ARENA Working Papers
WP 01/5
Beyond the EU Membership-Non-Membership Dichotomy?
Explaining Supranational Identities Among EU Decision-Makers
Jarle Trondal
ARENA
University of Oslo
Introduction[1] ![endif]>
Increasingly, studies of European integration
acknowledge the vertical blurring of governance levels in Europe (e.g.
Schaefer 2000; Wessels 1998). European integration constantly penetrates
and transforms the core elements of the governing dynamics of European
nation-states. Processes of European integration and national adaptation
(Europeanisation) have increasingly become two flips of the same coin.
However, until recently, the study of European integration largely ignored
Europeanisation of national government systems. The current study aims
at shedding light on how government levels become blurred due to� processes of Europeanisation. The present contribution
studies the extent to which national civil servants evoke supranational
allegiance. Supranational allegiances resemble identifications with
EU level institutions � e.g. towards particular EU committees and/or
towards the EU more generally. Suggestively, if supranational allegiances
exceed pre-established national and sectoral identifications, the individual
actors become Europeanised. Ultimately, if several national civil servants
�go native� in Brussels, the national central administrations get increasingly
Europeanised.
How can we best account for supranational
allegiances?
[2]
![endif]>![if> Several suggestions are depicted in the literature
(Beyers 1998; Hooghe 1999; Rosamond 2000; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet
1998). Three hypotheses on supra-nationalism are highlighted here. First,
supra-nationalism is triggered by the EU membership of each nation-state.
Arguably, national government officials from EU member states evoke
supranational allegiances more strongly than do officials from non-member
states. The current study compares officials from the two EU member
states Denmark and Sweden, and officials from the non-member-state (or
more correctly, the EEA state) Norway. Second, several scholars assume
that intensive and sustained participation on supranational institutions,
like EU committees, accompanies supranational allegiances amongst the
participants (Haas 1958; Lewis 2000; McDonald 1998; Niemann 1998; Trondal
2001). This assumption derives from the old neo-functional hypothesis
on political spill-over processes and elite socialisation in supranational
networks. In order to test this hypothesis, the current study compares
national officials participating on EU committees with different degrees
of intensity and duration. The data set applied covers national officials
attending Commission expert committees and Council working parties.
Finally, some authors have argued that national co-ordination may hamper
the emergence of supranational allegiances amongst the national civil
servants (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000; Moravcsik 1998). Supra-nationalism
is fostered by the general lack of national co-ordination; the lack
of written mandatory mandates and instructions from the national political-administrative
leadership. In the present study we compare national officials attending
EU committees with varying degrees of ex ante instructions and mandates.
The empirical analysis builds on survey data
on 160 Scandinavian government officials employed at the ministry and
agency level with various experiences from EU committees. Additionally,
47 qualitative face-to-face interviews were conducted on a systematic
sample of the above officials. The current article goes like this: The
second section outlines an institutional approach on supra-nationalism
and derives three different, however supplementary, empirical hypotheses
from this approach: (i) Supra-nationalism reflects the EU membership
of the respective nation-states; (ii) supra-nationalism is due to intensive
and sustained participation on EU committees amongst national civil
servants; and finally (iii) supra-nationalism reflects the lack of national
co-ordination. The third section of the article presents the data in
greater detail. The fourth section provides an empirical analysis, shedding
light on the relative explanatory power of the three hypotheses on supra-nationalism
suggested above.�
Towards three hypotheses on supra-nationalism
Whereas past literature on European integration draw primarily on neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist accounts, an �institutionalist turn� has been observed in the 1990s (Andersen 2000). However, this turn borrows heavily from past theories on European integration. Even more, this turn has moved the study of European integration more in the direction of analysing national adaptation to the European integration processes. Still, based on old neo-functionalist insights, recent institutionalist accounts on European integration emphasise that national officials involved in EU decision-making processes may shift orientations, attitudes, role perceptions and institutional identifications (e.g. Jensen 2000: 75; Lewis 1999; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; Trondal 2001). An institutional perspective focuses on how supra-nationalism may reflect the institutional embeddedness of nation-states, of individual officials, and of particular decision processes. Assuming that institutions �matter�, three analytical takes are outlined below, providing three different and supplementary explanations of supranational allegiances amongst EU committee participants.
EU membership �matters�
First, supranational allegiances evoked by
national civil servants may reflect the EU membership of the nation-state.
The enactment of supranational identifications amongst individual decision-makers
is thus accounted for by the EU membership versus non-membership distinction.
Some have suggested that processes of Europeanisation may be observed
in EU member-states only. �[W]ith EC-membership [states] will start
moving in the direction of Europeanisation and convergence whereas countries
outside the EC � will not follow this direction until they have gained
full membership� (Wessels and Rometsch 1996:357 � emphasis added).
As such, this represents a macro-level institutional approach to supra-nationalism.
EU member-states have institutionalised and rutinised linkages to the
various EU institutions, and thus forced to comply with community regulations
more extensively than non-member-states. EU member-states also become
socialised into �community methods� to a larger extent than non-member-states.
Hence, we would expect government officials from EU member-states to
evoke supranational identifications more strongly than are officials
from non-member-states.
However, two important caveats are warranted:
First, the EU membership versus non-membership is a continuum rather
than a dichotomy. Nation-states may have different forms of affiliation
to the EU, as well as different degrees of interaction with different
Union bodies (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Stubb 1996). For example, while
Denmark has made reservations concerning the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Norway have decided to provide troops to a European rapid reaction
force. The distinction between insiders and outsiders of the Union becomes
blurred and ambiguous. Consequently, the EU membership versus non-membership
distinction becomes an ambiguous explanatory tool-kit because the extreme
endpoints on that variable are seldom reached in real life situations.
Second, individual civil servants are embedded in different institutional
environments. The EU membership variable represents an aggregate institutional
environment in political-administrative life. Arguably, more immediate institutional environments mould individual identifications
more strongly than do more aggregate institutional contexts. Hence,
when explaining supra-nationalism amongst non-aggregate entities like
civil servants, it is probably wiser to rely on explanatory tools of
a non-aggregate character. In the following, two non-aggregate explanations
of supranational allegiances are suggested: First, the intensity and
length to which national civil servants participate on EU committees,
and second, national co-ordination processes occurring prior to meetings
within EU committees.
Intensive and sustained participation on EU committees
Does supra-nationalism reflect intensive
and sustained participation on EU committees amongst national civil
servants? Moving from the macro-contextual explanation suggested above,
the current approach to supra-nationalism focuses on institutional arguments
at the more meso-level. Most national civil servants have several institutional
affiliations simultaneously. Some of these affiliations are primary
to them, some more secondary. Accompanying diverse institutional affiliations,
�human behaviour is considered � multifaceted, exhibiting different
logics� (Knill and Lenschow 2001: 5). Hence, a multifaceted and multi-layered
conception of identity underpins this study. However, contrary to Haas
(1958), I argue that supranational allegiances are supplementary
to pre-established national and sectoral identifications, not a replacement.
Institutions provide cognitive frames, opportunity
structures, normative assessments, physical boundaries for sense-making,
action, institutional allegiances and role perceptions (March and Olsen
1989). �Institutions do not affect simply the strategic calculations
of individuals, but also their most basic preferences and very identity�
(Knill and Lenschow 2001: 8). Institutions remind actors daily about
the appropriateness of different decisions, the set of cognitive frames
possible to select, the Pareto-optimal choices available, and the goodness-of-fit
between environmental standards and local adaptations (Peters 1999).
Focusing on how institutions change the identities of individual actors,
a new-institutional perspective is applied focusing on actors as bounded
rational. Limits on the cognitive capacities of individuals render them
vulnerable to and sensitive towards institutional values, norms, goals
and demands (Simon 1997). Institutions provide stimuli to the actors,
triggering particular responses in return.
Different institutions matter in different
ways (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990). However, institutions also matter
to different degrees (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Building on identity
theory, actors with life-long careers and with few competing organisational
affiliations are likely to evoke uni-dimensional and uni-layered identities.
Actors who have participated loyally and faithfully in one singular
organisation for several years, and who generally interact intensively
with fellow organisational members are likely to identify strongly with
that particular organisation. Yet, actors normally have several partially
contending organisational affiliations simultaneously. Competing logics
of appropriateness� and contending cognitive schemes strive constantly
for attention. Hence, actors may evoke a multitude of different identities
that fit only at the margins. Multiple institutional affiliations may
trigger at least three different responses amongst the actors: (i) they
might attend to one overarching identity that precedes all others, (ii)
they might construct different allegiances that co-evolve over time,
or (iii) they might construct different identities that are acted on
sequentially in different institutional contexts. I argue that the latter
scenario is most likely amongst national civil servants attending EU
committees. Hence, coping with identity conflicts need not be synonymous
with resolving those conflicts.
National central administrations and EU committees
are intersecting circles of government.� These institutions represent spheres of activity in which identities
may be moulded and remoulded (Pescosolido and Rubin 2000: 55). In the
following will be argued that EU committees may be conceived as secondary
institutional affiliations to national government officials, supplementing
pre-existing affiliations towards national ministries, agencies, professions,
corporations, etc. In this study, national ministries and agencies represent
primary institutional affiliations to the civil servants, whilst EU
committees are considered secondary institutional affiliations. National
civil servants attending EU committees are thus highly pre-packed and
pre-socialised before attending the EU committees. Most national officials
are only temporarily and ephemerally affiliated towards the EU committees.
Henceforth, pre-established national allegiances and professional identifications
are likely to take primacy over supranational allegiances. National
administrations and EU institutions might not develop into more than
imperfect integrated orders.
Still, under certain conditions supranational
identifications are more likely to be evoked by EU committee participants.
That is, if the participants generally attend the EU committees intensively
and for protracted periods of time. Protracted and intensive exposure
towards certain organisations render it likely that actors �go native�,
increasingly identifying with the organisation attended (Haas 1958).
However, in the current study identity is of organisational character
only, and not of personal character. Institutional identities do not
have the same depth, scope, durability and inertia as, for instance,
sexual and parental identities. Institutional allegiances are more mouldable,
changeable and possible to construct and reconstruct than for example
parental identities. Hence, national officials participating extensively
on EU committees are likely, over time, to evoke new supranational allegiances,
supplementing pre-established national and sectoral allegiances. Hence,
supra-nationalism stems from the sheer intensity and length to which
national government officials attend EU committees.
National co-ordination mechanisms
The third hypothesis argues that supra-nationalism
stem from the lack of genuine national co-ordination. Suggestively,
lack of co-ordination prior to EU committee meetings may accompany the
enactment of supranational allegiances amongst the EU committee participants.
Those officials attending EU committees are not free riders, nor are
they solely trustees. Officials attending Council working parties and
COREPER meetings are shown in particular to be guided by well co-ordinated
national positions (Schaefer, Egeberg, Korez and Trondal 2000; Trondal
2001). Participants to Council working parties are often equipped with
written mandates of mandatory character (Trondal 2001). These instructions
are often the result of inter-ministerial co-ordination processes, often
involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a vital interlocutor
and gardener of the �national interests�. The MFA might be regarded
as the last stronghold of the nation-state. Hence, the extent to which
the co-ordination role of the MFA is weakened in the national decision-making
processes preceding EU committee meetings, the committee participants
become more likely to evoke
supranational loyalties. Lack of written mandates from national government
institutions might thus propel the emergence of loyalties towards EU
institutions. Not having clear mandates or instructions to follow, the
room for additional supranational allegiances to develop increases.
Not being reminded of their �national missions� on a daily basis in
Brussels, the actors more easily loose sight of the nation-state as
their primary locus of loyalty. Even more, actors participating on a
daily basis within EU committees, frequently meeting and interacting
with fellow committee participants, are more likely to evoke supranational
allegiances, especially if these actors have few and weak national mandates.
Nevertheless, one caveat is warranted. National
co-ordination is mostly geared towards governing the actual decision-making
behaviour of the EU committee participants (Kassim, Peters and Wright
2000; Metcalfe 1994). For instance, Norwegian officials attending Commission
expert committees are intended to draw up instructions considering the
following aspects: background and status on the particular dossier,
existing national regulations, Norwegian interests on the subject matter,
the present bargaining situation, and finally administrative, economic,
budgetary and juridical consequences (The Prime Minister�s Office 1997).
Beyond this, national instructions seldom entrust the participants with
particular loyalties, identities or allegiances. Hence, national co-ordination
may not have a direct causal effect on supra-nationalism. The effect
may be indirect, through the decision-making behaviour chosen by the
actors.
Data and methodology
This study builds on two sources of empirical
data: One survey and several qualitative interviews. First, from summer
1998 until spring 1999 a survey was conducted amongst Danish, Norwegian
and Swedish government officials with experiences from EU committees.
The sample selected was systematic, excluding officials without such
experiences. No statistical generalisations are possible on the basis
on our analysis. Still, theoretical generalisations are possible (Yin
1993). 203 questionnaires were distributed by post to these officials,
whereby 160 answered. The response rate is thus 79 per cent.
[3]
![endif]>![if> Additionally, 47 qualitative face-to-face interviews
were conducted amongst a systematic sub-sample of the above survey sample.
Owing to the fact that most EU committees deal with dossiers of a highly
technical nature, most of the officials selected to the survey study
and to the interviews are employed at the agency level, and employed
in medium rank positions. Hence, our sample of respondents largely mirrors
the average EU committee participant (Institute of Europ�ische Politik
1987; Pedler and Schaefer 1996; Schaefer, Egeberg, Korez and Trondal
2000).
Systematic samples, like ours, often accompany
certain biases. First, our study concerns officials employed in two
different policy sectors: the environment sector and the occupational
health and safety sector. These two policy areas were selected due to
the fact that the environmental sector is heavily integrated in the
EU aquis and the EU integration process, whereas the field of occupational
health and safety is less so. Hence, selecting these two policy sectors
increase the likelihood of selecting civil servants with widely different
experiences from EU committees. Second, this study covers officials
from three �small� European countries: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. One
bias that may accompany this selection is that officials from small
states tend to be more supranational than officials from larger states
(Beyers 1998; Hooghe 1999). Finally, this study has been conducted in
three unitary states. Civil servants from political systems where political
authority is vested in national central institutions are shown to be
less supranational than officials from federal states (Hooghe 1999).
Hence, two biases, which partly are at odds with each other, are represented
in our study.
Three layers of identification
Actors embedded in several institutions,
at different levels of governance, might arguably enact several partially
competing institutional allegiances. The respondents in our survey were
asked to identify the institutional allegiances evoked most strongly
when attending EU committees. Table 1 compares the relative strength
of supranational allegiances versus pre-established identifications.
Table 1 Proportion of national civil servants evoking
different institutional identities when attending EU committees (%).
|
|
Supranational allegiances: Allegiance towards the EU committees attendeda��������. |
35 |
Allegiance towards the EU as a whole������������� |
25 |
�An �esprit de corps� emerges over time in the EU committees�b��.. |
41 |
Pre-established allegiances: Allegiance towards my own department������������. |
78 |
Allegiance towards my own ministry/agency as a whole������ |
92 |
Allegiance towards my own government������������ |
83 |
Allegiance towards my own profession/educational background��... |
44 |
Allegiance towards my own policy sector�����������... |
63 |
Mean N������������������������� |
120 |
a) Variables 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 7 combine values 1
and 2 on the following five-point scale: to a very great extent�(1), to a fairly large extent (2), both/and (3), to a
fairly small extent (4), and to a very small extent (5).
b) Variable
3 combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: agree totally
(1), agree to a fairly great extent (2), agree somewhat (3), agree to
a fairly small extent (4), and disagree totally (5).
Table 1 clearly reveals that national civil
servants retain pre-established institutional allegiances when attending
EU committees. Supranational allegiances are only supplementary to pre-established identifications. Those identities
enacted most strongly are: allegiances towards their own ministry and
agency (92 per cent), allegiance towards their own government (83 per
cent), and allegiances towards their own department (78 per cent). Allegiances
towards their own policy sector (63 per cent) and their educational
background (44 per cent) are less prominent. Hence, institutional allegiances
seem to reflect the immediate institutional environments embedding national
civil servants (cf. below). Moreover, pre-existing institutional identifications
are evoked more extensively than supranational allegiances (cf. Egeberg
1999; Schaefer, Egeberg, Korez and Trondal 2001; Trondal 2000; Trondal
and Veggeland 2000). According to one Swedish agency official,
�I feel strongest allegiance to Sweden, but develop a certain amount of loyalty to the committee. Still, this loyalty never exceeds the loyalty to the [national agency]� (Author�s translation). In a similar vein, one Swedish agency official argued that, �it is hard to change ways of acting and thinking� (Author�s translation).
�However, it seems that attendance on EU committees affects the scope, or width, of the supranational allegiances evoked: EU committee participants seem to identify more strongly with their own EU committee (35 per cent) than with the EU as a whole (25 per cent). Similarly, 41 per cent of the EU committee participants report that an �esprit de corps� emerges in the committees over time. According to one Norwegian agency officials attending Commission expert committees,
�I feel a certain sense of belonging to the group, or to individuals of the groups, especially to Nordic colleagues whom we meet occasionally in other contexts� (Author�s translation).
Henceforth, the EU committees may be considered
more immediate institutional environments than the EU as a whole. However,
whereas identifications with the EU committees attended and with the
EU as a whole is strongly interrelated (Pearson�s r .54**), none of
these variables correlate significantly with the tendency of feeling
an �esprit de corps� within the EU committees.
Hence, identification towards EU institutions (EU committees and the
EU as a whole) seems to represent a different aspect of supra-nationalism
than the �esprit de corps�
variable. Whereas the two former variables represent personal and individual
identifications towards particular EU institutions, the latter variable
may partly represent personal experiences and partly observations of
the general atmosphere and milieu in the committees. Hence, identifications
towards particular EU institutions are perhaps a more adequate operationalisation
of supra-nationalism than the emergence of an �esprit
de corps�.
Next, does supra-nationalism merely reflect
the EU membership of the nation-states, the intensity and length to
which individual civil servants attend EU committees, or the general
lack of ex ante national co-ordination mechanisms?
These three hypotheses are dealt with separately below.�
Does EU membership really �matter�?
The effects of EU membership have been revealed empirically in several recent scholarly contributions (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Jacobsson and Sundstr�m 2000; L�greid 2000; M�ny et al. 1996; Wessels and Rometsch 1996). Table 2 reveals the extent to which EU membership accompanies supranational allegiances amongst national civil servants attending EU committees.
Table 2 Proportion of national civil servants evoking
supranational identities, distributed by country (%).
|
Allegiance
towards the EU committees attendeda |
Allegiance towards the EU as a whole |
�An
�esprit de corps� emerges over time in the EU committees�b |
Mean N |
Norwegian officials���. Swedish officials����. Danish officials����� |
16 48 36 |
8 36 16 |
35 42 45 |
29 48 35 |
|
112 |
a)Variables 1 and 2 combine values 1 and 2 on the following
five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly large extent
(2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), and to a very small
extent (5).
b)Variable 3 combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: agree totally (1), agree to a fairly great extent (2), agree somewhat (3), agree to a fairly small extent (4), and disagree totally (5).
Table 2 provides fairly strong indications
that EU membership matter as to the enactment of supranational allegiances
amongst EU committee participants. Most significantly, fewer Norwegian
officials seem to evoke allegiances towards the EU as a whole and towards
the EU committees compared to Danish and Swedish officials. Similarly,
Danish and Swedish civil servants feel more strongly that an �esprit de corps� emerges within the EU committees compared to the
Norwegian civil servants. However, the differences between the Danish
and Swedish officials on the one hand, and the Norwegian officials on
the other is far more extensive related to the two former dependent
variables. Even more, fewer Norwegian officials attend EU committees
compared to Danish and Swedish officials (Trondal 2001). Hence, EU membership
might accompany the enactment of supranational identifications amongst
a greater number of Danish and Swedish national civil servants than
Norwegian officials. As such, supranational allegiances amongst individual
Danish and Swedish civil servants seem to reflect the EU membership
of Denmark and Sweden, respectively.
However, the observed effects of EU membership
may potentially contain spurious
relationships. Hence, when analysing the evocation of supra-national
allegiances at the individual level we might need to go beyond the aggregate
effects of the EU membership versus non-membership distinction.
Beyond the EU membership � non-membership
dichotomy
Intensive and sustained participation on
EU committees.
As the EU becomes increasingly differentiated,
allowing for various levels of �enhanced co-operation� and different
forms of affiliation towards the Union, the membership versus non membership
dichotomy becomes a less adequate analytical tool-kit. First, individual institutional affiliations towards
EU committees may accompany supranational allegiances amongst individual
civil servants. Arguably, officials attending EU committees fairly intensively
and for protracted periods of time are more likely to enact supranational
allegiances than officials devoting little time and energy participating
on these committees. Table 3 reveals that this hypothesis merits attention.
Table 3 Does supranational identities reflect the intensity
and length to which national officials attend EU committees? A multiple
OLS regression analysis (beta)a.
|
Allegiances towards the EU committees attendedb |
Allegiances towards the EU as a whole |
�An �esprit de corps� emerges over time in the EU committees�c |
Affected by the EU/EEA agreement������� |
.02 |
.26** |
-.03 |
Time devoted to EU related issues generally����� |
-.06 |
.01 |
.06 |
Time devoted participating on Commission expert committees and Council working parties����� |
.02 |
-.02 |
.23** |
Number of EU committees attended�������... |
-.09* |
.05 |
.15** |
Number of meetings in EU committees last year��� |
.14* |
.04 |
.19** |
Do you give oral presentations during EU committee meetings?��... |
.08* |
.13* |
.11* |
Face-to-face contacts outside formal EU committee meetings���. |
.33** |
.05 |
-.14* |
Contacts by phone, e-mail, fax, etc. outside formal EU committee meetings���. |
.05 |
.08 |
.12* |
Number of years having attended EU committees�.. |
.07 |
.00 |
-.06 |
*) p � .05��������� **) p � .01���������������������������� R2 = .15��������������������������� R2 = .12���������������������������
R2 = .15
a)
Independent variables:
The values of variable 1: To a very great extent (1), to a fairly great
extent (2), somewhat (3), to a fairly little extent (4), to a very little
extent (5). The values of variable 2: very great proportion (1), fairly
great proportion (2), both/and (3), fairly little proportion (4), very
little proportion (5). Variable 3 combines values 1, 2 and 3 on the
following five-point scale: very great proportion (1), fairly great
proportion (2), both/and (3), fairly little proportion (4), very little
proportion (5). Variable 4 is dichotomised as follows: one committee
(2), two committees or more (1). Variable 5 is dichotomised as follows:
one meeting (2), two meetings or more (1). Variable 6 combines value
1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very often (1), fairly often
(2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom/never (5). Variables
7 and 8 have the following values: very often (1), fairly often (2),
sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom/never (5). Finally, variable
9 is dichotomised as follows: between 1994 and 1998 (2), before 1994
(1).
b)
Dependent variables:
Variable 1 and 2 applies the same value labels as table 2. Hence, the
dependent variables are dichotomised. This poses no problems for the
regression analyses due to the univariate frequencies on each original
dependent variable is evenly distributed.
������ Dependent
variable: cf. b.
Table 3 applies nine different empirical
proxies measuring the sheer intensity and length to which national officials
attend EU committees. These measures range from the less demanding task
of being affected by the EU/EEA agreement at the one end of the spectrum
towards participating on EU committees and having informal face-to-fact
contacts with fellow committee participants on the other. Most notably,
table 3 reveals that national officials participating fairly intensively
and lengthy on EU committees seem to evoke supranational allegiances
more strongly than officials participating with less intensity. Most
notably, when studying the magnitude of the different beta coefficients
revealed in table 3, supra-nationalism seems most strongly affected
by informal face-to-face contacts amongst fellow committee participants
(.33**), by being affected of the EU/EEA agreement (.26**), and finally,
by the time devoted participating on EU committees (.23**). Even more,
giving oral presentations during EU committee meetings seems to relate
significantly positive on all three operational measures of supra-nationalism
presented in table 3.
Only two deviant observations are detected
in table 3: Officials attending a great deal of EU committees seem to
identify with the EU committees less strongly than officials attending
fewer EU committees (-.09*). This relationship, however, is hardly significant.
The second deviant observation revels that officials having a great
deal of informal face-to-face contacts with fellow committee participants
outside formal committee meetings report that an �esprit
de corps� emerges to a lesser extent compared to officials having
fewer face-to-face contacts (-.14**). This beta coefficient is also
fairly weak. Substantively, this negative relationship may reflect the
fact that officials having many informal contacts outside the EU committees
become less strongly exposed to the �esprit
de corps� emerging within
each committee. By and large, however, the above observations render
it likely that intensive and sustained participation on EU committees
accompanies supranational allegiances amongst the participants.
National co-ordination mechanisms.
The third hypothesis suggests that supranational allegiances reflect the general lack of national co-ordination and governmental steering. Suggestively, national officials that are not bounded and tied up by written instructions from the national political-administrative leadership, but rather act like trustees, are more likely to attend to supranational identities than officials who are controlled, instructed and governed by national mandates. Table 4 provides no clear evidence that may support this hypothesis. [4] ![if>
Table 4 Does supra-nationalism reflect the general lack
of national co-ordination? A multiple OLS regression analysis (beta)a.
|
Allegiances towards the EU committees attendedb |
Allegiances towards the EU as a whole |
�An �esprit de corps� emerges over time in the EU committees�c |
Doing clearances with other central administrative institutions before attending EU committees������ |
-.08 |
-.00 |
-.03 |
Doing clearances with the MFA��������.. |
-.15* |
-.16* |
-.02 |
Paying heed to signals from the political leadership nationally��. |
-.03 |
.15* |
.15* |
�I co-ordinate with the MFA or with other central co-ordinating units���.. |
.21* |
.05 |
.03 |
�My �position� has been co-ordinated with all relevant ministries���... |
-.12* |
.10 |
(.12*) |
�I have clear instructions as to what �positions� to pursue in EU committees� |
.05 |
-.14* |
.01 |
*) p � .05��������� **) p � .01������������������������� R2 = .04���������������������������� R2 =
.07���������������������������� R2
= .07
a)
Independent variables:
Variable 1 combines value 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale:
to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), somewhat (3),
to a fairly little extent (4), to a very little extent (5). Variable
2 has the following values: Yes (1), No (2). Variable 3 combines value
1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly
important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant
(5). Variable 4, 5 and 6 has value 1 on the following three-point scale:
always or fairly often (1), half of the time (2), seldom or never (3).
b)
Dependent variables:
Variable 1 and 2 applies the same value labels as table 2.
������ Dependent
variable: cf. b.
First and foremost, table 4 unravels an equal
number of predicted patterns and deviant observations. Supportive to
our hypothesis, officials evoking supranational allegiances tend to
do relatively few clearances with the MFA before attending EU committees
(-.15* and -.16*), tend to co-ordinate poorly with all relevant ministries
(-.12*), and have unclear instructions as to what �positions� to pursue
during EU committee meetings (-.14**). These observations suggest that
supra-nationalism reflects the general lack of ex
ante national co-ordination processes. However, four observations
go largely counter to this pattern: Table 4 reveals that officials evoking
supranational allegiances tend to pay heed to signals from the political
leadership (.15* and .15*), to co-ordinate with the MFA or other central
co-ordinating units (.21*), and to have served for fairly long periods
of time in the national central administration prior to attending EU
committees (.16**). Hence, supra-nationalism seems not hampered by national
co-ordination or governmental steering.
The above contradictory empirical patterns
might be interpreted as follows: First, the re-socialising power of
EU committees may render the co-ordination reflex weaker: Despite having
written instructions at their disposal, the re-socialising power of
EU committees gears actors towards evoking supranational identifications.
Even more, national co-ordination is often geared towards affecting
the actual decision-making behaviour of the actors, not entrusting them
with particular loyalties. Reflecting this, table 4 reveals that only
a marginal proportion of the variance is explained. However, table 4
reveals that the general lack of national co-ordination to some extent
has independent casual effect on the enactment of supranational allegiances.
Hence, the general lack of ex ante national searing of EU committee
participants increases the room available for evoking supranational
identities.
The ambiguous empirical patterns unveiled
in table 4 render it important to include all variables from tables
2, 3 and 4 into the equation. Henceforth, table 5 reveals the relative
explanatory power of (i) the EU membership versus non-membership dichotomy,
(ii) of the sheer length and intensity to which national civil servants
attend EU committees, and finally, (iii) of different national co-ordination
mechanisms.
Table 5 The relative explanatory power of (i) the EU-membership
� non-membership distinction, (ii) the length and intensity to which
national officials attend EU committees, and (iii) national co-ordination.
A multiple OLS regression analysis (beta).
|
Allegiances towards the EU committees attendeda |
Allegiances towards the EU as a whole |
�An �esprit de corps� emerges over time in the EU committees�b |
(i ) EU member-states versus
non-member statesc |
.16* |
-.01 |
-.01 |
(ii) Affected by the EU/EEA agreementd��. |
-.01 |
.27** |
-.10* |
Time devoted to EU related issues generally�. |
-.01 |
.07 |
.15* |
Time devoted participating on Commission expert committees and Council working parties����.. |
-.06 |
.01 |
.21** |
Number of EU committees attended��.. |
-.11* |
-.05 |
.25** |
Number of meetings in EU committees last year... |
.15* |
.07 |
.19** |
Do you give oral presentations during EU committee meetings?��. |
-.10* |
-.01 |
.10* |
Face-to-face contacts outside formal EU committee meetings��.. |
.37** |
.13* |
-.24** |
Contacts by phone, e-mail, fax, etc. outside formal EU committee meetings� |
.02 |
-.13* |
.13* |
Number of years having attended EU committees... |
.01 |
-.09 |
-.10* |
(iii) Doing clearances with other central administrative institutions before attending EU committeese�����.. |
-.19* |
-.05 |
.06 |
Doing clearances with the MFA��������.. |
-.30** |
-.15* |
.04 |
Paying heed to signals from the political leadership nationally��. |
.09 |
.25* |
.12* |
�I co-ordinate with the MFA or with other central co-ordinating units���.. |
.36** |
.05 |
.02 |
�My �position� has been co-ordinated with all relevant ministries���... |
-.14* |
-.02 |
-.01 |
�I have clear instructions as to what �positions� to pursue in EU committees� |
-.02 |
-.18* |
.11* |
*) p � .05��������� **) p � .01�������������������������� R2 = .22��������������������������� R2 = 17����������������������������� R2 =
.28
![if>
a)
Dependent variables:
Variable 1 and 2 applies the same value labels as table 2.
b)
Dependent variables:
cf. a.
c)
Independent variable:
The first variable has the following values: Sweden and Denmark (EU
members) (1), Norway (EEA member (2).
d)
Independent variables:
Cf. the value labels from table 3.
������ Independent
variables: Cf. the value labels from table 4.
A first look at table 5 reveals that the
proportion of explained variance is significantly higher than in tables
3 and 4. Moreover, table 5 uncovers that the sheer number of controlled
effects that load significantly on the enactment of supranational allegiances
are greatest on the intensity dimension. There are relative few co-ordination
variables having a significant effect on supra-nationalism. Second,
the EU membership versus non-membership turn out having a significant
positive effect on the enactment of allegiances towards the EU committees
attended (.16**). Hence, Danish and Swedish government officials tend
to establish allegiances towards EU committees to a larger extent than
the Norwegian civil servants.
Moreover, the interview data render ample
support for the intensity thesis:
�We
talk together at the pub in the evenings. Then we get good contact.
The same individuals arrive at several meetings. We call each other
and send e-mails to each other. An �esprit de corps� emerges in the
group� (Source: Norwegian agency official � author�s translation).
�We have regular e-mail contacts.
An enormous feeling of collegiality emerges amongst the Nordic colleagues.
A strong sense of allegiance develops in the groups when you have participated
for 5 years. It becomes your baby. It becomes so collegial� (Source:
Norwegian agency official � author�s translation). �The dinners in the evenings are important arenas
for talk. We spend a lot of time together� (Source: Norwegian agency
official � author�s translation). The same official reports that �I travel from Norway as an �ambassador� for
Norway, only to return as a representative for the EU Commission. I
often feel stronger allegiance to my Swedish colleague than to my Norwegian
colleagues� (author�s translation). �We
have frequent contacts between the meetings, rather informal personal
contacts. This result in a certain allegiance to the committee and to
the individuals who attend� (Source: Swedish agency official � author�s
translation).
Despite the various countervailing observations
made in table 5
[5]
![endif]>![if>, the vast majority of the above observations support
the predicted pattern: There are a greater number of significant effects
supporting the proposed pattern, and these effects are generally stronger
than the deviant effects. The general observation thus holds: Supra-nationalism
is strongest amongst Danish and Swedish officials, strongest amongst
those officials devoting much time and energy participating on EU committees,
and strongest amongst those officials whose �positions� are poorly co-ordinated
and weakly instructed at the national level of governance.
However, two general countervailing tendencies
stand out: First, officials evoking supranational allegiances tend to
have participated for only shorter periods of time on EU committees.
Yet, this observation may reflect the fact that supra-nationalism reflects
less the sheer length to which national officials attend different EU
committees and more the intensity of current and instant involvement
(Trondal 2001).
Second, some officials evoking supranational
identities also tend to participate on EU committees with a low degree
of intensity. The three observations deviating most strongly from the
predicted pattern will be discussed in greater detail in the following.
First, the strongest deviant observation of table 5 reveals that officials
having a great deal of informal face-to-face contacts with fellow committee
participants outside formal committee meetings report that an �esprit de corps� emerges to a lesser extent compared to officials
having fewer face-to-face contacts (-.24**). This negative relationship,
however, may reflect the fact that officials having many informal contacts
outside the EU committees become less strongly exposed to the �esprit de corps� emerging within
each committee. The second strongest deviant finding of table 5 reveals
that officials that pay heed to signals from the national political
leadership tend to develop allegiances towards the EU as a whole (.25*).
This may reflect the fact that, despite strong political signals, the
EU committees manage to re-socialise the participants. Hence, this observation
may reflect the re-socialising power of the EU committees. Finally,
the strongest deviant observation of table 5 reveals that officials
co-ordinating with the MFA or with other central co-ordinating units
tend to evoke allegiances towards the EU committees attended (.36**).
This observation might also reflect the re-socialising power of EU committees.
However, one caveat is warranted. National co-ordination and national
political signals are generally not geared towards entrusting the delegates
with particular institutional allegiances. National instructions are
more geared towards controlling and monitoring the actual moves made
by each EU committee participant (cf. above). Hence, despite strong
national co-ordination and governmental control, there is plenty of
room left for supranational allegiances to emerge. This might be due
to the re-socialising power of EU committees, triggered by the intensity
to which national officials attend EU committees.�
Conclusions
Despite providing ample evidence that membership
in the EU indeed propels supranational identifications amongst EU decision-makers,
the current article reveals that the EU membership versus non-membership
distinction is not the only explanation of supra-nationalism, perhaps
not the most adequate. Foremost, the current study highlights the re-socialising
power of EU committees. Hence, when studying supra-nationalism at the
level of the individual civil servants, one should pay heed to the intensity
to which national civil servants attend EU committees. Finally, supra-nationalism
also stems from the general lack of ex ante co-ordination mechanisms at the national level of governance.
This conclusion lends support to an institutional approach to supra-nationalism.
Institutions embedding civil servants matter as far as the evocation
of particular allegiances and identifications are concerned. Even more,
the empirical observations support a multilevel version of institutionalism
in two respects. First, accompanying multiple institutional affiliations
at different levels of governance, civil servants are shown to evoke
a multiple set of national, sectoral and supranational identities. Parallel
to Haas (1958), intensive and sustained participation on EU committees
gear national civil servants towards shifting loyalties and institutional
allegiances towards the EU level. However, whereas Haas (1958) argued
that supranational loyalties replace pre-existing national identifications,
the current study shows that supranational identifications merely supplement
pre-established national and sectoral allegiances. Second, a multilevel
version of institutionalism is empirically supported in the sense that
the diverse institutional allegiances evoked by the civil servants reflect
the multiple institutional affiliations embedding them. Contrary to
Haas (1958), supra-nationalism reflects not only the re-socialising
impact of EU institutions on national decision-makers, but also particular
institutional dynamics of national government institutions embedding
EU decision-makers.
Endnotes
[1] ![endif]>![if> Paper to be presented at ECSA�s 2001 International Conference, May 31-June 2, Madison, Wisconsin, and at the SCANCOR workshop on Transnational regulation and the transformation of states, June 22-23, Stanford University, California. The current study is financed by the ARENA-programme (The Norwegian Research Council). An earlier version of this paper was preented at the Norwegian conference in political science 10-12 January, 2001. Thanks to Morten Egeberg, Arild Farsund, Hans-Petter Graver, Leif Helland and Hans Robert Zuna for valuable comments.
[2] ![endif]>![if> In the current article the conception of supra-nationalism parallels the notion of supranational identities, as defined here.
[3] ![endif]>![if> The following ministries and agencies are included in this study:
Denmark: The Department of Environment and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Forest and Nature Agency, the Department of Labour, and the National Labour Market Authority.
Norway: The Ministry of Environment, the Norwegian Pollution Agency, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, and the Directorate for Labour Inspection.
Sweden: The Ministry of Environment, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication [3] ![endif]>![if>, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
[4] ![endif]>![if> One of the above observations is needless to comment because it unveils spuriousness in the OLS regression analysis presented in table 5. This relationship is marked by a parenthesis in the above table.
[5]
![endif]>![if> Officials evoking
supranational allegiances tend to be fairly weakly affected by the
EU/EEA agreement (-.10*), attending few EU committees (-.11*), give
few oral presentations during EU committee meetings (-.10*), have
few informal face-to-face contacts outside formal meetings with fellow
EU committee participants (-.24**), have few informal contacts by
phone, e-mail or fax (-13*), and having attended EU committees for
only a few years (-.10*). Second, national civil servants enacting
supranational allegiances tend to pay heed to signals from the political
leadership (.25* and .12*), co-ordinate with the MFA or with other
central co-ordinating units (.36**), have clear instructions (.11*),
and having served for fairly long periods of time in the national
central administration prior to attending EU committees (.-09*).
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