Compliance and Conditionality
This paper discusses conditionality - the use of incentives to alter a state's behaviour or policies - in the light of post-Cold War developments in Europe. It is argued here that regional integration generates a transition of national interests; the toolkit for analysing compliance must henceforth be expanded.
ARENA Working Paper 18/2000 (html)
Jeffrey T. Checkel
Conditionality is a basic strategy through which international institutions promote compliance by national governments. Recent years have seen an explosion in both its aggregate use and a change in its underlying purpose, with political conditionality coming to the fore. This quantitative and qualitative expansion has attracted critical scrutiny from both academics and policymakers. While conditionality will never disappear, a growing body of research suggests we need to broaden our conceptual toolkit when considering the causal nexus between it and national compliance. Examining the current expansion of regional organization in post-Cold War Europe, I argue that the traditional incentive game of conditionality needs to be supplemented by strategies that seek to alter the very nature of interests in the transition states of East Europe and the former USSR.