Norway: Insider AND Outsider*
Svein S. Andersen**
Recently , there was a conference about Scenarios for Norwegian development. The objective was to evaluate how well the scenarios for year 2000 painted in the late 1980s hit their target. At the same time new scenarios were sketched pointing towards 2020. There are many things to be said about such exercises. The point is simply that no one mentioned the EU, or the types of changes that are taking place in the EU, as a context for the Norwegian development.
The focus of this presentation is Norway's relationship to the EU ? and particularly the EEA - over the last 5 years. It is not meant to be a detailed evaluation of effects stemming from Norway's special relationship to the EU. Rather, it will focus on some key elements and examples, to characterise the Norwegian situation within a Nordic context. I will focus on five major points.
1. Degrees and forms of EU membership
Finland and Norway relationship to the EU would make for an interesting comparison. The Finnish perspective is forward-looking, strategic and about how Finland can shape the development in the EU. The Norwegian perspective is more `here and now', it is not clear what the strategy is, but it is clear that the focus is mainly on implications for Norway. A major objective is to preserve status quo as much as possible. Norway wants to achieve this by being both an outsider (non-member) AND an insider who is able to participate in important areas of EU co-operation though special institutional arrangements, most notably the EEA and so-called Schengen agreement. Interestingly enough, Finland is one of the countries that has been least indulgent with this mixed Norwegian strategy.
A comparison with Finland, or any of the other Nordic EU members, tends to emphasise that Norway is an outsider ? a non-member. The idea about a Europe with different speeds of European integration indicates that EU membership may be a matter of degree even for member countries. Denmark and Sweden are members with reservations about parts of the EU co-operation, such as the EMU and also in relation to the development of CFSP. But in bot cases their arguments and formal reservations differ. Norway and Iceland are outsiders, but participating in key areas of EU co-operation, most notably through EEA and the Schengen co-operation. Also, they would like to develop more arrangements of this nature . The either ? or perspective on membership is also modified if we look at popular support for EU-membership in the Nordic countries.
The Norwegian relation to the EU ? as both outsider AND insider - over the last five years can be summarised as follows: Norway has been an activist for institutional innovations concerning the boundarie(s) between the EU and EFTA countries. A key challenge has been to provide access to areas of EU co-operation, while at the same time protecting the formal autonomy and democracy on a national level. However, the intense search for a formal framework which allows for freedom of action is not matched by everyday efforts. The EEA agreement is the most important part of Norway's relationship to the EU, and the implications are considerable, both for various policy sectors and for the economy. By and large such changes have created surprisingly few conflicts, considering the intense debate over so-called 'EU-adaptation' in the early 1990s. A key question is whether the EEA, and the Schengen co-operation agreement, can survive in the long run and even be supplemented by similar arrangements in other areas. Alternatively, such arrangements may become the victims of EU-dynamics related to deepening and widening of policies and enlargement.
The rest of this presentation will focus on three aspects of Norway's relationship to the EU:1) The formal framework, 2) effects on national sovereignty and democracy and 3) effects for economy and society.
2. The formal framework: Norway as an activist for new institutional arrangements between national sovereignty and supranational authority
Norway's relationship to the EU fits a historical pattern, when it comes to forms of international co-operation. This pattern ? characterised as nationalistic internationalism ? has two elements: 1) In principle, Norway is for all kinds of international co-operation, but 2) the forms of such co-operation is often problematic. Participation will therefore often be reluctant and a central concern is to find special institutional arrangements ? and special solutions (Lundestad 1985).
This generalisation does not only hold for Norway's relationship to the EU, but most forms of international co-operation after the Second World War. In NATO Norway wanted special arrangements for NATO bases. When the International Energy Agency was created Norway reluctantly became an associated member. In 1972 even those strongly for Norwegian membership in the EC wanted lasting special arrangements in the areas of fisheries and agriculture (Lundestad 1985: 45).
Norway has also chosen to be formally outside the EU, but it has been very active in constructing new institutional arrangements that allow EFTA-countries to participate in key areas in ways that protect formal autonomy and sovereignty.
Norway played an important role in the creation of the EEA from 1989 and later in developing the agreement between the EFTA and the Schengen countries.
Initiatives were taken last during winter 1998/99 to achieve some kind of link between the Norwegian krone and the Euro, but in this case the EU would not accept a mixed affiliation (individual or as part of EU/EFTA-arrangement). Presently, this is not a domestic political issue.
In relation to the CFSP, Norway again faces the same challenge, and here it may be possible to find arrangements that allow for continued influence in NATO although NATO will be more and more linked to the EU and (possibly) dominated by a few major EU countries. With respect to this, the present Finnish EU-presidency has been quite clear. The Norwegian wish to use the EEA and Schengen agreements as models for Norway's relation to the CFSP is not an option. Also other central EU countries are sceptical to new special arrangements for Norway and other EFTA countries . The exact arrangement for non-EU countries that are NATO members remains to be seen.
EEA and Schengen are as much a solution to domestic Norwegian political problems as functional arrangement for Norway's relation to the EU. A key design principle behind these arrangements is that they should allow for participation in key areas of EU co-operation on the basis of one common set of rules, while at the same time in principle providing Norway with formal sovereignty and room for strong national democratic processes. For those opposing EU-membership it was the final stop, for the others it was just temporary stop on the way to full EU-membership. What characterises this position of being outside AND inside the EU's institutional structure?
One important characteristic of the EEA and Schengen is that they differ from conventional international agreement: They are both a legal and institutional framework, on the one hand, and living relationships or partnerships, on the other hand. At the same time they are linked to the overall structure and dynamics of the EU project. The latter is particularly well illustrated by the Schengen co-operation:
The Schengen co-operation started in 1985 as co-operation between Benelux, France and Germany. The Schengen Convention from 1990 opened for new members from the EU. When Denmark wanted to be an observer and later a member in 1994, this threatened the Nordic co-operation in this area. In 1995 negotiations were opened between the Schengen countries and the Nordic countries. The Norwegian parliament ratified the first Schengen agreement June 9 1997, but with the conclusion of the Amsterdam treaty negotiations on June 16-17th, the formal basis for co-operation changed even before it could be implemented.
A basis for Norway (and Iceland's) original agreement with the Schengen countries was that the EFTA- countries were to meet with the so-called Executive Committee before Schengen decisions were made. With the Amsterdam treaty the Schengen agreement was linked to the formal EU co-operation, and parts of it (ex. border control) became integrated in the first pillar. This also meant that the Council now became the decision-making body. Still, the understanding during the second round of negotiations was that the EFTA countries should be able to participate in pre-meetings ? but not as members of the Council. This was accepted for the German Presidency. However, the Finnish presidency decided to change the sequence, so that the EFTA countries only meet their EU counterparts after the EU decisions have been made. This is currently a contested issue.
EEA and Schengen were born out of a complicated domestic political situation in some EFTA-countries and the dynamic of European integration. They reflect that status quo was no alternative. Relating to a dynamic integration process is quite different from a traditional international agreement. The gain was the creation of legal forms which allow inclusion in collective arrangements without formal loss of sovereignty. The price was a reinforcement of the small-country predicament: to be policy taker, but not policy maker.
Eivind Smith ? a Norwegian authority on constitutional law - has called the Norwegian agreement with the Schengen countries ? especially when it was moved into the EU treaty ? a `constitutional disaster', for the following reasons:
- the Norwegian Parliament is suspended as legislative authority
- the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is blurred'
- the principle about public openness is in reality excluded.
The same could also be said about the EEA-agreement, and below we will take a closer look at how principal motivations behind the EEA arrangement has been pursued in everyday policies.
3. Preserving sovereignty and democratic process within the EEA framework is difficult, but are politicians really trying?
When Norway was formally outside the EU-system ? before EEA and Schengen ? there was an intense debate over Norway's relationship to the EU. Key arguments on both sides emphasised the need to preserve autonomy and democracy. Those in favour argued that only membership could accommodate such challenges in today's world. The opponents argued that it could only be dealt with outside the EU. The EEA and Schengen agreements were compromises. The EEA agreement provides Norway with access to the internal market and to aspects of decision shaping in this area, but it also places Norway in a peripheral position in the EU decision-making system.
The formal arrangement may be regarded as an attempt to uphold a formal political system boundary, but at the same time accepting the impact of EU decisions in key areas. Also within the EU we find that some countries have reservations with respect to parts of the EU integration, like Denmark and Britain. In these cases, however, we find that there is a lively national debate and efforts have been made to organise parliamentary and administrative processes in a way which strengthen the national input to the EU system.
Within the EEA we can distinguish between two types of active influence over EU decision-making. One is within the formal framework, and this is mainly related to the early stages of legislation within working groups and committees under the Commission. The other is the informal political influence within the general 'partnership' relation implied by the EEA-treaty. The formal procedure provides Norway with very limited space for influence, and the possibilities for informal influence are not fully exploited. The general picture is that EU-adaptation takes place with little active involvement except for areas of confrontation, i.e. oil and gas and salmon export (Andersen 1999).
Norway has an asymmetric relationship to the EU in that Norway in most other areas are of marginal importance to the EU. On the other hand, the general relationship to the EU is coloured by the political confrontation over key sectors. Loss of sovereignty and democratic deficit is partly self-inflicted; politicians are not actively using the space for influence/ autonomy. And, interestingly enough, this is not an issue for either party in the conflict over EU membership.
If we look at the public debate ? as reflected in the most influential newspapers the picture is very striking. Due to modern technology it is now possible to make simple counts of how often the EU and EU-related issues are mentioned in the most important newspapers . If we look at how often the word EU appears alone, or in relation to words like sovereignty, freedom of action and democracy over the years, the pattern is very simple and clear. The word EU (EC) started to appear around 1984 and the count per year than grew steadily until 1992 ? to about 3000. The count then fell a little before reaching a peak in 1994 ? of about 4000. After that there was a rapid fall to a little less than 1/3 of this level, and there it has stayed since (figure 1). A similar crude count of newspaper articles in Denmark and Sweden over the show that the numbers of references to EU are between 2 and 3 times as high as in Norway, and it has not changed much since the referendums.
Random checks show that articles about the EU also are relatively brief and more often than not about event in the EU than about Norway's relationship to the EU. If we look at articles mentioning both the EU and `freedom of action' the count fell from a little less than 50 in 1994 to 3 in 1998 and 2 in 1999. The number of references to democracy has also fallen to about 1/3 of the 1994 level (from 262 to 82), but again random checks suggest that it is mostly the development in Brussels and not Norway's relationship to the EU, which is the focus of most articles. A most striking characteristic is that the media's use of partisan comments to contextualise new items seems to be the exception rather than the rules.
Lack of public debate and this is not compensated for by active, but silent, work of central political-administrative system:
The EEA agreement means that Norway has limited formal rights to politically influence legislation within the economic area. Experts may participate in expert groups and committees under the Commission. Such committees are important sources of information about ongoing EU decision-making. This opens for active lobbying and it facilitates later implementation. However, there are generally little efforts from Norwegian authorities to influence, as mentioned above (Veggeland 1999). Direct political influence on the EUs decision-making in the early stages of EU decision-making has to take the forms of bi-lateral lobbying. The Norwegian politicians only have a formal role to play when the EU has passed a directive and then sends it over to the EEA-Committee. The Committee may accept it or veto it, and if the latter happens it will have consequences for all EEA countries. However, it would be more accurate to call this a limited unilateral reservation right, since a so-called veto will not influence the position of a directive in the EU.
The decision to accept a proposal is taken by national parliaments. In Norway the parliamentary EEA committee prepares such decisions.
So far the right to veto has not been used. An important reason for this is that it could result in countermeasures from the EU, and indeed threaten the whole EEA-arrangement. This constraint is the background for the unlikely event of last November (1998) when Centre Party members of the minority coalition government and the parliamentary group of the Centre Party voted against it's own government's proposal to accept the so-called `veterinary directive'. This they could do, knowing that the opposition parties would create the necessary majority.
Norway has been openly critical to several EU directives, and this has been possible partly because there has been internal conflicts among EU countries. Norway has worked hard to get exceptions from three directives regulating additives in food production. This directive has been controversial and it has been `in the pipe-line' for 3-4 years. Also Denmark has been working for similar exception, arguing on the basis of the EU environmental guaranty which says that individual countries should be able to introduce stricter standards. In a meeting on October 26 (1999) the Danish request was refused, and it therefore seems very unlikely that Norway will be able to achieve its objectives as well. This area was one where the government had signalled that the use of veto would be seriously considered if exceptions were not accepted. However, recently (Aftenposten October 28 1999) the position of government representatives was modified. Veto now did not seem as likely `if negotiations with the Commission were not successful!' . If this is correct the threat to use the EEA veto may have been mainly tactical. However, it also signals a change among parties that are against EU membership and sceptical to the EEA-agreement. During the 1997 election all party leaders in the present government coalition `promised' a veto if necessary changes were not achieved
A study from the ARENA-programme shows that top politicians in the Parliament show limited interest the national EEA committee, since directives are already decided in the EU before they reach this point in the decision-making process. The authors, Trond Nordby and Frode Veggeland (1999) characterise this as the suspension of legislative authority. Between 1994 and 1997 more than 2200 'legal acts' were incorporated with almost no debate, about 80 per cent as 'regulations' and the rest as legal changes (Sejersted 1997 30/34 , Nordby and Veggeland 1999: 90/102). A more positive way to characterise this is that the Parliament has voluntarily abdicated as legislative authority within the framework of the four freedoms. This authority is in practise delegated to the EU and the EEA-committee, where the government has the right to reserve itself in relation to certain proposals. One important consequence is that the political debate become `de-politicised and legalised'.
Another implication of EEA on political process is that the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is blurred. The members of the Committee of foreign affairs and the members of the national EEA delegation form the EEA committee in the parliament. As a result the relatively closed nature of foreign policy is carried over to policy areas that are traditionally dealt with as national policy-making characterised by democratic openness. This is very different from what we find in another country which has emphasised national influence and the importance of national democracy; namely Denmark. In Denmark, the EU committee has become the central `linchpin' for domestic political and EU processes.
The way that EEA-issues have been handled in the Norwegian parliament differs from what has happened in the central national administration. Here, EEA-issues have mostly been incorporated within existing structures, and dealt with as part of national policy-making (Veggeland 19999. A comparative Nordic study of national administrations (L�greid 1999) shows that EEA has had considerable effects over its 5-year period. About 80 per cent of all departments in the ministries are effected, about 1/3 of them significantly. However, there are no signs that Norwegians compensate for weak formal opportunities for influence through more active adaptation and EU-directed activities. On the contrary:
Research shows that national administrations have not changed dramatically, towards a common European pattern to implement common EU-rules. In this sense the Norwegian adaptation is rather typical, and bureaucracies may have more built-in flexibility than we like to believe (Bulmer and Bursch 1998). However, adaptation in the Norwegian central administration is less pronounced than in the Nordic member countries. In Sweden, for instance, effects on national administration are much greater, and generally perceived as more positive. Those working with EU/EEA issues in the Norwegian administration use less time and are less woven into European networks. They go to Brussels less often and have less developed contact-networks (L�greid 1999).
Another aspect of this concerns the relationship between the central administration and the government and the parliament. In Norway the parliament and the administration have chosen different concepts for integrating EEA-related issues; foreign policy versus national policy patterns, and little has been done to accommodate the two. In Denmark, on the other hand, an important part of the adaptation to the EU has been to increase the co-ordination within the administration and to create a clear coupling to the EU-committee in the parliament. Compared to other Nordic countries there is in Norway less contact between the parliament and the administration, and the demand for political instructions by civil servants are less than the supply offered. As a result there is a tendency towards de-politicisation and more technocratic orientation, and civil servants often have to fill `political roles' in terms of contact and to formulate Norway's political views in relation to specific issues.
4. EEA has widespread economic AND political implications: Consequences increase over time
The EEA agreement was signed in May 1992 and implemented January 1st 1994. In this way Norway, and the other EFTA-countries, were integrated in the internal market with its four freedoms. The following is not, however, an attempt to calculate economic effects of the internal market for the Norwegian economy. As the so-called Cecchini report (1988) demonstrated such an analysis has many methodological problems, and I am not aware of any attempt to carry a real economic consequence analysis. Here, the focus will be some of the political aspects of the economic processes stimulated by the internal market.
We can distinguish between three types of effects of the EEA regime; 1) immediate economic effect, 2) immediate needs for structural change and 3) dynamic effects over time. However, there has been no systematic report on how the EEA agreement works (although proposed by Jon Dale ? an MP for the Centre Party - sometime early 1997, inspired by Schengen)
During the debate over Norwegian EU-membership the supporter of EU-membership painted a dark picture for Norwegian economy, even within the EEA. Among the opponents there were, on the other side, considerable concerns about the negative effects of the EEA-agreement. The immediate economic effects have not, however, been dramatic and such arguments are rarely heard anymore. An important aspect of EEA membership has been to de-dramatise effects of the internal market. There seems to have been a growing understanding that the internal market reflects more general international changes that Norway has to relate to. The general point is that, the short term fluctuations in the economy seem to be related to a number of factors that are outside the scope of the EEA-membership; international business cycles and the price of oil.
One major exception was last winter when the high interest rate by many was considered to be the price paid for not being a full member. In a recent interview (Aftenposten October 10 1999) the Norwegian finance minister ? when reporting on the meeting between the EU-EFTA finance ministers concluded that this was no longer an issue. Another exception is local effect of cross-border retail trade which have grown steadily. In 1999 Norwegians are expected to spend about 6.5 billion kroner in Sweden .
The immediate effects for restructuring of the economy are of two types. Those initiating major reforms, and those stimulating and channelling ongoing change, and also in these areas there are important political implications:
Deregulation and privatisation of public monopolies is one area where the immediate effects have been greatest. A good case is the national monopoly for import of medicines (Norwegian Medicinal Depot ). In this case the national monopoly was abruptly abandoned and competition introduced from private companies. This happened with almost no political debate (Moen 1998). The Wine-monopoly reform was also triggered by the EEA-agreement. In this case changes were more controversial. The monopoly on distribution and sales to `industrial customers' (restaurants etc) was abandoned, while the distribution monopoly for the consumer market was upheld (Br�in 1998). This unbundling of various commercial functions is very much in line with what EU has introduced in other areas of oligopoly or monopoly arrangements. The new gas directive will also have important consequences for how Norway organises its gas export (Eldevik 1999). In these cases national sector arrangements were only to a limited extent a matter of public debate before the EEA-agreement. The EEA-regulations put the deregulation issues on the agenda (which is also likely to happen to gas-export). Also, it seems likely that such changes would otherwise have been more contested and conflictual than they have been.
In relation to telecom, liscencing for oil and gas and banking the impact of the EEA has been to stimulate and speed up changes already under way. With the exception of banking these sectors were also earlier dominated by strong monopolistic and nationalistic tendencies. The trend towards liberalisation and privatisation had been under way for some time, due to changes in technology as well as a broader ideological shift (Eliassen and Sj�vaag 1998). In the banking sector, an important implication of the EEA-agreement was to open up for new actors and types of competition. Between 1984 and 1990 only 10 foreign banks applied for concession in Norway. In 1996 alone 83 foreign banks informed the Norwegian authorities that they wanted to compete in the Norwegian market (Andersen and Revang 1997:16).
In these sectors we also find that EEA rules have an impact on long terms transformation. The Telia/ Telenor merger, Hydro-Statoil's unfriendly take over of Saga Petroleum, the possible privatisation of the States direct Financial Investment in the oil sector, and the proposed bank mergers all have to rely on EEA-competition authorities (i.e. Commission). EU competition authorities were also brought into the discussion about the concession to develop of the Fornebu-area (Claes and Tran�y 1999: 9). In relation to such issues EEA rules are regularly brought into political debate. However, the way this has happened, it is mostly as a legal context for domestic politics and serves, therefore, as another illustration of de-politicisation.
In some cases the Norwegian authorities and firms have been forced to accept changes as a result of the EEA-court rulings. This was the case for the `selective employer's tax' which has been part of the regional policy, and also upholding the subsidies for the coastal express (hurtigruta) may be complicated by this. On the other hand, the EEA-post directive may constrain plans for more centralisation in the postal distribution system. The issue over `selective employer's tax' demonstrates well the dilemmas involved. After the EFTA-court ruling the supervisory agency ESA accepted intermediate period where discrimination was allowed. However, in the present budgetary negotiations the opposition reacted to the government's proposal about how to do this. They wanted clearer `objective' criterias. Another round of discussions and clarification could lead to Norway not meeting the ESA deadline. This means that the legal framework of the EEA not only influences the content of decision, but also puts time constraints on democratic processes. EEA legal rules define the space for domestic political discretion , although it seems unlikely that it would sanction delays due to democratic procedures .
All in all, effects on important economic sectors are considerable, but this seldom leads to political debate.
4. EEA is vulnerable in the long run
Norway is already in important ways part of the EU. At the same time Norway has pursued a special type of strategy in its relationship to the EU. Key elements have been to develop institutional forms, which may be an acceptable frame for domestic politics, preventing confrontations over the EU issue. However, everyday politics does not, to the same extent reflect the political energy, which have gone into the creation of such institutional forms. There is a clear distinction between the selection of formal arrangements, on the one hand, and how these arrangements are to be used to realise political objective, on the other hand. The symbolic enactment of formal sovereignty and boundary control does not correspond to real control with ideas and transaction crossing this boundary. The lack of political debate over the latter is striking, when we look at how EU influences more and more areas of Norwegian economy and society. Presently it is not easy to find elements of an active Norwegian strategy towards the new dynamics in the EU. It may be that Norway's relationship to the EU will continue to develop as a reaction to increased integration and enlargement. One important area for the time being is CFSP. But new initiatives may emerge, as an implication of economic integration ? harmonisation of taxes (there are 45 ways to calculate VAT in the EU). Other areas, that Norway would welcome, include stronger regulation of food quality.
Enlargement to the East is going to happen faster than we thought only half a year ago, with the first new members entering perhaps already in 2-3 years. Altogether there are 12 candidate countries. Enlargement will have important consequences in two ways. The first is that it changes Norway's relationship to these countries. Bringing these countries into the internal market will also threaten the established bilateral trade agreements with these countries. In several areas, like export of fish, for example, there will be disadvantages. Also, it seems likely that cross-national labour mobility may increase within the EEA. Such effects have so far been very limited, but given the huge differences in wage levels between the present EEA and the new EU member countries to the East this may change.
The second implication is that in an enlarged EU the asymmetry between EU and EFTA will be even more pronounced. It can easily become 25 countries with 400 mill against 3 countries with 4.5 mill. Even if the EU will accept the EEA, Schengen and other special arrangements in the future, it is not likely that they will put a lot of effort into such a bilateral arrangement. Special arrangements will only exist as long as the EFTA countries accept EU rules without too much fuss. At the same time, the candidate countries will already during the membership negotiations achieve more influence over EU policies than Norway has through the EEA. One major newspaper, Dagens n�ringsliv (October 12 1999:2) rhetorically argue that Bulgaria already next year may have more influence over parts of Norwegian policy than Norway itself. It also asks if it will be possible to keep the membership issue to come up during the next 2001 election.
New developments may create an impossible situation for domestic policy-makers in EFTA countries, stimulating arguments about full EU membership as well as dismantling of the EEA. In any case, there is a need for a debate about Norway's actual relationship to the EU. Such a debate must address both political objectives and how to organise Norwegian efforts to achieve such objectives. It would have to relate to the broad changes going on in Europe and not only the short term `fall-out' for Norway. Presently the likelihood for such a debate seems rather slim. As some of you may know ambassador Bj�rn Barth tried to raise such issues publicly, in an open letter to the Minister of foreign affairs , he received no answer. Another public letter from professor Johan P. Olsen pursuing this initiative had the same result . No one in the opposition has criticised the Minister of foreign affairs for not answering or tried to answer themselves. It seems that Norwegian politicians do not want to discuss Norway's ongoing relationship with the EU.
Can Norway change? If we look at Finland it is clear that rather radical changes are certainly possible. If we go back 15 years it was Finland ? together with Island ? that were characterised as the isolationists in the periphery of the periphery of Europe (Dadealeus 1983, Lundestad 1985). There are, however, important differences between Finland and Norway. In the Finnish case, isolation was partly caused by external pressure. In Norway it exists despite external pressures to the contrary. The Danish author Carsten Jensen has formulated the truly pessimistic view on Norway. He argues that the Norwegian attitude is almost a `functional necessity', given the geographical and climatic conditions, and therefore impossible to change. He asks the rhetorical question: What would happen if the 4.43 million Norwegian were all replaced by people from the African continent. His answer is that, in all likelihood, they would ? after a 1000 years ? be just like today's Norwegians. I do not want to guess about what will happen in the Norwegian EU debate, and when. But I do think that Carsten Jensen, eventually, will be proven wrong.
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[*] Paper presented at ARENA's Yearly Conference, November 18, 1999
[**] Professor, Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation State, ARENA
 *Scenarios 2000', Folkets hus, November 11 1999
 Switzerland represents the extreme position of EFTA-countries in that it has, so far, opted for a formal outsider status. However, the domestic debate suggests that the country may soon become a member of the EU.
 'Kald skulder fra EU'. Dagens n�ringsliv November 3 1999: 22-3.
 Thanks to Ulf Torgersen, INAS, for help to calculate these numbers.
 Matsminke: Norge m� bite i gresset'. Aftenposten October 28 1999.
 EEA1: October 1992, about 1600 legal acts, about 100 legal changes mostly as smaller adjustments in exsting law. A few new laws. The rest awee changes in regulations. EEA2: 4-500. The following years 1-10 pr. month, about 30-40 a year; ie. 150-200.
 Aftenposten September 11 1999 'Grensehandelen rett til v�rs'
 Offical english translation.
 The EEA relies on the EFTA-court as parallel to the EU-court. However, as it turns out the formal independence may in some cases lead to differences in rulings, which are not intended to be part of the EEA-autonomy.
 'Politisk strid mellom regjering og opposisjon om arbeidsgiveravgiften', i Aftenposten October 28 1999.
 'Kj �re utenriksminister'. Aftenposten August 23 1999.
 'Vil du ikke svare, utenriksminister'. Aftenposten September 5 1999.
[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper series: 15.02.2000]