of state and city politics’, but ‘it goes without saying that a
crazy-quilt ethnic patterning of this kind profoundly inhibits by itself a structuring of
national politics along any durable and overriding cleavage line, and most especially
those related to class’ (Burnham 1974:655).

Although the American Congressional parties resemble the EP parties, one crucial
contextual difference is that the U.S. Congress has more political power than the EP.
The U.S. voters also elects a powerful executive president, creating a national party
system that operates more as an instrument for competitive linkage than what can
remotely be found at the EU level. Peter Mair makes the point that the congressional
and the EP parties have similarities: ‘… precisely because the Congress does not
involve the contest for government, there is no real party system to speak of. Rather,
the representatives in Congress reflect the politics of 50 different state-level party systems’. In the absence of a parliamentary linkage (or an elected executive) ‘there will be no European party system’ (Mair 2000:40). For the major difference between the EU and the U.S. is ‘the competition for the office of President’ (40). While the European electoral arena ‘is an exclusively legislative electoral arena’, the national party system of the U.S. belongs to the ‘executive electoral arena’ (40-41). A similar argument is found in Hix and Lord (1997). Given that national parties will fight EP elections ‘for some time to come, a possible other way of legitimising EU action is through the direct election of the commission President’ (216). In their view the U.S. model is ‘perhaps a good model for parties in the EU to follow’ as the U.S. parties are ‘forced to construct wide coalitions of socio-economic and territorial interests’ (219).

**The BJP Hindu revival in India**

At the 1991 election the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) almost doubled its vote compared to the election two years earlier (to 20 %). At previous elections the BJP had never polled more than 9 % of the vote (1967). In 1996 it became the largest party in number of seats in the Lok Sabha, the Indian (lower house) parliament, although it polled fewer votes than the Indian National Congress Party (INC). The same happened at the elections in 1998 and 1999. India is a nation of extraordinary social and cultural diversity. Religion, language, caste, ethnicity, economy, regionalism, etc. create ‘multiple and cross-cutting cleavages’ (Sridharan and Varshney 2001:207). Until the 1990s the hegemonic position of the catch-all Congress party created a ‘one-party-dominated multiparty system’ (ibid.). The Congress Party controlled the federal state for most of the period after independence in 1947. The party was itself a coalition of the major political and social forces. Ideologically INC was ‘centrist, committed to democracy, minority rights, secularism, federalism and, a mixed economy’ (Sridharan and Varshney 2001:219). According to Pradeep K. Chhibber and John R. Petrocik at the national level ‘the Congress party is as fractured as the social cleavage theory of party systems would predict from the heterogeneity of Indian society’ (2002:57). At the sub-national, state level, however, the ‘electoral support of the Congress depends upon a definite social basis, but one that varies from state to state. (…) Any aggregation at the national level masks a cleavage alignment which is almost precisely what the social cleavage theory of party systems expects to find’ (71). Congress lost their dynastic leader after Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in
1989. Rajiv Gandhi was not the strong leader similar to Indira Gandhi, but still the Congress was a ‘leader-dependent force’ (Hasan 2002:11). That may be one reason why the cleavage based BJP party managed to dethrone the Congress party in the 1990s.

The Congress Party had to leave government after the 1996 election, and a coalition of regional, caste-based parties took over. The BJP entered government in 1998 as the dominant partner in a coalition of altogether 18 parties. BJP is not a religious party in the West European sense by advocating the values of an institutionalised church. The Hindu religion has no church organization – like the Catholic Church – that could formulate its values in an authoritative way. BJP ultimate goal is to create a pan-Indian Hindu ethnicity. The party has been labelled differently – ‘right-wing religious’, ‘Hindu-nationalist’ or ‘ethno-nationalist’, ethnicity then defined in terms of ‘religious-cultural markers’ (Chhibber 1999, Sáes 2001, Sridharan and Varshney 2001, Hasan 2002). The ideological militancy of the party is said to have been somewhat toned down, ‘at least outwardly’, since the early 1990s when party supporters and cadres tore down a mosque in Ayodhya (Sridharan and Varshney 2001:215). During the 1990s the BJP was exposed to the general pressure on all Indian parties ‘to adopt broad social-coalitional strategies and appeal’ which according to Sridharan and Varshney apply even ‘to ideological parties of the right (like the BJP) and the left (like the communist parties)’ (2001:214). Our interest here, however, lies in the fact that after more than 30 years with a party system dominated by a ‘catch-all’ Congress party, the party system in the 1990s came to be more cleavage-based, contrary to the catch-all party theory predicting a trend towards increasingly broad-based, non-cleavage parties.

How to explain this change is the theme of Pradeep Chhibber’s book *Democracy without Associations* (1999). His general argument is that parties are more important in terms of creating links between social cleavage groups and the political system in societies where the state plays an active role and the associational life is weak – like in India (12). With an active state at the federal level there is more to fight over that is important to the electorate, and this make cleavage issues more constitutive in the formation of competitive party systems. Weak associations leave the parties with few competitors in creating links between the social cleavages and state policies. Under these circumstances ‘electoral competition over state policy is key in determining
which social cleavages will form the basis of the party system’ (218). Weak
associations must, however, be coupled with the impact of political agency. The BJP
got its chance when the Congress Party signalled a policy to reallocate state jobs and
education opportunities to the less privileged. In this situation the BJP succeeded in
forging an alliance between their traditional religious Hindu following, parts of the
middle classes and the ‘forward castes’ that felt threatened by the new policies of the
Congress party.12

**Electoral systems and the federal factor**

Both the U.S. and India operate with majoritarian ‘first past the post’ (FPTP) electoral
systems. This creates a political incentive to establish broad electoral coalitions and
operates potentially to push politics in the direction of a two-party system. The U.S do
have a two-party system, India does not. One reason why India does not have a two-
party system is its institutional mix of a federal, parliamentary system without a
directly elected national executive office, like the U.S. presidency. The Indian
Congress Party is a nation-wide party with fairly strong electoral support in most
states. At state level the major party competitors to the Congress has varied. Douglas
Rae – with a particular reference to the Canadian experience – modified the Duverger
‘Two-Party law’ for FPTP electoral systems by arguing that to capture provincial-
level power might be a sufficient incentive to sustain strong regional parties (Rae
1971).13 Although the FPTP system might generate two-party systems at regional
level, many strong, but different regional parties would add up to a multi-party system
at the federal level. Before the 1999 election the BJP created an electoral alliance –
the National Democratic Alliance consisting of 24 parties – to fight Congress and to
keep government power. The FPTP system may provide incentives for building catch-

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12 To try the generality of his argument, Chhibber (1999) also discuss political changes in Algeria in the
early 1990s and in Spain in the 1980s. Both Algeria and Spain are listed as countries with an active
state and with weak associations, and both developed cleavage based party system in a context where a
catch-all party previously had been dominant – just like in India. In Algeria the religious FIS party beat
the catch-all FLN, the party leading the struggle for independence, at the 1990 local elections. The
reason, Chhibber claims, was ‘the intraparty politics of the FLN and the policy positions adopted by the
FIS’ (195). In Spain both the centre-right UCD and the social-democratic PSOE emerged in the early
years of post-Franco democratic politics as broad, catch-all parties. From the early 1990s both PSOE
and the PP turned much more class-based in terms of electoral support. The change was triggered
politically, namely by a challenge to the PSOE from left parties and the trade union movement, and the
party reacted by moving to the left. Both PSOE and the PP gradually became more ideologically
pronounced on the left—right scale and subsequently less broad in electoral support (213-214).

13 For a supportive and much elaborated discussion, see Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count.*
all parties, but clearly does not exclude the possibility of rising cleavage-based party successes.

**A EUROPEAN CLEAVAGE BASED PARTY SYSTEM?**

What kind of competitive party system is conceivable in a future redesigned EU. How many and what type of significant parties will emerge? Will the parties be cleavage based? If so, what kind of cleavages will dominate? The literature on these questions is both restricted and biased. It is restricted in the geographical sense by focusing on West European experiences. In addition, the comparative perspective is poorly developed. The literature is also biased analytically in that studies predominantly are anchored in a ‘cleavage approach’, searching for basic social interests that might structure parties and party competition – potentially also provide some underlying stability to a future party system at the EU-level. These authors, however, generally stress the indeterminate character of Stein Rokkan’s cleavage theory, namely that emerging party systems depend on the specific configuration of forces and that the historic outcome of party systems in Western Europe varies between countries. This theory offers an analytical mode rather than hypothesize a specific causal outcome. It should therefore not come as a surprise that predictions vary on several scores: In terms of the potential system ‘cleavageness’, in terms of the cleavage dimensionality and in the number and types of parties in a prospective EU party system.

*Cultural revival?*

According to Peter Flora Rokkan’s approach ‘reveals promising perspectives also for examining the process of European unification’ (Flora 1999:89). The question is how the ‘multiple identities and loyalties combine with territorial and other institutional differentiations’ (90). For a European level cleavage development to take place much

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14 For Rokkan’s ‘cleavage theory’, see Flora et al. 1999.
15 Cleavage theory is a ‘layer on layer’ approach to party system analysis. The sequence of events influences and triggers the cleavages or coalition of cleavages (or interests) creating parties and party systems. Rokkan’s cleavage theory at least tells us that discussing a future European cleavage based party system is like looking into the crystal ball. Of course we do not know the changes in social landscape, the cultural movements, the institutions and the organizational developments within a future new Europe. (If there will be a ‘new’ Europe in the meaning that the EU project will succeed in creating a European political space with ‘genuine’ parties.) The theory, however, gives grounds for ‘educated guesses’.
will depend on how the institutions develop. Flora argues (with Rokkan) that increased cultural homogenization at the nation level over time also increased the political significance of class. Inversely, increased cultural heterogeneity at the European level could again decrease the weight of class and ‘give the cultural dimension in general and the national-territorial dimension in particular greater weight’ (91). In addition, ‘European-wide centre-periphery structures will form and solidify’ (91). Although Flora do not make full-fledged translation of Rokkan’s theory to the present EU-setting, the perspective is that cultural heterogeneity, the national-territorial dimension, European-wide centre-periphery structures and the left—right cleavage will be the most relevant cleavage possibilities in a prospective EU-wide competitive party system.

**European integration as a centre—periphery dynamics**

The integration process in itself is creating a major cleavage in European politics. According to Stefano Bartolini ‘Europeanization’ can be seen as one of several ‘major developmental trend(s)’ in Europe since the sixteenth century. The EU is the institutional locus of this (Bartolini 2002:130). Searching for ways in which ‘“truly” European conflicts, oppositions and political mobilization cleavage line could emerge’ (148), Bartolini seeks guidance from the history of cleavage formation in European nation-states (148). First, the territorial resistance to centre formation; second, the cultural reactions against the standards of the centre; and third, the functional differentiation within the new system, all of which lead to a ‘restructuring’ of the cleavage system at a higher level (149). For the ‘latent’ oppositions created by the historical development to give rise at the European level to a ‘political realignment for party organizations, social groups and individuals’, it is necessary with a ‘prolonged, salient and systematic misfit between national parties and their electorates’ (149). The blocking of the party channel must be followed by political debate and mobilization in opposition to existing party alternatives to create new parties. The group interest must be accompanied by group consciousness and organizations to support its political aims to form a cleavage. Cleavages emerge from ‘politicized’ debates at the ground level (not the technocratic-elitist debate) and the political participation and mobilization around these issues increases and makes the political elites more ‘vulnerable to public opinion mood’ (149).
The impact of the emerging integration-independence conflict on existing cleavages is ambiguous as more integration may mean both more internal *market economy* and more EU-level *political control*. The integration conflict therefore cuts through the national left—right dimension and means that ‘market orientation and cultural orientation in the integration process may sharply diverge’ (151). The left—right dimension is ‘unlikely to be dominant in this constellation’, but it is ‘difficult to foresee how these latent conflicts would interact with the national cleavage structures if they were to become politicised’ (151). One (likely) development is that the political issues created by the integration process would interact with old issues and produce a new package where the integration ‘mood’ would be dominant because it is likely to be ‘expressed into clear-cut institutional and policy conflicts’ (152). However, the process would vary across EU-nations due to different cleavage histories and elite management.

This brings Bartolini to suggest four scenarios for how the European and national levels might interact to create or bloc a competitive party system at the European level:

1. Europeanization of the nation state: National parties regroup into Europarties that will align along a *left-right axis*. Euro-sceptical groups could remain marginal, and territorial-cultural cleavages would persist as internal divisions inside the Europarty families.

2. Internalization of ‘European integration’: Opposition/support for integration will be kept at the national level. The European ‘electoral-parliamentary processes and arenas will remain ‘second-order’ structures, loosely bounded and poorly co-ordinated’ although there will be party contacts among like-minded parties across national boundaries on the integration dimension.

3. Europeanization of ‘European integration’: *The integration issue* will emerge only at EU level elections and institutions, generating a ‘split’ or two-level party system within the EU (like in Denmark). Specific Euro-election parties would debate integration issues. This outcome would require a more clear-cut, constitutional division of competence between the two levels to be sustainable.

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15 Preceding *europeanization* is *state building*, capitalism, nation-formation, democratization and welfare systems formation.
4. Externalization of ‘European integration’ cleavage: The integration issue will restructure national party systems and form new aligned Europarties. This would make Europe enter a new phase of ‘mass politics’ (155), facing most ‘developmental crises’ at once.

In all but the first scenario the integration issue will play a leading role in potential EU-level cleavage formation. Integration will also be part of the first system scenario, although clearly subsidiary to the left—right dimension.

**Integration with class added**

The belief that integration will be central in a new European party system is legion, the view that it will be dominant, not to speak of exclusive, less so. The pervasive force of class, of redistributive politics or the capacity of the general left—right conflict dimension have strong advocates.

Phillip Schmitter reflects prospectively over the potential future party system of the EU (Schmitter 2000:66-71). EU is now, says Schmitter, in a situation roughly analogous’ with European nation states in the mid-18th century: Something like a party system already exists within the EP but without forming ‘stable identifications, shared symbols, and common platforms’ among the electorate (66). The electoral orientation is primarily national, not European. Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis might prove relevant as a EU level party system could eventually freeze in the same way. The EU, however, is ‘disadvantaged’ compared to earlier European systems building in that these nations waged war internally or externally which contributed to forming national identity and national party systems (67).

Traditional cleavages were about class, regional competition, sectorial clashes and religious struggles. Not all, however, are equally salient today (67). Religion lost importance and/or has shifted focus (‘clash of civilizations’?), but this shift could create the basis for an ‘extreme right-wing and militantly anti-EU party’ (68). The agrarian forces might be tempted to form alliances with ‘integration losers’, provided these are not fascists or hyper-nationalists. Other sectorial clashes are too ‘diffuse or fragmented’ to create a ‘we-they’ pattern. Centre—periphery remains a ‘significant

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17 Like the ‘Kangaroo Group’ in the EP, working to abolish the barriers hindering free movement of goods, services and people within the EU, or the Crocodile Club, supporting the creation of a federalist EU. See Andeweg 1995:70.
line of cleavage’ (68). Some regions, however, have been increasingly part of the ‘core’. ‘Peripheral peripheries’ may ‘join a mega-alliance of losers’ (69). Class is still with us, but as a cleavage it is decreasing in intensity.

The EU party system will, according to Schmitter’s ‘speculative observations’, be less uniform than at the national level and with more fragmented parties. The European cleavages will be more numerous and less salient than at the national level and Europarties will be more centripetal in their competition. ‘Class conflict will continue to provide the major cleavage to the emerging Euro-party system’, but will be crosscut by sectorial and centre—periphery lines. New cleavages may emerge and align with the left—right conflict, generational conflict being the most likely candidate. This will create a 2+2 party system with two pro-EU parties – left and right, competing ‘for most of the votes and collude in the management of EU affairs’ – and two anti-EU parties, also initially divided on the left—right axis. Over time there may develop a two-party system with very heterogeneous pro and con EU parties. This could be a system ‘that superficially resembles the U.S. party system’, but the central issue would be ‘state’s rights’, not class. The emerging EU party system would consequently be significantly different from the national party system.

Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen argue a similar thesis (Marks and Steenbergen 2002).European issues have now become important for both political parties and voters, the question is to what extent this has affected how ‘domestic political actors conceive the basic alternatives for European integration’ and how it is related to ‘the issues that have characterized political life in Western Europe during the past century or more’ (879-880). The cleavages that came to dominate in West European national politics during the 19th and 20th century has declined in importance since the 1960s. Their ‘ideological residue’ is still visible with the left—right dimension as the most important, but they are challenged by the ‘contestation’ over European integration. According to Marks and Steenbergen’s there are four main alternatives as to how the old cleavages – the left—right in particular – interact with integration (882):

1. Contestation takes place over pro-integration v. con-integration while left—right is irrelevant.
2. Pro/Con integration and left—right are independent of each other.
3. Integration and left—right are fused in a single dimension.
4. Integration and left—right are related, but not fused.

These propositions are analysed on the basis of a varied material.¹⁹ The authors find support for the assertion that contestation, i.e. the conflict dimensions, takes a similar form for the different political actors (voters, parties, social movements, experts). The actors ‘assimilate the new policy issues raised by European integration within their existing schemas – (…) the Left/Right dimension in particular’ (889). The EU dimension is neither independent of the Left/Right dimension nor fused with it.

Among the experts the Left/Right dimension appear to split in two: One economic Left/Right and another libertarian—authoritarian. This suggests that ‘some portion of the Euro-scepticism may reflect nationalistic sentiments’ (890). This would mean that the current conflict structure at the EU level is contingent two-dimensional: one Left—Right dimension composed of both economic and libertarian issues, another Pro/con EU integration and these dimensions are related to each other. In spatial terms the dimensions are ‘oblique’ not ‘orthogonal’ to each other.

**Institutional inertia**

Lastly, some argue that existing party organizations will be a strong force in shaping the future party system of the EU. Simon Hix and Christopher Lord (1997) state that Europarties today operate with the goal of achieving office and implementing policies within the strategic environment laid out by the historic and political context of the EU institutions. They emphasise the entrenched position of the ‘old’ party families within the (West) European nation-states, including the Liberals, the Christian-democrats, the Conservatives and the Socialists. Later ‘post-universal suffrage cleavages have been unable to challenge the dominance of the classical *familles spirituelles*’ (Hix and Lord 1997:25).

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¹⁹ In a special edition of Comparative Political Studies (2002) on “dimensions of contestation in the European Union”.
²⁰ The Eurobarometer for voters, election manifestos for the Europarties, ‘protest events’ recorded in the news for the social movements and an expert survey for an evaluation of the party system. One problem with the Eurobarometer survey is that the questionnaire lumps together whether the respondent agrees/disagrees with a policy statement and whether he or she considers this policy dimension a priority for EU policy-making. This makes it difficult to tap – in pure form – resentment against the EU decision-making level, the anti-federalist sentiment, as such.
In Hix and Lord’s view the classic left–right dimension is basically over the role of the state in society, but in political debate the concepts of ‘left’ and ‘right’ have acquired the role ‘to simplify the multiplicity of cleavages and issues in a single dimension of political conflict’ (25). Increasingly party conflict over European integration has also gained importance, and European level party families may be divided on European integration (26). Hix and Lord make a partial exception for Christian Democrats (CD) and (perhaps more questionably) for the Conservatives. The pro-EU CD parties have been influenced by the Church ‘reluctance to treat the state as the “natural” political structure’ (26).

Regionalist parties – left and right – often side with the Christian pro-integration parties, as they welcome EU’s countervailing power to the nation-state. Politically coherent are also the anti-integrationalist movements\(^1\) who side with those defending national sovereignty.

Hix and Lord contend that party politics in the EU system have two ‘fundamentally irreconcilable dimensions’, namely the *left–right* (‘an abstract summary of socio-economic and political cleavages’) and the *integration–sovereignty* dimension (‘derived from deep social, cultural, national and territorial traditions’) (27). Although ‘we do not yet know how a Europe of parties would look’ (204), Hix and Lord map the weak EU party system of today (cf. 213-214) as composed of party families competing in this two-dimensional space (49). They project the emergence of three main blocs in the EU party system: *A left bloc, a centre-right bloc and a pro-Europe bloc* ‘that is coherent on the integration-sovereignty dimension and consequently cuts through the two other blocs’ (51). In addition there will also be *two ‘openly anti-integration party families’* – one of the extreme right, another presumably more mainstream ‘Anti-European’. Lastly they foresee three more ambivalent party families: *The radical Left, the Greens and the Conservatives*. In all, this makes a future EP consisting of eight party families, or Europarties. In differentiating between what they call ‘blocs’ and ‘party families’, the message (presumably) is that the three blocs (the Left, the Centre-Right and the Pro-Europe) will be the largest and will dominate within the EP. Although the historical and ideological nature of the old party families suggests that they are rather stable, the integration dimension will ‘seriously undermine the coherence of the traditional party families’ (54).

\(^1\)This is not the case, however, with several Protestant groups, the Norwegian Christian Peoples’ Party for example advocate a ‘no’ to Norwegian EU-membership.

\(^2\)Labelled ‘Anti-Europeans’ (?) by Hix and Lord.
THE PROSPECTS OF A EU PARTY SYSTEM

Party systems are best described by the manner in which parties compete for votes. This is partly a question about the character of the parties, partly about the basis for the party competition for votes and partly about the number of significant parties, i.e. party types, party linkages and party numbers.

Will there be ‘genuine’ EU-parties?
Even now we find ‘genuine’ parties at the EU level if we employ the minimum party definition: The EU parties run for elections to the European Parliament presenting candidates carrying the party label. They also organize trans-nationally, work out election manifestos and organize party groups in the EP. However, in the literature they nevertheless emerge as ‘second-order’ and ‘not genuine’ – they are not articulating ‘the will of that section of the Union’s population which they seek to represent’ (Janssen 1998). What is lacking is a competitive linkage to the EU-voters. That linkage is crucial in creating ‘genuine’ parties with the capacity of sustaining a democratic polity.

More than party organizational changes are required to achieve this competitive linkage. Europarties do not control nominations to EP elections. But nor do parties in the U.S.A. Even in the decentralised nominations found in most Norwegian parties, where the county branches are pretty much sovereign in these matters, it is difficult to argue that the ‘national’ party controls nominations. It is, however, only in rare instances – involving issues of particular regional interest – that the district MPs do not vote according to the party whip in parliament. Moreover, Europarties do not have (democratic) internal party processes in developing their election programs, involving and giving a decisive say to their party membership. Again: Nor do the U.S. parties, and the degree to which internal party democracy prevails in most West European national parties in general is at best contested. Dichotomies seem therefore rather

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22 Raunio (2002: 273) suggests that changing the rules for making EP party nominations ‘by giving the Europarties the right to influence the candidate selection’ would improve their competitive linkage. This, firstly, does not seem very likely as the national parties would have to give away influence, and, secondly, the move could well trigger party splits and/or a ‘split-level’ party system development.
unhelpful in this discussion: Party/Non-party, genuine/non-genuine is not the issue. The question is rather to what degree the party organizations operate as channels for political decision-making and thereby contributing to linking the citizens to the state. But even if the Europarties were able to mend their intra-party linkages, at least to the level found in national parties, one cannot be certain that a competitive party system would emerge. The reason of course is that changes in the EU power structure are required as well. The impact of the party-electoral channel on EU-level executive power would be central, basically meaning that the voters would need to feel that by voting they would give a mandate for policy decisions that actually made a difference at the EU level.

Looking back at the history of European nation-building it would be difficult to argue that it is unthinkable or impossible for real European parties to emerge even if this looks remote at present. Considering the development of the party groups in the EP, one might even get the (superficial) impression that this is coming along quite well. The party groups are presently less coherent in terms of voting behaviour in the EP than they are in the national parliaments. But they are ‘more cohesive than party groups in the US Congress and at least on a par with the Swiss federal parliament’ (Raunio 2002: 265). Still, the rise of ‘truly European’ parties is not very likely in the short run. Both the institutional inertia of established national parties (that would be unhappy with losing their power) and the unlikely development of a strong and direct electoral – executive institutional linkage (in the form of a parliamentary EU government or a US-type presidency) works against this. In Andeweg’s view a ‘confederate’ or ‘supra-national’ form of trans-national party system has a greater chance of emerging if we take for granted a future ‘deepening’ of the EU institutions.

**Cleavage parties?**

Given that ‘genuine’ Europarties will emerge – which need not be ‘given’ – can we expect these parties to be cleavage-based? With the ‘catch-all’ parties and ‘volatile’ electorates found at the national level it is not very likely that the strong electoral bonds implied by the cleavage theory will remerge at the European level. Indeed, the ‘melting-of-the-old-cleavages’ debate has been around at least since Otto Kirchheimer’s catch-all party analysis in the 1960s (Kirchheimer 1966). Cleavage clusters have during the latter decades of the 20th century disintegrated or lost their
mobilizing capacity. The uprooting of society into more individualized citizens and voters that are less embedded in stable interest structures – economic, cultural or otherwise. West European voters do not seem to have the kind of entrenched belongingness they used to, nor do they anchor their political views to the same extent in historically generated ‘world views’. Is the age of cleavage politics over? Or was it always a specific aspect of a very particular West European historical phase with few parallels from other times and places?

The ‘cleavage’ concept may be used either a weak or in a strong sense. In the weak version cleavages are just another way of talking about ‘important issues’, issues that parties regularly fight over and that are salient to the voters. In the strong version cleavages are enduring political identities entrenched in socio-cultural interest structures and sustained by interest organizations. This differentiation would suggest an empirical distinction between ‘cleavages’ and ‘issues’. And the main challenge to the strong ‘cleavage’ version today is its empirical relevance.

Parties became less distinct in social or cultural policy terms as well as in voter attachment during the latter decades of the 20th century. The bonds between social interests, organizations and consciousness weakened. This change, however, occurred at different paste in different countries as well as for different parties within the same country. Some parties also at best had a dubious ‘cleavage past’ at all. But as cleavage parties coexist with catch-all parties, it is relevant to ask about the degree of ‘cleavageness’ in a party system as a whole. By and large West European party systems still have a higher ‘cleavageness’ than the U.S. party system, mainly due to the persistent strength of the Social- and Christian-Democratic parties. The U.S. pre New Deal party system fits the cleavage theory poorly, and post-war American party politics has more often been accounted for in terms of ‘party identification’ and ‘issue publics’ than cleavages. In Western Europe today emerging catch-all parties and ‘volatile’ electorats increasingly make cleavage analysis (at best) supplementary.

23 The other side to this interpretation of cleavage theory is the massive workload necessary to make the cleavage variable empirically operative as the data requirements are formidable. This is evident in Stefano Bartolini’s impressive The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980. The Class Cleavage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.

24 But also because the PR election system made small cleavage parties, like the Nordic agrarians, viable in terms of parliamentary representation and in government coalitions.
If a party system is not cleavage based, what is it? The catch-all party relies in part on strong leadership. The U.S. parties are power-seeking, candidate-generated policy coalitions. Indian federal polity is generating parties and governments that basically are held together by dynasties and/or the elite struggle for positions of power. It seems that the non- or low-cleavage based party systems in essence are based on ‘agent-driven’ parties where leaders and leadership have a stronger impact than in the cleavage-based party system.

*Competitive space and the number of parties?*

Low party ‘cleavageness’ does not of course exclude the prospect of building genuine Europarties. Nor is it necessarily the case that leadership is all that keeps them together. Emerging Europarties would most likely – as parties in the U.S.A. and in India – be structured around major political issues. The very organizational inertia (nationally anchored) that retards the emergence of ‘genuine’ Europarties under the present EU institutions could help create them under a different institutional setting. Provided parties won increased EU-power through the electoral channel, the established (national) parties would see it to their advantage to ‘move in’ to structure electoral competition at the EU-level to their advantage. Social-Democrats and Christian-Democrats would have a mutual advantage of making the diffuse and amorphous left—right ‘dimension’ the central axis for party competition at the EU-level. The national parties would work to structure party competition at the EU-level along the same diffuse policy dimensions that we now see at the national level, mobilizing voters with issues based on what is left of both social class, religion, region and language at EP elections. The Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats would face each other at European Parliament elections in some version of the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People’s Party (EPP). The Left—Right dimension would (also at the EU-level) become a source of political gravity drawing most emerging issues into the frontline between these parties.

In these circumstances we would also expect to see an effect on party competition of the federal—anti-federal struggle. There would be an open question, however, as to the content of this struggle. What will the integration debate be about? The question is seldom raised in the literature. Would this issue dimension mobilize according to attitude towards EU jurisdiction, power, etc. and thereby cross-cut the territorial
centre—periphery axis? Or would it align along territorial lines, for example small against large nations, regions against national elites? Would the issues politicized be economic (protectionist?), cultural (education, religion, film industry), legal (the reach of EU jurisdiction) or structural (institutional, constitutional)? They could all mobilize pro and con integration voters, although the internal free market makes mobilization less likely on the basis of economic issues. Still, there could be ‘repentant’ groups fighting the free market institutions (agrarians, some conservatives?). Still, Bartolini might be right in pointing out that the integration-independence dimension could mobilize within an ‘overarching attitude’ or ‘mood’ focusing on ‘clear-cut institutional and policy conflicts’ (Bartolini 2002: 152).

The left—right parties would in fact come under an increased pressure as both pro- and anti-federalist sentiments would threaten established national party alliances with friction and occasional splits. The jeffersonian party of the early U.S. republic, defending state rights, illustrates the dynamic. This anti-integration party would fight increased federal rights at the expense of the member states, although the particular interest they would defend could vary enormously from protecting agriculture and home industries to cultural values and minority rights. How encompassing and large such an anti-federalist party would turn out to be is of course impossible to predict, particularly as this would be highly contingent on the enlargement experience as well as how successful the centre—periphery issues was handled inside the established left—right parties. Polls, however, do tell us that support for EU ‘deepening’, the euro and enlargement is low, although volatile, giving the anti-federalists good prospects.

Left—right and integration will most likely structure the competitive space of a prospective EU party system. However, assuming PR elections, a powerful parliament and no direct elected president, we would expect further complications of a EU-level party system, giving room for more ‘real’ cleavage based parties. Potentially the Greens would belong to the cleavage category, but agrarian parties in the North and (after enlargement) in the East may also end up as a cleavage based Europarty. In addition the national anti-immigration parties could be successful in impacting the competitive European political space with a party of their own. Under PR or with a presidential system the charismatic leader could also be instrumental in creating and strengthening Europarties, although this would be more difficult in a multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and multi-national setting than we currently see at the national level in
Western Europe. Potentially both ethnic and particular religious parties may establish themselves at the EU-level, but their electoral base would have ‘natural’ restrictions.

**A European competitive party system?**

The complexity of a European party system will in part depend on a new EU constitution and the distribution of power and the institutional structure to emerge from that. Key institutional factors at the EU-level are federal power, parliamentarism/presidentialism and election system. A strong *executive linkage* (parliamentarianism/ precidency) may create more favourable conditions for a EU-level competitive party system. Both the U.S. and especially the India experience, however, indicate that *federalism*, with a strong sub-national (state) level, might sustain a two-level party system. Like in India and in pre New Deal U.S.A. there would be a different competitive logic at state and federal levels, with a stronger potential for cleavage politics at the state level. Contrary to U.S.A. and India, EU has adopted a *PR election system* that might give cleavage parties a better chance than the FPTP system.

But whatever the importance of institutions, developments in civil society – in the economy and culture as well as the extreme cases of political violence and wars – might rearrange party politics regardless of institutional structure. The lack of a single language would hamper the emergence of a EU-level debating arena and consequently the emergence of competitive Europarties. In India there is Hindi and English that creates a fairly common ground for debates. Nor does the EU have the experience of a political dynasty of the Nehru-Gandhi type, which would give increased cohesiveness to a Europarty. The Indian BJP electoral successes suggest that a cleavage party can come to power through mobilization and coalition-making at the federal level. But it also tells us that the pressure to ‘dilute’ increases as a cleavage party enters government and starts fighting for re-election.²⁵

²⁵ Chhibber (1999) argues that the Indian situation is special in the sense that the strength of ‘associational life’ is weaker than in Western Europe in general. He in fact contextualizes and reverses the Bartolini-Mair argument of the importance of organizations to cleavage politics by arguing that without the structuring force of strong associations a dominant catch-all party is vulnerable to attacks from a cleavage-based revival party. To Chhibber group interest and identity is a sufficient base for a re-emerging cleavage politics, organizations are not needed and might work to hinder this.
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