ARENA Working Papers
WP 01/25

 

The 'Parallel Administration' of the European Commission

National Officials in European Clothes?

 

Jarle Trondal

NIFU

 

 

Abstract

This paper poses the following question: Do the Commission manage to transform the loyalties and identities of Commission officials seconded on short-term contracts? Secondment refers to national civil servants hired on temporary contracts within the European Commission (from 3 months up to 3 years). Studying the mix of national and supranational loyalties amongst Commission officials is important in order to assess the integrative and transformative power of the European Commission. Moreover, the �parallel administration� of the Commission is an important laboratory for studying integration across the EU/nation-state interface. This study applies an institutional middle-range approach to analyse and assess the transformative power of this �parallel administration�. Arguably, supranational allegiances are likely to be evoked among seconded personnel under three conditions: (i) intensive and sustained participation within the Commission at large, and within different DGs; (ii) non-compatibility in organisational structures and institutional core-values between national administrative systems and the EU Commission; and finally (iii) particular social and physical environments embedding seconded personnel while staying in Brussels. Based on these scope conditions this paper outlines a middle-range research agenda for future empirical studies.

 

Introduction [1]

Despite much efforts uncovering the �cogs and wheels� of European integration, the scholarly debate has largely been trapped in a neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist dichotomy. The 1990�s, however, witnessed a theoretical turn in the study of European integration towards less focus on either/or �unifying story-lines� and more in the direction of both/and middle-range theories. This theoretical move partially reflects a more general �institutionalist turn� in the study of public administration (Andersen 2000; Jupille and Caporaso 1999; March and Olsen 1998). The study of European integration has developed from a study of EU institutions towards a study of the EU through institutional lenses (Schneider and Aspinwall 2001). Assuming that �institutions matter�, the next question is under what conditions institutions matter in particular ways. The current study applies an institutional middle-range approach to analyse and assess the transformative potentials of the �parallel administration� of the European Commission. The goal is to suggest an empirical and theoretical research agenda.

 

The European Commission is located at the very heart of the Union (Nugent 1997). As a catalyst of European integration and Europeanisation of national government systems the European Commission is an important case-point to make. This paper poses the following question: Do the Commission manage to transform the loyalties and identities of Commission officials seconded on short-term contracts? Secondment refers to national civil servants hired on temporary contracts within the European Commission (from 3 months up to 3 years). Studying the mix of national and supranational loyalties amongst Commission officials is important in order to assess the integrative and transformative power of the European Commission. Suggestively, supranational loyalties denote Commission officials identifying with the EU at large, with the European Commission, with the DG in which they are employed, or with particular task roles. Despite the existence of several partially competing organisational logics within the Commission (Christiansen 1997), it is important to uncover the relative primacy of supranational dynamics. Shore (1995 and 2000) demonstrates that supranational dynamics dominate the identities of top Commission bureaucrats and Commissioners. However, more intergovernmental dynamics strive constantly for attention (Bellier 1997; Hooghe 1999a; Middlemas 1995:247). The current study focuses on one under-researched �Cinderella� of the Commission where intergovernmental dynamics might have ample chances of survival and viability: the �parallel administration� of seconded national civil servants to the European Commission (Cini 1996; Shore 2000; Wessels 1985). Hence, a least likely research design underpins this study.

 

Envisaging an independent European bureaucracy, Jean Monnet rejected the model of delegated and temporary seconded national civil servants (Shore 2000:177). [2] For federalists, like Monnet, secondments represented the opposite of an independent civil service at the EU level. According to Spence (1997) the �parallel administration� of the Commission represents a �Trojan Horse� threatening the coherence and autonomy of the Commission. Reflecting increased workload, functional differentiation and a need for external assistance, the non-statuary staff of the Commission has increased to about 30 per cent of the current Commission�s workforce (European Commission 1999:18; Shore 2000:197). The overall rationale of studying national civil servants seconded to the Commission is to identify the extent to which individual Commission officials come to construct new supranational loyalties, identities and role perceptions. This represents a critical examination of the socialising and re-socialising power and, ultimately, the integrative and transformative role of the European Commission. Arguably, the emergence of supranational identities and roles amongst seconded Commission officials is conducive to European integration and Europeanisation across levels of governance at a micro level. According to the White Paper on European Governance issued by the Commission in 2001 �exchange of staff and joint training between administrations at various levels would contribute to a better knowledge of each other�s policy objectives, working methods and instruments� (European Commission 2001:13).

 

Few scholarly contributions have penetrated the internal life of the European Commission (Cram 1994:197; Shore 2000:127). The �parallel administration� of the Commission has been subject to even less scholarly attention. Seconded Commission personnel represent an adequate testing-ground for institutional approaches to European integration. Seconded national civil servants are heavily �pre-packed� and pre-socialised prior to entering the Commission. Their stay at the Commission is relatively short and the majority return to prior positions in national ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts come to an end. Seconded personnel also remind paid by their employer at the national level when working for this supranational executive, however, combined with supplementary allowances from the European Union. Hence, one might expect these officials to be fairly reluctant towards enacting supranational identities and allegiances when working within the Commission. However, the prospective emergence of supranational allegiances amongst seconded personnel is indicative of the supranational character of the Commission at large. Moreover, the enactment of supranational identifications amongst seconded national civil servants is also indicative of the integrative and transformative power of the European Commission. According to Cini (1996:121), �the appointment of temporary staff encourages an intermingling of national and European administrators which itself has the potential to provoke a sort of process of europeanisation at the national and subnational levels�. The emergence of supranational role orientations amongst seconded personnel is an even stronger indicator of system level integration than mere cross-level contacts (Borneman and Fowler 1997:497).

 

The next section provides a short review of recent literature on the �parallel administration� of the European Commission, succeeded by suggestive characteristics of administrative integration across levels of governance. This section argues that the construction of supranational loyalties amongst seconded staff is conducive to administrative integration across levels of governance. Finally, an institutional perspective on administrative integration is outlined, suggesting scope conditions under which supranational allegiances are likely to precede national identifications amongst seconded personnel. Arguably, supranational allegiances are likely to be evoked under three conditions: (i) intensive and sustained participation within the Commission at large as well as at the DG level; (ii) non-compatibility in organisational structures and institutional core-values between national administrative systems and the EU Commission; and (iii) particular social and physical environments embedding seconded personnel while staying in Brussels. Based on these scope conditions, this study outlines a middle-range research agenda for future empirical analyses.

 

The �parallel administration� of the European Commission

There is a surprising dearth of academic studies of the European Commission (Christiansen 1997:83; Egeberg 1996; Shore 2000:127). [T]here has been little serious academic analysis of the Commission�s complex and messy internal life� (Shore 2000:127). Most studies of the Commission are focused on the Commissioners (Hooghe 1999b:436). Hence, it should not surprise anyone that the �parallel administration� of the Commission is under-researched (Christiansen 1997:84). �The socialising impact of short-term employment in the European civil service has not been investigated� (Nedergaard 1995:11).

 

Organisations often consist of two parallel procedures for recruitment and two sets of personnel: permanent and temporary officials recruited on the basis of merit and quotas, or parachutage, respectively. The construction of new organisations sometimes warrants hiring external officials on temporary basis. Recruitment to the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community and to the Commission of the EEC was mainly based on national officials on short-term contracts (Nugent 2001). Few contemporary organisations have institutionalised a �parallel administration� to the same extent as the European Commission. [3] The size of the current �parallel administration� of the Commission has forged counter-reactions from the Commission, highlighting that �the high percentage of non-permanent officials in the Commission cannot be justified� (European Commission 2000:37). The �parallel administration� of the European Commission makes up a considerable part of the institution, making the Commission a multi-faceted organisation with respect to recruitment practises, personnel, career paths, and, possibly, institutional allegiances. Moreover, the �parallel administration� of the Commission consists of two sets of institutions. First, the various expert committees and comitology committees and secondly, the non-statuary staff employed within the Commission on various short-term contracts. This study highlights the Commission as composed of permanent �Eurocrats� together with seconded �travelling civil servants� (Nedergaard 1995:26).

 

Being largely an understaffed institution, the Commission is heavily dependent on external assistance. This assistance is brought into the Commission through the web of EU committees and more permanently through the non-statuary staff. However, whereas �comitology� has grown into a big research �industry�, secondments have been given less scholarly attention. There are about 16 000 permanent officials working on established posts in the Commission (European Commission 1999:9; Nugent 2001:164; Stevens and Stevens 2001:17). Additionally, the Commission has about 4 200 non-permanent officials on various short-term contracts (European Commission 1999:9). The system of non-permanent staff is divided into three different sub-groups: temporary agents (2400), auxiliary staff (1000), and seconded national experts (760) (European Commission 1999:9; Stevens and Stevens 2001:17). Seconded personnel are our focus here. Seconded national experts are civil servants from member-state administrations �loaned to the Commission for up to three years� (Spence 1997:9). Temporary agents and auxiliary staff, by contrast, come from various research institutes, interest organisations, etc. Seconded personnel numbered 200 in 1989, 250 in 1990, about 600 in 1994, and in 1995 the number was 650 (Bodiguel 1995:442; Edwards and Spence 1997:79; Hay 1989:29). At present, seconded national officials number 760, accounting for 15 per cent of all A-grade staff of the Commission and probably for about 25 per cent of A4 to A6 staff (Nugent 2001:165; Stevens and Stevens 2001:20). Hence, the �parallel administration� of the Commission has increased substantially in the 1990s, especially in the top ranks. [4]

 

Seconded national experts have a potential for generating administrative integration across levels of governance �by allowing [national] civil servants � to learn about [EU] procedures and administrative culture� (Spence 1997:79). According to the Commission (1999:63), seconded national experts �are a way of forging stronger links between national administrations and the Commission��. Moreover, studying the emergence of supranational loyalties amongst temporary national experts within the Commission can identify mechanisms of re-socialisation at the heart of the Union. According to Shore (2000:152), �[t]hey find it a wonderfully mind-expanding experience: most who come here want to stay after their secondment has finished. Like the agents temporaires, once they get one foot in the door they want to get the rest of their body through�. Most temporary national experts experience that their cognitive maps and political psychology change during their secondment period (Shore 2000). Parallel to this, Shore (1995) observes the emergence of a �community method� and esprit de corps amongst new recruits to the permanent staff of the Commission. These empirical observations anticipate two different notions of administrative integration across levels of governance.

 

Two concepts of administrative integration

This section discusses a weak and a strong notion of administrative integration. A weak concept views administrative integration as the web of contacts, networks and relationships that emerges between administrative systems. A strong concept measures administrative integration as system transformation � that is, the basic modes of governance, representatitional roles, individual identities and decision processes change.

 

Administrative integration, both in the weak and strong sense, is a relatively embryonic field of study. This phenomenon remains under-studied and poorly understood. Administrative integration or engrenage might be understood as processes and not fixed states of affairs (Held 1999:27). The mutual relationships between administrative systems constitute ever-changing phenomena in political-administrative life. Just like single organisations are in constant state of flux�, the relationships between organisations are constantly evolving. Moreover, administrative integration is relational - covering the relationships, interdependencies and interconnections between different administrative systems and between the members of these systems (Spinelli 1966). Finally, administrative integration is a continuum, not a dichotomy, ranging from weak to strong modes of integration (Trondal 1999). As discussed more thoroughly below, weak administrative integration requires that actual contacts occur between at least two administrative systems. A stronger notion of integration requires, in addition, that these contacts mutually affect the systems and the individual members within them.

 

Several suggestions as to how to view administrative integration have been addressed in the literature (cf. Laffan, O�Donnell and Smith 1999:75). March (1999b:134) conceives of administrative integration as gauged at measuring the �density, intensity and character of the relations amongst the elements of [different administrative systems]�. Moreover, ��integration� signifies some measure of the density, intensity and character of the relations among the constitutive elements of a system� (Olsen 2001:4). Scheinman (1966:751) sees administrative integration as the �intermingling of national and international bureaucrats in various working groups and committees in the policy-making context of the EEC� (cf. Cassese 1987; Pag 1987). Similarly, Majone (1996) �refers to the idea of copinage technocratique to denote the interaction between Brussels officials, experts from industry, and national civil servants� (quoted from Radaelli 1999a:759 � original emphasis). Finally, Rosenau (1969:46) defines administrative integration as penetrative processes whereby �members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another�. Common to all these conceptualisations is an emphasis on the mutual relationships and contacts between administrative systems and the members of these systems. The above conceptions of administrative integration represent weak definitions of this phenomenon, emphasising that different administrative systems actually come into mutually contact of some sort.

 

Approaching a stronger notion of administrative integration, Barnett (1993:276) asks, �[w]hat happens when state actors are embedded in two different institutions � that call for different roles and behaviour?� Similarly, Olsen (1998:2) asks, �[w]hat happens to organised political units when they become part of a larger unit?� More assertive, Eriksen and Fossum (2000:16) argue that �integration, in the true meaning of the term, depends on the alteration, not the aggregation of, preferences�. European integration in general and administrative integration more particularly, thus denotes processes whereby organisational dynamics and behavioural logics are transformed amongst European institutions and decision-makers (Held 1999:18). While the above paragraph defines administrative integration in a weak sense, Barnett and Olsen apply a stronger definition of this phenomenon by emphasising how the systems are mutually affected by increased contact. Moreover, whilst Olsen emphasises system level analyses, Rosenau and Barnett apply the individual government official as the unit of analysis.

 

Patterns of administrative interaction across levels of governance are formally institutionalised within the EU committees and the system of secondments. The next section argues that the Commission is a transformative institution that affects the identities and institutional loyalties of both permanent and temporary personnel. Seconded national civil servants thus represent an adequate testing-ground for theories of administrative integration.

 

From the late 1960s onwards, a growing literature on administrative integration emerged in the wake of accelerating processes of European integration. Studies of public administrations discovered how domestic administrative systems became increasingly embedded within international political orders. Consequently, the multi-level character of domestic administrative systems attracted the attention of scholars of public administration. Early scholarly contributions on administrative integration demonstrated how the domestic-international distinction became blurred due to the intermingling of national and international bureaucrats (Cassese 1987; Egeberg 1980; Feld and Wildgen 1975; Hopkins 1976; Kerr 1973; Pag 1987; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman 1966:751; Scheinman and Feld 1972). Highlighting �bureaucratic inter-penetration� across levels of governance, this literature emphasised that the �description of the Community as �above�, �alongside� or �outside� the member states were useless oversimplifications� (Pag 1987:446; Rosenau 1969; Scheinman 1966). The national level and the Community level were described as mutually interwoven and intermixed in fundamental ways (Demmke 1998:15). This body of literature studied the extent to which national government officials became regular participants at the EU level of governance (Rosenau 1969). Only scarce attention was devoted to how the employment of national civil servants within the Commission on temporary contracts affected the �inner selves� of the participants, let alone their actual decision-making behaviour (see however Feld and Wildgen 1975; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman and Feld 1972). As such, a weak notion of administrative integration underpinned these early studies.

 

Despite this growing scholarly interest for administrative integration across levels of governance, little light has been shed on the dual character of the European Union bureaucracy that consists partially of permanent officials and partially of officials hired on short-term contracts. Despite the 1990s witnessing a significant increase in the scholarly attention devoted to EU committees, less attention has been paid to the non-statuary staff of the Commission services.

 

The next section poses the following question: how can we explain the emergence of supranational loyalties and identities amongst seconded national civil servants? Going beyond a sui generis notion of the EU and the European Commission, the next section outlines three institutional perspectives on administrative integration. Assuming that the Commission shares important characteristics with national bureaucracies and organisations, three general institutional arguments are applied to render intelligible administrative integration through the �parallel administration� of the European Commission.

 

Towards a framework for analysis

Past literature on European integration has been largely trapped in the neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist dichotomy. Reflecting this trap, Wessels (1998) and Laffan (1998) reach opposite conclusions with respect to the emergence of an esprit de corps amongst national civil servants in Brussels. This study argues that both conclusions are partially correct. According to an institutional approach, national civil servants seconded to the European Commission are likely to evoke new supranational loyalties (Laffan 1998:242-243) but also to sustain pre-established national and sectoral allegiances (Wessels 1985:12 and 1998:227).

 

The following section suggests scope conditions affecting the likelihood that seconded national civil servants construct supranational roles and allegiances, and conditions under which their pre-established national and sectoral identities are sustained. Our aim is not to pinpoint the various micro-foundations that underpin various institutionalist approaches, only to suggest scope conditions rendering the evocation of supranational allegiances intelligible.

 

Three institutionalist arguments

The current study goes beyond a rational choice institutionalist account. The conservatory logic underpinning rational choice approaches render it difficult to account for the transformation of actors� identities, loyalties and allegiances. This section introduces institutional arguments from Simon (1957), Selznick (1957) and March and Olsen (1989) which emphasise the transformative potential of organisational structures (Polsby 1975).

 

One such approach is the cognitive perspective on organisations (Simon 1957). According to the bounded rational approach in organisational science the attention of actors is limited. They have cognitive limitations, rendering them vulnerable to the systematic selection of decision premises and stimuli offered by organisational structures (Dearborn and Simon 1958). Organisations contribute to activate and deactivate particular repertoires of decision behaviour, identities and role perceptions (March and Olsen 1989 and 1995). Political and administrative life is contextualised and embedded. Formal structures are pictured as political agendas that contribute to a mobilisation of bias (Hammond 1986; Schattschneider 1960). The identities enacted by organisational actors reflect their rational choices, however, biased and skewed in systematic ways by the organisational structures embedding them. According to this line of argumentation the organisational characteristics of the Commission affect the identities and roles of the civil servants in particular ways.

 

Second, formal organisations are sometimes �infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand� (Selznick 1957:17 � original emphasis). Value-laden organisations acquire strong potentials for socialising the organisational members into loyal trustees (Schneider and Aspinwall 2001). At the same time, however, actors affiliated to organisations with a strong institutional core are often disposed to resist changing pre-established identities and roles (Knill 2001). �The longer a rule has existed, the more it becomes linked to the values of organisational stakeholders� (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000:72-73). Accordingly, processes of socialisation make actors take particular identities and roles for granted. Actors become norm- and rule-driven. A cultural perspective on organisations emphasises the �pre-packed� character of governmental actors. When seconded into the European Commission national civil servants retain and sustain pre-established national and sectoral institutional affiliations and evoke role perceptions that deviate only marginally from past roles.

 

Third, a related institutional perspective views actors� identities and allegiances as reflecting various logics of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; 1995). Actors often have several institutional affiliations simultaneously that provide different cues for action and senses of belonging. Based on the following questions actors make deliberate choices as to what identity or role to apply in particular situations: (i) What kind of situation is this?; (ii) Who am I?; and (iii) What should a person such as I do in a situation such as this (March and Olsen 1989)? According to the logic of appropriateness actors are basically rule- and identity-driven. Actors are geared towards evoking identities that associate with particular situations and that have several points of resemblance. Actors tend to evoke new identities that deviate only marginally from past identities. Hence, when national civil servants are seconded to the European Commission they are likely to evoke pre-established national and sectoral identities more strongly than supranational allegiances. However, seconded officials who have served within the Commission for long periods of time are increasingly likely to evoke supranational allegiances.

*       *       *

 

Three different institutional arguments have been addressed above. First, a bounded rational argument emphasising that organisations have a modest transformative potential with respect to the identities and allegiances evoked by the organisational members. According to this perspective, organisational structure bias and skew role and identity perceptions in systematic ways. However, the impact of socialisation processes is modest both with respect to depth and permanence. The second and third institutionalist approach outlined picture a stronger transformative potential of institutionalised organisations. Officials not only �go native� in Brussels, they �stay native�. However, this transformation process easily becomes subject to inertia, path-dependency and a logic of recency (March 1994). Bearing these theoretical insights in mind, the next section outlines a middle-range approach that specifies under what conditions seconded Commission staff is likely to evoke or construct supranational allegiances.

 

Towards a middle-range approach on supra-nationalism

Notwithstanding intense research on the various micro-foundations of institutional theory, less scholarly attention has been devoted to the question of conditional validity of various social mechanisms. Assuming that �institutions matter�, the next question is under what conditions institutions matter in particular ways (B�rzel and Risse 2000). Despite arguing that the Commission socialise Commission officials into supranational agents and �European elites� (Christiansen 2001; Shore 2000), less effort has been put on studying under what conditions Commission officials evoke supranational loyalties. Based on the above institutionalist arguments, this section suggests the following scope conditions:

 

Primary versus secondary institutional affiliations of each civil servant,

the organisational principles underpinning domestic administrative institutions and the EU Commission,

the length and intensity of affiliation to the Commission of each civil servant,

different degrees and modes of pre-socialisation by each civil servant outside the Commission, and

social and physical environments embedding the civil servants in Brussels.

 

Due to lack of empirical studies of seconded personnel in the EU system, the following section applies empirical observations of a more general kind. The empirical data presented illustrate how the above scope conditions affect the strength and weakness of supranational allegiances amongst Commission decision-makers.

 

First, seconded national civil servants to the Commission retain their primary institutional affiliation to the national ministries or agencies. When seconded to the Commission the civil servants remind largely paid by their national employer. Moreover, their stay in Brussels is only temporary. When the secondment period reaches the end most civil servants return to prior positions within the national civil service. Consequently, the Commission is a secondary institutional affiliation to the seconded personnel. Even when staying in the Commission, their national ministry or agency reminds their primary institutional affiliation (cf. Schmitter 2000:9). Hence, the identities evoked by seconded personnel are likely to be more national than supranational. Seconded officials are heavily �pre-packed� and pre-socialised when entering the Commission. They also anticipate potential future career paths within the national civil service after their stay in Brussels. Hence, they are likely to attach weight to their national identities while working as non-statuary staff in the Commission. A study of seconded officials from the Scottish Office of the UK central administration to the European Commission supports these arguments (Smith 2001). Smith (2001) observes that seconded officials have reinforced their national administrative cultures and allegiances rather than becoming more supranationally oriented during their stay at the Commission.

 

Whereas Haas (1958) argued that supranational loyalties were likely to replace pre-established national identifications, the current study maintains that supranational identifications merely supplement pre-established national and sectoral allegiances. Hence, a multi-faceted and multi-layered conception of identity and role underpins this study. Notwithstanding this, under particular institutional conditions supranational allegiances might gain particular strength. Suggestively, supranational identifications are likely to be strengthened and fostered amongst seconded Commission personnel under two particular conditions. In the following section we discuss the relative influence of (i) particular institutional traits of the Commission, in particular the degree of institutional fit or miss-fit across levels of governance, and (ii) various social characteristics of the daily working-environment embedding Commission officials.

 

The internal organisational structures of the Commission are conducive to weakening national allegiances amongst seconded personnel. The dominating organising principle of the Commission is sector (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). This is especially so at the DG and the unit levels. Most seconded personnel are employed at the A1 and A2 levels within various DGs. Reflecting the general low level of inter-DG co-ordination and mobility, seconded personnel mostly work at the unit level within singular DGs during their short Commission careers (European Commission 1999:57-58). Only few seconded officials move beyond singular DGs during their stay at the Commission. Hence, seconded personnel are affiliated to organisational units within the Commission that are organised according to a sectoral principle. Prolonged and intensive exposure towards sectoralised stimuli within Commission DGs increases the likelihood that the officials� role perceptions get denationalised. Their roles are likely to become strongly sectoralised.

 

Egeberg (1996), McDonald (1997), and Shore (2000) support these propositions empirically. Similarly, Cini (1997:86) observes that institutional identities among the statuary staff of former DG Competition and Environment are directed more towards the DG than towards the Commission at large. Senior DG personnel are more likely to identify with the Commission as a whole. Moreover, officials employed in top rank positions within DGs having broad horizontal mandates and portfolios are likely to identify with the Commission as a whole more strongly than officials employed in medium or lower rank positions within DGs having specialist tasks descriptions (Hooghe 1997:105). Overall, sectoral allegiances are likely to precede national identifications amongst permanent Commission officials. However, Egeberg (1996) reveals that the nationality of permanent Commission officials affects their decision behaviour. This stems partly from territorial principles of organisation underpinning the Commission structures (the cabinets, national quotas, etc.) and partly from their primary institutional affiliations nationally. Seconded personnel to the Commission are likely to put particular emphasis on pre-established national and sectoral senses of belonging due to their primary institutional affiliations at the national level of governance.

 

Most seconded personnel have lifelong careers in the national civil services. They are heavily pre-socialised before entering the Commission. They remind mostly paid by their national employer while working for the Commission. Most of them also return to prior positions in the national civil service after finishing their stay in Brussels. Furthermore, the Commission is a relatively young and small institution compared to national central administrations. These factors render it difficult for the Commission to instil new identities into officials with pre-established loyalties towards national government systems. [5] Hence, supranational allegiances are likely to be modified and conditioned by pre-existing national affiliations and allegiances (Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Hooghe 2001; Kerr 1973; Scully 2001). Supporting these arguments, national officials attending EU committees tend to evoke national senses of belonging more strongly than supranational identities (Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2001b; Trondal and Veggeland 2000).

 

Most of those officials seconded to the Commission are national experts from sector ministries or agencies organised beneath the department level. These officials have permanent positions within national government institutions that are organised according to a sectoral principle. They are thus likely to put particular weight on sectoral identities, considerations and interests. Together, the above arguments suggest that officials seconded to the Commission are likely to enact a mix of national and sectoral allegiances.

 

However, Shore (2000:131) observes that an esprit de corps and a �community method� emerges among new recruits to the permanent staff of the Commission. Similarly, national officials who attend EU committees tend to evoke supranational loyalties (Lewis 2000; Schaefer et al. 2000; Trondal 2001b). Seconded personnel are affiliated to the Commission for longer periods of time than national officials attending EU committees. Seconded personnel are also likely to be involved in the social milieu at the Commission more extensively than EU committee participants. These factors render it likely that seconded personnel construct supranational identifications more strongly than EU committee participants.

 

Moreover, seconded officials on long-term contracts are likely to become re-socialised into supranational actors more strongly than officials on short-term contracts. Officials employed within the Commission for one-year periods, or for even shorter periods of time, are less strongly exposed towards the supranational characteristics of the Commission than officials employed on three-year contracts. Acknowledging this, the Commission argues that secondment contracts �can be so short that they sometimes make it difficult to incorporate the expert effectively into a department or for them to adapt to the working environment in the Commission� (European Commission 1999:63). Seconded personnel are also de-coupled in time and space from domestic institutions and decision-processes, �providing circumstances under which additional identities are more easily evoked� (Egeberg 1999:461).

 

The potential for being affected by particular institutional dynamics partly relates to the duration and intensity of exposure towards certain organisational structures (Checkel 2001a; Risse and Sikkink 1999). The potential for being socialised and re-socialised increases with protracted memberships within organisations (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Checkel 2001b:26; Hooghe 2001). This general argument rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship between the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group take the world for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1991), become victims of �group think� (Janis 1982), or develop particular �community methods� (Lewis 2000). Socialisation is seen as a dynamic process whereby the actors come to identify with their government institution or particular task roles. Socialisation processes are uni-directional in the sense that the �socialisator� educates, indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his norms and ideas to the �socialisee�. The potential for socialisation to occur is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organisational members (Berger and Luckmann 1966:150; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976).

 

According to Ernst Haas (1958), participants become �locked in� and socialised by the sheer intensity of interaction. Similarly, in current neo-functionalist literature the construction of supranational allegiances is also seen as being �a function of the duration of the socialisation impact� (Niemann 1998:437 - emphasis added; McDonald 1997:51). �[T]he relative intensity of transnational activity � broadly determines variations [in supra-nationalism]� (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998:4). According to Deutsch, �common identities are the product of intensive transactions and communications� (Rosamond 2000:46). As such, civil servants are likely to identify with EU institutions due to �daily reinforcement� and intensive exposure towards information, stimuli and decision premises at the EU level (Hooghe 1999b; Kerr 1973; Lodge 1978:241; Scheinman and Feld 1972; Smith 2000:618; Trondal 2001a).

 

Most Commission officials have long working days. They often interact with officials from other nationalities, talk foreign languages or apply �Euro-speak�. According to Shore (2000) �Euro-jargon� and �Commission-speak� characterise the working language used by most Commission officials. Over time, seconded officials are likely to adapt to the same set of grammar and semantics as permanent Commission officials. �Euro-language� may represent an identity-mark that establishes buffers towards the �others� and underscores shared practises among themselves (Bakke 1996:481; Bellier 1997:95). A shared vocabulary contributes to bind actors together and assist in the construction of a distinct European elite (Christiansen, J�rgensen and Wiener 2001:15; Lewis 2001:26).

 

As a consequence of interacting frequently with fellow colleagues within the Commission seconded civil servants are likely to take on supranational identifications (Christiansen 2001). That is, identify with their task role within the DG, with the DG as a whole, with the Commission or with the EU at large. [6] However, some seconded officials also have prior experiences from international organisations, trans-governmental committees and boards, and from the permanent representations in Brussels. Suggestively, prior international experiences might be conducive to supra-nationalism (Hooghe 1999a). However, seconded Commission officials having prior experiences from intergovernmental organisations like NATO or the UN are likely to put less emphasis on supranational allegiances. Moreover, some seconded officials are pre-socialised through their educational background (e.g. the College of Europe, Brugge), or through a multi-national family background. Hence, seconded personnel may have constructed supranational loyalties prior to entering it. According to Page (1997:60), seconded officials generally have contacts with the Commission prior to entering the Commission. Frequently, they �indicate a wish to spend three years in Brussels� (Page 1997:60). This indicates that supranational identities might reflect processes of pre-socialisation as much as processes of re-socialisation. Even more, most Commission officials travel a lot. Suggestively, a high level of cross-border mobility is conducive to the construction of supranational identities.

 

Finally, supranational allegiances might reflect the social and physical environments embedding seconded personnel while staying in Brussels. The physical symbols and artefacts dominating the Commission building remind the seconded staff about their current supranational role. The blue flag with the golden stars in the reception area and in the corridors of the Commission buildings constantly remind the officials of their current �European� affiliation. According to Shore (2000) supranational allegiances also reflect some general social dimensions embedding Commission officials. Seconded personnel live in exile in Brussels, talk several non-native languages, often applying �Euro-talk� or �Commission speak�, socialise with other nationalities, and live in �EU-ghettos� in Brussels. Commission bureaucrats and the Belgian population of Brussels �constitute two parallel social universes� (Ab�l�s, Bellier and McDonald 1993:26). The social environments surrounding seconded officials might be conducive to the evocation of supranational identities. However, many Commission officials also socialise with colleagues of the same nationality and take weekends off in their home country (Stevens and Stevens 2001:132). Hence, they are reminded of their national origins on a daily or weekly basis. Hence, a blend of national and supranational identities is likely to be evoked by seconded Commission personnel. However, the relative primacy of each identity is likely to vary under different institutional conditions.

 

Conclusion

Few studies have empirically penetrated the inner life of the European Commission. The dynamics and behavioural logics predominating this supranational executive have attracted minor scholarly attention. The current study has a dual goal: First, to identify scope conditions rendering the transformative character of the European Commission intelligible. We ask, under what conditions is Commission officials likely to construct or activate supranational roles, identities and loyalties? Second, determining the transformative power of the European Commission is warranted when studying administrative integration across levels of governance. Arguably, the �parallel administration� of the Commission is an important laboratory for studying integration across the EU/nation-state interface.

 

Going beyond a sui generis view of the Commission, the current study applies institutional arguments to account for the transformative power of the Commission. According to the institutional approaches outlined above organisational members often have multiple institutional affiliations that generate multiple cues for action and role enactment. Seconded personnel to the Commission have two major institutional affiliations: the national central administrative system and the European Commission. The former is considered primary to these officials, even after being hired on fixed-term contracts within the Commission. The Commission and the DGs is deemed secondary affiliations to most seconded personnel. Hence, national and sectoral allegiances are likely to exceed supranational allegiances amongst the vast majority of seconded personnel.

 

However, under certain institutional conditions seconded personnel to the Commission are likely to evoke supranational allegiances more vigorously. That is the case among officials employed within national ministries and agencies which are organised according to a sectoral principle, officials on long term contracts with the Commission, officials who have prior experiences from international organisations, who interact intensively with officials from several other nationalities, who apply �Commission-speak�, and who live in typical �EU-ghettos� in Brussels. Together, intensive interaction within the Commission is conducive to supranationalism.

 

The scope conditions outlined above are not exhaustive, only suggestive. Making explicit references to operational dimensions are vital in order to determine the conditions under which institutions matter generally, and in order to identify the conditions under which the European Commission contribute to administrative integration across levels of governance in particular.

 

 Endnotes

 

[1] This paper is financially supported by the ARENA programme (The Norwegian Research Council). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Grenoble, 2001. Thanks to the participants in the workshop �Political Logics within the European Commission�. This paper has also been presented at a publishing seminar at ARENA in 2001. Finally, this paper represents the chosen topic in my defence for the doctoral degree, September 21 - 22 2001. Special thanks to Jeffrey T. Checkel, Thomas Christiansen, Michelle Cini, Helen Drake, Johan P. Olsen, C�cile Robert, Helene Sjursen, Andy Smith and Ulf Sverdrup for valuable comments.

[2] This vision of Jean Monnet largely collided with the wishes of the French government in the 1950s and 1960s. The French government �had made a strong case for the Commission to be comprised solely of temporary officials seconded from national administrations� (Cini 1996:120-121).

[3] The Council of Ministers, the Secretary-General and the European Parliament have �practically no temporary staff� (Bodiguel 1995:451). However, different EU institutions often second officials among themselves (Christiansen 2001).

[4] Seconded personnel might also be parachuted into top positions of the Commission (A1 and A2 positions). Reflecting both individual aspirations, a need for technical expertise from outside the Commission, informal national quota systems, as well as new states joining the EU, �nearly half of senior appointments [in the Commission] are recruited through parachutage� (Hooghe 1999a:399 � original emphasis). Even more, the vast majority of those parachuted to the Commission are national civil servants (Page 1997:85).

[5] Supranational allegiances are likely to be severely challenged in situations where national interests are at stake (Egeberg 1996:725).

[6] Middlemas (1995:263) assumes that supranational loyalties will emerge more strongly amongst observers of the EU than amongst the �practitioners� themselves. �To them should be added academic commentators in the field of business studies and public administration� (Middlemas 1995:263).

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