



# **Democratic Deliberation Between Citizens in the EU**

Is Plurilingualism and Multiculturalism  
Compatible with Democratic Deliberation?

*Anne Linn Fløttum Høen*

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# Democratic Deliberation between Citizens in the EU

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Centre for European Studies  
University of Oslo  
P.O. Box 1143, Blindern  
N-0318 Oslo, Norway  
Tel: + 47 22 85 87 00  
Fax: + 47 22 85 87 10  
E-mail: [arena@arena.uio.no](mailto:arena@arena.uio.no)  
<http://www.arena.uio.no>

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## Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to empirically investigate the potential for democratic deliberation between citizens in the EU. Researchers suggest that deliberative processes could better promote integration in the EU. However, deliberative theory implicitly states that deliberation works best in situations where participants share the same political culture and speak the same language. This assumption raises a fundamental question: Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism? This question has often been discussed theoretically and philosophically, emphasising the many obstacles for successful deliberation in such contexts. Empirically, this topic has usually been studied within national, monolingual settings. This thesis contributes to existing literature by studying an actual transnational, plurilingual deliberative process among citizens in the EU. I rely on data from the *EuroPolis* project, a deliberative experiment that took place in Brussels 2009.

The combination of *EuroPolis* survey data and overall findings from one small group deliberation provides perspectives on the overall *structure* of the deliberative process. This data provides a good platform for studying *whether* citizens interacted with each other, or if language and culture differences seemed to interfere with the level of interaction. Preliminary findings indicate that, contrary to theorist's skepticism, citizens interacted with each other, related to European concerns and identified with the EU. However, establishing whether democratic deliberation is compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism also requires an in-depth analysis of *how* citizens interacted with each other. For this second and more thorough analysis, I rely on the Discourse Quality Index, a tool that helps structuring deliberative processes according to Habermas' criteria of ideal deliberation. I find that the deliberative process tended towards language dominance by English-speaking participants, as well as a quite formal type of interaction and low levels of justification. These findings raise some concerns regarding how compatible and how *democratic* deliberation in transnational contexts can be. They suggest that democratic deliberation's primary function in a transnational setting is to create a common ground. In this sense, democratic deliberation could be complementary to a representative democracy at the EU-level, but not as an independent democratic procedure.



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*Anne Linn Fløttum Høen*  
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## List of tables

Table 2.1 Group composition.....	20
Table 3.1 Matrix of references .....	33
Table 3.2 Respect towards other participant's arguments.....	34
Table 3.3 Content of justification.....	35
Table 4.1 Theoretical predictions and empirical expectations .....	42
Table 4.2 Content of discussions .....	44
Table 4.3 Level of participation .....	45
Table 4.4 Participation per sequence .....	46
Table 4.5 Nature of speech acts given by the moderator .....	46
Table 4.6 Source of argument.....	49
Table 4.7 Level of justification .....	50
Table 4.8 Nature of references participants received .....	54
Table 4.9 Nature of references participants gave.....	54
Table 4.10 Asking.....	55





# Table of contents

<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
The idea of deliberative democracy .....	3
Case: the EuroPolis project.....	5
Research question .....	6
Thesis structure.....	8
Conclusion .....	8
<b>Chapter 2: Analysing deliberation</b> .....	<b>11</b>
Introduction.....	11
An exploratory approach .....	12
Starting point: Habermas' discourse theory .....	13
The empirical study of deliberative processes .....	14
Deliberative polling.....	21
Validity and reliability of the study .....	22
Conclusion .....	24
<b>Chapter 3: Analysing the deliberative structure</b> .....	<b>27</b>
Introduction.....	27
Theoretical predictions: language, culture and Identity.....	28
EuroPolis.....	30
Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism? .....	37
Conclusion .....	39
<b>Chapter 4: Analysing the deliberative process</b> .....	<b>41</b>
Introduction.....	41
Empirical expectations.....	42
Overview of the deliberative process .....	43
Analysing the deliberative process .....	44
Is democratic deliberation compatible with plurilingualism and multiculturalism? .....	56
Conclusion.....	58
<b>Chapter 5: Conclusion</b> .....	<b>59</b>
Summary of the main findings.....	59
Contribution to research.....	61
Suggestions for further research.....	62
<b>References</b> .....	<b>65</b>
<b>Appendix</b> .....	<b>71</b>



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Deliberative theory suggests that democracy should be more than the mere aggregation of preferences in elections. It should also involve how citizen's preferences are formed and possibly transformed through informed and respectful dialogue with other citizens and representatives (Dryzek 2010: 3). *Deliberation*, as Habermas describes it, is a process whereby truthful actors justify their positions by fully presenting their arguments. In order to ensure that the best argument wins, participants are required to listen attentively to each other's arguments and be open to change their own positions. To face this ideal deliberative process, Habermas emphasize deliberative qualities like equality, respect, truthfulness and considerations of the common good (Habermas 1996: 305-308).

Can a group of citizens characterized by several nationalities, cultures and languages, successfully deliberate together? This question arises because deliberative theory implicitly states that deliberation works best in contexts where participants share the same culture and speak the same language (Habermas 1998: 24; Wessler 2008: 2). At the same time, researchers emphasize democratic deliberation's potential for promoting integration in the European Union (EU) (Eriksen and Fossum 2000: 7). An increasingly globalized and interdependent world has led to the creation of large political units containing a variety of identities like the EU, which makes the deliberative model's predicted potential of current interest. Furthermore, the EU is at the present recognized by the growing distance between elites and citizens of the member states, as well as the absence of a collective identity (Kraus 2008: 38). This plurality of identities cannot be displayed and represented in its full diversity through a model of

representative democracy (Gargarella 1998: 270). Democratic deliberation, on the other hand, ensures that all opinions are being heard (Benhabib 2002; Dryzek 2009; Walsh 2007). Through dialogue, citizens have to listen to and consider interests and values that are different from their own. This process thereby increases the chances for reaching mutual acceptance, trust and a common identity among diverse citizens (Dryzek 2005).

Democratic deliberation has, however, usually been applied and studied within national and monolingual settings<sup>1</sup>. This thesis seeks to (partly) fill this research gap, by empirically exploring the potential for deliberation in contexts of plurilingualism and multiculturalism. I study an actual deliberative process among participants from the EU by using data from the *EuroPolis* project. *EuroPolis* was a transnational deliberative experiment that took place one week ahead of the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. Based on the survey data together with the empirical findings from one group, my attempt is to reflect further on the possibility of arranging transnational democratic deliberation on a regular basis at the EU level.

This introductory chapter is structured as follows: First, I present the idea of deliberative democracy and define the difference between *deliberative democracy* and *democratic deliberation* and explain why I choose to focus on the latter definition when studying deliberation. Second, I present the empirical framework for my thesis, namely the *EuroPolis* project. Third, I present the research question and briefly elaborate on how I will go about to answer this in chapter three and four. Fourth, I present how this thesis is organized, chapter by chapter.

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<sup>1</sup> With the experiment Tomorrow's Europe, and now EuroPolis as two exceptions. However, both projects focus on measuring preference change by using survey data before and after deliberation, and not on the process as such. Furthermore, empirical studies of deliberative processes among participants with different nationalities and languages have primarily focused on elite deliberation in parliamentary and committee debates, for example Lord and Tamvaki (2011): 'The Politics of Justification? Applying the DQI to the study of the European Parliament'.

## The Idea of deliberative democracy

The essential idea of deliberative democracy dates back to ancient Greece. Plato stated that we do not know something unless we give an account for it; otherwise it is just an opinion and not real knowledge (Taylor 1985: 222). The same idea can be transferred to deliberative theory: Through arguments we give an account for something, that way universally valid norms can be discovered through reasoning (Habermas 1996: 14). This idea has been proposed as a democratic procedure, where solutions to political problems can be found through discussion and the weighting of factors that is relevant for choosing a course of action. In this process different interests and opinions are heard and properly discussed through, which in turn should lead to legitimate solutions (Habermas 1996: 104).

The model of deliberative democracy has often been contrasted to the model of representative democracy (Chambers 2003: 308). Representative democracy views the central purpose of democratic politics as to provide a vote that aggregates the preferences of individuals. This process generates a majority that legitimates the formulations of policies or the enactment of legislations (Schumpeter 1974: 269).

Deliberative theorists criticize the representative model for its lack of a process through which claims of citizens could be challenged, arguing that a preference-aggregating procedure leads to decisions based on self-interest and prejudice rather than on the basis of fairness and justice (Patten and Kymlicka 2003). Consequently, representative democracy can neither supply the necessary democratic legitimacy, nor provide the necessary interconnectedness and trust among citizens to build a community that is sustainable (ibid.). Thus, democracy is as much about the building of a community as it is about ensuring the appropriate democratic procedure.

This particular realization is also reflected in research on the EU. Previous studies of European democracy have emphasized the institutional side (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Recently, research on the EU has emphasized the role of the citizens. Hooghe and Marks (2008) argues that the role of citizens in the EU has shifted from *permissive consensus* to *constraining dissensus*. The reason to this is the

growth of Euro-skepticism which has led to a decline in public consensus. An underlying assumption is therefore that the EU needs more citizen participation to overcome its democratic deficit (Eriksen and Fossum 2000: 7). Deliberative processes have been proposed as a mean to turn 'the Europe of elites and governments' into a Europe of citizens (Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 404). However, the EU's absence of a collective identity and a common language possibly obstructs democracy in the EU (Grimm 1995: 295-297). Grimm argues that democracy requires an awareness of belonging together to be able to communicate about goals and problems and thereby reach majority decisions (ibid.), while Breidbach (2003: 8) argues that the feeling of belonging together presumes communication:

Since Europe is a multilingual area in its entirety and in any given part, the sense of belonging to Europe and the acceptance of a European identity are dependent on the ability to interact and communicate with other Europeans using the full range of one's linguistic repertoire

Consequently, the EU's language diversity hinders both a European political discourse and a European public to emerge. The European Deliberative Poll of *EuroPolis* can test these predictions empirically. Before I present the *EuroPolis* project in greater detail, it is necessary to separate the understanding of deliberative democracy to the understanding of democratic deliberation. The two models have fundamentally different ambitions: Simone Chambers (2009: 323) claims that system-oriented theories of *deliberative democracy*, which seeks to find an alternative to representative democracy, are declining, while process-oriented theories of *democratic deliberation*, which focus on deliberative initiatives, are ascending. The former focuses on the macro-level of institutions, and seeks to replace the institution of representative democracy, whereas the latter is micro-oriented and focuses on processes that can supplement the already established institutions by making them more democratic (Chambers 2009: 331). This thesis follows the micro-oriented approach by studying an actual deliberative process in one of the participating groups in *EuroPolis*.

## Case: the *EuroPolis* project<sup>2</sup>

*EuroPolis* was arranged after the model of *deliberative poll* (Fishkin 2009) and engaged citizens from all member states in the EU to debate topics on immigration and climate change.<sup>3</sup> A central assumption in deliberative polling is that more politically informed citizens lead to improved deliberation and opinion transformation (Fishkin and Luskin 2005: 289). Therefore, participants in *EuroPolis* were provided with balanced and unbiased information material to ensure the same minimum of knowledge regarding the topics involved.

The experiment lasted three days and included a random sample of 348 citizens from all the membership countries. Participants were invited to discuss the two topics in small groups, and later in plenary sessions with policy experts and politicians. Participants were interviewed before, during and after the deliberation, and once again after the European Parliamentary elections. Their opinions were compared to those of a control group which did not deliberate, but was asked the same set of questions before and after the EU Parliamentary elections. This was to test whether the citizens who participated in deliberation actually changed their attitudes and preferences, which is a central goal according to deliberative theory (Steiner et al. 2004: 17). Participants were divided into several groups consisting of two or three language groups. Discussions were led by moderators who raised a set of pre-determined issues for debate. In addition, a group of translators were involved with each group due to their plurilingual character. Moreover, experts from civil society organizations as well as decision-makers from the European party groups gave plenary talks and answered questions posed by the different groups (Cabrera and Cavatorto 2009: 2).

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<sup>2</sup> EuroPolis is a project co-founded by the second framework programme of the European Commission, the King Baudoin Foundation, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, Compagnie de San Paolo, and the Open Society Institute. For an overview see: <<http://www.europolis-project.eu>>.

<sup>3</sup> The research team was composed by the University of Siena, Italy; the University of Essex, UK; the University of Mannheim, Germany; Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politique, France; University of Oslo - Arena, Norway; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Spain; European Policy Centre, Belgium; Avventura Urbana, Italy; TNS Opinion; Belgium, Median Research Centra, Romania; Stanford University, US; University of Texas at Austin, US.



In the aftermath of *EuroPolis*, there is still a need to establish how ordinary citizens interacted across languages. While the survey results can confirm that citizens changed their preferences, the process of deliberation itself remains largely unexplored (Olsen and Trenz 2010: 4). In the following section, I will briefly elaborate on how I will go about exploring the deliberative process of one small group that engaged in this deliberative poll.

## Research question

Studying transnational deliberation at the micro-level contributes to existing research in several ways: First, because previous empirical studies have focused on deliberation in national and monolingual contexts (Olsen and Trenz 2010: 4). Second, because previous studies of transnational deliberation have focused on the macro-level, that is, measuring the outcomes or effects of deliberation. This thesis, however, focuses on the micro-level by studying the deliberative *structure* and *process* of a mini-public. It offers an in-depth analysis of *whether* and *how* a group of EU-citizens composed of different cultures, identities and languages interacted with each other. Third, this thesis contributes to the field as it studies deliberation among *ordinary* citizens in contrast to earlier studies that have focused on elite deliberation in Parliaments. Fourth, the question whether democratic deliberation within a plurilingual and multicultural setting is possible has often been dealt with in a *theoretical* and *philosophical* manner. In this thesis I use original data from the *EuroPolis* project to answer this *empirically*. More specifically, this thesis seeks to explore the following research question:

*Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism?*

By this, I mean, whether democratic deliberation can work within a heterogeneous group of participants who are socialized in different national cultures and do not share the same language. As mentioned above, dialogue is the most essential in deliberation, which has led some theorists to assert that democratic deliberation requires a common language and a shared identity to be meaningful and sustainable (Barry 1999: 247; Breidbach 2003: 8). A transnational setting like *EuroPolis* therefore raises fundamental questions regarding the possibility of interaction.

To answer this rather broad question, I have taken the following approach: First of all, the European Union may serve as an apt framework for investigating the potential for deliberation in a transnational context (Breidbach 2003). The EU is constituted by states with many different languages. The new diversity of the enlarged Europe is potentially a further obstacle to mutual understanding among the peoples of Europe and the activation of European citizenship (Kraus 2008: 48). Given the trend in globalization where many states are coming together to form large political unions such as the EU, the issues that are raised concerning plurilingualism and multiculturalism are indeed going to be raised more frequently in the context of emerging supra-states. Consequently, if deliberative theory wishes to remain relevant, it has to deal with questions of plurilingualism and multiculturalism (Addis 2007: 122).

Second, this question has often been dealt with in theoretically and philosophically manners and I will discuss the most central of these perspectives. Added to this discussion, empirical aspects from the *EuroPolis* survey including some of my own findings from one participating group provides perspectives on the overall *structure* of the deliberative process. Of particular interest is how multiculturalism and plurilingualism affected the deliberative process on quite basic levels, and by that I mean *whether* citizens actually interacted with each other and the extent to which they identified themselves with the EU. Contrary to theorist's skepticism, I find that citizens interacted with each other, and identified with the EU.

Third, I study the actual deliberative *process* to see *how* citizens interact with each other, and to see if the deliberative process was characterized by democratic ideals like equality of participation and respect. Together, these findings should give some in-depth perspectives on how well democratic deliberation functions in transnational settings.

## Thesis structure

In chapter 2 I present both theory and method together. This is especially important because the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is created to capture Habermas' theory on communicative action. Therefore, Habermas' philosophy and theory is presented first to get

a better understanding of the essence in the DQI. Furthermore, I elaborate around the deliberative poll model behind the *EuroPolis* project. Next, I discuss how deliberation can be studied empirically by using the Discourse Quality Index 2.8 (DQI2), which is an updated version of the original DQI that better captures lay citizen deliberation. I will also discuss this method according to the criteria of validity and reliability.

Chapter 3 is the first chapter of analysis that explores the *structure* of democratic deliberation in a transnational setting. To start with, I present different theoretical predictions that directly or indirectly discuss the possibility of plurilingual and multicultural deliberation. Next, I present the empirical findings from the *EuroPolis* project as a whole, and exemplify with some of the findings from the group that I studied.

In chapter 4 I explore the deliberative *process* in one of the participating groups in *EuroPolis* to find out which characteristics best describes this particular group's deliberative process based on the coded data from the DQI, including some illustrative speech acts from the transcripts.

Chapter 5 is a concluding chapter where I address the aim of the thesis, summarize the most important findings from chapter 3 and 4, and reflect upon the contribution of my thesis and suggest further research on the subject. I also address the implications of my findings by discussing the prospects for arranging deliberative processes on EU-level at a regular basis.

## Conclusion

This introductory chapter has consisted of four main points. First, I presented the overall topic for my master's thesis, which is democratic deliberation in transnational contexts in general. The subject is interesting to study empirically, since deliberative theory implicitly argues that deliberation belongs in contexts where participants share the same culture and speak the same language. Democratic deliberation is especially relevant in settings where there are many different languages and cultures, because it can potentially provide the necessary interconnectedness and trust among citizens to build a community that will sustain over a long period of time. More

specifically, it may have an integrative effect in 'supra-states' like the EU.

With regards to the EU, there is an underlying assumption that the EU needs more citizen participation to overcome its democratic deficit, and the *EuroPolis* project could be a fitting empirical experiment for testing citizen participation at the EU-level in practice. This is a pioneering project, since democratic deliberation usually has been studied empirically within a national, monolingual culture. This thesis contributes to the field by doing an in-depth study of one of the groups that participated in the experiment.



# Chapter 2

## Analysing deliberation

### Introduction

Although empirical research on deliberation is increasing, attempts to take a closer look at the *process* of citizen deliberation, that is, the actual interaction between participants, have been scarce. This gap suggests that researchers have been more interested in measuring deliberative effect than in the real content of deliberation (Ryfe 2005: 54). Furthermore, the empirical studies of deliberative processes among participants with different nationalities and languages have primarily focused on elite deliberation in parliamentary and committee debates (Steiner *et al.* 2004; Bächtiger 2005; Pedrini 2009; Lord and Tamvaki 2011).

First attempts to study deliberative processes with the tool of content analysis<sup>4</sup> were made by Gerhards (1997) and Holzinger (2001), followed by studies like Dutwins (2003), Stromer-Galleys (2007) and Rosenbergs (2007). In this thesis, I use the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) as a tool for analysing the deliberative process of one small group in *EuroPolis*. The DQI is developed by Steenbergen *et al.* (2003), and measures factors like equal participation, justification of arguments, references to the common good and respect. As such, the index is widely regarded as the most comprehensive tool to measure deliberation, especially because it captures almost all aspects of Habermas' discourse theory (Thompson 2008: 507). Truthfulness is

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<sup>4</sup> Content analysis involves any kind of analysis where communication content (speech, written text, interviews, images) is categorised and classified (Krippendorff 2004)

the only standard of Habermas' theory which is not displayed by the DQI (Steenbergen *et al.* 2003: 43).

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I explain why I approach this study in an exploratory manner. Second, Habermas' discourse theory is presented to get a better understanding of what the DQI tries to measure. Third, I elaborate on the deliberative poll model behind the *EuroPolis* project. Fourth, I discuss how deliberation can be studied empirically by using the DQI. I present and discuss each relevant indicator and 12 derive some expectations on the basis of theory. And finally, I discuss my study in terms of validity and reliability.

## An exploratory approach

An exploratory approach can be used when relatively little knowledge and few definitive hypotheses exist on the specific research area (Patton 1990: 130; Blaikie 2000: 73). One of the advantages by using this approach is that it can generate new and unexpected knowledge that generate hypotheses and interesting research questions (*ibid.*). As pointed out in the previous chapter, both deliberation among ordinary citizens in multicultural and plurilingual contexts, and the actual process of deliberation, is relatively understudied. Given this observation, an exploratory, in-depth approach seemed to be a natural research tool.

Regarding to what degree the researcher can meet empirical data without any prior understanding, it has been argued that 'research without theory is blind and theory without research is empty' (Wacquant 1989: 51). However, it is possible to do exploratory empirical research while at the same time using a theoretical frame that guides the analysis (Checkel 2007: 3-4), which is the case for my study. The DQI is a content analysis approach where the indicators are clearly defined according to Habermas' discourse theory.

Content analysis is by definition 'a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use' (Krippendorff 2004: 18). It is a tool that can increase understanding of a certain phenomenon. Furthermore, this particular method should be governed by rules that are explicitly stated and applied equally to all units of analysis (*ibid.*:

19). I will later percent the DQI in greater detail and explain how this tool and the following coding procedure satisfy these criteria.

## Starting point: Habermas' discourse theory

Habermas views *discourse* as arguments that claim a theoretical truth, and where the normative claims that we ordinarily take for granted are challenged (1996: 296). However, his discourse theory is stated in ideal-typical terms where 'real' debate usually is far away from this ideal type (Benhabib 1985: 86). The starting point of Habermas' discourse theory is the principle of *universalism*, which holds that a norm is valid only if everyone who is potentially affected by the norm accepts its consequences (Habermas 1998: 40). Related to this, participants should consider the common good and treat each other with respect (Habermas 1996: 306). According to Habermas, the acceptance of norms cannot be imposed in an authoritarian manner. Rather, individuals ought to consent to those norms, and this is achieved through a process of argumentation. This process of argumentation constitutes *communicative action*, where individuals give reasons and also criticise other reasons for holding or rejecting particular claims (ibid: 14). Related to this is the ideal of reaching a rationally motivated *consensus*, where participants should be willing to yield to the force of the better argument (ibid: 305).

Furthermore, there should be *free and equal participation* (ibid.). Every competent individual should be free to take part in this process. Moreover, everyone should be able to express their attitudes, desires and needs, and should not be prevented from exercising these rights due to internal or external coercion (Habermas 1998: 131). According to Habermas, *logical justifications* should also be present, because it has the potential to resolve disputes and stimulate the deliberative process. The tighter the connection between premises and conclusions, the more coherent the justification is, and the more useful it will be for deliberation (Habermas, 1998: 23–24). Finally, Habermas requires *truthfulness* (1987: 27). Stated preferences should reflect the participant's true intentions, and should not be strategic or dishonest. However, to judge if a speech act is authentic is difficult, since the true preferences are not directly observable.



## The empirical study of deliberative processes

As mentioned in the introduction, there are several instruments available for analysing deliberative processes. I have chosen DQI because it is regarded as the most comprehensive tool. With the exception of truthfulness, the DQI manages to include all dimensions of Habermas' discourse theory and therefore bridges a gap between theory and empirical research (Steenbergen *et al.* 2003: 43).

DQI has recently been subject to minor adjustments. The original version was developed to analyse elite discourse in parliaments, but in trying to analyse citizen deliberation, alternative forms of communication were included that better reflected the way ordinary citizens deliberate (Bächtiger *et al.* 2009a). The updated DQI (DQI2) therefore includes storytelling as well as a broader dimension of interaction that better detects who responds to whom and how, since the original DQI did not fully grasp whether participants really engaged with each other. The measure of equal participation was also expanded by accounting for a speaker's overall engagement in the discussion (*ibid.*).

DQI is a tool that measures deliberative *quality*. However, my aim is not to decide if the deliberative process in *EuroPolis* was of good or bad quality, but rather to use the DQI to systematise the deliberative process and thereby present descriptive data of the different *qualities* this particular group's deliberative process had. I choose to focus on qualities rather than quality, because as Dryzek (2007: 244) says: 'The DQI makes it hard to determine whether the deliberative process analysed is actually good enough [...] The Index is just a comparative measure.' The reason is that the DQI lacks threshold values (Bächtiger *et al.* 2009a: 3). A possible approach if the researcher wishes to assess deliberative quality, is to compare lay citizen deliberation to parliamentary deliberation among elites (*ibid.*). However, lay citizen deliberations and parliamentary (elite) deliberations are, the way I see it, not directly comparable. For example, DQI's indicator 'justification of arguments' is expected to have lower levels of sophistication for citizens than for politicians, because the latter deals with politics daily and are better prepared to present their arguments (Bächtiger *et al.* 2009a: 6).

As mentioned in part 2.2, the DQI2 tries to capture Habermas' discourse theory, including some indicators that better captures

ordinary citizen's deliberation. In the following section, I will discuss the DQI2 and its indicators in greater detail, what they measure and how I have interpreted them for the practical coding of speech acts.

### Applying the Discourse Quality Index 2 to the EU-level<sup>5</sup>

The unit of analysis in the DQI2 is a speech act delivered by a participant at a particular point in a debate. The coding procedure was therefore broken down into smaller speech units, which were coded into the ten different categories. The original DQI consisted of seven coding categories that closely followed the principles of Habermas' discourse theory, namely *participation*, *level of justification*, *content of justification*, *respect toward groups*, *respect toward demands*, *respect toward counterarguments*, and finally, *constructive politics* (Steiner *et al.* 2004: 55). In addition to these seven categories, the DQI2 includes *source of arguments*, *off-topic talk* and *asking* to better capture how ordinary citizens deliberate. The DQI2 also includes the role of the moderator. In the following part I will present the different categories<sup>6</sup>. Based on theoretical predictions I outline what to expect from the empirical data.

#### *Participation*

The level of participation for each nationality was displayed by the length of speech acts measured in seconds. To determine whether there was equal participation separately for the different nationalities, I implicitly compared the number of speech acts as well as the length of these speech acts with their overall representation in the group. Furthermore, by coding the role of the moderator it was possible to see if participation had to be encouraged, and who needed this encouragement. The moderator's speech acts were coded in addition to the speech acts of the participants.

The model of deliberative polling makes use of a moderator to guarantee equal participation (Fishkin 2009). Smith (2008: 11) states that few deliberative democrats has theorised the moderator's role in deliberative polls, but argues that to achieve inclusiveness in the

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<sup>5</sup> See attached DQI codebook for an overview of the indicators

<sup>6</sup> I do not present the categories of 'constructive politics' and 'off-topic', simply because the deliberative process in *EuroPolis* didn't aim to reach a consensus. These categories are therefore seen as irrelevant for this study and are therefore not elaborated further.

interactions between citizens, structure and clear rules are required. Hence, securing equal participation and equal speaking opportunities is the moderator's most important function (Farrar *et al.* 2006: 4). In deliberative polls, the moderator should increase the likelihood that a diversity of perspectives are heard (Young 2000: 53) and that no groups or participants dominates (Thompson 2008: 504). Considering that *EuroPolis* was modeled after the deliberative poll, I expected to find equality in participation for the different nationalities. However, the distribution of nationalities in the group that I studied is skewed. I therefore expected that the number of speech acts was relative to the number of participants for each nationality. For example, six participants were French in this group, which amount to 46 percent. Hence, French speech acts should also amount to 46 percent of the total speech acts.

### *Level of justification*

In order to assess the level of justification, five different subcategories were used: unjustified statements, inferior justifications, qualified justifications, sophisticated justifications (broad) and sophisticated justification (in-depth). Whereas an unjustified statement didn't contain any reasons for a claim, an inferior justification contained an incomplete reason merely supported by illustrations. This often happened because participants presented narratives or gave examples from situations in their own country without further elaborating on them. These types of arguments were considered as inferior or incomplete due to the lack of expressions in a logical and coherent way, which possibly made them difficult for other participants to understand (Steiner *et al.* 2004: 20). Furthermore, the DQI2 differentiates between qualified justification and two types of sophisticated justification. Whereas it suffices for qualified justification to bring in one premise to support a conclusion, sophisticated justification has to be more elaborated with several complete justifications to support a claim (*ibid.*).

With regards to level of justification, the theoretical predictions are not clear. Habermas emphasises rational justification as the ideal. Fishkin (1995: 41) argues that there is a tension between theory and practice concerning rationality:

We can put the ideal speech situation at one extreme of an imaginary continuum and then imagine various forms of

incompleteness – compared to this ideal – as we think about more realistic forms of deliberation. [...] In practical contexts, a great deal of incompleteness must be tolerated.

Sanders (1997: 348) argue that certain people are not able to express themselves in a rational way, which possibly results in the domination of people that are better able to articulate themselves. Deliberative theorists have therefore suggested a broader perspective on justifications, as the requirements for rational arguments are considered to be too idealistic to occur in the real world, and therefore do not necessarily reflect the deliberative process (Young 2000: 38; Bächtiger *et al.* 2009a: 6). They wish to include alternative forms of communication, such as storytelling, arguing that citizens might score low on justification rationality due to the lack of time and skills (Sanders 1997: 348; Mansbridge 1999; Dryzek 2000). These assumptions were also taken into account in the DQI2. Based on these predictions, I expected to find rather low levels of justification according to the criteria of rationality in the DQI.

### *Content of justification*

The DQI distinguishes whether participants referred to benefits or costs for a certain constituency or narrow group interest, or if they referred to the common good in collective or utilitarian terms. In the present study, reference to a narrow group interest or home country was placed in the category of ‘references to costs or benefits for one self or one’s home country’. If people thought in terms of the common good at the EU or European level, the code 2a was attributed. 2b was attributed for references to global concerns. This reference level was recently distinguished in order to establish in what degree participants relates to concerns on the EU-level. Code 3 was placed if participants addressed concerns for the world community.

Young (2000: 43) argues that the common good is likely to express the view of the dominant group, which would undermine deliberation as such. Nevertheless, deliberative theory acknowledges the power of deliberation to transform individual perceptions and identities in line with the common good (Mansbridge *et al.* 2010: 78). Patten (2001: 701) argues that language is a central feature of identity, because people identify with participants of their own language and recognise each other’s as members of the same group on the basis of language. I therefore expected to find that participants expressed more concern

to their own nation than the common good for Europe, the EU or the world.

### *Respect*

The different aspects of respect were recently revised, where a measure of respect toward people, including respect toward participants and toward participant's arguments was presented to fully assess mutual respect *and* interactivity (Bächtiger *et al.* 2009a: 5). First, every reference to a participant or someone's argument could be regarded as interactive statements. Second, negative, neutral and positive references were distinguished. Third, arguments that could be attributed to specific statements of participants were placed in the category of 'respect toward other participant's arguments'. Especially this latter dimension reflects if and how participants interacted with each other. Moreover, 'respect toward demands and counterarguments' also represents a category for agreement. The level of disagreement can also partly be expressed in the category of 'negative references toward participant's' arguments. Disagreement could be an important indicator for the heterogeneity in perspectives that exist within a group (Stromer-Galley 2007: 5), and a certain level of disagreement can reflect how 'deliberative' the deliberative process really was (Sunstein 2002: 177).

The topic of deliberation was in this study immigration. Benhabib (2002: 153) argues that immigration lies at the core of the nation-state, and that it reflects 'some of the deepest perplexities faced by all nation states in the era of globalisation'. I therefore expected that the participants perceived themselves as representatives of their own nation, possibly causing them to defend their nation's immigration policies. Steiner *et al.* (2004: 131) finds that typical polarised and salient issues, which immigration is a perfect example of, leads to less respectful debates than discussions on non-polarised and non-salient issues. Due to the particular topic of this group's deliberative process, I therefore expected to find low levels of respect. However, I was aware of the possibility that the very setting of plurilingualism tempered this. The reason is that plurilingual participants could be especially conducive towards certain 'habits of listening', which could be ascribed to the formal setting and the higher normative expectations among participants (Doerr 2009; Barisone 2010).

### **Source**

This indicator establishes the reference point of participants. In total, this indicator distinguishes nine possible types of reference points. However, this indicator do not aim to capture the quality of the story or the reference, it just describes it. For example, arguments could refer to personal experiences, general descriptions of a situation in the home country or a reference to the media.

Young (2000: 71) argues that storytelling may foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experiences and may therefore contribute to find a common ground. Neblo (2007: 534) argues that using storytelling promotes trust, inclusion and respect. Moreover, Polletta and Lee (2006: 702) suggest that storytelling occurs more often in value-oriented discussions than in strictly policy-oriented discussions. The topic of immigration for this particular group focused on the perception of migration in the EU, as well as a discussion about which immigration policies the EU should adopt. This discussion therefore varied between being value-oriented and policy-oriented. Furthermore, since storytelling may foster understanding and create social bonds among members of a polity with very different backgrounds, I expected to find that storytelling was very much used.

### **Asking**

Asking was coded to capture informative and argumentative exchange. Asking is therefore another category that can help to establish the level and type of interaction between citizens. For this indicator, it was coded whether participants did or did not ask for information, knowledge or arguments from both participants and the moderator.

### **Overview of the group**

To be able to code the data, the audio record of the group discussions had to be transcribed in a first step. The audio record was recorded in English, which implied that for English-speaking participants, the original voice was audible from the tape, while for non-English-speaking participants, the simultaneous translation from the interpreter's cabin was recorded. The moderator announced the name of the speaker; therefore it was quite easy to attribute a speech act to the correct person. For every speech act, a code was placed for each of the relevant indicators. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the group:

Table 2.1 Group Composition

<b>Country</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Age of end education</b>
Ireland	37	M	18
France	50	F	23
France	45	M	22
France	33	M	24
France	70	F	25
France	60	M	35
France	37	M	20
Luxembourg/Portugal	52	M	15
Malta	24	M	23
United Kingdom	61	F	14
United Kingdom	31	F	23
United Kingdom	42	M	16
United Kingdom	61	F	21

Data on the ideological and demographical composition of the groups was not available for the *EuroPolis* project. Case selection was therefore based on gender composition and nationality. Since my focus was to explore deliberation in multicultural and plurilingual settings, I focused on finding the group with the most heterogeneous selection of nationalities. *EuroPolis* consisted of 25 groups in all. Only five groups were recorded in English (unfortunately, the only language possible for me to understand), and two of these were already coded by other researchers. Of a somewhat limited sample of three groups, I chose the most heterogeneous of these. There were some selection biases in this group: Of thirteen participants, six was French, four English, and only one participant from respectively Ireland, Luxembourg (Portuguese background) and Malta. Furthermore, gender distribution was not entirely balanced. Of thirteen participants, eight were men and five women. Age of end education also indicated that this was a highly educated group. Only four participants were 18 or younger when they finished their education. There were also some age biases: Only one participant was below thirty, four participants in their 30's, two participants in their 40's and six participants in their 50's or older. Students or young participants were therefore underrepresented in this particular group.

In order to ensure interaction between participants, simultaneous translations were provided in the small group discussion as well as in the plenary sessions. Although simultaneous translation allows deliberation across language groups, there may be possible weak spots due to missing the cultural connotations and norms (Warren

2007: 279). On the other hand, Doerr (2009: 2) finds that simultaneous translation may be favorable, because inclusiveness might be higher in plurilingual settings due to the 'neutral' translations.

In this thesis, only the discussion on the topic of immigration was analysed, which leaved out the discussion on climate change. The question if the topic under discussion can influence the deliberative process has received some attention (Farrar *et al.* 2006: 334; Steiner *et al.* 2004: 89–90), but research on the subject is still limited. However, Cook *et al.* (2007: 17) suggest that personal interest strongly affects participation in deliberative settings, especially how active or passive citizens participates. Data from *EuroPolis* indicates that there was a notable difference in how much participants learned about the different topics. They learned most about immigration (a 20.2 percent before-after knowledge gain), second most about the EU (10.5 percent), and least about climate change (9.9 percent). One possible explanation to these differences could be that participants related more to the topic of immigration than the other topics. In that case, this should be considered when analysing the deliberative process.

## Deliberative polling

As mentioned above, theories of deliberation have largely been a philosophically debate. After 2000, democratic deliberation took a practical turn (Dryzek 2010: 8). Several designs of so-called 'mini-publics' were introduced, such as citizen's juries, deliberative polls, consensus conferences, and citizen's assemblies (Fung 2003: 340–342). However, the most widely used is the method of deliberative polling, an approach created by James Fishkin (1995), which is said to be '*a way of serving both deliberation and equality*' (Fishkin and Luskin 2005: 287). In short, deliberative polls consist of a representative sample of participants; group discussions which involves a moderator whose task is to ensure balanced participation; informative and balanced briefing materials to ensure that participants have a minimum of the same knowledge of the topics involved; expert's presence so that participants can ask them questions; and finally, pre- and post-questionnaires to measure if the deliberative process affected preference change (Fishkin 2009).

The motivation for developing deliberative polls was to correct what is argued as imperfections of conventional public opinion polls, arguing that people's answers are neither well-considered nor well-



informed. In many ways, deliberative polls want to overcome what social science call 'rational ignorance', namely the unwillingness to get information about issues (Fishkin 1996: 133). Moreover, deliberative polls provides the opportunity to discuss issues from a wider and more diverse perspective than citizens mostly do since they are usually surrounded by people they share similar values with (Fishkin 2009). Through deliberation they can consider values and viewpoints that are different from their own, and with that challenge their beliefs. Fung (2007: 172) praises deliberative polling for its ability to overcome participation bias and to mirror a population adequately.

The *EuroPolis* project employed this model of deliberative polling. Comparing the participants of DP to the control sample, it showed that it was possible to gather a subsample of 348 participating citizens that was in terms of demographic variables (gender, age, education) almost similar and in terms of their position on the right/left-scale even most identical to the sample of non-participants (Cabrera and Cavatorto 2009: 5–6).

However, the strongest differences were found in terms of class and voting intentions. In the participant sample, people of the upper middle class were overrepresented at the expense of working class people. This gives rise to some concerns about the representativeness of the sample. A possible explanation for this skewed selection of participants could be several external factors. For example everybody did not have the possibility to travel to Brussels. Attending the discussions required taking off for at least one or two working days. While we can assume that this is easier for retired people and students etc., it might be more difficult for employees and workers, who were disproportionately represented in the groups.

## Validity and reliability of the study

The validity of a study refers to the consistency between the given object of the study and what is actually studied. Hence, the relationship between theory and the subsequent operationalisation of the theoretical concepts is essential for the validity. This link between concepts and observations is known as measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 2001: 529). How concepts are operationalised is decisive for the accuracy of the collected data, implying that it is also crucial for the reliability of the study as a whole. As stated earlier in this chapter, I have chosen DQI because it is regarded as the most

comprehensive tool that manages to measure the theory of Habermas, thereby bridging the gap between deliberative theory and empirical research (Steenbergen *et al.* 2003: 43). I therefore take for granted that this tool measures Habermas' theory adequately.

A potential drawback by studying just one group is that it reduces validity, meaning that I cannot claim that the findings can be generalised to other groups or contexts. Moreover, in the group that I studied, gender, age and education distribution was not entirely balanced. This group confirms the overall selection bias of participants from upper-middle class, giving some concerns about the representativeness of the sample, which limits generalisation even more. It is also possible that another topic than immigration would give different results. Still, based on these shortcomings, I chose the most heterogeneous of the available groups. A group consisting of five different nationalities should generate some interesting perspectives regarding the compatibleness of democratic deliberation within transnational settings.

Moreover, since only audio records were available for the present project, the process that has been analysed just looked at verbal communication. This may not capture deliberation fully, since some deliberative theorists argue that much of the deliberative communication is done through nonverbal forms of communication (Mansbridge 2007).

A paradox of using the DQI is that it provides quantitative outcomes, but the process of transcribing and coding is highly qualitative in nature. The coding process is largely based on the researcher's judgment, and is therefore something that can affect the validity and reliability of this study. Furthermore, the process of coding arguments into numbers causes a great deal of information to be left out. Despite of these potential shortcomings, I consider it to be a suitable tool for getting an overview of the deliberative process.

Inter-subjectivity and intra-subjectivity are measures for the reliability of the study. I will not and cannot perform any reliability tests, but I do give an account of some of the choices during coding for speech acts that were hard to place in either of the categories by taking notes alongside the coded data. However, this didn't happen a lot, because the criteria for placing a speech act in the different

categories were very clear, and it was agreed in advance to use a conservative approach when coding to ensure the reliability of the coding. In addition, I received coder training with two other researchers in advance. We coded some of the speech acts individually, and then sat together to discuss our choices. By using a rather conservative and strict coding approach, we discovered that the coding was for the most part equal for all three. In addition, the intercoder-reliability of the DQI also turned out to be good to excellent in a series of tests (Steiner *et al.* 2004: 68–73).

Deliberation in the real world is discovered to be a much more complex phenomenon than previously thought (Bächtiger *et al.* 2009a: 3). Therefore, to really understand transnational deliberation, one should probably combine the DQI with qualitative interviews and observations during the deliberative process. However, this is not possible for the study of this thesis due to the lack of time and space. But my study could perhaps be useful as a starting point for researchers who wish to combine the two approaches.

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have addressed the theoretical framework and the methodological approach for this study. I have also discussed the study in terms of validity and reliability. To study deliberative processes empirically, I follow an exploratory approach. The Discourse Quality Index 2 captures the theoretical framework of Habermas' discourse theory, and serves as the analytical tool for structuring my data. DQI2 provides significant insights in the process of deliberation, and can help establish the level of interaction contrary to more indirect measures which only measure the outcome of deliberation. Although there are other tools for analysing deliberative processes, I choose to use the DQI2 because it derives from theory, and is said to be the most comprehensive tool for measuring deliberation, especially because it manages to capture almost all aspects of Habermas' discourse theory.

The process of coding speech acts is often based on the researcher's judgment, and can possibly affect the validity and the reliability of the method. However, I used a conservative approach when coding to limit estimation and ensure reliability of the study. This approach proved to be promising during coder training with two other researchers in advance.

There are some concerns regarding whether the sample used is representative. In the participant sample, people of the upper-middle class were overrepresented at the expense of working class people. In addition, more people from the participant sample intended to vote compared to the non-participants. Thus, participants who gathered in this deliberative poll were possibly quite interested in politics and concerns of the EU already, which in turn could lead to overly optimistic findings.



# Chapter 3

## Analysing the deliberative structure Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism?

### Introduction

This chapter looks at the *structure* of deliberation in *EuroPolis* by referring to the results from the survey, and by studying the interaction of one small group who participated in this experiment. The aim of this chapter is to establish whether citizens interacted with each other and the extent to which they identified with the EU. These findings contribute to the basic understanding of whether plurilingualism and multiculturalism interferes with the deliberative process. Discourse theory does not discuss this question; it just presumes an ideal situation where no external factors obstruct communicative actions (Habermas 1996: 314). In this chapter I will therefore present theoretical perspectives that directly or indirectly discusses how plurilingualism may interfere with democratic deliberation. I discuss these predictions by comparing them with descriptive data from *EuroPolis* in addition to some illustrative speech acts from participants.

The main argument in this chapter is that while theorists are mostly sceptic towards the possibility of democratic deliberation across languages and cultures, results from *EuroPolis* show that it is indeed possible to have democratic deliberation at the EU level. Overall, citizens interacted with each other and identified with the EU. These findings suggest that language differences can be overcome by translations, and that cultures and identities are perhaps more flexible than theorists predict.

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I review existing theories that can be related to democratic deliberation in transnational

settings, with special emphasis on the problem of plurilingualism and how this factor is interrelated with culture and identity. Second, I describe the overall results from the survey data to show that citizens overall changed their preferences and attitudes. This may further indicate that participants interacted with each other. Third, I explore some findings from the group-level to display whether plurilingualism interfered with the level of interaction, the extent of identification with the EU, and if participants agreed or disagreed with each other. Finally, based on these findings I discuss whether democratic deliberation could be compatible with transnational settings like the *EuroPolis* deliberative poll.

## Theoretical predictions: language, culture and identity

Is applying democratic deliberation at the EU level a dead-end objective? Many theorists argue that it is, as I will show in the next subsection. They fundamentally question that citizens with different languages and cultures can successfully interact and understand each other. The overarching feature that obstructs interaction, and thereby also democratic deliberation, is plurilingualism and how this factor is interrelated with culture and identity.

### The problem of plurilingualism

Language diversity has been emphasised as one of the major challenges of democracy beyond the nation state (Olsen and Trenz 2010: 5). The reason is that communication and participation, two central features of democracy, is fundamentally dependent upon and mediated through language (Grimm 1995: 295–297). Despite the global communication revolution and the increasing competence in foreign-language among the young generation, the large majority of citizens can still only communicate in their mother tongue (Eurobarometer 2005). Consequently, language diversity prevents the possibility of a European political discourse, and thereby also a European public to emerge (Breidbach 2003: 8).

Alan Patten argues that a common language is important for democratic deliberation, because the latter presumes that participants have access to the thought-processes and concerns of their fellow participants. He argues that language diversity is a fundamental barrier if democratic deliberation is to fully flourish, for '[...] if citizens cannot

understand one another, or if they only deliberate with co-linguists, then democracy will inevitably be compromised' (2001: 701).

Furthermore, a common language can play an important symbolic role in democratic deliberation as a trust-building factor. Speaking the same language can create the trust that is needed for citizens to reach agreement on political issues (Miller 1995: 93). Trust is therefore seen as a prerequisite for deliberation to function effectively. Participants have to be confident that other citizens will treat them as partners in a common agenda, and that they will not be cheated (Putnam 2002: 6–7).

Sharing the same language could also create a sense of belonging. *Identity* is interrelated with the feeling of belonging, and belonging implies some sort of boundary: Individuals, groups and nations get an understanding of who they are by contrasting themselves to whom or what they are not (Croucher 2004: 40). Similarly, Patten (2001: 701) argues further that language is a central feature of identity, because people identify with participants of their own language and recognise each other as members of the same group on the basis of language. Grimm (1995: 295–297) concludes that what inevitably obstruct democracy at the EU level is a weakly developed collective identity and a low capacity for transnational discourse.

Theorists also emphasise the interrelation between language and culture. *Culture* can refer to the distinct customs or perspectives of a group or association, or in the multicultural sense of national and ethnic differences (Kymlicka 1995: 18). Culture is thereby synonymous with a 'nation' or a 'people' where their common history and language is an important aspect of their identity (*ibid.*). Further, Van de Steeg (2003) states that a common culture can only be created through interaction, which requires that participants understand each other. Another related argument is that different cultures contain different discourses, and therefore language is fundamentally tied to cultural expressions that most likely are not intuitive for outsiders (Kraus 2003: 6; 2008: 8; Taylor 1985: 34). Consequently, discourse between different cultures is fundamentally problematic because the lack of this 'deep' understanding of each other (Leigh 2004).

A possible solution that has been proposed is the use of translations. Printed matters would then be distributed in the various languages



and formal deliberations would be simultaneously translated (Addis 2007: 119–121). Simultaneous translations were also used in the *EuroPolis* experiment. However, translation may not be ideal in the long run. The cost of translation might be prohibitive if the number of languages exceeds three or four, because of the need to pause for translations. Consequently, this perceived inefficiency of the system of translation may in the long run result in participant's perceived illegitimacy of the deliberative process itself (*ibid.*). As Patten (2001: 692) states: Translations are often '[...] expensive, inconvenient, and always imperfect'. Moreover, if 'deep' understanding of language and cultures are required, as Leigh (2004) propose, it is reasonable to assume that translations will not catch this unless the translator has perfect knowledge of the languages and cultures involved.

Considering these theoretical predictions, I expected to find low levels of interaction across nationalities, more disagreement than agreement, and stronger identification with one's own national identity than with the EU. However, it was possible that these expectations would be moderated considering that translation were used. Still, participants in the *EuroPolis* came together to discuss topics without knowing each other in advance, and without sharing culture and identity. On some level, it was likely to find democratic deliberation and transnationality to be fundamentally incompatible.

## EuroPolis

In this part, I describe the overall results from *EuroPolis* in the first section, and data on group-level in the second section. The former is a summary of the most relevant findings from the survey data, whereas the latter is some of the findings generated from my own study of one of the participating groups. Together they compose the structure of the deliberative process in this deliberative experiment.

## Overall results<sup>7</sup>

A central part in Habermas' discourse theory is that participants should be willing to yield to the force of the better argument. Related to this is the ideal of reaching a rationally motivated *consensus*. However, to change one's preferences and reach a consensus presumes

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<sup>7</sup> See all results in Cabrera and Cavatortos article *A Europewide Deliberative Polling Experiment* <<http://europolis-project.eu/about/2/>>.

dialogue (Habermas 1996: 305). Therefore, by looking at some of the before-and-after results from the *EuroPolis* survey we may establish, on a basic level, whether citizens interacted with each other.

With regards to the topic of European Citizenship 37 percent of the participants thought that their country's membership of the EU to be 'a very good thing'. However, after deliberation this percentage rose to 52 percent. 47 percent considered it their duty to 'vote in EU elections', after deliberation this rose to 56 percent. Before deliberation, 72 percent thought of themselves as 'just being from their own country', but this fell to 56 percent after deliberation. These results indicate that many citizens changed their attitudes and preferences, presumably on the basis of listening to other citizen's arguments and interacting with them. They also show that preference change after deliberation was in favor of the EU. This is an interesting finding considering the many cultures and identities involved. These preliminary findings suggest that perhaps citizens are more apt to form a European identity than theorists predict.

The fact that participants evaluated the quality of the discussion to be high indicates that language differences were less of an issue. For example, 60 percent found the level of participation in the discussion to be equal, 90 percent thought that they had opportunity to express their views, and 84 percent felt that their fellow participants respected what they had to say. Moreover, 81 percent thought that they had learned a lot about different cultures. For example, one participant said<sup>8</sup>:

I was a participant at europolis in Brussels. Please allow me to thank you and to say that I learned so much about how things work in Europe. I came home with different attitudes. Before I went I did not feel that I was a European citizen, just an Irish one. After talking to all the other EU citizens and having been part of it, I now really feel European. Thanks again and well done to all the people who brought it together, it was great.

Another participant stated the following:

I just wanted to say THANKS, for Europolis was a great

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<sup>8</sup> See <<http://europolis-project.eu/feedback>>-

experience which gave me the opportunity of both learning so much about the EU and its current problems and meeting so wonderful people of any age, location and background. We discussed important topics which affect our everyday lives and it made me become more politically and socially aware. Also, the cultural exchange was very enriching for us all and I think listening to other people's opinions and experiences helped many of the participants to forget all about clichés and become more open-minded.

Interestingly, these participants both highlighted the meeting and talking to all the other EU citizens an important reason of learning about the EU and the feeling of being European. These findings suggest that an awareness of belonging together can evolve out of arranging these kinds of gatherings that allows citizens to meet and to talk with each other.

Does the picture change when turning to findings on the group-level?

### **Group-level results**

The data below are structured according to the theoretical predictions of language, identity and culture.

#### ***Indicator 1: Language***

Table 3.1 is a matrix of references that clarify who referred to whom, and can therefor establish whether citizens interacted with each other. This can give some further indications about whether language differences could be a potential obstacle for democratic deliberation.

Results in table 3.1 suggest that interaction between the different nationalities was present. Besides France, participants from all other nationalities referred to arguments of participants from other nationalities *more* than their own co-national participants.

Table 3.1 Matrix of references

		Reference by					Total
		UK	France	Ireland	Malta	Luxembourg	
Reference to	UK	4 14,8%	2 25,0%	9 81,8%	11 100%	1 20,0%	27
	France	8 29,6%	3 37,5%	0	0	4 80%	15
	Ireland	5 18,5%	0	0	0	0	5
	Malta	7 25,9%	2 25,0%	2 18,2%	0	0	11
	Luxem- bourg	3 11,1%	1 12,5%	0	0	0	4
	Total	27 43,6%	8 12,9%	11 17,7%	11 17,7%	5 8,1%	62 100%
Participation (in length)		42,1%	23,6%	21,6%	6,7%	6,1%	100%

UK and France referred to arguments from almost all nationalities, while participants from Ireland, Malta and Luxembourg (the nationalities in minority compared to UK and France) mostly referred to the nationalities in majority (UK and France). This is an expected result though, since participants from Ireland, Malta and Luxembourg didn't have other participants from their countries and therefore didn't have the possibility to refer to them.

These findings establish that participants actually referred more to participants from other nationalities than their own. They suggest that maybe a common language is not that important to understand each other's concerns and arguments, but can actually be overcome by the use of translation.

Another aspect that is relevant to look at is to what degree citizens agreed with each other. As seen above, theorists argue that speaking the same language creates the trust that is needed for citizens to reach agreement on political issues. DQI2's indicator for respect towards other participant's arguments can shed some light on this prediction (table 3.2):

Table 3.2 Respect towards other participant's arguments

	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	UK	Total
	4	1	2	2	5	14
<b>No respect</b>	13%	5%	33%	10%	9%	10%
<b>Implicit</b>	23	13	3	18	41	98
<b>Respect</b>	74%	65%	50%	86%	72%	73%
<b>Respect</b>	1	2	0	0	2	5
<b>(balanced)</b>	3%	10%	0	0	4%	4%
<b>Explicit</b>	1	1	0	0	1	3
<b>Respect</b>	3%	5%	0	0	2%	2%
	2	3	1	1	8	15
<b>Agreement</b>	7%	15%	17%	5%	14%	11%
	31	20	6	21	57	135
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Overall, it seemed that citizens mostly did not have a clear opinion of other arguments: This is reflected in the category of 'implicit respect', where the speech acts was coded if there were no particular reference to other arguments. The high level of implicit respect (73 percent) may be interpreted as *quiet consent*, that citizens in fact didn't disagree much about the topics involved, which implies that lack of trust among participants probably were not an issue. Alternatively, it could be interpreted in the sense that citizens didn't trust each other and therefore didn't dare to speak their minds and take a standpoint on the topics involved. A third explanation could be that in this particular deliberative poll, citizens didn't have to reach a consensus on a particular policy and therefore didn't bother to take clear standpoints. It is imaginable that if citizens were to reach consensus on a certain policy, it is more likely that we would have seen high-tempered debates. I'm leaning towards this latter explanation.

Furthermore, more references qualified as 'no respect' (10 percent) than 'explicit respect' (2 percent). This suggests that there were some heterogeneous opinions that participants sometimes disagreed on, but as Stromer-Galley (2007: 5) claims, disagreement could be an important indicator for the heterogeneity in perspectives that exist within a group. Sunstein (2002) assumes that a certain level of disagreement may be 'healthy' for the creation of a deliberative environment. Agreement (11 percent) was, however, even more common than disagreement.

**Indicator 2: Identity and culture**

Table 3.3 displays that common good in terms of the EU and Europe were one of the most common contents of participant's arguments.

Table 3.3 Content of justification

	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	UK	Total
<b>Own country or group interest</b>	3	4	1	3	10	21
	19%	40%	33%	33%	45%	35%
<b>Common good (EU, Europe)</b>	7	2	1	3	7	20
	44%	20%	33%	33%	32%	33%
<b>Common good (Global)</b>	0	0	1	0	0	1
	0	0	33%	0	0	2%
<b>Common good (In terms of different principle)</b>	6	4	0	3	5	18
	38%	40%	0	33%	23%	30%
<b>Total</b>	16	10	3	9	22	60
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

This shows that participants indeed expressed considerations in the interest of the EU. As the data shows, national interests were the most common content of participant's justification (35 percent), but common good in European or EU-terms performed almost equally frequent (33 percent). This could further be exemplified by the following statements:

TO [10:39–11:33]: [...] [S]o even though we are all Europeans we have sometimes problems of relationships between countries, [...] [Emphasis added].

A participant from the UK expressed this concern:

JE [11:41–13:15]: [...] [C]ertainly, we need to do as Liam says: If we are going to be a part of a federal Europe, we have to forget, I think, about the policies that we've had in the past of allowing lots of other people in. [Emphasis added].

This Maltese participant expressed the following concerns with regards to strengthening the EU territory:

AM [13:34–14:30]: [...] What I think is that we should certainly strengthen the borders around the EU, and a number of borders have already been abolished, but what I think we should do is strengthen the controls within the European territory so that we've got a better idea of what is happening within the EU territory [...] [Emphasis added].

These expressions show that participants were able to think in collective terms and propose solutions in favor of a stronger EU. It is also interesting to see how often participants used “we” when they stated their arguments. Mendelberg (2002: 172) argues that using the plural term ‘we’ creates an atmosphere of sharing a common destiny. For example, this French participant expressed the following:

FA [06:05–06:38]: The only thing I want to say is that we can't really allow sitting on the fence. If we truly want to build a true Europe, we should talk about external borders only, and the EU member states should relinquish some of their sovereignty. I think that there's no other way to go about it. [Emphasis added].

One participant from the UK answered with the following statement:

LI [06:40–10:20]: [...] [T]he difficulty is that, on one hand, we want to keep sovereignty, and on the other hand we want the EU to work when it suits us on a particular issue. [...] It's our police force and army that controls our borders as it is now. So if we want to put that up on a bigger scale and control the EU, we gonna have to have some sort of integrated EU police force and EU army. And are the people of Europe prepared to accept that? [...] so, I think that the EU itself has a very big part to play, but the people within Europe have got to accept that if they relinquish their control to Europe, it is a relinquishment of sovereignty. [Emphasis added].

The use of the plural term ‘we’ seemed to be especially present in sequence two, which was the ‘problem-solving’ sequence. When looking at the dynamics in session two, it seemed like using the term ‘we’ influenced participants into using the term in nearly all speech acts. It is possible that this ‘domino effect’ can be related to the positive

findings of identity and citizen's ability to relate to the EU. Perhaps, as Mendelberg suggests, the way of speaking created a sense of cooperation and a common – if still nascent – European identity.

## Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism?

Based on the theoretical predictions earlier in this chapter, a deliberative experiment like *EuroPolis* should not be compatible with factors like plurilingualism and multiculturalism. The main reason is that deliberation presumes communication, and communication requires a shared language. In fact, sharing the same language is by many theorists seen as interrelated with both identity and culture, which further complicates the possibility of successfully arranging deliberative processes where participants could find a common ground and reach agreements on political issues. As mentioned above, this is the main reason why language diversity has been emphasised as one of the major challenges of democracy beyond the nation state.

However, results from table 3.1 showed that interaction between the different nationalities was present. In fact, 4 out of 5 nationalities referred more frequently to arguments of participants from other nationalities than participants from their own nationalities. Moreover, participants evaluated the quality of the discussion to be high. Also, results indicate that participants didn't have problems understanding each other: Language was seen only by 12 percent as a barrier to follow the debate. These findings suggest that participants probably understood each other, and that plurilingualism may be overcome by translation. However, the process of having simultaneous translation and pausing for translation can be regarded by participants as inefficient in the long run. Democratic deliberation requires significantly more and other resources than aggregative majoritarianism, because it requires citizens to engage with fellow citizens, and to offer reasoned arguments and reflect upon the common good. Nevertheless, participants in *EuroPolis* evaluated the experience of participating in the deliberative event as highly positive, and no participants uttered that the process was inefficient. Still, arranging gatherings like *EuroPolis* is likely to be costly and time-consuming if it is to be arranged on a regular basis. Basically, there are some concerns regarding the *practical* compatibility of democratic deliberation at the EU-level.



Is this a good argument for not having democratic deliberation at the EU level? The inefficiencies and costs that follow deliberation in multiple languages should be far more tolerable than the alternative: To continue as usual and not strive to find a common ground. Increasing interdependence and globalised communicative structures has led to the creation of larger political units like the EU. Although American domination in world is currently making English the preferred second language of many around the world, different language groups have still not adopted English as the common language (Nanz 2006: 43). Therefore, solutions like the one in *EuroPolis* with simultaneous translations seems like a much needed, though perhaps a bit inefficient, alternative.

The convergence to one language is more efficient, but is it the most desirable option? If the EU converges on the use of one language, not only can the deliberative process be conducted more quickly and efficiently, but the EU can also make plenty of savings. It is no doubt that it costs a great deal of both money and human resources to find and train translators and other plurilingual staff (Patten 2001: 702; Pool 1996: 160). Furthermore, translation may have the side-effect that, unless the translators have perfect knowledge of the languages involved, the translated argument cannot be expected to reflect the exact version of the original content and meaning. However, a positive aspect is that multicultural and plurilingual deliberative settings may increase interaction and respect in ways that unilingual and monocultural deliberations might not (Doerr 2009: 156). One main reason is that transnational groups might be more attentive listeners. The proposed reason to this is the combination of technical equipment and simultaneous translations which focus the attention of the participants. The natural pauses in between translations operate as a motivating mechanism that leads participants to pay respect and attention to participants from other language groups (*ibid.*). Moreover, it seems to be higher normative expectations of entering into dialogue with citizens from other member states in transnational settings. For example, observers in *EuroPolis* noticed that most participants tried to make their arguments understandable for other nationalities by explaining and 'translating' their local experiences (Olsen and Trenez 2010: 12-13). On the other hand, transnational deliberations may also have some negative side-effects that would be less present in national deliberations. In *EuroPolis*, observers noticed that many participants felt at unease about

speaking through microphones. Moderators therefore had to intervene and make sure that participants from all language groups voiced their opinions. Observers also noticed that same-language participants tended to cluster together at the table, which possibly interfered with the cross-national interaction (*ibid.*).

It should be mentioned, though, that even if simultaneous translations were used in the *EuroPolis* experiment, the group compositions never exceeded three different language groups, and therefore it cannot challenge the theoretical prediction of Addis (2007: 120) who suggest that translations as a solution might be prohibitive if language groups exceed three or four. In most cases there were only one or two languages, but usually three to five different nationalities. However, a group of three or in this case of analysis, five different nationalities, should be sufficient with regards to heterogeneity to challenge the theoretical predictions about identity and culture. As mentioned above, regarding the EU and its many language groups, it is difficult to imagine how a collective identity can possibly emerge (Grimm 1995: 295; Patten 2001: 691; Chambers 2003: 314). Nevertheless, common good in terms of the EU and Europe were one of the most common contents of participant's arguments. This shows that participants indeed related to the EU. Also, participants often included the plural term 'we' when expressing their arguments. This was especially present in sequence two. The dynamics of this sequence suggests that participants influenced each other into thinking and arguing in collective terms.

In addition, expressions like 'Before I went I did not feel that I was a European citizen, just an Irish one. After talking to all the other EU citizens and having been part of it, I now really feel European' indicate that a deliberative setting like *EuroPolis* can create the *awareness of belonging together* that Grimm (1995: 297) talks about. These preliminary findings suggest that deliberation works despite differences of language, and that perhaps identity is not that constant as theorists predict, but can actually be transformed through deliberation, as Mendelberg suggests (2002: 172).

## Conclusion

This chapter has studied the structure of democratic deliberation by referring to the overall survey data from *EuroPolis*, and by looking at factors like interactivity, identification and respect in one of the

participating groups in *EuroPolis*. As my findings suggest, democratic deliberation is indeed compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism. As we have seen, deliberative theory predicts that deliberation works best in situations where participants share the same political culture and speak the same language. This is probably true in some respects, but deliberation like the one in Brussels also has some qualities that unilingual and monocultural deliberation may not have. There might also be higher normative expectation in these settings of entering into dialogue with citizens from other member states and act accordingly. In *EuroPolis*, for instance, most participants sought to make their arguments understandable for other nationalities by explaining and 'translating' their local experiences. Findings also displayed high levels of respect, interactivity across nationalities, and aptness to create a common ground.

Theorists have emphasised translation to compensate for plurilingualism. That way, democratic deliberation and plurilingualism can accommodate one another. Although this is a costly and perhaps somewhat inefficient solution, it may be the best alternative. In many ways, globalisation demands that citizens across nations come together to find a common ground. If one were to push the unitary language argument further, then there is no point of bringing together participants across nations, because they wouldn't understand each other anyway. However, we shouldn't stop trying to arrange gatherings like *EuroPolis*. As we have seen, participants benefited from the process and felt more European than ever after deliberation.

# Chapter 4

## Analysing the deliberative process Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism

### Introduction

In the previous chapter, survey data including some of my own findings from one of the participating groups analysed the overall *structure* of the deliberative process in *EuroPolis*. This was to find out *whether* participants interacted with each other despite the plurilingual and multicultural setting. These first and preliminary findings established that citizens in fact did interact with each other, related to European concerns and identified with the EU. As such, these results suggested that democratic deliberation can be compatible with transnational contexts.

However, establishing whether democratic deliberation is compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism should also include an in-depth analysis. This chapter therefore explores *how* participants interacted with each other by focusing on the deliberative *process*. I rely on the Discourse Quality Index 2 to systematise the deliberative process according to Habermas' criteria of ideal deliberation. According to Habermas, qualities like equality, respect, and consideration of the common good are especially important (Habermas 1996: 4). The empirical data is derived from audio-records of the deliberative process for one of the participating groups. The entire debate for all three days was transcribed and speech acts coded according to the indicators in the DQI2.

The main findings in this chapter is that the deliberative process tended towards language dominance by English-speaking participants, as well as a quite formal type of interaction with storytelling and low levels of justification. My findings imply that much of the

time when participants could deliberate on political issues were actually used to get to know each other. These findings raise important questions regarding how useful democratic deliberation actually is as complementary to representative democracy when participants do not share a common ground.

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I present some theoretical predictions and empirical expectations about the different qualities one may expect to find in transnational deliberative processes. These expectations are just briefly mentioned here, as they were already elaborated in chapter 2. Second, I give a general overview of the different sessions in the deliberative process to give the reader an impression of the deliberative content, and also the length of the different sequences. Third, I analyse the overall level of participation distributed among nationalities to see if there was equal participation. Fourth, I explore the different qualities in this transnational deliberation by describing the results for the remaining indicators of the DQI2, in addition to exemplifying by using the qualitative data from the transcripts.

## Empirical expectations

Table 4.1 Theoretical predictions and empirical expectations

Indicator	Theory	Expectation
Participation	Moderator should secure equal participation	Equality of participation
Level of justification	Rational justifications the ideal, but ordinary people far from this ideal	Low levels of justification
Respect	Immigration a polarised and nation-specific issue	Low respect, but potentially tempered by the 'habits of listening' in transnational settings
Source	Storytelling a means to create common ground when people have different backgrounds	Storytelling

The theoretical predictions and the analysis of this chapter are structured according to the indicators of the DQI2<sup>9</sup>. In this part, I outline

<sup>9</sup> However, I do not analyze the indicator of Content of Justification/Common good orientation, because this is already displayed in chapter 3. As mentioned in chapter 2, I also don't present data on the category of Constructive Politics nor Off-topic,

what type of interaction to expect based on the most relevant indicators of the DQI2. As these were elaborated in chapter 2, the most central expectations derived from theory are displayed in table 4.1.

## Overview of the deliberative process

The group discussions in *EuroPolis* were split in six sessions of unequal lengths, which all served different purposes:

Before the first discussion session started the moderator shortly explained the purpose of deliberation, explained the procedure of the discussions and gave information on the technical equipment and on the overall stay in Brussels. Having done that, the participants shortly introduced themselves by telling their names, their country of origin, and what language they wanted to use in the discussion. Unfortunately, this group didn't give information about what types of education and professions they had. Then, the first discussion session was started by the moderator, who gave a short introduction to the topic. She raised some general questions and touched upon how the problem of immigration was perceived, and asked the participants to suggest what should be done by the EU to tackle it.

The first session was dominated by perceptions of migration (problem oriented). At the start of the second session, the moderator reintroduced some broad suggestions on what policies the EU should adopt on this subject (solution oriented). After discussing different policies and their possible impacts, the participants were asked in the third session to formulate some questions that could be posed to the experts in the plenary session the following day. The participants came up with four different questions, two of which had to be chosen. There should have been a fourth session the next day focusing on party manifestos of European Parties, but this particular group didn't deliberate on this issue. The fifth session was very similar to the third one, as the participants had to agree on questions that would be posed to the politicians in the second plenary session. The sixth session was a very short one that aimed at capturing the participant's impressions on the plenary sessions with the politicians. The sixth session was carried out the day before session five.

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because these categories are not of direct relevance for the critical issue of interaction across nationalities, which is the main topic of this thesis.

Some discussions required that the participants should come to a consensus, while others did not. In sequence 3 and 5, participants had to agree on questions they wanted to have answered by experts and politicians. Table 4.2 (under) displays which sequences that were given most priority. Sequence 1 was quite long, but contained rather few speech acts. This is mostly because a lot of time was spent on the presentation of each participant and the moderator giving practical information, therefore the speech acts that were relevant for coding did not start before the end of the sequence. Sequence 2 was clearly the longest and contained the most speech acts. Sequence 3, the first session where the participants had to reach some consensus in terms of which questions they would prepare for the plenary sessions with experts and politicians, is the second longest measured in number of speech acts. Sequence 5 is the second session where consensus on questions had to be reached and is almost as long as session 3. Sequence 6

Table 4.2 Content of discussions

Sequence	Content	Day	Length (Min.)	Number of speech acts
1	Problem-oriented: Perception of third country migration in the EU	Friday	49 26,1%	14 7,3%
2	Solution-oriented: Immigration policies the EU should adopt	Friday	57 30,3%	64 33,2%
3	Formulation of choice of questions for the plenary session with the experts	Friday	29 15,4%	46 23,8%
6	Impression and evaluation of the second plenary session	Saturday	30 16,0%	27 14,0%
5	Formulation and choice of questions for the plenary session with the politicians	Sunday	23 12,2%	42 21,8%

dealt with participant's impressions and evaluations of the plenary sessions, and was given more time than session 3 and 5, but contained few relevant speech acts. The first and the second sequence were therefore given the most priority.

## Analysing the deliberative process

In this part, my aim is to establish the level of participation, and second, how participants interacted. The analysis is structured under two headlines: First, *participation*, where each nationality's level of participation including moderator's role is displayed. Second,

*interaction*, where the indicators of sourcing, respect, asking and level of justification is displayed.

## Participation

Table 4.3 shows the overall level of participation separated for each nationality in terms of number of utterances and length of speech acts. The measures of number and length of speech acts are separated for respectively *all speech acts* and speech acts that did not need to be encouraged. This is to give an impression of whether participants were active by their own initiative, or if they constantly needed to be encouraged by the moderator to speak up. The left hand side presents the results including all speech acts, while the right hand side only includes the speech acts that had not to be encouraged by the moderator. There are some interesting findings when looking at nationalities.

Table 4.3 Level of participation

Groups	Group composition (percentage)	With moderator		Without moderator	
		Utterances (percentage)	Length (percentage)	Utterances (percentage)	Length (percentage)
<b>Nationality</b>		N=136	N=136	N=112	N=112
			Total length (sec.)= 7547		Total length (sec.)= 5074
<b>France</b>	46,15	22,79	23,60	19,64	16,48
<b>Ireland</b>	7,69	14,71	21,60	15,18	20,36
<b>Luxembourg</b>	7,69	4,41	6,10	4,46	7,94
<b>Malta</b>	7,69	15,44	6,70	17,86	9,11
<b>UK</b>	30,77	42,65	42,10	42,86	46,12

Participants from France were clearly in majority, but their participation was almost just half of the participants from the UK. Participants from the UK clearly dominated the deliberative process overall. It was also interesting to see that the Irish and Maltese participant were not far from accounting for the same total length of utterances that the six French participants had together. French participants were the group that had to be encouraged most frequently by the moderator. Considering that the Irish and Maltese participant also spoke English, the language dominance by English-speaking participants is even more severe. Further, by looking at participation per sequence, the same tendency is displayed:



Table 4.4 Participation per sequence

Sequence	UK	France	Ireland	Luxemburg	Malta	Total
<b>1</b>	4 (44,4%)	3 (33,3%)	1 (11,1%)	1 (11,1%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)
<b>2</b>	20 (42,6%)	13 (26,7%)	8 (17,0%)	2 (4,3%)	4 (8,5%)	47 (100%)
<b>3</b>	12 (42,9%)	2 (7,1%)	8 (28,6%)	0 (0%)	6 (21,4%)	28 (100%)
<b>6</b>	7 (38,9%)	5 (27,8%)	3 (16,7%)	0 (0%)	3 (16,7%)	18 (100%)
<b>5</b>	15 (44,1%)	8 (23,5%)	0 (0%)	3 (8,8%)	8 (23,5%)	34 (100%)
<b>Total</b>	58 (42,7%)	31 (22,8%)	20 (14,7%)	6 (4,4%)	21 (15,4%)	136 (100%)

Table 4.4 clearly shows that participants from the UK also dominated every sequence. The fact that participants from the UK were not in majority, but shared the same language as the moderator, supports the empirical observations that the language of the moderator leads participants of that same language to dominate the deliberative process. In general, participants from the UK had the most and also the longest speech acts.

According to Farrar *et al.* (2006: 4) and Young (2000: 53), securing equal participation and equal speaking opportunities in deliberative polls should be the moderator's most important function, no group or participant should dominate (Thompson 2008: 504). However, this is not the case in the group I am studying. It is therefore necessary to take a further look at the moderator's role.

Table 4.5 Nature of speech acts given by the moderator

	Frequency	Percent
Initiates debate on new topic	5	8,8
Intervenes if the debate is becoming off-topic	3	5,3
Intervenes to engage individual participants in the debate	24	42,1
Intervenes with explanation of purpose of Deliberative Poll	2	3,2
Intervenes by providing information/knowledge	11	19,3
Intervenes by making evaluative statements/arguments on the topic	2	3,5
Intervenes to ask questions	10	17,5
<b>Total</b>	57	100

The most typical role of the moderator was to intervene when she wanted individual participants to engage in the debate. Intervention accounted for 42 percent of the moderator's participation. These findings suggest that the moderator in fact *was* quite including. Despite these observations, dominance from one particular language in this group was present. This is a concern for citizen deliberation in the EU, because unequal speaking opportunities prevents that a diversity of perspectives are heard, which is the opposite of what deliberation should be (Young 2000: 53). In plurilingual settings, people should be able to participate without being subject to dominant language use (Breidbach 2003: 21). The language people use the most as they deliberate together (in this case English) usually favors one way of seeing things and discourage others (Mansbridge 1991).

One may wonder if the language dominance in this group is a coincidence or symptomatic of the global tendency that currently is making English the *lingua Franca* of the world (Vogt 2004: 112). Janssen (1999: 46) puts it the following way:

A type of non-coordinated language drift is at work in favour of English which is characterized by the phenomena that the competent use of the English language ensures the speaker's dominance in any type of communication between speakers from European countries.

The dominance of English-speaking participants for this group possibly points to implicit power structures which put the non-competent speaker of English at a considerable disadvantage, thereby impeding the democratic process (Breidbach 2003: 20; Addis 2007). In this way, Patten (2001) is right in his prediction that language diversity is a serious barrier to the full flourishing of democratic deliberation. The very idea of democratic deliberation is, contrast to representative democracy that minorities should be able to be heard through the process of transforming the views and judgments of the majority. The problem is, if they are in subject to dominance in the deliberative setting as well, if democratic deliberation is any better than representative democracy. Can it still be a productive complement to aggregative procedures? To ensure equality of participation, the moderator should perhaps be even more including and make sure that all language groups involved are being heard. However, the risk is that this would make the deliberative procedure even more

controlled, thereby potentially compromising democratic ideals like free speech. The paradox is that the deliberative process, which claims to be the most democratic, ends up being less democratic in transnational settings. Still, as seen in chapter 3, democratic deliberation clearly holds an important potential in terms of transforming citizen's identity and creating a common ground. Democratic deliberation should therefore not be rejected at this point.

### **Interaction**

Regarding the issue of language dominance, an additional explanation could be that participants from the UK very early shared their personal stories and experiences with each other, and related very much to each other's experiences with immigration in the UK. As table 4.6 shows, participants from the UK based their arguments on personal experiences and description of situations in their own country more frequently than other participants. One may assume that this led participants from the UK to feel that it was safe to state their arguments, and therefore were quicker to speak up than other nationalities. Furthermore, it may be possible that participants from the UK clustered together at the table (unfortunately I don't have data to confirm this), which in addition to sharing language with the moderator, served to reinforce their active participation.

Table 4.6 Source of argument

	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	UK	Total
<b>No source mentioned</b>	19	7	3	17	31	77
<b>%</b>	61,3	35,0	50,0	81,0	54,4	57,0
<b>Personal experience/ Storytelling</b>	3	0	2	0	6	11
<b>%</b>	9,7	0	33,3	0	10,5	8,1
<b>Description of situation in one's own country (without using any other source)</b>	5	10	1	3	11	30
<b>%</b>	16,1	50,0	16,7	14,3	19,3	22,2
<b>Other sources connected to the setting (expert/ politician, interview, etc.)</b>	2	1	0	1	2	6
<b>%</b>	6,5	5,0	0	4,8	3,5	4,4
<b>Knowledge of other participants</b>	0	1	0	0	4	5
<b>%</b>	0	5,0	0	0	7,0	3,7
<b>Other</b>	2	1	0	0	3	6
<b>%</b>	6,5	5,0	0	0	5,3	4,4
<b>Total</b>	31	20	6	21	57	135
<b>%</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

In general, I noticed that storytelling was present in almost every speech act in the first two sequences, and less frequent for other sequences<sup>10</sup>. Such means of expression were exceedingly used in the very initial sequences of the discussion, and therefore supports claims that acknowledge storytelling for its ability to create social bonds and create a common understanding (Wesolowska 2007: 676; Young 2000: 73). Benhabib (2002: 138), for instance, argues that plurilingual groups need more time to get familiar with other speaking styles. The most common source was descriptions of the situation in one's own country. This finding also supports Polletta and Lee (2006: 702) who suggest that storytelling occurs far more often in value-oriented discussions than in technical or policy-oriented discussions.

<sup>10</sup> However, one might also argue that the topics of some sessions did not leave sufficient room for personal stories to be told. This may especially be true for the question formulation task in sequence 3 and 5 and for sequence 6, where participants were asked to comment on the secondary plenary session.

The problem is that storytelling occurred in the sequences where participants had the opportunity to deliberate the most on important policies, but instead used these sequences to get to know each other. This suggests that democratic deliberation's primary function in this very setting was to create a common ground. In this sense, democratic deliberation could be a productive complement to the representative democracy on the EU-level, but probably not as an independent model of policy making.

Moreover, I noticed that the topic of immigration was quite emotional for many participants, which resulted in a type of argument that very often involved personal stories. This also transmitted to the level of justification for most participants, resulting in what the DQI2 defines as low levels of justification:

Table 4.7 Level of justification

	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	UK	Total
<b>No justification</b>	15	10	3	12	35	75
<b>%</b>	48,4	50,0	50,0	57,1	61,4	55,6
<b>Inferior justification</b>	11	8	2	6	9	36
<b>%</b>	35,5	40,0	33,3	28,6	15,8	26,7
<b>Qualified justification</b>	5	2	1	3	11	22
<b>%</b>	16,1	10,0	16,7	14,3	19,3	16,3
<b>Sophisticated justification (broad)</b>	0	0	0	0	2	2
<b>%</b>	0	0	0	0	3,5	1,5
<b>Total</b>	31	20	6	21	57	135
<b>%</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

The justifications were mostly performing at a 'no justification'-level<sup>11</sup>. According to Habermas (1987: 27), low levels of justification

<sup>11</sup> I should also mention that the scores for the level of justification probably do not reflect the rationality of the discussion in sequence 3 and 5 adequately; therefore the low level of justification may be overestimated. In addition, the results for common good orientation (as showed in chapter 3) might also be underestimated. This is because the questions that were chosen in sequence 5 and in sequence 3 indirectly referred to the common good by inquiring about the pursuit of common policies at

are less serving for deliberation in the sense that it is not directly understandable (and therefore not fully convincing) for other participants. The consequence is that unconvinced participants lead to little or no change in preferences and attitudes, which is counter to the aim of deliberation (*ibid.*).

The typical argument consisted of an opinion complemented by examples either from participant's own country, personal experiences or stories from other countries. Here's an example:

TO [04:43–06:04]: Yes, I would like to say something about the strengthening of the external borders. What you have to know, is that on the European level there is in fact not a force, but there are units that exist at the EU level and that protect the borders. Along the coastline in Spain you know there are many people going through the strays of Gibraltar, and I know our French units are patrolling the area in order to fight against illegal migration. But it's still in its infancy, it should be further strengthened. The problem lies also with the regulations and the legislation. I think that each of the EU member states should control this particular aspect of the situation. And the same also applies to Italy; I know that the Italians are doing a lot to the fight against illegal migration. I know that they put road blocks in order to search the Lorries; they are looking for illegal migrants.

As we can see this participant is relatively clear on his opinion. He clearly states what he thinks the EU and the member states *should* do, but there are no clear reasons to support *why* this should be done. Instead, he gives examples from Italy which may be obvious for him, but not necessarily for the other participants.

Another example which is also quite representative for this group comes from another participant:

FA [06:05–06:38]: The only thing I want to say is that we can't really allow sitting on the fence. If we truly want to build a true Europe, we should talk about external borders only, and the EU

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the EU-level. Measuring these processes with the DQI2 may therefore give a wrong impression on the different qualities of this deliberative process.

member states should relinquish some of their sovereignty. I think that there's no other way to go about it.

The problem with this argument is the lack of sufficient arguments as to *why* it is a good idea to talk about external borders or relinquish sovereignty. These types of arguments were therefore coded as 'inferior justification' or 'no justification'. An example of a *qualified argument*, on the other hand, was the following:

PA [21:20–22:23]: Could I just make two points of [...] how can I put it? The immigrants are already in these countries that we were speaking about, for example the Turkish and the Portuguese. I think maybe [...] concentrating on, you know, finding these people and moving them on, would be the wrong thing, because I think we should be more concentrated on strengthen the border around the EU to, you know, to stop these populations getting bigger. And I think maybe that it would be a waste of time of energy and resources focusing on the people who are already in the countries; whereas the time and money could be focused on, you know, strengthen the border around Europe. You know, as I said, to try and control the amounts that are coming in.

This particular argument had a clear reason linked to the opinion, and the argument was explicitly elaborated in a logical way. For arguments to be considered as 'sophisticated justification', participants had to have several explicit reasons like this, which for participants of this group only occurred twice.

Overall, the results for level of justification were rather low, as most arguments had 'no justification' or 'inferior justification'. According to Habermas, this should lead to little or no changes in attitudes and preferences. But as we have seen in chapter 3 from the overall outcomes of *EuroPolis*, a majority of the participants did in fact change their attitudes and preferences. It is possible that participants from my group didn't change their attitudes and preferences, but unfortunately there is not data available to get knowledge of this. I did, however, notice that especially one participant had consistency of speech acts through the deliberative process. According to Steiner *et al.* (2004: 56) this may indicate that this particular individual was stubborn and unwilling to yield to the force of the better argument. Sander's (1997: 348)

assumption that participants who do express themselves in a rational way, will dominate deliberation, cannot be supported in this case. As we saw, participants from the UK dominated every sequence, but were also the ones who used storytelling, meaning arguments merely illustrated by examples, the most. On the other hand, theorists predictions that ordinary citizen might score low on this indicator (Sanders 1997; Mansbridge 1999; Dryzek 2000; Young 2000), is supported.

Considering that participants *overall* changed their attitudes and preferences, it may indicate that citizens can change attitudes and preferences despite low levels of justification. Perhaps the DQI2 has a too narrow definition of what should qualify as an adequate justification, or perhaps the level of justification should be separated with one set of criteria for lay citizens, and another set of criteria for politicians. As we have seen, some theorists have offered a far more expansive view of deliberation. Mendelberg (2002: 168), for example, argue that democratic deliberation should be a mixture of reason and emotion, and that emotion may be at least as effective as rationality. Although the kind of justification found in this group doesn't hold according to the DQI2, it is possible that other participants understood and related to this kind of argumentation anyway. It could be that the demand for rationality in Habermas' sense isn't applicable for the way ordinary citizens deliberate. On the other hand, Habermas also clearly stated that he described an *ideal type* which was intended to guide practice (Neblo 2005: 172). Dryzek (2010: 158) argues that ordinary citizens probably deliberate more authentic than elites or partisans that strategise against each other. Based on empirical observations he concludes that ordinary citizens make good deliberators, and they even have better capacity to change their minds as a result of deliberation (*ibid.*). These empirical findings contradict theories that highlight citizen's lack of skills in arguing. Turning to respect, table 4.8 displays the types of references participants received:



Table 4.8 Nature of references participants received

	UK	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	Total
<b>Negative reference</b>	4 (14,8%)	6 (40,0%)	1 (16,7%)	0	3 (27,3%)	14 (22,2%)
<b>Neutral reference</b>	21 (77,8%)	4 (26,7%)	4 (66,7%)	4 (100%)	7 (63,6%)	40 (63,5%)
<b>Positive reference</b>	2 (7,4%)	5 (33,3%)	1 (16,7%)	0	1 (9,1%)	9 (14,3%)
<b>Total</b>	27 (42,9%)	15 (23,8%)	6 (9,5%)	4 (6,4%)	11 (17,5%)	63 (100%)

Table 4.9 Nature of references participants gave

	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	UK	Total
<b>No reference to other participants' arguments</b>	12	4	1	8	20	45
<b>%</b>	38,7	20,0	16,7	38,1	35,1	33,3
<b>Negative reference to other participants' arguments</b>	5	3	3	1	8	20
<b>%</b>	16,1	15,0	50,0	4,8	14,0	14,8
<b>Neutral reference to other participants' arguments</b>	11	10	1	12	21	55
<b>%</b>	35,5	50,0	16,7	57,1	36,8	40,7
<b>Positive reference to other participants' arguments</b>	3	3	1	0	8	15
<b>%</b>	9,7	15,0	16,7	0	14,0	11,1
<b>Total</b>	31	20	6	21	57	135
<b>%</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

Looking at what type of references the different nationalities *gave*, the most common references were also neutral ones or no reference at all. Further, asking was not very common in this group, as displayed in table 4.10.

Table 4.8 displays the types of references the different nationalities received. When looking at the nature of references, the most common type of reference overall were neutral ones.

These results indicate that participants mostly behaved on a quite formal level towards each other. They didn't ask many questions to each other, and often gave neutral references to each other's arguments. This indicates that participants were very respectful towards each other, which means that the prediction of Steiner *et al.* (2004: 131) that a topic like immigration should lead to less respectful debates cannot be supported. On the other hand, the whole deliberative process was very formal and non-spontaneous, which may have been a result of certain framing effects of *EuroPolis* (Barisone 2010; Doerr 2009).

Table 4.10 Asking

	France	Ireland	Luxembourg	Malta	UK	Total
<b>Does not ask any information/ Justification</b>	26	12	5	17	35	95
<b>%</b>	83,9	60,0	83,3	81,0	61,4	70,4
	1	0	0	1	7	9
<b>Asks information/ knowledge from other participants</b>						
<b>%</b>	3,3	0	0	4,8	12,3	6,7
	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Asks information/ knowledge from moderator</b>						
<b>%</b>	0	0	0	0	1,8	0,7
	0	3	0	0	5	8
<b>Asks arguments/ justifications from other participants (broad)</b>						
<b>%</b>	0	15,0	0	0	8,8	5,9
	4	5	1	3	9	22
<b>Questions for experts/ politicians are formulated</b>						
<b>%</b>	12,9	25,0	16,7	14,3	15,8	16,3
<b>Total</b>	31	20	6	21	57	135
<b>%</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

For instance, the moderator was very careful to set the tone of the debate the first day. She stated early the importance of both respect and interactivity. This highly respectful start may have influenced the dynamics of the whole process. For example, she stated: '[...] so, we'll have a discussion about immigration and I want to stress in the beginning that what will be important is that there will be an exchange of ideas between people [...]' And further:

[...] you have to feel free to talk, nobody will judge you for your Ideas, there will probably be very different point of views between you, so I ask you to keep a polite form of course, to talk slowly in order to let the translators interpret what you say [emphasis added], and yes - to talk one by one. This will be very important.

The formal setting of *EuroPolis* with regards to timetables, topics and questions in addition to moderator's emphasis on courtesy and polite form of discourse, may be one of the 'framing effects' imparted to participants that Doerr (2009) speaks about. It is possible that these effects of the very setting affected the normative expectations of participants to be respectful and polite. However, it is possible that this also made participants afraid to speak up and to fully disagree with each other. These findings raise concerns regarding how 'deliberative', meaning how much dialogue there actually was in this particular group. The question is, how much dialogue does a setting like *EuroPolis* really allow? The combination of heterogeneous citizens, translations, as well as the ideal of equality in participation, seems like a difficult balance point both in practical terms, and in democratically terms.

### **Is democratic deliberation compatible with plurilingualism and multiculturalism?**

To sum up, one of the main findings is that participants from the UK clearly dominated every sequence. This supports the observation that language dominance occur when it is imposed either by the majority of speakers or by the language of the moderator. Their dominance already in the first sequence shows that this might have created a barrier for participants of other nationalities to enter the debate.

Data show that participants mostly interacted on a formal level towards each other. This may indicate that the level of respect was high, but also that the participants didn't actually dare to speak their minds and disagree with each other and that the whole deliberative process was very non-spontaneous. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that the specific setting of *EuroPolis* may have caused this. The explanation is probably found in the combination of the formal setting in addition to the normative expectations among participants. The formal setting of *EuroPolis* with regards to timetables, topics and questions in addition to moderator's emphasis on courtesy and polite form of discourse, may be one of the 'framing effects' imparted to participants, thus leading to the formal interaction and implicit respect among them.

Overall, the results for level of justification were rather low, as most arguments had 'no justification' or 'inferior justification'. Participant's arguments didn't reach the high levels because of their personal and emotional character. Although this kind of deliberation doesn't hold according to the criteria in the DQI2, it is possible that other participants understood and related to this kind of argumentation. According to Habermas, this type of argumentation should lead to little or no changes in attitudes and preferences. But as we have seen in chapter 3 from the overall outcomes of *EuroPolis*, a majority of citizens did in fact change their attitudes and preferences. A possible explanation could therefore be that the criteria for what qualifies as an adequate justification in the DQI2 don't separate the two different spheres of elite vs. ordinary citizen deliberation.

Based on the findings from chapter 3 and 4, the answer to the research question would have to be twofold. Democratic deliberation is indeed compatible with plurilingualism and multiculturalism in terms of promoting interconnectedness and a common identity, but perhaps not as democratic as it should be. However, democracy should also concern how to build and sustain a community in addition to ensuring the appropriate democratic procedures. In this respect, democratic deliberation could be a productive complement to the representative democracy.

The possibilities of arranging democratic deliberations at the EU-level on a regular basis is clearly not impossible, but still a demanding

project in the sense that it is both costly, time-consuming and requires a lot of organising.

However, considering that the EU is increasingly politicised, *EuroPolis* brings with it evidence that the opportunity to engage in real debates is a more effective means to mobilise political participation and to promote active citizens than for example by media campaigns.

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have addressed *how* participants interacted with each other in *EuroPolis*. The deliberative process was structured according to the indicators in the DQI2. I organised the findings in two main categories, participation and interaction.

Regarding participation, the deliberative process was dominated by participants from the UK, despite that they were not the nation in majority. French participants were in majority, but had significant lower levels of participation than the UK participants.

This raises some concerns regarding whether speaking the English languages gives certain advantages.

Regarding interaction, the main finding was that participants made very much use of storytelling. In fact, even more time was dedicated to get to know each other than on discussing policies. Participants also interacted very formally towards each other, possibly as an effect of the very setting of *EuroPolis*.

# Chapter 5

## Conclusion

### Summary of the main findings

The purpose of this thesis was to empirically investigate the potential for democratic deliberation between citizens in the EU. The research question was the following: *Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism?* To answer this question, the analysis was separated in two independent chapters. The first one described the overall structure of deliberation in *EuroPolis* by referring to survey data including some of my own findings from one small group. This was done to establish whether citizens interacted with each other or if language and cultural differences seemed to interfere with the interaction. When analyzing one of the participating groups, I found that interaction across nationalities was highly present. Participants from nearly all nationalities referred to arguments of participants from other nationalities more than their own co-national participants. I also found that common good in terms of the EU were one of the most common types of contents participants included in their arguments. Furthermore, participants often used the plural term 'we' when stating their arguments, which possibly contributed to a sense of a shared, European identity. As such, these first findings indicated democratic deliberation is indeed compatible with transnational settings.

For the second chapter of analysis, I performed an in-depth analysis of *how* citizens interacted with each other during the deliberative process. In this analysis, I used the Discourse Quality Index 2 to structure the deliberative processes according to Habermas' criteria of ideal deliberation. These findings indicated that the deliberative process tended towards language dominance by English-speaking

participants, as well as a quite formal type of interaction with low levels of justification. These results raises some concerns regarding how compatible and, especially, how *democratic* deliberation in transnational contexts actually can be.

The presence of language dominance from English-speaking participants supported the observations that the moderator's language leads participants of that same language to dominate the deliberative process. This is a concern for citizen deliberation in the EU, because unequal speaking opportunities prevent a diversity of perspectives from being heard. This is the opposite of what deliberation should be. People should be able to participate without being subject to dominant language use. Language should not favor one way of seeing things and discourage other.

In a broader context, these results perhaps points at the more global tendency of making English the *lingua Franca* of the world. This development favors the English language in the sense that the competent use of the English language leads to dominance in any type of communication. In worst case, the dominance of English-speaking participants for this group points at underlying power structures which put the non-competent speaker of English at a considerable disadvantage.

The very core of democratic deliberation is its democratic feature that different interests and opinions are heard and properly discussed through, which in turn should lead to more legitimate political outcomes. Voice is the one factor that gives minorities this empowerment. The fundamental problem is, if they are already outbid by English dominance in a transnational setting, is if this model is any better than representative democracy? Added to this, storytelling occurred in the two sequences where participants had the opportunity to deliberate the most about important policies, but were instead used to get to know each other. This suggests that democratic deliberation's primary function in a transnational setting could be to create a common ground. In this sense, democratic deliberation could be a productive complement to a representative democracy on the EU-level, but not as an independent democratic procedure.

With regards to arranging democratic deliberations at the EU-level on a regular basis, there are some practical dilemmas. First, the

translations provided in *EuroPolis* may affect the efficiency of the deliberative process. Second, democratic deliberation requires significant resources, and even more so when a multitude of languages are involved. The training and transportation of plurilingual staff to carry out the deliberative process, in addition to bringing and keeping the participants, is indeed costly in the long run. Third, tendencies of language dominance suggest that transnational group composition puts stronger pressure on the moderators to control the setting, which may result in a mini-public that is very much controlled and non-spontaneous, thereby compromising fundamental democratic principles such as freedom of speech.

These deliberative experiments are, however, needed in an age of globalization. We shouldn't stop trying to make citizens from all over Europe to come together and find a common ground. The best evidence that deliberation at the EU level was useful can be found in the participant's evaluation of the experiment. Participants were grateful to attend and participate; they learned much about the EU and its policies and felt more European than ever. These findings confirm the integrative potential deliberation has with regards to the European Union.

## Contribution to research

This study contributes to existing research in several ways: First, because previous empirical research has mainly focused on deliberation in national and monolingual contexts. Second, because previous studies of deliberation have to a large extent focused on the macro-level, by measuring the outcomes or effects of deliberation. This thesis, however, have focused on the micro-level by studying the deliberative *structure* and *process* of a mini-public. It has generated an in-depth analysis of *whether* and *how* a group of EU-citizens interacted with each other. Third, this thesis has studied deliberation among *ordinary* citizens in contrast to earlier studies that has focused on elite deliberation in Parliaments. Fourth, the question whether democratic deliberation within a plurilingual and multicultural setting is possible has now been answered *empirically*.

However, the findings of this thesis have to be interpreted cautiously due to several limitations: First, this study only analyzed one of the 25 group discussions and is therefore subject to limited



generalization. Second, I only focused on the topic of migration. It is possible that the results would be different for the debate on climate change. Third, in the group that I studied, gender, age and education distribution was not entirely balanced. In general, there was a selection bias of participants from upper-middle class, giving some concerns about the representativeness of the sample. Although I chose the most heterogeneous group within the available sample, there are shortcomings regarding information on the ideological composition of the group and on demographic and political characteristics that possibly influenced the deliberative process on the individual level.

Fourth, since only audio records were available for the present project, the process that has been analyzed just looked at verbal communication. Some deliberative theorists argue that much deliberation is expressed through nonverbal forms of communication (for example Mansbridge 2007).

Finally, this thesis only focused on the analysis of deliberative process, without looking at whether deliberation actually had an effect on the outcome in the sense that participants significantly changed their opinion after the group discussion.

## Suggestions for further research

This exploratory study of transnational deliberation among ordinary EU-citizens has generated perspectives that (partly) fill the research gap in this area. However, to understand transnational deliberation's potential and citizen's deliberative capacities in its full extent, further research will certainly be indispensable.

More empirical research would be welcome. For instance, it would be interesting to compare *EuroPolis* to a national and monolingual deliberative setting to establish the framing effects of *EuroPolis*. For instance, if there would be less storytelling and more focus on discussing policy in monolingual settings, but also to compare the level of interaction and the degree of respect. For instance, Doerr (2009) suggests that multicultural and plurilingual deliberative settings increase interaction and respect in ways that unilingual and monocultural deliberations might not. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare *EuroPolis* to other transnational deliberative settings where participants would have to reach a consensus on

policy issues. This could possibly establish if the pressure to reach agreement would generate less formal and more high-tempered debates.

Methodologically, one should perhaps include more qualitative studies of participants in *EuroPolis* to see how important nonverbal forms of communication are for the deliberative process. It would also be interesting to study participants in-between the deliberative sequences to see if the cross-national interaction was the same, or higher or lower than in the formal deliberations. Furthermore, it would be interesting to include interviews with the participants in this study to better understand the social mechanisms of the interactions that led (or didn't led) individuals to change their interests and identities. Moreover, my analysis basically applied a content-analytical approach. Perhaps a more discourse-oriented approach could focus in more detail on how people were actually communicating with each other.

In *EuroPolis*, observers noticed that many participants felt at unease about speaking through microphones. It would be interesting to see if the participants who felt at unease had some common features. For example, in this present study it was clearly that French participants needed the most encouragement to speak up. Qualitative interviews could perhaps generate valuable perspectives on why participants felt this unease. For instance, if this mainly had to do with personality of the participants, or if cultural traits may have caused this.

Regarding the EU-dimension, it would be interesting to compare the transnational deliberations in *EuroPolis* to transnational deliberations in a state like Canada. The EU is still in the making, but shares similarities with a clearly defined state like Canada. That way, one could possibly establish whether the 'unsettledness' of the EU affects how participants deliberate.



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# Appendix

## Codebook DQI

*Version 1 October 2010*

### 1. General Codes

Sequence      Sequence of the discussion

- (1) Problem-oriented
  - (2) Solution-oriented
  - (3) Formulation of question for experts
  - (4) Discussion of party manifestos
  - (5) Formulation of questions for politicians
  - (6) Evaluation
- (or similar)

Notes: The topic of a sequence is defined by the question the moderator asks in the beginning. E.g. 'What policy-options do you see for dealing with third country immigration?' -> code 2. A sequence ends when the moderator introduces a new topic. When the participants depart from the topic within a given sequence this has still to be coded as being part of the sequence (e.g. a participant only talks on the integration of Muslim immigrants when the group was actually supposed to discuss policy options dealing with third country immigration -> code 2). In this case however, the participant gets in addition a code 1 for off-topic talk (-> variable 'offtopic')

Name      Name of the participant.

Gender      Participant's gender.

- (0) male
- (1) female

Nation                                      Nationality

And other demographics like age, education, mother tongue, etc. VIII  
name Name of the participant.

## 2. Additional Codes for the Moderator

Modspeech    Nature of speech act given by the moderator

- (1) initiates debate on new topic
- (2) intervenes if the debate is becoming off-topic
- (3) intervenes to engage individual participants in the debate
- (4) intervenes to engage specific language group in the debate
- (5) intervenes with explanation of purpose of Deliberative Poll
- (6) intervenes by reminding respect (incl. no interruptions)/decent language
- (7) intervenes by providing information/knowledge
- (8) intervenes by making evaluative statements/arguments on the topic
- (9) intervenes to ask questions
- (10) invites the participants to read the briefing material

**Notes:** (1) Indicates the beginning of a new sequence; (3) and (4) are only used to integrate participants/language groups that have not spoken for a while (9) is used if the facilitator addresses general questions to everyone. If he asks a question to integrate someone in particular, code (3) or (4) will be given instead.

## 3. Participation

p\_sec                      Length of speech in seconds.  
Formal                    Nature of the speech act (interruption 1)

- (0) Formal speech act
- (1) Informal speech act: the speaker interrupts another speaker
- (2) Informal speech act: a person starts to say something without being authorized (and gets interrupted by the moderator)
- (3) Informal speech act: a speaker talks to his or her neighbour and does not address his speech to the whole group (= does not use the micro)

[if possible, code all DQI indicators not only for the formal, but also for the informal speech acts]

Interrupt      Interruption of the speech act (interruption 2)

- (0) The speaker can speak freely (= no interruption)
- (1) The speaker gets interrupted by another participant
- (2) The speaker gets interrupted by the moderator

Inter\_name    If (1), name of the person who was interrupting (interrupt 3)

#### 4. Justification

jus\_lev      Level of justification

- (0) The speaker does not present any argument or only says that X should or should not be done, but no reason is given.
- (1) *Inferior Justification*: Here a reason Y is given why X should or should not be done, but no linkage is made between X and Y – the inference is incomplete or the argument is
- (2) *Qualified Justification*: A linkage is made why one should expect that X contributes to or detracts from Y. A single such complete inference already qualifies for code 4. merely supported with illustrations.
- (3) *Sophisticated Justification (broad)*: Here at least two complete justifications are given, either two complete justifications for the same demand or complete justifications for two different demands.
- (4) *Sophisticated Justification (in depth)*: Not only are at least two complete justifications given for a demand, one justification is also embedded in at least two complete inferences.

**Notes:** (2) is considered to be the reference level for citizen deliberation. If there is one argument that contains one justification but if it is followed by additional speech that is first, a lot longer than the argument and its justification and second, would not qualify for code (2), code (1) is given instead. The same accounts for code (3): If there is either one argument and at least two complete justifications or more than one justified argument, but the following text – which is of equal length or longer – does not fulfill the above mentioned criteria, code (2) is given instead.

jus\_con            Content of justification

- (0) No reference: The speaker does not refer to benefits and costs at all.
- (1) Explicit statement concerning constituency or group interests (*own country*).
- (2) Explicit statement in terms of a conception of the common good in utilitarian or collective terms (*EU, Europe, global*).
- (3) Explicit statement in terms of the difference principle (*solidarity, quality of life, justice, etc.*).

## 5. Respect

resp\_grm        Respect toward groups- third country migrants (out - groups)

- (0) *No Respect*: This code is reserved for speeches in which there are only or predominantly negative statements about the groups.
- (1) *Implicit Respect*: No explicitly negative statements can be identified, but neither are there explicit positive statements.
- (2) *Respect (balanced)*: Both, positive and negative respect is equally expressed.
- (3) *Explicit Respect*: This code is assigned if there is at least one explicitly positive statement about the groups and either are negative statements

resp\_ingr        Respect toward groups (in-groups) (see resp\_grm)

resp\_polit        Respect toward politicians (see resp\_grm)

resp\_dem        Respect toward demands and counterarguments

- (0) *No Respect*: Only or predominantly negative statements about demands and/or *counterarguments are made*.
- (1) *Implicit Respect*: No explicitly negative statements were made, but neither are their explicit positive statements.
- (2) *Respect (balanced)*: Both, positive and negative respect is equally expressed.
- (3) *Explicit Respect*: There is at least one explicitly positive statement about demands and/or counterarguments and either are negative statements completely absent or positive statements are clearly dominating the negative statements.

- (4) *Agreement*: This code is given if speakers agree with the demands and/or counterarguments of other actors. In case of demands, they must simultaneously value them. This code is not given if actors state that they –agree| unwillingly or under force.

## 6. Interactivity

intarg\_pp      Respect toward other arguments (Interactivity *between participants*)

- (0) No reference to other participants' arguments.
- (1) Negative reference to other participants' arguments.
- (2) Neutral reference to other participants' arguments.
- (3) Positive reference to other participants' arguments.

intarg\_mp      Respect toward other arguments (Interactivity *between moderator and participant*)

- (0) No reference to other participants' / moderator's arguments.
- (1) Negative reference to other participants' / moderator's arguments.
- (2) Neutral reference to other participants' / moderator's arguments.
- (3) Positive reference to other participants' / moderator's arguments.

**Notes:** Just explicit interactivity is coded:

-The name of the participant is connected to an argument.

-There was no name mentioned, but the following speech act clearly referred to a proceeding one.

## 7. Consensual Approaches

conspol      Constructive Politics

- (0) *No Proposal*: No new proposal or aspect is introduced.
- (1) *Unspecific Appeal*
- (2) *Alternative Proposal*: A speaker makes a proposal or introduces an aspect that does not fit the current agenda but belongs to another agenda. In such cases, the proposal is really not relevant for the current debate, although it may be taken up in a different debate.

- (3) *New Proposal*: A speaker makes a new proposal or introduces an aspect that fits the current agenda.
- (4) *Mediating proposal*

**Notes:** This is maybe not comparable to the coding of the original variable of 'constructive politics', if participants face an open discussion where no consensus has to be reached. The code (3) was given if a speaker simply introduced a new proposal or aspect that was relevant for the current debate and code (2) was given if it was not relevant for the current debate. An unspecific appeal (1) refers to sentences like —we should do something about this or this problem‖ but does not give concrete ideas on how to tackle the problem. A mediating proposal (4) fits the current agenda and aims at reaching consensus.

## 8. Sourcing

source1            Main source of arguments.

- (0) No source mentioned.
- (1) Personal experience / storytelling
- (2) Description of situation in one's own country (without using any other source)
- (3) Briefing material
- (4) Other sources connected to the setting (Expert/politician interviews, etc.)
- (5) Politicians (other than those interviewed)
- (6) Media
- (7) Knowledge of other participants
- (8) Knowledge of the moderator
- (9) other

source2            Additional sources of arguments (see source1)

source3            Additional sources of arguments (see source1)

offtopic            Is the speech act on- (0) or off-topic (1)?

**Notes:** A speech act will uniquely be considered as off-topic if not a single argument is included that fits the current agenda. Accordingly, a speech act will just be coded as off-topic, if there is no reference to the guiding question (moderator) and if no statement was made about common regulations on the EU-level, a topic which leads through the whole debate.

## 9. Asking

ask Informative and argumentative exchange (asking)

- (0) does not ask any information/justification.
- (1) asks information/knowledge from other participants
- (2) asks information/knowledge from moderator
- (3) asks arguments/justifications from other participants (broad).
- (4) asks arguments/justifications from moderator
- (5) questions for experts/politicians are formulated.

<p><b>Notes:</b> If the moderator or the participants pose general questions that are not addressed at someone in particular, there is no corresponding code in Interactivity I</p>
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This report investigates empirically the potential for democratic deliberation between citizens in the EU. Deliberative theory implicitly states that deliberation works best in situations where participants share the same political culture and speak the same language. This assumption raises a fundamental question: Is democratic deliberation compatible with multiculturalism and plurilingualism?

This report studies an actual transnational, plurilingual deliberative process among EU citizens. It relies on data from the *EuroPolis* project, a deliberative experiment that took place in Brussels in 2009. The analysis is twofold. First, how did citizens interact with each other, and did language and culture differences seem to interfere with the level of interaction? This analysis is based on a combination of *EuroPolis* survey data and overall findings from one group deliberation. Preliminary findings indicate that, contrary to theorist's scepticism, citizens interacted with each other, related to European concerns and identified with the EU. Second, how did citizens interact with each other? By using the Discourse Quality Index, the analysis finds that the deliberative process tended towards language dominance by English-speaking participants, as well as a quite formal type of interaction and low levels of justification.

Anne Linn Fløttum Høen is Master of Political Science from the University of Oslo, where she was affiliated with ARENA through the student scholarship.

ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo promotes theoretically oriented, empirically informed studies, analyzing the dynamics of the evolving European political order. ARENA's primary goal is to establish high quality research on the transformation of the European political order, with a particular emphasis on the European Union.



P.O. Box 1143, Blindern  
N-0318 Oslo, Norway  
Tel. (+47) 22 85 87 00  
[arena@arena.uio.no](mailto:arena@arena.uio.no)  
[www.arena.uio.no](http://www.arena.uio.no)