



# **Financing the Future**

**Assessing the EU's approach to financing  
the Sustainable Development Goals  
in light of global justice**

*Sunniva Unn Hustad*

GLOBUS Report 6  
ARENA Report 6/19

# Financing the Future

## Assessing the EU's approach to financing the Sustainable Development Goals in light of global justice

Sunniva Unn Hustad

Copyright © ARENA and the author(s)

ISBN (print) 978-82-8362-030-6

ISBN (online) 978-82-8362-031-3

ARENA Report Series (print) ISSN 0807-3139

ARENA Report Series (online) ISSN 1504-8152

GLOBUS Report Series (print) ISSN 2535-3179

GLOBUS Report Series (online) ISSN 2535-3187

Issued by:

ARENA Centre for European Studies

University of Oslo

P.O. Box 1143, Blindern

N-0318 Oslo, Norway

[www.arena.uio.no](http://www.arena.uio.no)

Oslo, September 2019

**Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice (GLOBUS) is a research project that critically examines the EU's contribution to global justice.**



Funded by the European Union's  
Horizon 2020 programme



[www.globus.uio.no](http://www.globus.uio.no)



Twitter: @globus\_h2020



Facebook: @globus.h2020

## About GLOBUS

Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice (GLOBUS) is a Research and Innovation Action (2016 – 2020) funded by the EU's Horizon 2020 programme, Societal Challenge 6: Europe in a changing world – Inclusive, innovative and reflective societies. GLOBUS is co-ordinated by ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway and has partner universities in Brazil, China, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy and South Africa.

GLOBUS is a research project that critically examines the European Union's contribution to global justice. Challenges to global justice are multifaceted and what is just is contested. Combining normative and empirical research GLOBUS explores underlying political and structural obstacles to justice. Analyses of the EU's positions and policies are combined with in-depth studies of non-European perspectives on the practices of the EU. Particular attention is paid to the fields of migration, trade and development, cooperation and conflict, as well as climate change.

## Abstract

The adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, signified a leap in global development policy from its predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This was in terms of purpose, concept and politics. The financing of these goals is key to its success, and the EU, due to its development cooperation budget, is going to play an important role in this process.

This thesis contributes empirically to the literature on the EU's development policy by analysing the EU's position towards financing the SDGs. Applying a global justice approach, this thesis forwards three main arguments. First, the thesis suggests that there has been a change in an increasing emphasis on the role of the state in financing its own development. This has happened at the expense of the safeguarding of the EU's repeatedly emphasised core values, such as human rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law. Second, this thesis also shows that the EU still considers its own position to be 'the correct' way of governing. Ultimately, this thesis identifies characteristics of the EU's position towards financing development that are difficult to justify in terms of justice.

## Acknowledgements

First and foremost, thank you to my supervisors, Johanne Døhlle Saltnes and Helene Sjursen. Your thorough comments, guidance and interest in my topic have meant a lot. I would also like to thank you for granting me the opportunity to participate in the GLOBUS-project. The insight I have gained from this inspiring research project, has influenced my thesis in many ways.

Thank you to all the excellent people that work at ARENA and to my fellow master's students here; it has been a pleasure sharing an office with you.

A special thanks to Vera, Marte, Tora and Ane for always being such great people to be around. These two years would not have been the same without you.

Thank you to both Hedda and Shona for proofreading and providing comments on previous drafts of my thesis.

Finally, my sincerest gratitude goes to my family and friends for your support and patience.

Responsibility for mistakes and inaccuracies remain entirely mine.

Oslo, 22.05.2019

# Table of contents

<b>Chapter 1: Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
The EU as a global actor in development policy .....	4
European competence in development .....	6
Outline of thesis.....	7
 <b>Chapter 2: Theory .....</b>	 <b>9</b>
The case for global justice .....	9
Justice as non-domination .....	14
Justice as impartiality .....	17
Conclusion .....	20
 <b>Chapter 3: Research design and methodology .....</b>	 <b>21</b>
Within-case study design .....	21
Case selection.....	22
Using norms and ideas as units of analysis.....	22
The use of ideal types .....	23
The sources of data .....	25
Reliability and validity .....	27
 <b>Chapter 4: An increasing role of the state.....</b>	 <b>29</b>
Change in international development discourse: MDGs to SDGs .....	30
A shift towards a more statist approach.....	30
Mobilisation and effective use of domestic public finance.....	36
International public finance .....	39
The growing role of private finance .....	42
Chapter conclusion.....	48
 <b>Chapter 5: ‘Our size fits all’: Universal norms and the EU .....</b>	 <b>51</b>
From the ‘Washington consensus’ to the SDGs .....	51
A distinct way of mobilisation domestic resources.....	53
The strengthening of international institutions .....	56
A break with the past? .....	58
Chapter conclusion.....	60
 <b>Chapter 6: Conclusion.....</b>	 <b>63</b>
The EU’s position towards the SDGs .....	63
Revisiting the literature on EU development policy .....	67
 <b>References.....</b>	 <b>69</b>

## List of tables

### **Table 2.1:**

Perspectives on global justice (Sjursen, 2017a) .....14

### **Table 2.2:**

Summary and operationalisation of theoretical concepts .....20

## List of abbreviations

AAAA	Addis Ababa Action Agenda
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DG-DEVCO	Directorate-General Development Cooperation
EU	European Union
FfD3	Third Financing for Development Conference
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G20	Group of 22
G77	Group of 77
GBS	General Budget Support
GNI	Gross National Income
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	Middle Income Countries
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OWG	Open Working Group
PPPs	Private-Public Partnerships
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United National General Assembly
WTO	World Trade Organization



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of September 2015 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 70/1 *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.<sup>1</sup> The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are the main outcome of the resolution, can be understood as a set of goals and principles that is meant to guide the creation of development politics until 2030. To this date, it is the most extensive commitment made by the international community in relation to sustainable development. However, to achieve the SDGs, it is estimated a need of a trillion of dollars (Voituriez, Morita, Giordano, Bakkour, & Shimizu, 2017). This is also the reason why the debates have increasingly focused on the needs of development finance; ‘the success of any global development agenda depends on the financial foundations it is built on’ (Dafe, Hartwig, & Janus, 2013). Consequently, the financing of the SDGs is going to be the key to its accomplishment, and when it comes to financial mechanisms for

---

<sup>1</sup> In the rest of the report, this resolution will be referred to as both the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs.

development, the European Union (EU)<sup>2</sup> is hailed to be a significant actor (Orbie et al., 2017).

The EU upholds itself as a promoter of global norms such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. It has claimed that human rights ‘are a sliver thread that runs through everything we do in external relations’ (Ashton 2012). The EU’s own commitment to these values is also often pointed to as an important characteristic of the EU in the existing literature on the EU as a global actor (Carbone, 2017: 312; Kumm, 2005: 16; Sjursen, 2017b: 447; K. E. Smith, 2006). This is especially the case in regards to the EU’s development policies, where the EU frequently reiterates that these values guide its policies (European Commission, 2011; European Union, 2006). Lately, there has been several changes to both the global development context and the EU itself, which makes it important to reassess the EU’s role as a ‘norm setter and champion of global values’ on the international realm (Sjursen, 2017b). The emergence of powers such as China, Brazil and Russia in the sphere of development is, for example, now an important component. In addition to this, there has been an evolution in the way development is perceived. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were the first time the international community agreed on a set of global objectives relating to development, were perceived by many as a narrow ‘North-South’-agenda reflecting a top-down process in its construction (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). Now, however, the development discourse has moved away from a donor-recipient mind-set towards a *global* development agenda that emphasise that *all* countries have challenges, are responsible and should be held accountable for achieving the goals. Simultaneously as these changes has taken place, the EU has been affected by several internal difficulties. The so-called ‘migrant crisis’, the European sovereign debt crisis and an emergence of populist movements all over Europe, are examples of such difficulties.

After the adoption of the SDGs, the literature concerning the goals has primarily focused on the effectiveness of the 2030 Agenda and how the SDGs should best be implemented (e.g. Deacon, 2016; Leal Filho et al., 2018; Razavi, 2016; Stafford-Smith et al., 2017). In terms of research on the EU, it is almost entirely concentrated on the EU’s role in realising

---

<sup>2</sup> EU is defined as ‘a set of international institutions and arrangements within which the interest and preferences of member states and other actors are coordinated for international purposes’ (Hill, Smith, & Vanhoonacker, 2017: 11).

the goals. However, to be able to fully understand the EU's way of *implementing* the SDGs, it is also important to analyse how it positioned itself in the negotiations. The decisions made in the intergovernmental discussions represented important deliberations on which principles and measures should govern the realisation of the goals. In addition to this, the EU has loudly flagged its pivotal role in the process of developing the SDGs. The European Commission has for example on several occasions claimed that the EU 'has consistently played an important and constructive role in these processes, providing key inputs and engaging actively with partners at all levels' (European Commission, 2015b). Without the notable exception of Keijzer (2017), the literature has yet to study the EU in the SDGs.<sup>3</sup> In this report, I therefore aim to fill this gap and contribute to the existing research on the EU as a development actor. Most importantly because analysing the EU's position in the negotiations has an important impact on how we should understand its current policies. In this report, I therefore ask:

*What characterises the EU's approach to financing global development in the negotiation process of the SDGs?*

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to address a more detailed preliminary research question:

*To what extent and how does the EU's position suggest changes to the financing of global development as agreed in the MDGs?*

In order to answer these questions, I will analyse the EU's position towards the financing of the SDGs. An important part of this report is to compare the EU's position with how financing of global development has previously been realised, and then to identify to which extent and how the EU's approach represents a shift. The financing of the MDGs as laid out in the Monterrey Consensus, will therefore serve as an important point of reference. In relation to analysing and understanding the EU's approach to financing, it is important to identify which normative considerations are behind its position. Conceptions of global political justice will therefore be used to analyse the ideas underlying the EU's approach to the SDGs. This is an appropriate starting point for several reasons. Firstly, financing of development have frequently been a source of injustice and domination in relation

---

<sup>3</sup> Keijzer (2017) examines the discrepancies between the EU's position in the 2030 Agenda and its current policies on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).

to global development. This is especially the case in terms of the imbalance of power at place in multilateral organisations and the dependency relationships existing in regards to, for example, foreign aid. Secondly, this theoretical framework allows for a nuanced analysis of the EU's position due to its inclusion of multiple dimensions of normative ideas of justice.

In this report, I take a qualitative research approach and follow an interpretative tradition in political science (Weber, 1978). The research design for the analysis, is a within-case study. Based on theories of global political justice, two ideal types are presented with following expectations. These are further used as a method for interpretation of the empirical material. Official documents from the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, are used to analyse the EU's position towards financing the SDGs. In addition, I have collected statements made by the EU in the intergovernmental negotiations and notes and summaries provided by independent NGOs.

The introduction proceeds as follows; first I will go through the current literature on the EU as a global actor in the sphere of development policy, then I provide an overview over the EU's competence in development, finally I will give an outline of the rest of the report.

## **The EU as a global actor in development policy**

There is an ongoing academic debate around whether the normative identity of the EU is reflected in its performance as an international actor (Aggestam, 2012: 462). In this regard, Manner's (2002) conceptualisation of the EU as a 'normative power Europe', is a main point of reference. The argument that is often made, is that the EU differs from other actors in its promotion of norms instead of interests (Manners, 2002; Manners & Whitman, 1998).<sup>4</sup> This does not necessarily come from its official declarations or the rhetoric used, but rather from the EU's uniqueness in the international system (Birchfield, 2011: 143; Manners, 2002: 251). In essence, it is claimed that the true power of the EU is its capability to spread certain values beyond its borders and, thereby, also redefine what is 'normal', 'acceptable' or even 'preferable' in international relations (Aggestam, 2008; Manners, 2002: 239; Stocchetti, 2013: 19). There are, however, several critics of the 'normative

---

<sup>4</sup> In line with the definition provided by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891), I define norms as 'shared standards of appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors'.

power Europe' concept (Diez, 2005; Sjursen, 2006). Some scholars have for example underlined the vagueness of the concept and therefore its inability to be operationalised for empirical research (Sjursen, 2006). The debate of the EU as a normative power is an important starting point for this report because the EU's policies vis-à-vis third countries is a key aspect in assessing its role as a global actor.

The question raised in this report is concentrated around the issue of what *kind* of actor the EU is when it comes to its development policies. The literature has been split in the view of whether the EU inhabits a distinctive approach to development policies or not, but lately more scholars claim that an EU identity in development has emerged (Orbie et al., 2017; M. Smith, 2013: 526). Firstly, there are those scholars who believe that a part of the distinctiveness of the EU's approach to its development policy is based on what one can perceive as a 'value-based'-identity. Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 132) for example finds that the EU's core values; democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have guided the EU's development policies. This resonates well with Manners claim of 'normative power Europe', and in addition corresponds with the EU's own perception of its role. Also Birchfield (2011: 159) claims that the EU's development policy is largely consistent with the values it proclaims governs its practices, and that there is a congruence between EU as a normative power and its policies. Other scholars paint a more mixed picture when it comes to the EU's global role in development. According to Storey (2006: 334), the EU instead of promoting norms based on human rights, are more in line with norms such as market liberalisation and 'good governance'. Orbie (2008) arrives at a similar conclusion; he claims that the EU pursue a development policy based on the idea of the market as key to progress and prosperity. Interest-based perspectives are also commonly used by scholars to account for the EU's development policy (Carbone, 2013a; Horký, 2012; K. E. Smith, 2001; Youngs, 2004). K. E. Smith (2001: 196), for example, claims that the EU's human right policy is strongly affected by its commercial and political interests. Arts and Dickson (2004), sees the EU's development policy as a measure used to enhance its status in the international sphere. These scholars, which rely on an interest-based approach, also often challenge the view of the EU's development policy as being distinct. Instead, they claim that inconsistencies in its policies which can be related to its self-interest, are an evident characterisation of the EU's



development policy (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2013b; K. E. Smith, 2001; Youngs, 2004).

## European competence in development

While the normative role of the EU in global politics and what kind of norms it promotes is a debated topic, there seems to be an agreement among scholars around the fact that the EU is a *significant* international actor when it comes to its development policies (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Farrell, 2008; Holland & Kelly, 2012: 247; Mold, 2007; Orbie, 2008). This is often pointed out to be by virtue of its financial resources, which are available for developing countries. The EU is estimated to be the biggest donor of aid to developing countries when counting the contribution of all member states. The European Commission is by itself an important aid donor with the responsibility for roughly 10 percent of the aid organised by the EU (Mold, 2007: 237; Orbie et al., 2017: 494). The EU also presents itself as the most open market to developing countries, with duty-free and quota-free trade access for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) for everything but arms. In addition to this, the EU and the member States are collectively the leading provider of Aid for Trade (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

The EU's development policy is founded in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 strengthened the legal basis for the EU's development policy with the inclusion of humanitarian aid and development cooperation with the articles TFEU, 212-213. In addition, it reinstated poverty eradication as the central goal for the EU's development policy (Carbone, 2012: 175). It is clearly stated that development is a 'shared competence' between the Union and the member states, and explicitly emphasised that the member states should not be prevented in exercising their own policies and that neither takes precedence over the other (Orbie & Lightfoot, 2017: 203). However, development policy is perceived as a 'soft' policy field by the member states, which often makes it easier to accept common initiatives (Orbie & Lightfoot, 2017: 204). There are, for example, several key documents which strongly coordinates the member states and the EU's strategies; the European Consensus on Development (2005), the EU Strategy for Africa (2005), the Joint Africa Strategy (2007), the Agenda for Change (2011), the communication on EU Budget support (2012), the New European Consensus on Development (2017) and the joint position in the negotiation process of the SDGs.

## Outline of report

This report proceeds as follow. In *Chapter 2*, I will present a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework. Firstly, I argue for the added value of using a global justice perspective when analysing the EU's approach to financing the SDGs. Secondly, I introduce the two GLOBUS-perspectives that will guide the interpretation of the analysis. These are *justice as non-domination* and *justice as impartiality*. Furthermore, this chapter presents expectations to both of the approaches. In *Chapter 3*, I proceed by discussing the research methodology and design applied in this report. I present the sources that constitute the data material for the following analysis, and I follow with a discussion around the reliability and validity of the design. In *Chapter 4*, I bring up three current trends that are especially prominent in the EU's position towards financing the SDGs. In addition, I link the theoretical expectations laid out in chapter 2 with the empirical findings. In this chapter, the analysis is especially concentrated on where the justice as *non-domination approach* coincides with the EU's position. The chapter ends with a summary of its most important findings. *Chapter 5* provides an alternative interpretation and examines how the EU's position corresponds with the second theoretical perspective; *the impartiality approach to justice*. Lastly, it reviews the main discoveries in this chapter, and looks at the implications they might have. *Chapter 6* brings up the research questions and reflects upon the main contributions of this report. This chapter also looks at what implications the empirical findings might have for the literature on the EU's development policy.

# Chapter 2

## Theory

International goals like the SDGs and the MDGs are setting normative principles when it comes to sustainable development and development policies. The mere construction of global development goals is based on a collective aim to address some of the most pressing issues of injustice in our time; global poverty, inequality and violations of human rights (Cimadamore, 2016: 131). In this report, I investigate the EU's position towards financing development in the 2030 Agenda and aim to identify if there is an evident change in its position from how development policies on the international arena have previously been organised. In this chapter, I will first present why a global justice approach to the EU's position is a constructive point of departure when analysing the EU's position towards the financing of development. I will then introduce the two ideal types of justice which will further guide the analysis of the empirical material. Lastly, I will present expectations related to these two ideal types.

### The case for global justice

In theories of international relations, states' foreign policies are often claimed to be governed by power and national interest (Carr, 2016; Mearsheimer, 1995; Moravcsik & Legro, 1999; Morgenthau, 1951; Walt, 1990; Waltz, 1979, 1986). Until recently, the recognition of the importance of global justice in IR theory has been absent (Cimadamore, 2016). In the issue of development policy, it can however be insufficient to explain it solely from a perspective of *realpolitik*. When Lumsdaine



(1993) examined the history of humanitarian aid, he found that most foreign aid was based on humanitarianism and a perception of the world as an 'interdependent community'. He claimed that there was a sense of world citizenship that led individuals to support assistance to developing countries. However, this approach has also been subject to criticism for being based on a simplistic dichotomy between self-interest and 'humanitarianism' (Breuning, 1994). Consequently, the role of interests and norms in international politics are arguably important, but analysing development policies only in terms of strategic concerns, or alternatively as driven by altruistic motives, limits the understanding of this policy area, and disregards some very important issues. For example, who has the responsibility in addressing global issues like poverty, what are the solutions to problems of global justice, and are the responses provided reasonable ones? Analysing foreign policy in the light of global justice allows for a more nuanced analysis of these important issues of our time.

## Global political justice

In theories of global justice, there have traditionally been an emphasis on unjust distribution and how to combat this concern (Barry, 1982; Beitz, 1999; Singer, 1972). This focus is both understandable and important because the world is inherently unfair when it comes to how resources in all forms are distributed. Justice is however a much wider concept than that of distribution, this is especially the case since the asymmetry of power that exist in the world is a central reason for why distribution is not just (Laborde, 2010). The global institutional context creates relations of dependence and exploitations between regions. The issue is therefore not simply one of distributive inequality. To promote justice it is important to address the political aspect of it as well as the institutional problems that exists, and not merely the transfer of wealth from richer to poorer people (Young, 2000). Theories of *political* global justice will therefore be the central point of departure in this report.

In republican political theory, the most important harm inherent in states is that of *domination*. Domination is here understood as a relationship in which one party enjoys a degree of alien control over another, or what Pettit (2010) defines as arbitrary interference (see also Laborde, 2010; Pettit, 2010: 73). This perception derives from the idea of freedom as the ultimate ideal, and freedom is that of *non-domination* (Buckinx, Trejo-Mathys, & Waligore, 2015; Eriksen, 2016: 4; Pettit, 2010: 77; Skinner, 2010). Domination is always an evil for republicans, but it can

be seen as a tragedy when it results in the rejection of fundamental human capabilities (Laborde, 2010: 54). The standard republican justifications therefore argue that one should concern oneself with both global inequality and poverty, since there may be an impact in a people's ability to organise themselves as a free state (Laborde, 2010: 53; Lovett, 2016: 41).

### **Financing development and the risk of domination**

What has been a distinct feature of development policy through history, is that the agenda is set at the donor end, while the policy most of the time is implemented in another sovereign entity (Stocchetti, 2013: 42). This creates unbalanced power relationships that easily results in domination. Young's definition of domination captures the essence of this issue, she addresses domination as 'the lack of participation in determining one's actions and the conditions of one's action' (Young, 2011: 258). Development policies are about determining policies that can contribute to better living conditions for people, but these policies are futile without the resources to execute them. Financial measures and mobilising resources are therefore at the core of development policy.

Throughout history resources and financial measures used for financing development have also played the role as sources of domination. Many of the existing mechanisms and institutions which enable developing countries to finance their development, are also by the definitions of both Young and Pettit, at the same time dominating them. Hurrell (2001) focuses on international financial institutions like the IMF, WTO and the World Bank, where important decisions are made which concerns developing countries. Because of structural inequalities which results in weak bargaining positions, they have, however, little to say about these decisions. Instead, these international economic institutions are effectively under the control of the richest nations and powerful corporations which have significant influence over their policies. In both the IMF and the World Bank this is exemplified with the fact that voting power depends on economic contribution (Young, 2002: 274). It is also often been pointed out that there is an asymmetrical balance of power in aid relationships, and that the often included concept of conditionality can be problematic. This is because it refers to development aid where the aid is given on political or economic conditions valued by the donor (Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Petito, 2006; Temple, 2010). Aid-giving practices have also been questioned because the aid relationship has frequently been perceived as neo-colonial (Easterly,

2006; Langan, 2015: 102; Nkrumah, 1971; Stocchetti, 2013: 43). As regards to international borrowing, this often results in the imposing of legal obligations upon the beneficiary country, while it is also shown that great amounts of international debts threatens states' ability to fulfil their human rights obligations (Sudreau & Bohoslavsky, 2015).

Weak states have always been victims of domination on the international arena. While exploitation and colonisation is no longer formally accepted, new potential forms of arbitrary domination have taken place. One of the main characteristics of contemporary globalisation is the renewed role that it has enabled *private* actors in international politics (Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016: 282). Non-state actors can, for example, operate across borders to follow their own interests, while at the same time avoiding public control. Transnational corporations (TNCs) sometimes have budgets which are the same size as the countries in which they operate. This, in turn, can create an asymmetrical dependency between the states and the TNCs. In addition, the organisational structure of such corporations can make it difficult to track responsibility for matters like tax avoidance, labour conditions and abuses of power (Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016: 282). The competition triggered by the market can also result in pressure on public regulation of financial measures and domestic labour regulations, which again undermines the states' constituencies to decide on these issues (Rodrik, 2011). Developing countries can be especially vulnerable when it comes to TNCs exerting arbitrary power over domestic issues. This is because they are often very dependent on the financial resources these corporations contribute with, while they simultaneously have poor regulation mechanisms (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 240).

## The EU and global justice

The EU politicians often make an appeal to justice when arguing for their policies to the public, and injustice is especially a frequent element in the discourse when it comes to legitimising the EU's development policy (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). However, there is no agreement on what justice entails. To analyse the ideas of justice behind the EU's position in relation to the financing of the 2030 Agenda, there is a need to identify a set of criteria's one can use to assess the EU's contribution to global justice (Eriksen, 2016: 4). As previously mentioned, financial measures and existing laws can in many circumstances be sources of domination. In this report, the main focus will be on how the EU's position towards financing can be said to be in line with ideal-types of

justice. Both Eriksen (2016: 5) and Nussbaum (2006: 323) argues that the responsibility to eliminate dominance and in that way promote justice, is assigned to both international and domestic bodies. Pettit (2010) also reasons that it is particularly important that institutions promote and preserve non-domination for everyone. A premise of this report is therefore the assumption that the EU, as an influential actor when it comes to its development policies, strives to diminish domination and promote global justice in the international arena.

## Conceptions of global justice

The GLOBUS-project introduces three ideal-conceptions of global political justice based on philosophical theories of justice.<sup>5</sup> These three approaches are; justice as *non-domination*, justice as *impartiality* and justice as *mutual recognition*.<sup>6</sup> These concepts are all connected to the underlying political question of how decisions are made and who actually makes them, instead of focusing on what would be a fair distribution (Sjursen, 2017a: 5). The principles of justice are not 'written in stone' and they are neither necessarily mutually exclusive. They are, however, conceptions that outline central concerns and dilemmas in terms of justice (Eriksen, 2016: 4). The key indicators are summarised along the two perspectives in table 1. These indicators will help identify the presence of the two approaches to justice and are further operationalised in table 2. This global justice approach is particularly relevant when analysing normative standards to the EU's position towards financing development in the negotiation process of the 2030 Agenda. Using this perspective allows for a nuanced analysis of the EU's position. This is because it creates room for the interpretation of various dimensions and normative dilemmas. The next section presents the two concepts of justice applied in this report and the expectations related to both of them.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Eriksen (2016) for a further introduction of the GLOBUS project.

<sup>6</sup> In this report, I use the non-domination and impartiality conceptions. Further research could go into mutual recognition.

Table 2.1: Perspectives on global political justice (Sjursen, 2017a).

	<b>Non-domination</b>	<b>Impartiality</b>
<b>Reason for action</b>	Duty of beneficence	Moral duty
<b>Rightful claimants of justice</b>	States	Individual human beings
<b>Main concern</b>	Non-interference	Autonomy
<b>Core organisational principle of global politics</b>	External sovereignty	Rights protection
<b>Institutional form</b>	Multilateral	Supranational
<b>Legal structures</b>	International law	Cosmopolitan law

## Justice as non-domination

Justice as *non-domination* is a statist approach to justice which emphasises status and equality among sovereign states. It rests on the premise that it is inside the state structure the freedom of the individual is best protected (Pettit, 2010: 77; Sjursen, 2017a: 7). To ensure this freedom of the individual, other states need to acknowledge them as equal and abstain from interfering in other states' affairs.<sup>7</sup> This follows the Rawlsian idea of a just world, where an ideal would be a world of internally just states (Nagel, 2005: 115). However, the realisation of this ideal, does require states to cooperate and form effective institutions and organisations (Buckinx et al., 2015: 3). It is not only states that can be sources of domination, but also private entities, churches, powerful individuals and public bodies created by states, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union (Pettit, 2010: 77).

I operationalise this ideal-conception in the following way; most importantly, the financing of development would best be addressed by states independently, since states are perceived as the *rightful claimants* of justice. This does not necessarily mean that outsiders have no claim to not be dominated, but it is emphasised that 'a world organised in states is the best way of protecting the non-domination of all' (Buckinx et al., 2015: 3). This again is because states are best equipped to represent the interest of their citizens. Mobilising domestic resources would therefore be framed as central, which also coincides with its main concern; *non-interference*. Resources retrieved from tax would be an example of

<sup>7</sup> Pettit distinguishes between representative states and unrepresentative states, and some human rights abuses 'allows' for interference (Pettit, 2010: 88).



domestic resources that would coincide with the non-domination view of justice. However, a well-functioning tax system is often one of the characteristics of developed countries, while this is an area where developing countries usually lag behind. Gaining sufficient resources from taxation also require that a great share of the population is working and paying income tax, which is a much bigger challenge in developing countries. This is due to the fact that they tend to have large informal sectors that are difficult to tax (Besley & Persson, 2014). Mobilising resources from the private sector has become an increasingly prevalent issue when it comes to the financing of development. One of the features of private flows is that they primarily go where they can accumulate the most profit, and that they therefore do not necessarily follow public policy objectives (Schulpen & Gibbon, 2002). However, there is not necessarily a contradiction between this type of resource mobilisation and the non-domination approach, but the private sector would then need to be governed by the premises of the domestic regulations and there is a need for clear cooperation between the private sector and the governments.

According to the non-domination perspective, states might address injustices outside their own borders, but this is not an obligation, but rather depending on the actors own sense of responsibility (Sjursen, 2017a: 7). Addressing injustices in other states would therefore be justified as a *duty of beneficence*, understood as a form of charity in comparison to a duty based on rights or as a duty of justice. Consequently, the reasons for action would be framed as a form of assistance similar to Rawls' concept of a 'duty to assist' which he presented as a universal minimum where 'people have a duty to assist other people living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime' (Rawls, 1999). As regards to mobilising international public finance and especially in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA), this should not be attached with restrictions since this could be perceived as a breach of the receiver state's sovereignty, and respecting the developing countries' right to decide over their own policies is a core concern.

*Multilateral* cooperation based on 'a rule-based international order' is an important notion for the non-domination concept of justice, because it is in this context one is best equipped to overcome domination (Sjursen, 2017b: 454). The role of global rules based on international law is also underlined due to its function to protect the 'right of all

states to organise themselves as they see fit' (Laborde & Ronzoni, 2016: 293). In the case of financing for development, this approach would highlight that issues of governing should be addressed through multi-lateral institutions. The goal is then to facilitate just intergovernmental discussions, but not with an aim of establishing an international body of binding law, but rather to foster policy debates on important issues (Pettit, 2015: 63).

## Expectations

One would expect from the EU, if its approach to justice coincides with non-domination, that financial measures inside the state structure will be of its main focus, and that states are the ones who stand accountable for achieving the goals. I should then be able to observe in the EU's mandate a focus on streamlining its taxation methods and improving domestic budgeting as important measures. This is because taxation is a matter of domestic politics and one of the strongest measures governments have available for financing its policies. The EU should, however, not impose any restrictions since it is up to each state to decide this on its own.

Secondly, there should be a focus on the respective states choosing how they want to implement the goals themselves, because they are the ones who know their citizens' interest the best. There should therefore be evidence of flexibility towards national adaption in the EU's position, and external sovereignty should be a main concern. Since the prime responsibility for development is assigned to the state, one would also expect that aid is given as a *duty of beneficence*, which implies that the donor should be reduced to solely givers and with little influence over how the money is spent by the receiver country. Demands on reporting and accountability would naturally be necessary, but never going as far as demanding political control. One would also expect that national solutions would take precedence over international ones.

Thirdly, the EU should strive to strengthen the multilateral cooperation between the states. Its position should encourage weaker states and help make them better equipped to counter dominance by stronger ones. The EU therefore ought to support developing countries in achieving more autonomy within international settings such as the WTO. One would also expect that the EU argues for deciding trade issues in multilateral organisations where all states are represented on an equal level, like the WTO or UN bodies. The aid effectiveness agendas

are also examples of multilateral and intergovernmental actions that would coincide with the non-domination approach to justice. It would be expected that the EU for example would argue for strengthening the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), which is a multi-stakeholder platform.

## Justice as impartiality

Justice as *impartiality* is a cosmopolitan approach to justice that emphasises the rights of the individual. The core idea of moral cosmopolitanism rests on an idea that 'all individuals are fundamental units of equal concern generating obligations on every person' (Mikalsen, 2017; Pogge, 2008). This approach to justice focuses on achieving non-domination for *all individuals*, not only domestically, but also internationally. It is committed to a set of shared universal standards based on human rights and democratic values, and aims to create common principles which all should act upon (Held, 2004: 389). These shared values are important for ensuring that the individual's rights are secured independently of the state's action. Conditionality of partnerships based on these universal values would be of importance in this justice perspective. The concept of a human rights-based approach to development would be an example of this. The EU's conditionality clause on aid, which is included in all cooperation agreements with non-EU countries, would also be in line with this perspective. This is because it makes sure that its partner countries have a mutual respect towards these values (Saltnes, 2013).

In the case of financing for development, a justice as impartiality approach would therefore emphasise that there should be shared international standards. In the impartiality approach it is assumed that there are some solutions that can be reasonably supported from the point of view of all (Eriksen, 2016: 13). According to this approach to justice, it is expected that it is advocated for a system which discriminates between states based on their internal features (Eriksen, 2016: 17). International borrowing usually includes the power to impose internationally valid legal obligations upon the country, and a refusal to honour debts will be punished by banks and governments of other countries. The consequences of such actions will be that the country then lose its borrowing privilege (Pogge, 2001). This response to breaches can be in line with the impartiality approach to justice because state sovereignty never trumps *rights protection* (Dworkin, 2011).



Both justice as impartiality and non-domination are concerned with dominance in global affairs, but they differ in their solution to diminish it. Where non-domination perceives states as the responsible actors, impartiality emphasises the need for a 'law-based order' *beyond* the state. This is because an individual's right is more important than collective goals (Eriksen, 2016: 14). The relative value of states then becomes dependent on to which extent they can both enhance and ensure these rights, and the principle of sovereignty can be surpassed for the sake of securing the individual's right. There is also a need for authoritative institutions that are able to enforce the support of these rights (Sjursen, 2017a: 8). Thus, while the non-domination approach to justice emphasises *state* institutions as the most important rule makers in international trade and similar policy areas, the impartiality approach of justice promotes regulatory practices and governance through international institutions with *supranational* characteristics. The IMF is an example of an international organisation that inhabits supranational bureaucracies, where its staff are capable of making decisions of great importance for its member states (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 128). In addition to this, mobilising resources from the private sector would in light of the concept of impartiality, demand strong international guidelines to avoid the risk of domination.

In Kant's writing on moral philosophy, aiding those individuals in need is explicitly mentioned as a commandment of the categorical imperative. In the Kantian philosophy, helping is by no means optional, giving aid is therefore framed as a duty and a moral obligation and not simply an act of benevolence (Gosepath, 2015: 257). Mobilising international public finance, especially the concept of ODA, is primarily a concern of distributive justice because it addresses a redistribution of resources from rich countries to poor countries. It is, however, also a concern of political global justice when it evolves around who should provide it and how it should be provided, enforced and monitored. Foreign aid policy is frequently framed as an *obligation* and a *moral duty* of improving economic justice outside the states own border, and would in this context fit well under the impartiality approach (Lovett, 2016: 45). This is for example emphasised by Barry (1982) and (Singer, 1972) who both claim that there is a humanitarian obligation for rich countries to give economic aid to poor countries. However, in the impartiality approach, foreign aid does not come without restrictions; aid should be given where the social and political conditions are right and where protection of human rights are met. ODA is frequently

provided with conditionality clauses, and the EU is no exception, it withholds the right to withdraw its economic assistances if a beneficiary country violates human rights or democratic principles. This is especially in the case of *project aid*, which is usually directed towards individuals or specific groups in a country and is typically constrained by more strict control from the donor than for example ODA in the form of budget support, which is characterised as a government-to-government support. Though, also when it comes to budget support good governance is usually included as an important criterion.

## Expectations

To identify an EU position in line with the concept of justice as impartiality, it would be necessary to recognise an emphasis on universal standards and global solutions for the financing of the 2030 Agenda. In the mandate, one would therefore expect there to be a visible underlining of solutions that would fit all countries independent of level of development. This could be in the form of global standards around tax issues or when it comes to trade and debt related matters. It will most likely also be highlighting the importance of being consistent with the UN standards.

There is a presumption that the EU would emphasise clearly appointed guidelines for the financial partnerships. This would be on the basis of the norms that the EU adheres to, more specifically human rights, good governance, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. When arguing for the different financial resources, one would also expect human rights or the rights of the individual being a part of its reasoning because it places the rights of the individual over the state (Sjursen, 2017b).

In addition, one would expect that the EU emphasised the role of supranational institutions. This would be institutions where authority is delegated from member states. The ability to sanction non-fulfilment and having a direct role in the regulations, are important characteristics. This would be central due to the fact that the impartiality approach presupposes that there needs to be institutions which can enforce global decisions. Considerations of state sovereignty should not be framed as a great concern; the EU should rather seek to strengthen the system of international financial mechanisms, which have the ability to enforce restriction based on universal standards.

Table 2.2. Summary and operationalisation of theoretical concepts

<b>Ideal type</b>	<b>Theoretical expectation</b>	<b>Empirical indicator</b>
<b>Non-domination</b>	Duty of beneficence as a reason for action	Aiding other states are framed as assistance and understood as a charity
	External sovereignty as a core principle	Financial measures inside the state are emphasised. Ex. taxation and domestic budgeting.
	Flexible solutions	Financial solutions with the possibility for national adaption.
	Multilateralism as institutional form	Reference to organisations where financial decisions are taken by consensus and without any possibilities to penalise breaches.
<b>Impartiality</b>	Moral duty as a reason for action	Aiding other states is framed as a moral duty and understood as an obligation.
	Rights protection as a core organisational principle	Appointed guidelines for partnership based on values which ensures the right of the individuals.
	Universal solutions	Universal solutions, which should be followed by all, independent of level of development.
	Supranational as institutional form	References to the strengthening of international organisations where authority is delegated from member states and which possess the ability to sanction nonfulfillment.

## Conclusion

The expectations that are laid out identify how the different ideas of justice could be translated into the case of financing global development goals, both in the official documents and in the statements made in the intergovernmental process. Both approaches assume that foreign policy actors are trying to alleviate the existence of dominating relationships in the world. The concepts of justice therefore make it possible to identify, among other factors, how the EU is prioritising as regards to state sovereignty and cosmopolitan values, such as individual rights protection. Not only does the framework assist with categorising which perspective of justice, if at all, coincide with the EU's position, the theoretical framework also provides the tools to analyse if the EU's position at times can be perceived as increasing the risk of domination.

# Chapter 3

## Research design and methodology

In this report, I seek to analyse the EU's approach to financing development in the 2030 Agenda. The analysis follows a qualitative and interpretative tradition in political science (Weber, 1978), as I focus on which ideas of justice are present in the EU's position. To begin with, this chapter introduces the within-case study as the research design applied. Thereafter, the use of ideal types as a method for interpretation are presented. Then follows an introduction of the sources of data used in this report, and lastly a discussion around the validity and reliability of the design.

### Within-case study design

In this report, I examine the EU in the negotiation process of the 2030 Agenda. The research design for the analysis of this report, therefore constitutes a case study. Yin (2014) provides a two folded definition of case studies. Firstly, the scope of a case study, he claims, is 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context'. The second part of Yins definition concerns the *features* of case studies which he says 'copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables than data points' (Yin, 2014: 17). A within-case design is characterised by being an in-depth exploration of a single case. In this report, the EU in the negotiation of the SDGs serve as the main case. The aim is further to characterise its position towards the financing of the SDGs. The case

is therefore limited in its scope towards the financing part of the EU's position, while it is delineated in time in terms of the period of the negotiation. In this case the period spans between January 2013 and until the official endorsement of the 2030 Agenda, in September 2015.

## Case selection

Levy (2008) brings up the importance of thinking *beyond* the actual case and establishes that the case is also an *instance* of something else. This is important because while a case study is the study of 'a contemporary phenomenon in debt', the aim is also to shed light on a larger population. The EU in the negotiations of the SDGs was a unique event, but at the same time it was also an occurrence of the EU's development policies. It can be argued that this case is an especially good example of the EU's development policy, since the negotiations represented an arena where the EU agreed on a shared position which was profoundly negotiated between its member states. Its position thus gives a good indication on the EU's ambitions in relation to global development policies. In addition to this, the 2017 European Consensus on Development puts the 2030 Agenda at the core of its development policy. It is also mentioned as a crosscutting dimension for the implementation of the Global Strategy on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy which was presented in 2016. This again underlines the representativeness the joint position of the EU in the SDGs was, in terms of the EU's development policy in general. In this sense, this case would fit the description of a *typical-case* approach in terms of case selection (Gerring, 2007: 91).

## Using norms and ideas as units of analysis

In this report, the aim is to analyse the EU's approach to financing the SDGs. To do this, I make use of a normative analytical method for identifying the characteristics of the EU's approach and analyse which ideas of justice are prominent in its position. A substantial part of the analysis evolves around interpreting discourse in official documents and statements. Norms and ideas as they appear in the official documents therefore serve as important units of analysis. This kind of approach in political analysis, where a study of ideas is used to illuminate, understand and explain politics, has, in recent times been emphasised by several theoretical contributions in political science (Béland & Cox, 2011; Parsons, 2007). Following this strand of research, an important premise is the sociological insight that 'norms and values serve as the foundation



of any social order and that they have behavioural consequences' (Finnemore, 1996; Sjursen, 2017a: 1; Weber, 1978; Wendt, 1999).

The literature that exists on analysis of ideas is often split on the question if these studies should aim at *explaining* political outcomes or if they should seek to *map* the ideas present. In this report, the goal is not to explain *why* the EU has a certain position, but rather to interpret and analyse the ideas of justice which is presented in its position and the implications this might have. This is because my goal is to analyse what kind of actor the EU is in its external relations and more specifically what kind of development actor it is, rather than explaining why the EU promotes certain ideas.

## The use of ideal types

To guide the interpretation of the analysis, I use ideal types to structure the examination. The main aim of ideal types is to define a set of central characteristics which are typical of a category or a class. The goal is not to construct a diverse reality, but rather to establish an ideal whereby experiences in a complex world can be measured and weighted against (Bratberg, 2017: 82). The ideal types then contribute in making the premises for the analysis explicit and works as a framework of interpretation (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 166). The use of ideal types to interpret the analysis has several similar traits to what Yin (2014) calls *pattern matching* and George and Bennett (2005) describe as the *congruence method*. In this report, it is the two concepts of justice laid out in chapter 2; *justice as non-domination* and *justice as impartiality*, which serve as ideal types. They represent two contrasting normative perspectives on what a just foreign policy could look like. The ideal types, for example, prioritises differently when it comes to the role of the state versus the individual. In the non-domination ideal, states are considered to be the actor of importance, while in the impartiality ideal it is the individuals who are the rightful claimants of justice. There is also conflicting emphasis on which institutional form is best capable of ensuring global justice; multilateral or supranational, and if external sovereignty or rights protection should serve as the core principles.

According to Bergström and Boréus (2012: 173), there is no given template for constructing an analysis based on ideas. This provides the researcher with the freedom to develop its own tools which fit the overall purpose. In chapter 2, I have presented expectations for each of the ideal types and operationalised the theoretical concepts that help

in the process of identifying the perspectives of justice in the empirical material. One advantage with the use of ideal types, is that it contributes to a systematic analysis of a comprehensive empirical material, especially when it comes to ideas at a specific point in time and comparison between different time periods (Solhøy, 2016: 53). This is also an asset in this analysis, since I compare the EU's current position with earlier trends in global development policies to establish a change. The ideal types then serve as two different modes of explanations, as I first examine if this change is in the direction of non-domination, while I in the preceding chapter discuss if this change involves elements of the impartiality concept after all.

The greatest criticism towards the use of ideal types, is the lack of clarity it can create around whether the categories are prepared in advance or if they are constructed as a result of the analysis (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 166). The outset of my analysis, the two concepts of justice presented, are based upon well-established theories of justice; republicanism and cosmopolitanism.<sup>8</sup> While the GLOBUS framework is fairly new, it has been applied in different research papers in the fields of migration (Lucarelli & Fassi, 2017; E. D. Olsen, 2018), climate policy (von Lucke, 2017; Walker, 2018; Zellentin, 2018), security policy (Tomic & Tonra, 2018) and gender (Holst, 2018). Thus, there should be no uncertainty that these ideal types are being constructed as a result of the analysis as such. However, the framework has never been used in the context of development financing, and a part of my contribution is to apply and adapt the theoretical framework to this new setting. Accordingly, it has been essential that the ideal types not only describe how a just foreign policy might look like, but more specifically present what a fair financing of the development goals could resemble. This also entails that the theoretical assumptions laid out in chapter 2, to some extent have been modified during the process of the analysis and can therefore not be described as completely deductive. Due to the fact that the construction of ideal types presupposes good knowledge of the material that will be analysed, these modifications have, however, been necessary (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 151).

---

<sup>8</sup> The cosmopolitan worldview is at the core of the impartiality concept of justice. The concept of distributive justice is, however, not addressed by the GLOBUS-project and the impartiality approach is best described as a 'republican cosmopolitanism' as laid out by Bohman (2004).

## The sources of data

The sources that constitute an analysis are important for any assessment of its validity. In this report, the data is collected through publicly available documents obtained through searches online. I have compiled four Council conclusions and four communications from the Commission from the period of January 2013 until May 2015. In addition to this, I have collected 54 official statements and speaking points which the EU presented in the Open Working Group and the intergovernmental negotiations for the 2030 Agenda. The part of the negotiations that concerned the substance of the actual goals, is praised to be very transparent. In the negotiations which involved the financing part of the 2030 Agenda, informal consultations and meetings behind closed doors were much more common, and speaking points from member states are not always made publicly available. However, the IISD reporting services attended all the official sessions and provided summaries and briefing notes from the conferences.<sup>9</sup> These meetings were two preparatory meetings held in April and May 2015, two drafting sessions in May and June and the Third Financing for Development (FfD3) conference itself, that took place in July 2015 and which resulted in the adoption of the AAAA-document. In addition, news articles from journalists who were present at the negotiations, have also been used as a source.

Since the EU consists of 28 member states, the need for developing a comprehensive shared position is important in a negotiation process such as the post-2015 process. The EU is known to spend an excessive amount of time on this, and one can therefore with great certainty conclude that the analysed documents accurately cover its shared position in this matter. The EU itself argued that its position towards the SDGs is presented in six official documents. These documents are the European Commission communications of February 2013,<sup>10</sup> July 2013,<sup>11</sup> June

---

<sup>9</sup> The IISD Reporting Service' Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) is an independent reporting service on United Nations environment and development negotiations.

<sup>10</sup> COM(2013)92, 'A decent life for all: Ending poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet', 27 February 2013.

<sup>11</sup> COM(2013)531, 'Beyond 2015: towards a comprehensive and integrated approach to financing poverty eradication and sustainable development', 16 July 2013.



2014<sup>12</sup> and February 2015<sup>13</sup> and the Council conclusions of June 2013,<sup>14</sup> December 2013,<sup>15</sup> December 2014<sup>16</sup> and May 2015<sup>17</sup>. The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union and is also granted monopoly on proposals regarding legislation. Policy initiatives by the European Commission are prepared by the different Directorates-General (DGs), which are organised by policy areas, and then presented in communications. The Council of the European Union, along with the European Parliament, hold the legislative power of the EU. Based on communications from the Commission, the Council adopts Council conclusions which in turn define the political direction and the priorities of the EU. While the Council of the European Union is also, in theory, an executive body, it usually delegates to the European Commission the task of representing the EU in intergovernmental negotiations such as the negotiations of the 2030 Agenda (E. Olsen, Rosén, & Trondal, 2017: 83-104). When developing and presenting the EU's common position, this was done by representatives from the DG DEVCO and the DG Environment, but also EU member state officials played a key role in shaping the EU's position due to their role in the Council of European Union (Keijzer, 2017).

Turning our attention to the EU's position towards financing and implementing the agenda, this is primarily laid out in four official documents. These are the Commission communications 'Beyond 2015: towards a comprehensive and integrated approach to financing poverty eradication and sustainable development' from July 2013 and 'A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015' from February 2015. The propositions laid out by the Commission are then reaffirmed by the European Council in two council conclusions; 'Financing poverty eradication and sustainable development beyond 2015', from December 2013 and 'A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development

---

<sup>12</sup> COM(2014)335, 'A decent life for all: From vision to collective action', 2 June 2014.

<sup>13</sup> COM(2015)44, 'A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015', 5 February 2015.

<sup>14</sup> 11559/13 'The overarching post 2015-agenda', 25 June 2013.

<sup>15</sup> 17553/13 'Financing poverty eradication and sustainable development beyond 2015', 12 December 2013.

<sup>16</sup> 16827/14, 'A transformative post-2015 agenda', 16 December 2014.

<sup>17</sup> 9241/15, 'A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015', 26 May 2015.

after 2015' from May 2015, where the latter also constitutes the most complete description of the EU's position.

To be able to identify a change, documents that have constituted the core of development policies on the multilateral level in addition to the key documents that have constituted the EU's development policies, have also been analysed. On the EU level this is particularly the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the Agenda for Change (2011). On the multilateral level, the most important documents are the outcome document from the Monterrey consensus and the Doha declaration, in addition to the MDGs.

There are some potential problems with interpreting solely from textual sources, and especially diplomatic sources. Diplomatic language is often meant to be broad so as it stands a chance in an international setting where everyone needs to agree. However, the summaries and briefing notes provided by the IISD help to control for inconsistencies between what the EU writes in its documents and what the EU actually said in the negotiations. It has therefore been important to cross-check the information in the official documents. In addition to this, the notes from the IISD give a more nuanced picture of the EU's position, due to the fact that they also present some of the reactions from other actors, in relation to the EU's proposals.

## Reliability and validity

One of the challenges of any academic study, is the issue of reliability and validity. *Reliability* can be understood as to which extent the results can be verifiable (Bratberg, 2017: 26). The goal of reliability is therefore to diminish the errors and biases that exist in a study and is closely linked to how the analysis is pursued (Yin, 2014: 49). The strengths of this data material in terms of reliability, is that the documents are all based on publicly available sources. This enables other researchers to obtain the same documents, and the transparency of this report is therefore high. *Validity* on the other hand, concerns to which extent we are measuring what we think we are measuring (Holsti, 1969: 142). Validity therefore addresses the links between the research question and the selected data and method. High reliability is always essential for ensuring high validity, but high reliability alone cannot guarantee validity.

There are several important concerns in terms of validity when it comes to the use of ideal types as a method of analysis. The first concern is if

the ideal types cover the data material sufficiently. A potential weakness of the study would be if most of my text material did not fit under neither of the two ideal types presented. The EU's position papers and statements span over a great amount of policy areas. Consequently, not all of the elements are included in the analysis. However, I do argue that the analysis covers the most essential parts of the EU's position. This is also reflected in the included areas of the EU's position being the evident tendencies in terms of global development. The second problem this method raises, is what one should do with the material which falls outside the already identified ideal types. In the analysis, I have been aware that there might be ideas evident in the position papers which are impossible to place within the ideal types. One of the conceptions of justice; *justice as mutual recognition*, is, for example, excluded from the analysis, which again increases the chance of some elements in the data material falling outside the theoretical framework. However, the aim of the analysis is to trace evidence of the two ideal types presented, and outlining other ideas, is therefore not a concern as long as these ideas of justice are sufficiently present in the data material. At the same time, I have been open to the fact that the EU's position does not necessarily only contain evidence of one of the ideal types, but both.

# Chapter 4

## An increasing role of the state

The financing plan for the SDGs or what is called the *Global Partnership* is described by the EU as the 'how' part of the 2030 Agenda (European Commission, 2013a). Since the MDGs were introduced in 2001, the 'how' part of realising global objectives, have changed substantially on the multilateral level.<sup>18</sup> In the first part of this chapter, I establish that there has been a change in how development policies are financed. I then use the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 2 to analyse if this change has been towards the concept of justice as non-domination. In the course of doing this, I identify three main changes which will guide the composition of the analysis. These are; an increased focus on domestic action and resources, a less prevalent role of international public finance, and the inclusion of the private sector as an important actor.

---

<sup>18</sup> I recognise that there exists other formal development objectives than the ones agreed upon under the UN (the MDGs and the SDGs). However, the UN represents a unique global legitimate body for creating international norms for development cooperation. These agendas can therefore be useful proxies for identifying the main objectives and trends that exist in this fields.

## Change in international development discourse: From MDGs to SDGs

The adoption of the financing framework for the 2030 Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), signified the establishment of several important changes when it comes to how development policies are financed. In the official documents, there is for example an increasing emphasis on developing countries financing their own development through domestic resource mobilisation (Kamau, Chasek, & O'Connor, 2018: 235). Development cooperation has traditionally been financed through aid either from bilateral or multilateral donors. For instance, the MDGs were broadly perceived as a framework for traditional aid, and how *high-income* countries could finance development in developing countries. The MDG8 which was the principle of global partnerships, and the only goal that focused on how to achieve the objectives, exclusively provided responsibilities to the donor community (ITU, OHCHR, & UNDESA, 2013). The tendency now, however, appears to be less emphasis on international public finance. This is illustrated by the frequently endorsed phrase 'beyond aid', which is often used to question aid and indicate changes in development cooperation (Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2015). Abandoning the dichotomy between the developed and developing countries and moving away from the 'traditional North-South paradigm' and the concept of 'donor-recipient', are other examples of how the discourse has changed. In addition, the development community used to be characterised by a distrust of business, where they would rather refrain from holding them accountable for development outcomes (Scheyvens, Banks, & Hughes, 2016). Now however, the private sector is called upon to contribute with significantly more resources. This is not only as technical measures, but also as actors (Engberg-Pedersen, 2016). Without the exception of Keijzer (2017), there is however no literature on the EU's role in this change. The following sections of this chapter will assess how the EU positions itself in this changing landscape of development policies.

## A shift towards a more statist approach?

Global justice as non-domination considers the state to be responsible and best fitted for ensuring the protection of its population. To find support for this concept, I should therefore be able to identify in the EU's position a main concern on financial measures inside the state. It should also be evident in the documents that there is a focus on *assisting* other states without appointing guidelines that can restrain its policy

space. It is also expected that the EU should encourage the strengthening of multilateral cooperation and institutions. In the following sections, I will analyse the EU's position when it comes to domestic actions and resources, international public finance and private finance.

## Domestic actions and resources

As also identified by Kamau et al. (2018: 235), the adaption of the SDGs signified a trend towards an increased focus on domestic action and resources. When examining the EU's position towards financing the 2030 Agenda, this is an especially prominent feature. In the official documents, the EU frequently underlines that domestic public finance is the main source of financing which is available for governments, and that domestic actions should be reckoned as the most important ones. The EU for example states that 'a global approach to financing should leave resource prioritization first and foremost to the country level' (European Commission, 2013a). In addition to this, the EU's emphasis on domestic action and domestic resources are both underlined and amplified when looking at the key principles that the EU wanted to be in the forefront of the Global Partnerships. It is for example stressed that the partnerships should be based on national ownership and grounded in the principles of universality. In the following section, I will first go through the guiding principles of ownership and universality, which I find emphasise the EU's focus on national action. Secondly, I will look at how the EU wanted to mobilise domestic resources to finance the agenda.

## The principle of national ownership

The inclusion of ownership as a guiding principle for the SDGs, is one of the important features of the implementation part of the 2030 Agenda. This was also a principle the EU emphasised continually throughout its official documents. Ownership does not have a universally accepted definition, and because of its vague term it can appeal to actors for different reasons (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009a). This also makes it important to address how it is understood in the EU's documents and statements. Whitfield and Fraser (2009a: 3) point out two ways the concept of ownership is usually understood. This is ownership as *commitment* to policies, or ownership as *control* over both the process and the choices of policies. Kindornay (2015) on the other hand, defines ownership as 'the extent to which developing countries own development priorities, including their ability to define, lead and implement their preferred model of development'. While the Millennium Declaration never mentioned the concept, both the following Monterrey



Consensus from 2002 and the Doha Declaration from 2008 stressed that ownership was an important principle. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness even placed ownership at the heart of the aid effectiveness agenda (Keijzer, Klingebiel, Örnemark, & Scholtes, 2018; Kindornay, 2015).

There are two visible shifts in how the EU understand ownership in the 2030 Agenda, when comparing it to how this concept is previously understood at the multilateral level. Firstly, in the Monterrey consensus, Doha Declaration and the Paris Declaration, the notion of ownership was closely linked to aid effectiveness. In this context, ownership was looked upon as a technical issue which should be managed to ensure effective use of the resources provided. Some scholars also argue that the inclusion of ownership was part of an effort to re-legitimise foreign aid (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009a: 90). The concept of ownership was therefore used to move away from donor fragmentation and the external conditions imposed on receiver countries, and instead provide aid that was aligned with beneficiary governments own development strategies. In this way it was often understood as *commitment* to policies instead of actual control (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009a: 2). In the EU's position papers for the 2030 Agenda, however, it is the *goals* themselves and the implementation methods that the EU claim should be based on respect for country ownership. The EU, for example, states that the agenda ought to be 'guided by the principles of accountability, the fundamental requirements of which are ownership of the whole agenda by all countries' (Council of the European Union, 2014: 2). Ownership is here presented as essential across a *variation* of key inputs in the Agenda, and not only when it comes to international public finance, which traditionally have been the case. Secondly, in the EU's official documents, ownership can be understood from a perspective of *sovereignty*. The EU for example wanted the final text to say:

We reiterate that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development and that the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasised. For all countries, public policies and the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources, underscored by the principle of national ownership, are central to our common pursuit of poverty eradication and sustainable development.

(EU, 2015a)

The final text agreed upon in intergovernmental negotiations, looked quite different. In that paragraph, the passage does not include the section that claimed that national policies cannot be overemphasised. In addition, the section which request that public policies should be underscored by the principle of national ownership, has also been omitted. The way the EU emphasises ownership creates space for domestic political processes since it underlines the need for flexible solutions so that states can choose their own focus. This is also evident when the EU claims that the most essential element for making the post-2015 agenda transformative, is effective implementation which takes place at the country level, and that 'national ownership and leadership will be of key importance' (Council of the European Union, 2014: 7). Thus, how the EU understands the concept of national ownership, represent in many ways a safeguarding of national sovereignty at the same time as it moves accountability from the international community to the respective states. Safeguarding of national sovereignty is the core organisational principle of the non-domination perspective and this emphasis by the EU gives support to this concept of justice.

### **The principle of universality**

The concept of universality is fundamental for the 2030 Agenda and hailed as one of the main advancements from the MDGs (Dodds, Donoghue, & Leiva Roesch, 2017). The concept is often seen as a reaction and a compensation of what was the great weaknesses of the MDGs; that the goals were only significant for the developing countries and not for the already developed states (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). Similar to the concept of ownership, universality also seems to have different meanings when coming from different actors. I argue that the way the EU understands this concept corresponds with the expectation from the non-domination perspective of justice where states are assigned the prime responsibility of development. In its position papers, the EU stresses that universality underlines that everyone needs to contribute to the goals, and the concept is repeatedly mentioned in the same sentence as shared responsibility, mutual accountability and 'action by all' (European Commission, 2015b: 6). This points to a definition of universality that evolves around all countries engaging and taking responsibility for the implementation of the agenda, and which favours the financial part of the agenda more than its applicability. It is, for example, frequently reiterated that 'commitments must be made by all, reflecting the universality of the agenda as well as the different and evolving capacities and changes in the global economy' (Council of the



European Union, 2015b). The EU's statements in the intergovernmental negotiations also reaffirms this:

The spirit of a new global partnership should be addressed and in this regard universality is fundamental. It marks a true paradigm shift on which the Declaration should put more emphasis, outlining what it means and its implications, in particular in the introduction and in the vision. And universality comes with shared responsibility [...].

(Falkenberg, 2015)

In the negotiations, however, it is made clear that there were several differences in how the universality concept was understood. The definition of the UN, for example, is more directed towards the goals being universally *applicable* to all countries, also high-income countries. It was therefore important that all the goals were constructed in such a way that every country could find them relevant and that the goals identified issues which all countries are affected by. This is also demonstrated with the UN underlining the importance of 'leaving no one behind' and that the 2030 Agenda is for everyone, when arguing for universality (UNDG, 2015). Consequently, this definition by the UN is more focused on the goals themselves, and that *they* are 'universal', than the EU's emphasis on universality which seems to aim for better burden-sharing among the countries.

The developing countries, with the G77 and China in the forefront, expressed concern about how the EU and several of the other developed countries understood the concept of universality. This was because the developing countries presumed that this implied that there was no differentiation between developed and developing countries. The G77 and China then claimed that this would result in developing countries being 'stuck between a rock and a hard place', and that they would neither get the financial support necessary to achieve the SDGs, nor the suitable policy space to implement their development policies (Long, 2015; Muchhala & Sengupta, 2014: 2). The G-77 and China therefore held that the universality concept in the Global Partnership should be based on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), a principle that underlines that countries should contribute based on financial capabilities and historic responsibilities (Stern, 2013). This way of underlining universality includes assigning a *fair share* of the burden to everyone. The principle of CBDR would however assign more

responsibilities to the developed countries due to more resources and their colonial past (Long, 2015: 217). The EU and the other developed countries opposed this inclusion strongly and wished to also avoid references to North-South approaches (IISD, 2015a; 2015d: 6). They argued that ‘the world has changed dramatically over the last decades, including our respective capabilities to address global challenges’, and that the CBDR therefore did not belong in the 2030 Agenda (EU, 2015b). The EU could neither accept the proposed text where developed countries were called on to increase efforts to formulate policies consistent with the objectives of ‘economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development of developing countries’ (IISD, 2015b: 6). Instead of the principle of the CBDR, the EU proposed that ‘the polluter pays’ principle should provide guidance for both choice and design of policy instruments (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 6). This principle, which only concerns environmental policies, places the responsibility on those that produce pollution, in compared to the CBDR which places responsibility on the ones who have financial capacity or the ones with historic responsibilities. The emphasis on ‘the polluter pays’ also clearly underlines that the EU believe states primarily should take responsibility for their own actions and development.

The UN’s way of emphasising universality have strong similarities with the impartiality view of justice because it is people-centred and reflects a cosmopolitan ideal of realising the goals for all human beings. The developing countries demand to include CBDR as an overarching principle, does neither reflect a cosmopolitan ideal nor the non-domination ideal. Instead this focus on differentiation based on historic responsibility falls outside the laid out theoretical framework.<sup>19</sup> The EU’s way of underlining universality on the other hand, corresponds much more with the non-domination expectations which emphasise that states stand accountable for achieving the goals. The principle of universality is almost exclusively mentioned together with shared responsibility. This again gives the impression that the EU is moving towards an increasing statist approach, which will be further explored in the next section.

---

<sup>19</sup> In the concept of justice as mutual recognition, different solutions to different contexts is at the core (Eriksen, 2016). The promotion of the principle of CBDR, could in this way correspond well with this concept of justice.

## Mobilisation and effective use of domestic public finance

Domestic resources have always played an important role when it comes to development policies. However, as already stated, global objectives like the MDGs focused mainly on international public finance and how the 'North' could finance the 'South' and was less about how one should mobilise domestic finance. In the AAAA document and the 2030 Agenda however, domestic resources are given a central role. As already underlined, the EU's commitment to domestic actions are evident in how the EU interprets the principles of ownership and universality. However, as will be further elaborated on in the next section, the domestic financial measures that the EU stresses also gives strong connotations to the non-domination concept of justice.

In accordance with the non-domination concept of justice, I expect that domestic measures should be prioritised because it ensures an enhanced control of states' own policies. In accordance with this, I should be able to identify in the EU's position a focus on measures and policies which are decided by the government and that these suggestions doesn't come with any restrictions. As expected, in the EU's official documents, it is outlined that the EU believes that the key to mobilising domestic public finance is reforming national and international tax systems, enhancing nationally driven policies and combatting illicit financial flows, and focusing on sustainable debt financing (Council of the European Union, 2015b; European Commission, 2013a, 2015b). Especially, the EU sees a well-functioning tax system as invaluable for the effective use of domestic public finance. This is because the EU sees taxation as a vital element of 'the social contract that underpins domestic accountability', and it therefore claims that supporting increased domestic resource mobilisation and assisting in greater capabilities in taxation for partner countries, will be an important way forward (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 9). The EU says that it is ready to increase its assistance for 'nationally driven efforts to implement public finance policy, administration reforms, and to promote a transparent, cooperative and fair international tax environment'. This would also be supporting of capacity building and enhancing the civil society for more transparency and accountability. Institutions with the responsibility for budgetary planning and oversight should be strengthened, which the EU suggests should include 'independent national supreme audit institutions, parliaments and civil society'

(European Commission, 2015a: 4). The EU also underlines that national regulations are key to combat illicit financial flows. In addition, it is important for the EU that the primary responsibility for sustainable debt levels is placed with the borrowing countries (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 10).

Looking at the EU's position towards how countries should mobilise domestic resource, there is a great emphasis on *assisting* countries that desire and require help. Assisting in greater capabilities in taxation for partner countries can be seen as to be in line with the principle of *duty of beneficence*. This is the case, since assistance is not framed as an obligation and would neither interfere in states' respective policies. Instead it would be on the premises of the beneficiary country and outlined as charity. This is exemplified in a statement made on behalf of the EU by Gaspar Frontini; 'Such a partnership should emphasise the primacy of national government for their own sustainable development, supported by enabling actions by others where appropriate' (Frontini, 2015: 372). Accordingly, the government itself should have the authority to select its own policies, there should not be a universal solution, and in addition, outsiders should help, but only where the government requires it. Acts based on a *duty of beneficence* is one of the expectations drawn from the non-domination perspective. The EU's emphasis on assistance therefore coincides with the non-domination concept of justice.

### The case for an upgraded global tax system under the UN

A concept of global justice as non-domination focuses on the equal standing of states and consequently favours multilateral cooperation based on fair representation by all. The question of where important international decisions should be decided upon, was also one of the areas where the intergovernmental negotiations of the SDGs revealed great differences between the developed and the developing countries. The developing countries for example questioned the universality of the outcome of the financing agenda when it came to the current institutional arrangements. The developed countries, with the EU and the US in front, all supported the use of existing institutions. This entailed that issues pertaining to restructuring debt should be kept under the IMF, while measurement of ODA and global tax matters should be held under the OECD. The contradictions between the developed and the developing countries were particularly conflicting when addressing issues concerning the international global tax system.

The developing countries called for 'new and more inclusive institutions under the UN'. More specifically, they suggested to upgrade the existing UN Committee of Experts on International Tax Matters to a more powerful UN intergovernmental body (IISD, 2015c: 16). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the institution which have primarily been taking the decisions which are concerned with 'global' tax and transparency standards, and in many cases also with the mandate from the G20. However, in the current system under the OECD jurisdiction, over 100 developing countries are excluded from these meetings, but whom are still expected to follow the decisions made. The conclusions arrived at by the OECD usually affect developing countries to the same degree as developed countries. In addition to this, a great amount of untaxed finance leaves developing countries every year, which results in lost revenues and is a major concern. There are estimated numbers which suggests that developing countries lose one trillion dollars each year in illicit financial flows, which actually is more than they receive in aid (Kar & Spanjers, 2014). Not being a part of the decisions is therefore perceived as very problematic by many developing countries. This is emphasised by the supporters of a global tax system under the UN, which frequently demonstrated with the parole: 'If you're not at the table, you're not on the menu' (Anyangwe, 2015). In addition to this, the current system is often described as a promoter of an 'unhealthy fight between countries to capture private investment by reducing tax rates, or to outright capture taxes from other countries' (Griffiths, 2015: 7).

The issue over a new intergovernmental UN tax body stood out to be the biggest bone of contention in Addis Ababa between the developed and the developing countries. The G77 and China fought hard to include it, while the EU with the support of the US, repeatedly stated that it could not support such a upgrade (IISD, 2015c: 7). Instead the EU claimed that all conclusions from the G20 and the OECD, should be implemented when it comes to global tax issues (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 10; IISD, 2015c: 7). While rarely giving an explanation for their stand, the argument of 'inefficiency' and pointing to the fact that they have been taking these decisions for over 50 years, was used as reasons by the developed countries for not supporting the developing countries request (Anyangwe, 2015; Glennie, 2015; IISD, 2015a: 4). In addition to this, of the 35 member states in the OECD, 21 of them are also member states in the EU, and together they provide a major part of the OECD budget (EEAS, 2016). This entails that the EU



has an important influence over the organisation. In a global system where all 193 UN member states are represented, this would no longer necessarily be the case.

When it comes to the theoretical framework, the fact that the EU rejected the developing countries suggestion of an intergovernmental tax body under the UN, this does not seem to fit with the non-domination concept of justice. In this perspective, one should work for a system where all states are equally represented. From this expectation one would therefore anticipate that the EU supported a multilateral alternative where everyone is represented on an equal level instead of the current system. An intergovernmental tax body under the UN would at least in theory *decrease* the risk of domination for developing countries. Every country, independent of their level of development, would have a voice with this system. The OECD structure clearly consists of several dominating elements, especially in relation to representation. It is not without reason that it is frequently referred to as the 'rich countries' club' (Ryding, 2016; Stiglitz, 2015). In the non-domination view of justice, this action by the EU would therefore be perceived as increasing the risk of domination.

## **International public finance**

The second visible trend in relation to development policies on the global level, is that the role of international public finance has changed. This seems to be exceptionally prominent in the EU's position, which repeatedly wishes to reduce the role of international public finance when it comes to financing global objectives. This position by the EU is indirectly promoted by looking at the principles of universality and ownership and the further emphasis on domestic actions and resources, where responsibilities from the international community seems to be weakened at the expense of the states. The change is, however, also explicitly underlined in the EU's framing of a new global context and the changed role of international public finance, which will be further elaborated on in this section.

## **Downplaying the role of ODA**

There seems to be quite a clear message from the EU that it wanted domestic resources to take precedence over international public resources in regards to the financing of the 2030 Agenda. In a speaking point from the intergovernmental negotiations the EU states that 'the description of the role of ODA is not balanced, it should be clearly



presented as a complement to domestic efforts. There should also be reference to all public international finance, not just ODA' (EU, 2015c). In another statement the EU is concerned that the text gives 'the impression that ODA and capacity building are more important than issues of domestic resource mobilisation, the private sector and trade', and the EU clearly wants this to be changed (EU, 2015e). Comparing these statements to earlier positions by the EU, illustrates an evident transformation. In the 2005 Development Consensus the EU stated its commitment to 'delivering more and better aid', and calls for additional resources from some of the member states (European Union, 2006). This change is also visible when looking at the MDGs, which were broadly perceived as a framework for traditional aid, and how high-income countries could finance development in developing countries. While the reference to better aid in terms of aid effectiveness still stands, the reference to *more* aid has disappeared at the expense of what appears to be a focus on domestic and private measures. However, the fact that the EU attach less importance to the role of ODA is in line with the expectations in the non-domination approach where international solutions and finance would be toned-down at the expense of national ones. This again, gives the impression that the EU wants the international community and developed countries, to have less responsibility for achieving development globally.

The stressing by the EU of a 'new global context', also reiterates this observation. The EU claims that the agenda should reflect changes in the global economy and expects all partners, independent of development level, to 'contribute their fair share' (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 4). The EU emphasises in its position papers that international public finance has a changed role in the global economy, but is still important for some, more specifically the Least Developed Countries (LICs). In this context, the EU underlines that ODA needs to be directed more efficiently and that Upper Middle Income Countries (UMIC) needs to start taking their share and commit to an increasing contribution of international public financing (European Commission, 2015b: 8). While it is argued that this is a visible global trend in the field of financing development, exemplified by the common expressions 'beyond aid' and 'moving beyond the North-South paradigm', there was no clear consensus between the actors around this issue. The G-77 and China for example wanted to elevate the role of international resources (IISD, 2015d: 8). They asked for more emphasis on the critical role of ODA and suggested to raise the ODA commitment from 0.7 %

to 1% of GNI. They also wanted to delete the references to 'innovative financial mechanisms'. The EU objected strongly to this and claimed that the financing of the agenda should be considered in a changed global financial landscape. Subsequently, the EU claimed that 'domestic public resources' should be framed as the core of the agenda instead (IISD, 2015c: 16; 2015d: 8). The fact that the EU tries to stress a new global context where everyone needs to contribute, and downplays the role of ODA, is in line with the expectations from the non-domination view of justice, because in this conception of justice the state should be appointed the main responsibility for development.

### **Changed role of international public finance**

The changed role of international public finance is not only evident in the EU's emphasis on a changed global context, but also apparent when the EU underlines that international public financing not only includes ODA, but also South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 11). The EU, for example, claimed that 'South-South cooperation can make substantial contributions to shaping global development outcomes' (European Commission, 2013b: 14). This description of international public finance by the EU represents a shift in the understanding of ODA going from exclusively being a transfer of resources between governments to a more extensive definition (Dodds et al., 2017: 120). South-South cooperation has in recent years also consisted of South-South trade, South-South flows of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and the exchange of technology and knowledge (UNOSSC, 2019). Triangular cooperation is a quite new mode of development cooperation which involves a traditional donor, an emerging donor from South, and a beneficiary country from South (Ashoff, 2010). Guiding principles of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation, are respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality and non-interference in domestic affairs (UNOSSC, 2019). Including South-South and triangular cooperation into the definition of international public finance therefore broadly enlarges its meaning. International public finance has primarily been understood as ODA, which again has been a typical example of policies which correspond with the impartiality view of justice. This is largely due to the role conditionality has played in its past. This is illustrated by the many conditions that were attached to the Bretton Woods institutions and imposed on beneficiary countries (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009b: 90). South-South and triangular cooperation on the other hand, emphasise

elements that can be interpreted in line with the non-domination view of justice because of its focus on *non-conditionality* and *non-interference* in domestic affairs. This way of doing development cooperation would therefore correspond to an act based on a *duty of beneficence*, since it is in line with the expectation that donors should be mainly reduced to givers without the ability to demand political control.

### Partnerships for effective aid

There are also other elements in the EU's position in relation to international public finance that corresponds to a concept of justice as non-domination. One of the expectations laid out in chapter 2, suggests that one would observe an emphasis on multilateral cooperation in the EU's mandate. Multilateralism is an important part of the non-domination perspective because it is in this format states are best equipped to overcome domination (Pettit, 2015: 63). The strengthening of multilateral solutions for improving effectiveness of ODA, are examples of the EU's position which coincides with this expectation. In this context, the EU highlights that there is a need to reform the ODA, based on the commitments under the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) and the principles of the Busan Partnership. Ownership, inclusive partnerships, focus on results, transparency and mutual accountability would here be essential principles (European Commission, 2013a: 7). The emphasis on commitments in line with the GPEDC corresponds with the multilateralism expectation in the non-domination perspective because GPEDC is a voluntary multi-stakeholder partnership which promotes effective development, by for example sharing knowledge and providing guidance.

### The growing role of private finance

A third visible trend in relation to global development, is the increased emphasis on the private sector as both a measure for achieving sustainable development and as important actors in this field. Indeed, the role of the private sector has been perceived as one of the most significant shifts when it comes to the financing of the SDGs (Scheyvens et al., 2016). It is the first time that the private sector has been equally called upon together with governments and civil society to pursue a more sustainable path. The AAAA even argues that the private sector 'should integrate public interests into its activities' (Engberg-Pedersen, 2016). The EU was especially vocal in relation to the inclusion of the private sector for financing the SDGs, and there are two important observations in the way the EU underlines private finance, and which

this section will investigate further. Firstly, there is an inconsistency with the fundamental norms that the EU adheres to and its emphasis on private finance. This is because the safeguarding of human rights and equality of people does not necessarily corresponds with the profit making aim of private finance. Secondly, although the EU stresses that the government should play a part in the partnerships with the private sector, there are little mentions of the potential risks that comes with relying on private finance initiatives.

### Fundamental principles and private finance

The EU does underline in its position that the agenda should be based on what it promotes as key European values; good governance, rule of law, human rights, democracy and equality. This is however an element that seems to be less prevalent than it used to be. The EU's constant emphasis on private measures and the fact that this often does not go hand in hand with these norms, is an example that illustrates this. This is an evident change in all parts of the financing agenda, but it is especially visible in the EU's arguing for more emphasis on the private sector.

In the literature, one of the very important characteristics of the EU as an external actor, has been its grounding in what it refers to as universal norms and principles. This has been argued as important justifications and legitimisations for the EU's power aspirations. In addition, the EU is often said to adhere to a cosmopolitan worldview since it regularly has expressed that the 'power of rights' surpasses the 'rights of power' (Aggestam, 2012: 457). Orbie (2012: 25) even argues that the EU, and especially the European Commission, 'claims to have a distinctive view on development issues, inspired by European values'. In the Lisbon Treaty, it is underlined that the Union should build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles of human rights, freedom, equality and solidarity, the rule of law and adhere to the principles of the UN (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 (Art 10(A))). These have been important guidelines for the EU in its partnerships. While these values also are brought up in the position papers towards the financing of the 2030 Agenda, there is a change in the way they are framed. Where compliment to these values used to be described as a conditionality for any partnership with the EU, it now gives more associations as a *recommended* principle. This change in framing is evident when looking at the *Agenda for Change* from 2011, one of the essential documents for the EU's



development policy. In this document, the EU emphasise that the partnerships should focus on partners' 'commitments to human rights, democracy and the rule of law and to meeting their peoples' demands and needs' (European Commission, 2011: 5). The EU also claims that the level of aid will depend on the receiver countries ability to conduct reforms, and that strict conditionality will be warranted to ensure that commitments to human rights and democracy are kept by the beneficiaries (European Commission, 2011: 5). These statements from the Agenda for Change, coincides well with the expectations in the impartiality view of justice. These expectations suggest that that partnerships should be followed with conditionality based on principles which ensures the right of the individual. The observation that these values are brought to the forefront of its partnerships in the Agenda for Change, while any mention of this kind of conditionality, are virtually absent in the EU's position papers for the 2030 Agenda, indicates that there is a tendency towards a change in the EU's approach. Instead in the 2030 Agenda, the EU takes a stand where respecting the states' policy space is more important than ensuring that its fundamental values are upheld when it comes to its partnership. This is apparent in the already discussed transformation of the role of international public finance, where ownership is frequently emphasised. However, it is also evident when looking at the extensive role the EU wants to provide the private sector, which will be further elaborated on in the next section.

### The EU's approach to private finance

While these fundamental values in general play a reduced role, it is especially puzzling that they are practically never mentioned in connection with private finance. By nature, private finance is short term-oriented and biased towards predictable outcomes. The 2030 Agenda has abstract aspirations in a long-term perspective and does not necessarily correspond well with the aims of the private sector (Keijzer et al., 2018: 51). The whole *raison d'être* for the private sector is profit-making, and seeking commercial returns and revenues will always be the main objective (Scheyvens et al., 2016). This is also what ultimately separates the private sector from the government and the civil society. The latter reckons human well-being as of both key importance and its main responsibility, while for the private sector, growth and economic development will weigh heavier. This does not exclude the fact that private finance initiatives can have a strong social profile, and contribute significantly to both job creation and public goals. Business areas

can seamlessly overlap with government concerns, but it is possible that tensions between these interests can arise, and there are no guarantees that the social welfare profile of a business will be pursued in a case of conflicting interests of profit-making (Estache, Serebrisky, & Wren-Lewis, 2015: 293; Scheyvens et al., 2016).

In the non-domination concept of justice, it is inside the state structure that the individual is best protected. In order to find evidence for this concept of justice, the EU's position should emphasise that the private sector should be closely governed by the premises of the government. This would be to ensure that big corporations are not able to arbitrarily interfere in the states' policy areas. In the position papers, the EU characterises private finance as the key driver of growth, and underlines that business and consumers will be important actors in the transition to sustainable development. It is therefore of great importance to have a business environment that is 'conducive to private sector initiatives, supporting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, empowering women and deepening financial inclusion' (European Commission, 2015b: 12). Private finance is further described as bigger than all public resources combined. It is also emphasised that it has the potential to drive transformation 'by addressing issues such as transparency, labour conditions, health and safety at work, access to social protection and strengthening the rule of law', and the EU strongly believes in the importance of harnessing this potential at both the domestic and the international level (Council of the European Union, 2013: 7; European Commission, 2015b: 13). To achieve this, the EU focuses on creating domestic and international policy incentives for making public-private investments more beneficial. The EU recommend that all countries should take action in ensuring a business environment favourable to the private sector, and with a predictable legal framework (European Commission, 2015a: 7).

Several of the financial measures that the EU underlines in its position papers, coincides with the non-domination concept of justice since it is amplified that the government is an active part of it. Both blending and Private-Public Partnerships (PPP), which are methods the EU frequently brings up, are approaches where the governments to some extent would normally be involved in the decisions made. There is no agreed definition on PPPs, but it is usually understood to be long-term contractual arrangements with the government where the private sector provides infrastructure and services that have conventionally



been delivered by the public sector and where the private sector shares the risk of the production. This could for example be hospitals, schools, roads or water supply and distribution (Jomo, Chowdhury, Sharma, & Platz, 2016). Blending is often defined as a mixture of public and private funding, but also frequently entails combining funding from financial and nonfinancial partners. In the definition of the EU, blending involves 'using targeted EU grants to mobilise non-grant funding under the lead of a European multilateral or national finance institution' (Voituriez et al., 2017: 262). The EU also underlines that private finance does not necessarily pursue public policy goals, and it is therefore important that governments and the private sector work together, and that the government sets the 'regulatory environment, ensuring its enforcement and establishing incentives, while the private sector have to make more sustainable investments' (European Commission, 2015b: 12). A further emphasis is also placed upon the fact that accountable and efficient institutions, which are in accordance with the rule of law, would be necessary, and that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) are important components of private sector investments (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 15). The underlining that private finance does not necessarily pursues public policy goals, is however the only reference in the EU's position that contains any doubts when it comes the interest of private finance, and is once briefly mentioned in the Commission communication from July 2013 (European Commission, 2013a: 8).

### **The potential risks of private finance**

Neither the official documents from the EU nor its statements in the intergovernmental negotiations contain any reference to the risks which can be entailed, when relying on investments from the private sector. For example, the EU never mentions that one should show prudence while engaging with business or that is should be done with caution. Instead the EU proposed to delete paragraphs that included scepticism of capital flows (IISD, 2015a: 6). As regards to Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), the EU wanted to specify that governments should not direct FDI, but incentivise it (IISD, 2015a: 5). In addition, the EU together with the US, Canada and Mexico opposed any new international arrangements for sovereign debt restructuring 'that would be inconsistent with a market-based approach' (IISD, 2015b: 6). However, the civil society and developing countries and emerging countries like China, expressed great concern that the 2030 Agenda was being

'outsourced' to the private sector and innovative financial mechanisms (IISD, 2015a: 6).

Numerous studies exist that shows that there are great uncertainties when it comes to the effect of private sector in financing development. There are also grave reservations when measuring the influence of PPPs and blending finance (Griffiths, Martin, Pereira, & Strawson, 2014). Research for example, has shown that there are great limitations in incentivising private capital flows, and that this most likely would require a change in investors behaviour, which again is unlikely to happen (Griffiths et al., 2014: 21) Before the Commission and the Council finished their official position to financing the SDGs, the European Parliament commissioned a study which concluded that precautions should be taken when arguing for the use of blending. The study called on the European Union to 'properly evaluate the mechanisms of blending loans and grant - particularly in terms of development and financial additionally, transparency and accountability, local ownership and debt risk - before continuing to develop blending loans and grants' (Griffiths et al., 2014; Voituriez et al., 2017: 263). This request to be more careful before engaging in blending mechanisms was reiterated in the European Parliament's Financing for Development resolution right before the last Council Conclusion ahead of the AAAA conference (European Parliament, 2015).<sup>20</sup>

In the literature, it is also pointed out that there are frequent debates around if TNCs actually benefit the host economies. A normal criticism of FDI is that they contribute little to the local economy (Hobden, 2014: 66). The authors of the study commissioned by the European Parliament for example, found that in 2011 70 % of FDI in developing countries went to only 10 countries. It also stressed that these countries were mainly the major exporters of natural resources. This again can be highly problematic because the FDI then does not necessarily promote development in these countries. Resource extraction usually has low job creation potential; recent research has found it to generate as little as 1 to 2 % of total employment while accounting for 60-90% of FDI in low-income countries (Ramdoo, 2015: 6). At the same time, these sectors can have a huge negative social, environmental and human

---

<sup>20</sup> The European Parliament was not part of developing the EU's shared position and it was neither present at the negotiations. This was done by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union.

rights impact and it can increase problems of macroeconomic management by being dependent on commodities that are vulnerable to changes in commodity prices (Griffiths et al., 2014). In a position paper for the summit in Addis Ababa endorsed by 142 Civil Society Organisations, it is likewise stressed that PPPs and blending 'should be approached with caution, and should only be considered if other less expensive and risky financing solutions are not available' (Eurodad, 2014: 11).

As already demonstrated, the EU's position towards the role of private finance, does at times coincide with the expectations laid out in the non-domination perspective. Many of the measures the EU emphasises, are based on partnerships with governments. PPPs and blending facilities are some examples of this. The EU also underlines CSR as an important component. However, the constant claim from the EU that it is key to create a favourable business environment, incentives FDI flows, and favouring PPPs and blending mechanisms, can increase difficulties of transparency and democratic accountability. This again can result in a decreased ability by the state to decide on its own policies. The EU's fixation on these mechanisms could therefore be increasing the risk of domination by big corporations for many countries.

## Chapter conclusion

This chapter has brought up some important characterisations of the EU's position towards financing the 2030 Agenda. For example, a changed global landscape seems to be a narrative the EU frequently promotes. It declares that it wishes to move away from a 'donor-recipient' and 'North-South'-language. The official documents and the statements from the negotiation process also reflect a strong focus on domestic action as the most important method for financing development. The issue of ownership is constantly highlighted and is framed as very important in this context, and the EU reiterates repeatedly that each country has the primary responsibility for its own development. In addition, the EU claims that ODA should only be presented as a complement to domestic efforts. The principle of universality also exemplifies the tendency towards a great focus on the state, as it is usually mentioned by the EU in the same paragraph as shared responsibility and commitment for all. Furthermore, private finance is given an exceptionally remarkable role when it comes to financing the 2030 Agenda.

These observations speak for a move away from the importance of the former emphasised cosmopolitan values that correspond with the concept of justice as impartiality, and which commonly have been an important characterisation of the EU's development policy. Instead it appears that the EU is leaning towards a more statist approach coinciding with the non-domination perspective of justice. This again speaks of a shift in who the EU believes should be responsible for financing development; instead of global institutions being accountable for goals and targets, the EU believe that the responsibility should primarily rest within national governments.

The changed emphasis on responsibility from the international community towards the domestic level and private finance, is an important observation because it also signifies an *avoidance* of responsibility. The EU together with its member states are the biggest contributors to ODA, and the EU possess the role of an important actor when it comes to development policies. When the EU argues for less focus on international public finance and more focus on domestic actions and private finance, it therefore also states that it wants less responsibility for global development. If the same argumentation came from one of the developing countries this would not have been the case.

The strengthened emphasis on the state as the most important actor and especially the focus on national ownership as important guidelines, have some significant implications for international development. Firstly, it weakens the international mandate to pressure states who do not fulfil their commitments. In this way it also illustrates one of the criticisms towards the non-domination perspective; giving the responsibility to the states reduces the possibilities the international community has in ensuring that obligations are upheld. At the same time, emphasising national ownership also increases the risk of governments selecting less ambitious approaches to the implementation of the SDGs, which could end up simplifying the goals.

While the EU at times underlines the importance of a human rights and other universal norms it adheres to, how they want to finance the agenda reveals an inconsistency with this approach. The official documents and the statements in the negotiation process for example reveal a great optimism towards private finance. Multi-stakeholder partnerships and blending facilities are not only at the centre in its position towards mobilising private resources, but are also mentioned in its

position when it comes to trade, domestic resource mobilisation and international public resource mobilisation. As already laid out, these financial measures are unpredictable and predominantly follows their own interest and not necessarily universal values or public policy goals. Arguing for private finance without the right measures for ensuring accountability could therefore increase the risk of domination. Hence, there appears to be an inconsistency between highlighting these measures for financing and claiming that human rights are at the core of its development policies.

# Chapter 5

## ‘Our size fits all’: Universal norms and the EU

At first glance, the concept of justice as impartiality represents a focus on individual's rights and a set of universal values all should follow, and which the EU openly claims that it complies to and puts in the forefront when it comes to its partnerships. Chapter 4 presented the allegation that one has seen a change from the impartiality concept of justice, towards an EU position that adheres more to the non-domination perspectives. This chapter, however, wants to explore the possibility that this might not be the case, and that the change is actually more in the way impartiality is unfolded. The chapter is structured as followed; firstly, I will give an introduction to the changing global trends when it comes to development norms; secondly, I will go through the different aspects of the financing agenda that corresponds with the expectation laid out by the impartiality concept, and then discuss the implications of these findings.

### From the ‘Washington consensus’ to the SDGs

The previous chapter identified several important changes when it comes to how one finance development. These changes did not necessarily arrive with the adoption of the SDGs. However, what makes this UN led framework of development very important, is that it provides a normalising arena for these policies. The SDGs will most likely be



dominating the discussions around development policies for the next decade, and the shifts identified will presumably be the next standards as regards to development. The 2030 Agenda is in its way a creator of what will be the coming norms in terms of development politics. This is also illustrated when looking at previous norms which have dominated global ideas of development. The so-called 'Washington consensus' from the 1980s is an important example of a shift in how one presides with development policies. The consensus consisted of a set of policy recommendations for developing countries, based on neo-liberalism and marketisation, and which was a part of the loan conditionality by the Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and the World Bank. These recommendations have been held responsible for almost an universal movement towards market economy during the 1990s (Burnell, Rakner, & Randall, 2014: 5). There was great confidence that these 'sound' policies imposed on the countries that received loans was the correct approach, and the failure by these governments was linked to incompetency and corruption or blamed on neo-patrimonialism (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009a: 29). Its creator, John Williamson, even claimed that this consensus constituted 'the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists' (Williamson, 1993: 1334). Today, however, the ideas behind the consensus are widely left behind because of its apparent inability to deliver on its promise. In its place, some scholars' claim that a 'post-Washington consensus' has emerged, where *political* liberalisation is at the forefront instead of *economic* liberalisation, and where an effective state is needed to complement market activities (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011; Burnell et al., 2014: 6; Stiglitz, 1998). This illustrates that norms changes at the pace of global trends. However, what the Washington consensus and the 2030 Agenda both have in common, is that they represent universal frameworks which consists of universal solutions meant for all to follow regardless of relations and local differences.

The concept of universalism has been important to moral cosmopolitan theories of global justice and are central aspects of the impartiality concept of justice (Caney, 2006; Pogge, 2008). This stems from the belief that to effectively ensure individual rights, there is a need to first have some access to collective goods, which are valid on a global basis (Zürn & De Wilde, 2016: 290). In one dimension, the mere existence of the SDGs seems to incorporate a cosmopolitan account of global justice because it is a global framework which presents solutions for all. The debate, on the other hand, follows the question if it is actually possible

to reason for universally valid norms, without at the same time allowing for some ethical ideas while marginalising others (Zürn & De Wilde, 2016). In the following section, I argue that the dimension of *universal solutions* in the impartiality concept is particularly evident in the EU's position.

## **A distinct way of mobilising domestic resources**

As laid out in chapter 4, the EU strongly emphasises the role of domestic resources and that these should be developed nationally. However, the position papers also reveal that the EU has a strong opinion on how this should be accomplished. A conception of global justice as impartiality focuses on the need for solutions that fit all independent of level of development. In order to substantiate this expectation, I should therefore observe in the EU's position a focus on universal standards all states should adhere to.

On the one side, the EU argues that the 2030 Agenda needs to take into account 'different national realities, capacities and levels of development' (European Commission, 2014: 3). For example, in a statement from March 2015, the EU said that the conference in Addis Ababa should not

aim at creating a one-size-fits-all template or promote silver-bullet solutions, but rather recognizing that achieving sustainable development will require a complex set of actions by all countries and other stakeholders that will have to take account of different country situations'.

(EU, 2015d)

On the other side, however, the EU suggests very specific measures which should be implemented. For example, the EU claims that 'adequate social protection floors and inclusive and equitable development measures should be integrated in relevant socioeconomic policies' (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 6). Furthermore, the EU points to the fact that one needs social dialogue to both reinforce democracy and improve transparency. In addition, in order to combat inequalities, 'national legislation, policies and practises should be inclusive and ensure access to affordable, adequate and quality services and goods without discrimination'. The EU also adds that 'all countries should facilitate investments in human capital via education, skills development and training' (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 6). These

are all proposals which does not contain a lot of flexibility for national variation. Instead they are rather concrete proposals which gives the impression that the EU has already decided upon how one should best ensure effective development at the domestic level. Consequently, even though the EU argues for nationally adapted policies and the importance of differentiation, it simultaneously suggests what would be characterised as universal standards and solutions that all countries should adhere to. As already mentioned, advocating for standards that all countries should follow is one of the main expectations from the impartiality concept of justice. This finding therefore suggest that some parts of the EU's position also corresponds to this concept of justice.

When investigating the EU's position towards financing the SDGs, there are numerous examples which seems to show that the EU has some kind of blueprint that it believe presents the best way of financing development. In the discussion around what the EU describes as harnessing the positive effects of migration for example, the EU claims that this new global partnership needs to foster a better joint approach for developing the benefits of international migration (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 20). It therefore recommends that one should allow migrants to keep more of what they earn. This could be achieved by reducing remittances and recruitment costs, and by claiming portability of earned social security benefits. The EU suggests that the costs of remittances should be reduced to less than 3%. At the same time, the EU underlines that there is a need for recognising migrants' skills and qualifications while also combatting discrimination (European Commission, 2015b: 14). It is also highlighted that countries should take action to reduce forced migration and building resilience to external shocks, such as, conflict and climate change (European Commission, 2015a: 9). Accordingly, the EU seems to have decided on how everyone should deal with migration, thus giving the impression that there is one specific solution all should adhere to. This reflects the universalist belief that it is possible to find solutions that are justifiable for all, and without the need for contextual adaption.

This pattern is also visible when it comes to how the EU wanted the tax cooperation to be formulated and implemented. Firstly, the EU states that the 2030 Agenda should encourage countries to participate in international tax cooperation and support regional tax administrations cooperation frameworks (Council of the European Union, 2013: 6). The EU then advocates for that all countries should 'comply

with the minimum standards of good governance in the tax area and commit to enhancing national regulations to tackle tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning and to avoid harmful tax competition' (European Commission, 2015b: 7). Furthermore, global standards should be implemented for the automatic exchange of tax information, with a special attention to the LDCs (European Commission, 2015a: 3). These statements are additional examples of how the EU emphasises and presents common principles they envisage that everyone should act upon, and are all evidence that supports the expectation of universal solutions as it is laid out in the impartiality approach.

### Shared standards and the private sector

Global justice as impartiality focuses on the need to secure the equal protection of the right of the individual. To find support for this approach in relation to private finance, I should therefore be able to identify an emphasis on strict international standards which can ensure that corporations upheld human rights. However, as already argued in the previous chapter, the EU's position towards private finance as an actor, comes without any worries of the risks such a position can entail. Instead the private sector is perceived as ideally suited to contribute to the global goals. There are neither any references of international regulations, and the EU seem to believe that the private finance is best managed without too many international restrictions. However, the EU does, to a certain degree, highlight that the government needs to create laws to regulate the private sector, which is one of the expectations that corresponds with the non-domination concept of justice. Yet, what speaks for impartiality is the fact that the EU seems to claim that leveraging private funds, blending and PPPs would be *universally* good methods and is something every country should pursue.

This finding is illustrated by the fact that the inclusion of the private sector is brought up as a method in practically all the areas in the EU's position towards financing the SDGs. The prevailing role of private finance is, for example, underlined by the EU in the discussion around driving the transformative change through science, technology and innovation. This is apparent where the EU highlights that public-private partnerships and investments in research is essential to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (European Commission, 2015b: 11). In the discussion around domestic public finance, the EU states that the policies implemented should ensure that money is spent

well, which would also include innovative partnerships and leveraging private funds. This would require a transparent financial sector and multinational enterprises (European Commission, 2013a: 6). In addition, in the discussion surrounding international public finance, the EU suggests that the international community should explore using more *innovative* sources for directing international public finance. Here, the EU recommends the EU blending facilities and claims that blending finance has the potential to finance projects ‘that would not otherwise attract funding and private investors due to their high risk profile/and or low profitability’ (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 14). It is therefore proposed to use public resources to ‘invest in areas that leverage private investments and support innovation’. This could be achieved using equity, loans or guarantees (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 17; European Commission, 2013a: 9). Consequently, when it comes to the role of the private sector, it is the dimension of private finance as a *universal solution* that all should follow which speaks for the impartiality concept of justice. Ensuring international standards for financing which would protect the *individual’s* rights, does not appear to be very present in the EU’s position.

## The strengthening of international institutions

### The World Bank and the IMF

One of the important elements of the impartiality view of justice, is its emphasis on supranational institutions. This is because it is essential to have institutions that are able to enforce the support of securing the individual’s right (Sjursen, 2017a: 8). This again evolves from the perception that states are not equal when it comes to power on the international arena. Securing state sovereignty, as argued for in the non-domination concept of justice, is therefore insufficient to avoid the risk of domination. Instead, there is a need for supranational institutions that operate with universal standards, independent of state power. To find support for the impartiality concept, I should therefore be able to find that the EU argued for the inclusion of institutions with supranational characteristics in its position.

While there are few supranational institutions when discussing financing for development, there are some elements of the EU’s position which corresponds with this feature. The EU, for example, emphasises that International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are critical for reaching the SDGs. The most prominent of these institutions are the World Bank



and the IMF. The EU states in its position that the IFI's role is essential for 'providing targeted development finance as well as financing for the provision of global public goods' (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 14). It further claims that IFIs should strengthen its backing for good governance and promote both transparent and fair tax systems while making a stand against illicit financial flows. In addition to this, the IFIs should take a leading role by taking environmental and social precautions in all its operations (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 14). While the World Bank and the IMF are not, by definition, supranational institutions, they both have characteristics that coincide with supranational organisations. For example, since their establishment in 1944 at the Bretton Woods-conference, both of the institutions have had an extensive broadening of tasks and activities, far beyond the initial mandate (Dijkstra, 2007: 275). The voting power in both institutions are based on financial contributions. In addition to this, the World Bank and the IMF both make decisions on behalf of their member states in order to promote financial stability. It is, for example, the staff of these institutions who negotiate with the recipient country's governments, and the staff are perceived as more influential than the representatives of the shareholder governments<sup>21</sup> (Dijkstra, 2007: 279). While not necessarily being supranational, this enables a form of *supranational governance*.

The prominent role assigned to the World Bank and the IMF by the EU, is especially evident in its discussion around long-term access to resources. The EU wishes to strengthen the international financial architecture for debts sustainability, and it claims that it will continue to support the existing initiatives involving debt relief and at the same time promote responsible lending and borrowing practices (European Commission, 2013a: 6). In this context, the EU claims that the sustainable debt financing should be guided by the IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework of financial stability (Council of the European Union, 2015b: 10). The IMF and the World Bank are characterised by strict conditionality when it comes to borrowing, which at times can undermine domestic accountability. The IMF and the World Bank usually require that 'laws to be approved'. This is especially the case in the context of, for example, tax reforms (Bekkers, Dijkstra, & Fenger,

---

<sup>21</sup> With the exception of the United States which is the biggest shareholder and therefore have an direct influence on the staff and also the power to veto in major decisions (Dijkstra, 2007: 279).



2016: 281). This element also has a strong resemblance to the earlier Structural Adjustment Plans (SAP), which were part of the 'Washington Consensus' and characterised by strict conditionality which gave little room for national adaption of policies (Fraser, 2009: 46). While this can weaken domestic legal processes, it also ensures that the countries that borrow comply with some minimum requirements. This is also in line with the impartiality concept of justice, where ensuring the right of the individual are more important than respecting external sovereignty.

## A break with the past?

Chapter 4 presented the claim that the EU's position represented a shift towards a more statist approach to financing development. This is an interesting finding when looking at the EU's previous stance in relation to financing development, where cosmopolitan values such as human rights have been prominent features. A shared commitment to these values has been particularly important when it comes to the EU's aid relationships. Thus, the apparent lack of this type of conditionality in the SDGs in the EU's position in the 2030 Agenda signifies, in a way, a break with its past. In the following section, I will discuss this further.

As laid out by the theoretical framework, in order to substantiate the existence of impartiality in the EU's position, I would have to find evidence for appointed guidelines based on the universal values it adheres to for its partnerships. As already argued in the analysis, this is a less prevalent element of the EU's position than expected. At times, the EU remarks in its position that human, rights, good governance, rule of law and the support for democratic institutions should be included as elements in the 2030 Agenda (European Commission, 2015b). Yet, the EU never claims that the partnerships should depend on these values, as has been an important characteristic from the EU in previous documents. This is, for example, the case in the Agenda for Change from 2011 (European Commission, 2011). This observation is puzzling because conditionality clauses are in place in all EU's aid and trade agreements with non-EU countries. This again entails that the EU withholds its right to withdraw from its agreements, dependent on the partner's mutual respect for certain principles which are usually human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law (Saltnes, 2013: 1).

As briefly mentioned in chapter 2, a distinction is made between *project aid* and *budget support*, as different methods for delivering aid. Budget support is characterised by funds being channelled to the receiver

government for their own allocation, while project aid is linked to specific projects and often independent of the receiver country's government. The discussion around whether budget support or project aid should be emphasised, reflects an ongoing debate around ownership as opposed to donor control (Cordella & Dell'Ariccia, 2007; Langan, 2015). Conditionality and donor control are prevalent features of project aid, while budget support usually gives more room for national ownership and are sometimes less transparent in the way it is used. This is mainly because an important feature of budget support is the emphasis on the role of the state in achieving development. Respecting the developing countries' sovereignty is underlined as one of the prominent arguments behind this method. Project aid on the other hand is usually more directed towards individuals or specific groups in a country and is often constrained by more strict control from the donor.

In the EU's official position towards the financing and implementation of the global agenda, it is not specified which type of ODA should be emphasised. However, budget support as an important means is reiterated in the New European Consensus on Development from 2017, and during the 2012-16 period, budget support represented on average 12.2% of ODA disbursement from the EU (OECD, 2018). The characteristics of budget support gives the impression that it coincides well with the concept of justice as non-domination, especially since it underlines the importance of granting national ownership and the safeguarding of external sovereignty. Yet, some scholars claims that budget support is just another way for donors to increase their influence in terms of the policymaking process (De Renzio & Hanlon, 2009: 259; Langan, 2015; Whitfield & Jones, 2009: 201). Langan (2015), for example, points to the EU's use of budget support as repeatedly being tied to trade opening and economic liberalisation in Africa. De Renzio and Hanlon (2009: 260) argue that the use of budget support has resulted in donors being involved in more stages of the policy process and that they have gained the ability to put pressure on receiver countries 'from within'. Consequently, conditionality remains important for the EU in its relations to developing countries, both in project aid and in budget support, it just sometimes comes in different shapes.

As presented in the section above, conditionality based on human rights, democracy and good governance is typically an important characteristic of EU aid. The absence of this feature in its position towards the SDGs therefore looks like a break from its past. This observation is

also supported when examining the new European Development consensus from 2017. This consensus also departs from the Agenda for Change from 2011, where greater conditionality based on its key values, is particularly underlined (European Commission, 2011; European Union, 2017).

## Chapter conclusion

Global justice as impartiality emphasises the importance of universal standards based on norms like human rights, good governance and democracy. I find little evidence of universal standards based on these norms, and the right of the individual does not seem to pay a central role in the EU's position when it comes to financing the 2030 Agenda. As chapter 4 laid out, the concept of sovereignty is a much more prominent feature. This change is also evident when comparing previous key documents from the EU, where the EU clearly emphasises the need for appointed guidelines for its financial partnerships, based on the values it adheres to.

Instead, the EU frames one of the main principles of the agenda as based on national ownership and claims that it needs to take "into account the different starting points and capabilities of countries and the need to ensure achievability, ownership and measurability" (European Commission, 2014). The findings of this chapter, however, argue that there is strong evidence of the opposite. There are many examples in the EU's position where it has already decided upon what is the right and universally good solution for financing development. This is, for example, demonstrated with its universal highlighting of private finance as an important actor, and the clearly appointed guidelines on how domestic resources best should be mobilised independent of level of development. This also supports some of the literature that exists on the EU as a development actor. Orbie (2012: 24), for example finds, that there is a belief in the EU that a more 'European' development policy would be better for development. Bicchi (2006: 293) also points to a similar pattern, she finds in her research that the EU follows a 'script' in its relation to developing countries, and that it seems to hold a 'our size fits all'-attitude.

We instinctively think of impartiality as characterised by the right of the individual, and chapter 4 presented the claim that the right of the individual is surpassed by the right of the state in the EU's position. The EU does, however, seem to see financing as a blueprint, and while

not always explicit, the position papers are inundated by universal standards and common solutions for all. This implies that there is not necessarily a change *from* impartiality, but rather a different format of impartiality.

# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda in September 2015 represented an ambitious agenda that will guide the future of development policy. In this report, I have analysed the EU's position towards financing the SDGs. This is done through focusing on the questions brought up in the introduction; *what characterises the EU's approach to the financing of the SDGs?* And the more detailed question; *to what extent and how does the EU's position suggest changes to the financing of global development as agreed in the MDGs?* In this final chapter, I will first reflect on my answer to these questions. Secondly, I will discuss the empirical implications of my findings for the literature on the EU's development policy.

### The EU's position towards the SDGs

The literature around the SDGs has to this date primarily focused on how they best should be implemented, what effects they will have on development, and numerous case studies about what it takes for them to best be achieved (e.g. Deacon, 2016; Leal Filho et al., 2018; Razavi, 2016; Stafford-Smith et al., 2017). However, research concerning how the goals were agreed upon and the norms and principles that underpins the agenda, are still scarce (cf. Chasek et al., 2016; Dodds et al., 2017; Kamau et al., 2018). When it comes to *the EU's* role and position



in these negotiations, the literature is especially limited (cf. Keijzer, 2017). The main contribution of this report, is its role in filling this gap of research, and in this next section, I will discuss my main findings.

When it comes to the characterisation of the EU's position towards financing the 2030 Agenda, I expected based on earlier commitments that the EU would focus on human rights, the rule of law, democracy and good governance as key elements that would guide its financial measures. Conditionality based on these values was also expected to be important, based on the extensive role this has played previously in official documents that have constituted the EU's development policy. However, this turned out to be a less prevalent characterisation than anticipated. Instead, what this report has found to characterise the EU's position, is the prominent role it gives states in financing their own development. This is, as laid out in chapter 4, evident in various areas of the EU's position. I, for example, argue that the way the EU emphasises the principles of ownership and universality amplifies the role of the state. In the context of ownership, this is because national adaption and the safeguarding of sovereignty are made central. When it comes to universality, the EU constantly underlines that it entails shared responsibility and commitment by all. This again speaks for an understanding of universality, which strengthens the EU's focus on the state. The EU also wanted to frame domestic resources as the core of the agenda, while simultaneously attaching less importance to the role of international public finance. In addition to this, the EU argue for an extension of the concept of international public finance into including South-South Cooperation and triangular cooperation, both of which have a greater focus on non-interference and non-conditionality and gives more room for national policies.

The aim of this report was also to analyse how the characterisations of the EU's position in the SDGs can be understood in relation to how financing of development has been previously governed. I initially established that the EU's position represented a leap from how the financing of global development was laid out in the Monterrey Consensus. Secondly, I have argued that this shift is evident in the EU's key documents when it comes to its development policies. The ideal types of justice have played a valuable role in assessing how this change can be understood, and in my report I identify two ways it can be interpreted. With the help of the ideal types, I have established a move from an EU position that coincides with the concept of impartiality as

justice towards a position that corresponds with the concept of non-domination as justice in the 2030 Agenda. This is, among other factors, based on the absence of the cosmopolitan values of human rights, democracy and good governance as conditions for partnerships. In addition, this shift is evident in the precedence of domestic actions and resources over international actions and resources, and in the EU's repeated emphasis on the safeguarding of national sovereignty.

The empirical findings also speak for a move in terms of responsibility and accountability, and suggest that the EU wants to have less responsibility for achieving global development. While previous global development agendas have given a lot of responsibility to global institutions and the developed countries, the EU's position towards the SDGs instead assigns a lot of this responsibility to national governments and the private sector. One important reflection, however, is that this emphasis on better burden-sharing can be understood in light of poor ODA track records of several of the EU's member states. As brought up in the introduction, the EU has been affected by several internal difficulties lately. This again, has resulted in the need for adopting to new realities, as both the European sovereign debt crisis and the 'migrant crisis' have had a great impact on the EU. The EU's position can therefore reflect an increasing difficulty for the EU in getting new commitments from the member states. Development policy in the EU is most likely under pressure from other policy fields, such as security.

This change in responsibility can, however, have some important consequences for global development. As regards to the EU's emphasis on ownership, there are, for example, several implications of such a position. On the one hand, national ownership has frequently been pointed to as a key element in achieving effective development. It is often underlined that proper ownership of development policies increases the chance for success in long-term projects (OECD, 2018). On the other hand, however, emphasising the concept of ownership can also lead to adverse effects. For example, when national governments are given the main responsibility in adapting the goals and ensuring national ownership over them, this also weakens the international communities' possibility to ensure that these obligations are upheld. Instead, one is praised the judgement of the respective states. Thus, this can undermine the universality of the Agenda; instead of being goals that ensure that 'no one will be left behind', which is framed as

the core of the SDGs, development is then dependent on the capabilities of the respective states. In addition, an emphasis on ownership creates the opportunity to adapt weak goals. Governments with low ambitions would be able to avoid responsibility due to the focus on national adaption.

Yet, the EU seems to compensate its emphasis on national ownership by providing detailed descriptions of 'how to' finance development. This brings us to another important characterisation of the EU's position towards financing the 2030 Agenda. Even though the EU frequently call for flexible solutions and claims that national adaption of the goals will be vital, the EU's position repeatedly signifies something else. The EU continually opts for universal solutions which it claims will be vital for successful development. Consequently, the EU has a blueprint of how it perceives that development should best be financed and which the EU frames as important recommendations for all countries. This could also be interpreted as a method the EU uses to compensate on its emphasis on national responsibility in contrast to international. Nevertheless, the characterisation of the EU's position that emphasises universal solutions, does not entail an actual shift when applying the theoretical framework, but rather a continuity of the impartiality concept of justice. The remark, however, is that it is not impartiality as we would normally identify it; ensuring the right of the individual independent of a state's capabilities. Instead, it is universal solutions based on a broader range of norms.

In this report, I also find that there are some aspects of the EU's position that does not correspond with any of the justice concepts. Instead, the EU's position is perceived as at times to coincide with *increasing* the risk of domination. Arbitrary domination is inevitable in a global world order, but as Laborde and Ronzoni (2016: 290) points out; 'one should always favour forms of intervention where arbitrariness is minimised'. The EU consistently claims that engaging with the private sector would be beneficial for everyone. However, the literature examined in chapter 4, shows that one should take precautions when claiming that private finance is exclusively positive. In the expectations derived from the non-domination perspective one would expect such a position to emphasise regulations inside the state, while in the impartiality concept, strict international standards for the private sector should be underlined. Yet, as the analysis in chapter 4 and chapter 5 demonstrated, the EU provided neither. This again could

result in big corporations undermining domestic policies. Increasing the risk of domination is also evident when the EU rejected the developing countries' wish for a more representative global tax system. The current system under the OECD, possess dominating features in its ability to take important decisions concerning countries which are not allowed a seat at the table.

## Revisiting the literature on EU development policy

The literature on the EU's development policy as laid out in the introduction, proposed competing views on how the EU can be understood as a distinctive actor in terms of global development. Birchfield (2011) and Bretherton and Vogler (2006) claimed that the EU had a 'value-based'-identity which corresponded with the EU's own description. Orbie (2008) and Storey (2006), on the other hand, suggested that norms based on market liberalisation were important characteristics of the EU's development policy. Some of the scholars didn't see a distinctiveness in the EU's development policy at all (Carbone, 2013a; K.E Smith, 2001; Youngs, 2004). Instead, they pointed to either strategic, political or commercial interests as guiding features of the EU's development policy. The strength of my contribution to this literature, is that my research has allowed for more nuances. Instead of investigating whether the EU's position is either value-based, governed by its interests, or norms like market liberalisation, I can simultaneously address a broad spectre of these issues. For example, the findings of this report, suggest that a 'value-based'-identity as described by Birchfield (2011) and Bretherton and Vogler (2006), is not a prominent feature of the EU's position towards financing the 2030 Agenda. Instead, the way the EU argue for the inclusion of private finance corresponds more with the picture Orbie (2008) and Storey (2006) paint of the EU as a promoter of the market as key to progress in development. In addition, when the EU rejected an upgrading of the global tax system, I found no justification which were in line with any of the justice concepts laid out. This could in a way speak to the interest-based perspectives. The finding that the EU emphasises universal solutions all parties should follow, independent of their level of development, is not necessarily a new characteristic of the EU, and as elaborated in chapter 5, it is also identified by Bicchi (2006) and Orbie (2012). However, it fits well with the claim of a distinctiveness of the EU's development policy. The finding that stand out, however, would be the shift in focus towards the state being a more central actor in the EU's development policy.

Lastly, the SDGs have gained a considerable amount of attention in relation to how they best should be implemented. There has, however, been significantly less interest in the political process that accumulated in the adaption of the goals. In this report, by investigating the EU's approach to financing the SDGs, I have empirically showed the importance of looking at the political dimension of justice and not only the distributive one. In relation to development finance, it is just as important to analyse how decisions are made and who should make them, as looking at how resources are distributed. Indeed, it is crucial to address the imbalances of power and the unjust relationships at place in today's world order.



# References

- Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical Power Europe? *International Affairs*, 84(1), 1-11.
- (2012). Global Norms and European Power. In K.E. Jørgensen & K.V. Laatikainen (eds), *Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power*: Routledge.
- Anyangwe, E. (2015). Addis Ababa Talks Risk Deadlock Over UN Agency for Tax. *The Guardian*, 15 July. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jul/15/addis-ababa-talks-risk-deadlock-over-un-agency-for-tax-ffd3-financing-for-development>.
- Arts, K., & Dickson, A.K. (2004). *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol?* Manchester University Press.
- Ashoff, G. (2010). *Triangular Cooperation: Opportunities, Risks, and Conditions for Effectiveness*. Retrieved from World Bank, New York: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/213798-1286217829056/ashoff.pdf>.
- Barry, B. (1982). Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective. *Nomos*, 24, 219-252.
- Beitz, C. (1999). *Political Theory and International Relations*: Princeton University Press.

- Bekkers, V., Dijkstra, G., & Fenger, M. (2016). *Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices*. Taylor & Francis.
- Béland, D., & Cox, R.H. (2011). Introduction: Ideas and Politics. *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*, 3-20.
- Bergström, G., & Boréus, K. (2012). *Textens Mening och Makt: Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text-och Diskursanalys*: Studentlitteratur.
- Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2014). Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(4), 99-120.
- Bicchi, F. (2006). 'Our Size Fits All': Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 286-303.
- Birchfield, V.L. (2011). The EU's Development Policy: Empirical Evidence of 'Normative Power Europe?'. In R.G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives* (pp. 141-160). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Birdsall, N., & Fukuyama, F. (2011). The Post-Washington Consensus: Development After the Crisis. *Foreign Affairs*, 90(2), 45-53.
- Bohman, J. (2004). Republican Cosmopolitanism. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 12(3), 336-352.
- Bonaglia, F., Goldstein, A., & Petito, F. (2006). Values in European Union Development Cooperation Policy. In I. Manners & S. Lucarelli (eds), *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy* (Vol. 37, p. 164).
- Bratberg, Ø. (2017). *Tekstanalyse for Samfunnsvitere [Text analysis for Social Scientists]*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.
- Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2006). *The European Union as a Global Actor*. Routledge.
- Breuning, M. (1994). Clouded Vision: The Complexities of Foreign Aid Motivation. [Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989, David Halloran Lumsdaine]. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), 357-359. doi:10.2307/222746
- Buckinx, B., Trejo-Mathys, J., & Waligore, T. (2015). *Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical and Institutional Perspectives*. Routledge.
- Burnell, P., Rakner, L., & Randall, V. (2014). *Politics in the Developing World*. Oxford University Press.
- Caney, S. (2006). *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*. Oxford University Press.

- Carbone, M. (2012). Preserving Policy Autonomy: EU Development Cooperation from Maastricht to Lisbon. In F. Laursen (ed.), *The EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation* (pp. 229-242). Burlington: Ashgate.
- (2013a). Between EU Actorness and Aid Effectiveness: The Logics of EU Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Relations*, 27(3), 341-355.
- (2013b). International Development and the European Union's External Policies: Changing Contexts, Problematic Nexuses, Contested Partnerships. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26(3), 483-496.
- (2017). The European Union and International Development. In C. Hill, M. Smith, & S. Vanhoonacker (eds), *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford University Press.
- Carr, E.H. (2016). *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. Reissued with a new preface from Michael Cox. Springer.
- Chasek, P.S., Wagner, L.M., Leone, F., Lebada, A.M., & Risse, N. (2016). Getting to 2030: Negotiating the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law*, 25(1), 5-14. doi:10.1111/reel.12149
- Cimadamore, A.D. (2016). Global Justice, International Relations and the Sustainable Development Goals' Quest for Poverty Eradication. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, 32(2), 131-148. doi:10.1080/21699763.2016.1198267.
- Cordella, T., & Dell'Araccia, G. (2007). Budget Support versus Project Aid: A Theoretical Appraisal. *The Economic Journal*, 117(523), 1260-1279.
- Council of the European Union. (2013). *Financing Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development Beyond 2015 - Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Members States, meeting within the Council*. Brussels, 12 December 2013.
- (2014). *Council Conclusions on a Transformative post-2015 Agenda*. Brussels, 16 December 2014.
- (2015a). *Council Conclusions on a New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015*. Brussels, Belgium, 26 May 2015.
- (2015b). *A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 - Council conclusions*. Brussels, 26 May 2015.

- Dafe, F., Hartwig, R., & Janus, H. (2013). Post 2015: Why the Development Finance Debate Needs to Make the Move from Quantity to Quality. *German Development Institute Briefing Paper*, 22.
- De Renzio, P., & Hanlon, J. (2009). Mosambique: Contested Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Aid Dependence. In L. Whitfield (ed.), *Politics of Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deacon, B. (2016). SDGs, Agenda 2030 and the Prospects for Transformative Social Policy and Social Development. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, 32(2), 79-82. doi:10.1080/21699763.2016.1200112
- Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 613-636.
- Dijkstra, G. (2007). Supranational Governance and the Challenge of Democracy: The IMF and the World Bank. In V. Bekkers, G. Dijkstra, A. Edwards, & M. Fenger (eds), *Governance the Democratic Deficit: Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices* (Vol. 269). Ashgate.
- Dodds, F., Donoghue, D., & Leiva Roesch, J. (2017). *Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals: A Transformational Agenda for an Insecure World*. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Dworkin, R. (2011). *Justice for Hedgehogs*. Harvard University Press.
- Easterly, W.R. (2006). *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. New York: Penguin Press.
- EEAS. (2016). The OECD and the EU. *Relations with International Organisations and For a*, 23 June. Retrieved from [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/paris-oecd-and-un\\_en/12350/The%20OECD%20and%20the%20EU](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/paris-oecd-and-un_en/12350/The%20OECD%20and%20the%20EU).
- Engberg-Pedersen, L. (2016). The Addis Ababa Action Agenda: Breaking New Ground, Incremental Changes, or Neoliberal Business as Usual? In A.M. Fejerskov, M. Funder, L. Engberg-Pedersen, Y. Jiang, H.M. Ravnborg, & N. Webster (eds), *Financing Sustainable Development: Actors, Interests, Politics*: DIIS Report.
- Eriksen, E.O. (2016). Three Conceptions of Global Political Justice. *GLOBUS Research Papers*, 1/2016.
- Estache, A., Serebrisky, T., & Wren-Lewis, L. (2015). Financing Infrastructure in Developing Countries. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 31(3-4), 279-304.

- EU. (2015a). EU Text Suggestions for Preamble/Declaration. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/16186eu2.pdf>.
- (2015b). Post-2015 Intergovernmental Negotiations, 19 February 2015 - EU Speaking points. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/13034eu2.pdf>.
- (2015c). Speaking points - Post-2015 intergovernmental negotiations. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/16183eu.pdf>
- (2015d). Statement on Behalf of the European Union and its Member States. 27 March 2015 - Coordination with the FFD process. Draft.
- (2015e). Statement on Means of Implementation - Post-2015 Intergovernmental Negotiations. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/16345eu8.pdf>
- Eurodad. (2014). *Position Paper: UN Financing for Development Negotiations: What Outcomes Should be Agreed in the Addis Ababa in 2015?* <https://eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546294-position-paper-un-ffd-what-outcomes-should-be-agreed-in-addis-ababa-in-2015-.pdf>
- (2011). *Increasing the Impact of the EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change*. Brussels, 13.10.2011
- (2013a). *Beyond 2015: Towards a Comprehensive and Integrated Approach to Financing Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development*. Brussels, 16 July.
- (2013b). *A Decent Life for All: Ending Poverty and Giving the World a Sustainable Future*. Brussels, 27 February.
- (2014). *A Decent Life for All: From Vision to Collective Action* Brussels, 2 February.
- (2015a). *Annex: A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015*. Brussels, Belgium, 5. February 2015 COM (2015) 44 final.
- (2015b). *A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015*. Brussels, Belgium, 5. February 2015 COM (2015) 44 final.
- (2017). *Financing for Development. International Cooperation and Development*. 28 March. Retrieved from [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/financing-development\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/financing-development_en)
- European Parliament. (2015). *Financing for Development*. In *European Parliament Resolution of 19 May 2015 on Financing for Development* Strasbourg: European Parliament.



- European Union. (2006). Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus'. In *The European Consensus on Development*. Official Journal of the European Union, 24.2.2006: 2006/C46/01.
- (2017). The New European Consensus on Development: 'Our world, our dignity, or future'. Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. *Official Journal of the European Union*, 60(30 June 2017).
- Falkenberg, K. (2015). Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States - 22 June 2015. Delivered by Mr. Karl Falkenberg, Director General - DG Environment, European Commission. In: Post-2015 intergovernmental negotiations session 22-25 June 2015.
- Farrell, M. (2008). Internationalising EU Development Policy. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 9(2), 225-240.
- (2017). Group Politics in Global Development Policy: From the Millennium Development Goals to the post-2015 Development Agenda. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 12(2-3), 221-248.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Fraser, A. (2009). Aid-Recipient Sovereignty in Historical Context. In L. Whitfield (ed.), *Politics of Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frontini, G. (2015). Means of implementation and the Global Partnership. Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States - 23 July 2015. Delivered by Mr. Gaspar Frontini, DG DEVCO - European Commission. In: Post-2015 intergovernmental negotiations. 23 July, New York.
- Fukuda-Parr, S. (2016). From the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals: Shifts in Purpose, Concept, and Politics of Global Goal Setting for Development. *Gender & Development*, 24(1), 43-52. doi:10.1080/13552074.2016.1145895
- George, A.L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Glennie, J. (2015). Financing the Sustainable Development Goals will Rely Heavily on the Tax Factor. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jul/13/financing-sustainable-development-goals-tax-addis-ababa>
- Gosepath, S. (2015). Deprivation and Institutionally Based Duties to Aid. In B. Buckinx, J. Trejo-Mathys, & T. Waligore (eds), *Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical, Institutional Perspectives* (pp. 251-290): Routledge.
- Griffiths, J. (2015). *Financing for Development: Key Challenges for Policy Makers*. Retrieved from Eurodad - European Network on Debt and Development:
- Griffiths, J., Martin, M., Pereira, J., & Strawson, T. (2014). *Financing for Development Post-2015: Improving the Contribution of Private Finance*.
- Held, D. (2004). Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective. 39(2), 364-391.
- Held, D., & Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004). Introduction to 'Global governance and public accountability'. *Government and Opposition*, 39(2), 125-131.
- Hill, C., Smith, M., & Vanhoonacker, S. (2017). *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford University Press.
- Hobden, S. (2014). The Developing World in the Global Economy. In P. Burnell, L. Rakner, & V. Randall (eds), *Politics in the Developing World* (pp. 71-88). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holland, M., & Kelly, S. (2012). A Payer or Player? EU Developmental Action in the Pacific. In *The European Union and Global Development* (pp. 245-260). Springer.
- Holst, C. (2018). Promoting Global Justice When Backlash Strikes. *GLOBUS Research Papers* 7/2018.
- Holsti, O. R. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Horký, O. (2012). The Impact of the Shallow Europeanisation of the 'New' Member States on the EU's Actorness: What Coherence between Foreign and Development Policy? In S. Gänzle, S. Grimm, & D. Makhan (eds), *The European Union and Global Development* (pp. 57-73). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hurrell, A. (2001). Global Inequality and International Institutions. *Metaphilosophy*, 32(1-2), 34-57.
- IISD. (2015a). *Briefing note on the second additional session for the preparatory process for the third international conference on financing for development: 26-29 May 2015*. Retrieved from [http://enb.iisd.org/vol23/ffd3\\_intersessionals\\_briefing\\_note\\_2.pdf](http://enb.iisd.org/vol23/ffd3_intersessionals_briefing_note_2.pdf).

- (2015b). *Briefing note on the third additional session for the preparatory process for the third international conference on financing for development: 1-5 June 2015*. Retrieved from [http://enb.iisd.org/vol23/ffd3\\_intersessionals\\_briefing\\_note\\_3.pdf](http://enb.iisd.org/vol23/ffd3_intersessionals_briefing_note_3.pdf).
- (2015c). Summary of the second drafting session of the outcome document of the third international conference on financing for development: 13-17 April 2015. *Ffd3 Bullentin, iisd Reporting Services*.
- (2015d). *Summary of the third drafting session of the outcome document of the third international conference on financing for development: 15-22 June 2015*. Retrieved from <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb2309e.pdf>.
- ITU, OHCHR, & UNDESA. (2013). UN system task team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda: Assessment of MDG8 and lessons learnt. *UN*.
- Janus, H., Klingebiel, S., & Paulo, S. (2015). Beyond Aid: A Conceptual Perspective on the Transformation of Development Cooperation. *Journal of International Development*, 27(2), 155-169.
- Jomo, K. S., Chowdhury, A., Sharma, K., & Platz, D. (2016). Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. doi: <https://doi.org/10.18356/f42bd4bb-en>
- Kamau, M., Chasek, P., & O'Connor, D. (2018). *Transforming Multilateral Diplomacy: The Inside Story of the Sustainable Development Goals*. Routledge.
- Kar, D., & Spanjers, J. (2014). *Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003-2012*. Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity.
- Keijzer, N. (2017). Expectation Management? Contrasting the EU's 2030 Agenda Discourse with Its Performance in Evaluating Policy Coherence for Development. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 22(2), 177-195.
- Keijzer, N., Klingebiel, S., Örnemark, C., & Scholtes, F. (2018). Seeking Balanced Ownership in Changing Development Cooperation Relationships. *EBA Rapport*, 8.
- Kindornay, S. (2015). *Realising Country Ownership Post-2015?* Retrieved from ActionAid, Ottawa: [https://www.actionaid.it/app/uploads/2015/06/Realising-Country-Ownership-Post\\_2015.pdf](https://www.actionaid.it/app/uploads/2015/06/Realising-Country-Ownership-Post_2015.pdf).
- Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004). Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability. *Government and Opposition*, 39(2), 234-259.
- Kumm, M. (2005). To be a European Citizen: Constitutional Patriotism and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. *Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional* (74), 9-62.

- Laborde, C. (2010). Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9(1), 48-69.
- Laborde, C., & Ronzoni, M. (2016). What is a Free State? Republican Internationalism and Globalisation. *Political Studies*.
- Langan, M. (2015). Budget Support and Africa-European Union Relations: Free Market Reform and Neo-colonialism? *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 101-121.
- Leal Filho, W. et al. (2018). Reinvigorating the Sustainable Development Research Agenda: The Role of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology*, 25(2), 131-142. doi:10.1080/13504509.2017.1342103
- Levy, J. S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25(1), 1-18.
- Long, G. (2015). The Idea of Universality in the Sustainable Development Goals. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 29(2), 203-222.
- Lovett, F. (2016). Should Republicans be Cosmopolitans? *Global Justice: Theory Practice Rethoric*, 9(1).
- Lucarelli, S., & Fassi, E. (2017). The European Migration System and Global Justice A First Appraisal. *GLOBUS Report 1*.
- Lumsdaine, D.H. (1993). *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989*. Princeton University Press.
- Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 235-258.
- Manners, I., & Whitman, R.G. (1998). Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU's Network of Relationships. *Journal of European Integration*, 21(3), 231-249.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (1995). A Realist Reply. *International Security*, 20(1), 82-93.
- Mikalsen, K.K. (2017). Equal Sovereignty: On the Conditions of Global Political Justice. *GLOBUS Research Papers*.
- Mold, A. (2007). *EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century*. Amsterdam University Press.
- Moravcsik, A., & Legro, J.W. (1999). Is Anybody Still a Realist? *International Security*, 24(2), 5-55.
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1951). *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.



- Muchhala, B., & Sengupta, M. (2014). A Déjà Vu Agenda or a Development Agenda? A Critique of the post-2015 Development Agenda from the Perspective of Developing Countries. *Economic Political Weekly*, 46, 28-30.
- Nagel, T. (2005). The Problem of Global Justice. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 33(2), 113-147.
- Nkrumah, K. (1971). *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. London: Panaf.
- Nussbaum, M.C. (2006). *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- OECD. (2018). *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: European Union 2018*.
- Olsen, E., Rosén, G., & Trondal, J. (2017). *Hvordan virker EU?* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Olsen, E.D.H. (2018). Out but Still In: Norway's Approach to Migration and Asylum as a Non-EU State. *GLOBUS Research Paper*.
- Orbie, J. (2008). *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*. Ashgate.
- (2012). The EU's Role in Development: A Full-Fledged Development Actor or Eclipsed by Superpower Temptations? In S. Gänzle, S. Grimm, & D. Makhan (eds), *The European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making?* (pp. 17-36). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Orbie, J. et al. (2017). The Normative Distinctiveness of the European Union in International Development: Stepping Out of the Shadow of the World Bank? *Development Policy Review*, 35(4), 493-511.
- Orbie, J., & Lightfoot, S. (2017). Shallow Europeanisation? In A. Hadfield & I. Manners (eds), *Foreign Policies of EU Member States: Continuity* (pp. 201).
- Parsons, C. (2007). *How to Map Arguments in Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pettit, P. (2010). A Republican Law of Peoples. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9(1), 70-94.
- (2015). The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement. In B. Buckinx, J. Trejo-Mathys, & T. Waligore (eds), *Domination and Global Political Justice*. Routledge.
- Pogge, T. (2001). Priorities of Global Justice. *Metaphilosophy*, 32(1-2), 6-24.
- (2008). *World Poverty and Human Rights*. Polity.



- Ramdoo, I. (2015). Presentation on Extractives, Local Content Policies and Industrial Development, slide 6. *Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management: ECDPM*.
- Rawls, J. (1999). *The Law of Peoples* (Vol. 20). Harvard University Press.
- Razavi, S. (2016). The 2030 Agenda: Challenges of Implementation to Attain Gender Equality and Women's Rights. *Gender & Development*, 24(1), 25-41.
- Rodrik, D. (2011). *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy*. New York: Norton.
- Ryding, T.M. (2016). On debt and taxation, rich and poor countries are worlds apart. *The Guardian*. 26 July. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/26/debt-taxation-rich-poor-countries-worlds-apart-un-trade-conference-kenya>
- Saltnes, J.D. (2013). The EU's Human Rights Policy. Unpacking the Literature on the EU's Implementation of Aid Conditionality. *ARENA Working Paper 2/2013*.
- Scheyvens, R., Banks, G., & Hughes, E. (2016). The Private Sector and the SDGs: The Need to Move Beyond 'Business as Usual'. *Sustainable Development*, 24(6), 371-382.
- Schulpen, L., & Gibbon, P. (2002). Private Sector Development: Policies, Practices and Problems. *World Development*, 30(1), 1-15.
- Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 229-243.
- Sjursen, H. (2006). The EU as a 'Normative' Power: How Can This Be? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 235-251.
- (2017a). Global Justice and Foreign Policy. *GLOBUS Research Papers*, 2/2017.
- (2017b). Principles in European Union Foreign Policy. In C. Hill, M. Smith, & S. Vanhoonacker (eds), *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford University Press.
- Skinner, Q. (2010). On the Slogans of Republican Political Theory. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 9(1), 95-102.
- Smith, K.E. (2001). The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: 'Foreign Policy' with an Ethical Dimension? In K.E. Smith & M. Light (eds), *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (pp. 185). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2006). The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations. In *The European Union at the United Nations* (pp. 154-174): Springer.

- Smith, M. (2013). Foreign Policy and Development in the post-Lisbon European Union. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26(3), 519-535.
- Solhøy, S.H. (2016). *Unntak for Trossamfunn? Politikkutforming i Spenningsfeltet Mellom Statlige Likestillingsambisjoner og Religiøs Autonomi 1974-2014*. PhD thesis, University of Oslo, Retrieved from <https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/48776/PhD-Solhoy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Stafford-Smith, M. et al. (2017). Integration: The Key to Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. *Sustainability Science*, 12(6), 911-919.
- Stern, T.D. (2013). The Shape of a New International Climate Agreement. In *Remarks by Todd D. Stern - Special Envoy for Climate Change*. Chatham House, London, UK. October 22, 2013.
- Stiglitz, J. (1998). *More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the post-Washington Consensus*, Helsinki, Finland.
- Stiglitz, J. (2015). America Is on the Wrong Side of History. *The Guardian*, 6 August. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/06/joseph-stiglitz-america-wrong-side-of-history>.
- Stocchetti, M. (2013). Inside the European Consensus on Development and Trade: Analysing the EU's Normative Power and Policy Coherence for Development in Global Governance.
- Storey, A. (2006). Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 24(3), 331-346.
- Sudreau, M., & Bohoslavsky, J.P. (2015). Sovereign Debt Governance, Legitimacy, and the Sustainable Development Goals; Examining the Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. *Washington International Law Journal*, 24, 613.
- Temple, J.R. (2010). Aid and Conditionality. In D. Rodrik & M. Rosenzweig (eds), *Handbook of Development Economics* (Vol. 5, pp. 4415-4523). Elsevier.
- Tomic, N., & Tonra, B. (2018). The Pursuit of Justice Through EU Security Strategies: Sisypheus Redux? *GLOBUS Research Papers* 2/2018.
- Treaty of Lisbon. (2007). Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
- UNDG. (2015). Universality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development From a UNDG Lens - Discussion Note. *United Nations Sustainable Development Group*.

- UNOSSC. (2019). About South-South and Triangular Cooperation. *United Nations Office for South-South cooperation*. Retrieved from <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/about/about-sstc/>
- Voituriez, T. et al. (2017). Financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In N. Kanie & F. Biermann (eds), *Governing Through Goals: Sustainable Development Goals as Governance Innovation* (pp. 259). Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- von Lucke, F. (2017). O Justice, Where Art Thou? Developing a New Take on Climate Justice. *GLOBUS Research Papers* 1/2017.
- Walker, H. (2018). Mutual Recognition in Global Negotiations: The Case of the 2015 Paris Climate Summit. *GLOBUS Research Papers* 8/2018.
- Walt, S.M. (1990). *The Origins of Alliance*. Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K.N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- (1986). Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics. In R.O. Keohane (ed.), *Neo-Realism and Its Critics* (pp. 322-345). New York.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Vol. 1): University of California Press.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Whitfield, L., & Fraser, A. (2009a). Introduction: Aid and Sovereignty. In L. Whitfield (ed.), *Politics of Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2009b). Understanding Contemporary Aid Relationships. In L. Whitfield (ed.), *Politics of Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whitfield, L., & Jones, E. (2009). Ghana: Breaking Out of Aid Dependence? Economic and Political Barriers to Ownership. In L. Whitfield (ed.), *Politics of Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, J. (1993). Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus'. *World Development*, 21(8), 1329-1336.
- Yin, R.K. (2014). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (5th ed, Vol. 30). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Young, I.M. (2000). Self-determination and Global Democracy: A Critique of Liberal Nationalism. *Nomos*, 42, 147-183.
- (2002). *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- (2011). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton University Press.

- Youngs, R. (2004). Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(2), 415-435.
- Zellentin, A. (2018). Different Angles on Climate Justice: Insights from Non-Domination and Mutual Recognition. *GLOBUS Research Papers* 1/2018, 1.
- Zürn, M., & De Wilde, P. (2016). Debating Globalization: Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism as Political Ideologies. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 21(3), 280-301.

# GLOBUS Reports

- 6: Sunniva Unn Hustad: "Financing the Future: Assessing the EU's Approach to Financing the Sustainable Development Goals in Light of Global Justice"
- 5: Sigrid Jerpstad: "Who Should Bear the Burden? The EU's Approach to Responsibility for the Sustainable Development Goals"
- 4: Vera Sofie Borgen Skjetne: "The EU as Promoter of Global Gender Justice. Combating Trafficking in the Face of the 'Migrant Crisis'"
- 3: Lea Augenstein: "The Western Argument Wins: A Postcolonial Critique of Conceptions of Global Justice as Mutual Recognition"
- 2: Joachim Vigrestad: "Partnerships for Sustainable Trade? The EU's Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in the Context of Global Justice"
- 1: Enrico Fassi and Sonia Lucarelli (eds): "The European Migration System and Global Justice: A First Appraisal"



In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This signified a leap in global development policy from the previous framework, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in terms of purpose, concept and politics. The financing of these goals is key to their success, and the EU, due to its development cooperation budget, is going to play an important role in this process.

This report contributes empirically to the literature on the EU's development policy by analysing the EU's position towards financing the SDGs. Applying a global justice approach, this report forwards three main arguments. First, it suggests that there has been an increasing emphasis on the role of the state in financing its own development. This has happened at the expense of the safeguarding of the EU's repeatedly emphasised core values, such as human rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law. Second, the report also shows that the EU still considers its own position to be 'the correct' way of governing. Ultimately, the report identifies characteristics of the EU's position towards financing development that are difficult to justify in terms of justice.

Sunniva Unn Hustad has a Master of Political Science from the University of Oslo. She was affiliated with ARENA Centre for European Studies and the GLOBUS project through the student scholarship.

