ARENA Working Papers
Taking Deliberation Seriously Jeffrey T. Checkel ARENA University of Oslo First presented at a workshop on "Ideas, Discourse and European Integration," European Union Center, Harvard University, 11-12 May 2001. Thanks to Andreas Føllesdal, Johan P. Olsen, Thomas Risse and Martha Snodgrass for helpfull comments and suggestions. |
Introduction
For political
theorists, Europeanists and constructivists within international-relations
(IR) theory, deliberation is a process with potentially transformative
effects.� Indeed, students
of deliberation are very open to the possibility that social agents
may leave an interaction different from how they entered it.� However, these commonsensical insights hide
a good deal of controversy and gloss over unresolved analytic challenges.� For example, is deliberation always a �good�
thing?� What theories and -
equally important - methods should be used to study it?� Just how prevalent is it in contemporary Europe?� Can deliberative dynamics partly be captured
by more nuanced versions of rational-choice theory? My intention
is not to provide comprehensive answers to these (and many other!)
issues.� Instead, I �take deliberation
seriously� by asking three questions whose goal is to bring its study
down to an operational, real-world level.�
Empirically, do deliberative dynamics ever
occur?� Theoretically, what toolkits are available for their study?� Methodologically,
whatever the toolkit employed, how would we recognize deliberation
if we saw it?
[1]
![endif]>![if> A Definition and a Clarification
As much
of the recent EU work draws on the deliberative democracy tradition
in political theory, I turn there for a foundational definition.� According to Rawls, when agents deliberate:
This
description has strengths and weaknesses.�
On the plus side, it is consistent with the intuitive insights
with which we began: Deliberation is a (potentially) transformative
process.� To an IR theorist, it is thus one possible
social setting where the core properties - preferences or interests
- of individuals may come to be reshaped.� A clear weakness is
that such a definition underspecifies the precise causal mechanisms
underlying this �exchange [of] views and debate� among social agents.� While
many equate deliberation with arguing (Eriksen and Fossum 2000, 44-45,
for example), I will suggest below this is at best a starting point for theorizing such transformative
dynamics. The clarification concerns the
particular understanding of deliberation on offer here.� My concern is to explore its causal role within
institutions, and not in the broader setting of the public sphere.� While deliberative dynamics in the latter are
surely important in both Europe (Schlesinger and Kevin 2000; Risse
2001) and elsewhere (Lynch 1999), the macro-focus inevitably short-changes
the micro - in particular, the specific micro-mechanisms that can
lead to a change in agent preferences.�
Moreover, the EU�s densely institutionalized structure would
seem an ideal laboratory and �social soil within which actors� preferences
might be transformed� (Caporaso and Jupille 1999, 440) - that is,
where deliberation within institutions might have causal effect. The Empirical RealityDoes deliberation - understood
as a process during which social agents may come to change their preferences
- ever happen?� I have two
answers: �Of course!� and �Well, maybe.��
The former is simply an observation based on an empirical case
I know well - myself.� Indeed, I have often been in situations approximating
the deliberative ideal, where I debate with colleagues, provide justifications
for my views and, in some instances, reconsider my basic interests
on an issue. The more hesitant answer is my
response to the EU literature that talks about deliberation.� While many Europeanists have drawn intriguing
connections between the Union�s decentralized, multi-level, polyarchy
and a enhanced role for deliberation, there is surprisingly little
robust empirical verification that the latter does occur.� By �robust,� I mean that the empirical work
of which I am aware fails to employ a transparent research methodology,
where the data (and their
limitations) are clearly identified, proxies for measuring deliberation
are established and alternative explanations are considered.�
Lacking this, it is difficult for other scholars to see deliberation�s
causal role (Joerges and Neyer 1997a, b; see also Joerges and Everson
2000, 182-85). In addition, much of the EU research
on deliberation has been normative in nature, exploring the case for
it in restoring a greater sense of legitimacy to the European project.� This is an important analytic concern in its
own right, one that has led scholars to suggest new strategies for
repairing the Union�s democracy deficit (Eriksen and Fossum 2001).� Unfortunately, it has left us no closer to
an empirically testable deliberative research program. A final reason for skepticism
concerns the results of my own work.�
As part of a larger project on norm compliance in post-Cold
War Europe, I have theorized and empirically reconstructed deliberation�s
causal role in small-group settings at the European level - in my
case, committees within the Council of Europe, the main European rights
institution.� Operationalizing deliberation as attempts at
persuasion, I have discovered the latter occurs only under certain
conditions - marked by de-politicization and privacy, for example
(Checkel 2000a, b; Idem 2001b). In sum, the empirical answer
is �yes and no,� which will come as no surprise to any scholar who
has sought to operationalize and test ideal types.�
However, the conclusion is not to dismiss deliberation as causally
irrelevant, but to explore and theorize conditions of scope and domains
of validity.� That is, when and under what conditions will deliberation have causal force
in changing people�s minds? The
Theoretical (Micro) Gap
To answer such questions, work
on deliberation must move from the realm of meta- or political theory
to the practical level, addressing the tough �why, how and when� issues.� Two examples suggest the importance of the
latter move.� Some proponents
of deliberation argue that individuals must share a �common life world�
for it to occur (Risse 2000, for an excellent and nuanced discussion).� From what does such a life world derive?�
Professionalization into common community norms is one answer,
while, in other cases, it is created by repeated meetings over time
- say, in the Comitology procedures under the Commission and Council.�
Thus, it is in part the duration of contact that promotes deliberative
forms of interaction.� This is a plausible hypothesis, yet it fails
to control for an equally likely result of prolonged exposure: decoupling.� The longer a social agent resides in a particular
setting or unit, the more he/she learns �to just talk the talk.�� Such behavior may shield an actor from the
deliberative force of group arguments.
[2]
![endif]>![if> In addition, many claim that
deliberation leads to a better outcome, a consensus reached through
principled debate instead of a crude aggregation of interests.� Maybe, but, then again, maybe not.� Deliberation implies an intense exchange of opinions and debate,
which sometimes occurs among a small group of individuals.� Social psychologists have developed a robust
experimental literature for describing what happens in such situations:
�group think� (t�Hart, Stern and Sundelius 1997).�
By leading a group to ignore certain arguments or options,
group think would likely produce a sub-optimal
outcome.� Again, the point
is not to suggest that deliberation never occurs; rather, without
further elaboration as a substantive theory, it is not clear how one
would distinguish or predict the good deliberative outcome from the
bad group-think one. For students of deliberation
within institutions, these examples suggest that more attention must
be payed to the micro-mechanisms in such processes.�
The good news is that several literatures in the broader discipline
might be especially helpful in this regard.�
Below, I briefly consider three: work by IR constructivists
on Habermasian communicative rationality; research by social psychologists
on persuasion and social influence; and arguments drawn from institutional
theory.� All these literatures
provide more systematic insight into the basic assumption of the deliberative
school: that social communication can bring about changes in the core
properties of actors. IR Theory and Habermas.� In recent years, IR scholars have theorized and begun to operationalize
the argumentative motor that lies at the heart of many deliberative
frameworks.� Explicitly drawing
upon Habermasian notions of communicative rationality (Risse 2000;
Lynch 1999; see also Reus-Smit 1997), these analysts have not only
addressed the difficult issues that arise when one moves from theoretical
ideal types to the real world (for example, that few social agents
really share a common life world).�
Equally important, in social-theoretic terms, they have decisively
broken with �either/or� reasoning - either deliberative arguing or
strategic bargaining, say - and begun to develop synthetic frameworks.3 The latter has inevitably focused
attention on the development of scope conditions - for example, that
deliberative argumentation is more likely in non-hierarchical, network-like
settings or where agents operate in situations marked by a high degree
of international institutionalization.�
Of course, the methodologically-inclined scholar will note
that such conditions are imprecise, fuzzy and, thus, non-falsifiable.� While this may be true at present, several empirical projects underway
are designed precisely to test and refine such propositions.4 Social Psychology and Persuasion.� The starting point for much of this literature
is that the �power of the better argument� thesis advanced by students
of deliberation (Eriksen and Fossum 2000, xii, for example) is underspecified.�
In part, this is a real-world response to Habermasian claims,
where many who conduct field work have discovered that it is not the
force of the better argument that changes minds, but the persuasive
appeal of one�s interlocutor (the persuader) and the open-mindedness
of the persuasion target (the persuadee).� The most morally compelling or logically correct
argument may matter little if it is advanced by a weak debater, or
is presented to an individual with deeply held and countervailing
beliefs.� A second reason for the turn to persuasion
is more substantive, with several scholars suggesting that, if one
examines Habermasian arguments carefully, most of the causal weight
falls on (unspecified) mechanisms of persuasion (Lynch 1999, chapter
1; Checkel 2001b). Persuasion can be defined as
a social
process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause
and effect in the absence of overt coercion (Checkel 2001b, 13).� While the social psychology literature on persuasion
is mainly laboratory-experimental (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991; Brody,
Mutz and Sniderman 1996), it does highlight a key point: Persuasion
does not always change minds.� Using these experimental insights as a starting
point, recent work by IR scholars has documented that persuasion is
more likely to work in particular contexts, defined by cognitive uncertainty
and noviceness on the part of the persuadee, in-group status of the
persuader and, more generally, in less politicized and more insulated,
in-camera settings (Johnston 2001; Idem nd; Gheciu 2001; Checkel
2001b; Finnemore nd, chapter 5; see also Chayes and Chayes 1995). Precisely because these are scope
conditions, they open up analytic space for strategic perspectives
to play a role in deliberative settings.�
For example, if several of the conditions do not hold (Checkel
2001b, for details), the process is more likely be driven by the manipulative
use of persuasive appeals (Payne 2001) or by rhetorical action - the
strategic use of norms and arguments (Schimmelfennig 2000; Idem
2001).5 Institutional Theory and Multiple
Embeddedness.� With its emphasis on the role of agent noviceness,
persuasion research begins to explore an issue largely ignored by
deliberative and argumentative accounts.�
Simply put, social actors, when entering a (possible) deliberative
setting at the European level, are in no sense free agents; they arrive
with a certain background. Institutional theorists studying
the EU most systematically explore this issue of background conditions.�
Their starting point is that individuals are embedded in multiple
international and domestic organizational contexts.� However, these analysts go an important step further, theorizing
and documenting how particular features of domestic and Europeanization
organizations can hinder or promote preference and identity change
within, say, the Commission (Egeberg 1999; Idem 2000; Hooghe
2001).6 The validity of the institutional
arguments is bolstered by the degree to which they overlap with those
drawn from other research traditions.�
Symbolic interactionists have theorized this same notion of
multiple embeddedness in terms of role conflict (Stryker 1980; Barnett
1993; see also Meyer and Strang 1993).�
More important, these insights are supported by a new generation
of methodologically rigorous work on socialization in central EU institutions
(Beyers 1998; Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Idem 1998).� This research has consistently shown that the
possibility of preference change at the European level is heavily
influenced by the amount of prior, national pre-socialization. Summary.� Europeanists who study deliberation could benefit in two ways from
the literature surveyed above.� The
work on arguing and persuasion operationalizes the central processual claim of deliberationists: that the very process of social
communication can lead to a change in core actor properties.� Institutional arguments on embeddedness help
to specify the initial conditions
prior to the onset of deliberation. The Methodological ChallengesOn the research methodology of
deliberation, it is necessary to address and rebut two strikingly
similar claims - advanced from opposite ends of the epistemological
spectrum.� Each revolves around individual agents and
their intentions, that is, the extent to which one needs �to get inside
people�s heads� when studying the causal motors of deliberation.� Choice-theoretic critics will claim such an
exercise is impossible, while deliberation theorists will say it is
not necessary.� Both are wrong. Any response to the former must
begin with a clarification.� The
claim here is not that we must get inside heads when studying deliberation;
rather, we should and can shrink the black box that has been built
around the actual deliberative process.�
Much of the research cited above is performing precisely this
�shrinking� exercise.� These
scholars employ a process-tracing methodology, triangulate across
multiple data streams, consider alternative explanations and, where
appropriate, conduct counterfactual analysis - all aimed at understanding
better the conditions under which and the mechanisms through which
deliberation-arguing-persuasion occur.� That is, they have gone some way toward answering
a key question: How would we recognize deliberation if we saw it? Of course, all this hard work
will never �prove� that deliberation has occurred (Joerges and Everson
2000, 183).� Then again, one
should bear in mind that no social science ever proves anything!� Rather, the methodological challenge is to enhance the plausibility
of one�s findings and reduce problems of validity. The argument made by students
of deliberation is different.� They
claim that we need not care about what people really think; it is
what they say that matters (Risse 2001, 2, 5, for example). �I have encountered this stance on numerous occasions and do not understand
it.� How can we make claims
that �the force of the better argument� has led social actors to alter
their preferences when we only look at what they say?� How does such an approach control for the possibility that individuals
have strategically deployed arguments in an attempt to manipulate
others (Schimmelfennig 1999; Idem 2001)? For sure, one has Elster�s notion
of �the civilizing force of hypocrisy� (Elster 1998, 109-112), which
is often invoked by deliberative scholars.�
This is a claim that, even if a social agent is using arguments
strategically, their public utterance - that is, publicity - can have
a �civilizing� force on his/her more self-interested instincts.� That is, what starts out as strategic behavior
(a) may later lead to preference change (b).� Well maybe.� However, absent
some theoretical explanation for how we get from (a) to (b), and,
more important, empirical evidence that such a dynamic ever really
occurs, this claim should be treated with skepticism.7 There is an even more basic problem
with bracketing agent motivation and intention when studying deliberation.�
We do not study deliberation simply for deliberation�s sake.�
Rather, as deliberative scholars make clear (Eriksen and Fossum
2000, chapter 1), we examine it as part of a larger concern with social
order and compliance.� If this
is the case, then let�s consider three ideal-typical ways in which
order and compliance occur: an agent is coerced; he/she complies out
of self-interest; or he/she complies because it is the legitimate
and appropriate thing to do.� The causal mechanisms of compliance in these
three instances are very different: force; incentives; and internalization.8� It seems intuitively obvious that the durability of compliance and social order will vary significantly
between the second and third mechanisms.�
With the second, which corresponds to Elster�s �civilizing
force,� compliance will be tenuous as an agent will calculate differently
when the incentive structure changes.�
However, once internalization occurs, compliance will become
more robust and enduring (see also Follesdal 2000, 91-92). In sum, given their own professed
concerns, students of deliberation do need to care whether the �force of the better argument� has convinced
someone (internalization) or whether arguments are being deployed
strategically (incentives).� And,
methodologically, this will require greater attention to agent motivation. Conclusions Why Going Micro Isn�t Such a
Bad Thing.� This move to the micro-level by students of
deliberation could have four benefits.�
First, it minimizes reliance on �as if� assumptions in theorizing
deliberative dynamics - that is, agents acting as if they have been
persuaded by the force of the better argument.�
While it is true that we can never get inside people�s heads,
the work cited above, by being methodologically self conscious and
employing multiple data streams, has demonstrated that the choice-theoretic
criticism of the impossibility of measuring preference change is no
longer tenable.� Second, an agency focus will force students of deliberation to contextualize
their claims.� In particular,
much of the IR and social psychology literature surveyed earlier is
cast explicitly in terms of scope, asking about the conditions under
which persuasion (say) will change an actor�s preferences.� Given that more and more students of deliberation recognize that
their perspective supplements
- but does not replace - strategic approaches, greater attention to
questions of scope and boundary would seem essential. Third, emphasizing the micro-level
can promote theoretical bridge building.� Indeed, in adopting a micro-focus, the work referenced above is
moving onto the �home turf� of rational choice.� It has thus theorized and documented not only �sincere� argumentation
and persuasion in the deliberative process, but also the strategic
use of norms and arguments and the manipulative use of persuasive
appeals (see also Riker 1986).� From
a problem-driven perspective, there is absolutely nothing wrong with
such findings!� They hold the
potential for opening a much-overdue dialogue with students of rational
choice (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). Finally, the micro-perspective
outlined here is mundane and �nitty gritty� in its attention to empirical
operationalization and research methodology.�
It thus complements other work by Europeanists on deliberation,
which tends to be more normative in orientation.�
While the latter is often - and appropriately - visionary in
nature, suggesting, say, how deliberation could help resolve the EU�s
growing legitimacy crisis, it comes up short at the operational -
�how do we do it� - level. Remaining Challenges.� Of course, problems remain, with three being most central.� First, this emphasis on the micro has come
at the expense of the macro.� In
particular, social and material power receive insufficient attention.� Do deliberative outcomes ever not coincide with the interests of materially
powerful states in the EU?� In
a particular small group setting, what makes an argument prevail?�
Is it simply the force of the better argument?�
Or, does it have more to do with whether an agent�s arguments
resonate and are thus legitimated by broader social discourses?�
Answers to this last question would likely necessitate attention
to a literature I have bracketed throughout this essay: work on deliberation
in public spheres. Second, most of the deliberation
studied by the scholars surveyed here is one-way.� That is, the causal arrows run from one agent,
whose properties are temporarily fixed, to another, who is the target
of argumentation or persuasive appeals (Checkel 2001b, for example).� Yet, this research design violates the true
deliberative ideal, where the preferences of all agents are (potentially) up for redefinition.� The failure to capture these more complex social
settings arises partly for practical reasons: Process-tracing methodologies
are resource and time intensive, and one can do only so much in a
given project. Epistemology plays a role as
well, however.� Most of the
scholars discussed above operate within a positivist framework; for
their analyses to work, something - one social agent�s preferences
- has to held constant for the causal mapping to proceed.� More interpretative epistemologies might better
capture the recursive dynamics among multiple, arguing agents.� Unfortunately, answers to the why and how of
deliberation would then be lost. Third, other techniques are needed
as a supplement to the interviews that figure prominently in this
micro-deliberation research.� Possibilities
include cognitive mapping, the adoption of interview methodologies
from clinical psychology, and utilizing content analysis techniques
that isolate argument structures.�
All three would serve to reduce the reliability problems that
arise from the attempt to get inside heads, as it were.10 Deliberation and Enlargement.� Contemporary Europe is a gold mine for testing and refining hypotheses
on the role of deliberation-arguing-persuasion in changing actor preferences
or promoting compliance and social order.� �Europe� here means both West and East Europe, for the reality of
enlargement will force students of deliberation to rethink their core
arguments. Vast power differentials between East and West, dramatically
differing degrees of domestic institutional embeddedness, great variance
in the degree of agent noviceness, allegedly very different common
life worlds - exploring these (and other) factors should lead to more
fine-grained theses on how and when social communication can indeed
change minds.
References
Beyers, Jan. 1998. �Where does Supranationalism Come
from? The Ideas Floating through the Working Groups of the Council
of the European Union.� Paper presented at the Third Pan-European
Conference on International Relations, Vienna (September).
Beyers, Jan and Guido Dierickx. 1997. �Nationality and
European Negotiations: The Working Groups of the Council of Ministers.�
European Journal of International Relations 3 (December).
-------. 1998. �The Working Groups of the Council of
the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?�
Journal of Common Market Studies 36: 289-317.
Bohman, James. 1998. �Survey Article: The Coming of Age
of Deliberative Democracy.� Typescript, Department of Philosophy,
Saint Louis University (May).
Brody, Richard, Diana Mutz and Paul Sniderman, Editors.
1996. Political Persuasion and Attitude Change. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Caporaso, James and Joseph Jupille. 1999. �Institutionalism
and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative
Politics.� Annual Review of Political Science 2:429-44.
-------.
2000. �Integrating Institutions: Theory, Method and the Study of the
European Union.� Typescript (24 December).
Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. The
New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2000a. "Building New
Identities? Debating Fundamental Rights in European Institutions."
Working Paper 00/12. Oslo: ARENA/Universitetet i Oslo (July).
-------. 2000b. �Compliance and Conditionality.� Working
Paper 00/18. Oslo: ARENA/Universitetet i Oslo (September).
-------. 2001a. �International Institutions and Socialization
in the New Europe - Chapter 1: Introduction.� Paper prepared for the
ARENA/IDNET Second Project Workshop, European University Institute
(18-19 May).
-------. 2001b. �Why Comply? Social Learning and European
Identity Change.� International Organization (forthcoming).
Checkel,
Jeffrey T. and Andrew Moravcsik. 2001. �A Constructivist Research
Program in EU Studies?� (Forum
Debate) European Union Politics 2 (June).
Egeberg,
Morten. 1999. �Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role
Perceptions of National Officials in EU Decision-Making.� Journal
of European Public Policy 6 (September): 456-74.
-------.
2000. �What Organization Tells Us about Preference and Identity Formation:
EU Committees and National Officials.� Paper prepared for the ARENA/IDNET
First Project Workshop, Universitetet i Oslo (June).
Elster, Jon, Editor. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Fossum, Editors. 2000.
Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?
London: Routledge.
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and John Fossum. 2001. �Post‑National
Legitimacy in the EU?� Typescript, ARENA/Universitetet i Oslo (February).
Finnemore,
Martha. N.D. The Purpose of Force.�
Ithaca: Cornell University Press (forthcoming).
Follesdal, Andreas. 2000. �Subsidiarity and Democratic
Deliberation.� In Democracy in the European Union: Integration
through Deliberation?, edited by Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John
Fossum. London: Routledge.
Freeman, Samuel, Editor. 1999. John Rawls: Collected
Papers.� Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Gheciu,
Alexandra. 2001. �The Long Road to Tomorrow: NATO, International
Socialization and the Politics of State Crafting in Post-Cold War
Central and Eastern Europe.� Paper presented at the International
Studies Association Annual Convention (February).
Hooghe,
Liesbet. 2001. �Top Commission Officials on Capitalism: An Institutionalist
Understanding of Preferences.� In The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist
Approaches to the Study of Europe, edited by Mark Aspinwall and
Gerald Schneider. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Hurd,
Ian. 1999. �Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.� International
Organization 53 (Spring).
Joerges,
Christian and Juergen Neyer. 1997a. �From Intergovernmental Bargaining
to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of
Comitology.� European Law Journal 3 (September).
-------.
1997b. �Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving:
European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector.� Journal of European
Public Policy 4 (December).
Joerges, Christian and Michelle Everson. 2000. �Challenging
the Bureaucratic Challenge.� In Democracy in the European Union:
Integration through Deliberation?, edited by Erik Oddvar Eriksen
and John Fossum. London: Routledge.
Johnston,
Alastair Iain. 2001. �Treating Institutions as Social Environments.�
Typescript, Department of Government, Harvard University (March).
-------.
N.D. Social States: China in International Institutions. Princeton:
Princeton University Press (forthcoming).
Katzenstein, Peter, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner,
Editors. 1998. �International
Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study
of World Politics.� Special Issue of International Organization
52 (Autumn).
Lynch, Marc. 1999. State Interests and Public Spheres:
The International Politics of Jordan�s Identity. NY: Columbia
University Press.
Meyer,
John and David Strang. 1993. �Institutional Conditions for Diffusion.�
Theory and Society 22 (August).
Olsen, Johan P. 2001. �Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism
and the Study of Politics.� American Political Science Review
95 (March).
Payne,
Rodger. 2001. �Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction.� European
Journal of International Relations 7 (March).
Reus-Smit,
Christian. 1997. �The Constitutional Structure of International Society
and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions.� International Organization
51 (Autumn).
Riker, William. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Risse, Thomas. 2000. �>Let�s Argue!�: Communicative
Action in World Politics.� International Organization 54 (Winter).
-------. 2001. �Is Transnational Deliberation Possible
in Europe?� Paper prepared for a workshop on �Ideas, Discourse and
European Integration,� European Union Center, Harvard University (11-12
May).
Risse,
Thomas, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, Editors. 1999. The Power
of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Schimmelfennig,
Frank. 1999. �The Double Puzzle of Enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical
Action and the Decision to Expand to the East.� Working Paper No.15.
Oslo: ARENA/Universitetet i Oslo (June). -------.
2000. �International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action
in an Institutional Environment.� European Journal of International
Relations 6 (March).
-------.
2001. �The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.� International Organization
55 (Winter).
Schlesinger, Philip and Deirdre Kevin. 2000. �Can the
European Union become a Sphere of Publics?� In Democracy in the
European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, edited by Erik
Oddvar Eriksen and John Fossum. London: Routledge.
Stryker, Sheldon. 1980. Symbolic Interactionism: A
Social Structural Perspective. Reading, MA: Benjamin-Cummings.
t�Hart,
Paul, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, Editors. 1997. Beyond Groupthink:
Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Trondal, Jarle. 2000. �Explaining Supra-Nationalism:
The Transformative Character of EU Committees.� Paper prepared for
the ARENA/IDNET First Project Workshop, Universitetet i Oslo (June).
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zimbardo,
Philip and Michael Leippe. 1991. The Psychology of Attitude Change
and Social Influence. NY: McGraw Hill.
Notes
|