Collective Identity and Democracy

The Impact of EU Enlargement

Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach (eds)

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Preface

Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON) is an Integrated Project supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Priority 7 ‘Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society’. The five-year project has 21 partners in 13 European countries and New Zealand, and is coordinated by ARENA – Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo. RECON takes heed of the challenges to democracy in Europe. It seeks to clarify whether democracy is possible under conditions of pluralism, diversity and complex multilevel governance. See more on the project at www.reconproject.eu.

The present report is part of RECON’s work package 8 (Identity Formation and Enlargement), which has two interrelated objectives: to clarify how much trust and commonality is needed to establish democracy, as a means of collective will formation at the various levels of governance of the compound EU-polity; and to understand the formation of collective identities with regard to enlargement processes, with an emphasis on comparing the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ member states. This comparative study is based on an analysis of identity conflicts emerging in the process of EU constitutionalisation.

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Introduction

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The enlarged and enlarging European Union is a novel political project in motion. The supranational institutions created for six member states over 50 years ago are influencing the everyday lives of more than 500 million European citizens in 27 countries. In addition to being national citizens such as French, Polish or Hungarian, they are now also Europeans. This generates the following questions: how do ongoing political processes affect who the Europeans are; what is the content of their reconstructed identity; and what are the consequences of changes in collective identity formation for political processes in Europe?

This report is part of RECON’s work package 8 – ‘Identity Formation and Enlargement’ – and brings together contributions covering recent research dealing with the changing nature of collective identity formation processes in the enlarged and enlarging Europe. The point of departure is a broad reconsideration of the concept of identity in the context of completed and future EU enlargement. The authors investigate the changes of established identities in old, new and prospective EU member states, and provide theoretical reflections on new processes in identity (re)construction. The present volume is the
result of the cooperation of a multidisciplinary research group. This cooperation allowed for fruitful and thought provoking exchange of ideas and deepened the understanding of recent changes in societies in Europe in the context of RECON’s theoretical framework. These changes can be approached from various angles and with the use of different methodologies. As a result, the chapters of this volume are of diverse nature as the researchers come from different disciplines and employ different perspectives. The volume thus reflects the research activities taking place within the RECON framework at different partner institutions.

During more than three years of research, the questions addressed in this volume have been the basis of our studies. What kind of identity will emerge from the process of European integration? What kind of involvement and feeling of belonging and in relation to what symbolic images will be the essence and the product of the new European social and cultural space? What kind of polity and political identification will emerge and solidify? How are the new patterns of collective identity formation influencing the process of European integration? Finally, will the enlargement and the entry of countries with a different tradition of identity formation and different recent past make any changes to European collective identity formation? To what extent is the experience of those new member states specific to Eastern and Central Europe, or could it be applicable also to prospective member states?

Although complete answers to these questions are not easily found, they serve as signposts giving us directions for further research. The major aim of this report is to reconstruct and explain the processes of change in dominant collective identifications, but also to combine the research on collective identities and democracy in contemporary Europe.

**Report outline**

This volume is divided into two parts according to the particular aspects of identity problems the authors are focusing on. The first part presents research capturing the conceptual conundrum of identity, democracy and EU enlargement. The first chapter by Zdzislaw Mach and Magdalena Góra provides the common
framework of analysis including the theoretical reflections on the meaning and nature of democracy and identity in Europe, and the RECON theoretical framework which we employed in our research. In the second chapter, Ulrike Liebert explores the concept of European identity perceived as a political project. Liebert analyses the German debate on European identity and concludes that the further questions to be asked are on the forms, conditions and consequences of European identity.

In the third chapter, Grzegorz Pożarlik analyses collective identity in the context of axiological pluralism in new Europe. Pożarlik focuses on the phenomenon of trust and civil society perceived as necessary foundations for the development of a mature, democratic society.

The second part of this volume presents national cases of identities in the making. This part is also devoted to selected aspects of the reconstructed identities in the new Europe which are in particular challenging especially as regards the future prospects of identity formation – gender equality or the changing perception of democracy perceived as a major value in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.

In chapter four, Katarzyna Zielińska focuses on the women’s movement in Poland after the transformation and the discourse of feminists in Poland. Zielińska briefly presents the factors facilitating and inhibiting the development of the women’s movement in Poland, stressing the significance of the transitional context. Secondly, she discusses the role of EU integration in the development and activities of women’s groups. Thirdly, she focuses on feminist intellectuals’ discussions on nation state and society in the context of the EU.

In chapter five, Nora Fisher Onar and Meltem Müftüler-Baç analyse the Turkish case, asking how the Turkish elites perceive the European project. The authors map the Turkish political scene in reference to European integration and answer the question how the elites are relating to cosmopolis. In chapter six, Maria Heller and Borbala Kriza investigate whether European identity constructions are already available among citizens based on the Hungarian case. Methods of discourse analysis were used on material recorded during focus group discussions in Hungary. Different discussion groups were organised to deal with problems of identity, and to scrutinize the way
people handle their multiple identities in various communicative situations. The chapter matches the three RECON models with the different identity constructions detected in lay citizens’ discussions. In a country where national identity is a highly debated topic both in private and public discussions, the emergence of European identity and its relation to national, ethnic and other forms of identity is an important stake.

The Polish case is approached from several perspectives. Marcin Galent and Paweł Kubicki examine in chapter seven the openness towards *cosmopolis* among the representatives of the new Polish urban middle class in two cities – Kraków and Wrocław. They use the palimpsest and labyrinth as a metaphoric reconstruction of identities in the face of European integration in the most dynamic segment of the Polish society. This is presented in light of the traditional mode of constructing Polish national identity.

In chapter eight, Beata Czajkowska deals with another dynamic group – the Polish intelligentsia. This is not only a crucial social stratum as regards identity politics in Poland, but also one of the most contested categories used in researching national identity. Czajkowska argues that this group is going through fundamental changes. It is interesting how Polish elites are reconstructing their identity and narration on Europe. These beneficiaries of the transition consume and produce culture and flourish professionally but no longer serve as the guardian of the Polish civic ethos, its distinguishing characteristic. They are part of the European professional class, in both lifestyle and outlook.

In chapter nine, Dariusz Niedźwiedzki analyses Polish pendulum migrants, another group which holds various experiences and based on this construct the one – possibly European – identity. Niedźwiedzki explores the connection between migration and reconstruction of identity. Besides the obvious effects of migration, the author presents the mechanisms of reinforcing national identification and developing the elements of European identity as the effect of the adoption of cultural elements from other national groups. The author also touches on an interesting effect of migration – the adoption of a more cosmopolitan perspective, emerging from the observation that people are just different, but still people.
In chapter ten, Jacek Kołodziej focuses on democracy and its meaning in post-transition societies. Based on the Polish case, he proposes a socio-linguistic analysis of the meaning of democracy. For Polish society, democracy – even though it must still be defended from possible explicit and implicit enemies – has a significant potential for cooperation and generating trust between actors. It is also important that democracy for Polish-speakers is deeply embedded in the national structure, and that Europe is such an arena for democracy only in 10 per cent of the Polish public oral and written texts.
Chapter 1

Identity formation, democracy and European integration

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The contemporary collective identities of Europeans are going through major changes as a result of the process of European integration and the wider process of globalisation. An important element of these changes stems from the changing nature of the nation state, which has in recent centuries been the basic frame of reference for peoples in Europe. One of the crucial components necessary for understanding the fluctuations in the nature of the state – the results of globalisation, multiculturalism, supranational integration etc. – is democratic legitimacy. Individual political loyalty and political identification, being part of the wider collective identification, are no longer solely controlled or predominantly channelled by the nation state and its framework. As the nature of contemporary ‘imagined communities’ is changing, departing from the domination of the Westphalian triad of territory, nation and exclusively exercised power, there is a dynamic in identification formation. In most approaches toward European integration there is a consensus that the nation state is losing its salience as the political organisation of human activities. It is worth noticing that these processes are even more profound in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and countries like Turkey. The CEE member states of the EU
are polities which regained their independence and sovereignty after 50 years of Soviet domination. Sovereignty therefore has a sacrosanct character for many of their inhabitants. However, European integration has again brought with it the discussion about the meaning of the concept, as sharing sovereignty with supranational institutions is for many people from this part of Europe difficult to accept or comprehend. The changes in the political reality in these countries – although similar to those in the West – are perceived as much more significant and posing much more difficulties. A similar case is witnessed in Turkey, where the distinctive history and the role of nationalism as a state ideology is strongly influencing the perception of European integration.

As the nation state is transforming and new supranational institutions are emerging, there is more and more interest in how in the new polity in statu nascendi in Europe political processes might be organised and how they, in turn, can influence the society. This emerging European polity is supposed to be a democratic one. Moreover – as many politicians in the EU repeat – it is supposed to improve the functioning of democracy in Europe. One of the most salient features of any democratic order is the collective identification in which political loyalty is anchored. Political identification is a seminal concept for this research because, as Castiglione (2009: 30-1) writes, it contains two elements: One refers to the way in which political action and ‘institutions contribute to processes of individual and collective identification and differentiation; the other to how this process of identification provides the grounds for political allegiance in a political community.’ The latter is of prime importance for any normative reflection on how the democratic order in any polity could be adjusted. Moreover, as we accept the notion that the nature of the polity we are living in is influencing the type of political identification, we need to detect new patterns of political behaviour in the new European polity ‘being post-national in character and post-state in form’ (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000: 68). This means that the traditional frames of reference are changing and new institutions are emerging, thus changing the political identification of Europeans. Our major puzzle then, is how to link the political changes with the collective identifications of Europeans. As Ulrike Liebert stresses in her chapter in this volume, European identity is a political project and should be analysed as such. Eriksen and Fossum (2009) – drawing theoretical frames for research – stress that there are
three possible perspectives in which we could embrace such a project. But before we reach the models of integration we need to say a few words about collective identity.

The changing nature of collective identity formation in Europe

We understand identity as a process, and not a fixed structure. It is perceived as a dynamic construction of images in relation to others. The ongoing process of renegotiation of boundaries between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe involves newly emerged partners in interaction, dialogue and negotiation with new ‘significant others’.

Collective identity ‘is simultaneously both a prerequisite for the future collective social practices as well as the outcome of those social practices, with accumulated marks of past experience’ (Sztompka 2004: 482). This observation is crucial for the further investigation of the connections between collective identification and the democratic order. Collective identities are the basis on which the social and political institutions are anchored and at the same time preserving established identities – for instance national – is a goal for any democratic order. Thus we are facing one of the most interesting paradoxes of democracy and identity of a group – the latter being at the same time a foundation and a goal in itself (Góra et al. 2009: 286).

One of the most profound processes observed as regards changes in collective identification is the process of its Europeanisation. Before we discuss further how this happens we need to make some comments on Europeanisation itself. The term is highly controversial and still does not have a precise definition. As Caporaso (2008: 23) has noted, it is more and more often used and as a result much of the energy of scholars is directed to clarifying what it means. For us, Europeanisation – following Kohler-Koch’s definition – means the ‘processes that enlarge the scope of the relevant unit of policy-making and hence not only transform economic governance, but also push social actors out of the scope of the nation state’ (quoted in Grabbe 2006: 45). For Radaelli, on the other hand, it is a ‘process of (i) construction, (ii) diffusion and (iii) institutionalisation of norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing’ that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic
(national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies’ (Radaelli and Pasquier 2008: 36). Recent attempts to theorise the process of Europeanisation bring with them more clarifications regarding this concept. It should be distinguished from the parallel and closely intertwined processes especially visible for instance in the Central and Eastern European countries such as transformation, democratisation and finally – which also concerns the ‘old’ EU member states – globalisation. The major concern of scholars is how to grasp the causal relationship between European integration and changes on a national/domestic level (Haverland 2008). Moreover, Europeanisation means different things and is a broader concept than ‘EU-isation.’ No matter how challenging it is to distinguish these processes and how blurred the concepts are, we found it useful to refer to the term Europeanisation, understanding it predominantly as broadening the frames of reference in which social actors can act in contemporary Europe.

The processes of constant crossing of national borders (or to put it differently, the process of diminishing of these borders as obstacles) have a significant impact on the process of construction of collective self-understanding in Europe. One of the most important consequences of the change in political reality and the processes of integration is the process of Europeanisation of collective identities. This phenomenon – although constantly being researched – poses many controversies as regards the scope of the process, its outcomes and products (nested or multiple identities, zero sum and positive sum identity etc.) and finally its resonance with the polity Europeans are living in (cf. Risse 2001; Góra et al. 2009). Sztompka admits that

[i]n this late modern period, identity has become multi-dimensional, multi-layered, differentiated. It is produced as a personal construction built of a multiple repertoire of options. People ‘craft themselves’, rather than receiving themselves ready-made.

(Sztompka 2004: 493-4)

This is a result, then, not only of Europeanisation, but of the changes brought by the times the Europeans are living in.

The question therefore again returns: whether there is a causal relationship between the European institutions and the EU itself and
the processes of (re)construction of identity of Europeans. The creation of a thick European identity may in the end serve as a foundation for the creation of a European federation. But there is no agreement as to whether this is possible based on what is nowadays a European identity. A different, but also interesting concept is presented by Delanty and Rumford (2005: 54): ‘[t]o varying degrees, all national identities in Europe contain elements of a European identity, which is not an identity that exists beyond or outside national identities.’ They perceive it as a certain – cosmopolitan – disposition which is present in most European societies and which historically stems from the Europeanised and multilingual elites and is now becoming more and more widespread in Europe. This implies the different nature of national identity and European identity – the latter being rather ‘a process of self-recognition [which] exists as a constellation of diverse elements which are articulated through emerging repertoires of evaluation. This European identity corresponds to a dialogic view of culture’ (ibid.: 55). European identity in this perspective is rather a disposition to certain behaviour. They explain further: ‘[r]ather than an overarching, all-embracing collective identity reminiscent of the nineteenth-century nation-state, European identity should be sought in the cosmopolitan currents of European societies in which new forms of self-understanding are emerging’ (ibid.: 68). Outhwaite (2008: 14) notice: ‘This is one of the principal vectors of European culture, expressed in cross-cutting processes of nationalisation on the one hand, notably in the construction (or sometimes reconstruction) of national languages and literatures, and cosmopolitan internationalisation on the other.’ The role of the existence of the cosmopolitan currents and their role in shaping the political reality in Europe is in particular interesting for us. This observation will allow us to escape from the trap of thinking about the changes in collective identification in the nation-based mode (both on national and European level) and will open the gate to post-national identification. Many transnationalist and cosmopolitan scholars argue that the European project is an outpost of general changes in the world order leading to a more cosmopolitan community, abandoning the tribal connections.

The problem of the relationship between national and European identities could be explained also by introducing the concept of zero sum and positive sum games of identifications introduced by Risse (2004) and Checkel and Katzenstein (2009). In this perspective in both
the national and the European federal model we have a zero-sum relationship between national identities in the first model and between national and European identities. On the contrary, cosmopolitan Europe is characterised by a positive sum relationship between nested identities. In this case we could expect that there will be a combination of elements of human rights universalism and global solidarity with a particular democratic order (Góra et al. 2009). This will be further developed in the following sections.

Reflexes in the mirror: Eastern enlargement, prospective members and identity

During the process of Eastern enlargement in the last 20 years – assuming that the process of Europeanisation started almost together with the democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 – the group of 10 new countries were affected by transformation and democratisation in the context of overarching Europeanisation. The outcomes of these processes which could be observed today in the CEE region are different, yet somehow parallel. As empirical research shows, the process of enlargement had a clearly visible impact on the CEE countries as regards politics, institutions and social life (Grabbe 2006; Smith 2004; Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The social dimension is probably the least researched, as the changes are slower than in other areas and less clearly connected solely with Europeanisation. As mentioned above, for those societies many changes occurred in the last twenty years which are having a constitutive result on their functioning. The major areas in which the process of Europeanisation is the most visible and has the most profound impact are migration and freedom of movement of people, gender equality and mainstreaming and the reconstruction of identification among young people. No matter how difficult the political and social processes seem for Europeans from CEE, there was really no other option proposed in these societies by elites and political parties prior to enlargement. Therefore, the majority of societies and elites supported the process of integration with all its effects and continue to do so. This motivation made the process smoother – according to the logic that ‘we are returning to where we belong’.1 For instance Polish society consistently shows a

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1 The famous phrase used in the television address of the President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski on the occasion of the ratification of the Act of Poland’s Accession to NATO, Warsaw, 26 February 1999.
very high level of support for Poland’s membership in the European Union. Recent surveys show that, since joining the EU in May 2004, support for membership has been steadily rising. It reached 85 per cent in April 2009, with only nine per cent declaring themselves against EU membership. Over the past five years, the percentage of supporters of membership increased by 21 per cent and opponents declined by 20 per cent.\(^2\)

The enlargement and the two decades of justifications given for this difficult and expensive process also changed the self-perception of ‘old’ Europeans (Sjursen 2006). For many years – after the decision on the European political order negotiated with Stalin at Yalta – Western Europeans perceived themselves as different from those living on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The ‘significant other’ was then visible and served very well for defining Europeanness. The end of the Cold War and the question of enlargement – the unexpected lack of divisions and requirement to redefine who we are – posed one of the most important questions for Europe. In the process of answering the questions of who we are, what our values are, what we have in common – a process of redefinition of the Western European ‘we-feeling’ occurred. A new space was created and new institutions needed to embrace the process of enlargement. Answering the question of the CEE countries of what standards we should adhere to, a process of intensified reflection on the quality of democracy in the EU started. Examples of this might be protection of human and minority rights and the problem of double standards in Western European countries demonstrated during the Eastern enlargement (Schwellnus 2006; Johns 2003).

The Eastern enlargement did not end in 2004, as the abovementioned processes and their effects will serve as a natural laboratory for researchers for years. As Sztompka comments:

\[
\text{I also believe that the revolutions of 1989 will not have been completed until such transformations of identity have come to a successful conclusion. Being invited to enter the ‘European house’ does not necessarily mean automatically ‘feeling at}
\]

home’ or that newcomers will necessarily be treated as ‘one of us’ by the current tenants.

(Sztompka 2004: 482)

For him, the ‘soft’ results of Eastern enlargement will definitely puzzle us for a much longer period of time. However, nowadays it is no longer the CEE countries which are serving as a major puzzle, but rather Turkey, as the process of further enlargement of the EU has reached the historical boundaries of the European continent. The Turkish case is not only a question of boundaries – as Europe could be perceived as a state of mind rather than an essentially geographical concept – but also the question of what Europe really means and what foundations are crucial to building a sustainable democratic European polity. Moreover, as ‘enlargement fatigue’ was noticed even on the eve of the Eastern enlargement, we are witnessing and can expect even more discussion and political mobilisation before the Turkish membership. The Turkish puzzle poses one of the most important questions in contemporary reflection on European integration – this is the question about the nature of this process and, moreover, answering it will possibly allow us to solve the ongoing dispute between the federalists and the transnationalists and cosmopolitans. In other words – bringing Turkey into the European Union (even if in a twenty-year perspective) means that we can imagine this project based on more cosmopolitan values and rights, not limited to the Christian Europe closed in a fortress and considering the outside world as alien and ‘othered’. Keeping Turkey outside the EU will probably lead to a more traditional way of building the European polity. This is not only about the EU accepting Turkey or not, though, but also (or predominantly) about Turkey absorbing and accepting the European, cosmopolitan understanding of identity – not exclusively nationalistic or Muslim. Is this at all possible? We need at least to study it.

Models of integration and identity

The European Union can be analysed in the framework of three major perspectives on the processes of integration. All three models assume that the major question is that within the changing context of the European political reality democracy shall be reconstituted to better serve the peoples of Europe. For this reason democracy may be analysed in two dimensions: as a polity understood as the set of
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institutions responsible for decision-making and the reallocation of resources, and as a forum – the arena of communication between citizens, civil society, where they can form their opinions and assess decision-makers (Eriksen and Fossum 2008: 9).

We understand collective identity as a dynamic and reflexive project – what should be clarified before presenting the perspectives on the development of the EU is our perception on the connection between democracy and identity. As stated above, the type of political identification is a decisive factor for the creation of certain institutions, and also those institutions are crucial for further reconstruction of existing identities. From this perspective one of the recent ways of rethinking democracy is its deliberative version, which suits our concept of collective identity best. According to Cohen and Sabel (1997) there are certain virtues which makes deliberation ideal, and as such influence the role of collective identification. Ideal deliberation should be free, based on reason, and have as its goal rational consensus. These ‘virtues’ imply a certain perspective on collective identity: we assume that the most important element is activism, and the criterion of belonging is based on the notion that one who solves problems with us is ours. Action is a condition to being accepted within the community; the activity must, however, accept the rules of the game. There is also a certain conception of rationality being the basis for this perspective on democracy. It is communicative rationality – after Jürgen Habermas – where actors perceived as communicatively rational are able to provide a rational explanation of their behaviour or choices which may be assessed by other participants of the deliberation (Sjursen 2006: 7). This approach meets our general assumption that identity is created within interactions with others, being social phenomena based on interaction.

The answers to the question how to reconstitute democracy in Europe could be threefold, as proposed within the RECON project. It is worth clarifying that these models – approached below – serve more as blueprints for possible constituents in which democracy and as a result collective political identification could be framed. It is important to notice that we treat the proposed RECON models as heuristic structures enabling us to organise the analysis of the field research results gathered in different countries using different methods and techniques. The RECON models created the
interpretative scheme for the discussion of the research results, but as the research was not based on the integrated comparative mode, their interpretation may vary depending on the scope and focus of analysis.

RECON model one of audit democracy – intergovernmental in its very nature – perceives the European Union and its developing institutions as compensation for the capabilities of nation states in realisation of the interests of the citizens they represent. This first model sees the EU as mainly a narrow economic union based on efforts to solve certain problems. Its functioning is based on the concept of instrumental rationality and judged by the people on the criterion of efficiency. In this model both political identification and the legitimisation of the system are organised within the framework of the 27 nation states participating in the integration project. RECON model one assumes that only the nation state can deliver the sufficient ways and channels of controlling the decision-making process in the form of the ‘reciprocal public justification process’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 20). This model emphasises firstly that the nation state is the right structure for performing democratic systems, and secondly that the supranational regulatory system (the EU) does not need direct popular legitimisation.

In such a construction the zero-sum relationship between national collective identities is based on a substantialist notion of identity. We can assume that the mainstream of collective identity formation will still be within the national framework. The Europeanisation of the national identity in this model is limited and will not necessarily bring any changes in solid national foundations, while the resonance with the European substance will rather enforce national identification. Moreover, national subjectivity is perceived as the best basis for democracy. The nature of the collective identities will be more stable than changing and historically rooted in pre-political bounds. Within this model we can perceive both types of identity: civic and ethnic. The important question emerges in reference to these two types: how collective identity mobilises people in relation to the European Union and the process of integration. However, regarding traditional identities, still very prominent in European society, one can perhaps say that national identity no longer dominates collective identity in Europe so unquestionably, though it remains traditionally the main frame of symbolic reference for many people (Smith 2001).
The ethnic concept of nation, traditionally developed in many European societies and in particular dominating in the CEE region, is now more and more often seen not only as unfashionable and parochial, but also as counter-productive regarding European integration. Ethnic nations are oriented to the past, expecting their members to base their identity on tradition, common roots, and ethnic culture (Geertz 1963; Eriksen 1993). They are exclusive, and sceptical about innovation and change which may bring new ideas and new identifications. They elevate to the top collective values such as family and religion. On the contrary, the civic model of nation focuses on individual values such as freedom, human dignity, and free choice. The model is more open to dialogue, multiculturalism and democracy and as a result it becomes more open to further changes and adaptation to the changing context. Taking into account the changes of the external environment and political institutions in Europe this position may lead to significant changes in identification. There is increased conflict between the two levels. The question is: what may the result of the ‘resonance’ with the European substance be?

The first answer takes the form of the second proposed model of European multinational democracy (RECON model two), which is connected with the federal reflection on the future of European integration. This approach is deeply rooted in the initial phase of integration and the ideas of the founding fathers of the European project, and assumes that the final stage of European integration will be the creation of a federal entity. The crucial element here is creation over the course of time of a European identity, being a ‘sound basis for the citizenship, for specifying the rights and duties of the members, and for setting the terms of inclusion/exclusion’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 26).

As regards the creation of a European demos, RECON model two might duplicate the process of nation-state identification on a wider scale but with similar patterns, scope and substance. Again it is substantialist in nature, similarly to RECON model one. This may lead to the construction of a multinational federal European state. This presupposes that there might be a clearly delimited territory of Europe, certain people who are differentiated from clearly defined ‘others’. This approach is widely criticised. The main focus of this criticism is that this kind of project will need forces similar to those
responsible for the creation of strict national identification. But European integration is first of all lacking in aggressive nationalism, and tends to calls more for universal rather than for national principles like human rights protection or the rule of law. Thus, as Habermas notes, ‘It is neither possible nor desirable to level out the national identities of member nations, nor melt them down into a “Nation of Europe”’ (quoted in Fossum 2001: 2). Even though this is today the strongest alternative to the first, existing model and possibly the most comprehensible for societies, it poses many problems. Probably the biggest is that the European identity is not thick enough for building the polity embedded in it.

An interesting alternative to the aforementioned models is the third model – a regional-democratic polity as a European variation of the cosmopolitan order (RECON model 3) (Sjursen 2007: 9; Eriksen and Fossum 2009: 22). The assumptions behind this proposal vary significantly from the two other models. This model goes beyond the template of the nation state both in its current European meaning and in its future, possible understanding of the nation state of Europe. This proposal assumes that under the conditions of globalisation European integration is an outpost of the new global system based on the Kantian cosmopolitan law of the people. As Eriksen and Fossum point out,

such a Union must be set up as a non-state entity, and yet retain some of the hierarchical attributes of government. The idea is that since ‘government’ is not equivalent with ‘state’, it is possible to conceive of a non-state, democratic polity with explicit government functions. Such a government-type structure can accommodate a higher measure of territorial-functional differentiation than can a state-type entity, as it does not presuppose the kind of ‘homogeneity’ or collective identity that is needed for comprehensive resource allocation and goal attainment. Such a governmental structure is based on a division of labour between the levels that relieves the central level of certain demanding decisions.

(Eriksen and Fossum 2009: 22)

Concentrating on the European, regional dimension of this project, it reacts to the critics of the existing political system of the European Union and offers new solutions. From the perspective of collective
identity formation the innovatory element of the model is that it assumes creation of an effective polity which ‘does not presuppose the kind of ‘homogeneity’ or collective identity that is needed for comprehensive resource allocation and goal attainment’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 31). This model provokes a departure from the traditional perception which perceives democracy and the nation state as the best, ‘natural’ marriage. It brings a new approach, indicating that democratic citizenship does not necessarily require national identity, but rather socialisation with a common political culture based on universal values/rights (Habermas 1992). The important question – based on the historical processes of formation of modern citizenship in Europe – is how the process of consolidation of the citizenship of the wide and populated Europe can take course. Dahl’s three standard criteria for inclusion as a citizen should be tested as regards the new polity: subjection to political decisions, competence to act as a citizen, and finally a feeling of solidarity and trust (1989). It seems that especially trust is important in the process of political identification with others in the polity (cf. Sztompka 1999). The post-national concept of citizenship most famously promoted by Habermas can be founded on the rights and rule of law – in the EU the signs of this kind of development would be constitutional patriotism created on the basis of the Charter for Fundamental Rights and Treaty Constitution for Europe (2001). This position stresses the significance of the ‘consensus on justice that is granted by law’. Critics, however, point out that this basis may be again too ‘thin’ to provide European citizenship, and argue that because there is no clear prospect for creation of a truly European basis for citizenship, it must be secondary to national citizenship (Bellamy 2005). As a comment we can stress that currently European loyalty is no longer perceived in the conservative terms of patriotism within national frames of reference, but rather in the liberal reference to solidarity and legitimacy (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 86). The most important point is that – similarly to identities – loyalties may be multiple and negotiable. As Europeans have various, compatible identifications, from the local to the supranational, they can theoretically develop various versions of loyalties.

This model assures compliance and consent not on the traditional exclusive monopoly of exercising power attributed to the national government, but through the softer methods of consultancy and deliberation in transnational structures of governance (Eriksen and
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Góra and Mach

This model is not hierarchical in terms of power (like the first and the second ones) and has no clear categories within the modernist vision of the world. The central idea is that a decentralised, horizontal model of decision-making might be created. In the rights-based community the major point of reference is universal rights and democratic procedures (Sjursen 2006: 203).

Reconstituting democracy in Europe – which is the overarching theme of our research – means concentrating both on the polity and on the forum where democracy is nested (Eriksen and Fossum 2008). In both dimensions we focus on the changes of collective identities in the contemporary enlarged Europe to understand and normatively assess the condition and possible improvement of democracy. Identity is from our perspective a process of negotiation, is activism itself, where there is no identity without action in the current, rapidly changing world – this concept of identity serves best as a basis for the development of a deliberative version of democracy on various levels (especially the local one) of the polity. People’s activity is something that generates changes in identity formation. It is visible, for instance, when migrants return to their local communities and try to improve functioning based on the experiences brought with them. Openness which overcomes former borders, on the other hand, creates new identity as well. The young inhabitants of Polish cities no longer accept the dominance of Warsaw. This phenomenon is a result of the fact that new frameworks of their activities have been created. They are able to connect their community within the European polity because they act within this polity as professionals or as citizens of the European Union.

Three major dimensions of progress in CEE and Turkey are important: gender relations, migration and the young population. The European forum where feminists from CEE have started to operate and gain access to information and ideas has influenced their identity formation. This is because another type of engagement and activity on a supranational level has occurred. It is not the case that if one is engaged in activity at a supranational level one changes one’s identification; but the engagement itself, the action, in our opinion creates the close interconnection between new frames of reference, identity and its change. Those who have the ability to engage in such activity could become Europeans. But this brings with it another question: what kind of competencies is needed to act in the European
forum? We can argue that this requires trust in other participants. Those who are afraid, feel threatened and do not trust – even if they are physically mobile, leave their home community and stay in another place – will not develop a new identification, as Dariusz Niedźwiedzki describes in the case of ‘formal migrants’ (see chapter nine in this volume).

These observations could contribute to the debate about European identity perceived as positive sum identity. The European identification could enforce local identification. People are engaged in various levels of activities and various identifications are developed: European, national and local. What is important is the potential of conflict between these levels: the European and local levels go together, yet at the cost of the strength of the national one – at least in the cases we researched. This could be perceived as a step toward RECON model two or three. The process of Europeanisation results in acceptance of European structural funds or EU law but also makes Europeans aware of the fact that the national community is not the only one and not necessarily the most important one. Decisive factors for detecting which model could be more possible in the future – though further research is necessary here – are as follows: firstly, the strength and nature of tensions between the levels of identification; secondly, the direction of changes, as RECON model two is rather a top-down process while RECON model three would require a bottom-up approach; thirdly, the common (if existing) values on which this European identity is founded, and whether it is rather an open or a closed project.

The other question for further investigation is comparison of how these processes are taking place in ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. One of the major results of our research is that Europeanisation has an extremely important, fundamental yet not uncontested influence on Central and Eastern Europe. EU enlargement is a process of modernisation – one of its major traits was imitating the processes in Western Europe.

Every debate on Europe and Europeanisation links with the question of how it will influence sovereignty – whether it will survive untouched or have a new meaning in the European context. The newly regained sovereignty becomes an important value for CEE societies – closely interwoven and inalienable with democracy itself. The questions of protecting national borders and national identity are
still significant in CEE countries. On the other hand, for Turks identity perceived in nationalistic terms guarantees the secular and republican character of the state and at the same time blocks the threat of Islamism. Europeanisation provokes debate – not only in Turkey but also in the CEE countries – about the relationship between the liberal model of open democratic society based on Enlightenment values and social groups committed to the traditional collectivist vision of state connected with the religious heritage and ethnic nationalism. Europe as a concept and European institutions as actors are delimiting the new frames for such a debate and struggle between modernisation and tradition and between national sovereignty and building the open European society and polity. This in turn shows that there is a connection between structural and cultural changes in CEE and Turkey which are closely related with the values identified as European, but which necessarily requires that the traditional version of social structure should be rejected. This is especially visible in the debate about gender equality. One must remember that, due to the enormous pace of these changes not comparable to the length of similar processes in the West, they raise much more controversies and are perceived as an attack on tradition and national consistency, for others being just a modernised, enlightened attempt to rebuild social reality.

It is also worth commenting that there was and still is a fear that the CEE countries are fundamentally different from the West – and as a result they can change the entire European integration. The process of recent and future enlargement, as shown above, serves as a trigger for Europe’s self-understanding. Understanding this ongoing self-assessment will possibly bring us closer to comprehending the changes in collective identity formation in Europe. After enlargement Europe lost its familiarity – the new member states are not known, Western Europeans do not know what could be expected from them. On the other hand, for the new societies included in the EU, the ‘old’ Europe is also unknown. The major question is whether these countries are so much different from each other and how these real and imagined differences will influence European integration and common identity. In this context we can venture the hypothesis that the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands is connected with lack of trust to each other and lack of control of this enlarged, unknown Europe. The same problem appears to be present with Turkey. How similar to Europe is this
country, and to what extent does it need to be changed in order to be accepted? We need to take a look at these problems and focus our research on them in a broader context.

The particular elements of functioning of these new frames of reference for reconstructing collective identity have been detected and researched – especially the effects of migration. Europe is for more and more people becoming a framework for their identity and action. However, this does not necessarily mean that this phenomenon is unambiguous, common and similar for all cases. One of the most important factors contributing to social changes is mobility. Migrations and new experiences are a basis for many migrants to build a supranational, European identity, especially in a situation where European migration is not mobility only in one direction and irreversible. The phenomenon of constant commuting all over Europe is contributing to building supranational constructions. This new pattern of European migration – short-term, with frequent visits home – is influencing the sending communities even more significantly. The returning migrants become a source of influence and change. This somehow delivers European frames of reference even for those who are not mobile.

We assume that European identity is a political project and as such is accepted and promoted in the Central and European societies by thus far narrow circles. The promoters are mostly young and active, mobile and competent (with specific professions). They believe in this project because it is attractive for their personal careers and prospects, and it is also sometimes a reaction (as with Polish feminists) to the oppressive national political structures and activities which are marginalising certain groups.

Questions for future research
We have already indicated that identity in Europe – especially in the new member states – is reconstructing and becoming Europeanised. This brings us to a new point where new questions emerge. We found useful the recent concept of Checkel and Katzenstein, who distinguished two very different European identity projects. The first one is an ‘onward-looking and cosmopolitan European identity project’, which was visible for example in the Constitutional Treaty. The second one is an ‘inward-looking, national-populist European identity project’. 
identity project that focused on the economic and cultural threats’ (2009: 11). We found this thought-provoking, especially as besides this dichotomy one can imagine that the European identity could also be closed and inward-looking in wider than national frames of reference. Such an approach is visible, for instance, in the concept of ‘fortress Europe’. This latter project, which could be encapsulated in the federal European vision, might have a similar dynamic to the abovementioned inward-oriented projects. Moreover, the contrasting dynamics of these projects highlights the major shift in contemporary European approaches to identity, and also stresses that the onward-looking project is dominated and propagated by Europeanised elites, while the inward-oriented one is more populist and present in mass politics.

This opens up a very uneasy question. If we are to accept the first project – onward-looking and cosmopolitan as regards the creation of European identity – we must think of values and rights as being a basis for the European project. If we accept that Europe is a state of mind rather than a geographical concept, then the question arises of what this state of mind is. Even if we build an identity as a dialogue with others we need to define the conditions of this dialogue based on European values. We would like in our future research to concentrate on these issues and continue our common reflection on how the issue of European values is utilised in debates on possible further enlargement and the final borders of Europe. These debates are determined by the previous experience of the Eastern enlargement, but at the same time concern the broader question of how Europe wants to form its identity. It is therefore crucial to find out what the mechanisms of negotiation of shared European values are and if there is an agreed system of fundamental values in Europe.
References


Chapter 2

Two projects of European identity

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Introduction

‘European identity’ is neither already a reality nor purely a wishful thought, and at the same time it is no scientifically established, analytical concept, but first of all a political project (Meyer 2004; Meyer and Eisenberg 2009).¹ This project implies two normative as well as empirical problems: first, whether it is necessary; and second, how the formation of a European identity might be possible, that is how Europeans can come to conceive themselves as a political or cultural community. Referring to the first question, Willy Brandt, the chancellor of West Germany at that time, wrote as early as 1973 in the New York Times that Europe needed its own identity and a new self-confidence aimed at a collective ‘policy of assertiveness in the world economy and thus also in world politics.’² Half a year later the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community signed in

¹ This chapter is a substantially revised version of an article previously published in German (Liebert 2009); the author would like to thank Ben Koschalka for providing an English translation of this chapter. The responsibility for any remaining errors is mine.
Copenhagen a declaration of the EC 9 on European identity. Regarding the second question about the formation of a European identity, European political leaders have put in practice a range of institutional innovations for the deepening of European integration over more than three decades: from the direct elections to the European Parliament introduced in 1979, the ‘Citizenship of the European Union’ established by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted by the first European Convention (2000), to the EU’s Lisbon Agenda (2000-2010), and last but not least the Constitutional Treaty (signed in 2004) and its successor, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), both aimed at making the EU of 27 member states more effective and democratic, that is ‘bringing it closer’ to the 500 million citizens. Indeed, even the ‘return to Europe’ of ten Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007 was justified with reference to a supposedly shared European identity. And the most recent expression of that project has been the ‘Berlin Declaration’ on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the EU, under the 2007 German EU Presidency. However, the volition for a pan-European identity also continues to taste bitter defeats, whether related to the split of the ‘European civil power’ on the question of participation in the Iraq War after 2003, or to the failures over ratification of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005. In the enlarged EU, the European identity

3 See the ‘Document on the European Identity’, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973 (‘Dokument über die europäische Identität’, Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 14 December 1973, 12: 131-4. Available at: <http://www.ena.lu/dokument_europaische_identitat_kopenhagen_14_dezember_1973-030002278.html>). Drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the then nine member states (EC 9), this document established for the first time a connection between the foreign-policy role of Europe, European identity and democratic constitutional principles by expressing the will of the EC to protect ‘the foundations of representative democracy, the rule of law, and the social justice which are the goal of economic progress, as well as respect for human rights as fundamental elements of European identity’, and also to play an active role in world politics (Haftendorn 2005).

4 The Lisbon agenda was concluded by the 2000 European Council meeting in Lisbon and aimed at making the EU ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010’ (see: Council Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council on 24 March 2000).

5 For these institutional reforms of the EU, see: <http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/institutional_reform/index_en.htm>.
project faces two challenges. First of all, contention over the What, Why and How of a European identity project is not any more limited to European leaders or high-ranking ‘reflection groups’, but has broken the permissive mass public consensus and triggered a politicisation of national publics, too. Second, the European public identity debate is complicated by the segmentation of national public spheres. European identity discourses remain fragmented by Europe’s linguistic diversity and hardly capable of ensuring mutual recognition across language boundaries (Kraus 2004). Almost inevitably, European identity is a contentious project.

Arguably, the questions about a European identity will remain controversial as long as the ‘political philosophy of a Europe in progress’ (Friese and Wagner 2002: 342), i.e. the foundations for its legitimacy, are not clarified: how should the unity, that is the building of a political order from the inner diversity of the enlarged and enlarging Europe, be justified? Three kinds of positions on this question compete with one another in the contemporary EU debate: the first claims that it would be more convincing to derive the political legitimacy of European authority from the sovereign national ‘demoi’. After all, taking into account the persistence of a diversity of headstrong national identities, intergovernmental-cooperative rule would not require any community identity. Worse, a European identity would conflict with or even undermine national identities. The second response argues that only a supranational or pan-European identity can provide the foundation for legitimate EU governance, suggesting a unified post- or supranational political order, modelled on the national identity that had been historically constructed as a basis for the legitimacy of the modern state. Finally, the third position holds that it would be better to rethink entirely the legitimacy of the EU’s non-state order and its relation to European identity in novel empirical and normative terms. In sum, these three positions do not only diverge over what constitutes the foundations of a legitimate political order for Europe but they also reflect different uses of the term ‘identity’.

In this context, ‘European identity’ is conceived not as an aggregation of individual identities of the Europeans, but as a collective identity in the sense of an evolving repertoire of symbols and meanings of the European societies that mixes with but also transforms the national
self-images as well as the relationships between them. Furthermore, it is assumed that communicative processes and, thus, national debates play a crucial role in the formation of European identity, in three respects: first, national identity debates – or particular configurations of identity discourses – contribute to the ongoing process of drafting the all-European identity lexicon; they continuously enrich it with new ideas, symbols and meanings of collective European self-understandings. Furthermore, national public spheres are also arenas for testing alternative ideas of European identity for their compatibility with national self-perceptions. Finally, certain identity discourses emerging from a national debate may also articulate tensions or even clashes with other national identities, thus challenging the very possibility of a shared European identity. In other words, national public debates will assume a key role in the formation of a European identity as well as in the deconstructions and reconstructions of the traditional national identities.

Germany is a case in point that reveals how closely the European identity is intertwined with the struggles for a national self-understanding. If, historically, national identities all over Europe always emerged from within pan-European contexts, these ‘entangled identities’ (Eder and Spohn 2005) nevertheless differ considerably across member states. In any given national context particular ideas of European identity can be expected to prevail depending on their discursive fit with the national self-images. If this is true, which then are the key ideas in the German debate that discursively knit German and European identities together?

In the following I will show that the European identity project pursued at present by German political elites is culturally defined and diverges markedly from the democratic constitutionalist ideas of European identity that have gained purchase among German cultural

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6 The only analysis to date comparing the national-European ‘entangled identities’ of the old and new EU member states from a historical perspective can be found in Eder and Spohn 2005. Similar to this is what Thomas Risse calls ‘marble cake’, i.e. that the various components of the individual identity cannot be differentiated on the basis of distinct levels. Unlike Wilfried Loth, who describes the ‘multi-layer character of identity construction in Europe’, i.e. national, regional and European identities (Loth 2002b), the ‘marble cake’ model conceives of intertwined identities whereby national and European components mix and blend (Risse 2010:659, see Cram 2009).
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and intellectual elites. Moreover, I will argue that a ‘European identity project’ based on a ‘European community of values’ is problematic, because it appears to overestimate the consensus for a culturally legitimised EU policy and underestimate the need for a deliberative civilisation and reconciliation of intra- and extra-European conflicts through legitimate processes – whether these conflicts concern issues of material distribution, recognition of cultural differences and historical justice, or participatory parity.

The chapter proceeds in three steps: after having elaborated the German self-understanding, I will map the contemporary German debate on European identity and then discuss the two European identity projects that have gained prominence within and beyond the German context: the project of a democratic constitutionalist European identity, based on the key notion of ‘European constitutional patriotism’, coined by Jürgen Habermas; and the project of a European cultural identity, based on the idea of a European community of values. While the latter relies on a substantialist notion of collective identity understood as a fixed resource for European political leadership that is rooted in the European people, the former project is configured – and constantly reconfigured – in ongoing democratic processes of reconstituting Europe through citizenship and civil society.

German self-understanding in the post-national constellation

The Federal Republic of Germany, as one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community and since 1990 the most populous country in the European Union, is too small to dominate the EU, but too large to permit a federation with balanced shares of power. Germany, refounded in part in 1949 as a ‘semi-sovereign’ state and ‘tamed’ by the European Union after reunification (Katzenstein 1998), swings accordingly between Europeanisation and self-assertion (Kohler-Koch and Knodt 2000). With respect to their inclusion in the EC/EU, the German governments are able to rest on a quite reliable cushion of ‘permissive consensus’ in the German public sphere. Yet the post-national
German identity, ‘reinvented’ after 1949, emerges from tensions between four more specific discourses:  

- The discourse about *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, or coming to terms with the past, processing the troublesome heritage of the Nazi state in constructing the new Federal Republic.
- The discourse about German identification with the West and/or Europe.
- The discourse about ‘venture more democracy’, promoting ideas about a civic democracy opposed to an authoritarian and statist culture, multiculturalism or the recognition of ethnic-cultural differences against an ethnic-assimilationist culture.
- The discourse reflecting and contesting the renaissance of a more positive national self-esteem of Germans that emerged from German reunification and its coupling with a thrust for European integration and notably a federal form of Union.

The first discursive thread encompasses debates over the consequences of the German defeat and how to deal with German guilt and responsibility. In the history of the Federal Republic the public debate over the trauma of the Nazi era broke ground, with a delay and in different stages: after years of silence in post-war Germany, debates started over the statute of limitations in the 1960s and with student protests against ‘forgetting’ in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the German Parliament became a forum of ritual acts of remembrance, where sensational speeches were given by State President von Weizsäcker. But also outside the state, the German society has worked through its uncomfortable memories in the most diverse forms: uncompromising descriptions of outrages, guilt and injustice in literature, films and public debates were connected with the search for concrete footholds for building understanding, dialogue and trust beyond the old trenches and graves. Over the years, these processes have fuelled the German peace movement and pressures from below for civil forms of conflict resolution. At the fault lines of past or present conflicts and violence, these ideas have become nodal points of German-French reconciliation, the development of German-Israeli dialogue, German-Polish

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7 The following section is based on Liebert 2007.
8 The most thorough analysis of the conflicts of the German Bundestag with Nazi rule over four decades can be found in Helmut Dubiel 1999.
understanding, civil peace negotiations in the Balkans as well as the way of dealing with extreme-right radicalism and xenophobia in the united Germany.

The second discourse in the debate over German identity pursued a new definition of national identity in the European and transatlantic context. This line of argument, founded in the early speeches of Konrad Adenauer, is concerned with Germany’s responsibility for shaping Europe as a driving force for the process of European unification. Unlike the vision of the founding fathers of the European Communities, who aimed at building an association of West European democracies, the ‘Europe’ of the German governments – from Willy Brandt’s new Ostpolitik to Helmut Kohl’s new German and European policies after the collapse of communism – clearly went further East, even as far as the Urals, encompassing Russia and the Transcaucasian states. This Europe is built on common values, including peaceful conflict resolution, freedom and solidarity between citizens. In this sense, it is constantly the most bitter lessons from their national as well as the common European historical experience that Germans bring to mind: emphasising the particular responsibility of Germany for the European unification project, and also turning the ‘never again!’ into energies for building a more just and peaceful future.

The third discourse in the German identity debate regards the idea of a republican civic community or pluralistic, democratic, multi-ethnic civil society. Aiming at a thorough democratisation of the German self-identity, the postulate ‘Venture more democracy!’ has put the democratic question for the Federal Republic of Germany upfront and on top of the national question. It holds that the transition from totalitarian rule to democracy – whether premised on the principles of communism, Nazism or fascism – must lead to – and be led by – civil society. This position distances itself from the traditional scepticism towards democracy in Germany. In the debates on the opportunities and restrictions for democracy in the former Federal Republic and that of today, political and academic elites as well as

9 In his Berne address of 23 March 1949, Konrad Adenauer spoke for the first time in favour of the Western European countries uniting to save Europe: ‘Hardly a single thought is as popular in Germany at present as that of a European association’ (Adenauer 1965: 190).
many citizens had seen the idea of a ‘leader democracy’, with a sharp
differentiation between the leader and the led, as the best option for
practising democracy. By contrast, political publicists, public
intellectuals and politicians – from Dolf Sternberger to Jürgen
Habermas, from Willy Brandt and Hans Koschnik to Joschka Fischer
– remind us of the concept of the state as a plurality of citizens. In
fact, the idea of active civic citizenship committed to the common
good was for a long time a novelty for Germany (Sternberger 1995). It
is still a matter of controversy whether the Aristotelian, or exclusively
male-connoted concept of state was in need of revision, and to what
extent the democratic state was not only the state of its citizens, but
also that of the multitude of (residing) immigrants and religious and
ethnic minorities.

The fourth and most recent discourse in the construction of the new
German identity emerged from the renaissance of the ‘national
question’ in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall. As a matter of
fact, the German experience of reunification awakened not only new
national feelings and hopes, but also old fears. The questions ‘nation
state – yes or no?’ and ‘if yes, then on what grounds?’ threatened to
polarise the German political class and cultural elite. While demands
for the ‘decriminalisation of German contemporary history’ and a
return to ‘the normality of the nation state’ did the rounds,
admonishing voices castigated the rise of national or even nationalist
identifications among Germans, which they accused of allowing the
old hallucination and myths of nationalism to return again. In spite of
the heated (verbal) battle over the resurfacing German national
rhetoric, what is characteristic of it is rather the absence of
nationalistic ardour from the public sphere, the dominance of
‘professional sobriety’ (Wehler) of the political elites on the
‘landslide’ towards German unity, and not least new popular
demands for directly democratic amendments to representative
democracy (Liebert 1991: 84ff).

10 Theodor Eschenburg, chronicler of the four German regimes of the 20th century,
stated that he was ‘downright horrified [by] Brandt’s words “we want to venture
more democracy” in the government policy statement of 1969’, while he was
impressed by Helmut Schmidt, as ‘he was the only post-war Chancellor to rule
against the Zeitgeist’ (Eschenburg 2000: 230, 240-1).
Following these four discourses within the evolving German identity debate after World War II, and because of (not despite) the tensions among them, the collective self-understanding of the new (or reunified) German Federal Republic can be described as post-national: It results from ongoing self-critical confrontations with the German past and the lessons to be learned from this for the present and future; it is thoroughly embedded in the European integration project and the Western culture; and it comprises a constitutional patriotism that builds on democratic and international human rights principles aimed at transcending past national imperatives and illiberal traditions of the state. Against this background – admittedly a stylised one – should we not expect this post-national German self-imagery to go hand in hand with the European identity project? Yet a closer look at the nodal points of the German debate about European identity will show that the fundamental questions of whether a European identity is necessary and how it is possible are not fully resolved; they are anything but lacking in controversy.

European identity from the German perspective

Two projects

Contrary to some agnostics who consider ‘European identity’ a non-existent issue of public and scholarly debate, let us establish that the increasing number of publications in German on the subject can no longer be overlooked on the agenda of the German public sphere. ‘European identity’ is a topic that is much discussed, be it in addresses, declarations and debates of prominent German politicians, at academic conferences and in academic publications, or in the quality press.

11 In recent years, the growth of monographs and anthologies on the topic of ‘European identity’ published in German or by German authors has been impressive; see e.g. Tibi 2000; Elm 2002; Loth 2002a, 200b; Meyer 2004; Ichijo and Spohn 2005; Eder and Spohn 2005; Doing, Meyer and Winkler 2005; Michalski 2006; Nida-Rümelin and Weidenfeld 2007; Madeker 2008; Meyer and Eisenberg 2009.

12 Such as Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the occasion of the 11th International Thomas Mann Festival, see: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2007/070714-ThMann.html> (accessed 6 September 2010), or German Home Secretary Wolfgang Schäuble: ‘German or European Identity?’, available at: <http://nzz.gbi.de/webcgi>.

13 The multidisciplinary literature on European identity encompasses contributions from the fields of constitutional law and sociology of law (Bogdandy 2004, Jörges,
At the same time, we should note that one cannot talk of a narrow-thinking German, i.e. nationally self-referential debate, since most of the contributions by German politicians, academics or public intellectuals are the product of international exchanges and many have also found their way into English-language publications. We will therefore draw in the following on two different discourses on European identity published in both German and English by academics and publicists with a German origin and professionally situated predominantly, but not exclusively, in Germany.

The German public debate on European identity focuses on two questions, as posed succinctly by Jürgen Habermas (2006: 67ff): ‘Is the development of a European identity necessary, and is it possible?’ More specifically, it is debated, first, whether or not to consider a collective identity for the EU necessary, and if so, what functions and consequences should be ascribed to it. And, second, it is questioned what kind of European identity is possible, i.e. what its characteristics are, how it relates to national identities, on what premises and in what ways it might develop – through targeted political strategies, conflicts, institutions, discourses.

The answers to these two sets of questions can be divided into two camps, a basically sceptical and an optimistic one:

The sceptical position considers European identity neither necessary nor possible. From the viewpoint of a Europe of sovereign nation states European identity appears impossible, as it is lacking the...
necessary conditions on a European level, namely a European public sphere. And it is also unnecessary for the legitimacy of the EU’s authority, since this is derived from the democratic member states. This scenario is presented by German constitutional lawyers (Grimm 1995) and by advocates of the intergovernmental paradigm of international relations. It is based, however, on a premise which in the post-national constellation can no longer be seen as steadfast – the locking-in of the sovereign people, or the demos, within the nation state. This premise is informed by a conception of legal constitutionalism based on three binary dualisms: (i) an unbridgeable gap between state/politics and society; (ii) a state organisation law which is detached from the individual rights of the citizens, thus leading to an apolitical understanding of rights;16 and (iii) a duality of international law, as a result of which state sovereignty together with the foreign policy prerogative of the Executive are separated from the sovereignty of the people, which is limited to domestic policy; this leads to ‘the subordination of international law to state sovereignty and to democracy being encapsulated within the borders of the nation state’. However, Hauke Brunkhorst has argued that in the context of denationalisation and globalisation these three binaries are exposed to continuous processes of deconstruction (Brunkhorst 2007: 40f).

The pessimistic variant of this sceptical position considers European identity as entirely desirable but, in light of the above premises, as unrealistic. The supporters of this view recognise the European identity as a necessary resource for a democratically legitimate government in Europe. However, in a much cited diagnosis Graf Kielmansegg has depicted the ‘dilemma of democracy’ in European integration in the following way (Graf Kielmansegg 1996): if democratic legitimacy normatively did not rest on government by the people, but on a European community of remembrance, public sphere and collective identity, and a European people does not exist, then the crisis of legitimacy, motivation and rationale of the EU was inevitable. Therefore, given the pressures of multicultural

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16 According to this liberal constitutional understanding, rights and laws are ‘politically neutralised fences’ which should make interventions by societal powers into the realm of politics just as impossible as extralegal encroachments of state authority on the private affairs of its citizens (Brunkhorst 2007: 40).
immigration and economic globalisation, Graf Kielmansegg did not discount an ultimate failure of the European integration process, as the conditions for a European demos were not given. A variation of this collapse scenario can be found in the writings of the German political scientist Bassam Tibi (2000), entitled ‘Europe without Identity? The Crisis of Multicultural Society’. These sceptical, if not pessimistic, positions have stimulated much criticism and a plethora of empirical revisions, with regard to both their theoretical-normative premises and empirical presuppositions and claims. Namely, the work by Thomas Risse, a Berlin-based political scientist in the field of International Relations, and his research group and partners, have greatly contributed to that empirically grounded research agenda.

The second ‘optimistic’ scenario argues that European identity is necessary and that its development is possible, depending on a range of preconditions and mechanisms. However, the prospects diverge as to which type of European identity might be normatively justifiable and empirically viable. Risse (2001) proposes a typology of European identities which provides an understanding for comparative empirical studies, namely for the analysis of national discourses on European identity. According to this typology, five competing types of European identities emerge as a consequence of processes of Europeanisation: first, the nationalistic conception of a Europe of nation states; second, the identity of Europe as a community of values; third, European identity as a third way between communism and capitalism; fourth, the European identity as a part of the Western identity; and fifth, the Christian European identity.

As regards an empirical, explanatory research strategy, Risse has suggested a social constructivist analysis of the Europeanisation of national identity discourses, aimed at elaborating empirically grounded and theoretically convincing answers to the puzzle of how European identity emerges. For example, the introduction of the euro has worked as an important catalyst of the transformation of nation-state identities, albeit in different ways in Germany, France and the United Kingdom, depending on how national and transnational discourses and the construction of a public space are

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17 Thomas Risse’s work is in a large part anchored in interdisciplinary and international research projects, see for instance IDNET (Hermann et al. 2004).
Two projects of European identity

functioning in each of these countries (Risse et al. 1999; Risse 2001, 2003).
The German debate illustrates a large spectrum of substantially different notions of European identity (Meyer 2004). In this section, I strive to elaborate more on two especially influential positions on the questions of the Why and How of a European identity, in particular the conception of a ‘European constitutional patriotism’, on the one hand, and the vision of a ‘European community of values’ on the other. Both of these bring forward arguments that show considerable divergence in terms of justifications and proposed strategies that should be examined and compared. Although they appear to be rather closely related at first glance, in fact the two positions differ rather markedly from a normative point of view. The goal is to advance our understanding of the project of a multi-layered ‘European identity’ by offering a critical reflection on these diverging positions that are both central to the German debate as well as on their normative premises and the political implications resulting from them.18

The project of a ‘democratic constitutional’
European identity

Over the past twenty years, the voice of Jürgen Habermas, the most well-known contemporary public intellectual from Germany, has frequently been heard on current European issues. His numerous contributions to German and international public debates include, most notably, his conception of deliberative democracy, the notion of the ‘post-national constellation’ that he coined for the diagnosis of the transformation of the nation state in the context of globalisation and European integration, and the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ that he developed as a form of political identity for the national as well as the supranational level. Compared to the Copenhagen

18 The ideas of European identity in the sense of a European community of values or as constitutional patriotism correlate with two concurrent conceptions of a political order for Europe (c.f. Eriksen and Fossum 2007): the supranational and the deliberative-cosmopolitan model. While the former remains committed to the frame of reference of the nation state and pursues an identity conception based on homogeneity and equality, the latter is based on a hierarchical concept of post-traditional ‘multilayered identities’, ‘entangled identities’ or ‘nested identities’, with the principle of the recognition of differences that constitutes these concepts. This analytical-constitutional debate cannot be pursued further here.
‘document on European identity’ of the EC in 1973, the conception of a European constitutional patriotism constituted a quantum leap in the debate on European identity.

The internationally influential concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ was first proposed by Habermas on the eve of German reunification. Following Sternberger, he coined it as the only defensible form of political identification for West Germans (Habermas 1990). As regards the European Union, Müller has further elaborated the history of ideas and theory of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Müller 2007: 26ff). The author conceives of it as a ‘new theory of citizenship’ that can be applied to the European Union as well as to the USA. Rather than linking ‘affiliation’ with blood or shared believes, this citizenship theory is based on ‘civil involvement’, democratic decision-making procedures, and the critically reflective acquisition of a shared history. Müller thus advocates a ‘weak’ form of constitutional patriotism that is in sync with contemporary ‘culturally pluralistic democracies’. As a matter of fact, he places more emphasis on political morality and the need for public justification than on collective memory and membership. In a similar line of thought, Kantner has refuted claims for a ‘strong’ cultural identity for Europeans. She argues that on a day-to-day level this is not an indispensable requirement for legitimate governance of the EU (Kantner 2006). However, in exceptional situations and in ethically sensitive policy fields EU citizens need discursive procedures for reaching agreements about the ‘ethical self-understanding’ of their lifestyle. For this reason, Kantner advocates for the case of the EU a type of ‘collective identity’ demanding not a collective memory or shared culture but a common framework for citizenship and ‘civic affiliation’ (id.). Referred to in these terms, constitutional patriotism rests on universalistic norms, but is matched to the concrete constitutional culture of the given polity and thus ‘corrects’ an abstract cosmopolitanism. Moreover, adopting the framework of European constitutional patriotism, ‘political membership’ will replace conventional conceptions of popular sovereignty and a ‘demos’ that liberal nationalist theories have established. Defined through ethical principles and democratic practices, constitutional patriotism defines ‘political membership’ as a correlate of a (European) civil society. A European identity constructed along these European constitutional-patriotic lines would therefore be well suited
to support, if not to consolidate the incremental democratisation of the established modes of EU governance.

Through the lenses of his ‘post-national constellation’ diagnosis, Habermas (1998) sees European identity as a resource that is necessary for the maintenance of the ‘specific European life form’, confronted with globalisation, denationalisation and enlargement. In his view, on the one hand the EU will not be capable of coping with the new challenges of globalisation by its conventional modes of intergovernmental negotiations or bureaucratic problem-solving. On the other hand, as a result of the accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries, the mechanisms of EU governance are under tension: decision-making by unanimity has to be replaced by majority rules and deliberative procedures, raising the costs of legitimation and requiring a greater deal of trust between minorities and the majorities. Moreover, as a result of the advancements of market integration, Habermas claims that the EU has an increased need for harmonisation in extended policy areas, from the labour market, via economic development and immigration, to the ‘creeping Europeanisation of social policy’ (Offe 2003: 437ff). As a consequence, for making EU authority more effective and legitimate under these new conditions, a conversion from an output- to an input-based form of democratic legitimacy appears necessary and, ergo, makes clear the need for a European identity:

A shifting of legitimation from the side of results to that of the co-determination of political programmes that affect citizens of all member states equally, though not necessarily in the same ways, will not be possible without the development of an awareness of shared belonging to a political community that extends across national boundaries

(Habermas 2006: 70)

Following the argument of Habermas, the EU is facing the need to redefine its role in the world and vis-à-vis the USA, notably bystrengthening the common European security and defence policy. In order to achieve this goal, ‘a pan-European democratic opinion and will formation’ is required and, more specifically, a constitutional-patriotic – and therefore cosmopolitan and universally applied – type of European identity, as an indispensable prerequisite for democratic
legitimation. A European identity would be required if Europe were to pursue global solidarity, redistribution, an international framework for peace and human rights, in cooperation with – or in the extreme case also against the unilaterally acting, military superpower of – the USA.

Regarding the question about the conditions for the possibility of a civil European identity, Habermas sees them rooted in the historical ‘experiences, traditions and accomplishments, which constitute for European citizens the consciousness of a shared political fate that has been endured and has to be shaped in common’ (id. 2001; author’s translation). The mental ‘habitus’ of Europeans that is based on individualism, rationalism and activism applies to the whole West, but according to Habermas finds a more specific expression in Europe. For example, differences with the USA can be seen in the more negative attitudes of Europeans to the death penalty, and to the ‘liberal’ play of market forces. Habermas sees Europe as being more sceptical regarding the promises of progress, as thinking in more social terms, feeling more empathy with the weak, and having been particularly sensitised by the Holocaust (ibid.). It is against this background, he argues, that Europeans could develop a particular type of civil identity. A democratic constitutionalisation of the EU would permit ‘solidarity between strangers’, but would require the ‘decoupling of the constitution from the state’ (id. 2006: 78-9). Yet, Habermas warns that EU governments would be ill advised if they tried to use the draft constitution as a ‘vehicle for forming a European identity’ without involving the citizens, given that it left important questions open: namely, if

[...] they accepted an admittedly risky and unavoidably time-consuming change in their accustomed way of doing business, and if they involved the citizens themselves in the process of shaping the constitution through referenda. This is [...] even more pressing because the debate concerning the new constitution has put the unsolved and suppressed problem of

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19 Following Habermas’ frequently posed diagnostic question about ‘learning from catastrophes’ and facing the amnesiac handling of the post-Laeken constitutional project, Christian Joerges advocates working through ‘bitter experiences’ as a requirement for a ‘cleansed European identity’ (Joerges 2007).
the ‘ultimate goal’ (*Finalität*) of the unification process on the political agenda [...] First, the question of the political structure of the Community: which Europe do we want? And, second, the question of geographical identity: what are the definitive boundaries of the European Union?

(Habermas 2006: 71)

Europeans, in his view, should remain faithful to a cosmopolitan self-understanding that is not looking at fixed borders, but at democratic, ethical and social principles. A culturally defined European identity politics would be an impediment to that end. While the latter points to a ‘common heritage’ or ‘shared culture’, a constitutional identity project would always refer to the formation of a democratic will of the European citizens.

What objections can be made to this constitutional-patriotic project of a European identity? For one, if one agrees with the claim that it is desirable to overcome the EU’s deficits in social and welfare policy-making, the question which constitutional model will be adequate for a European Market Economy remains controversial. A European constitution would only provide a viable social economic order as long as the populations in question demonstrate the necessary mutual solidarity, as Meyer (2007) argues. The preferences of citizens for a stronger integration of social policy in the hands of the EU can be empirically proven, and yet they vary in comparison between the old and new member states (Mau 2005). Regarding the disparity of interests in the enlarged European citizenry, Bogdandy (2004) argues that even a concept of European identity that is defined by democratic constitutional patriotism might be ‘crypto-normative’ and ‘thus dangerous’, since it confronts citizens with massive expectations. Should a ‘liberal polity’, Bogdandy asks, not be better guided by the long-term self-interest of the citizens, rather than by a common identity?20 However, such dichotomisation of interests and identities evaporates when one accepts the post-traditional, decentralising concept of identity, which serves Habermas as a foundation of his understanding of ‘constitutional patriotism’.

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20 This should suffice: ‘Constitutional law ex parte civium should aim for the democratic, constitutional and efficient operations of policy and not infringe on the identity and thus the soul of the citizen’ (Bogdandy 2004).
According to this, identity formation occurs in processes of relativisation of social norms and individual preferences and their mediation with ethical principles. Moreover, the citizens themselves would have to work out agreements and achieve unity in, let’s assume, democratic processes of constitutionalisation, about concrete principles – e.g. the recognition of those who are culturally different, social solidarity, or democratic procedures, such as the reversibility of constitutional acts or the flexibility of constitutional principles. The constitutional-patriotic project of a European identity thus relies on European democratic citizenship, defined in terms of ‘political membership’ and as a central condition for democratic legitimacy beyond the nation state. Against the background of the politically and civilly defined association of the citizens, it requires the ‘recognition of differences’, or of the ‘cultural Other’.

Whether and to what extent such democratic constitutional processes would actually help to shape a real civil society, or unleash ‘uncivil’ powers in European politics, is another issue. To provide a bearer of hope, Beck and Grande suggest the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ as a corrective to forestall vicious dynamics. As a peculiarity of Europe, the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ would entail a ‘refined perception of the cultural other’ that has emerged out of ‘the total devastation and cruelty experienced’ and ‘the immeasurable suffering and guilt that the nationalistic warmongering Europe brought to the world’. Arguably, these historical experiences have made Europe ‘more sensitive to the internalised measures of self-criticism, more open and at the same time more resistant in the struggle for a peaceful, post-religious humanity’ (Beck and Grande 2004: 159).

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21 According to this individual and collective identities are, or should be, no longer formed uncritically in complex societies with their various spheres of values over the internalisation of religious or nationalistic imperatives; an unproblematic relationship with a quasi-holy object, including the homeland, is no longer possible because of this. Individuals are developed in the disenchanted world rather by what Habermas, following the psychological model of Lawrence Kohlberg, calls ‘post-conventional identities’: this holds that identities are decentralised to the extent that individuals relativise in the light of more comprehensive moral considerations as to what they want themselves and what others expect from them (Müller 2007: 27).
The project of a European cultural identity based on a community of values

While political membership based on democratic citizenship, civic principles and the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ are of central importance for the democratic constitutional project of European identity, the advocates of a European cultural identity aim at the construction of a European community of values (Biedenkopf 2006; Michalski 2006). Both projects agree on the need for and possibility of a European collective identity, yet, they refer to different traditions and self-images of modernity. While the former affirms a self-reflexive concept of reason and intersubjective transformation of modernity and looks forward to an open-ended formation of European identity, the latter looks back to antiquity and European history for determining the normative foundation of a European identity (Nida-Rümelin 2007).

Tasked to ‘take stock of the spiritual and cultural dimension of an enlarged Europe’ and to determine ‘the intellectual foundations of the Union’, a European expert panel with German participation convened under the auspices of the European Commission (Biedenkopf 2006: 13ff).22 Starting with the questions ‘Who are we? Are there common roots from which a shared sense of belonging can deduced?’ the high-level group examined a variety of goals and values, but rejected the European constitutional project. As Biedenkopf argues, a European identity cannot be built from a European constitution, but only from a pre-existing community defined by common values:

Constitutional questions are also questions of values; but any attempt to provide a constitution for a community assumes that the community already exists. The constitution as such cannot provide that identity

(Biedenkopf 2006: 15)

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22 This group, appointed by Commission President Romano Prodi in spring 2002, was coordinated by Krzysztof Michalski; Germany was represented by Kurt Biedenkopf and Jutta Limbach; other contributions came from Ernst Böckenförde, Rainer Bauböck, Ute Frevert, Anton Pelinka and Ulrike Lunacek (Michalski 2006); see <http://www.iwm.at/r-reflec.htm>.
This project of a cultural community of values does not look for principles of democratic constitutionalism or ‘civil citizenship’ as the foundation for political belonging, but is primarily interested in historical narratives, symbols and values. Turning back to the ‘Christian Occident’, to the Enlightenment or to 50 years of European integration seems a promising way for determining crucial cultural resources as preconditions for a European identity capable of enhancing the EU’s capacity to act (Michalski 2006; Nida-Rümelin and Weidenfeld 2007). The emphasis is not primarily on the maintenance of a democratic and social life form considered specifically European, but on a Western-defined, universal set of values as reference points for identity. From this perspective, the formation of a European identity is not understood as one of the functions of the democratic process, but as the result of cultural socialisation and internalisation of European values through the symbolic use of politics, culture and education. Ultimately, the question ‘What keeps Europe together?’ is answered with reference to the ‘European soul’, meaning a normative canon of values (Biedenkopf et al. 2006; Weidefeld and Nida-Rümelin 2007).

Following this position, ‘political cohesion’, understood as a political community grounded on ties of solidarity, is a necessary condition for building a political union (Biedenkopf et al. 2006: 95). ‘Europe’s common culture’ is depicted as such in terms of a ‘new source of energy’, but to make use of it is also ‘task and process’. European culture must be made politically effective (ibid.: 97). The already existing ‘common European cultural space’ consisting of diverse traditions, ideals and aspirations that are often interwoven and in mutual suspense does not alone create unity. But it would offer policy-makers the chance to create a Europe as a politically unified entity by using ‘the power of European culture’ (ibid.: 98, 102). In order to reach this goal, Biedenkopf points to three conditions: the encouragement of a civil society in Europe; a ‘convincing and transparent political (and not bureaucratic) leadership for European policy-making (ibid.: 99), and finally, European religions should be given a greater public role aimed at unleashing the ‘community-fostering power of religious faith’ (p. 101).

Nida-Rümelin has nailed down this political project of developing a European community of values in more theoretical terms (2007). His
starting point is premised on the assumption that for overcoming the present crisis of European integration, a binding normative foundation for European identity is required. An agreement on the normative foundation of European integration is all the more needed, he argues, since pragmatic strategies of promoting integration have ‘ultimately failed’. As one basic element of such a normative foundation, Nida-Rümelin suggests an ‘understanding on European statehood’, founded on common ethical, legal and cooperative norms (Nida-Rümelin 2007: 31). For constituting the identity of Europe, it is necessary to develop such a normative consensus (ibid.: 33). This consensus could neither be derived from the perspective of interest politics, nor from a subjective-relativistic position, but only from ‘public justification games’ (ibid.: 37). Nida-Rümelin proposes three particular elements to constitute the ‘normative identity of Europe’: autarky, or freedom; scientific reason, and universalism; democracy is not included, but could be derived from these three principles (ibid.: 42). The identity of Europe, he argues, was constituted by these three basic norms, and developed in the framework of the concrete institutional configurations, through ‘civil practices’ and the ‘cooperation networks’ of the citizens (ibid.: 44). But history and culture alone could not foster European unity. This is why European political elites have to assume leadership, proving their political will and talent in ‘public justification games’.

In a critical account, it can be objected that European leadership, when playing the ‘old card of cultural achievements of universal values’ for Europe’s struggles within the global competition, inevitably risked instrumentalising European identity as a resource of European government. Feichtinger (Csáky and Feichtinger 2007: 21, 41) has critically noted that if the EU, albeit originally founded as an economic union, were now redefined as a community of values, its European identity politics would provoke charges to ‘recall and allow to continue nationalistic inclusion and exclusion dynamics’, inasmuch as ‘the new need for meaning’ risked concealing ‘the plurality of layers [and narratives] of European memory’. Any assumption that a European cultural identity was possible because it could be constructed and controlled strategically can be questioned on such normative grounds. Moreover, it seems dubious also in the
practical terms of day-to-day European politics, for instance in the European Parliament. 23

Another open question is the practical feasibility of an elite-driven, cultural-political European identity project. While a certain capability of European leaders for cooperation is given, leadership performance in terms of public justification and building of mass public support appears more limited. The ‘Berlin declaration’ on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the European Union in March 2007 is an interesting test case in point. The German 2007 Council Presidency had ventured an attempt to reinvigorate such a European community of values, as a way out of the EU’s constitutional ratification crisis. Its objective was to coordinate all 27 member-state executives in diplomatic bilateral interaction aimed at drafting a joint document on European historical and cultural identity and then to sign it as a public symbolic act at Berlin. Despite major difficulties and complexities of the negotiations preceding it, this symbolic act did in fact happen. But was this European ceremony also successful in terms of injecting a dose of shared values into the identity-formation process of the wider public? From the perspective of the mass public in the various countries, this must be open to doubt. The Presidency consultations took place behind closed doors, as usual; the ceremony itself remained in the closed circles of the heads of states and governments; and the limited mass-media coverage of this act did not really reach the hearts and minds of the citizens, either. A European identity document can hardly serve as an engine of identity development, if set up by leaders and limited to diplomatic and official acts, and if not including also open, pluralistic and controversial debates in the various public forums of European civil society.

Beck and Grande belong to the most ardent critics of the project of a European cultural identity, on historical and ethical grounds. Pointing out that the nomenclature of a universalistic Western modernity was rather a part of the European malaise (Beck and

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23 At the Bremer Universitätsge spräche of 2006, the MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit depicted the requirements of Europe’s daily work as that of reconciling a great number of interests and identities which cannot be brought down to the common denominator of a dominant culture (Bremen, 17 November 2006).
Grande 2004: 15) than a resource for overcoming it, they plead for a cosmopolitan identity project premised not on the ‘first modernity’ but on the ‘second’ or ‘reflexive modernity’, capable of learning from past atrocities committed within and outside Europe in the name of superior European cultures. In fact, eschewing a ‘mononational identity’ as well as a ‘shared collective identity of nation-state citizens of Europe’ in favour of a ‘trans- and multinational European identity’ appears not only more legitimate but also viable. Amending the norm of ‘homogeneity’ to ‘differences’, they underscore the principle of the recognition of the cultural Other.

Metamorphoses of European identity from a German angle: Conclusions
Without a doubt, the common market conquered the new member states of Eastern Europe before the reunified Europeans had found communicative frameworks within which, if not answering the European identity question coherently, then at least debating it controversially was possible. This chapter has analysed the question of European identity from a German angle, by identifying four discourses that have shaped the evolving German self-understanding after World War II as springboards for debating whether a European identity is necessary and how it can be brought about. The European identity controversy is in no way an exclusively German problem, but in the German context it bears particular connotations. The complexities of the national question in Germany – the national consciousness with its load of historical traumas – have made it particularly important for Germans to seek resolutions and redemption in a new European identity – or to vehemently bemoan the lack thereof. The question of what ‘soul’ Europe has, how it brings into line the subject and object of the European self, and whether that can authenticate the continuity of the unity in spite of all the internal diversity and external global tasks of Europe, is therefore being discussed with utmost passion, especially following German reunification.

Also in Germany, the formation of a European identity is an ongoing process and a target in motion – despite the more encompassing all-party consensus and a relatively high level of mass public ‘permissive consensus’ for European integration. From Konrad Adenauer, via
Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl to Joschka Fischer and Angela Merkel, European unification has consistently been high on German government agendas. Yet the idea of a European identity has experienced metamorphoses, from the first declaration of Willy Brandt and the Council of foreign ministers in 1973 and Jürgen Habermas’ role in the birth of European constitutional patriotism twenty years later (1992; 1998), from the ‘finality’ of a federal European Union set out by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at his famous ‘Humboldt speech’ in Berlin (2000), followed by the advocacy of a ‘Christian Europe’ by Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI, to the attempt of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to inscribe the ‘post-constitutional’ cultural values of Europe into history with the declaration of the Heads of State and Government on the occasion of the EU’s 50th birthday in March 2007. In the semi-sovereign system of the post-war Federal Republic the German self-image was shaped by self-critical confrontation with the German past as well as the identification of the successor state with the West in general and Western Europe in particular. Therefore, it should have been not a culturally homogeneous, but rather a pluralist democratic model of European identity that had the best prospects in the German debate. Yet the transformation of the German identity of a ‘Kulturnation’ through ‘Europeanisation’ (Minkenberg 2005) and emergence of a German European ‘constitutional patriotism’, is not the whole German story.

As a matter of fact, two competing German and European identity projects have been discerned as the reference points around which the contemporary German – and arguably the larger European – debate revolves: the democratic constitutionalist project of a European identity (‘European constitutional patriotism’) and the European cultural identity project (‘European community of values’). Both projects have not only contributed to making sense of Europeanisation in the German public sphere but have also produced arguments and ideas for supporting the deepening of the European Union. Yet they differ markedly as to which routes for European integration they propose. This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the latter project relies on a substantialist notion of collective identity understood as a fixed resource for European political leadership that is rooted in the European people. The former, by contrast, proposes a model of European identity that is being configured – and constantly
reconfigured – in ongoing democratic processes of reconstituting the European order, through the agency of European citizenship and civil society. Empirically, innovative gauges of European identity have been identified in European civil society networks (Frevert 2006), be they formed as a result of attempts to come to terms with traumatic national experiences from the past through common remembrances (Eder and Spohn 2005); constructed by ‘Europe as a memory community’ (Assmann, cited in Doing 2005); forged by Europe-wide peace movements protesting against military interventions, for instance, in the case of the US-led war in Iraq – interpreted by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida as heralding a ‘rebirth of Europe’;24 or articulated by anti-globalisation movements in the European social forums (Della Porta 2007).

Contrary to what sceptics and pessimists hold on the issues of a European identity, these two basically optimist normative positions should not be played out against each other in ideological terms. Rather, they present provocations to empirical research to shed further light on the competing propositions regarding the forms, conditions and consequences of European identity. Judged by the amount of scholarly and public debates that the question of a European identity has triggered, 50 years after the foundation of the European Economic Community, such ‘reality checks’ appear more pressing than ever before.

As Kantner (2006) has argued, looking at the daily routines of European politics, a European homogeneous cultural identity might be superfluous. However, in the case of exceptionally critical issues, requiring European political choice, a project for encouraging the formation of European identity needs to be sensitive to the multiple differences among citizens and residents who make up the political community of Europeans. It must respect individual rights and safeguard common procedures which foster communication and consensus-building ‘amidst diversity’. Supposing that this is part of a European identity project, we assume that in European politics differences are the rule rather than the exception, and that they can be accommodated by democratic processes only. Arguably, the European Union will continue to enlarge, and the calls for a

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24 Habermas and Derrida, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 31 May 2003.
European collective identity shared by old and new Europeans will become more pertinent, but what will ultimately count more than ‘debating European identity’ will be ‘doing Europe’ – the variation and consolidation of integrative principles in European political practices. The negotiation of what – under conditions of complexity – holds Europeans together, that is which democratic and constitutional principles and which common values form their common core – involves multiple sites and agents, among which not only European presidencies and national governments but also parliaments, civil society and public spheres are indispensable.
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References


Chapter 3

Collective identity and the challenge of axiological pluralism in the new Europe

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Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to look at public discourse in post-2004 EU member states – Poland being the special case – from the perspective of the impact of the EU’s major institutional reform on redefinition of predominantly essentialistic pattern of collective identity construction in the new EU member countries. In the following, I argue that the EU Eastern enlargement magnified deconstruction of well-established interpretation of the significant other syndrome understood as a point of reference for collective identity construction across enlarged Europe. Consequently, for liberal democratic societies of Western Europe it is no longer the Cold War homo sovieticus who constitutes the significant other. For ‘new Europeans’ it is not yet European regional democracy with a cosmopolitan imprint which is referred to as foundation of all-European ‘we-identity’. Studying attitudes towards democracy and citizenship in the old-new-prospective EU societies analytical triangle through the conceptual lens of symbolic interactionism, especially the significant other concept, seem to be particularly valuable when trying to correlate the RECON models with existing and emerging forms of collective identity. Change in social trust, which is understood as the foundation of a given type of societal
bonds is to be identified here as the main indicator enabling us to construct such correlation.

A theoretical framework of European identity discourse
Before analysing a public discourse related to the impact of the EU’s major institutional reform on redefinition of predominantly essentialistic pattern of collective identity construction in the new EU member states, let us reflect briefly on the theoretical discourse on the impact of symbolic interactionism, more specifically on the significant other syndrome as ideational framework of European identity discourse. This will also provide a theoretical framework for further discussion of identity reconstruction process in the new EU member states in the context of the EU institutional reform. European society becomes ever more heterogeneous and pluralistic. As Fossum argues, in cultural and linguistic terms Europe is marked more by its diversity than by its coherence (Fossum 1999). The current phase of cosmopolitisation taking place in the context of the European integration process reinforces a permanent reconstruction of identity. Consequently, further deepening of European integration results in a situation when identity can no longer be taken at face value both at the individual or collective level. The mainstream discussion of contemporary European identity (Beck and Grande 2009) follows Mead's (1970) argument according to which, western society undergoes a phase of its own evolution that could be called a ‘pre-figurative society’, where an individual can no longer hide behind already given collective interpretation of identity that can only be rediscovered and reproduced. As Mamzer (2007) argues:

> a member of social group has to create an individual definition of one's own identity [...] It is becoming now an everyday task and individual responsibility for every human being, also because our western European culture experiences a very strong turn towards individualism in general, leaving behind collectivism and its ideas.

(Mamzer 2007: 191)

Not surprisingly, contemporary scholarly work on European identity refers to classic symbolic interactionism (Mead 1967; Cooley 1956) as main theoretical framework, which emphasises the influence of social
interaction on the process of identity construction. Recent post-structuralist discourse (Bauman 1998, 2001, 2004; Giddens 2006) on identity seems to be inspired to a great extent by symbolic interactionism imperative of identity self-definition. The explanatory value of symbolic interactionism into the study of transformation of European collective identity is that it provides opportunity to better grasp the dynamics of identity reconstruction within the realm of constantly changing – often conflictual – societal habitat. Moreover, the theory of symbolic interactionism with the ‘significant other’ being one of its central categories offers an analytical perspective which enables us to define identity reconstruction as an outcome of par excellence interactive processes of consolidating symbolic integrity of the ‘in-group’ (the self) through emphasizing symbolic distance with those outside the community (the others). It should be emphasised in this context that Cooley’s ‘looking glass self’ concept holds its relevance also today, especially when trying to understand mechanisms of negative stereotypisation within and among deeply divided societies of enlarged Europe and its cultural and political neighbourhood. We find a strong tendency displayed by both ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europeans to identify themselves to a large extent according to the picture that they believe others may hold of them As we already argued, the constructivists – Bauman and Giddens being the two most prominent representatives – incorporated this assumption into their study on transformation of European identity. This position has also been adopted both by Hall (1996: 4-5) who argued that: ‘identities are constructed through, not outside, difference through the relation to the other’ and by Delanty (2000: 115), who claimed that: ‘all identities are based on some kind of exclusion, as the identity of the self can be defined only by reference to a non-self.’ McCrone (1998: 184) made it even more explicit having argued that: ‘“other” is an enemy against which we can measure and develop our identity.’ Consequently and sadly enough, we may conclude that the collective consciousness of contemporary Europeans does not reflect axiological pluralism as the common denominator of European we-identity. On that basis Shore (1996) argues that the easiest way to promote a sense of European we-identity is to manipulate fears of Europe being invaded by enemy aliens. European identity tends to be meaningful only when it is contrasted against anything considered as ‘non-European’.
The trust lost syndrome and collective identity construction in the enlarging EU

Citizens of the integrating Europe have constantly been embedded in the processes of Europeanisation of virtually all aspects of their social life. They have been both objects and subjects of these processes. Significantly enough, Shore argues that:

> Europeanisation has been to a large extent an elite-driven project whose main aim is to plant axiological foundations of European identification among the citizens of Europe. In doing so, European elites refer in their actions to a multidimensional concept of emerging European identity.

(Shore 1996)

The post-Laeken process, although designed to counterbalance the elite logic of further integration paradoxically petrified it, at least in the collective consciousness of European citizens. The Convention for the Future of Europe elaborated a breaking document promising regional European democracy as social and institutional frames of reference for construction of values and a rights-based cosmopolitan Union in Europe (Eriksen and Fossum 2008). The Constitution for Europe failed, however, due to a communication deficit stemming from the weakness of the European public sphere. In this context, the deepening of the sense of ‘an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’ is being perceived by the wide European public as a centrally planned process animated by the steering committee of European leaders. This group of European leaders did not, however, form a single body. As Thernborn argues:

> this group of steering processes directors did not constitute a single command structure either in the sense of a given group of political leaders or in the sense of any central management office [...] Those leaders represented different nationalities, political affiliations, offices, pluralistic socio-cultural roots and ambitions whose main aim was not to manipulate discretionally the European public but to establish reliable and sustainable mechanisms of channelling social processes towards building an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe.

(Thernborn 1998: 521)
The ‘elite–driven project controlled by a narrow group of Eurocrats’ has been useful rhetoric used by opponents of the EU as a manifestation of European unity. The main axis of the critique has been the perceived threat to the nation state as the only legitimate sphere of reference for collective identity and democracy in the context of the EU enlargement. The central position of the nation state within the EU political system is a fundamental assumption of the audit democracy model of European integration as conceptualised in RECON model one.

This debate revealed a multiple character of collective identity in the enlarged EU, which is manifested in the parallel existence of essentialistic and civic modes of identity construction across Europe. A particularly important feature of the essentialistic type of political collective identity – dominant in the Central Eastern European societies – is the idea of the nation state nation as the only legitimate space where collective identity can be constructed. Here, the nation state is defined as a community based on re-discovered and mythologised history and culture that constitute the identitarian backbone that can only be reproduced by subsequent generations.

The nation state, interpreted in this perspective, takes the form of a community, whose membership can only be acquired through the exclusive *ius sanguinis* principle. Finally, the nation state is identified here as a natural framework for democracy and citizenship, which becomes even clearer in relation to the opposite side of the political collective identity continuum, which is filled by a civic mode of defining a sense of belonging together.

The civic mode of identity construction – prevalent in the Western European societies – is reflected in the narrative of – as Gellner put it in *Nations and Nationalism*:

the society based upon a powerful technology and uninterrupted development, the society requiring permanent distribution of labour as well as constant, frequent and precise communication of foreign people with each other; communication that has to happen through common meanings, carried over through a uniform language and – when and where needed – through writing.

(Gellner 1991: 46)
This polarisation of types of collective identity affects a different understanding of European political identity among the societies of the enlarged EU.

The main hypothesis that could be drawn from the analysis of implications of the EU eastern enlargement on collective identity formation is that it magnified deconstruction of well-established interpretations of the significant other syndrome understood as a point of reference for collective identity construction across enlarged Europe. For liberal-democratic old Europe it is no longer the Cold War homo sovieticus who constitutes the significant other. For ‘new Europeans’ it is not yet European regional democracy with a cosmopolitan imprint that is referred to as the foundation of European ‘we-identity’. Thus, the process of reconstruction of the significant other in the context of further EU enlargement may consolidate the tendency to replace previously existing geo-politicisation with geo-culturalisation of European identity. Attitudes towards democracy and citizenship – best expressed in the level of public trust and condition of civil society – are of particular relevance when analysing the process of reconstruction of collective identity in the enlarged Europe. Social trust is one of the fundamental indicators of the conditions of a given society. It strongly affects understanding and practice of democracy as well as dynamics of collective identity construction.

Fukuyama (1997) was particularly outspoken in emphasising the importance of an endured trust being constructed within the realm of a liberal cultural habitat in producing the social capital of a given political and economic community. As he claimed: ‘There is no contradiction between community and efficiency’, on the contrary, ‘those who pay attention to the community may become the most efficient’ (1997: 42).

Putnam’s thesis about the role of social capital in constructing a given type of democratic regime (1995) seems to be particularly relevant here. Putnam, followed by Sztompka (1999, 2007), assumes that vibrant civil society is preconditioned by horizontal and vertical trust (a trust to people and institutions), wide social ties, social empathy and altruism, self-confidence and effectiveness of actions. Empirical findings which reflect the level of participation in democratic life across Europe seem to confirm the explanatory value of Putnam’s
thesis. From a range of European survey research¹ (Eurobarometer 65/66, 2006, European Value Survey 2002) and national survey data (Jasińska-Kania 2002; Czapinski 2006), we learn about a positive correlation between participation in organised civil society and a certain type of democratic Weltanschauung. We find that in societies where values such as trust to fellow citizens and institutions, durable social bonds, social empathy and altruism, self-confidence and effectiveness of actions prevail, a higher level of participation may be noted in democratic life when compared to societies with a relatively low level of intensity of these values (Sztompka 2007; Bokajlo 2007).

In this context it needs to emphasised that Polish society displays the lowest level of participation in third sector activity in the region (Kucharczyk et al. 2008), namely only 20 per cent of population have experienced at least one day of voluntary activity in their whole life. An explanation for this phenomenon is to be found in the predominance of informal bonds and ritual collectivism as values influencing group behaviour in Poland. As Janusz Czapinski (2006: 204) argues: ‘effectiveness of social capital decreases in the case of informal ties because they increase the opportunity for maximisation of particular interests’. This seems to be a specific feature of Polish democratic culture, permitting us to identify it with the first RECON model of reconstituting democracy in Europe.

The tendency for maximalisation of particular interests in public life in contemporary Poland is manifested in the petrification of the post-authoritarian ‘escape to privacy’ syndrome. This syndrome is rooted in the contemporary Polish society particularly deeply compared with other post-communist societies. Recent sociological research on this phenomenon has shown that the Poles mainly trust their relatives, friends, colleagues and neighbours. The highest level of trust is displayed towards the closest relatives. A recent CBOS public opinion poll proves this observation (February 2008)² – see Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: The Question: ‘In general, do you trust...’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Trust Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your closest relatives</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More distant relatives</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People you work with every day</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your neighbours</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your parish priest</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consequently, the vast majority of Polish society manifests limited trust to strangers. Nearly 50 per cent of the population distrust strangers. It is important, however, to emphasise a reverse trend that has been observable over the last two years. Table 3.2 portrays the dynamics of trust toward strangers in Polish society.

Table 3.2: The Question: Do you generally trust or distrust strangers whom you meet in different situations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Definitely Trust</th>
<th>Rather Trust</th>
<th>Rather Distrust</th>
<th>Definitely Distrust</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The slight improvement of the level of public trust over the last three years could be interpreted as a consequence of growing satisfaction with the economic situation as a result of the EU membership which increases self-confidence among Poles. This, in turn, is particularly important when we take into account the strong feeling of peripherality that produced the ‘second class Europeans’ attitudes which were manifested prior to EU accession. It was precisely this syndrome that could be identified as the social background of the democratic backlash in Poland in 2005. According to social researchers (Kucharczyk et al. 2008: 8), part of the reason for the populist take over in Poland in 2005 is to be found in the low level of social capital,
including a low level of trust in citizen-to-citizen interactions and democratic institutions, and a low level of participation in non-governmental organisations. It should be mentioned here that Polish voters are among the most apathetic in Europe, with a turnout of subsequently 20 per cent and 23 per cent in the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections.

These findings also indicate the turbulent nature of the democratisation process in Poland after 1989. Jacques Rupnik’s diagnosis of this process is particularly relevant. As he argues: ‘the crumbling of communism in Eastern Central Europe brought with it the prospect of democratic change but that its success depends on the new balance found between the democratic ethos of opposition to totalitarianism and the resurfacing of deeper undercurrents of the region’s political culture. Just as the term ‘return to Europe’ was ambiguous, so the term ‘return of democracy’ was problematic for anybody who had studied pre-communist politics of Eastern Central Europe’ (2007: 2).

We may observe a discrepancy between declaratory acceptance of democracy as a political habitat and profound or even traumatic disappointment with the way it has been exercised. At present, 62 per cent accept democracy as a way of conducting public life. At the same time, only 30 per cent of respondents are satisfied with the way it functions in Poland. About 58 per cent expressed quite the opposite belief.³ In the context of the findings mentioned above, an interesting phenomenon appeared in Polish public life in the years 2005-2007, which affects social perception of democracy as a domain within which trust and commonality are being constructed, namely citizens’ activity in the form of public protests.

Kolarska-Bobińska (2008) deconstructs this phenomenon by correlating the negative evaluation of the policies of the former Law and Justice government with mobilisation of different social groups (predominantly middle class) on an unprecedented scale since August 1980. However, the rise of social protest in the period 2005-2007 is to be explained rather in terms of a defensive, ad hoc reaction to the

populist policy of the former government with no further implications for the otherwise weak condition of civil society. However, as Kucharczyk argues (2008: 12):

The Polish experiment with ‘illiberal democracy’ has been effectively resisted by political opposition, independent media and civil society, as well as other democratic institutions, most notably the Constitutional Court and the judiciary. The systematically growing number of opponents of the government led to the electoral tsunami of 2007 when voters turned out en masse [a 52 per cent turn out in Polish public life justifies such an expression] to vote against the government.

In order to explain the prevalence of the phenomenon of ad hoc mobilisation of civil society in contemporary public life in Poland one should look back to the genesis and evolution of civil society in the post 1989 reality. This should enable us to understand the prevalence of the post-totalitarian, nation state narrative as a mode of collective identity construction in new EU societies as it is directly correlated with social perception of democracy, civil society in particular. It should be emphasised in this context that political transformation in the East-Central European countries brought about an extremely high level of distrust to public institutions, far and foremost, to such fundamental institution as the democratic state. Dramatically low level of trust to public institutions in East-Central Europe is an evidence of much larger problems of a malfunctioning of civil society, which is manifested especially in its relationship with the democratic state. The pre-1989 ‘anti-political’ ethos adopted by mass movements in the East-Central European countries was built upon a common designate being the contestation of a legitimacy of the communist state as abusing its ideological credo ‘power to the people and by the people’. This led to the petrification of a social image of the state–society relationship as being constructed along the bipolar continuum: ‘Civil society was “us”; the authorities were “them,”’ (Smolar 1996: 24). The distinctive feature of this contestation was that it took form of a covert cultural opposition which operated within the restricted space provided by the state framework (Brennan 2003: 15). This par excellence defensive character of civil society in the pre 1989 period in East-Central Europe is still present in public life.

This seems to be specific features of Polish democratic culture,
permitting us to identify it with the first RECON model of reconstituting democracy in Europe. The predominance of informal ties and collectivism could also be given as explanation for the dichotomous nature of collective identity construction in post 1989 Poland. This dichotomous approach to the interpretation of collective identity construction assumes that Poles do not manifest strong ties with groups of collective reference other than the nation, on the one hand, and the family, on the other. This approach, however, seems to simplify an otherwise much complicated picture. As indicated previously, identification with relatives and friends overrates identification with institutions of representative democracy as well as local civil society institutions.

We may observe, however, especially after accession to the EU that other institutions and social actors have emerged which become significant references in the process of individual identity construction, thus influencing collective identity formation. Here we refer to migrant workers, professionals, academic youth and third sector activists benefiting from EU assistance who undergo the process of identity reconstruction most intensively. Table 3.3 portrays this dynamic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3: Self-identification with different social groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My village /town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion, the Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS ‘Więzi społeczne i wzajemna pomoc. Społeczno-psychologiczny kontext życia Polaków, BS/24/2008 [Social bonds and mutual assistance, February 2008, survey conducted in the period from September to November 2007, a representative random sample of adult Poles N=38866].

The essential assumption of our lead at this point is that the
functioning of organised civil society is strongly correlated with fundamental values such as trust and commonality which precondition a given type of democratic order. In other words, we may argue that the more trust-based and self-reliant the society is, the more likely that it will be bound by ever stronger inclusive we-identity feeling. A fundamental assumption can be seen here as constitutive for further considerations, namely that defining a given type of democratic order and by the same token identity model is strictly depending on existence of a coherent value system.

**European citizenship and collective identity construction in the new EU societies**

Having debated the nation state based model of European identity reconstruction in the light of the EU enlargement, let us now turn to the other important motive in the European identity discourse, which is an attempt to project the multinational federal state system as a domain for construction of collective European identification. The idea of federal Europe has been conceptualised here – according to RECON’s second model – as a legal and institutional framework aimed at deepening the collective self-understanding of EU citizens in order to transform the EU into a value-based community, founded on a common European axiology (Eriksen and Fossum 2003: 25). The critical condition in this context has been the construction of a *sui generis* European identity, being a ‘sound basis for the citizenship, for specifying the rights and duties of the members, and for setting the terms of inclusion/exclusion’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 26). Following this line of thought, Føllesdal (2001: 315) defines European citizenship as a symbolic and material space for enhancing trust and commonality among the citizens of the integrating Europe. Therefore, European citizenship is anticipated to become a vehicle for European ‘we-identity’. This assumption holds its validity especially when applied to processes of construction of a supranational political and social community. European citizenship could be considered a relevant integrative platform with a built-in reference to supranational community since shared citizenship identity does not eliminate differences, but instead can be expected to supersede rival identities (Karolewski 2009: 12).

From yet another perspective, the introduction of European citizenship narrative broke the monopoly of the nation state paradigm
in defining the scope and the meaning of the very concept of citizenship. Bauböck (2007) explains this phenomenon convincingly:

On a horizontal dimension, this [the nation state] paradigm does not recognise multiple membership across states and requires that individuals be citizens of one and one state only; on a vertical dimension, unitary conceptions of external and internal sovereignty block the formation of nested polities in which individuals are simultaneously citizens of substate, state-based, and superstate political communities.

(Bauböck 2007: 454)

Consequently, European citizenship being a variant of supranational citizenship could be – according to Bauböck (ibid.) – considered ‘a specific type of a vertically-nested structure of membership confined to Europe’.

Deepening of this process contributes to the consolidation of the supranational system in which policies and social interactions develop beyond the exclusive control of any single member state. The very construction of European citizenship as defined in the Maastricht Treaty seems to follow this logic. The fundamental provision that depicts the essence of European citizenship as expressed in the Maastricht Treaty is formulated in Article 8, which states that: ‘Every person holding the nationality of a Member States shall be a citizen of the Union.’ The Amsterdam Treaty amended this provision by enforcing a principle of complementary status of European citizenship, since ‘Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship’ (Art. 17). The 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference that elaborated an amended version of Article 8 was inspired by the European Commission Report for the Reflection Group, in which one of the chapters was entitled ‘Heightening the Sense of Belonging to the Union and Enhancing its Legitimacy’.

The rationale of European citizenship in the light of the Amsterdam Treaty was to ‘deepen European citizens’ sense of belonging to the

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4 The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, see: <http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/treaty/treaty.htm>.
European Union and make that sense more tangible by conferring on them the rights associated with it’ (Art. 8). These rights constitute a par excellence supranational code of civic rights as they provide for: the right to move and reside freely within the territories of the Member States (Art.18 of the EU Treaty); the right to take part in local elections as well as European Parliament elections guaranteed to every citizen residing in a member state, other than his/her own, under the same conditions as enjoyed by the nationals of the member state (Art.19 of the EU Treaty); the right to diplomatic and consular protection in the territory of a third country in which the member state of which he or she is a citizen is not represented, to be protected by diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State (Art.20 of the EU Treaty); the right to petition the European Parliament and the right to apply to the European Ombudsman (Art.21 of the EU Treaty).

In light of these provisions it becomes more evident that European citizenship has been constructed to complement member state national citizenship by expanding the scope of rights in distinct spheres of public life. As Koslowski (1999) rightly observed:

This extension of rights creates a divergence between nationality and citizenship – categories that traditionally coincide in the context of nation states. This divergence corresponds with the co-existence of multiple political identities, national and European. Moreover, by extending democratic participation, EU citizenship represents a potential source of legitimacy for the integration process as a whole; it is therefore more than empty symbolism.

Koslowski (1999: 115)

However, European citizenship being based upon a code of rights alone cannot be acknowledged a sufficient platform for creation of European civil identity. There arises the problem of a common value system that could be considered a sine qua non condition for genuine societal and legal recognition of a code of European civil rights. A decisive step in this direction was made by the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003 when a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was adopted. Adoption of this document

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5 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03.
marked the culmination of a ‘constitutional moment’ in the development of European integration processes ever since.

The meaning of ‘constitutional moments’ in the history of political communities has been convincingly presented by Weiler (1999), who argued that:

These moments may be linked in the mind to non-legal yet symbolic historical events and the constitutional change they reflect may be indirect and informal – the beginning or end of a deeper process of mutation in public ethos or societal self-understanding.

(Weiler 1999: 3)

Undoubtedly, the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe introduced by the European Convention on the eve of the coming enlargement of the European Union marked a turning point in the debate on re-definition of European identity understood as a genuine and coherent spiritual as well as rational construct.

The evolution of European citizenship that can be observed from the adoption of Maastricht’s code of rights until the elaboration of the Charter for Fundamental Rights and the Treaty of Lisbon could be seen in the light of a permanent struggle of the Union to increase its popular legitimacy. If legitimacy is defined not exclusively in terms of a lawfulness of procedure that leads to establishment of democratic political representation but also in terms of societal recognition, then the deepening and widening of European citizenship certainly enhances the legitimacy of the European integration process. Let us now consider the legitimacy-building potential of European citizenship through an analysis of the impact that European citizenship has on the emergence of European collective identity built on axiological pluralism.

As I have argued already the restructuring of the scope and interpretation of the European citizenship code specifically in the

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Charter for Fundamental Rights may lead to consolidation of the European demos or European civil society as one may put it. The substance of the Charter’s provisions open up an opportunity for the emergence of European civil identification, in which overlapping political communities co-exist and where many channels of interest advocacy appear within the domain of public governance. It is plausible to expect a slow but firm dismantling of the long-lasting symbiosis between the nation state and civil identity/loyalty. As Weiler (1997) put it convincingly:

As ‘the normative or in that sense constitutive aspect of European citizenship dissolves interdependence between citizenship and nationality within the supranational constitutional sphere which in turn leads to establishment of a Union composed by citizens, who by definition do not share the same nationality’ [...] The substance of membership (and thus of the demos) is in a commitment to shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment, inter alia, to the duties and rights of a civic society covering discrete areas of public life, a commitment to membership in a polity which privileges exactly opposites of nationalism – those human features which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism

(Weiler 1997:119)

Consequently, European citizenship denotes what Jürgen Habermas defines as ‘post-national constitutional patriotism’ (1992: 12) as well as a precise allocation of citizens’ rights and obligations within the distinctive domains of member states’ jurisdictions and the body of the EU’s law. Popular identification with the values embodied in its constituent documents – in the Charter for Fundamental Rights in particular – provides a normative source of legitimacy whereas the complementary source is to be found in the day-to-day implementation of the code of European citizens’ rights within the jurisdictional spaces created.

Concluding this part of the lead, we can follow Koslowski (1999) in stating that just as the very notion of citizenship was constitutive for the state itself in the Aristotelian times, national citizenship was firmly interwoven with the idea of democratic nation state, and the emergence of European citizenship symbolises a new understanding
of democracy in today’s Europe.

The new understanding of the imperative to bring citizens closer to the European design and European institutions formulated in the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 triggered a lively, sometimes even pretty emotional, discussion in the Convention for the Future of Europe as to whether it is possible or even necessary to arrive at a canon of core values that would transform a concept of European civil society into social reality across a wider European Union.

The axiological pluralism of the Charter for Fundamental Rights turned out to be not so much proof of normative eclecticism but evidence of a conscious choice of inclusive rather than exclusive normative *credo* relating to the fundamental values underlying humanism. This stance is based upon a conviction that there is no obvious and totally accepted system of values in Europe whatsoever. Having assumed that this axiological choice is shared by a majority of the citizens of Europe one can expect that the impact of the post-Laeken process – with the Charter for Fundamental Rights being the special case in point – will not only bring European citizens closer to the European institutions but shall bring European citizens closer to themselves. Again, the critical condition here remains a common value system the Europeans live by.

The foundations of such system are to be found in the substance of the Charter. Moreover, the restructuring of scope and interpretation of the European citizenship code in the Charter for Fundamental Rights may lead to consolidation of a sui generis European demos or European civil society. This, in turn, provides an axio-normative bridge between two models of reconstructing democracy in Europe, namely the multinational federal state and post-national union.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights debate in the new Europe

Incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to *acquis communautaire* of the EU reaffirmed the central position of the citizen of the Union in the integration process. The very foundation of this construction was laid down in the Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (reproducing Article F of the Maastricht Treaty), which obliges the Union to respect and protect fundamental rights: ‘as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 2 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law’, as a founding principle of the Union.

From another perspective, the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been an ‘important symbol providing a counterbalance to the euro and the whole European economic sphere, a part of the constitutional picture of European integration that has significantly contributed to understanding Europe as a community of values’ (Weiler 2003: 35). Undoubtedly, the Charter has an enormous symbolic value for collective identity construction processes within the whole of European society since it emphasises the supreme position of the individual citizen’s rights within the realm of a supranational pluralist society of the EU.

European society may be considered a pluralist society (Belvisi 2005). The term ‘pluralist society’ denotes a society in which diversity is a constitutive feature of a per se pluralist social and political habitat. A pluralist society is a society of differences which are recognised and protected. The definition of society as pluralist is in fact implicit in the official documents of the EU. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe are of particular relevance here. Especially Art. I. 2 of the Constitutional Treaty emphasises that:

The Union is founded on [...] the rights of persons belonging to minorities [...] in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance[...] prevail’. In the context of the EU, the integration function both on the legal and social levels, is assured by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as sources of inspiration and of recognition of fundamental rights as general principles of Community law.

With the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union a debate is gaining momentum as to whether the concept and substance of fundamental rights – one of the least understood and most important dimensions of European integration – has been improved to the extent that we can clearly see the iunctim
between axiological pluralism of a new legal construct and supranational, European identity. In order to be able to answer such questions, one should define precisely the scope of the very notion of fundamental rights as it has been the subject of constant improvement within the EU *acquis communautaire* and confront this constitutional narrative with its perception among the EU citizens themselves.

The Charter for Fundamental Rights has been an outcome of extremely passionate axiological-oriented constitutional debate concentrated on the ontological status of values and their identification. The backbone of this debate was a confrontation between two distinct perspectives: absolute (or cognitional), and relativist (or non-cognitional). The debate within the Convention on the Charter for Fundamental Rights as well as its popular reception revealed a clash between the proponents of the objective nature of moral values deriving from a transcendent source – God’s will – and the advocates of cultural determinism as a framework for conscious and rational human choice related axiological foundation of identity.

These two perspectives, prevalent within European societies, constituted a bone of contention in the process of the drafting of the Charter. It was the overwhelming spirit of inclusive axiological pluralism and not so much the competing value choice perspective that prevailed in the Charter's Convention, which opened up a room for consensus over its axiological foundation. However, one should not overlook the complex process of reaching for this consensus through matching overlapping sets of values such as Christian-democratic (religion, nation, tradition, law), liberal-democratic (ownership, liberty, rule of law, tolerance) and social-democratic (labour, equality, tolerance).

A great deal of attention paid by public opinion – seen especially in the new member states with Poland, being a special case – was focused on the problem of the superior status of individual rights over collective ones as well as the question of the perceived ethical relativism of some of the Charter's provisions. The focal point of this debate was the reference to Christian values (*Invocatio Dei*) as a one of the key sources of European identity. This problem was already addressed in the Polish constitutional discourse in 1997 over the new Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The Preamble of the current Polish Constitution became the subject of a fierce ideological dispute
between proponents of cognitional and non-cognitional perspectives on the axiological source of commonly binding laws.

The compromise that was reached in the constitution-making process took the form of inclusive axiological pluralism or, we might say, an ecumenical Invocatio Dei as one may put it. The axiological consensus in this case was built upon the recognition that:

‘We, the Polish Nation – all citizens of the Republic, Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from another source [...] Hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, co-operation between the public powers, social dialogue as well as on the principle of aiding in the strengthening of the powers of citizens and their communities.

Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997)

Interestingly enough, this ecumenical Invocatio Dei has been advocated by the Polish representatives for the Convention for the Future of Europe as possible ground for consensus over the axiology of European identity expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution for Europe. However, it did not find support among other members of the Convention due to the prevalence of Valery Giscard d'Estaing's idea of not referring directly to any particular religion as a source of European identification.

One can expect certain ideological disputes to continue even after the formal completion of the ratification process of the Reform Treaty. Thus, we may argue that the adoption of a contextual, non-cognitional approach to constitution-making was a reliable choice, which provides a wider window of opportunity for axiological consensus. Significantly enough, one can observe a divergence in the public perception of the debate of the Charter in the new and old EU countries. In the old member countries – especially in Great Britain, Germany and France – a great deal of attention was paid to social and economic values attached to civil rights and freedoms, whereas in the new member countries, in Poland particularly, the focus was mainly on ethical values. This, in itself, constitutes the biggest challenge for the citizens of new Europe: how to merge the two distant perspectives
Collective identity

on the same code of rights and freedoms into a single sphere of European civil society?

In this context, the Charter for Fundamental Rights became the object of fierce political and axiological dispute in Poland. The political context of this dispute is that the current government led by the pro-EU Civic Platform, did not want to risk further deepening of the crisis with the president who is authorised to sign the ratification bill over the very ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by enforcing adoption of the Charter into the Polish legal order. The former president of the Republic of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, clearly supported the Polish opt-out approach as confirmed by the former Law and Justice government decision to join the so-called British Protocol on the Charter.

The axiological aspect of this dispute, on the other hand, is related to what Staniszkis (2007) calls ‘a deep intervention of the Charter into the social fabric of Polish society’. The advocates of the Charter's rejection find the essence of this intervention in undermining traditional values such as Catholicism, family and national solidarity that have constituted the foundation of collective identity of Polish society.

The Charter is here perceived as a logical manifestation of globalisation, hence, a dysfunctional compared with the nation state paradigm of collective identity. The Episcopacy of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, whose voice has always been influential in the public sphere, adopted such an interpretation of the Charter, which in turn affected the ultimate decision of both the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform governments on the Polish opt-out.

The protagonists of the Charter (Smolar 2007), representing mainly liberal and left-wing political milieus as well as public intellectuals and NGO's involved in protection of human rights, emphasised the historical meaning of the Charter in introducing for the very first time in the history of European integration a canon of common European axiology which could unite nations of the enlarging European Union.

The Polish public debate on the Charter, which became a forum of polarised threat-opportunity exchange of arguments was framed by the problems discussed elsewhere in Europe such as human cloning, prohibition of trafficking of human organs, prohibition of eugenic practices and natural environment protection standards. However,
what became a focal point of public discourse over the Charter, channelled by the mass-media, was the catalogue of problems, which were not directly part of the Charter provisions but restricted to national legislations, such as the definition of marriage, application of abortion and euthanasia. Here the antagonists of the Charter claimed its deduced direct legal applicability in these areas which would lead to the right for same sex marriage, abortion and euthanasia to be executed by Polish courts. Apart from ethical threats, the antagonists of the Charter, emphasised the danger of the right to property restitution being mainly executed by German citizens who are expected to benefit from the Charter’s provision on private property protection and the right to small homeland.

Interestingly enough, the German restitution threat is being used at present by Law and Justice members of the European Parliament who – like Kamiński (2009) – argue that ‘there are some in Europe, who are not happy seeing the Polish national flag waving around the city of Szczecin’. The activity of the Charter’s protagonists is therefore directed towards demystifying those threats and advocating the meaning of the Charter for the consolidation of the EU’s internal and external image as a normative, value and rights-based Union where human dignity understood as the freedom of individual choice does not undermine but co-exists with collectivistic approaches to fundamental rights according to the ’united in diversity’ principle.

**In lieu of a conclusion**

The main hypothesis of the presented analysis was that the EU Eastern enlargement magnified deconstruction of well-established interpretations of the significant other syndrome understood as a point of reference for collective identity across the enlarged Europe. Consequently, we may observe that in ‘old’ Europe it is no longer the Cold War *homo sovieticus* who constitutes the significant other just as for ‘new Europeans’ it is not yet *European regional democracy with a cosmopolitan imprint supranational deliberative democracy* which is referred to as foundation of all-European ‘we-identity’. Secondly, I have argued that attitudes towards democracy and citizenship – best expressed in the level of public trust and acceptance of axiological pluralism – are of particular relevance when analysing the process of reconstruction of collective identity in the enlarged Europe. East-Central European societies, which experienced a communist
dictatorship, manifest a low level of cultural capital, which is in turn displayed in limited social trust as well as rejection of axiological pluralism as a foundation of societal habitat. The prevalence of the culture of social distrust in the new member states of the EU creates a favourable environment for the rhetoric of the Euroskeptics, who adopted the slogan of the ‘elite-driven project controlled by a narrow group of Eurocrats’ as a manifestation of European unity. The main axis of their reasoning has been the perceived imposition of axiology of the ‘Brussels cosmopolitan super-state’ on the new EU societies, which challenges the nation state as the only legitimate sphere of reference for collective identity and democracy in Europe. As we argued, the new EU societies – Polish society being the particularly evident case – widely acknowledge the dominant position of the nation state within the EU political system, which confirms the validity of the intergovernmental model of reconstitution of democracy in the enlarged EU as conceptualised in RECON model one. The debate on the axiology of the Charter for Fundamental Rights – as observed in the new EU societies especially – constitutes a challenge to an otherwise nation state determined process of collective identity reconstruction in the enlarged EU.

The Charter for Fundamental Rights adopted by the European Council in Nice 2000 and reaffirmed in Lisbon in 2007 is an outcome of an extremely passionate axiologicaly oriented debate concentrated on the ontological status of values and their implications for European identity construction processes. The character of the axiological debate on the essence of European fundamental rights has been the forum of a tension between two distinct perspectives: absolute (or cognitional), and relativist (or non-cognitional). More specifically, the Charter became a source of uses and misuses between the proponents of the objective nature of moral values deriving from a transcendent source - the God’s will - and the advocates of cultural determinism as a framework for conscious and rational human choice within the sphere of axiological identity construction.

However, what was missing in this debate was an emphasis on the par excellence European perspective on the role of fundamental rights in constructing European identity. In this analysis, we argued that this polarised, thus simplified, discourse over the Charter in the new member states of the EU is an outcome of a predominance of ethnically constructed and nation state based understanding of
democracy perceived as a frame of identity reference. Consequently, especially the new member states of the EU seem to manifest attachment to only half of the EU’s axiological credo ‘unity in diversity’ with more emphasis given on integral ‘unity’ within the national part of supranational, ‘diverse’ common Europe. Last but not least, the public debate over the Charter in the EU member states proved their disregard for the overwhelming spirit of inclusive axiological pluralism which opens up a room for consensus over the axiological foundations of the par excellence European regional democracy in statu nascendi.
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Chapter 4

Challenging the nation
Polish women’s quest for democracy and justice

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The process of European integration initiated profound transformations within each of the member states. The new political entity of the European Union, initially being a creature formed by the member states, also began to cause direct or indirect transformations in the member states themselves. Certain fields considered as crucial for national sovereignty (e.g. constitutional, social, defence and security as well as immigration and internal policies) became steadily more and more influenced by the EU (Kantner 2006: 501). As Eriksen and Fossum (2007: 8) stress, “European states” identities and even stateness have come to resonate with their Europeanness, as national law has become so entangled in EU law practice that the states are no longer conventional “national states.” Not surprisingly, these substantial transformations in the EU and the member states have attracted the attention of scholars, stirring fervent discussions about the democratic character of the new political order. In these debates two main standpoints can be distinguished. On the one hand, scholars use the nation state as a template to look at and discuss the EU. In this approach the lack of elements (e.g. common language, history, traditions etc.) traditionally defined as crucial for functioning
of democracy is pointed out as the major obstacle to building a viable polity. On the other hand, the EU is sometimes perceived as a new form of polity beyond the nation state, with prospects for developing a new form of democracy. This post-national approach stresses the civic and political values based on European institutions or built on the process of active engagement in public life. This post-national Europe ‘is a territorially vague and governmentally multiple space, filled with universal, cosmopolitan values, beyond the particularism of the nation state’ (Antonich 2008: 506).

Nonetheless, supporters of both approaches seem to agree that a new sort of multilayered polity resulting from the alteration of the institutional architecture and shifts in political power has begun to emerge, and that this new constellation challenges the nature of the nation state. Particular attention has been paid to changes in EU integration, accompanied by the processes of globalisation and individualisation, caused in collective identity formation. Research indicates that the nation state seems to lose its traditional role, as designed by the Westphalian model, of the frame of reference for the construction of collective identity (Delanty 2005: 14). However, the direction and substance of these changes are still open questions. So are the questions about the models of democracy relating to these new forms of collective identity. The RECON models of European democracy – delegated, federal and cosmopolitan – as spelled out by Eriksen and Fossum (2007, 2009) provide convincing answers to those questions, at least in normative terms. Each of the models differs in terms of institutional arrangements reflecting various ways of realising democratic values within different global-structural contexts, as well as in the terms in which the collective identity is constructed and sustained. Delegated democracy requires well-developed, but also Europeanised, collective identity at the level of the nation state. Federal multinational democracy entails a symbolic collective European ‘we’, required for making collective decisions. This collective European identity would become a basis for citizenship – stipulating the rights and duties of members and setting up the terms of inclusion and exclusion (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 26). It would be strong and founded on constitutional patriotism at the EU level, but the same time would allow the citizens to keep their distinctive national identities, by providing the mechanisms for reciprocal recognition of both (ibid.: 2007: 39, 2009: 16-7). The regional European democracy model envisages post-national collective
identity. At the EU level it would be based on universal norms and fundamental rights as well as on democratic procedures. At the member-state level it would be constructed with respect for diversity and limited by European and cosmopolitan norms and values (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 39, 2009: 22-6). Still, the question remains open as to the extent to which these theoretical assumptions find reflection in social reality as well as ways of constructing credible indicators.

Examination of the RECON models of European democracy suggests that collective identity can be treated at least as the indicator of the type of democratic order, if not as a variable influencing the process of reconstituting democracy in Europe. Therefore, analysing the dynamics of identity could bring some information on the type of democratic order already emerging or at least wished for by Europeans. The aim of this chapter therefore is to explore the way collective identity is constructed and negotiated and, on this basis, answer the question about the presence of elements of European democratic orders as envisaged by RECON models in the Polish context.

The Polish collective identity is still predominantly defined in terms of ethnicity and religion (Byrnes 1993; Borowik 1997: 73; Mach 1997: 67, 2007: 60-1). It stresses homogeneity, defines the nation in terms of ethnos and stresses the importance of collective over individual rights. The predominance of this model is accompanied by a backlash against the supranational models of democracy and distrust in attempts at constructing postnational identity. Such a type of collective identity, having the nation state as its main point of reference, seems to convincingly match the audit model of democracy.

Intriguing becomes the task of reaching beyond the nation state model. My aim was therefore to find a group which overcomes the national frames of references in order to construct their identity. My initial intuition was that the Polish feminist and women’s movements\(^1\) could be a good example, and there are several main

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\(^1\) I understand here the term ‘women’s movement’ as broader than ‘feminist movement’, the former being a particular example of the latter, which focuses on challenging the patriarchal character of the existing social order and its
reasons for making such a claim. Firstly, I chose feminists because of the highly contested status of this group in Polish society. Feminism in Poland seems to be an example of what Castells (2004: 8) defines as resistant identities. These are ‘generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devaluated and/or stigmatised by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society.’ I assumed that Polish feminists, because of their devaluated and often stigmatised position, would construct their identity using elements exceeding the national framework, and therefore would be in favour of new models of democracy, reaching beyond the national state.

Secondly, women’s organisations through their activities and their transnational coalitions are often perceived by various scholars as a vehicle for promoting active citizenship, democratisation, and social change (Coyle 2003: 58). Therefore analyses of their activities in Poland will aim to show their involvement in construction and/or reconstruction of the democratic order and their quest for justice.

Thirdly, feminism by definition concentrates on individual rights and stresses – especially in its postcolonial and postmodern forms criticising the limits and exclusive character of identity politics – differences, respect for diversity, inclusiveness and openness (see Yuval-Davis 1999; Mizielińska 2006: 38). A comparison between those feminists’ recent discussions concerning the subject, identity, political activities and citizenship, and the elements of the cosmopolitan consequences. In practice in Poland, the distinction between ‘women’s’ and ‘feminist’ groups is often difficult, since not all groups, even if they are involved in activities which could be described as feminist, would call themselves feminist organisations. This seems to be related to the negative connotation of the word ‘feminism’ in the Polish context. It is perceived as anti-feminine, threatening family, foreign and anti-national ideology, endangering the natural order created by God. Similarly, feminists are often described as unhappy, anti-feminine, hating men and unfulfilled (Tomasik 2004; Młodawska 2009; Land 2009). Mizielińska (2008: 93), summarising her recent research, confirms the careful use of the adjective ‘feminist’. She stresses that avoidance of the stigmatising label of feminism is often consciously used by organisations in order to make their functioning feasible.

2 Recent qualitative research shows that for some women feminism serves as a tool for resistance or opposition against the limitations imposed on women by the traditionalist discourse, or a chance for transgression of traditional gender roles (see Wojnicka 2009; Land 2006).
democracy model shows some similarities, especially as regards diversity and respect for individual and human rights (see Braidotti 2004). I was therefore interested whether, in the discourse of the Polish feminists and in the activities of the women’s organisations, elements indicating cosmopolitanism could be found.

Finally, taking into account the EU activities aiming at promoting gender equality, it can be assumed that European institutions and/or actors could naturally serve as addressees and collaborators for the nongovernmental actors fighting for gender equality at the national level. The questions are thus if such cooperation exists in the Polish context, how it is evaluated by women involved in the movement and how the existence of the new political dimension influences the political activities and identity of women’s organisations.

**Women’s identity?**

The concept of collective identity addresses ‘we-ness’ of the group, embracing shared attributes or resemblances around which members of a group come together (Cerulo 1997: 386). In research on collective identities scholars frequently focus on the group’s self concepts, the way a group defines itself, but also the way a group defines its opponents. The construction of the shared and often politicised views of the social world, principles of the social order and expectations for the future are also crucial. Moreover, the dynamics, diffusiveness, complexity and changing character of collective identity are frequently stressed (Reger 2002: 711; Cerulo 1997: 387; Mach 2008: 3; Liebert 2009). It is also often emphasised that the members of a group have different access to construction of the identity of the group. The polycentric pattern of identity construction is stressed, and usually special attention is given to the role of cultural elites and core institutions in the construction of identity. Two approaches seem to be most popular in empirical research – the individual approach, when the research focuses on manifestations of the collective identity at the individual level, and/or the analysis of the cultural expression of the group. Additionally, scholars stress that the collective identity often finds expression and articulation in various organisations (Reger 2002: 711).

Speaking of collective identity in the context of the women’s or feminist movement is particularly difficult in the light of the current
feminist discussions regarding the subject. In recent approaches a subject is defined as multiplied, contingent, provisional and constructed via various axes of identity (Lloyd 2005; Butler 1990; Yuval-Davis 2006). Feminism needs to ‘embrace an alternative version of the subject, understood as ambivalent, in-process, indeterminate, and terminally open to reinscription; a subject whose identity is always precarious, contingent and ambiguous’ (Lloyd 2005: 27). As a result, the utopia of the existing, stable community is replaced by an ephemeral community which encompasses plurality, diversity and changeability (Mizielińska 2006: 38). From such a definition of the woman subject a certain strategy for the political action emerges – recognising differences, but overcoming them by allying across the boundaries. Non-identity, queer, cyborg or transversal politics may serve as examples for overcoming essentialist understanding of the subject (see Lloyd 2005; Yuval-Davis 2000). Also deliberative democracy, presented as a model suitable for accommodating differences, seems to be a useful tool for representing diversified women’s issues and interests (Galligan and Clavero 2008: 11).

In order to touch upon the diversity of opinions within the Polish context, a twofold approach, based on content analysis and analysis of secondary literature, was applied. Firstly, the websites of the main feminist organisations in Poland were reviewed in order to reconstruct the relationship between these organisations and the EU, as well as grasp the scope of their activities and national and transnational cooperation. The websites provide comprehensive information about the local and global activities and initiatives of feminist organisations in Poland, but at the same time serve as a platform for exchanging information and developments regarding women’s issues. Each of these websites has a separate section devoted to the EU, but they differ significantly in the degree of their development. They mostly focus on reporting European issues, especially those related to women, but also serve as an important source of information about the initiatives of the EU directed to women. Information on the women’s movement in Poland was further complemented by a review of the existing research.

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3 These were: Feminiteka, Ośka, Centre for Women’s Rights, Polish Federation for Woman and Family Planning, Network of East-West Women and eFKa.
Secondly, in order to show the dynamics of feminist identity I decided to use the individual approach and focus on the writings of a few prominent and well-known feminist intellectuals: Magdalena Środa, Kinga Dunin, and Agnieszka Graff. For the analysis, I used the texts of these three authors published between 2000 and May 2009 in the Polish daily newspapers.

The main constraint of such an approach is its limited scope in terms of presenting regional differences. The three feminist intellectuals can certainly be defined as important for influencing the identity of Polish women’s movements, but they represent only the Warsaw circle. Similarly, the organisations whose websites I used represent rather a mainstream position within the feminist movement and are also mostly located in Warsaw. Therefore, the analysis offered by no means claims to be exhaustive and does not reflect the entire spectrum of diversities of opinions and differences within the women’s movement and among feminists in Poland. However, these shortcomings do not contradict the aim of this chapter, of grasping the elements in the identity construction processes challenging the frame of the nation state.

Several research questions organised my review of the websites and writings of the feminists. In the case of the former, I was interested in the activities and initiatives of women’s organisations in Poland, especially in the relationship with EU institutions. In the case of the latter, I focused on finding out how feminists define themselves and who their opponents or significant others (both positive and negative) are. Additionally, I was attempting to disclose how

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4 There were a few factors influencing this choice. Firstly, they are openly declared feminists. Secondly, they are visible and active participants in the public sphere since they regularly publish in the Polish dailies (especially in Gazeta Wyborcza and occasionally in Rzeczpospolita and Dziennik) and are frequently invited to various debates, conferences and discussions as representatives of Polish feminism. Thirdly, Środa, Dunin and Graff can also be defined as public intellectuals – they all work at Polish universities: Środa and Graff at Warsaw University and Dunin at the Medical University of Warsaw. Each, to some degree, cooperates with or is involved in the women’s movement in Poland.

5 Most of the articles were published in Gazeta Wyborcza (both Dunin and Środa have columns in this newspaper). Additionally, a few articles from other dailies - Rzeczpospolita and Dziennik-Europa-Polska - were included.

6 eFKa and Network of East-West Women are the exceptions, the former being located in Krakow and the latter in Gdańsk.
feminists perceive the social and democratic order of the society they live in as well as whether they project new orders and the way they define the future of the society. Questions about the meaning of Europe and European Union were also central. In order to contextualise the results of my research, a short background on the Polish national identity and the birth, transformation and reception of the contemporary women’s movement in Poland needs to be provided. This will be done below.

**Polish national identity, ‘Matka Polka’ and the feminist**

As was highlighted above, the Polish national identity is still based on a homogenous vision of nation, defined in terms of ethnos and stressing the importance of collective over individual rights. As many scholars point out, constructing a nation in ethnic terms implies a certain definition of women and their role vis-à-vis the nation. In the nationalistic discourse femininity and masculinity are mostly defined in essential terms and are differentiated as regards their roles, activities and location within the national structure (particularly the public vs. private sphere) (Kandiyoti 1991: 431; Yuval-Davis 1996; Hyndman 2004). Such ideological dimensions often influence the formal allocation of citizenship, rights and duties. Stapleton and Wilson aptly summarise this:

> Gender differentiation emerges across different national and institutional contexts (e.g. political, civil and social), and reflects the relationship of the individual to the state in question. Again, this relationship is likely to be influenced by both national ideologies and the individual’s particular location within these structures.

(Stapleton and Wilson 2004: 48)

Furthermore, nations have often been ascribed ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’ identities along with allied characteristics and values. Such personifications can be also used contemporarily for political purposes (Stapleton and Wilson 2004: 48). In nationalistic discourses – and this is clearly visible in the case of Poland – the role and

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7 Janion (2006) analyses in detail the symbolic role of women in various nations. Furthermore, feminist research points to war rape as a far-reaching consequence of ideologies equalising the nation with women, or women’s bodies (see Hyndman 2004).
conditions for participation of women in the nation are envisaged. Women are defined predominantly as mothers and preservers of national identity. The role of guardians of traditional morality is imposed on them, and they are obliged to fulfil the sacred duty to rear children for the nation and bring them up in the spirit of national and ethnic virtues (Siemińska 2003: 229; Titkow 2007: 71; Graff 2008: 141). The ‘Matka Polka’ (Mother Pole) model, dominant in Polish culture, is the strongest expression of the role prescribed for Polish women. It combines:

The ideal image of femininity in the figure of the Virgin Mary, a feminised image of the homeland, the historical experience of Polish women, and a set of collective expectations addressed to them.

(Ostrowska 2004: 222)

The model was constructed during the period of the fight for Polish independence in the 19th century and strengthened by the romantic visions which imposed on women an imperative sacrifice for the sake of the homeland and family. Initially, it was dominant mainly among the upper classes (landowners and intelligentsia), but in the interwar Polish state especially the Catholic Church promoted this maternal ideal for all social strata (Fidelis 2004: 309). Women’s presence in the public sphere was accepted only when men were absent fighting for the homeland. On their return women were expected to revert to their traditional gender roles. This romantic vision of women influenced heavily the identity of Polish women, ‘[a]s results of this romantic imperative, Polish women adjusted to bearing the burden of family and public life in the shadow and in silence, in order to fulfil the offering’ (Janion 2006: 99).

It was only in the early 1990s that this role ascribed to women came to be openly questioned. Before, despite a long tradition and history of the Polish women for emancipation, women’s interests were subordinated to more important aims – the fight for independence and preservation of the nation (see Titkow 2007: 47-73; Fuszara 2005: 209-218). The women’s movement emerging in the early 1990s was visibly different – women organised themselves in order to protect or fight in the name of their interests and rights and not to fight for independence. From the very beginning it becomes clear that the feminist identity in Poland was constructed in opposition to the
dominant conceptions of femininity and womanhood entangled in the dominant national identity project, and as resistance towards women’s exclusion from democracy and full citizenship based on ethnic, male and heterosexual constructions (see Mizielińska 2001).

Two processes – post-socialist transformation and EU integration – have had the most significant impact on the position, status and collective identity of Polish women. They were also crucial from the point of view of the emergence and formation of the women’s movement in Poland.

The transformation period and mobilisation of women

During the Communist regime state ideology officially stressed equality and women’s liberation. These were to be achieved by access to the labour market and through the participation of women in political structures and the public domain. In practice, as various data indicate, these postulates were never achieved. The representation of women in the Sejm stayed at a rather low level, varying from 4.1 per cent of the total number of representatives in 1956-61 to 23 per cent in the eighth term (1980-1985). In the history of the People’s Republic of Poland there was no woman prime minister, and only occasionally did women occupy the position of minister of education or vice-ministers of culture or internal trade (Sawa-Czajka 1996: 104). Besides, the real power was located in the party structures, from which women were mostly absent, especially in the top positions (Fuszara 2005: 89).

The presence of women in the labour market seemed to be a greater achievement. There was access to employment, even to jobs traditionally reserved for men. A system of well-developed day centres was available in order to help women to combine being mothers with their professional life. They usually held lower positions and had lower wages nevertheless. Moreover, this access to the labour market was not accompanied by a change in the social structure and gender roles. Women were therefore still solely responsible for all housework, and constantly experienced a double burden (Marody 1993: 856; Fidelis 2004: 314).

The emancipatory discourse of the regime also found expression in the creation of state-supported women’s organisations, the most
important being the Women’s League (‘Liga Kobiet’) established in 1945 and the National Council of Polish Women (‘Narodowa Rada Kobiet Polskich’) established in 1966. Officially, they aimed to represent and protect all women’s interests. In practice, they played a façade role and were treated as imposed by the regime (Fuszara 2005: 219).

Paradoxically, the liberating ideologies and policies of the state – by initiating the resistance – reinforced and sustained a patriarchal system based on essentialist gender definitions. Attempts to redefine or reshape the traditional gender definitions by the Communist regime were perceived as a threat for Polishness, for the Polish national identity. Traditional gender identities therefore served as a cultural resource for both resistance and survival (Watson 1993: 472). After the fall of communism in Poland, a qualitative change in the nature of the patriarchy in the Central and Eastern European countries was visible. Before, both women and men were excluded from power, or fully shared in the ‘power of the powerless’. In the new emerging democracies the distribution of power, new rights and new social power took place in a strictly gendered way, and women were barred from power and the public sphere in the emerging democratic country (Watson 1993: 473). The exclusion of women from power was already visible in the events of 1980/81 in Gdańsk and Szczecin. Women represented about 50 per cent of the Solidarity union in these years. However, negotiating and signing the ultimate agreements were almost exclusively male affairs. There were no women at all among the Szczecin signatories on either side and in Gdańsk there were two women and 16 men signing agreements on behalf of the shipyard committee and no women on the government side.8 A similar pattern was repeated during the Polish Round Table Agreement in 1989. Only one woman was involved out of 60 representatives of the opposition (Penn 2005: 277). In the first elections to the Sejm 13 per cent of representatives were women, and in the second term (in 1991-1993) just 10 per cent. The first Solidarity government had merely three women, administering the Polish National Bank, the Antimonopoly Office and the government Plenipotentiary for Women and Families, which was dismissed as unnecessary even in March 1992 (Sawa-Czajka 1996: 106). Similar

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8 Penn (2005) provides an interesting account of women’s participation in the resistance movement against the Communist regime.
processes could be observed in most post-Soviet countries in the early 1990s (Fuszara 2005: 89). Watson perceives this as a consistent pattern – ‘where parliaments have come to have a measure of real social power, so they have become much more clearly the preserve of men’ (1993: 475).

Not only were women excluded from political power, they were also the group who paid the highest price for the economic transformations. Various research points out that in the 1990s the level of unemployment was significantly higher among women than among men. To combine a career with bringing up children became more challenging as most of the day care centres and crèches were closed because of lack of economic resources on the part of the state (Fuszara 2000b: 8). Moreover, reinforcement of traditional gender roles and sentimentalisation of home and family became an important part of the dominant discourse, strongly influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. It was also accompanied with a strong backlash against feminism and women’s emancipation, perceived as remnants of the previous system. This all further barred women from public life and the labour market. As an extension and consequence of masculinisation of public life and reinforcement of traditional gender roles in the early 1990s a draft anti-abortion law was introduced and in 1993 passed in the parliament. It was done without consultations with the society, which was mostly in favour of maintaining legal access to abortion and despite a petition demanding a referendum, signed by over a million people (Kulczycki 1995: 485).

The beginning of the debate about abortion is perceived by various scholars as the birth of the women’s movement in Poland (Einhorn, Sever 2003: 175; Fuszara 2005: 220; Anderson 2006: 113). The debate mobilised women opposing the introduction of the new anti-abortion law and fuelled the emergence of a grassroots movement leading to the emergence of various women’s NGOs. The mobilisation of women in order to fight for women’s rights quickly extended to

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9 The first women’s initiatives emerged in the early 1980s, within the Solidarity movement. However, the imposition of Martial Law stopped their activities, and women’s interests were subordinated to a more urgent issue, that of fighting against the regime.

10 The debate also mobilised women’s groups supporting the introduction of the new anti-abortion law.
various groups filling in the gap left by the welfare and social services provided earlier by the state and lost during the transformation processes (Einhorn and Sever 2003: 173; Sawa-Czajka 1996: 108). According to the Directory of Women's Organisations and Initiatives of 1999 there were more than 200 groups of various focuses operating – including feminist, church and vocational groups. There were also groups created within political parties or universities as well as Polish branches of international women’s organisations (Fuszara 2000a: 1072-3). Striking was the high diversification of the movement and its involvement in a variety of areas affecting women (e.g. political participation, violence, birth control). The main division, becoming clear from the very beginning of the existence of the women’s movement, lay (and continues to lie) between Catholic and non-Catholic groups. The core of the disagreement reflects the different positions of both sides on reproductive rights and abortion (Fuszara 2005: 221).

The political, economical and social transformation taking place in Poland after 1989 profoundly redefined gender roles and fit Moghadam’s ‘women-in-the-family’ model of revolution’. The author argues that:

This type of revolution excludes or marginalises women from definitions and constructions of independence, liberation and liberty. It frequently constructs ideological linkage between patriarchal values, nationalism, and the religious order. It assigns women the role of wife and mother, and associates women not only with family but with tradition, culture and religion.

(Moghadam 1995: 336)

She contrasts this with the ‘women’s emancipation model of revolution’ (e.g. Bolshevik revolution, Kemalism in Turkey) in which women’s equality is an essential part of the revolution. For Watson, the changes in gender relations and de-gradation of feminine identity taking place in Poland (and in other countries of Central Eastern Europe) at the beginning of the 1990s was ‘a visible measure of the masculinism at the heart of Western democracy’ (Moghadam 1993: 485).
In spite of everything, these transformations stirred up women’s mobilisation. It is important to stress that the appearance of various formal and informal groups indicated the growing collective agency of women and redefinition of the political in the Polish context. In particular mobilisation against the anti-abortion law clearly showed opposition to the exclusion of those who are affected by the process of negotiating and forming of the relevant policies. If we accept that ‘democracy is a right to join together with others as equals to exercise public control over a polity before it is a system of rule likely to produce particular kinds of policy outputs’ (Lord 2008: 2), the activities of women’s groups during the debate about abortion and in reaction to it clearly aimed to reconstitute democracy in Poland in order to include women’s voices in the process of decision-making.

The claim to enhance both descriptive and substantive representation, as well as the introduction of women-friendly policies, were at the centre of various activities undertaken by women’s groups in the 1990s. For example, laws on the equal status of women and men were drafted and introduced to parliament by women’s activists. Different versions of the draft legislation were submitted to parliament in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2004, but each time the attempts to introduce the new law failed. Furthermore, the Pre-Election Polish Women’s Coalition was founded by women’s organisations with the aim of supporting women candidates for parliament and local authorities. The aim was to strengthen representation of women at all levels. The increased number of women in the Sejm and Senate – up to 20 per cent and 23 per cent respectively for the 2001 round – was to a large extent a result of the Coalition’s activities (Nowosielska 2004).

What sort of democracy did women’s organisations fight for? They used supranational structures in order to put pressure on the Polish

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11 There seemed to be a few reasons for rejections of these laws. Firstly, there was a widely shared belief among MPs that gender equality had already been achieved. Secondly, MPs were convinced that gender equality should not be enforced by law, but rather achieved by social practice. Thirdly, rejections resulted from a conceptual confusion between notions of ‘equality’ and ‘sameness’ (Galligan and Clavero 2005). No equality law has yet been created, despite it being required by Poland’s membership in the EU.
government to change the situation of women, but the main point of reference of the activities of the women’s organisations was the nation state and the reconstitution of democracy at this level. Only in the late 1990s, after the decision of the Luxembourg European Council on enlargement and when the accession negotiations started, did the EU steadily become an important partner for women’s organisations and a new supranational dimension for their activities become available.

The EU and women’s movements

Europeanisation from above?

EU integration was another important element contributing significantly to the transformations of the institutional and political shape of the new Polish democracy as well as of collective identities. This process has also had a considerable impact on the women’s movement in Poland. Generally speaking, women’s groups in the country – especially those of a feminist inclination – were very much in favour of integration, and followed the negotiations between the EU and Poland very carefully. Most of the activists believed that the act of joining the EU would impose on the Polish state a need to adjust its laws to the EU’s gender-mainstreaming standards and norms. The EU was perceived as a guarantor of gender justice in Poland and in the region (Matynia 2003: 503). Active support for integration was clearly visible in the various actions organised by women’s groups, informing about the EU and the chances and challenges related to the accession process (Fuszara 2008: 206). At that time, various EU documents regarding women’s rights and women’s organisations were translated into Polish, e.g. documents on equal rights translated by the Centre for Women’s Rights (2001), the

12 Well known was the practice of preparing shadow reports by women’s NGOs. The reports, showing the state of implementation of the various international conventions signed by Poland, were alternative and often contradictory to the official reports prepared by the government. Such reports were prepared for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (in this case two shadow reports were prepared – one by the Catholic women’s organisation, who opposed the approach to women’s rights envisaged in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the second by the organisations which based the report on this convention), for the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998), and for the UN Commission on Human Rights (Fuszara 2008: 167-8).

13 Information about the various meetings can be found at <http://www.feministki.org.pl/pl/herstory.html>. 
publication of the *EU Manual for Women by Organisation of Women’s Initiatives* (OŚKa) and the preparation of the Polish edition of *100 Words About Equality Between Women and Men* by the KARAT Coalition (Regulska and Grabowska 2008: 145). Also, women’s groups organised various seminars and conferences explaining the functioning of the EU and its impact on women’s life, and providing information about European projects and policies aiming to promote gender equality.

Hopes for a positive role of the EU in the imposition of gender equality and the mobilisation of women’s organisations were also clearly visible in the protest against the politics of the Polish government and neglect of women’s rights. A letter of protest (2002) was signed by various women – intellectuals, scholars, artists, also those not previously involved in the women’s movement – and addressed to the European Parliament and to Anna Diamantopulou, the EU commissioner for labour and social policy. The signatories expressed distress over the limitation of the debate on the situation of women in Poland and suggested that in Poland’s negotiations with the EU, behind the scenes, a certain kind of trading in women’s rights had taken place. In their opinion, the government, in the light of the sinking support for the integration process, was willing to sacrifice women’s rights in order to receive the Church’s support for EU integration (‘List stu kobiet’). This protest indicated the emergence of a new supranational dimension for women’s political action. It brought into play European institutions, from then on used as new points of reference for women’s collective actions, exceeding the national level. Similar activities had taken place in recent years. On January 11, 2008, a letter regarding the equality of women in Poland was sent to the Council of Europe and the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee of the European Parliament. The letter expressed concerns over lack of interest on the part of the Polish government in the issues raised by various women’s organisations and pointed to a reduction in civil rights for women in the country.

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14 See also the Polish Federation for Woman and Family Planning: <http://www.federa.org.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/ue/spis.htm>.

15 The letter was a reaction to the words of Bishop Pieronek, who, in response to a demand made by Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka, then minister responsible for equality, to make the anti-abortion law less restrictive and to introduce sexual education, called her ‘a feminist hardliner, who would not change even if treated with hydrochloric acid’. Available at: <http://www.feminoteka.pl/readarticle.php?article_id=634>.
The signatories also pointed to the lack of political climate for realising women’s rights in the context of human rights. On March 28, 2008, women’s organisations sent an appeal to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for adopting the resolution supporting abolition of the ban on abortion in Europe. Most recently, on February 9, 2009, women’s organisations sent a letter to the European Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities expressing disquiet over the passivity of the Polish government and lack of implementation of the EU directives on equality and effective anti-discriminatory policy. It therefore becomes clear that references to supranational institutions are frequently made, especially in the areas where the national state structures seem to be indifferent or react inadequately.

In the negotiation process it soon became apparent that gender issues would not be at the top of the agenda. Women’s issues appeared only in one out of 30 areas of negotiations. They were included in the area concerning social policy and employment and focused on the access of women to the labour market and education (Matynia 2003: 505). Equality as such was not a subject of negotiations. Moreover, women’s NGOs were not consulted on issues directly affecting women and were therefore excluded from the negotiation process. As a result the organisations quickly became disillusioned with the EU’s approach and critical of the lack of attention being paid to the issue of

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18 Similarly, the European Court of Justice was used by women’s and gay organisations in cases where the national institutions failed to protect and respond to the violation of human rights and guaranteed laws (e.g. Campaign Against Homophobia and Alicia Tysiąc cases).
19 Some scholars pointed to the lack of ‘localising’ of the principles of gender mainstreaming. In the Polish context access to the labour market and education was not the main problem faced by women in Poland. On the contrary, the backlash and lack of legal regulations on equality were crucial (Fuszara 2000b).
equality and women’s rights (Mizielińska 2008: 133). Graff bitterly commented at the time that gender discrimination could be accepted by the EU as a matter of local colour: ‘the French have their cheeses, the Brits their Queen and the Poles have their discrimination against women’ (Graff 2001a: 17).

How has EU accession influenced women’s organisations in Poland? The only comprehensive research on this topic was done by the team of Fuszara et al. (2008), and their results bring interesting findings on the identity of the women’s movement in Poland and its transformations resulting from EU integration. Firstly, in the accession process, women’s NGOs were aware that gender equality was not treated as a priority in negotiations. However, they still used the EU as a tool for putting pressure on the government, politicians or local authorities in order to attract support for women’s interests (Mizielińska 2008: 135) and as a back-up mechanism (ibid.: 138).

Secondly, the EU’s structures became new political actors in the region, a provider of legal order and a new space for transnational cooperation between women’s organisations. A clear example was the inclusion of the Polish Women’s Lobby, the umbrella organisation for the Polish NGOs, into the institutionalised European women’s movement by way of becoming part of the European Women’s Lobby, but also cooperation with women’s organisations from other EU countries (Grabowska and Regulska 2008: 209). Women’s NGOs are widely involved in the promotion of human and women rights, in various initiatives and transnational cooperation with other European and global organisations, promoting diversity and cosmopolitan values. At the same time the accession alerted the geopolitical relations in the region, as the interests and priorities of the Polish women’s organisations were redirected to the West (Regulska and Grabowska 2008: 143) and became incompatible with the interests and priorities of women from non-EU countries (especially with the

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20 See also Regulska 2009.
21 EWL works mainly with the institutions of the EU (the European Parliament, the European Commission and the EU Council of Ministers) and is the only lobbying organisation representing European women’s interests at the level of the EU. See <http://www.womenlobby.org/site/hp.asp?langue=EN>.
women from the post-communist region who were previously ‘natural’ partners) (Grabowska and Regulska 2008: 210).22

Finally, EU enlargement influenced the way in which women’s NGOs were financed, which had far-reaching consequences on the organisations. Firstly, after the accession former sponsors (various foundations, especially American organisations) withdrew from the country and EU funds became the main source of financing of women’s NGOs in Poland. Furthermore, the EU, by prioritising certain areas and by creating certain conditions (e.g. a need for building a partnership of a few NGOs, or a partnership between NGOs and local authorities) strongly influenced the identity of the organisations. Such strategies lead to the establishment of fake partnerships among various organisations and are an obstacle for establishing partnerships which stem from common interests. The priorities established by the EU frequently coerce the organisations towards redefinition of their aims, priorities, ways of acting and presence in the public sphere (Mizielińska 2008: 123).

From the above overview of the activities of women’s organisations and their relations with European institutions, it becomes evident that the EU is perceived as an important medium for introducing women’s issues into the political mainstream and is a significant platform for women’s activities. Similarly to the 1990s, actions undertaken during the negotiations process and in recent years show the attempts to reconstruct and engender democracy at the national level. Women mobilised in response to exclusion from the polity and deprivation of their full citizens’ rights. However, clearly visible this time is a reaching-out to the EU, with expectation of the reverse influence of the EU, of its values and laws on the gender regulations at the national state level. Furthermore, letters of protest sent to the EU institutions could be interpreted as attempts to put pressure on them to take their provisions regarding gender equality seriously. At the same time, the EU has become crucial in modifying the operation, mobilisation and political activism of women’s organisations in Poland. The impact the EU has had on women’s organisations and their adaptation to the EU opportunity structures (i.e. funding, new

22 This does not mean that such alliances do not exist any more. The best counter-example is KARAT, a regional coalition of organisations and individuals that works to ensure gender equality in the CEE/CIS countries and in which some Polish organisations take part, see <http://www.karat.org/index.php>.
dimensions of political activism, associational structures at the EU level) seems to confirm the top-down process of the emergence of a European civil society in which ‘[c]ivil associations are seen as the dependent variable, as actors which change their strategies and mobilise behaviour in reaction to European governance and integration’ (Trenz and Liebert 2008: 16).

A review of the activities undertaken by women’s organisations during and after EU accession brings interesting observations in the context of the RECON European democracy models. In the audit democracy, where ‘democracy is directly associated with the nation state’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2009: 11), it follows that gender issues should be regulated at this level, as ‘[t]he EU is envisaged as a functional regime that is set up to address problems, which the member states cannot resolve when acting independently’ (ibid.). The activities of women’s NGOs in Poland do not confirm such a model. On the one hand frequent references to the supranational structures and demands for the imposition of European gender equality norms and respect for basic rights seem rather to indicate the second RECON model. In this model,

The basic structural and substantive constitutional principles of Union law, as well as coercive measures required for efficient and consistent norm enforcement and policy implementation, will be institutionalised at both core levels of government (member state and European).23

(Eriksen and Fossum 2009: 17)

Moreover, the references to the supranational structure suggest the European dimension of the women’s organisations’ identity – they claim that women’s rights guaranteed to every person as citizens of the EU should be introduced and respected at the national level. The Polish ‘unfinished’ democracy should be supplemented or completed by European values and norms.

On the other hand, some aspects of activities of women’s NGOs could also be interpreted as support for the third, cosmopolitan model of democracy, especially their involvement in the activities supporting

23 Gender mainstreaming, as a tool for introducing and regulating gender equality issues, seems to match this model of European democracy.
promotion of human rights and democracy. In this model civil society and public spheres play key roles in ‘demanding and ensuring proper justificatory accounts’, so democracy is located more explicitly in civil society and in the public sphere than in the case of the other two models (Eriksen and Fossum 2009: 26). Polish women’s NGOs seem to fit such a role. Their activities, aiming to ‘remind’ the EU institutions about their gender equality provisions, can be interpreted as playing the role of a mechanism of accountability for the EU gender provisions.

**Feminists’ quest for Europe**

**Europeanisation from below?**

From the previous section it becomes clear that European integration has had an important impact on the women’s movement in Poland and its strategies for reconstructing democracy at the nation-state level. I was also interested in how European integration affects the self-perceptions and expectations of women, particularly of feminist intellectuals.

**What does it mean to be a feminist in Poland?**

‘Feminist’ is a contested concept in the Polish context. What does it mean to be a feminist in Poland in the opinion of feminists? How is feminism defined? First and foremost, to be a feminist means to be aware of the inequalities existing between men and women (Dunin 2006) and acknowledge women’s less privileged position (Środa 2005a: 20). Feminism is a certain way of looking at social reality, a way which includes women (Graff 2001b: 44; Mosiewicz and Dunin 2008: 20), and discloses the mechanisms of exclusion used against all sort of groups (Graff et al. 2007: 133). The common interest uniting women is ‘a fight against violence, care for status and independence of women, for their position, the welfare state, jobs and support in bringing up children’ (Środa 2006f: 16). It finds expression in concern about equal rights for men and women, chances and opportunities. Feminism implies a certain definition of political activism, overcoming differences and uniting in common actions – ‘[n]ot always is a common coalition of women beyond the divisions possible, but it is possible to form a common coalition of those who share views and style of acting’ (Mosiewicz and Dunin 2008: 21) – despite the differences in outlooks and political views and accepting the feminist identification or otherwise (Chołuj et al. 2007: 18). At the
same time, political actions initiate opposition toward the violation of democratic standards and civil liberties in Poland (Dunin 2006: 15) and aim to redefine social relations and to transform the public debate in Poland (Graff et al. 2007: 20).

Clearly visible in the feminist discourse is the redefinition of the traditionalistic conception of women, embedded in the essentialist nationalistic discourse and sustained by rightist politicians. In this model women are defined primarily as tender and emotional mothers, carers, supporters of the family and bearers of the community’s values (Graff and Bratkowska 2006: 20; Graff 2009: 40; see also Graff 2008b: 108). This implies a model of dependent women, requiring protection from male relatives. This vision is challenged, and individualism, the right to self-determination, right to choose to be a mother or wife, and to freely decide about the future of women is stressed and advocated (Dunin 2006: 15; Środa 2009). Clearly, the individual rights of women are contrasted with the collectively defined rights of the nation.

From ethnus to demos?
Noticeable in the analysed texts is a strong criticism of the notion of nation and of a predominant national identity construction sustained – in the opinion of these authors – by various right-wing politicians. A dichotomous construction in the text discussing this issue is manifest. On the one hand the authors present a vision of the nation predominant (in their opinion) in the public discourse, while on the other they construct their own vision of nation and citizenship. What does this dominant discourse imply? It is presented as an organic and eternal community, based on the ties of blood, history, tradition and values (Graff 2006: 12; Środa 2006d: 12). The Roman Catholic Church plays the role of the guarantor of the Polish national collective identity as well as its values and culture (Graff 2008a: 34; Środa 2006c: 21). The nation occupies the central role, and therefore the rights and choices of an individual need to be subordinated to the good of the entire community. Naturally, such a vision of the nation is connected with a certain understanding of citizenship based on sameness and ethnicity and restricted only to the full members of the community. Simultaneously, the role and place of a ‘stranger’ is clearly defined. Women should therefore follow their natural calling to become wives and mothers, immigrants should assimilate to the habits and religion
of the receiving society (Środa 2006a: 17), whereas gay people who (dare to) demand equal, public rights should be excluded from the national community (Graff 2007c: 21). Not surprisingly, a democracy based on such a vision of the community leaves out various groups which, by definition, do not belong and therefore do not deserve the same rights. In Poland citizenship is based on being male, Catholic and heterosexual. The rights and freedoms of those who do not meet those criteria are limited. This is clearly visible in the case of women, who become the prisoners of the nation.

In Dunin’s opinion this peculiar understanding of Polish national identity was especially noticeable during the EU accession period. Politicians of all political spectrums, under pressure from the Catholic Church, negotiated a guarantee from the EU that Poland’s accession would not violate the religious and national identity of the country. This was not only about the protection of certain values of the community, but also about real legal regulations – a ban on abortion, limitation of the rights of sexual minorities and protection of the privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church (Dunin 2004).24

From the material that was analysed an alternative vision of nation, citizenship and democracy may be reconstructed. In this project a crucial role is placed on respect for diversity, pluralism and individual rights. The authors stress the need for building a more open and inclusive model of collective identity, adjusted to the current self-perception of individuals. At the same time, it is stressed that a new collective identity needs to be negotiated in the common sphere, with respect for the diversity of views of participants (Dunin 2004). Nationality, as Graff stresses, can be ‘imagined’ on the basis of various elements. It can be described as a community of blood, as a besieged fortress or as a common mission to be completed, but in each case these elements need to be negotiated by the members of the community (2007a: 16). She argues that modern patriotism should include elements of openness, justice and diversity (Graff 2008a: 34). Dunin aptly summarises this: ‘Collective identity requires common reflection, building common images’ by members of the society. She also continues:

Who knows, maybe today – at least for some of us – the identification with universal human solidarity is more important than the identification with the communities defined within certain boundaries? Maybe we would like to change our collective identity, melt it in Europe?

(Dunin 2004)

Construction or negotiation of the new collective identity does not require the elements of local tradition, culture or memory to be renounced. However, it implies inclusion of various dimensions of individual and collective identity.

Another element crucial for establishing the new projects of collective identity is secularism, defined in general terms as a separation of religious and political spheres (Dunin 2004; Dunin 2007b: 18; Środa 2006b: 20; Środa 2005c). Special attention is placed by the authors on the need to secularise the public sphere, as it is a space for articulating interests, formulating the public opinion and the mechanism of power. Środa stresses that if the public sphere is to fulfil its function, a few conditions need to be met. It needs to be neutral, with no privileged or underprivileged topics and views. Pluralism of standpoints and views need to be acknowledged and rights to express the views need to be given to all participants. Finally, the participants need to be rational and use arguments. In her opinion, the public sphere in Poland does not meet these criteria – there are many taboo topics, and their transgression often means public exclusion or marginalisation from the public sphere (Środa 2005b: 19). It is clear from these writings that in order for the free debate to become possible, the presence and influence of the Roman Catholic Church needs to be limited. Additionally, the role of civil society in a democratic country is also underlined. It should be based on knowledge, freedom and plurality, and should be a space for the expression of opposition to xenophobia, ideological violence, the monopoly of political options and limitations of deliberation (Środa 2006e: 18).

This focus on secularism is very interesting in the context of recent theoretical debates. In the European discourse on modern

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25 In the RECON models the question of religion and its role or place in European models of democracy is not explicitly discussed.
democracy the secularisation thesis was broadly accepted for a few decades. It claimed that religion was supposed to be privatised and separated from the modern secular state and economy, and find shelter in the private domain. It should stop fulfilling various social functions and specialise in its own capacity. The relationship between politics and state and religion stemming from such a view became a desired model for modern democratic states – religion should not influence state and politics, nor does the state favour any religion or follow any religious norms or values (Dobbelare 1999: 230). More recently, a shift in the perception of the role of religion in the modern state could be observed and a certain role of religion in the public sphere of modern democratic states, under some conditions, is accepted (Casanova 1994: 61-2; Habermas 2008). In the case of the feminist discourse analysed here, the former standpoint dominates. It is frequently claimed that in order to reconstruct democracy that is inclusive, embracing diversities and protecting human rights, religion (i.e. the Roman Catholic Church) needs to be separated from public and political life.

In the envisaged form real democracy and equal citizenship, respect for diversity and protection of individual rights are repeatedly mentioned. There should not be superior or inferior citizens; all should be equal and have equal rights. In democracy ‘all citizens, those who are liked and those who are not, have an inalienable right to manifest their views in the common sphere, also in its ‘sacred’ places. To belong to the minority does not mean to be an outcast’ (Graff 2007c: 21), as real democracy is based on the plurality of values and on diversity, and it guarantees protection for minority rights against the pressure from the majority (Dunin 2006: 15).

Comparing these two visions of a nation, resemblances to the Smithian distinction between ethnic and civic nation become clear. The former sees the nation as a ‘super-family’, which ‘tends to be exclusive, creating boundaries separating “us” from “them”, and demanding that those who wish to join “our” community will convert to “our” culture, through assimilation’ (Mach 2008: 2). The latter vision, envisaged by feminists, resembles so-called civil or political conception of collective identity and ‘allows for more pluralism in the matters of culture, and more diversity’. In order to belong to the community, people must be willing to ‘contribute and to negotiate, but they may remain different’ (ibid.). At the same time,
this community is not limited to Europe, but rather defined in global and universal terms.

**Sweet home Europe?**

In the light of the earlier findings the question about the perception and the role Europe and the EU play in this discourse becomes particularly intriguing. What are the attitudes towards Europe expressed in the texts in question? What sorts of values are identified with Europe? This perception is twofold – positive or even idealistic and sceptical. I will start with the former. Europe is identified with pluralism, tolerance and openness, protection of minority rights, respect for diversity and individual rights and freedom of choice (Dunin 2003: 54; 2007a: 17; Środa, Karoń-Ostrowska et al. 2005: 23; Środa 2008: 22). Furthermore, Europe is defined as secular, and this feature is perceived as a core condition for the protection of religious and cultural diversity as well as plurality of worldviews (Dunin 2004; Środa 2008: 22). Europe or the EU (usually there is no distinction between the two) is usually contrasted with Poland. The former is presented as a model in which democratic values and principles are fully or almost fully realised and it is a community based on civic values. The latter is presented as a dysfunctional democracy, excluding women, gay people and all sorts of ‘different’ subjects not fitting the dominant vision of the nation. It therefore becomes clear that in this discourse Europe plays the role of the positive ‘significant other’, whereas the rightist, dominant – at least in the opinion of the authors – vision of the nation plays the role of the negative ‘significant other’, against which the feminists construct their own identity.

What should the relationship between Poland and the EU be? What sort of role should the Polish state play in Europe? These questions are rarely reflected upon in the writings of these three intellectuals. Only a few extracts give some indications on this topic. Firstly, the authors stress that Poland should contribute to the development of the EU and its further integration. Dunin, in the context of the debate about the preamble to the constitution of Europe, stresses that Poland stirred up unnecessary conflicts, instead of enforcing agreement and understanding (2004). She further stresses that Polish society may become a real member of the European community under the condition that it cares not only about the traditional, but also other
values. This standpoint would enable the country to actively participate in solving problems which extend the boundaries of the national states (Dunin 2007a: 17). A similar standpoint is expressed by Środa, who emphasises that Poland cannot be a country whose decisions are influenced by misleading feelings regarding its national pride and xenophobia. It needs to become a country which understands the importance and necessity of a compromise and which respects companionship and belonging to the community (Środa 2005b: 19).

In discourse on Europe, reference is also frequently made to human rights. As Środa stresses, respect for the rights of each individual is central for our/the European culture, and in contemporary Europe there is no tolerance for acts violating human rights. In the history of Europe, transgressing various cultures and morals in the name of universal human ideas has given subjectivity to various groups which were previously excluded and deprived of civil rights (2006d: 12). Human rights stem from the notion of liberal views giving the right of an individual priority over the solidarity of the community. These, along with the notion of equality, constitute European values (Graff 2006: 12). Frequently it is stressed that in Poland human rights are violated, particularly often in the case of sexual minorities and women. The citizenship and rights of these two groups is clearly limited by the nationalist notions of the nation and citizenship. Human rights are also traded in order for the ruling party to gain support for various political goals (Graff 2007b: 26).

This idealistic perception of Europe and/or the EU is counterbalanced with scepticism and criticism especially in the context of violation of women’s rights. In the pre-accession period the EU was perceived as an institution setting up certain standards as regards the equality between women and men (Dunin 2003: 54). Criticism was expressed especially in the light of the lack of acts regulating equality issues and the lack of a separate institution for protection of equality between women and men. In her recent book

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26 Graff was referring to the current prime minister Donald Tusk’s resistance to accepting the full version of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
27 The accusation about the violation of women’s rights was formed especially in the context of attempts to introduce the right to the protection of life from conception into the Polish Constitution and during the recent discussions on in-vitro fertilisation.
Graff aptly summarises the ambivalent position of the Polish feminist towards the EU. Before accession feminists believed that the EU would play an active role in promoting women’s rights and protecting equality. She concludes, however, that referring to the European norms, to the supranational level, in a country which accepts only the economic dimension of those norms is pointless (Graff 2008b: 68). In her criticism she also goes further, stressing that using ‘EU norms’ in the discussion about the rights of women and minorities can put these two groups in the position of guests in their own country. She postulates that this voice should be clearly expressed and treated as an equal dimension of the Polish public debate, not as something imported from the West, from outside (Graff 2008a: 34).

The standpoints analysed here strongly oppose the nation-state frame of reference, as in the opinions of these three feminists democracy in Poland, at its present stage, is incomplete. They point out, similarly to the case of women’s groups, the need to reconstruct the existing social order. Again, elements of the second and third RECON models can be distinguished. Firstly, the European dimension of this discourse can be captured. All three authors refer to the European dimension; they identify with European values and rights and demand their inclusion into the Polish context. As Graff stresses, these values and rights should be treated as an integrated and legitimate dimension of the Polish public sphere.

Secondly, visible and striking in the feminist discourse in Poland is a focus on individualism and respect for diversity of women as well as protection of human rights. The strong and exclusive national identity is criticised and new, more open and inclusive identities are envisaged. Interestingly, references are often made to each individual, who deserves equal rights, despite being different. Such a focus could be treated as an indicator of support for the third RECON model stressing cosmopolitan values.

There is also evident support for a new type of political activity, breaking with the identity politics based on the assumption of the similar interests and identities of subjects. It resembles the recent feminist debates challenging the notion of the sameness of the subject of women and envisaging possible strategies for political activism, embracing the differences and varieties of the involved actors.
kind of conception of politics seems to be more relevant for the post-national constellation. As Fossum stresses:

Such a system would be far more attuned to the non-national and hitherto less institutionalised forms of politics of difference, namely those based on gender, region, race, and ethnicity. [...] in the Westphalian system national identity was structurally privileged. Nationally defined territorial bounds – reinforced by the insecurities of states in a largely self-help state system – placed obvious constraints on the ability of other modes of identification to mobilise and become institutionalised on a broader cross-national scale.

(Fossum 2002)

**Conclusions**

The women’s movement in contemporary Poland emerged in response to the deficits of the new democratic order appearing in the post-socialist context. Women mobilised in order to gain recognition, inclusion and justice, permitting equal participation of men and women in social interactions, and participation as peers. In the actions undertaken by various organisations as well the writings of feminist intellectuals the claim for the construction of a more open and inclusive democracy, not only for women, but also for all individuals defined by the dominant national discourse as the ‘other’, is clearly visible. In this context the EU was/is perceived as a handy tool helping or enabling the reconstitution of democracy that is more open, inclusive and representative for all citizens.

Unquestionably, the women’s movement opposes the nation state model of democracy with its exclusivist claims. In demands for re-democratisation, the nation state institutional order and the dominant national identity project are often criticised and contested. The European identity or Europeanisation of the movement could therefore be interpreted as an unintended consequence of the exclusion of women and the democratic deficit at the level of the nation state.

The process of European integration has had a significant impact on the movement, its activities and identity. It altered the system of interactions within the movement and its relations with other social
actors and influenced the emergence of new strategies and collective problem-solving rules. The EU became – despite the ambiguous attitude of women’s organisations to its actions and equality polices – a new point of reference, a new scale for solving local problems and a source of values and laws considered as crucial for a democratic system. Noticeable are both the European and cosmopolitan dimensions in the activities of women’s organisations and opinions expressed in feminist writings. On the one hand, the supranational level is often referred to, and the women demand the introduction of the European values and rights guaranteed to them by European laws and institutions. This seems to match the second RECON model. On the other hand, both activities of women’s organisations and feminist discourse seem to point to cosmopolitan values, stressing the need for promotion of universal human rights and respect for each human being. Also, the mechanisms of accountability for both European and national institutions, as exercised by women’s organisations, seem to follow the third RECON model.
References
Zielińska


Chapter 5

Turkey in cosmopolis?
Turkish elite perceptions of the European project

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Models of ‘Europe’
In 1972, François Duchêne famously postulated that the European project represents an emergent and novel form of ‘political civilisation’ (cited in Nicolaidis and Howse 2002: 784). Whilst many agree, the nature and features of this project continue to be hotly contested by scholars and practitioners alike. There are at least three broad shapes into which the European enterprise may crystallise: an inter-governmentalist Europe, a federal Europe, and a post-national, cosmopolitan Europe. Each of these potential trajectories piques a number of philosophical and practical questions with ramifications for how European Union citizens, aspiring members, and others view Europe and their relationship with the EU. The inter-governmentalist project is associated with Westphalian concepts of order and belonging. An inter-governmentalist Europe would retain the current national pluralism of the EU but continue the pooling of sovereignty in clearly delineated functional areas. An inter-governmental Europe, therefore, would not necessitate a common identity. By way of contrast, in a federated ‘United States of Europe’ the locus of loyalty of EU citizens – a nascent European demos – would shift from the
national to the supra-national. This would make federal Europe a sort of Westphalian state writ large and citizens would have to share a common political identity. A post-national, cosmopolitan Europe would take this logic even further. Departing from the Westphalian model altogether, a cosmopolitan Europe would be built by a ‘novel and truly ‘civic’ type of demos [...] which transcends culture and represents nothing but the collective consent emanating from shared moral values’ (Kraus 2003: 669). A cosmopolitan Europe would thus be a sui generis political formation beyond the bounds of an intergovernmental body, or federal polity. The development and evolution of the EU in line with any of these three models will define the parameters of both future European integration and identity, in turn shaping identities in what today are the nation states that constitute the EU.

It is within the framework of the three models and their cognate implications for future European integration and identity that we explore how the evolving relationship with the EU is shaping collective identity in a candidate for membership in the future European polity: Turkey. To do so we first consider some of the tensions associated with the transference of a part of collective identity to the European level, noting that these tensions are amplified in the Turkish case. We then examine how such tensions are manifest in the views of Turkish political elites – one of the groups most affected by the EU process. Turkish political elites today avidly contest with one another the place of notions like ‘European-ness’, ‘universal values’, and ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the Turkish collective identity. Understanding elites’ views on such matters is of the utmost importance since the public takes its cues from elites’ positions. Elite views are also a good barometer for assessing EU projections onto its periphery. We locate elite views in the discourse of figures from four different camps in the debate over Turkey’s place in Europe: Kemalists, Islamists, liberals and right-wing nationalists. Drawing on interviews with 55 leading intellectuals and politicians from these four camps, we explore whether these figures believe in universal values and the possibility of constructing a European political project based on such values. We further examine whether they believe Turkey can and should participate in such a project. This enables us to assess the relative salience in the Turkish context of the three different models of a future European polity. For, if the EU has
successfully transferred its values to the periphery (i.e. Turkey), then there is some empirical validation for the supra- and even post-national models, especially if these values are understood by Turkish pundits as cosmopolitan values. If, on the other hand, Turkish elites tend to emphasise the material and instrumental value of participating in the EU project, then the empirical evidence would appear to support the first inter-governmentalist model. Our results suggest that whilst there is a cross-cutting consensus on the possibility of universals and universal values, and that a European project predicated on these values is a legitimate undertaking, there is ambivalence as to whether Turkey can or should participate in such a project. The source of ambivalence differs, however, both within and across camps.

**Linking the national and the European: the Turkish case**

There is a rich literature on the relationship between national and European-level identities and the possibility of their reconciliation. At least two important insights emerge from this literature. First, for many citizens the prospect of adherence to an inter-governmental Europe appears to present less of a challenge to national-level identity than that of participating in a supra-national, federal Europe which necessitates the transfer of a significant part of identity to the European level. A post-national, cosmopolitan Europe demands an even greater leap, requiring that citizens transcend national-level identifications to become individual constituents of a cosmopolitan polity (Eriksen 2006: 252). There is considerable resistance to both a federal and a post-national identification amongst European public spheres, as attested to by the French and Dutch rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty (Taggart 2005). Resistance is also evident in the rise of populist movements which increasingly challenge the long-standing commitment of mainstream centre-right and centre-left political forces to building a *sui generis* European project. Bornschier observes that resistance to European-level initiatives can be economic or cultural (Bornschier forthcoming). Economic resistance tends to be articulated by citizens on the left of the political spectrum. Their fear is that national welfare states will be

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1 See, for example Marks 1999; Smith 1993; Duchesne and Frognier 2002; Bruter 2003.
2 For an empirical and theoretical discussion of this phenomenon with specific reference to the French case see Guinaudeau (forthcoming).
sacrificed on the altar of European-level neo-liberalism (ibid.). Cultural resistance, however, is most frequently articulated by far-right, populist elements which fear for historically specific national identities defined in cultural, ethnic, and linguistic terms. Such views also tend to display a communitarian conception of national identity which runs against the grain of the individualistic universalism that would inform a supra-national, and above all, a post-national European enterprise (ibid.).

A second and related insight about the prospect of reconciling national- and European-level identifications is that the ‘civic’ values upon which a federal and above all a cosmopolitan Europe would be built are not culturally neutral. Such values emerged from the crucible of western European historical experience. This means that non-Western European aspirants for membership are faced with two choices. Either they must set aside values and practices steeped in their own historical, cultural, and national experience, or they must attempt the daunting task of building a consensus with their partners in cosmopolis around values which allow for the reconciliation of the local and the universal. The question is whether candidates are able or willing to attempt such reconciliation.

Both these tensions resonate in candidate countries which have yet to even experience the transfer of sovereignty in numerous fields to which member states and their publics have long been exposed. As outlying cases, debates in candidate states are thus a useful foil for exploring the tensions associated with the prospect of transferring identity to a supra- or post-national European-level. Few cases could be as outlying as that of Turkey, where apparent fault lines between the national and the European are amplified by historical and religious factors. The country is, after all, 99 per cent Muslim, and was borne from a crucible of conflict between European powers and the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 after years of protracted military confrontation with European powers which ended only when the nationalist resistance movement succeeded in expelling European invaders. The enduring resonance of this experience in the Turkish collective consciousness might lead one to expect that Turks interested in participating in the European project would be most drawn to an inter-governmentalist Europe in which national particularity remains sacrosanct. But do Turks in fact
Turkey in cosmopolis?

put a premium on national particularity and display a corresponding lack of enthusiasm for a more ambitious European project?

We address this question with specific reference to the prospect of reconciling Turkish national identity with a post-national, cosmopolitan Europe. In other words, is the Turkish collective identity formation more in line with the prospect of an intergovernmentalist Europe or of a post-national cosmopolitan Europe? To answer this, we must take into account the second paradox associated with the cosmopolitan European enterprise – namely the fact that it is based on values which emerged out of Western European particularity. This paradox is particularly salient in the Turkish case because Turkish resistance towards the EU tends to revolve around questions of national identity and sovereignty rather than over economic matters. Reasons for this include the fact that there is a long-standing and successful Customs Union with the EU, and a considerable consensus on liberal economic governance among Turkish political elites, and the fact that the accession process – still in its early stages – has yet to broker nitty-gritty questions related to, say, the agricultural sector, which may one day prove fodder for anti-EU populism in economic terms. A major implication of the heightened resonance of identity as opposed to economic concerns is that the left-right spectrum is not a useful gauge for understanding Turks’ views on the European project and Turkey’s place therein. Rather, to understand the spread of views on ‘Europe’, we must bear in mind the fact that although ‘Europe’ was the benchmark against which Turkish socio-political transformation was measured (Mardin 1997), Turkish national identity was built in opposition to ‘Europe’ in as much as independence was won against Allied forces after World War I. As such, from the inception of the Turkish Republic onwards, the project of building a homogenous, national identity (Kadıoğlu 1998) entailed importation of the main political values from Europe, whilst simultaneously defining national particularity in juxtaposition to ‘Europe’ (Müftüler-Baç 2000).

The importance but ambivalence of the ‘European’ referent of national identity is reflected in the positions of the main players in Turkey’s contest over its EU vocation today. These players fall into four broad groups: Kemalists, Islamists, liberals, and right-wing nationalists. We do not claim that all players in Turkish politics fit
into one of these camps. They are, however, the groups which play a crucial role in the debate over Turkey’s European vocation and who appear most concerned with the question of whether it is possible and/or desirable to reconcile Turkish identity and a European identity symbolised by cosmopolitan values. Table 5.1 presents the main political parties in Turkey with respect to the electoral support they received in the 2007 national and 2009 municipal elections. The electoral support these parties received also demonstrates to a certain extent the degree of public support for elite perceptions on the relationship between Turkish identity and the European project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes in 2007 elections</th>
<th>Percentage of votes in 2009 municipal elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP/DP-True Path Party and Democratic Party</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents*</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (smaller parties)</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 2007 elections a coalition of left-of-centre elements and the Kurdish DTP ran as a coalition of independents to get past the 10 per cent electoral threshold for parliamentary seats. In the 2009 municipal elections, however, the DTP fielded candidates, winning 5.4 per cent of the nationwide vote. Source: Radikal and Milliyet (Turkish daily newspapers) July 2007 and March 2009.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) may be considered part of the Islamist camp, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) as part of the Kemalist camp, and the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) as part of the right-wing nationalist camp. Liberals are not represented by any one party, but nevertheless help shape the parameters of the national debate over ‘Europe’ due to their strong presence in the media.

Importantly, none of the four camps is monolithic, and there may be divergence within camps and convergence across camps. People who self-consciously identify themselves as ‘Kemalist’, for example, come in at least two varieties. The more hard-line amongst them have made defence of their interpretation of Atatürk’s principles of secularism and national sovereignty their raison d’être. Their interpretation of the
latter revolves around the Kemalist injunction, ‘Sovereignty is unconditionally the nation’s’3 to protect national sovereignty at all costs, a commitment not particularly compatible with a will for cosmopolitanism. Indeed, many elements of the discourse of these Kemalists overlap with that of the nationalist right. Around 2005, such discourse became the hallmark of the ruling faction of the CHP, which won 21 per cent of the vote in the June 2007 national elections. It is also endorsed by important elements of the military and judiciary. This discourse in its most hard-line fashion assigns an increased role to the Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish public life as the ‘guardian of the Turkish state’ and envisages any concessions on the secular, republican character of the Turkish state as a threat which, if necessary, must be countered by force.

A second strain of Kemalism, however, is represented by what we might call ‘social democrat Kemalists’. These cohorts come from the CHP tradition and were affiliated with the party until its recent hard-line turn. In lieu of the emphasis on national sovereignty, social democrat Kemalists tend to privilege Atatürk’s injunction that Turks and Turkey rise to the level of ‘contemporary civilisation’ (muasır medeniyet) traditionally understood as the West and associated today with ‘universal values’. In principle then, they seek integration with Europe. That said, they are also wary of the possibility that EU-oriented revisionism could empower anti-systemic forces.

Islamists too come in several shapes and sizes. Many (though by no means all) are represented by the AKP. The AKP has controlled the parliament and government since 2002, when it received 35 per cent of the national vote, and the presidency since it took 47 per cent of the vote in the June 2007 national elections. For much of the multi-party period since 1946, Islamist discourse was anti-Western, but in 1997 a clash with the secularist establishment precipitated a split between hard-liners and moderates, the latter of whom came to dominate the movement. On February 28 1997, during a National Security Council 4

3 ‘Egemenlik, kayıtsız, şartsız milletindir’
4The NSC played an advisory role in which four military commanders and the Turkish chief of staff together with the prime minister, the ministers of interior and foreign affairs and the president came together regularly to discuss domestic and foreign policy. As an institution which incorporates the military into Turkish politics, it has been criticised by the EU since 1998.
meeting, a signal was sent to the Islamists who were at the time a coalition partner that the military would not tolerate encroachments on secularism in Turkey. Today, whilst hard-liners retain the traditional anti-Western posture, ‘moderate Islamists’ – a label frequently used in the literature – tend to employ a pro-EU, pro-human rights discourse which appears to be reconciled with political and economic liberalism (Fokas 2004: 131). That said, they continue to place great importance on the religious underpinnings of their political identity. As Turkish prime minister and the leader of AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared, ‘There is no such thing as moderate Islam’. ⁵ The concern for religiosity goes hand in hand with a commitment to carving out greater space for religious semiotics like the headscarf in public life. This piques the fear of some secularists that moderate Islamists’ embrace of ‘universal values’ is instrumental – a strategy for penetrating and eventually undermining the secular state. ⁶ In other words, Turkish secularists, represented most prominently by the Kemalists, fear that the AKP government’s professed commitment to meeting the EU accession criteria is a ploy to bring down secularism in Turkey and open the road for an Islamic state (Müftüler-Baç 2009).

A second group of Islamists within the AKP coalition are nationalist Islamists, many of whom migrated to the party from centre-right and far-right nationalist parties like the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the MHP. Such Islamists tend to back the moderate Islamist challenge to Kemalist secularism. Indicatively, former Justice Minister and current Minister of State Cemil Çiçek – a figure who may be characterised as a nationalist Islamist – described Kemalist secularism as being almost ‘North Korean’ in its rigidity.⁷ Yet, and fascinatingly, nationalist Islamist discourse on questions related to national sovereignty and identity tends to align with that of hard-line Kemalists and right-wing nationalists, all of whom envisage the body politic as a corporate, Turkish-Muslim entity exclusive of non-Turkish and non-Muslim identities (e.g. Kurds, Armenians, Jews)

⁶ See, for example Jenkins 2003.
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(Fisher Onar 2009). This meant that the likes of Çiçek were highly critical of moves like those of Turkish liberals to problematise the official line on the Armenian question – an initiative which, by way of contrast, was applauded by European actors keen that Turkey ‘confront the past’ before acceding to a Union predicated on reconciliation of past differences. Tellingly, Çiçek characterised a conference organised by liberal revisionists on the Armenian issue as:

A dagger in the back of the Turkish nation [...] We must put an end to this cycle of irresponsibility, lack of seriousness, treason and insult, and propaganda conducted against this nation by those who carry this nation’s identity cards.

(Arslan 2008)

This is particularly telling in terms of illustrating the common ground between these Islamists and nationalists with respect to their vision of Turkish collective identity as relatively removed from cosmopolitan, universal values. When all is said and done, however, nationalist Islamist figures tend to toe the more pro-EU line of the AKP leadership. Their lukewarm endorsement is characterised, nevertheless, by a tendency to play up common geostrategic interests with the EU, and play down common values. As Çiçek declared on another occasion, ‘The EU is a political and economic power but not a problem-solving’ or ‘strategic power […] it cannot be so without Turkey’.8

A third, and the most EU-friendly group in the country may be labelled ‘liberals’. They also have at least two faces. One is associated with the politically and economically liberal but socially conservative centre-right tradition that dominated civilian politics during the second half of the twentieth-century but which has been sidelined today by the AKP. A second group – sometimes referred to as ‘liberal-leftists’ – come from a left-wing tradition of opposition to the Kemalist establishment. Persecution in the wake of the 1971 and 1980 coups catalysed their embrace of political liberalism and social

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Liberals do not field a political party. They do, though, wield agenda-setting power due to their strong presence in media, academia, business, and civil society. Since the early 2000s, a number of liberals from both sub-strands cooperated with moderate Islamists in the name of EU-oriented reform as journalists at Islamist newspapers, or by running for parliament on the AKP ticket. For example, the current Minister of Culture under the AKP government, Ertuğrul Gunay, is a former left-wing politician who turned to liberalism and then found space for himself in the Islamist camp. Similarly, a number of liberal-oriented businessmen support AKP rule as it provided for economic stability during much of the 2000s.

Finally, right-wing nationalists in Turkey tend to be associated with the National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi MHP) founded by pan-Turkist Alparslan Türkeş. Though some are secularist, and others insist that Islamic religiosity is a core element of Turkishness, they share an anti-Western, anti-imperialist, populist platform. They are arguably the most Euro-sceptic group in Turkey, tending to interpret European demands regarding pluralism and the Kurdish and Armenian questions in particular through the prism of the ‘Sèvres syndrome’. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s declaration: ‘The EU process is harming the Turkish national interests in all realms’ is telling in that aspect. Even though the MHP has never been able to get majority votes in the Turkish elections, their consistent electoral support of around 15 per cent over the decades has made them valuable coalition partners. As a result, the MHP has taken part intermittently in coalition governments since the 1970s. They were coalition partners in the 1999-2002 government, and in the 2007 elections the party took 14 per cent of the vote, garnering it a place in the Turkish Parliament. As we have noted, the nationalist line is also very strong among Kemalists and certain segments of the Islamists. The MHP, however, is organised solely around the

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9 In the 1971 coup alone, for instance, over 5000 academics, journalists, writers, and trade unionists affiliated with the left were arrested, some of whom were tortured, see Zürcher 1995: 272.

10 Named for the treaty which would have parcelled out the Ottoman Empire to European Great Powers as well as Greek, Kurdish, and Armenian elements in the wake of World War I

nationalist logic, playing on and playing up fears in the Turkish collective imagination that EU demands represent a re-enactment of events after World War I when European powers were intent on dividing Turkey. Thus, the European project is approached with scepticism by those groups who tend to see the EU as a tool for dividing Turkey rather than a civilisational and modernising project. Table 5.2 summarises the position of the four camps vis-à-vis the prospect of adherence to the EU/European project defining its broad sense.

Table 5.2: Position of the Kemalist, Islamist, liberal and right-wing nationalists’ camps towards the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political camp</th>
<th>Position towards EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kemalists</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Hard-line’</td>
<td>Pro-EU w/major caveats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Social democrat’</td>
<td>Pro-EU w/caveats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamists</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Moderate’</td>
<td>Pro-EU w/caveats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Nationalist’</td>
<td>Pro-EU w/major caveats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberals</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w/Centre-right roots</td>
<td>Pro-EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w/Leftist roots</td>
<td>Pro-EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right-wing nationalists</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Secular’</td>
<td>Anti-EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Religious’</td>
<td>Anti-EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Universals, universal values, and EU-niversalism

The universal and universal values

We now turn to the views of actors from these four camps as to what values, if any, qualify as universal.\(^{12}\) It appears that with the exception of some right-wing nationalists there is a cross-cutting consensus that there are indeed universals. A ‘universal’ was frequently described as something which is valid for people everywhere despite the nuances of language, culture, and geography. That said, there was considerable nuance both across and within camps.

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\(^{12}\) We use the term to refer not only to the EU, but also to the broader CoE/OSCE normative regime, as employed by Nicolaidis (2008).
There was, for instance, a concern over the degree to which any phenomenon could be characterised as genuinely universal. Some felt that only physics, maths, and human biology were truly universal. Certain human needs and emotions were also seen as universal, from hunger and the need for sleep, to desire for a moral framework. Others went further, identifying the universal with shared principles or values. There was accord that the more one delves into the moral, the social, and the cultural, the more one encounters exception and particularity. There were attempts to identify at what point the universal elides into the particular. A politician and a former diplomat used the language of international relations, defining the universal as something non- or supra-national, something global. A liberal newspaper editor and a representative of the religious right both evoked the Ottoman term *cihan şümül*, meaning ‘encompassing the world’, as an ideal. But, the latter asserted with inflections of nationalist Islamism, that it was necessary to temper the ideal with the particular and practical:

> From the point of view of humanism and religion, I look at the universal with sympathy. Yet I am someone who, above all, loves the Turkish nation. I would never put my own country, the values and interest of my people, in the background. So a humanist ideal, *cihan şümül*, certainly should be our goal. But honestly, with the conditions before us, these are a bit far away. As an old politician *Realpolitik* seems more important to me.

In this formulation, the universal is a transnational, indeed transcendental ideal. But the here and now requires patriotism and realism. As will be shown, this equation of universality with utopia, and particularity with the real world, was also characteristic of the right-wing nationalist responses.

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13 Interviews with Ali Çarkoğlu, Sencer Ayata.
14 Interview with Murat Belge.
15 Interviews with Baskin Oran, Zekeriya Akçam.
16 Interviews with Şeyfi Oktay, Etyen Mahcupyan, Zekeriya Akçam.
17 Interviews with Özdem Sanberk, Yaşar Yakış.
18 Interview with İsmet Berkan.
19 Interview with Hasan Celal Güzel.
Meanwhile, there was considerable diversity in the temporality assigned to the universal. For many Islamists, the universal was located in a pre-modern past and post-modern, globalised world. Modernity, in between and in eclipse, was a force which homogenised societies into national particulars and set them in conflict with one another.\textsuperscript{20} The Harvard-educated editor-in-chief of the Islamist daily \textit{Yeni Şafak} said, for example, that in the past people were bound by their place of birth. This meant that when they looked at the stars they felt themselves ‘enclosed by a great universe’. This could lead to parochialism, but could also move a person ‘to search for points of contact with others, with the Other’. Though enchanted receptivity to the universal belonged to a bygone era, globalisation and complex webs of communication create opportunities today for comparable reciprocal influence (\textit{karşılıklı etkileşim}).\textsuperscript{21} A similar point was made by an AKP legislator, for whom the universal was something he came to understand growing up in a village. It is,

\begin{quote}
A state of first knowledge [...] the impromptu understanding that people everywhere have the same impressions, understand things in the same way [...] Modernity silences this basic truth through institutions like military service, which force you to ‘stand in file, sing anthems, wear the same clothing; you learn to battle, you learn Atatürk. But when you go home you see that life hasn’t changed much’.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

On the other hand, for many secularists of both the Kemalist and liberal stripe, the universal was not something intrinsic that was suppressed and then recovered through globalised inter-connectivity, but a work-in-progress embedded in the actualisation of modernity. Though we are still at an early stage in its instantiation, certain principles and values have acquired an aura of universality. As a former CHP Minister of Justice observed, the universal is about ‘shared values, principles, views, and ways of behaving that are increasingly accepted by people everywhere as common values’.\textsuperscript{23} Liberals agreed that the universal was evolutive and hoped one day

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{20} Interviews with Fehmi Koru, Akif Emre.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Fehmi Koru.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Zekeriya Akçam.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview with Seyfi Oktay.
\end{flushleft}
to see universal ‘rules’, ‘values’, ‘principles’, ‘standards’, ‘norms’, and ‘logic’ accepted everywhere. Several explicitly and positively associated the universal with the West. But they were also concerned with a tension between an emergent global consensus on the universal and the need for cultural pluralism. A Turkish-Armenian columnist explained his reservations:

The content of the word ‘universal’ is determined by conjecture […] when a Westerner says ‘universal’ its not clear that [his understanding] contains Chinese culture […] perhaps if this global world continues different understandings of the universal will speak to one another, at least at the intellectual level. But I think that the notion of the universal has yet to make itself independent of local culture, for example, Christian universalism.

Interestingly, this furtive hope for pluralistic universalism was attractive, at least in principle, for one right-wing nationalist, a one-time contender for chairmanship of the MHP. In practice, though, he was sceptical:

It’s not that I think there can’t be a universal culture of values; it’s just not about one culture. It’s about a framework of different cultures being able to come together on common points. And those points aren’t as rare as often thought, not at all […] However, the dominant Western-centric culture, instead of looking for common points in other cultures, says I have this value, you accept it, case closed […] This sparks a reaction in the other side before the common ‘universal culture’ can be constituted.

He went on to explain that the values touted as ‘universal’ since the eighteenth century are rooted in and serve the interests of ‘Anglo-Saxon nationalism’. Other right-wing nationalists did not even broker

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24 Interviews with Murat Belge, Şahin Alpay, Ayşe Kadioğlu, Fuat Keyman, Baskın Oran, Hasan Bülent Kahraman.
25 Baskın Oran, Hasan Bülent Kahraman.
26 Interviews with Murat Belge, Aydin Uğur.
27 Interview with Etyen Mahçupyan.
28 Interview with Ümit Özdağ.
the possibility of universals. Instead, they immediately attributed political and ideological content to the concept. For a former diplomat and columnist, the universal was the ideal of individualistic, cosmopolitan, urban intellectuals who dismiss nationalism as anachronistic and dangerous. They see globalisation as auguring a ‘new civilisation and think there is no turning back’. Yet, ‘nobody here has experienced this yet and we don’t see many examples around us’.29

With the exception of right-wing nationalist sentiment, then, there was considerable consensus about the possibility of universals. This translated into a comparable consensus – with right-wing nationalists as the spoilers – when it came to the question of whether there are universal values. Turks across the political spectrum upheld the trinity of basic rights and freedoms, rule of law, and democracy. The only exception came from right-wing nationalists, who did not disavow these principles but who cited ‘territorial integrity’, ‘respect’, and ‘defence of national culture’ as priorities.30 Social democrat Kemalists and a number of liberals (of leftist extract) were attentive to social and collective rights related to labour and employment.31 Islamists, on the other hand, cited freedom of religion,32 and the principle of inviolability (of one’s rights) as the overarching universal principle – an understanding that also resonates in Hanafi jurisprudence.33

The European project

If there was accord on the possibility of universals and universal values, there was far more ambivalence when it came to the question of whether an EU project predicated on universal values is legitimate. Still more contentious was the question of whether Turks could or should participate in such a project. Broadly, Turks from all four camps tended to believe that a cosmopolitan Europe built on ‘universal values’ was a valid and honourable undertaking in and of

29 Interview with Gündüz Aktan.
30 Interviews with Oktay Vural, Mehmet Şandır.
31 Ercan Karakaş, Seyfi Oktay, Şahin Alpay, Murat Belge.
32 Interview with Yaşar Yakış.
33 See Şentürk (2005).
itself, but displayed some equivocation as to Turkey’s role in such a project.

Social democrat Kemalists, for example, displayed both admiration for the European project and concern at the way its protagonists were handling Turkey’s candidacy. As a former CHP minister put it, the EU was a

Very hard, large, and important project, which though at the beginning of the road [...] has put an end to all the meaningless wars Europe fought for centuries’. With that sense of social solidarity that is part of European history and culture, it may yet right some of the injustices in today’s world.34

Yet, perhaps because of their initial admiration, social democrat Kemalists also displayed a sense of betrayal over the EU handling of Turkey’s candidacy. One figure, for instance, lauded the EU as the greatest project of its era, but proceeded to lament its misunderstanding of the Turkish situation. ‘I can’t understand’, he said with passion, ‘how they can say that Kemalism is an obstacle to Turkey achieving universal values. If it were not for Kemalism Turkey would be a theocratic state ruled by Islamic law like Saudi Arabia or Iran’.35 Kemalism had sought to construct a democratic, secular Rechtsstaat, to protect human rights, and have them be embraced by the people. He explained Turkey’s deficiencies on these counts with the same logic he used to explain the EU’s shortcomings: the instantiation of universal values is a process and cannot be achieved overnight. What was most important, he argued, was that Kemalism had secured the transition from a sacred to a rational ontology – a prerequisite for embracing universal values and something which the AKP, with unwitting EU support, sought to undermine. Similarly, a former vice-chairman of the CHP affirmed the legitimacy of the EU’s foundations, but lamented that Brussels and member states, ‘imprisoned in their own prejudices’, had exhibited ‘insincerity, double standards, condescension, and a stubborn insistence on not understanding Turkey’s problems’. This, he feared, had engendered a tremendous anti-EU front within

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34 Interview with Ercan Karakaş.
35 Interview with Seyfi Oktay.
Turkish society. The upshot was that he was now forced in his speeches to cast the need for greater freedoms as a requisite of ‘contemporary civilisation’ (çağdaş medeniyet) as distinct from European civilisation. ‘Of course these are the same thing’, he told me, ‘but at this point I can’t use the word ‘European’ or ‘Western’ without alienating people from the values themselves’. This statement flags a very important elision in Kemalist thinking, suggesting that Kemalists who have long taken ‘Europe’ to symbolise ‘contemporary civilisation’ feel increasingly alienated and perceive European actors to be strengthening the hands of religious conservatives like the AKP. Such sentiment was also discernible in the words of the first civilian – but nonetheless staunchly Kemalist – secretary general of the National Security Council, who challenged the assumption that ‘muasır medeniyet’ is tantamount to the West by arguing that if Atatürk had meant the West he would not have spoken about ‘contemporary civilisation’ at all and rather would have enjoined Turks to ‘Go to the West, find the West, resemble the West’.37

For liberals, on the other hand, Europe’s cosmopolitan aspirations were admirable and inconsistencies in the project were not grounds for losing faith. A cosmopolitan Europe might be built on values that had emerged out of a parochial context. But it was not doomed to Eurocentrism – if it managed to ‘democratise itself’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world it could achieve its true potential. This view flags an important element of liberal discourse in that the EU is deemed an important and legitimate anchor only when it is perceived to be democratic. The emphasis on democracy as necessary for the diffusion of cosmopolitan values could be treated as empirical evidence that Turkish liberals, though drawn to the notion of the EU as a post-national, cosmopolitan union, worry that the Union may not be able to fulfil that potential. As the editor of Radikal explained, ‘I am a non-believer and I have found my personal ethical framework in universal human rights’; these principles were used instrumentally by the OSCE during the Cold War, and by the EU towards

36 Interview with Erol Tuncer.
38 Interview with Etyen Mayçupyan.
candidates. But ‘even if I’m not entirely pleased, I don’t think it’s wrong either. It’s politicised but based on legitimate foundations’. Yet, like his social democrat Kemalist counterparts, he worried that the EU tendency to ‘dictate from above, to say you are backward peoples and societies’ had engendered a rejection of the values themselves, in Turkey, but even more dramatically in Putin’s Russia. A liberal columnist similarly believed Turkey must reform along the lines necessary for adhesion to a post-national, cosmopolitan Europe, but expressed frustration at recent EU policies. He believed that by introducing new, informal criteria for accession and ‘double standards over Cyprus’, the Union was impeding rather than facilitating Turkish adoption of cosmopolitan values. If the EU could only manage to practice what it preached, there was nothing wrong with embracing ‘universal values’ which emerged out of the Western canon. This view was further corroborated by a leading member of the Turkish chapter of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly who argued, on the one hand, that ‘those who insist on ‘our culture’ don’t mention that tanks and machine guns are also Western inventions’; on the other, he worried that the EU had recently abandoned its normative thrust for Realpolitik towards Russia and the Arab world.

In a vein not dissimilar to social democrat Kemalists and liberal commentators, an advisor to the AKP leadership was unperturbed by the EU’s bid to diffuse ‘universal values’. Its great achievement was in having compelled both members and candidates to adopt universal values, something which regretfully has yet to happen at the global level. Other Islamists endorsed the values but emphasised that they were part of a global inheritance emanating from the UN declaration – the Copenhagen Criteria (CC), after all, were simply a summary of other documents. As the chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights put it, a ‘norm becomes universal when it is accepted by all countries in the world, not just Europeans’. Another moderate Islamist acknowledged the

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39 Interview with İsmet Berkan.
40 Interview with Şahin Alpay.
41 Interview with Murat Belge.
42 Interview with Fehmi Koru.
43 Interview with Mehmet Elkatmış.
44 Interview with Mehmet Elkatmış.
European roots of the canon of universal values, crediting the Enlightenment for ‘opening’ the West to the universal. However, and in contrast to Kemalist and liberal views, this ‘opening’ did not have ‘to go the route of secularisation or be done in a European way [...] that first knowledge [...] that reflexive answer [can be] discovered from within one’s own tradition’, be it Islam or Hinduism.45

This observation reveals a concern with the (post-) Christian subtext of the European project. Social democrats, for example, were upset by the proposal to include a reference to religion in the draft constitution.46 Many Islamists, on the other hand, objected not to the proposed insertion of religiosity into the constitutional framework but to the exclusion of Islam from the canon of Western religions. As the editor of Yeni Şafak saw it, a reference to Europe’s Judeo-Christian-Islamic heritage would have acknowledged the debt to Islam for transmitting ancient Hellas to the Renaissance and the Aristotelian underpinnings of Islamic philosophy. It also would have enriched and empowered the EU in the eyes of millions of European Muslims.47 Still other Islamists were not bothered by the (post-) Christian subtext, so long as it was neither an instrumental nor existential reason for Turkey’s exclusion from cosmopolis. As an AKP delegate to the European Convention put it:

Why are you so jealous? Allow us to bring these values to Anatolia. We’ll take care of ourselves materially [...] We’ll uphold certain standards. [...] But don’t bargain over universal values [...] It’s possible to have cohabitation but don’t force every aspect of your universalism onto us. We’re not going to force you to become Muslim or veiled [...] We want a common language to share our common values in the public sphere. But don’t invade our private space.48

Interestingly then, both social democrat Kemalists and many Islamists pointed keenly to Turkey’s will to participate in a universal

45 Interview with Zekeriya Akçam.
46 Interviews with Murat Karayalçın, Ercan Karakaş.
47 Interviews with Fehmi Koru, Yaşar Yakış.
48 Interview with Zekeriya Akçam. He also added that he was not referring to a Habermasian public sphere, which he declared too abstract a concept to be useful in practice.
civilisation. They differed in the sources to which they attributed this receptivity. For the former, the source was Atatürk’s directive that Turkey ‘achieve contemporary civilisation’. As a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs observed, adjusting the Turkish project to the requisites of universal civilisation was the most important question facing the country. Atatürk, he explained, had recognised that the world would change. His open-ended directive sought to ensure that Turkey would accommodate the spirit of new times. In this view, Atatürk was misunderstood by those who thought themselves his most loyal defenders (presumably a reference to hard-line Kemalists). These cohorts did not realise that Atatürk’s emphasis on national sovereignty was based on the exigencies of the 1920s. But conditions today demand greater openness to international norms and institutions. Once before hostile European nation states had recognised this and transformed themselves into a Union, pooling sovereignty to survive and thrive under conditions of global interdependence.49

The Turkish-Armenian columnist believed that this had been understood at the grassroots level where traditional frames of reference were losing their meaning. Cosmopolitan ethics could take their place as a common reference point for Kurds and Turks, Islamists and secularists, because today these groups all desired human rights, democratisation, and freedoms. ‘People here’, he said, ‘want to be citizens of the world, want to be accepted by the rest of the world, want to live according to the same standards that people have elsewhere’.50

If social democrat Kemalists flagged ‘contemporary civilisation’, and liberals an emergent cosmopolitan ethos, moderate Islamists pointed to Sunni Islam and the Ottoman legacy as the source of Turkish receptivity to universal values. Turkish Islam was described as intrinsically ‘civic’ and ‘liberal’ because there was no clergy as in the West or Iran. This predisposed Turkish Muslims to a universalist rather than particularistic understanding of the world. Ottoman cosmopolitanism was another source, because under the universalist

49 Interview with Özdem Sanberk.
50 Interview with Etyen Mayçupyan. Interestingly, this statement gave credence to right-wing nationalist castigation of liberals as marginal societal actors.
Ottoman Empire everyone ‘was free to have their own community in which they were able to live their own truths (hakikat)’\textsuperscript{51}. This order could be (re)constituted through the process of EU accession, making Turkey a strong and positive force in the region and world\textsuperscript{52}.

A similar argument was made by a commentator with nationalist Islamist leanings. This translated into a slightly different reading of the legacy of Ottoman pluralism. In his view, 700 years of cohabitation under the Pax Ottomana has the most bearing for inter-ethnic rather than inter-faith relations. For the Turkish people – “heirs of a universalist civilisation’ – do not see an ‘Other’ when faced with others; our people are not racist\textsuperscript{53}.

Interestingly, the theme of Turks as intrinsically tolerant of ethnic difference also took pride of place in the discourse of a number of right-wing nationalists\textsuperscript{54}. But it was deployed in discourses seeking to discredit the European project as a totalising bid to eradicate difference. Europe was accused of constantly seeking to ‘invent minorities’ as part of an insidious attempt to undermine Turkey’s traditional ‘melting pot’\textsuperscript{55}. EU pretensions to cosmopolitanism were thus dismissed as a façade for the advancement of a power-hungry and essentially (post-) Christian Europe. Brussels’ imposition of its own understanding of human rights, democracy, and multiculturalism was characterised as an attempt to destabilise Turkey, its age-old and up-and-coming rival\textsuperscript{56}. Indeed, Western understandings of human rights were underpinned by an individualism that was, though, to undermine the cohesion of Turkey’s cultural and social fabric. As an MHP vice-chairman put it:

Democracy is a system for a society to diagnose its own problems and realise its own preferences; it should not be forced to observe human rights. Human rights are about having

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\textsuperscript{51} Interviews with Ayhan Bilgen, Zekeriya Akçam.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Yaşar Yakış.
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Fehmi Koru.
\textsuperscript{54} Interviews with Hasan Ünal, Oktay Vural.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with Hasan Ünal.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Ümit Özdağ.
a dignified life, and what is the point of a human rights canon that counts national identity and national culture for nothing?\textsuperscript{57}

Another nationalist – a former diplomat – also suggested that the EU’s cosmopolitanism was thin. Its ‘universal values’, he argued, had only recently been lifted from the Council of Europe (CoE), and EU actors employed these values with great ‘ambivalence and double standards’. This led Turks to believe that the EU is ‘absolutely not about universal values, and [that these values], in the full sense of the word, are being used against Turkey’. The ambivalence which infused Europe’s cosmopolitan pretensions, he argued, was rooted in a futile attempt to purge European civilisation of two intrinsic traits. The first was its warlike nature, the second its incomparable propensity to ‘Otherise’. All societies marginalise ‘Others’ in the act of self-definition, but the European impulse, he asserted, was so venomous it sought to annihilate its ‘Others’ – non-Christians in the Inquisition, women in witch hunts, Jews in the Holocaust. After the self-induced trauma of two world wars, European actors sought to purge these impulses by endorsing the peace project and a flimsy multiculturalism. But under the surface, he believed, these traits and a sense of guilt over them endured. Europe managed its repressed self-hatred by projecting it onto others. This was ironically manifest, he declared, in European condemnation of countries said to have poor records on human rights and multiculturalism like Turkey. In his view, then, criticising Turkey thus enabled Europeans to blithely overlook their own racism, Turkophobia, and Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{58}

Notably, both hard-line Kemalists and nationalist Islamists endorsed elements of this discourse. This was particularly the case with regard to EU criticism on free speech grounds of statutes like Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prescribed up to three years imprisonment for ‘insulting Turkishness’. Article 301 was included in the 2005 Penal Code, which lifted many other restrictions on freedom of speech. However, the inclusion of Article 301 in the new code has made it possible to open cases against prominent figures like novelist Orhan Pamuk and journalist Hrant Dink on the grounds that they had made public statements insulting to ‘Turkishness’. Even though

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Oktay Vural.
\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Gündüz Aktan.
most cases never reached court or were dismissed immediately when judges opened proceedings, the existence of Article 301 in the Turkish Penal Code testifies to the differences across the four political camps. The EU expects to see the article removed from the Penal Code in line with the Copenhagen criteria, but there is a strong opposition to its removal from, above all, right-wing nationalists. Nationalist Kemalists and Islamists also tend to interpret EU pressure regarding Article 301 through the prism of the famous Sèvres syndrome – the collective fear of dismemberment at the hands of European actors. Thus Kemalist, Islamist and right-wing nationalists alike were inclined to read EU criticism of Turkey’s shortcomings in upholding universal values as a façade for the advancement of Turkey-hating interests seeking, *inter alia*, to lay the groundwork for eventual recognition of the events of 1915 as ‘genocide’. The response of the chairman of the CHP to a French parliamentary resolution criminalising genocide denial was indicative:

> To see the children of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau fall to these depths is heartbreaking. There is no connection between [the French resolution] and human rights or civilisation. [...] What they are saying is: ‘Rescind 301 so that we can easily say there was an Armenian genocide and insult Turkishness’.\(^{59}\)

In the nationalist Islamist reading, moreover, the supposedly Turkophobic subtext to Europeans’ attempt to uphold universal values was tantamount to Islamophobia.\(^{60}\) For, when it comes to European criticism of Article 301, ‘what comes to mind is the “Armenian question”, or the role of the EU as a “shepherd of Cypriot interests.”’\(^{61}\) European actors’ purported instrumentalisation of ‘universal values’ was all the more deplorable in light of what was interpreted as patent disregard for the rights of pious Muslims. This

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\(^{59}\) ‘Baykal: Rousseau’nun Çocukları Ne Hale Düştü!’ *Radikal*, 11 October 2006. In April 2008, the law was modified by the AKP-led parliament. The new version prescribed, amongst other things, two rather than three years’ imprisonment. The purpose was to make it more difficult for maverick ultranationalists to invoke the law to harass intellectuals and journalists. However, Turkish and international watchdog groups fear that the revised law still leaves far too much scope for abuse.

\(^{60}\) Interview with Mehmet Elkatmış.

was said to be evident in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which upholds the rights of homosexuals, Jews, Jehovah’s witnesses, and even conscientious objectors - who ‘refuse to do their duty to their country’\textsuperscript{62} – but condones the violation of the rights of Turkish Muslims.\textsuperscript{63} Particularly rankling were Court decisions upholding the closure of Islamist parties and a ban on veiling in public institutions including universities. By thus alleging ‘double standards’ on the part of European actors, nationalist Islamists, together with right-wing nationalists and hard-line Kemalists, were able to disavow the prospect of Turkey becoming a part of a cosmopolitan European enterprise.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that whilst Turkish political elites tend to have a favourable impression of the European project in and of itself, they are more ambivalent towards Turkish incorporation to this project. The empirical analysis revealed that elites from diverse political camps believed in the possibility of universals, universal values, and the legitimacy of a political project predicated on those values such as the EU. Even a sprinkling of right-wing nationalists who were sceptical towards the European attempt to turn a project based on ‘universal values’ into a political platform asserted that genuinely common values were possible in principle if not practice. That said, there was some discomfiture with the parochial origins of the values upon which the nascent EU polity was said to be predicated. For social democrat Kemalists, liberals, and moderate Islamists this was not an insurmountable problem so long as European actors acted in an inclusive fashion. For hard-line Kemalists, nationalist Islamists, and right-wing nationalists, however, the tensions associated with the cosmopolitan enterprise were reflections of ‘double standards’ towards Turkish Muslims animated by a neo-imperialist will to dominate and dismember Turkey on the one hand, and an existential inability to accept Turkish-Muslims as *bona fide* members of a European-cum-universal commonality on the other.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview with Mehmet Elkatmış.

\textsuperscript{63} Interview with Mehmet Elkatmış.
As the Turkish negotiations for EU accession unfold and the impact of the EU criteria is felt in everyday life, there will be ever greater debate and recognition of the impact of EU values on Turkish collective identity. And what do these findings tell us with respect to the evolution of the EU as a federal state, an intergovernmental body or a cosmopolitan union? We have found out that the different camps of the Turkish elite react to the EU project through the prism of their own personal experiences and belief systems and there is no one uniform vision of the EU project amongst the elite, while neither is there a similar perception as to where Turkey fits into that EU project.
References


Chapter 6

Hungarians and Europe
‘A rather strange relationship’

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Issues concerning the present and future structure of the European Union
The European Union, as a political, societal, economic and cultural structure, is both reality and a plan to be implemented, a long-term project and an objective. Its implementation depends on conditions at various levels, but some of these conditions have not been ensured; moreover, there is still a great deal of uncertainty, as well as debates concerning goals and available resources (Eder and Giesen 2001). In this chapter, we do not seek to analyse components of political, economic or institutional development. However, we deem it important to look at the conceptual framework of the EU – that is, how its citizens view the community, how attached they are, what expectations they have and what they would like the EU to become. This research is targeted at identity issues, to find out what identity constructions people, average EU citizens, live with. A basic assumption of our research is that identity constructions can be isolated in discourses, in conversations in which people identify with embedding groups and talk about their participation and commitments. The objectives of this research also include an analysis of the interrelation among various identities through discourse about
identities. It is not assumed that identities are unchanging and stable phenomena (Taylor 1989; Ricoeur 1991, 1992; Bauman 1996). This study therefore aims at looking at identity processes, identities in the making and related reasoning. These processes of identity formation are especially worth examining after the 2004 EU enlargement when among Central European countries, Hungary became a member of the EU and thus it can be expected that the process of European integration affects how citizens perceive of their belonging to a new entity, how they evaluate the changes in comparison to their former expectations. The research carried out on discursive materials tried to touch upon the processes of identity formation, changes in identity structures, modifications in feelings of belonging and how these delicate, often unconscious transformations are to be detected in discourses (Góra and Mach, see chapter one in this volume).

Providing an answer to these questions is urgent because the events of the past few years, despite institutional development policies at multiple levels, have not increased the commitment of European residents to the EU. A good example of this mistrust is the referenda blocking ratification of the EU Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, as well as dwindling turnout at the European Parliamentary elections, growing Euroscepticism and the strengthening of nationalist movements.

The lack of commitment of European citizens could be attributed to various conceptual, political, ideological and socio-psychological factors. The theoretical basis of the European Union and the principles of its foundation are not clear: reconciliation within Europe or developing economic cooperation are indeed respectable goals that the community has succeeded in meeting. European integration has made a great deal of progress in order to reach these goals. In the enlarged EU, with its 27 members, however, these goals are too general and poorly operationalised; in order to meet and maintain them, more precisely defined, more detailed and more accurate plans, resources and procedures would be needed. The original structure aimed at eliminating tensions between Germany and France was already shaken up as early as at the time of the first enlargement (the integration of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland), and since the EU, which has become considerably larger, could not always appropriately manage the needs and expectations of new members.
Intricate details of a process of smooth integration, which could ensure agreement and support from a population now in the hundreds of millions, are not yet in place.

Not even on the planning level is there consensus on further directions for the development of the European Union, or on visions for the short and long run; there are competing development plans for the long term. Some actors view the EU as a loose federation of sovereign nation states cooperating on resolving current issues, while others conceptualise it as a superstate above the members, an integrating structure in which the geographically defined nation states are gradually losing their weight and where, by and by, their decision-making authority will be subordinated to common European institutions. According to this concept the nation states will give up more and more of their sovereignty, though one of the most important issues, how the consensus for various decisions would then be achieved (based on majority vote, veto, geographical weighting, etc.) has not been clarified as yet. Though giving up even this small amount of national sovereignty as it is at present is met with much negative sentiment, protest and attacks, there are plans supporting even tighter integration. Based on the democratic traditions of Europe, it would be possible to build a new institutional structure and democracy in which there is a more direct connection between citizens of the community and the institutions governing them. The current model of participatory democracy elicits a lot of criticism – political-philosophical, social-scientific and otherwise – and reshaping it would require the elaboration of new models and broad discussions (Elster 1998). A new mode of operation for the Union could be enhanced by working out new models of democracy based on cosmopolitan citizens’ commitments, new models of a participational democracy built on common rights and responsibilities of European citizens and supported by a reinforced and broadened European public sphere facilitated by new communication technologies (Berezin and Schain 2003). This new model of social structure and development could be an example to be followed not only in Europe but in other regions of the world as well (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, 2008, 2009). Our research attempts to find reflections or traces of these EU concepts in the everyday discourse of the lay public.
A cardinal problem in the current perception of the EU is the role and function of its basic values. The EU, on the one hand, is proclaimed to be based on certain political-philosophical principles: besides the values accepted since the French Revolution – freedom, equality, fraternity – values and principles such as democracy, the secular state’s enhancement of individual accomplishments, freedom of speech, legal equality and protection of human rights are the main basis and are considered as an example outside Europe as well. The EU, however, is not only the realm of abstract values, but also that of concrete interests, and that is the area where major problems may surface. Naturally, the EU is trying to reconcile the interests generated at various levels and of various natures, but there are no appropriate processes for the articulation and confrontation of interests, nor for settling interest battles. And above all, these proceedings are not transparent for voters. Our previous research has indicated that this area is where citizens are the most distrustful and that the EU receives the most criticism. People feel that there are no clear-cut forums and formal procedures for each player at any level in the EU to represent and discuss their interests. Larger or smaller groups of EU citizens, minorities, sub-regions, civil groups, and even the smaller EU member states think that their interests are not represented appropriately, decisions are not made on the basis of their interests, they have no control over strong lobby groups, and ‘the bureaucrats in Brussels’ make decisions high above their heads.

In our research so far the issue of interest articulation has appeared as a grave problem. This applies to the conflict between small and large countries, which often makes citizens of smaller countries think that it is only the ‘big ones’ that have a say in the EU.¹ In the case of Eastern and East-Central Europe the dichotomy of small country/large country is aggravated by the sentiment of an even more serious drawback: the conflict between old and new members. The recently integrated Eastern and East-Central European countries have to cope not only with the transformation problems arising from the integration, but with the economic, political and societal deficit of lagging behind Western Europe for centuries, due to their poor and

¹ This tendency is further strengthened by the communications of EU president countries (see for example the French presidency in 2008 and its media coverage).
delayed development. The people of these countries share a general, bitter feeling of being second-rate citizens of the EU, and of not receiving the same attention and financial support from the EU as the countries integrated earlier (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland, etc.). That sense of being second-rate or inferior is a general phenomenon among the people of Eastern and East-Central European countries which have suffered long oppression and continual regime changes. This frustration was further increased when the strong hope and high expectations concerning European integration proved to be futile.

Resolving problems of integration and identification is hindered by a lack of forums in which to discuss European values and objectives, and also of a shared European public sphere which would promote broad and extensive communication. Experience in Europe’s history also indicates that common communication forums are necessary for new societal formations to evolve (European agora), where participants (whether EU officials, national representatives, civil activists or just interested citizens) are offered an opportunity to discuss problems and possible solutions, to come to agreement and make plans in cooperation (Habermas 1962, 2006; Schlesinger and Kevin 2000). This arena could also provide room for groups, countries or minorities to elaborate their values and interests, to communicate them to others, shape their self-representation and experience such representations from others. This representation facility could build and strengthen cohesion for individuals and groups to serve as a basis for a European identity. Though some hesitant steps have been taken in that direction, the lack of a European public sphere is one of the most negative conditions hindering European integration (Schlesinger 2002).

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2 We can cite a few examples: Euronews, or some scattered TV programmes (Jeux sans frontières, Union libre, etc.), Lettres internationales, which is a European magazine, or Arte, the joint Franco-German television channel, which unfortunately has stayed in a bilateral cultural setting. Most of these examples, however, only address a narrow European elite. Other entertainment programmes are weak and boring.
Several surveys\(^3\) have indicated that there are problems with the European identification of citizens of the EU: they consider themselves to be members of national communities rather than European citizens. Political demands voiced by ethnic minorities have also provoked reactions by the nation states and reinforcement of these communities. The fragmented situation of Eastern and East-Central European nations, centuries-old territorial demands, roused sentiments between states, national or ethnic groups, shady deals by the great powers and the unfounded and ill-considered way the borders were defined (the first and second Versailles Treaties) have further aggravated national problems and have given rise (not only all through the 20th century but even nowadays) to the appearance of radical movements and nationalist, chauvinist and irredentist demands, to the incitement of hatred between communities, ethnic conflicts, and, moreover, ethnic-based cleansing and wars (e.g. the former Yugoslavia). Resolving these conflicts along the borders and on the periphery of Europe in a peaceful and empathic way is one of the most urgent tasks.

**Eastern enlargement**

Following the political regime change in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the former socialist countries aimed to join the integrative organisations of Western Europe (OECD, NATO and the EU). Hungary became an OECD member in 1996 and joined NATO in 1999. Prior to NATO accession a referendum was held on the issue: 49.24 per cent of voters turned up at the polls, with 85.33 per cent of them voting in favour. The pre-referendum campaign emphasised neutralising the several-decade-long propaganda against NATO, but in fact this was not necessary: the public was supportive of Hungary’s Western European integration. An analysis of the public debate on Hungary’s NATO entry (Heller and Rényi 2003a, 2003b), however, indicated that the primary motivation was not for joining NATO, a military organisation, but the European Union, or rather,

Hungarians and Europe

the desired West and its lifestyle. That hidden stake was most spectacularly proven by the various scenarios identified in the discourse analysis of the campaign. Various discursive constructions (scenarios such as ‘the best student’, ‘the winner in the race’, ‘the youngest son in folk tales’) all presented NATO integration as the ante-chamber to joining the European Union and offered options for the public in a way that a rejection of Hungary’s NATO entry could entail exclusion from EU accession as well. The discursive constructions, arguments and argumentation techniques elaborated during the campaign – no matter how irrelevant, stupid or ridiculous they might have seemed – reappeared at the time of the referendum on EU entry.

Hungary had been an associated member of the EU since 1991 and started entry talks with the organisation after the 1998 EU summit in Luxembourg. The negotiations were completed in 2002. At a referendum on April 12, 2003, 45.62 percent of eligible voters turned up, 83.76 percent of them supporting integration. Again, a campaign and public debates preceded entry. The parties and political forces that had been negative about joining NATO (MIÉP, Hungary’s only far-right party at that time, and the Workers’ Party, a renewed but insignificantly small communist party) again adopted a position of rejection. Just as before the NATO referendum, the public discussions focussed on interests rather than on values. Though such topics as the EU’s foundations on principles like democracy, legal equality and civil development were raised, the debates were more targeted at Hungary’s interests in joining the EU and whether enlargement in the East was not mainly dictated by the EU’s or the old EU members’ own interests. The negative arguments about the EU’s interests included, for example, obtaining new markets, control over competitors, gaining great power status, territorial gains, and obtaining cheap labour and property (such as land). The explicitly positive arguments, on the other hand, referred to Hungary’s development and the assumed financial support from the EU, but implicitly utilised the Hungarian population’s love of the West, their quest for Western lifestyles, for becoming a consumer society, as well as such symbolic values as returning to the West or gaining Western recognition for Hungarian culture, etc. The range of expectations at the level of principles and general community values was rather
narrow: to join the ‘winners’, which would compensate Hungarians for losses and injustice suffered over the centuries. People were primarily hoping for private personal gains: importing the Western European welfare state to the ‘East’ in the first place and extending the freedom of consumption and living standards of the West to Eastern Europe. There was a surprisingly large number of arguments seeking to protect traditional Hungarian life and culture, which touched upon entirely irrelevant and superficial topic constructions in terms of joining the EU, such as cardinal components of traditional Hungarian culture like ‘will the EU control the curve of cucumbers?’, or ‘will there be a ban on domestic pig-slaughter or on poppy-seed cakes?’ Both the official campaign and the voters expected that the EU would provide funding, though the purpose, magnitude and utilisation of those amounts were scarcely thematised. In any case, the decision of Hungarians and other Eastern and East-Central European citizens was probably largely influenced by a hope for access to EU funding and assistance, and it might also have been vaguely connected to a hope that Western European consumption levels would soon emerge in the life of the individual. The illusion of ‘land of milk and honey’, however, was quickly confronted with everyday reality, and particularly with the impact of the global crisis in recent months. Public opinion surveys in each recently joined country indicate sudden disillusionment and frustration.4

A shared European identity?
The sentiment and experience of belonging to a community based on a shared civilisation, cultural traditions and values could serve as a basis for a shared European identity. The research our team conducted (analyses of focus group discussions and of other everyday and public discourses) have indicated that the feeling of belonging to a group defined by values of a shared civilisation and culture is rather weak and incomplete. Compared to other epochs (e.g. in comparison with the shared values of the Renaissance, the age of humanism, the Enlightenment, or with the communities of medieval universities or crusaders) the everyday perception of shared components is poor, and their presence is overrun by other

4 Eurobarometer 69 and 70, see note 3.
components defined by globalisation. Therefore the values, problems or issues that could develop cohesion between EU citizens often appear to be global issues impacting the whole of human society (the global economic crisis, pollution of the environment, sustainable development, energy management, pandemics, etc.) and a shared European identity is mostly perceived in situations of conflict with the US.

Our research has shown that cultural diversity, an undeniable advantage of European culture, represents values primarily in the passive patterns of cultural consumption associated with private life, and mainly constitutes a drawback, a divisive factor in terms of building a shared cultural identity. The development of nation states in the 18th-19th centuries was predominantly based on the cohesion of genealogy and kinship and of ethnicity, which took shape in cultural and linguistic traditions. The appearance of the nation state radically suppressed certain identification criteria (feudally determined regional, kinship and other ties), and created, on the other hand, a kind of equality and sense of community within the framework of the nation state. Most of the earlier divisions lost their significance, and members of competing groups, defined by their differences, were elevated to the level of a new unity (Anderson 1982), thus each citizen received a share from the common national criteria. The results of that process of nation-building still serve as a solid basis for nation states, while national movements or political forces can efficiently use the national symbols and identity thus developed and reinforced (Gellner 1983).

Developmental processes in the 20th century were working against these national ideology and power structures, whether we consider

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5 One can refer to the example of French nation-building: the French nation was created by pushing to the background with a strong centralising policy former geographic, feudal, ethnic or kinship differences (Occitanians, Gascons, Catalanians, etc.) Central state administration and the school system played an important role in this process by devaluing, symbolically and otherwise, local languages and cultures, thus enhancing the emergence of a strong centralised common language and culture, having become unquestionable today. Movements of renaissance of local culture as they emerged in the second half of the 20th century could only achieve a status of colourful cultural peculiarity.
the appearance of consumer culture, the ideology of the international working class movement, the strengthening of competing cultural and civilisational structures (e.g. Islam) or that of globalisation; all these trends have been interpreted as a threat by representatives of the nation state and its ideology. In response, they advocated the importance of protecting national traditions, and, consequently, turning inward and isolation. In Hungary, that middle-of-the-road (or ‘third way’) ideology and other nationalist particularisms became extremely popular in certain periods of the 19th and 20th centuries, and gained special importance among the intelligentsia, advocated by well-known authors, artists, and public figures.

Hungary: delayed national development and problems of identity

A central problem in Hungary, just like in other, neighbouring countries, has been that national development had suffered delays during the past few centuries. Lagging behind the economic, political and structural development of Western Europe became an ever-growing problem as time went by (Szűcs 1988), and made these countries take a forced trajectory. Modernisation and closing the gap became the cardinal principle of political options. Hungary’s public life in the 19th and 20th centuries was characterised by the opposition of two ideological-cultural alternatives: the urbane (Western) philosophy of European traditions, advocating patterns of Western development and liberal democracy, or the populist philosophy relying on Hungarian historical traditions including rural lifestyle, national isolation and turning inward (Bibó 1986). In an attempt at making up for delays in the modernisation of Eastern and East-Central Europe there was, however, another alternative in the 20th century: the trend based on communist philosophy, which created the structure of state socialism based on Soviet-style forced modernisation.

The political and power structures based on these radically different politico-philosophical alternatives, competing and quickly replacing each other, made the identification patterns of residents of the region very uncertain. Foreign rule lasting for several centuries, ethnic and national communities manipulated to fight each other, more or less totalitarian regimes, which were based on entirely contrasting values
and ideologies and which were quickly changing in the 20th century, developed apathy and strategies among the population. Double talk, high walls separating private and public life (Ricoeur 2000), turning away from politics and public affairs, withdrawing into secure primordial groups (family, village community, religious groups) weakened identity processes customary in Europe’s luckier regions and brought about the practice of ‘hidden identities’.

In the early 1990s, right after the political regime change, the socialist orientation was forced to withdraw and the urbane and populist trends were changed from two cultural directions different in their values and fundamental principles into political opponents in a public life disrupted by sudden change and deprived of its earlier rules. The new political players coming from intellectual circles, especially from the humanities, soon became involved in heated debates with each other in this new public sphere that lost its norms or boundaries. The debates focused primarily on earlier taboos of state socialism: themes related to the nation, national identity and symbols of that identity. This was why issues such as what should be included in the coat of arms of the state (the crown), which politicians of former times should be reburied with great ceremony, what political force is the best representative of the nation, etc. became subjects for public discussion. Soon after the regime change, the debates focused on principles of categorisation of national identity, on questions of ‘who is Hungarian’, or rather ‘who is a true Hungarian’ and soon members of the opposing political elites were fighting over the right to define the identity of others or even to deprive others of their Hungarian identity (under the pretext of discussing criteria of being part of the Hungarian nation). Such debates over issues of definition will inevitably raise the topics of inclusion and exclusion (Tilly 2005), therefore discussions concerning national identity made it legitimate to measure the ascriptive criteria of identity, the classification and segregation of others by self-appointed public speakers of the populist trend, who considered themselves as Hungarian beyond doubt – in the very middle of mainstream public discourse as early as 1990 (Csoóri 1991; Heller and Rényi 1996a, 1996b). Rapidly spreading racism and anti-Semitism soon made stigmatisation customary and acceptable, and solidified the exaggeration of national values and the flammable mixture of a
feeling of inferiority rooted in frustration and extreme pride. Though some participants in the early discussions (Spiró 1990) pointed out the obsoleteness of the role of the populist intelligentsia, the vicious competition arising from cultural opposition has not ceased, but has increasingly become a cornerstone of public life and parliamentary politics. The populist intelligentsia, authors and public writers made attempts to preserve the symbolic assets through which they sought to secure their former social position in a completely different political and social situation by way of expropriating the criteria of national identity and dispensing or denying them to other people. The theme of national identity was present all through the debates preceding the EU accession, playing a role primarily in interest-based considerations: on the one hand, it was used in the early and rather weak Eurosceptic arguments, and on the other, it was included in utilitarian, interest-based considerations concerning Hungary’s possible benefits. As a result, it is not surprising that the theme of national identity stayed predominant in Hungary’s public discourse even after the country’s integration (Heller and Rényi 2008). The situation is further worsened by the continued presence of unresolved and undiscussed problems: the first of these, now the primary subject of political battles, is the ‘Trianon trauma,’ which is engraved by a revival of the chauvinist discourse of the inter-bellum era, continual conflicts with neighbouring countries over their ethnic Hungarian minorities, as well as the EU’s insensitive or far too cautious minority policies.

Though a positive consequence of the EU accession was creating ‘fuzzier’ borders, which could have resolved political fears associated with national grievances – since theoretically it would have facilitated the reunification of ‘ceded parts of the nation’ in a new setting (family, travel and employment facilities) – the heated symbolic fights prevented the topic from entering into public discourse with positive connotations. Instead, public discourse thematised an ‘influx’

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6 Hungary, as a defeated country, lost more than half of its population and 2/3 of its territory in the Versailles Treaty, signed in Trianon in the case of Hungary. This is why, between the two World Wars, the country became the staunchest ally of Nazi Germany hoping to regain the lost territories. The repeated defeat after the Second World War reinforced the first Trianon decision. This is the most central topic of today’s nationalist extremist discourse.
of minorities, jobs being snatched from Hungarians, a collapse of social services defining the primary danger as the ethnic Hungarian communities’ ‘giving up’ former Hungarian territories and suggesting that the national commitment to recapture those territories was weakening.

All this proves that the issue of national identity is present in Hungarian society as a complex problem, as in other Eastern and East-Central European countries, and the EU has not yet been able to provide guidelines for resolution, thus failing to reduce the problem or take its edge away. The central position of national identity, the acute nature of the problem, however, has hindered the development of a European identity to this day.

The development of a European identity, though, is not only delayed by unresolved internal Eastern and East-Central European problems. The EU has not met the expectations of the citizens of these countries in many fields: the opacity of the accession talks and the decision-making processes, as well as the difference between subsidising Eastern and Western members (e.g. size of structural funds, difference in agricultural subsidies, etc.) elicit ever stronger reactions by citizens of the former Eastern Bloc. The public debates and focus group discussions we analysed also indicate that people in these countries think that they are second-rate citizens of Europe and perceive a very sharp East/West division.

The communication of the EU does not effectively contribute to the representation of a ‘community’. Media coverage of the rich diversity of European culture conveys the message of division or fragmentation to most people: programmes presenting the values of different cultures highlight peculiarity, difference and strangeness. It is only people with a committed philosophy of openness and multiculturalism that can view different languages, different customs and achievements of foreign national cultures as shared and common, as their own, as an asset. Neither the media in each EU member state nor the scattered EU media have been able to create the genres which could build this common culture and enhance a feeling of sharing the culture with others. The colourful cultural mixtures underline otherness, and competitions (e.g. the Eurovision song
contest) strengthen opposition. A real cultural community would be promoted through learning the cultures of other peoples and the common European culture and through familiarity with it. To that end, Europe’s communication culture (media and education) should be radically changed (Foret and Soulez 2004).

Identity narratives in lay discourse
The above structural and developmental dilemmas are closely connected to the assumptions and representations of EU citizens about the Union, and they largely influence their sense of belonging, their identification with Europe and their support for integration. The present research made an attempt to assess that commitment and identification by analysing conversations of non-expert Hungarian nationals about identity.

In everyday situations rarely does it happen that participants explicitly define identities. Though the components of identity are reconstructed any time, from situation to situation, this construction game is rarely conscious and rarely worded in an explicit way; it is in situations of conflict, trauma or strong sentimental motivation that it is done consciously and becomes the focal topic of communication.

The theoretical bases of our research rely on the assumption voiced by various authors that people have multiple identities which are in constant change, developing and becoming reconstructed in the situations the individual experiences (Ricoeur 1991, 1992). Identities are considered as structures of multiple layers, which are manifested in accordance with discursive situations; they are, therefore, of a discursive nature (Eder and Spohn 2005). The different communicative situations in which the speakers participate may elicit different aspects of their identities. In certain situations it is the sensation of belonging to the same group, and in others it is the feeling of being different or the questioned or denied membership that elicits an identity discourse. The individual whose membership is questioned, whose sense of belonging is shaken or who is excluded from the group is forced by the situation into an identity discourse: he/she speaks about components of his/her identity relevant to the situation and communicates arguments in an attempt to justify and reinforce the questioned aspects of his/her identity. In such situations
the relevant components of multiple identity construction are highlighted, worded explicitly, using rational or sentimental, ascriptive, affiliative, achieved or meritocratic arguments and justification, with reference to more or less theoretical principles or practical elements of personal experience (Van Dijk 1985).

Our research team have long been involved in analysing public discourse, in which we primarily research the mechanisms of the public sphere, normative and strategic aspects of public speech and major topics for discourse (Wodak 1991; Wodak and Van Dijk 2000). We have made a comparison between the ‘limited public sphere’ of the times before the political regime change and characteristics of the pluralist public sphere that replaced it. These earlier studies focus on the publicly available discourse of the elite (Heller and Rényi 1994, 1996, 2003), and political actors (Kriza 2001), which, in turn, greatly determines the agenda, topics and value choice of the people passively consuming the discourses of the public sphere (Angelusz 2000). The objective of the present study was to look at the everyday discourse of the lay public to find out what identity constructions may surface and what arguments lay people advance to support their identity constructions, to what extent they feel themselves to be citizens of a nation state and if they have any commitment towards the EU. Based on our earlier research it was assumed that the European identity of Hungarian voters was rather weak. The results of the pre-entry referendum in 2003 and a comparison between the 2004 and 2009 EP elections indicate that Hungarian citizens only had some vague expectations concerning the country’s EU integration.

In October 2007, we organised four focus groups of two hours each to reveal the various identities in the conversations of ‘lay’ civilians.7 The focus groups did not aim to map out the national and European identities of a few dozen people; we primarily sought to obtain relatively informal discourse from our informers discussing these topics. The debate, in which different viewpoints were exposed, was expected to encourage participants to elaborate their positions, make them as coherent as possible, and defend them against contradictory

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7 The focus group research was carried out by Peter Bodor, Maria Heller, Borbala Kriza and Nora Schleicher.
constructions. In this process the participants used examples, references and arguments in order to support their statements, feelings and value-choices, and also in order to ‘anchor’ their position. These are the discursive tools we meant to elicit and examine. The focus group research, therefore, sought to reveal, record and capture a discursive corpus suitable for qualitative analysis (Bloor et al. 2001).

In focus group research, participants are usually pre-selected in accordance with the aim of the study. Our assumption was that having lived and worked outside Hungary is a decisive factor regarding attitude and identity towards one’s own country and a wider community; participants have been gathered according to their past experience. Participants were recruited with the help of a filtering questionnaire. In selecting prospective focus group participants the criterion of having spent at least three months abroad was applied, and half of the participants had had such experience. The level of education was another sociological factor that was taken into account at the choice of the participants. Thus, two groups had secondary school level education, while two other groups had university degree. In all the four groups roughly equal number of female and male informants participated in the discussions (eight persons in each group) and most of them were young adults (below 40).

Table 6.1: General descriptive data on focus group participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female / male ratio</th>
<th>Average age</th>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Longer stay abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 15/1</strong></td>
<td>4 : 4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 15/2</strong></td>
<td>3 : 5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 16/1</strong></td>
<td>4 : 4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>College/Univ. diploma</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 16/2</strong></td>
<td>5 : 3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>College/Univ. diploma</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focus groups usually have a schedule or a guideline which prescribes the topics to be discussed and the activities to be performed. While designing the focus group guide, we faced the delicate task of orientating participants towards our issues of interest and letting
them guide themselves there ‘naturally’. At the same time, we also had to consider some characteristics of group dynamics – for example we rotated individual, sub-group and all-group tasks. In general, first we intended to contextualise the issue of identity in the participants’ ‘lifeworld’ by asking them to talk about their sense and meaning of ‘home’, and then we directed them with various tasks toward Europe and Hungary, the home country. Each focus group was moderated by a researcher.

The focus group discussions lasted two hours each and were conducted based on a pre-defined structure, with the guidelines including various tasks in succession. They were above all oral discussions, but also included were written assignments and creating montage pictures and describing and providing them with discursive description and explanation afterwards.

The various tasks of the focus groups included: discussion about the meaning and content of the notion of ‘home’, associative description of what Europe means to each participant, personification of Europe and Hungary (team work), completing unfinished sentences about being Hungarian and being European, classification of towns according to varying criteria (group work) and making collages with the help of magazine photos about Europe today and Europe in the future. (See the complete guideline in Annex 1).

Through the focus group discussions we wanted, first of all, to investigate whether, apart from national identity, which often appears in private and public conversations, other identity constructions with special regard to a European identity may also surface. We also wanted to check if the three RECON models (see Góra and March, chapter one in this volume) or any of their tangible components might appear in the conversations. Finally, we wanted to know what arguments and argumentation techniques were applied in identity discourse, what values, sentiments, experience, or clichés the participants would refer to when talking about identity. We expected that a spontaneous debate in the focus groups would encourage participants to make their identity constructions explicit, along with their related experience and sentiments. The goal was to make participants start thinking about this issue, which is probably
rarely considered in everyday life. The focus groups indeed showed that it was not a customary assignment for participants to talk about identity. Analysis of the recorded conversations clearly indicates that in most cases the informers applied the usual clichés and common places in connection with the subject discussed. They tried to express both general principles and their own thoughts about identity through clichés familiar from public discourse, especially from the media. Apart from the clichés, the conversations were characterised by references to the participants’ own experiences.

References to clichés and individual experience were typical in all four focus groups; also, participants often took a personal position: remarks and opinions about the various topics were mostly based on their individual interests and sentiments. Consequently, in all groups the participants repeatedly noted that it was easier for them to talk about their sentiments about Hungary and their attachment to it rather than about the EU. The dichotomies and controversies of this discourse about identity and the patterns of ‘schizophrenia’ ascribed to Europe and Hungary by the participants are analysed by Bodor (2008).

**Detecting the three RECON models in the identity discourses**

The focus groups developed various narratives: i.e. text components or discursive elements were formed through the recitals, references and personal stories or through interaction between the participants indicating some identification, opinion or position.

We were primarily interested in finding discursive excerpts that could be interpreted as parts of a regional, Hungarian or European identity. In the following, we will analyse how and to what extent the RECON models (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, 2008, 2009), are detectable in the discussion. The models represent a normative, prescriptive view in political science, which admits that identification is important, but stresses statehood, institutions, and their future development. The requirements of a descriptive analysis, having to apply those criteria to actually existing discourses, poses a great challenge, a study analysing identity as personal, discursive
expression must assign actual discursive components to the theoretical models. The RECON models are not definitions, especially not of identity, which is why we consider them as ‘compasses’ which might become explicit, empirically measurable, accurately definable categories through the interpretation we provide.

We defined the basic interpretation of each RECON model concerning identity narratives as follows and analysed the discursive elements on that basis:

**RECON Model 1 (audit democracy, delegated democracy)**
Narratives closely connected to the nation state; Europe is represented as an institution to coordinate or solve problems only. It does not imply strong identification with the EU. It is associated with tradition and seeks to preserve national identity and national symbols and to reinforce national borders.

**RECON Model 2 (federal, multinational, supranational democracy)**
This model assumes a more closely integrated Europe. In this transnational state, national and European identities would go together and the European identity is not independent of the continent’s historic traditions and values. Loose identification with supranational institutions of the EU, weakening national identification

**RECON Model 3 (cosmopolitan, regional-European democracy)**
A community based on deliberative democracy, with politically active subjects who contribute to the discussion of public affairs. A globalised, universal, humane identity based on openness, inclusion and tolerance, which is not restricted to the territory of the EU. A dynamic multiple identity, which prefers active participation in the community based on the integrity of committed and responsible individuals to the collectivism based on traditional ascriptive values. A dialogue built on a conscientious commitment to rights and responsibilities, conflict management through negotiations, trust and mutual solidarity are cardinal components of this model.

With regard to the models defined above, we will point out the discursive identity components and put them in context. In this way we wish to provide a more detailed interpretation to those
components of the RECON models that are relevant for identity. We will furthermore seek an answer to the question of to what extent the identity narratives connected to each model are present in the semi-controlled conversations of the focus groups. Indirectly, this may also reveal what ‘is’ in comparison to what ‘should be’ according to the normative models. Through the analysis we identified the typical and most frequent topic constructions that can also be found in public discourse, constructions which the participants referred to and employed in their narratives of creating an identity.

**Topic constructions connected to the RECON audit democracy model**

The next section presents those topics and topic constructions in which we recognised patterns of the first RECON model, audit democracy. In the following the discursive elements will be presented providing a description of the context, the argumentations and the relationship between participants and the given topic.

*The EU as a travel possibility*

A typical, often recurring topic construction of focus group discussions is when participants identify Europe and being European with the freedom to travel, or quite simply with going on holiday and sightseeing. Obviously, the phenomenon could be explained in several ways. The freedom to travel should not be interpreted as the appearance of an abstract notion of freedom; the contexts seem to indicate that this is the manifestation of a hedonist, consumer-based ethos with an emphasis on private life. Earlier research, on value-structures (Hankiss 1985; Bessenyei and Heller 1983) indicated the extreme popularity of values connected to consumption with the Hungarian population in the last decades of the Kádár regime.

Travel is an important dimension of consumption, which has a special importance in Hungarian (and most Eastern European) contexts. In the ‘new Europe’, that is, in the recently integrated Eastern and East-Central European countries, memory of isolation by the iron curtain and travel restrictions is still fresh. The collective memory still preserves the myth of ‘trips to the West’, each in itself meaning a ‘fantastic adventure’ in a wealthier, freer and more developed world. The inclusion of travel in the value-structure of
consumption was reinforced for decades by the practice of ‘purchase tourism’,\(^8\) a plunge into Western life, consumer freedom and wealth.\(^9\)

The fact that people identify Europe and the European Union with travel and free movement, however, is more a result of the official EU discourse than of real experience (see the slogans promoting the EU before accession). Travelling was possible well before EU entry, since travel restrictions had been eliminated long before European integration, but the tangible change for the average citizen might have been the facility of crossing borders without passports, and most recently the actual elimination of borders has been the most spectacular sign of being integrated in the EU (Hungary became part of the Schengen system in 2007).

The topic construction of identifying the European Union with travel facilities is the most banal and most unreflected component of lay discourse on the EU. Association with consumption and mass culture is well characterised by the next two passages, which link the most primary global consumer products (‘EuroDisney’, Formula 1) with Europe.

Ildikó: ‘travel, new experience, a different environment and leisure time programmes […] I am fascinated by such large amusement parks as Disneyland and the like […] those famous sights one must see in Paris. […] Or London, or I don’t know, I would certainly wander around Europe if I could afford it.’\(^{10}\)

Ádám: ‘Formula 1, travel, summer holidays, seaside, my homeland, Amsterdam and the European Union. Well, I could give an explanation for each, why just those ones. Formula 1: many European countries have Formula 1, don’t they, and I especially like that sport. Travel and holidays go together […]. Then my homeland, because Hungary is in Europe. Amsterdam, because I want to go to

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\(^8\) Let us just refer to the image of shabby Trabant cars queuing from Vienna towards the Hungarian border with deep freezers and colour television sets on top on Hungarian national holidays.


\(^{10}\) Group 15/1, min. 25.
Amsterdam just once in my life by all means, and the European Union because we have joined and this will offer tremendous opportunities via Europe.’\textsuperscript{11}

Ádám wants to go to Amsterdam (‘because I want to go to Amsterdam just once in my life’, he says) and based on what he says it looks like an impossible but eagerly desired goal, which could be interpreted as a continued sense of the abovementioned isolation, the resulting immobility and deprivation of consumption and travel. The travel topic construction is often found in the focus group discourses: Zoltán: ‘It is good to be European, because we have opportunities, we can travel.’ Robi: ‘We have nice and interesting countries in the neighbourhood.’ Zsuzsa: ‘Because we can travel around the world as Europeans and we can see a lot of things.’\textsuperscript{12}

The picture of a diverse but atomised Europe is revealed by the above discursive components: Europe is a conglomerate of ‘nice and interesting’ countries, which could be visited and in which the respondents are really interested. These ‘travel narratives’, however, reflect an unreflected and superficial identification with Europe, and stay within the framework of private life; they indicate passive observation, a kind of ‘voyeur’ attitude, and do not encourage the traveller to take over, to interiorise the lifestyles and values he sees. Travel stays at the level of a one-off experience. Furthermore, such examples allow us to assume that relations between Europe’s countries are conceptualised as being embodied in leisure-time travel.

\textit{Sentiments reflecting attachment or belonging: here I was born, this is my homeland}

Arguments like ‘I was born in Hungary’, ‘this is my homeland’, ‘Hungary is in the heart of Europe’ are based on ascriptive, affiliative bonds. These are commonplace, unchangeable, sentimental arguments, which are typically included in sentences of the ‘why is it good to be Hungarian’ – type. Moreover, these are rather frequent, even required values or arguments in Hungarian public discourse. Tamás: ‘Because I was born here, this is my homeland, that is why I

\textsuperscript{11} Group 15/1, min. 18.

\textsuperscript{12} Group 16/1, min. 60.
always feel at home here.’\textsuperscript{13} Évi: ‘It is good to be Hungarian, because Hungary is ours.’\textsuperscript{14} István: ‘It is good to be Hungarian, because there is only one Hungary.’\textsuperscript{15} Roland: ‘Hungarian is one of the nicest languages and if a foreigner wants to learn a beautiful language that will not be an easy job.’\textsuperscript{16}

It is worth mentioning that this argument type transforms given and ascriptive, unchanging features, imposed on the speaker by his/her fate into positive arguments; this can be considered as an example of a primordial, instinctive and non-rational way of creating an identity.

\textit{Preserving identity in a European future}

The next topic construction highlights coexistence in an atomised world and the necessity of preserving and reinforcing one’s identity. The main focus is on national identity, which is symbolised by Rubik’s cube (a Hungarian invention) or some other spiritual or cultural Hungarian feature or value. Rubik’s cube is a so-called ‘Hungaricum’, a symbol of Hungary (for example, the respondents used its picture in the collage assignment in which they were asked to describe the ‘Europe of our children’ using cut-outs from magazines, and in which participants were hoping to preserve national values in a future Europe). The importance of the preservation of national values is usually based on Hungarian achievements or achievements by ‘great Hungarians’: the respondents feel a national pride thinking of those persons, acts, inventions or creations, and they find it important that their Hungarian origin should not be forgotten. The central position of preserving identity is also associated with fears that EU integration and globalisation may endanger national cultures. This is the manifestation of a century-old fear in everyday thinking: the vision of the nation coming to an end has been present both in Hungarian art and in everyday thinking since the early 19th century. See for instance these citations: Viktor: ‘Being European is bad, because Hungarians will disappear among so many peoples.

\textsuperscript{13} Group 15/2, min. 65.  
\textsuperscript{14} Group 16/1, min. 57.  
\textsuperscript{15} Group 16/1, min. 58.  
\textsuperscript{16} Group 15/1, min. 62.
Robi: ‘Being Hungarian is good, because the Golden Team\textsuperscript{17} is Hungarian, and the Rubik cube, matches\textsuperscript{18}, and a million other things in the world.’ Miklós: ‘And the nuclear bomb.’ Éva: ‘…’ Hydrogen’ […] Erika: ‘And the ball pen.’\textsuperscript{19} Robi: ‘Yes, ball pens and other things. That’s right. […]’\textsuperscript{20} Éva: ‘It is good to be Hungarian, because Hungarians have contributed so much to the world’s culture, science and history, that it makes me being proud of being Hungarian.’\textsuperscript{21}

Not only in the discourses, but also in the collages, the notions of tranquillity, love, peace, happiness and purity are closely connected to the image of a happier past but to an expected better future, as well as to the preservation of identity. Each country will retain its identity and will be arranged as side-by-side units as with the colourful pieces of a Rubik’s cube. Kata explains the collage containing a Rubik’s cube:

Kata: ‘The Europe of our children will be one in which children continue to be raised in happiness, in a happy childhood. Where generations can live together, where there is calm and love, where we can preserve our past and identity, but development, entertainment, dynamism and future should also be mentioned. Calm, peace and purity, we will also find those. […] we will also have nature, […] we’ll keep our identity, […] each country its own identity, that is why we chose the Rubik cube, which is Hungary.’\textsuperscript{22}

On another occasion, there was a fierce debate on how much the EU would be a melting pot for nations and to what extent national characteristics or the national identity might disappear. Zoltán argues that national identities should be maintained. He refers to the Soviet Union and its identity policy, and voices a negative opinion concerning an international or supranational identity or the disappearance of the national identity itself. This makes an association between the EU and the former communist empire, and

\textsuperscript{17} The Hungarian national football team of the 1950s.
\textsuperscript{18} Matches were invented by a Hungarian, János Irinyi, in the 19th century.
\textsuperscript{19} Also a 20th century Hungarian invention, by László J. Biró.
\textsuperscript{20} Group 15/2, min. 69.
\textsuperscript{21} Group 16/1, min. 57.
\textsuperscript{22} Group 15/2, min. 95.
this construction is often voiced as an argument, especially in radical nationalist anti-EU discourse. Zoltán: ‘Hungary will retain its own identity, and I think that is the right way. It must not melt in [...]. The Soviet Union tried, but it did not succeed. Each country should keep its own identity.’

In the same debate, others come up with similar arguments. Some uniformity is acceptable at the level of institutions, but culture and identity should be based on national foundations.

Évi: ‘Uniformisation in legislation or something like that, OK, but I also think that the cultures will be retained. Last November I went to a European conference, a youth meeting, and I had thought that it would suggest – it was in Germany – that we should adapt to the Germans. And no, the point was that everyone should present their own cultures and what their people are like. I [...] I liked that.’

**Reinforcing national borders, prevention against illegal immigration**

Reinforcing nation states and protecting their borders are requirements which could almost contradict the ‘Europe without borders’ principle. References to this problem go beyond the RECON democracy models of Europe and appear frequently in Eurosceptic positions as well.

Answering the question of what she associated Europe with, a focus group member worded the most obvious pro-European opinion, outlining benefits based on the European Union: borders would come down, nations would be closer to each other (e.g. partnerships between ‘twin cities’) – Europe will become integrated. It is important to point out that the respondent mentions friendly ties for example with Slovakia, which is often presented by the media as a bad neighbour, or even an enemy (it is possible, however, that by partner cities she means partnerships with ethnic Hungarian localities in Slovakia).

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23 Group 16/1, min. 25.
24 Group 16/1, min. 26.
Panna: ‘Well, I thought first of the European Union, that is the basis, isn’t it. And well, loosening up the country’s borders at the same time, and [...] building ties like that, [...] there are partner cities, aren’t there, in Slovakia, for example. So it was benefits of the European Union that I thought of first.’  

To her positive image of Europe (which could be interpreted as a narrative of the second RECON model, since the speaker outlines a cooperative, integrated, federal Europe), another participant reacts in a way that reflects the first RECON model:

Enikő: ‘I would certainly add that illegal immigration and the lack of control along the borders, you know, we have Schengen, so I do not consider it as a benefit at all. The right method is if we stop those that are not wanted at the border, that’s it. The US does it, too. Undesirables, stay out.’

Enikő questions one of the primary objectives of the EU (eliminating borders): she thinks that loosening the borders and the Schengen border control system are risk factors. Borders for her have a protective, not divisive, function; once they come down the country and the individuals will become vulnerable. Her fear of immigrants or unwanted entrants could be taken for a kind of xenophobia or welfare chauvinism (immigrants are a threat to our jobs and welfare achievements). The ratio of immigrants including illegal entrants in Hungary is negligible; still, there is a great deal of aversion concerning them. This is obviously rooted in earlier isolation; Hungarian society has problems in integrating its own traditional minorities (discrimination against the Roma minority, their segregation and hatred against them is especially striking); nor is there any policy to handle immigrants.

The reference to the US in Enikő’s arguments is an interesting strategy of legitimisation and should be interpreted as follows: ‘borders are strictly controlled, even in the very tolerant and democratic America’. That is, tight border control (exclusion of

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25 Group 16/2, min. 27.
26 Group 16/2, min. 28.
unwanted persons) cannot be politically or morally objectionable. According to Enikő, it is not the EU, but Hungary that corresponds with the US as an entity, and reinforcing national borders (rather than those of Europe) should be desired.

*Reinforcing national regulations*

A kind of mistrust for common European institutions and legislation could be perceived in the conversations: participants view national laws and regulations as more reliable. The following reasoning treats EU regulations and the integrated internal market in a rather paradoxical way. To the question of what he associates Europe with, one respondent presents a complaint that the country of origin of certain food products cannot be identified. We do not know in which country the product was made (the package reads ‘EU’ only), and it does matter, Márk says, because regulations are different. He voices doubts that each country has the same level of quality, adding that with Hungarian products in former times we used to know what to expect, and he also suggests that there is a lack of common European regulations and control. This latter comment certainly falls in the second RECON model’s range: what he sees as missing is a control which would overwrite, even in its details, national regulations. For the time being, however, participants think that the national regulations are more practicable and more reliable.

Márk: ‘Uncontrolled food that they feed us with, that is in it, too. I am interested in that subject, because I was trained as a food supervisor ages ago. And now you cannot actually tell where, say, milk comes from. It reads ‘EU’. [...] And earlier, there was a food act in Hungary, and even the street was indicated that the manufacturer was on. And now you can buy goods by the hundreds which only say EU. Try and find out where it comes from, where it was made or something.

Kitti: Integrated market, really EU, that’s it. Márk: [...] there are many food laws in other countries – the EU does not have one that each member observes.’

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27 Group 16/2, min. 33.
The image of Europe as a colourful mosaic

Diversity, or the ideal of a colourful Europe, is based on the ‘culture representing value’ principle, and recurs in various contexts of focus group conversations. In most cases, colourfulness is the most positive value attributed to Europe (rich culture, diverse traditions in contrast with American homogeneity, etc.) requiring the protection of these different cultural traditions. Positive arguments include those referring to the wealth of Hungarian culture, Hungarian cuisine or the beauty of the Hungarian language. Participants are sensitively aware of Hungary’s values, the ‘Hungarica’, and expect the EU, which considers colourfulness as a value, and its citizens to acknowledge and appreciate those Hungarian values amid European diversity. The fact that few people speak Hungarian, or that the culture is not so well known in Europe, occurred repeatedly in the conversations as negative references.

Roland: ‘I wrote about Europe that [it is] diversity, culture, history and travel. I don’t think it needs to be explained. Europe […] compared to the American continent, let’s say, if you look at North America, society is a lot more homogeneous there, so […] that is why they don’t have so many different cultures and such colourful society.’

Robi: ‘We have nice and interesting countries around.’ Rastamás: ‘It is good to be European, because there are a lot of nations living together and that is why it is colourful.’ Viktor: ‘It is good to be European, because many interesting cultures can be found in a small place.’

The following quotation is from one of the collage interpretations, when participants had to illustrate their representation of present-day Europe with pictures. Diversity here takes shape in a mosaic-like picture, in which the components are hardly related (e.g. younger brother – big brother) or not related at all (paprika, all kinds of wine, freedom, colours). Zsolt: ‘Each nation will find its place, we have big

28 Group 15/1, min. 23.
29 Group 16/1, min. 61.
30 Group 15/2, min. 68.
brothers, smaller brothers, the French, little Hungarians with paprika. [Tamás giggles] Rastamás: ‘All sorts of wine.’ Tamás: ‘Freedom [points at a picture] all kinds are present and actually we have all colours in a mixture, so it is quite colourful.’

**Topic constructions connected to the RECON federal multinational model**

*Europe as the pledge of common home and at the same time, organic development, of which we cannot be left out*

Arguments for the second RECON model occurred a lot less frequently in the focus group discussions. The next topic construction was raised when focus group members talked about domestic political conflicts and financial difficulties. Zsolt supports Hungary’s EU membership using economic, interest-based, i.e. utilitarian arguments. In his view Europe is an entity with multiple interdependent actors, therefore cooperation between countries (economies) is necessary. Through his rational reasoning he recognises that if Hungary were to be left out of this mutual cooperation, there would be no chance for it to close the gap with Europe, to develop.

Zsolt: ‘The problem is not that we join [the EU], but if we did not. We would have constantly developing economies around and […] they help each other, import, export, the same currency, all those things they teach in economics, that in theory promotes the flow of capital, and if we were left out, then we would have no chance, that is why we are forced to join.’

**Cooperation between loosely integrated European countries**

In the analysis of the first RECON model, the possibility of closer integration within the EU was already raised. Some participants envision the European Union as a tighter federation, in which the nation states have less significance. Naturally, related ideas are very vague, they mostly involve loosening up borders, building ties across the current borders (partner cities) and eliminating customs and tolls.

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31 Group 15/2, min. 65.
32 Group 15/2, min. 40.
In the discussions these elements are elaborated as ‘benefits of EU entry’.

Panna: ‘Well, I thought first of the European Union, that is the basis, isn’t it? And well, loosening up the country’s borders at the same time, and [...] building ties like that, [...] there are partner cities, aren’t there, in Slovakia, for example. So I thought about benefits of the European Union first. [...] And duties, that is, eliminating duties.’

Opinions blaming the weakness of EU integration and the lack of cooperation between discordant nation states and denouncing disagreement can also be interpreted as manifestations of the second RECON model. Remarks such as the following outline an image of the EU with closely cooperating members working for common goals:

Rastamás: ‘I wrote that integration is more difficult, for example, I mean the European Union itself, the Dutch and the French, they did not sign the common constitution, which means that many want to go in many different directions and [...] so I [mean] that integration is not so easy, not like in America where it was somewhat simpler.’

Opportunities offered by the institutional EU: employment
This topic construction refers to the developing legal system of an integrating European Union and its institutional structure. Shared rights and regulations and the common economy facilitate individuals building their careers and pursuing their own happiness in an integrating Europe.

Marianna: ‘[...] the European Union, well, you always hear it, don’t you, all those innovations, new developments, new decrees, and of course, we are a member already, I mean Hungary, as the centre of Europe.’

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33 Group 16/2, min. 27.
34 Group 15/2, min. 71.
35 Group 15/1, min. 27.
This topic construction includes the possibility of finding a job abroad, exchange programmes between universities, and some complaints that the EU will not protect employees against exploitation by multinational companies. They expect the EU to provide consistent regulations, control and more stringent criteria.

Robi: ‘Practically speaking, mainly in Hungary, [...] I think that working here, so [...] the interests of employees are not represented as [efficiently] as in other countries, and not even the EU [...] at least for me the [EU] entry has not brought tangible changes.’

**The EU as a source of development**

Many expect the European Union to provide economic or financial assistance, as was mentioned in connection with the integration campaign. Most of these expectations fall into the first RECON model: only the national economy’s interests are taken into consideration and the EU is seen as a benefactor distributing subsidies. In contrast, the arguments were definitely interpreted as part of the second RECON model, in which it was not a manifestation of selfish interests, a chance for getting rich, that prevailed; participants viewed EU integration as an opportunity for development, consolidation of the infrastructure and institutions, as well as becoming part of a European development process.

Rastamás: ‘[...] union as in the European Union. Stars in the flag, that’s what I can think of. Opportunities, jobs. And green lights on the way [...] I think that is clear. Closing the gap, from the whole country’s point of view, I mean with the European Union as a good background, so [...] we are getting lots of money.’

Marianna: ‘Well, as we are a European Union member state, there cannot be villages and isolated farmhouses as neglected as up to now. And I find it important that we should then also reach the same level and show that Hungary is just as good as any other European country.’

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36 Group 16/1, min. 29.
37 Group 15/2, min. 25.
38 Group 15/1, min. 27.
Topic constructions connected to the RECON cosmopolitan, regional democracy model

*Europe as the melting pot of nations*

When focus group members talk about the extent to which Europe will be able to melt in different cultures, one of the participants speaks for cultural diversity. According to this reasoning, the melting pot includes both the old Europe with its traditions and the non-European immigrant settlers as well. The nations’ melting in, therefore, is not seen in a negative light, as a loss; the participant does not envision the ‘disappearance’ of nations, but presents a rather open, tolerant and cosmopolitan reasoning, which most resembles the third RECON model.

Erika. ‘I have written the words continent, Union, culture, then melting pot of nations [...] well, concerning the Union I am rather of the opinion that we constitute a unified alliance with [...] how many countries? [...] Twenty something? [...] seven, yes. So everyone that has immigrated and settled. That is then the cultural diversity. And otherwise, Europe has an ancient culture, of which I am proud.

Moderator: Mm. And will they melt in? These nations, these cultures? Erika: I think, sooner or later, they will.’

Éva: ‘It is good to be European, because we share a past, a history with a great many people, which connects us and gives us a sense of security.’

*Europe as a ‘family’*

The next, more prescriptive than descriptive narrative reflects the basic philosophy of the EU; the idea is that the community should provide an answer to global crises and wars, by way of which we might resolve problems as a big family, and in which countries are connected by kinship. This is an entirely value-based philosophy of Europe, most typical of the third RECON model. We should add that though the participant desires such an ideal Europe, his narrative

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39 Group 16/1, min. 25.
40 Group 16/1, min. 60.
suggests a different reality. The desired precedence of values is in conflict with political and business interests – the latter contradict the EU’s philosophy and the participant voices his dislike of that practice.

Attila: ‘[…] so, the federation of European countries, the European Union was originally founded to prevent another such global crisis as World War II. That is how they tried to make the countries more like families, so that there should be, say, family ties between them. However, if we look at it now, the thing is completely different. It is now economic and political interests that will decide: yes, you should join, though the original purpose and the original criteria are absolutely not met, [the country] is still accepted; for example look at, say, Hungary.’

Europe as an opportunity for personal fulfilment
The third RECON model envisages autonomous, responsible and cooperative individuals, active in public life within the European community. The next speaker views Europe as a site to fulfil his personal achievements, a setting for personal success and accomplishment. It is not in his own country that he feels at home; he considers Europe as a familiar cultural context in which he can easily accomplish himself. Moreover, personal fulfilment is linked to a readiness to work for the community, which suggests the ethos of the ‘active citizen’ from the third RECON model.

Viktor: ‘Europe is the place in the world where I can also make achievements. […] Actually, there are many types (of people) and I am one for whom finances are not so important, for me it is more important to do something for the community or even for a smaller group. For me that is personal fulfilment and the best place for that is Europe[…] because I know this culture, and I know the environment, and I could not actually accomplish all this elsewhere.’

Europe as a place for peace and cooperation
The conversations include images of a deliberative democracy with its committed and responsible citizens actively working to resolve

41 Group 15/1, min. 46.
42 Group 15/2, min. 30.
public issues, even if we must note that the presence of the third RECON model was the least frequently registered during the focus group research. Participants that envisage accomplishment not only through personal success and within the boundaries of private life expect the EU to ensure cooperation, to create peace and to maintain it. Viktor: ‘Europe will be successful and I will consider it as positive if we, Europeans, can keep the number of those conflicts at a low level.’43 István: ‘I think of a European individual, because being European is associated with urbanisation, with cities, and in cities the citizens will emerge with a citizen’s consciousness. Miklós: It is good to be a European, because they are liberal and open.’44

**Eurosceptic topic constructions**

The discourse on the relationship between Hungary and Europe is distinctly influenced by a frustration rooted in inequality and a feeling of inferiority. Again, it has to be noted that often Europe is seen as Western Europe in these narratives, in contrast to the poor, dispossessed and abused Hungary. A component of Hungarian historic consciousness is the image of a defeated, occupied, cheated but at the same time innocent and drifting country (Bibó 1986), which used to be strong but now, due to external factors (and not to its own fault) is weak and unprotected. Naturally, this leads to the widespread notion that ‘the strong ones’ make use of and exploit this vulnerability. Objective conditions, such as an underdeveloped economy, differences in living standards, the imperfect institutions of low efficiency, especially if compared to the situation in Western Europe, further increase that frustration.

The elite discourse promoting accession to the European Union, especially during the pre-referendum campaign, focused on closing the gap with a rich and highly developed Europe. In public thinking this was translated as the promise of a long-desired welfare, but also as a kind of historic reparation, as compensation for past sufferings, indigence and injuries.

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43 Group 15/2, min. 30.
44 Group 16/1, min. 60.
Critical or rejective, i.e. Eurosceptic narratives, therefore, give louder and louder indication of not meeting that promise. They cultivate a continued sense of indignation, and nurture ideas of being cheated, deprived and subordinate.

**Guest workers are the slaves of Europe**

The possibility of being a guest worker was raised several times in the focus group discussions. Participants agreed that EU entry had opened up the opportunity to work abroad. There are discursive constructions, however, which indicate that this opportunity is perceived by participants as a limited option, and Hungarian (Eastern European, Third World) job-seekers are losers rather than winners, since ‘it is only slave labour that they will be left with’; the message of this topic construction is that again we will not be on the winning side; even if there is higher pay, we will be cheated and humiliated. This creates an image of the enemy as the Western European person ‘keeping the lucrative jobs’ to himself. Incidentally, this anti-EU narrative is one of the cornerstones of the discourse of far-right and extreme-left political parties.

The following conversation excerpt represents a communicative situation in which the two partners, arguing first, will soon come to agreement that employing guest workers is actually a form of exploitation. Interestingly, at a certain point the Eastern European guest worker is seen at the same level, or, to put it differently, seen to have a common fate with his Turkish peer.

Attila: ‘Because those who live in the EU in those countries, they are not stupid, so the rich jobs they will keep to themselves. If you have a craft which is marketable there, then I agree. But to go there just to become a slave, I will always have doubts about that.

Ádám: I see. But you may be making much better money if you do what we consider as a slave’s job. It may be good money. Even if you consider it at real wage level. Don’t you think?

Attila: I am not sure. If I were to do what I don’t like […] we have just said the word ‘home’ and now I said ‘slavery’[…] well, I could not live there and I could not call it home if I did not feel well all the time.
Ádám: Mm, I see. But I said ‘slave’ from their perspective. I thought you meant that your opinion is that for the people out there the job I would do is slavery, and they won’t do it. [...] Still, they could exploit you?

Attila: Look at, for example, Germany, [...] the Turkish, they are not in managerial positions, but [doing] the so-called dirty work which others are not ready to do. It could be attractive that living standards are higher, or something, [...] but still [doing] what and for what [in return]?45

Sovereignty or an alliance of interests with no advantages for us?
In the following conversation again a typical component of the abovementioned collective historic consciousness can be detected. The speaker argues that sovereignty has always been better for Hungary, as opposed to those ‘alliances of interest’ in which we always became losers. This puts the EU in the same category as political alliances which Hungary joined during its history, usually as a result of ill-considered decisions (e.g. our allies in the 20th century: the axis powers, the Warsaw Pact or Comecon). Through this reasoning, the speaker actually rejects Hungary’s EU membership:

Attila: ‘[...] we can always cope alone, by ourselves, and I think quite well, and any time when we made a political or economic alliance with some other country’s assistance, we always came off badly, but we were all right when alone.’46

Inequality: the paternalistic EU
The relationship between Hungary and the EU, often touched upon in public elite discourses, also featured in focus groups. Our earlier research also proved that this relationship is viewed as rather unbalanced by participants of political, intellectual debates as well as

45 Group 15/1, min. 20.
46 Group 15/1, min. 42.
Hungarians and Europe

by lay citizens. They attribute a subordinate, disdained status to Hungary, usually associated with the role or position of a child, a guided, instructed or reprimanded person. In the following narrative Europe is presented in an obviously negative light, first as a strict and aggressive parent, then as a profit-seeker who, motivated by his own selfish interests, ‘realises that it is worth making a deal with Hungary’. The inferiority complex we mentioned above, the feeling of subordination and abuse (‘gave him a good thrashing time after time’) and an infantile status compared to Europe (or rather Western Europe) is expressed in a completely explicit way.

Roland: ‘Well, I think it is a rather strange relationship, it is something like you have between two people. [...] If we really consider this [...] relationship of interest as that of two people, [...] for example they are parent and child, I think, but [...] this parent gave this Hungary child a good thrashing time after time, but then, when the child became older, he [Europe] realised that it might be worth [...] well, forming an alliance with him. Well, something like that.’

47 Group 15/1, min. 43.

Exploitation, economic inequality

The frustration and assumed abuse mentioned previously appears in the following topic construction, which gives a good idea of the average citizen’s opinion and his distrust concerning the distribution of European funds. An important component of Hungarian national discourse is that ‘we traditionally produce high-level, good quality agricultural goods’. The speaker quoted below uses that commonly held notion as his opening. At the same time, it is also obvious for him that Hungarian products are not competitive. He resolves this cognitive dissonance by seeking an external cause, a scapegoat, and finds it in the EU, which distributes community funds inequitably; he points out that we cannot be competitive as long as French farmers get the money Hungarians should receive. The following narrative, therefore, is a typical manifestation of the often heard Hungarian public discourse explaining a lack of success. Its main components are looking for a scapegoat, evading responsibility, and a complex of inferiority.

47 Group 15/1, min. 43.
Attila: ‘But this is utter rubbish, because if we speak about agriculture, under Hungary’s climate we always produced excellent quality, but there are some interests that will say no, because it is their turn. If we take, for example, the subsidies French farmers are given, aren’t they, Hungarians do not get the same, though theoretically they should. And why? They say that Hungarian products would be a lot more competitive, although that would be fair.’

‘Suits, agreements, smell of business’ – too much red tape in the EU

A general criticism in political discourse is that the European Union is actually a much too bureaucratic structure, at a great distance from the people, from the citizens of Europe. The topic construction of that criticism found at the level of the average citizen is reflected in the following conversation. For one of the participants Europe is not just a continent, but the European Union, representing institutions and bureaucracy equal to words of negative connotations such as ‘flags’, ‘suits’, ‘a smell of business’. This last, definitely negative phrase also indicates distance from the world of business and economic issues rooted in a general lack of information.

The speaker’s ambivalent feelings are indicated by mentioning development and globalisation in the same sentence; these concepts may, however, create a negative context given Hungarian society’s basic aversion concerning globalisation, usually associated with alienation, commercialisation and individualism. (Kriza 2004)

When another participant interpolates that all that is more typical of the US or Japan, she cannot convince the first speaker (Adél), who retorts with an image of the EU as suggested by the media: ‘EU here and EU there, agreements’. Europe, therefore, is far from real life, it is an abstract world smelling of business, of suits and ties and ‘agreements laid out on paper’. And though they laugh at the radical

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48 Group 15/1, min. 49.
wording, the other participants do not have actual objections to these remarks.

Adél: ‘Well, for me not so much of a continent, but the Euro, […] and then the EU, and flags, and suits and ties […], it smells too much of business, and the development, and […] I will take sides with you, this is globalisation, for me those [come to mind] rather than Europe. Moderator: ‘What does ‘smells of business’ mean?’ [laughter]

Adél: ‘This European, what I said, suits and managerial attitudes, whatnot, let us make money and the like.’ Kitti: ‘How strange, that [you think that] of Europe. I don’t know. I would rather associate all that with Japan or the US.’ Adél: ‘No. When I turn on the TV and the EU here, and the EU there, agreements and all that’ […]. [laughter]’

Conclusions
The problem of identity is a crucial question in the enlarging Europe: not only is the European institutional structure seen upon with growing scepticism by its citizens, but the lines of further development of the Union are also rather unclear. More and more debates concern the future plans as well as the very foundations of the enlarged Union, while continuous attempts to solve the institutional problems (Constitution, Treaty, etc.), the uncertainty of identifications, and unclear definitions of common European values also show that certain basic topics of the EU need to be discussed and settled and a wide-ranging consensus has to be found.

In this bundle of problems, the new member states raise new challenges and intensify certain unsolved questions. In spite of former expectations, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the accession of the Eastern and Central European countries to the EU have not eased the differences – on the contrary, some cleavages are felt to be deeper. All the surveys realised in this region prove that citizens of the former Soviet bloc experience a strong East/West divide and their former hopes and expectations about a quick catch-up with the West

49 Group 16/2, min. 33.
have turned out to be an illusion. Most citizens of the new member states were less concerned with values of freedom, justice and social equity; for many of them EU accession meant becoming part of the wealthy and more fortunate part of the world, where the society of consumption had become reality.

Indeed, the fundamental European values belong to an elite discourse about common European goals and a future land of peace, solidarity and collaboration. Even in the elite discourse, the relationship between a value-based, a rights-based and an interest-based community is still not satisfactorily settled. In our research, we set the goal of analysing lay people’s conceptions and representation of Europe. We wanted to investigate how ordinary citizens think, speak and feel about their belonging to a national community and the European Union.

This chapter is only the first comprehensive report of our team’s analyses of the focus-group discussions which aimed at collecting discursive material produced by lay persons concerning their national and European identity. The four focus-group discussions proved to be able to produce everyday casual discourses on how the participants felt about their home, their home country and Europe. As we expected, we found that everyday discourses on identity do not follow a strict logical structure, but contain contradictory elements. This is coherent and isomorphic with the general structure of identities: they contain several levels as well as links to various embedding groups. Identities are continually constructed and reconstructed in discourse in various discursive contexts. People more or less explicitly articulate a concrete identity construction or a mosaic thereof according to the concrete discursive situation they find themselves in. The discourses recorded during the focus-group research indeed reflected these patterns. The discourses showed many incongruities, unreflected sentiments and contradictory constructions, but as a whole the corpus proves to be a good basis for analysing identity constructions.

Our team detected discursive elements of identities that we called topic constructions in the discourses, and we have matched them to the three RECON models (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, 2008, 2009). Most topic constructions that were relevant according to the models
were related to the first model: the model of audit or delegated democracy. Indeed, sovereign nation states as they already exist today are deeply anchored in people’s conceptualisation. Identification is strong with the nation, and in the case of Hungary or most Eastern and East-Central European countries the historical experiences of several generations strengthen this identification. The topic constructions demonstrate the most typical ideas, commonplaces and stereotypes related to Europe. Europe for lay citizens is a colourful mosaic, with rich and varied cultural heritage, it appeals to them as a space for tourism and vacation, and this conceptualisation is mainly related to their private sphere of life. They see their own nation in Europe as an important entity that has to be protected, and its values and particularities (language, culture, traditions, etc.) should get higher evaluation among other European cultures and values. They put special emphasis on their concern that national borders and national regulations should be reinforced.

As for the second RECON model (federal, multinational Europe), some topic constructions were related to the consequences of enlargement in the labour market, the need for common regulations for guest workers in a united European labour-market and a common European tax system. The common currency, the euro, was sometimes mentioned as a goal, together with some concrete problems of regulations concerning immigration or traceability of food. It is worth mentioning that most of the topic constructions assigned to RECON model 2 are related to large global problems, and closer cooperation between European countries is viewed in the context of a globalised world (in contrast to America or Asia). These results can be attributed to a loose conception of the EU as a common safeguard, a ‘common European bastion’ against negative effects of globalization.

The topic constructions related to the third RECON model (cosmopolitan regional deliberative democracy) consisted of ideas depicting Europe as a family as well as a melting pot that will embrace all the various cultural heritages of the continent. Some vague ideas were detectable about the EU as a positive space which enables the individual to realise him/herself and as a place where the individual can contribute to the development of the community. The
basic values of a cosmopolitan polity were very rarely mentioned, but this may be due to the fact that lay people often find it embarrassing to engage in debate necessitating social scientific or philosophical language and reasoning.

We also found very typical Eurosceptic topic constructions which are based on the manifold sentiments of frustration that are generally frequent in the region. People feel frustrated because of their nation’s retarded development and less successful self-representation and because they feel themselves to be the unsuccessful and negligible part of the EU. They have a strong and traditionally widespread inferiority complex and a feeling of unjust treatment, of being exploited: ‘slaves of Europe’. They conceive of the EU as a patronising superstructure, an over-bureaucratised institution which is high above ordinary people’s concerns and only deals with its own interests. Eurosceptic views detected in lay citizens’ conversations are reinforced by political elite discourse radicalised by the political contention becoming more and more frequent in the public sphere.

In these unstable, flexible multiple identity constructions that were detectable from lay discussions, there is also the possibility of development according to the changing European context. They are also subject to formatting mainstream political and elite discourse and the media and the public sphere also have strong influence on them. It can logically be hypothesised that differences will be found as research continues between young and older generations, between people having personal experience having lived outside of their home country or between educated and less educated citizens, whose knowledge of foreign languages and access to other European cultures should be an important element of openness and identification.
References


Annex 1. Focus Group Guidelines

Focus Group Guidelines

0. The moderator introduces her/himself, and describes the purpose and rules of the discussion (5 minutes)

‘Thanks for coming here today and spending your time with us in the upcoming discussion, which will last for about 2 hours. This discussion is part of an international research project in which we are interested in your opinion and experiences. We would like to talk with you about what you think of your neighbourhood, of Hungary and of the wider world. In the next two hours there will be some playful and some more serious activities and situations. But in any case we are interested in your opinion; in other words, there are no right or wrong solutions to the questions we ask or the issues we pose. Also, you should be aware of the fact that our conversation is recorded for scientific and teaching purposes. Of course, the data obtained from you will be handled confidentially, and no data allowing personal identification will be published.’

1. Introduction (10 minutes)

‘Please introduce yourself: tell us five things that you consider important about yourself.’

2. Establishing group identity, anchoring participant’s identity – discussing the concept of ‘home’ (10 minutes)

‘Different kinds of things have just been mentioned, such as family, home, job, community. What do we need to have in order to feel at home? What does the word ‘home’ mean to you?’

Each participant formulates her/his respective ideas and the group discusses them.

3. Association task – focusing conversation on Europe (10 minutes)

‘What comes to your mind in connection with Europe? Please write it on a piece of paper.’ (2-3 minutes)

Reading aloud the replies and discussing them. Why?
4. **Personification (10 minutes + 10 minutes)**

The group works in two sub-groups; each creates and presents a biography, then all participants discuss them respectively.

‘There are two people: one of them is called ‘Europe’ and the other is ‘Hungary’. Let’s write the biography of ‘Europe-Person’ and ‘Hungary-Person’. One sub-group will compile a biography for ‘Europe-Man’, and the other one for ‘Hungary-Man’.

Presenting and discussing the biographies.

5. **Unfinished sentence (10 minutes)**

*Short individual work followed by group discussion.*

‘Let’s finish the following sentences. Everyone should work individually and complete each sentence.’

- It is a good thing to be a Hungarian, because ...
- It is a bad thing to be a Hungarian, because ...
- It is a good thing to be a European, because ...
- It is a bad thing to be a European, because ...

Group discussion of the replies. ‘Why do you think so?’

6. **Construct (REP-test) (15 minutes)**

*Common features and oppositions – pros and cons in argumentation.*

‘Select two items which are similar to each other, and tell us what the basis of the similarity is. What is the difference between the two similar items and the third one?’

Example: apple – orange – banana

Dimension/construct:
1. not produced in our country – produced in our country
2. round – long

Target items: Budapest – Brussels – New York – Moscow
7. Collage (25 minutes + 15 minutes)

The group works in two sub-groups; each creates and presents one collage, and then all participants discuss them respectively.

Using pictures taken from five magazines, and adding drawings and texts to them, try to assemble two collages with the titles:

1. What is Europe like today?
2. What should our children’s Europe be like?
Chapter 7

An invisible revolution
How the urban way of life is transforming
the identities of Poles

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Introduction
This chapter discusses the question of the emergence of new forms of social identities brought about by the contemporary dynamics of social and cultural change and its influence on Polish national identity. Specifically, it analyses those evolutionary changes which have transformed the character of this identity from an exclusive, ethnic model towards a pluralistic, civic one. Certainly, one has to remember that these two models are only theoretical constructs which should be treated as ideal types in the Weberian sense. Furthermore, one should bear in mind that it is difficult to treat national identities as monolithic, seamless entities, especially in the contemporary world where they are subject to constant renegotiation and redefinition by different segments of these groups. This is why we have chosen a specific social category, the inhabitants of the main Polish cities, because we think that indicators of the changes in the Polish national identity are most detectable among this segment of the Polish society. This is because the cities they live in are gradually replacing the most important frame of reference which, until recently, was dominated by the nation state. To illustrate these processes we
decided to employ a comparative approach to our research. Its two streams were conducted in two Polish cities: Krakow and Wrocław. The decision as to why these two cities were chosen was based on several important reasons. Firstly, both cities share many similarities: they have a similar population; both are very important centres of culture and science; both cities also have long and far-reaching traditions of cooperation in networks composed of other cities which are contemporary parts of other states: Wrocław – the cities of Prussia and Saxony, Krakow – the cities of the former Habsburg Empire. Besides, in the time of modernity, which was a decisive period for the creation of contemporary collective identities, they built their identities with relation to symbolically homogenous contents, despite the fact that both of them had multietnic populations. In the case of Wrocław it was a German one, and in the case of Krakow it was Polish. Today, both cities are trying to take advantage of their multicultural heritage in building their symbolic images. Secondly, both cities are significantly different as far as the reproduction of their population is concerned. Krakow is one of the few significant Polish cities where the bourgeoisie and bourgeois culture have been relatively smoothly reproduced in long-term processes, whereas Wrocław can serve as a typical example of entirely reconstructed identity. It was a city whose entire German population was removed and new inhabitants from other parts of Poland were attracted or repatriated after World War II.

The foreignness of cities in Polish culture
The specific conditions that determined the emergence of Polish nationalism during the 19th century meant that Polish national identity developed on the basis of two strata: gentry and peasantry. These two strata created two models of culture which differed between themselves to a large extent but shared one common feature which is fundamental, in our view, to understanding Polish national identity: a complete opposition to urban, industrial culture. This alienation can be described on a cultural level as well as a structural one, and it resulted in the situation in which values characteristic of urban, industrial society were perceived as ‘alien’, whereas features which were connected with folk and gentry culture were identified with ‘homeliness’. An important feature of the structure of Polish society in the 19th century was the weakness of the bourgeoisie. The
Polish historian Tadeusz Łepkowski estimated that in 1870 the urban population of Polish areas\(^1\) was about 16-17 per cent (Łepkowski 1967: 119). Furthermore, most of the bourgeoisie were perceived by Poles as alien in the ethnic sense, because Polish cities during that time were mostly inhabited by Germans and Jews. Additionally, the inhabitants of small towns made up a large proportion of the bourgeois population and had nothing in common with the term ‘urban’, which was characteristic of the industrialised western part of Europe.

Hence, it would not be inaccurate to say that during the age of modernity the Polish bourgeoisie almost did not exist in the demographic sense. But much more important in this context is an exclusion of bourgeois values to the mainstream of national culture. During the 19\(^{th}\) century, the crucial idea of Polish nationalism was the notion of sovereignty. In fact, whilst Polish history consists of one long struggle for sovereignty, this was especially so in the 19\(^{th}\) century, when mythologised history, art, and literature glorified the fight for independence. This resulted in a situation where the problem of political sovereignty took first place in the discourse of Polish nationalism. It is obvious that in this situation the values of the bourgeois – rationalism, accumulating property, cultural pluralism – could not fit into the dominant model of Polish culture. Thus, the Polish model of national identity was characterised by a structural alienation of the city and everything that represents urban culture.

Polish Romantic art – the best reflection of popular imagination in Polish society – always centred on the symbolic representation of essential values of Polish culture. It is very characteristic, in this matter, that most works of art call to attention the manor house as the symbol of Poland. For example, masterpieces of Polish literature like Pan Tadeusz (Mr. Tadeusz) by Adam Mickiewicz and Wesele (The Wedding) by Stanisław Wyspiański introduced two rustic iconic houses to Polish culture – Soplicowo and Rydlówka – which have become an archetypal image of Poland. These works of art were, and

\(^1\) The term ‘Polish area’ stands for Polish territory before the partitions. In 1870 the Polish state did not exist. Moreover, the territory identified as Polish changed radically during the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century, as a result of World War I and II.
in fact still are, a fundamental part of Polish culture, shaping the symbolic picture of Polishness. Moreover, in the visual arts, paintings concentrated only on rustic landscapes or ancient battles, almost passing over the cities completely. Thus, a symbolic picture of Polish culture was constructed where there was no place for cities and urban culture. In the few pieces of art where cities and urban culture played a leading role, they were portrayed as a dehumanised, dangerous place, settled by devious and two-faced people. Other good examples of this can be observed in such masterpieces of Polish literature as *Ziemia Obiecana* (*The Promised Land*)\(^2\) by Nobel Prize winner Władysław Reymont, and *Moralność Pani Dulskiej* (*The Morality of Mrs. Dulska*)\(^3\) by Gabriela Zapolska.

This alienation of cities and urban culture in art has its basis in the unique structure of Polish society in the 19th century. The elites who possess symbolic power – in the sense of Bourdieu (1991) – were strongly connected with the culture of the gentry. At that time the Polish intelligentsia came from the impoverished gentry who were undervalued and discriminated against economically, socially and politically by Russian and Prussian invaders.\(^4\) It was especially important under Russian rule, where Polish noblemen were stripped of their landed estates after failed uprisings and, as a consequence, had to move to the cities and try to start their lives anew. But they perceived the city and urban culture as alien: they could not work in such typical positions for the bourgeoisie, like bureaucracy, business or even the education system. Moreover, during that time the bourgeoisie in Polish cities came from different ethnic groups, mainly Germans, Russians, and Jews. In that situation, when the reality was perceived as alien, the myth of the lost paradise started to spread.

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\(^2\) Reymont described in his novel the consequences of radical industrialisation with the example of Łódź, the ‘Polish Manchester’. The city is shown in all its terrifying ugliness, with its crowded, dirty streets and smoking factories as a place of chaos and misery.

\(^3\) This is a ‘petty-bourgeois tragic-farce’, describing the double-faced and insincere morality of Polish bourgeois. Still today, a word derived from the name of the main character, *dulszczyzna*, is a synonym for hypocrisy in the Polish language.

\(^4\) The exception was Galicia, ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the period of liberalisation, Poles contributed to Austrian bureaucracy and politics. But the unique situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire – relatively backward, especially in Galicia – led to a renewal of the tradition of the gentry in this region.
An invisible revolution

this case, paradise was symbolised by a manor house and the unique type of culture which it evoked. This is why Polish art, as well as journalism, were dominated by such a special attitude to cities and urban culture. Most Polish artists and intelligentsia came from the impoverished gentry for whom the cities and their patterns of culture were alien and, moreover, perceived as dangerous for traditional Polish culture.

Another important fact of the alienation of the city in Polish culture was the process of the ruralisation of cities. In Poland, urbanisation had a different character to that in Western Europe: rapid industrialisation only began – with a few exceptions – after World War II, and was centrally planned by the ruling Communist Party. Moreover, in this respect, we should speak about two different processes of urbanisation. On the one hand, belated industrialisation occurred in a predominantly peasant environment. Thus, giant factories were staffed mostly by peasants from neighbouring villages. This resulted in a situation in which there dawned another era in the history of Polish cities: a social category which possessed a symbolic power that had nothing in common with urban culture. During the 19th century it was ‘gentry-intelligentsia’, whereas after World War II it was ‘peasant-workers’. These new inhabitants of Polish cities, the ‘peasant-workers’, possessed symbolic power in a double sense. Firstly, because of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, who had no power to impose their patterns of culture on them, and secondly because of communist ideology, according to which the real ruling classes in the Polish People’s Republic were peasants and workers, and where other groups were described as ‘enemies of the people’. A good example of this is the case of Nowa Huta. The Communist regime decided to build an entirely new town on the outskirts of Krakow for the workers of the newly built giant steelworks; this was to serve as a model of the ideal socialist city. The new inhabitants of this ‘ideal city’ were meant to constitute an ideological counterweight to the conservative, intelligentsia-dominated Krakow. Another important fact in this respect is that most Polish cities after the Second World War were seriously damaged, and re-building them consisted mostly of constructed housing estates from concrete slabs, isolated from the city centre and from each other. This resulted in a situation where individual housing estates fulfilled the function of
suburbs, and did not constitute an importance for urban culture – an *agora*, a public space.

On the other hand, Poland after the Yalta Treaty lost its eastern provinces, mostly inhabited by a rural society, but in exchange acquired ex-German urbanised provinces. Thus, Poles were expropriated from their eastern villages\(^5\) and settled in abandoned German cities. The Poles as new inhabitants of these cities felt a double alienation: firstly because of an urban environment which was completely the opposite of their native one, and secondly because these cities were German and, despite the communist propaganda, most of them had nothing in common with Polish culture. This meant that for a long time these migrants were not able to reconstruct their identity and feel at home in these places, living in permanent temporariness. This situation was described by Zdzisław Mach – who conducted his research on these cities in the 1980s in a book whose title puts the situation very eruditely: *Niechciane miasta* (Unwanted Cities) (Mach 1998). A similar situation occurred in the Polish ethnic part of Poland in the case of ex-Jewish towns, the so-called shtetls. Small towns, which were typical of pre-war Poland, were inhabited mostly by Jews; in the former Galicia Jews often constituted 70-80 per cent of the total population of these towns. As a result of the Holocaust and the emigration of Jews, their houses were subsequently inhabited by Poles from neighbouring villages.

These factors indicate that in the case of Poland after World War II we cannot speak about cultural urbanisation, but rather about ruralisation. Despite the fact that the population of Polish cities increased dynamically, this did not mean that the patterns of culture of Polish nationalism were transformed in the same way.

\(^5\) Obviously there were also cities, especially Lwów and Wilno – which were very important places for Polish mythology – but against the background of numbers of displaced persons, the Polish bourgeoisie were a rather small proportion.
Regaining cities – the emergence of a new social player: the ‘new urban middle class’

Since 1989 we have witnessed a number of complex and interdependent processes at play, such as: an economic transformation creating the economic and legal foundation for the growth of the bourgeoisie; globalisation; European integration; the emergence of a network society; the de-ruralisation of cities; the growing importance of the tertiary sector which is mainly located in cities etc. One of the consequences of these rapid social changes has been the emergence of a new social sector which has influenced the dynamics of the reconstruction of national discourse in an important way. We term this phenomenon which we introduce in this chapter as the ‘new urban middle class’, which should be treated here conventionally, as the identification of a new social actor would demand much deeper sociological research. Nonetheless, there are strong premises to claim that it is increasingly gaining more importance in the social reality of contemporary Poland. This strength makes this class an important social phenomenon which concerns the redefinition of the role of the city and urban culture in Poland. This redefinition consists of several important elements.

Foremost is the process of the de-ruralisation of Polish cities: for at least the last decade we have been able to observe the fast-growing process of the de-ruralisation of Polish cities. This is because there is a growing second and third-generation urban population in these cities, who have started to identify themselves with urban culture. But this new category, as with every new social phenomenon, is searching for axiological and symbolic values which can legitimise its identity – an urban identity. As we have tried to explain, traditional Polish nationalism excluded urbanism from the mainstream of Polish culture and thus, in the case of Poland, the urban culture is being invented or discovered as a multicultural heritage. Good examples of this situation are the cities of Wrocław and Krakow, which form the basis of this study: Wrocław is a city that was settled by Polish migrants who lived in a feeling of temporality, but whose children and grandchildren have grown up in the city and have started to construct their identity in line with the urban culture through multicultural heritage. The well-known and much decorated writers, Marek Krajewski from Wrocław and Paweł Huelle from Gdańsk,
describe the heritage of their respective pre-war cities in all their novels. These very popular novels discover the forgotten and rejected traditions of these cities and, thanks to the exceptional property of literature, make this tradition familiar. This is a well-known mechanism in the theory of migration, in that subsequent generations return to their roots but, contrary to classical theory, these generations come back not to their grandparents’ native folk roots, but to the roots of the city in which they themselves grew up.

Another example stems from traditional ethnic Poland, from Krakow. Before the Second World War about 70,000 Jews lived in Krakow; they made up about 30 per cent of the total population and mostly lived in one, separate district – Kazimierz. After the Holocaust this district was completely depopulated, and the local government sent people there from the dregs of society, creating a district of the underclass, thus giving this place a very bad reputation. Starting from the end of the 1990s, though, this situation changed completely. Nowadays Kazimierz is the most fashionable and vibrant place in Krakow, and this gentrification is mostly based on its Jewish heritage.

These examples are very interesting in the context of Polish national identity because, as we have tried to show above, the German and Jewish heritage of urban culture played the role of a typical ‘alien’. Thus, such a radical change in attitude towards these heritages, in our opinion, can be a very good variable in the transformation of traditional Polish identity from ethnic to civic.

Besides narratives, an important role in this process of regaining the memory of cities has also been played by the significant growth in the freedom of local government, allowing them to construct new identities and practice democratic attitudes in everyday life at a grassroots level. Despite the official declaration of self-governance in the Polish system, this self-governance has in fact never existed. This situation started changing as a result of administrative reforms (1999) and an amendment to local elections – the presidents of cities being elected via direct election (2002). This meant that cities gained local leaders who could mobilise and engage citizens and, in fact, we can observe a dynamic increase in local activity as a result, especially in cities which have real leaders. This is especially noticeable in Wroclaw, where the local authorities were highly regarded by almost each respondent, since they were convinced that the current success
of the city resulted from a well-thought out and long-term policy consistently applied by the same group of people since 1989: ‘At the very beginning the aim of the ruling group was to restore Wrocław to a European dimension, and it has been doing this all the time’ (M/W/12). What is also very important is the fact that authorities are not perceived through the prism of political affiliation. One of the respondents pointed out that one of the most important achievements of the authorities was: ‘To overcome the typical Polish dichotomy we-others, people in the city identify themselves as “we”’ (M/W/12). Wrocław’s authorities and especially leaders – formerly Bogdan Zdrojewski and currently Rafał Dutkiewicz – played a very important role in the process of the construction of local identity, and their names occur through every interview several times: ‘The feeling of local identity and sense of togetherness has risen rapidly during the last few years. A person walking on the street feels like a Wroclawer and he can forgive the president for the fact that this street is being dug up. This person feels that it’s his city, he lives there and he takes satisfaction from it’ (M/W03). Therefore it is not surprising that the president enjoys a considerable standing and arbitrates crucial disputes: ‘Some years ago in Wrocław there was a conflict about the name of the Hall, what we should say – People’s or Centenary – and Dutkiewicz said that both names are correct.’ ‘We understood it in the way, that we should wait until the older generation goes away and not stimulate needless conflict’ (M/W/06). In Krakow, by contrast, respondents did not identify the mayor of the city as a real leader: his name was mentioned only in response to direct questions and did not appear as an important factor in local identity. Local government seems to remain in the background, and is perceived without any emotion, either positive or negative. People appreciated changes for better in several aspects of the city life, but they did not identify these with the authorities. In our opinion this

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6 The reference technique used for the citations in this chapter specifies transcriptions available in the archives of the RECON project. For further inquiries about the references, please contact the authors.

7 The original German name of the building was Centenary, and it was given after the victory of anti-Napoleon coalition at the Battle of the Nations in 1813 at Leipzig. After 1945 the biding name was The People’s Hall.
situation is exacerbated by the fact that local government is perceived as a mirror image of conflict-ridden national politics.

I cannot understand why in Krakow we must always get bogged down in politicking, why in this city, in local elections, no civic or citizen’s movement has ever been a force to be reckoned with [...] why local government always imitates central government.

(M/K/08)

‘For me the worst problem in Krakow is the permanent political conflict between the three main powers in the city: president (left-wing), council majority (the Citizens’ Platform party) and council opposition (the Law and Justice party)’ (M/K/06).

8 This difference in appraisal of local leaders is correlated with the manner of social activity in the city, which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

Also the EU accession and the eligibility to receive structural funds for development allow for policies independent from the dominant centre – Warsaw. In the case of Polish cities, this has been a really revolutionary change that allows them to make up for any backwardness in urbanisation.

Another important factor which has contributed to the creation of a ‘new urban middle class’ identity has been the emergence of global cities. According to Saskia Sassen, global cities hold a key position in the new geography of centrality. The annihilation of space in the global economy is countered by the reassertion of the significance of place. Global cities are key places in this sense, since they host the financial districts where global investment decisions are made and the producers of services that support the command functions of transactional corporation. Cities that perform such a function often have greater interlinkages between them than they do with their respective regions or nations (Sassen 1998). A discussion was initiated

8 The Citizens’ Platform and the Law and Justice parties are currently the two major political powers in Poland. Their rivalry characterizes a permanent and severe conflict.
by Sassen on the role of global cities at the beginning of the 1980s, concerning Tokyo, New York and London, and was developed by Manuel Castells in his seminal trilogy *The Information Age* (1996, 1997, 1998), where he highlights the fact that, thanks to communication technologies, an increasing number of cities are being included in networks, thus leading to a deepening of the social phenomenon which is called by Giddens the ‘disembedding’ of social systems (1990). He defines this process as: ‘the lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space’ (ibid.: 22). Due to growing circulations of capital, goods, services, ideas, and people, life in such cities becomes progressively more and more similar. Such a growing mimicry sometimes happens at the expense of traditional regional ties or even nation-state interdependencies. This loss of connections between regional and national ties was very noticeable in the case of Wroclaw, and less so in that of Krakow. For many of the Polish ‘new urban middle class’, moving abroad to another big city in Europe is a more conceivable option than moving to the countryside or a small town in Poland. In visiting the places of entertainment of big European cities, places where most of the new bourgeoisie socialise, one cannot help but observe that they have often lost their distinctiveness. Music, dress codes, hairstyles, modes of behaviour and an imperfection of spoken English are nearly the same regardless of the national context. Regardless of whether it is Krakow, Amsterdam, Wroclaw, Barcelona, Florence or Berlin, such enclaves of social life create zones of universal ‘banal cosmopolitism’ of everyday life (Beck 2002) where young mobile Europeans discover familiarity. The essence of this trend was clearly expressed by our respondent:

My brother has gone to Spain and he is feeling at home there, he is doing very well and judging by his example I know that it would be the same with me if I went to one of the other European cities. Provided of course that it will be a relatively open city, since there are provincial cities everywhere where there are few newcomers, like for example in the former GDR or the poorer regions of Spain. Poles abroad have already managed to be themselves again and I think that you can be a citizen of a city everywhere, behave in such a way and be treated in such a way.

(M/W/05)
Such zones should not be confused with the phenomenon identified by George Ritzer as a deepening process of international standardisation, uniformity and depersonalisation driven by the necessity of instrumental rationality, since they have nothing to do with the impersonal and McDonaldised social spaces (Ritzer 1993). Quite the opposite, they rather create a platform for social integration and the possibility of constructing feelings of belonging. The importance of informal urban institutions of socialising is difficult to overestimate, since these are the ones which give certain cities a value or flavour which makes them attractive for young, mobile and creative people. They establish places of lifeworld which give chances to resist the process of colonisation of an informal network of social relations which constitute, on the grassroots level, a basis for civil society. Such spaces not only create contexts for micro-scale multicultural encounters, but they fill the gap between the private and informal sphere and the public and formal one. One of the respondents gave as an explanation how such loose communities are being created around urban micro-hubs of informal social life:

It’s like if someone comes here, for example for a year-long scholarship, and gets to know our place, if someone comes here for the fourth or the fifth time for a coffee, then they start to become familiar to us or to the barman. If they are recognised by the barman then it means that they start to have conversations with people at the bar: so what’s up? Good, good. And what do you do? I do this, I do that. After a few of these visits then this person is no longer regarded as anonymous but as someone who does a certain something, I don’t know, if they are a graphic designer and then if we need something graphical then the barman will say to us, listen, do you know this guy who comes here? And I’ll say: yeah, I do. Well, he’s a graphic designer, ask him, perhaps he can help. And so then: Listen, I hear you are a graphic designer, you come here a lot. Do you think you could do this and this for me? And he says: sure. And then he will start to come to our place more often, no? Most, basically all the people who work with us became involved in this way because, well because they like this place, they come here and start to do something with us. So, in answer to the question as to who is coming here for the birthday party, it’s all the people who helped to create this place, both employees and
regulars. Before the birthday we always give the regulars an invite, those who hang around here or who have played or sung here, those who have been involved in something.

(M/W/08)

For Poland, this global network opened firstly after transition, but especially after the accession to the EU, and has started creating new opportunities for cities and their inhabitants. The scale of circulation of different kinds of goods has risen rapidly over recent years. The airports in some large Polish cities have grown at among the fastest rates in the world, being second only to those of China. This is especially visible in Krakow, a fact which did not escape our respondents’ notice:

Because there was this time, about a year ago, when we had the feeling that the whole world was coming to Krakow. What’s more, yesterday, when I was at the radio, a guy came in who wrote a tourist guide in the 80s and quoted the fact that during the time of Gierek⁹ Krakow had 80 000 foreign tourists per year. Now we have 8 million, which speaks for itself.

(M/K/04)

This inclusion into a network of exchanges allows the dynamic spread of cultural patterns and creates the opportunity to experience multiculturalism and pluralism through direct contacts. In this sense Polish urban centres are going through a much more dynamic process of social change than the population of smaller towns and villages, where a multicultural environment and pluralism is present only via stereotypical images and where cultural or social strangeness is still seen through the prism of threat, whereas in the case of urban culture this heterogeneity and strangeness are associated with such positive meanings such as creativity and innovation.

The new opportunities of joining these flows are also utilised by members of a ‘new urban middle class’, who seem to be very mobile, and among whom international experience is very common. As one  

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⁹ Edward Gierek was the leader of the Communist Party in Poland from 1970 till 1980.
of our respondents stated: ‘Well, yes, now it’s hard to imagine someone who was born in one place and never left’ (M/W/07). Despite the fact that we did not try evaluate this variable when targeting our sample, it turned out that nearly every respondent had spent some time abroad. Many of them had lived in at least two different countries. What is even more important was the fact that their decision to move abroad was based on so-called ‘pull factors’. They did not leave Poland because they had to and the source of the decision to migrate did not stem from push factors, a difficult material situation and a necessity to seek better sources of income. They chose to go abroad not because circumstances forced them to do so, or because of financial reasons that compelled them to, but because they decided that life and work there would guarantee them more opportunities for personal development, for achieving higher qualifications and for furthering a career that would be more interesting and with better prospects: prospects not only in terms of higher wages, but also for making use of their talents and intellectual potential.

A lot of my friends often go to Berlin. They really, really want, and I thought the same for a while, to live in Berlin for at least a year, because in terms of price, Berlin is quite similar to Wroclaw [...] I also have a lot of colleagues who work there, so it wouldn’t be a case of living there for good but to live in East Berlin a little, to improve my language skills.

(M/W/11)

They returned to Poland, but this was also a matter of voluntary decisions and not tough conditions. One respondent from Wroclaw highlighted the dynamic changes in his city which attracted his friends:

No, no it was nothing like there not being a choice. They lived [...] one girl lived for a few years in London but came back. Another lived in Berlin but she also returned, so it was a conscious choice to come back here because it’s cool here, it’s a kind of El Dorado. Here everything is growing, everything is blossoming [...] there are some great opportunities here, in the
West everything is stable, settled but here everything is growing, blossoming so.

(M/W/07)

In the same vein a respondent from Krakow justified her decision to return to Poland:

Sweden is a bit of a boring country. I was there just when Poland was changing and so I remember that when I finished my journalism internship in Sweden I came back to Krakow for another internship and they sent me to a conference with Suchocka10 straight away since she was forming a new government and so on so there was a completely different dynamic between the countries.

(M/K/04)

What was also very telling was the very positive attitude towards transnational experiences gained during and through migration:

Every type of emigration is already a great success, regardless of whether you go there to work as a washer-up for a year, to work in construction, to do a language course or something else [...] in a certain context it is a great lesson. It isn’t just an education for those migrants who learn to live in a multicultural environment and reality, learning tolerance, respect to others – even more so, when they return to Poland, they bring new standards with them. New standards which apply to services, for example civic ones, they are accustomed to certain things which they learned in London, Paris or any other city and they want to have the same here and, after their return, they are an articulate voice which says that they aren’t happy with what we have in Wrocław, with what is going on, that they require European standards.

(M/W/09)

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Manuel Castells points out that:

The dynamics of networks push society towards an endless escape from its own constraints and control, towards an endless reconstruction of its values and institutions [...]. Networks transform power relationships. Power in the traditional sense still exists: capitalist over worker, men over women [...]. Yet, there is a higher order of power: the power of flows in the networks prevails over the flows of power.

(Castells 2002: 133)

This means that the traditional elites who possessed symbolic power are now losing it. The real power that produces culture and symbolic meanings is located in the flows. Arjun Appadurai identifies five ‘landscapes’ of flows: ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, finanscape and ideoscape (Appadurai 1996: 13). These flows operate between nodes - cities and Polish cities like Wrocław or Krakow are gradually included into the network which transforms the traditional framework of reference. For inhabitants of some big cities there is a visible process where a new ‘significant other’ emerges. Together with strengthening the collective identity based on an identification with the city, one can observe the introduction of new points of reference for shaping these identifications. For the ‘new urban middle class’ these new points of reference are simply other cities, either Polish or located in other European countries. The emergence of these new points of reference was often raised by respondents from both cities. A journalist who was a co-author of a widely publicised book on contemporary Krakow explicitly confirmed this change: ‘yes, that was also a thesis in our book, that today Krakow cannot be compared with Warsaw, but really with Berlin, London. It’s a matter of megalomania again but now we don’t want to compare Krakow to Warsaw’ (M/K/04).

A similar line was taken by a respondent from Wrocław:

I think that a certain segment of Wrocław wants to be like Berlin. That is [...] that which attracts you, not just the buildings. Wrocław doesn’t have many of those kinds of monuments to pull in hordes of tourists but it has something which allures [...] an atmosphere, some events which take place in the city. I think
that academically it wants to be even greater than Berlin but it hasn’t quite achieved that. Well, y’know, it’s like while Berlin isn’t just so-so now, it isn’t super any more.

(M/W/10)

A very characteristic feature of contemporary cities is the domination of the symbolic economy. According to Sharon Zukin, this can be defined by three points: first of all it is urban; secondly, it is based on the production of symbols as basic commodities; and thirdly, it is based on the production, in a very self-conscious way, of spaces as both sites and symbols of the city and of culture. The problem of the symbolic economy has become a subject of interest in cities because of the decline and relocation of manufacturing facilities, which has left a gap in many traditional industrial economies. The gap, to a small degree, was filled by the rise of the so-called knowledge-based industries and activities that placed design and innovation at the forefront of production, to construct images of cities in the urban imaginary, to attract people, to draw them in to improve the life of the public sphere. But the construction of the urban imaginary is not just a deliberate effort by government or by business or by the media. These are only a small part of the urban imaginary. The urban imaginary is made up of ordinary people living and working in cities and developing a sense of excitement that we find in world cities (Zukin 1995). This process, described by Zukin, has been observed since the 1970s but in Poland, for several reasons, we have only identified it in the last decade. Furthermore, the symbolic economy is not only related to post-industrial cities. Krakow and Wroclaw are good examples of this – cities which have never been dominated by industry and industrial culture. Nowadays these cities are building their symbolic image as fresh and vivid, creative places with lots of urban attractions, such as clubs, restaurants, art galleries, museums, festivals, etc., which attract young, well-educated people to settle. One of our respondents, when asked what defines the European nature of Krakow, answered using exactly such characteristics:

In what way am I conscious of the lifestyle of being a Cracovian, what it means to me, well it’s those who are lucky enough to work or live in the centre and it is that European nature which means that you can pop out and have a coffee on the way to work or go for lunch in the city, you can meet people
there in the evening for dinner, that is something and I think that it isn’t everywhere that it is so natural.

(M/K/04)

In the contemporary world, based mostly on cultural consumption, the workplace is attractive if it is connected with the possibility of consuming the symbolic economy. But this is inextricably linked with urban culture. Thus, cities are perceived not as dehumanised places as before, but rather as places which are conducive to living in, where everybody can fulfil themselves, not only in terms of their professions but, above all, by entertainment, lifestyle, hobbies, etc. Today it is consumption which to a large extent locates individuals in a social structure and influences the construction of identity, hence urbanism as a way of life becomes desired and a much appreciated value and constitutes significant grounds for defining the identities of generations of the ‘new urban middle class’.

This is very important especially in the context of a knowledge-based society, which is constituted on creative class according to the well-known theory of Richard Florida (2002). Florida argues that in the contemporary world only cities which are tolerant for a range of people, its ethnic and social diversity, can develop successfully, and this success depends on attracting talented people, including high-technology workers. In other words, the city must utilise a multicultural approach in practice which respects and promotes difference and creativity, regardless of the character of ethnic and social minorities. These cities possess low barriers for the entry of human capital, because they encourage open-minded and creative people to settle down. Therefore Polish cities started competing against each other for human and creative capital and building their images as open and tolerant, using an idea of multiculturalism in marketing campaigns in order to stress the uniqueness of their city. That is why their promotional strategies try to include references to their multicultural character, which is supposed to send a clear message that they are open, creative and tolerant. These strategies produce a special discourse which negates those discourses which are based on collective and national content where the most important value is ascribed to the notion of cultural homogeneity and unity. In fact most Polish cities, as well as other Central European cities, are deeply rooted in multicultural heritage, but, as we described above,
An invisible revolution

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this tradition was perceived as alien and dangerous for an exclusive ethnic culture. Nowadays, we can observe completely the opposite attitude. Multicultural heritage is a valuable feature and can be exchanged for crucial products in a symbolic economy: creative capital, human capital and especially tourism. Despite the great economic significance of tourism in this context, we would stress the fact that tourism allows for contact with ‘others’. But those others who nowadays come into Poland’s cities are perceived differently from the others who lived in these cities before WWII. During that time, relations between the Polish ethnic community and other ethnic groups were determined by ethnic and structural conflicts about a city space. Nowadays, the ‘others’ play an attractive and useful role, because they stimulate the local economy, add an additional flavour to a city, and they do not compete with the Poles for rare resources.

This positive attitude among the ‘new urban middle class’ towards reintroducing multiculturalism into the contemporary social and cultural life of Polish cities was fully confirmed by the empirical research. One of the main goals we wanted to achieve through conducting in-depth interviews was to establish to what extent our interviewees were positive about this part of the image of their cities which included explicit references to multicultural heritage and multiculturalism in the current social life. There was no single respondent who challenged this idea, either in Wroclaw or in Krakow. One could even think that multiculturalism was seen as something which was associated with the ‘normal’ shape of a proper western cosmopolitan city. Some of them invoked memories of living abroad where they had experienced a multicultural environment at first hand and recalled it in a positive way:

I really like multicultural cities and I lived in Berlin and I lived in Kreuzberg. Later I lived in Prenzlauer Berg and, in some way, the Turkish Kreuzberg was more melancholy, more friendly than Prenzlauer Berg, where only young Germans live, talented, rich and able, where you don’t meet anyone who is older than 50. Of course it’s a pretty, revamped neighbourhood but kind of monotonous. Whereas in Kreuzberg I felt great. On my street 75 per cent of people were Turkish and that never bothered me. It was nice because it smelt everywhere of Turkish bread. That multicultural nature was very welcoming
and I felt really safe. In a way, having experienced it myself, it was nice

(M/K/04)

I’ve lived abroad for a few years, so I also know how cool and nice it is to get to know different cultures’ (M/W/12).

I think it had a big effect on those European cities because they had colonies. Because they had a big influx of people from Africa, from Asia, from where they had colonies, from wherever they had been. If you go to France, the people are mainly from the Maghreb. Go to England and they are from the Caribbean, India or Pakistan. That kind of cultural mix is cool. If you want to learn something from someone, then you take it, if you don’t want to use those things, then you don’t. I would like to.

(M/K05)

The lack of cultural heterogeneity in Polish cities was often perceived as a legacy of the homogeneity enforced by the socialist regime, and something which made the respondents feel inferior to Western cities. It is worth mentioning that Polish society was one of the most diverse societies up until World War II; nearly 40 per cent of the total population consisted of ethnic and national minorities. As a consequence of the war, Poland became one of the most homogenous societies in Europe and it was a part of official propaganda to eradicate from the collective memory any traces of this long multicultural tradition. That is why the ‘new urban middle class’ must rediscover this multicultural heritage on their own:

I had a rather bad opinion about Kazimierz, as Disneyland with lot of pubs, but when I started attending lectures and cultural events there, I realised that Jewish culture is really vivid in this place and is not artificial [...] look, the synagogues are not rebuilt, they have been there all along.

(M/K/07)

But, they were rather aware of the fact that the marketing strategies promoting their cities were using their multicultural traits as a sort of invention without real content. ‘It is said that Wroclaw is the city of
many cultures: Polish, Czech, German, but in fact, it is just a myth. It isn’t perceived in everyday life’ (M/W/05). In Krakow most respondents stated that Kazimierz, as a much more significant example of multiculturalism, is artificial: ‘Kazimierz is not a multicultural district, it is a destination for a sentimental excursion for someone from Israel and a centre of entertainment for Poles … no, no Kazimierz is like Cepelia’\(^\text{11}\) (M/K/03). They knew that the multiculturalism of their cities was something which one could use as a good promotional strategy, but even such forms of multiculturalism were appreciated by our respondents – especially so in Wrocław, where the whole advertising strategy is focused on creating an image of the open city, ‘the city of meetings’ where everybody can find his or her place among others. Even though they knew that the multiculturalism of Wroclaw does not resemble that in genuinely diverse cities, they liked this kind of image and identified with it fully. As one of the respondents pointed out:

I don’t know, I think that Wroclaw was never […] I mean, what we’re talking about, that it’s a multicultural city […] its really easy to generalise, to apply that kind of handle to Poland, because we don’t really know what it’s like, what it’s like to live with other cultures, let’s just say that to me, there has been a slight increase on the whole but that it is a good programme. I’d rather that it looked that way rather than people said that here is just for us and for no one else. I think that Wroclaw will have to adjust to the image that it is creating pretty quickly because we are starting to really get that kind of international community here and a distinct one too, Asians too. There are Japanese, Koreans and that is a completely different culture.

(M/W12)

Pluralism and tolerance as social values are closely linked with social trust. Contemporary Europeans live in a progressively diverse world where the radius of trust is constantly expanding and can no longer be confined to family, kinship, friends and acquaintance groups. The presence of migrants may contribute to a better understanding of

\(^{11}\) In common Polish the word: Cepelia stands for an artificial folklor and an imitation of folklor culture.
‘others’ and create more trust and outward-looking attitudes (Galent 2008). It was a major argument which in turn stood behind the support of multiculturalism expressed by an interviewee in Krakow:

Is Krakow a multicultural city? No! Where? How? I do not see here people of different colour, I do not see here men running around in turbans and women dressed in colourful clothes. But I think that Poles are much better prepared for that than a few years ago. Many of them have been to London, they found themselves in the vicinity of such society, there they nearly have the whole world. And if you look at families at Krakow there is no single one in which at least one person has not been abroad. [...] I hate prejudiced people, people who are closed, and meet them all the time. I have already learnt, as I realised that I lost my patience and I do not try to educate people any more since you cannot change certain things. People must understand them on their own. That is why I would like people of colour, from diverse cultural backgrounds to come here. They would have a chance to show that they are the same as people who live here. I think that it would help people to get to know ‘others’ because many Poles are afraid of ‘otherness’ and since they are afraid they negate it. Obviously, there are problems in Europe and the world with terrorism, but maybe that is why we need this multiculturalism, because we know nothing about it, we have not the foggiest notion about it.

(M/K/10)

Despite the fact that in general multiculturalism is perceived rather as a marketing slogan, respondents in both cities agree that this is a good idea and they want their cities to become multicultural. Thanks to their experiences they seem to be fairly certain that multiculturalism broadens the mind, teaches tolerance and is not a threat to their identity. The boundaries of sameness in these cities are not built on strict and impassable components like religion, ethnicity or race. One of the respondents, when questioned if she is not afraid of the growing Muslim population in her city and minarets in the city landscape, said: ‘No, because it won’t be an abrupt process, it will be rather an evolution so we will become familiarised with it bit by bit’ (M/K/04).
The power of discourse
Differences between Krakow and Wrocław

The ‘new urban middle class’ described above have created their identity through activity and interactions, but they are determined by the discourse in which they undertake their social activity. In this context we observed important differences between inhabitants of Krakow and Wrocław. The framework of references for their activity depends not on the nation state or European discourse but is constructed in reference to the identity of the city in which they live. This is because the ‘new urban middle class’ perceive themselves as a dynamic and self-made phenomenon, and therefore they also want to be creators of the social and cultural surroundings in which they live. In the situation where national and European discourses are sensed as distant and are perceived rather as being imposed than created in interactions and deliberation, the ‘new urban middle class’ are seeking a level of identity in which they would be identified as real creators in every day interactions and deliberations themselves. In our opinion, significant differences between Krakow and Wrocław in terms of their creation of their city’s identity can be a very good variable. The unique cases of these two cities, which will be discussed below, have determined the process of the creation of their identity. In Wrocław – the city of ‘broken identity’ – the inhabitants identify themselves as the real creators of the city and perceive their city as an indivisible whole. Whereas the same generation in Krakow – the city of ‘grand tradition’ – is rather overwhelmed by this tradition – therefore we were able to detect processes of tribalisation, which consists of dividing the city into many local identities, which are created by the actions of people.

The case of Wrocław: A city of palimpsest

Many scholars have highlighted the fundamental role of the origin myth in the process of the creation of social identity. Thanks to its characteristics, the myth eases existentialist fear, giving sense to human life. This is why every city which possesses a strong and powerful identity has its own myth of foundation, guiding it from chaos into the cosmos and stressing the uniqueness of this place. We noticed that in Wrocław people needed and tried to create a myth of origin which could symbolise the end of a rite of passage: the transition from migrants in an ‘unwanted city’ to citizens in their
‘own city’. The history of Wrocław after 1945 can be described in terms of *rites de passage* by Arnold van Gennep (1960). Polish migrants who came to Wrocław underwent *rites of separation* from their native, folk community in eastern Poland, but they did not achieve the next position – citizens of Wrocław, they did not identify themselves with urban culture and felt a strong sense of alienation from the German heritage of the city (see Mach 1998, Niedźwiedzki 2000, Thum 2005). This meant that for a long time the inhabitants of Wrocław were living in *transition*. As van Gennep stressed, the rite of passage is ended by *rites of incorporation*, when the community symbolically shows that the time of transition is finished and its members have achieved a new social and cultural position. In the case of Wrocław we can identify two main symbols of incorporation.

First of all, the flood of 1997 plays the role of this symbol. The experience of the flood was very important for the people of Wrocław, with respondents indicating that it was the first time that people in the city felt a common solidarity and became aware that Wrocław was their city. The flood had another important meaning, as one of the respondents indicated; in fighting against the catastrophe, people defending the city did not make a distinction between the Polish or the German elements. They were defending their city and their heritage. As one respondent said: ‘During the flood people fought arm in arm in the street, they felt for the first time that they were unified, they felt that the whole of Wrocław’s population constituted one whole. After this heroic and victorious battle, the city and its heritage were no longer perceived as alien, the German heritage of the city became ‘our’ heritage’ (M/W/12). The flood also stimulated local activity. A respondent, in trying to explain why Wrocław is the best developed city in Poland (this is a widespread opinion in Wrocław), noticed that after the flood, the city was able to apply for several aid programmes, thus the local council and local NGOs had very good experience in this matter before the

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12 The flood in 1997 was the worst such catastrophe ever in Poland and was called ‘The flood of the millennium’. Wrocław was flooded only partially because of the heroic efforts of the inhabitants.

13 This fact is also strongly stressed by local sociologists: see the collection of essays on Wrocław’s identity by Żuk and Pluta (2006).
rest of Poland. Therefore, after Poland’s accession to the EU Wroclaw was more efficient in securing European funds (M/W/07).

Another symbol is the revitalisation of the Main Square and surroundings at the turn of the century. This revitalisation is indicated as one of the main successes of the city after the transition. The Main Square is mentioned in nearly every interview as an example of the pride of the town. But in this context, a crucial point is not only the renewing and rejuvenation of an elegant part of the city, but rather the creation of an *agora*, a public space which is a fundamental feature of every city which aspires to be a modern, open and creative metropolis. Wroclaw after WWII had not had a public space which could play the role of city’s salon. ‘When I came back to Wroclaw in the early 90s from the colourful West I was shocked. In the Main Square there was only one disgusting restaurant and after 5 p.m. all of the surrounding area was completely depopulated’ (M/W/12). A very telling remark in this context was given by one respondent: ‘After finishing the rebuilding of the Main Square, restaurant owners organised a big feast in the Square for thousands of inhabitants who could fraternise at the common tables’ (M/W/07). Therefore the revitalisation of the Main Square is perceived in a broader sense as an act of the recreation of the city because:

The square has always enjoyed a central position in European cities, as much a spatial position as a place in its value system. In every historical city, the square finds itself in the centre of the urban layout from which streets protrude in all directions of the world. The most important events in the life of the society take place here, legitimised and emphasised thanks to the symbolic weight accumulated in the space of the square.

(Kubicki and Piekarska-Duraj 2007: 46)

After World War II, Wroclaw was rebuilt, but had not had a symbolic centre as a metaphor of heart and soul. Now, thanks to its inhabitants, the process of rebuilding was completed and Wroclaw possesses its heart and soul once again. During our fieldwork we were often given a tip: ‘You have to go to the Main Square at the weekend, you will see how this place is bursting with energy’ (M/W/04).
It is very characteristic that most of the ‘new urban middle class’ started discovering the German heritage of the city relatively recently and often after the experience of living in other cities:

I discovered the German character of Wrocław when I reached maturity, when I came back to Wrocław after nine years of living in Krakow (M/W/08). Even though I was the best pupil, I had no idea about the history of Wrocław, I discovered it when I lived in Berlin, I was really shocked that everything was nearly the same.

(M/W/12)

This could indicate that, during the process of regaining the city, a parallel process of the recreation of the memory of the city had also been developing. After 1945, communist propaganda tried to eradicate the German heritage of the city, presenting it as antithetically alien and threatening to polish culture. Therefore, the people who lived under the constant threat from German heritage had to suppress it, and had not thought or talked about it. However, when the rite of passage was finished, people in Wrocław had to start building their new identity in a new framework of reference. Therefore we could observe a typical process of inventing tradition described by Hobsbawm (1983), in this case the invention of a bourgeois tradition. In contrast to the demographic census, which says that the vast majority of new Wrocławers came from villages, almost everybody who was born in Wrocław stressed that at least one of his ancestors had come from Lwów – in their opinion the ideal of the Polish bourgeois city before the war. But perhaps much more important is the fact that they identified themselves with the former German inhabitants of the city through the category of ‘We’. The contemporary citizens of Wrocław felt a historical continuity with the pre-war German bourgeoisie: one respondent, asked about bourgeois values and lifestyle in contemporary Wrocław, said: ‘Yes of course. It was nearly 70 years ago when WE were one of the capitals of the Reich’ (M/W/04). The remarks about comparisons between Wrocław and Krakow made by a woman who was born and studied in Wrocław but after graduation lived for nine years in Krakow are very interesting in this context.
If you look at pre-war photographs you can see Krakow as a rotten hole, with small wooden buildings and muddy streets. But Wroclaw was a real CITY at that time, tremendous buildings, wide streets, well-dressed people [...]. And these differences are still present, Krakow is a very provincial and closed city whereas Wroclaw, thanks to the cosmopolitan influences of Breslau and Lwów, is open and vivid.

(M/W/08)

Another interesting example: ‘People in Wroclaw have always been creative and open. [...] When in 1913 WE were building the Centennial Hall – the symbol of modernity at the same time – in Poznań they were building a pseudo-gothic castle – a typical indicator of backwardness’ (M/W/12).

The recreation of the memory of a city is also observed in attitudes to multicultural values. As a consequence of a growing interest in the history of Wroclaw, people became aware of the changeability and instability of borders and nation states. They read and discussed a very popular book in Wroclaw Obce miasto. Wroclaw w 1945 i potem (Alien city. Wroclaw in 1945 and After) by Gregor Thum, a German researcher. The author dealt with the problem of the social memory of Wroclaw after 1945, and analysed the process of the mythologisation of city space. He stressed that during the 20th century the names of streets, bridges and squares in Wroclaw were changed five times, legitimising various regimes which were based on very different values: the German Empire until 1918, the Weimar Republic until 1933, the Nazi regime up to 1945, the Polish Communist regime until 1989, and the contemporary democratic Polish Republic (Thum 2005: 285-327). Also Norman Davies, in his monumental history of Wroclaw Microcosm. Portrait of a Central European City, pointed out that for one thousand years the city belonged to different states and different cultures, and was named in several ways: Wrotizla under the Polish Piast Dynasty, Vretslav in the Kingdom of Bohemia, Presslaw under the Habsburg Monarchy, Bresslau in the Kingdom of Prussia and in the German Empire, and finally Wroclaw after 1945 (Davies and Moorhouse 2002). Therefore people in Wroclaw were aware that discourse is changeable, that there were no sacred, primordial values, especially those which referred to national or nationalistic discourses. They could easily
avoid thinking in the binary structures which are typical of modernism, and did not think about their city as a dichotomy: Polish versus German. They were aware that Wroclaw had been created by people from different ethnic and national cultures. They were also aware that there was no such thing as a monolithic German culture or a monolithic Polish one, that these cultures were heterogenic and produce various discourses. Therefore, the history of Wroclaw absolutely cannot be presented as the eternal struggle between Poland and Germany. This situation refers to theory of deconstruction of Grand Narrative described by the postmodernist philosopher Jean-François Lyotard (1984).

On the basis of postmodern theories, contemporary urban studies introduce a concept of palimpsest in order to describe the identity of postmodern city - where anybody can mark their existence but nobody can capture the city. It means that a traditional hierarchy of symbolic power no longer exists and any group could possess symbolic power (Rewers 2005: 303-304). The sentences below, which are typical of all respondents, describe this palimpsest identity in a clear way: ‘Wroclaw in itself is constructed for everyone, the Square was designed by a Czech, the best infrastructure was made by the Germans, and maybe we should add to the city something from us’ (M/W/06). One respondent, asked what he thought about introducing multicultural heritage into the city space, said:

In this city many cultures have lived over the centuries, many nations, so why not build monuments to commemorate their heritages? I want only one thing – just let it be aesthetic [...] And now the Poles put up their own monument\footnote{Monument of Bolesław Chrobry (Boleslaw the Brave; 967-1025), the Polish king who is believed to have added Wroclaw to the Polish state in the Middle Ages. The monument was unveiled in 2007, and has been criticised, especially for aesthetic reasons (it is badly proportioned and does not completely suit the square on which it stands). What is important in this context is that before the Second World War there stood a splendid monument of Emperor Wilhelm on this square which perfectly matched the square and its surroundings.} which unfortunately looks sad. And it is really true that it used to be a
very beautiful city. And what about now? Not necessarily, it is rather empty.

(M/W/04)

All the respondents treated the coexistence of different national heritages as the most natural thing to be thought of:

We would like to introduce these names [German], but there is still a big and strong group of people which is called by us ‘Piast dignity’, which has very little to do with Wrocław, but it holds, I would not like to call it this way, but it holds to a ‘small town mentality’, to parochialism. There is some complex about the fact that it is a big city built by Germans, and we also want to show that we are better, that we have our own monument of Boleslaw Chrobry.

(M/W/05)

The leader of a very dynamic NGO who had moved to Wrocław said:

In Wrocław we say that people become Wroclawers when they get off the train and, straight on the platform, they say: ‘I’m a Wroclawer’. In my organisation, which is oriented to improving the appearance of the city and promoting their culture and heritage, over 60 per cent of the founder members are permanently resident outside Wrocław.

(M/W/05)

One of the typical answers to the question as to who is a stranger in Wrocław came in the following way:

For me, the real citizens of Wrocław are my colleagues – two students from Chechnya, who organised a protest against destroying green fields and building a car park in their neighbourhood instead. Nobody among the ‘natives’ protested against it. So it is not enough to be born in the city to become one of its citizens’.

(M/W/01)
The case of Krakow: A city of labyrinths
Things look different in Krakow. With a continuity of history and a myth of origin which vanishes in the mists of time, this has a great influence on its stable identity. In Krakow, in contrast to Wrocław, the term ‘identity’ is used very seldom, and even when respondents answered direct questions about identity, their answers were often dominated by common clichés or slogan-like notions. According to Hegel’s famous line: ‘The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.’ Zygmunt Bauman points out that identity is perceived and is regarded as important only when it becomes problematic (Baumann 1997). The identity of Krakow is perceived as self-evident, and this is because of the unique history of Krakow which places the city at the centre of the Polish national system of values. The Polish state changed its shape on a number of occasions and consisted of several ethnic and national cultures during its one-thousand-year history, but Krakow was always located in this state framework and was developed in Polish ethnic surroundings. What is more, Krakow was the capital of Poland between 1320 and 1611, and the place of the king’s coronation up until partition at the end of the 18th century. However, much more important in this context is the time of partitions in the 19th century, when Krakow became the spiritual capital of Poland. The conditions in the second part of the 19th century – the liberalisation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy – allowed the cultivation of Polish culture in the province of Galicia, whereas at the same time the two other invaders conducted oppressive politics of Germanisation and Russification. Therefore Krakow was termed the Polish Piedmont, and thanks to such sacred national symbols as Wawel castle – the former residence and place of burial of Polish kings – it became the archetypal symbol of Polishness.15

Hence, the inhabitants of Krakow perceived themselves not as creators of the city and its meanings but rather as pilgrims who were

15 Krakow during that time was inhabited – as was every Central European city – by an ethnic mosaic, for example Jews constituted about 30 per cent of the total population. However national rituals, festivals and art created a symbolic picture of Krakow as essential and homogenously Polish, expelling from this discourse any ethnic and national minority. For more about this problem see Kubicki (2008).
going through a labyrinth of meanings and symbolic codes, which were created in the past and were perceived as sacred and essential. Very characteristic in this context are the following sentences: ‘I think that an important fact of becoming Cracovian is growing up in the city, somebody who did not grow up in Krakow can’t understand many things’ (M/K/04).

In Krakow there are a lot of things deeply rooted in this city which are like signposts: Wyspiański, everything that Pilch describes, Piwnica pod Baranami, Jagiellonka [...] Krakow is absolutely not open, if you want to be accepted you have to learn symbolic codes, meanings of this city.

(M/K/07)

But these symbolic senses were constructed in the past, and people felt that they were rather overwhelmed by them, so they were not able to create new symbolic meanings. What is also very interesting is the fact that nobody ever mentioned any important events from the recent city’s past, as was the case in Wroclaw. Relatively recent events, such as for example the rituals after the death of John Paul II, while thoroughly described and analysed by media and even social scientists, were not even mentioned by respondents in Krakow. This event, except for a few remarkable weeks, did not bring any long-term changes in the city, to its feeling of unity and the solidarity of its inhabitants. In the context of social changes, respondents highlighted their rather evolutionary character with such aspects as increasing tourism in the city and the gradual renovation of infrastructure and monuments. This was a typical evolution without any specific, crucial points in the past. They were able to indicate an important event from the recent past only if they thought on a micro-scale, district level. Therefore, people in Krakow did not perceive themselves as the creators of the identity of the city, but through the creation of micro-identities they started discovering or inventing district identities. This situation also influenced the perception of the city. While Wroclaw was described as very active and open, Krakow, by contrast, was often pictured as a symbol of stagnation: ‘This city needs to get some fresh air, new people, new institutions’ (M/K/04). ‘People who care professionally for Krakow, create various committees, various bodies which are in fact sluggish bodies. They gather together, write memos and finish their activity’ (M/K/03). ‘[…] I will give you an example;
in Sopot there is a ‘dancing house’, I am sure that in Krakow this kind of architecture will never appear’ (M/K/07).

In our opinion a good indicator for the processes described above could be civil participation and NGO activity. The ‘new urban middle class’ as a new phenomenon want to be the creators of a social and cultural reality in their surroundings. In Krakow, in contrast to Wrocław, they could not see themselves as subjects taking an active part in creation of city understood as an indivisible whole. This stems mainly from a stronger sense of local identity and a lack of political mobilisation caused by ‘invisible’ authorities. This is why we identified two different processes in creating local identity through NGO activity. In the case of Krakow we should speak rather about a process of tribalisation: ‘Krakow should break down into old districts, yes, I really want to see it’ (M/K/03). Districts and street festivals are one of the most popular urban rituals in Krakow, gathering crowds of local people. The inhabitants of such districts as Kazimierz, Podgórze or Nowa Huta identify themselves primarily with their districts; what is more, they build strong symbolic boundaries between districts: a pub owner who has lived in Kazimierz for ten years said: ‘I dug in here, I do shopping in the square (Plac Nowy) – the products are better and healthier. I very seldom go out on the Aryan side, a few weeks ago I went to a club in the [Main] Market Square – and never again…’ (M/K/05). In effect, NGO activities are mostly directed at specific problems which occur in the neighbourhood. A person who lived in Plac Nowy (one of the centres of nightlife in Krakow) said:

I established an association […] in order to prevent the terrible noise produced by pubs and clubs in Plac Nowy and to prevent the destruction of the special atmosphere of this place by creating a space for drunken parties […] it’s ironic […] I am an anarchist […] I never thought that someday I would become an activist.

(M/K/05)

Another respondent described the origins of a different NGO from Kazimierz:
At the beginning we were a group of friends interested in the history of this district who met at local pubs, we were not interested in the social problems of this district. But radical and negative change in Kazimierz during the last few years meant that we started to be interested in the problems of ordinary inhabitants [...] For example I love this district but I have not lived here yet, it’s too expensive for me.

(M/K/03)

NGO activities in Wroclaw differ significantly from those in Krakow. In Wroclaw identity does not exist on a micro-level, at the district level. Such sentences are very typical: ‘[...] no, in Wroclaw there are not districts, the city is divided into several dozen estates which play the role of constituency and that is all’ (M/W/02). ‘No, there is no district identity. Of course, sometimes people ask each other ‘where do you come from’, but it doesn’t mean that it is dividing Wroclaw. We are just from here, from Wroclaw, everybody’ (M/W/04). ‘Wroclaw is a patchwork of peoples. I’ve lived in my block of flats for two years and only know three people. People in Wroclaw want to have peace and quiet and there is no way to force them to do something for the neighbourhood’ (M/W/06).

This situation is confirmed by a local sociologist, Jacek Pluta whose survey asked respondents about levels of identification with city space on the scale of six indicators: private flat – block of flats – street – estate – district – city. The inhabitants of Wroclaw first of all identified themselves with the city as an indivisible whole, the next was private flat and tenement. The estate and district are these city spaces which are rather neglected by citizens (Pluta 2006: 65-66). Therefore NGO activities are oriented especially towards promoting the city and their culture. They have great publicity, since they do not take part in a play of interests between the authorities and local population and by this token they are not seen as agents of conflict and enjoy the impression of a common solidarity in the city, whereas in Krakow many powerless organisations try to solve a lot of micro-scale conflicts, building the picture of divided city.
Centre and periphery: The nation state and beyond

In our opinion these two models of the identity of cities are strongly correlated with centre – periphery relations. Krakow is still perceived by its inhabitants as the centre of Polish culture, as a symbolic representation of the nation.

When Krakow lost its capital city status, it attained the status of spiritual capital of Poland and this has shaped the way of thinking in Krakow. I do not claim that Krakow’s claim is more royal than, for example, Łódź’s. But I’m sure that students, intellectuals or office clerks do.

(M/K/02)

Hence, the framework of references is dominated by a symbolic representation of national culture. Nevertheless, there are also rare examples which transcend this overwhelming structure:

An older generation, in order to stress the distinctness of Krakow from the rest of Poland, used its Habsburgian heritage and put up portraits of the Emperor, but now, the new generation’s eyes are fixed on London, Berlin or Rome, because these cities produce trends, lifestyles, we want to live a laid-back life like in Rome or London.

(M/K/04)

In Wroclaw people identified their city as on the periphery of a national state. Almost every respondent, when asked if he/she could imagine their city developing beyond state structures, answered: ‘Yes, I can and I want it.’ The completely opposite situation can be observed in Krakow, where people said: ‘No, I cannot imagine it.’ This situation is conditioned by two main factors. Firstly, in Wroclaw we observed a strong feeling of the alienation and oppressiveness of the centralised national state, of which several sentences supply a good example: ‘Wroclaw helps itself. Sometime we joke that we could create the Free City of Wroclaw, even Mayor Dutkiewicz sometimes tries to act in this way by not acting as if he is still living in Poland’ (M/W/02).
We are less prejudiced against the Germans or the French than MPs and everything that is going on in Warsaw […]. I’m scared about what is happening in Warsaw, sometimes I think that the clutches of Warsaw will try to reach us and block our initiatives and activities.

(M/W/04)

People in Wrocław were convinced of the fact that the city had achieved its success by the gradual growth of subjectivity of Wrocław:

In my opinion everything we have achieved, we have done not only without help from the state but even contrary to the state […]. The state has not given us a single penny for the restoration of our monuments because they are German […]. The State didn’t support us for our bid for EXPO and EIT.

(M/W/01)

Thus, the feeling of alienation from the other parts of Poland was expressed very often: ‘Before World War II the French did not want to die for Gdańsk, and in the same way I’m not interested in the Main Market in Krakow, I am interested in my Market Square’ (M/W/06). Each respondent stressed, often with pride, that they had never been to the eastern part of Poland. A typical sentence describing this situation can be summarised thus: ‘For me Poland ends on the Vistula line, I have never been outside the line, I don’t want to go there, I’m not interested in the problems of Poland B, I don’t want to support backward Poland B with our taxes’.

The sense of a periphery position is also strengthened by another factor. The ‘regaining of the city’ resulted in an intensified interest in the history of city. People in Wrocław became aware of the changeability of countries, national states: ‘Lower Silesia is now Polish but previously was not, and it could also happen in the future.’ Even though Wrocław, according to objective criteria, is not a borderland city, in a subjective sense people identify themselves as a borderland people: ‘When I studied at Viadrina University in

16 Poland B is a shorthand nickname for the less developed eastern regions of Poland.
Frankfurt an der Oder I discovered how the borderland could be inspiring [...]. In my opinion we have achieved success because we – in Wrocław – are borderland people’ (M/W/07). They were aware of the specific identity of borderland and they often stressed that ‘the rest of Poland’ could not understand them:

When we renamed the People’s Hall Centennial Hall, as it should be named, then all of Poland accused us of propagating Prussian imperialism [...] but it’s just our affair because it is our Hall and the central power should not butt in [...]. We have tried to recover our pieces of art which were stolen after World War II by Warsaw, but Warsaw accused us of propagating Prussian imperialism [...]. We communicate very well with the inhabitants of Gdańsk. This city is very similar to ours – with a burgher tradition, a kind of little republic.... We have our cities with their unique history and Poland should not disturb us.

(M/W/01)

As a consequence, nearly every respondent indicated the need for the deregulation of central state power and the strengthening of self-government: ‘In my opinion national patriotism is dead, is unnecessary, what is now important is local identity, region, and the national state did not prove to be successful’ (M/W/07).

Self-government should be strengthened, I count on it. Of course I don’t want to be cut off from Poland in a cultural sense because we are Poles, I’m not talking about some kind of crazy autonomy, but I’m counting on us not being dominated any longer by the absurdity of politics from the centre.

(M/W/02)

They saw an opportunity for the city in a global network and could easily imagine their city as a node in a global network where dominant structures like states or even the EU are of little importance:

Now in a global world the most important role is played by cities and they compare only with international corporations. [...] In the contemporary world an important role is played by planes [...] it doesn’t matter how much the fare is from point A
to B, but how long the journey takes [...]. If a journey to Barcelona takes me 2 hours and to Warsaw 5 hours – no comment.

(M/W/05)

It is very characteristic in this context that in comparison to Krakow, people in Wrocław are not rooted in their region. Regional identification with Lower Silesia, as understood as a cultural and social phenomenon, is very weak because most of the ancestors of the inhabitants come from the kresy – the eastern frontier – or Central Poland and they have no relatives in the region. Furthermore, the idea of Lower Silesia is perceived as artificial: ‘There is no Lower Silesia, Silesia was one historical region, but now this region is divided into irrational parts: Lower and Higher and even Opole [...] completely ridiculous’ (M/W/01). ‘Frankly I don’t know anybody who can define themselves as a Lower-Silesian’ (M/W/09). What is of particular interest is that when respondents were asked about their holiday plans they said that they mostly went abroad or to other Polish regions. Most of them were not interested in visiting Lower Silesia. When they were asked about their favourite weekend trips, they mostly mentioned Berlin and Prague. We also observed a completely different situation in Krakow, where regional identity plays a significant role. This resulted from different processes related to the development of the city, where most contemporary inhabitants have their roots in the region of Galicia and Krakow is self-confidently perceived as the symbolic centre of their region. ‘Highlanders, people from the surrounding villages, are not ‘others’ in Krakow. They are strongly rooted in the city landscape’ (M/K/07). In contrast to Wrocław, the inhabitants of Krakow very often spent their holiday and weekends in the region, creating strong regional networks. In Krakow nobody highlighted regional autonomy, because the region is perceived mostly as a recreational and social backdrop rather than a base for the development of the city and its metropolitan area. Whereas in Wrocław the region is perceived as a necessity which guarantees the efficient development of the city, so their call for a regional autonomy should be seen as a search for a guarantee of the constant growth of the city.

Hence, the idea of the nation state with a closed and ethnic identity seemed to be completely obsolete and unacceptable in Wrocław. This
unwillingness to look at contemporary Europe as a space where separate national identities compete against each other can be detected at different levels. One very good indicator is their attitude towards the presence of German culture in the urban public space of Wrocław. Most respondents referred to Europe as a common place to live where national culture and national borders are meaningless:

I think at this moment we should think about developing connections with Prague, Vienna and Berlin. In my view this is a more important direction than the route to Warsaw. As for Dresden, we have also finished building the motorway. Certainly, a good connection should also be made with Warsaw, as it is the richest and most centrally located city in Poland. It is also important because it is also the financial centre of most important companies in the state.

(M/W/01)

For some of them it is not a national identification which plays a role but just the pragmatic challenges of everyday life. This is something that differentiates the ‘new urban middle class’ in their own view from the previous generations:

The older generation, I mean those who were beneficiaries of the former system, who were given flats in German houses, are afraid of the fact that Germans could raise the rents. There are quite a lot of such people. However, for me and people from my generation, who do not own their own flats and have to pay a rent of 1000 zloty per month, it is unimportant whether I pay it to a Pole or to a German.

(M/W/06)

What distinguishes Krakow in this regard is the fact that for respondents there the framework of the nation state was indisputable. Krakow as a city was seen as an integral part of Polish national history and identity. For them, Krakow was located in the centre of the national narrative, and that was why it demanded its national context. They were not able to transcend these national structures and imagine Krakow as an autonomous actor. So, despite the fact that they were as active and transnationally connected as the respondents from Wrocław, the dominant discourse on Krakow,
An invisible revolution which revolves around national mythology, did not allow them to transcend national structures as easily as their Wroclaw counterparts. In our view, the two main features described above – social memory and centre-periphery relation – determined a discourse whose framework of reference produce two different discourses, ways of thinking about social reality. In Wroclaw people can easily think and act beyond the dominant discourse of national state because they are conscious of the flexibility of social reality and national structure. In Krakow, social memory produces a completely different discourse – stability and a sense of the domination of national structure: Krakow will not go beyond Polish national discourse because the essence of Krakow is deeply rooted in national symbols and mythology.

Conclusion
In our opinion one of the main conclusions is the fact that the city in Poland has become an independent mechanism of identity discourse production. This new discourse challenges the traditional ethnic model of Polish national identity and creates opportunities for constructing identities which go beyond traditional grand narratives and become more fragmented, globalised, decentralised and fluid.

The unique nature of the city as a social space, which is often called anti-structure, allows for experiments in a normative sphere, for the creation of new cultural elements which would otherwise be suppressed in a framework of the official structure. Therefore, the ‘new urban middle class’ can be treated as an important player in the process of changing Polish national identity, especially since they are well equipped with three kinds of capital: cultural, social and financial. Of these, the most important are the first two, which, as was shown during the research on the attitudes of the Poles towards European integration, play a key role in creating the kinds of competences which best allow people to cope with the changing consequences of structural social change (Galent et al. 2001). In our view, this social category is characterised by the highest dynamics of change in their social identity and by the fact that they acquire material and symbolic power which can influence other segments of the Polish society. We do not want to claim that there is a fundamental difference between the younger and older generations or between the population of the big cities and the rest of the country.
We merely think that the changes in social identity among the ‘new urban middle class’ are more intense, and by this token more detectable. Thanks to their social and cultural resources they are becoming the most important subjects in building a civic and open society. They perceive and treat ‘the others’ as those who they cooperate and sometimes compete with, on the broad free market of material, political and cultural resources, but they do not treat this competition through a prism of distrust and resentments.

Having agreed that the nation state ceased to play the overwhelming role in shaping collective identities of the ‘new urban middle class’ in Poland, one has to ask about the role of European integration in influencing and determining these changes. It seems that the answer to these questions cannot be straightforward and unambiguous. Nevertheless, we managed to identify the most important logic which structured their views on the shape of European integration and values involved in this process. The most important observation was probably that which confirmed the fact that for the ‘new urban middle class’ European integration and membership in the European Union was something that was fully supported and without serious reservations. For the ‘new urban middle class’, European integration and membership in the EU have already become a part of their natural habitus. This embeddedness in the Europeanised social, cultural and political landscapes is something which one could call, following Ulrich Beck, a ‘banal Europeanism’.

We discovered that many respondents were able to talk about Europe and European integration without reference to the most important actors representing the European milieu: states and EU institutions. In our view this is really something which brings the perception of European integration to a different level. It abandons the traditional categories of institutions/nation state actors and opens channels for new discourse, where the European sphere can be conceived not only as a sum of elements but also as something autonomous, which should be regulated by certain ‘rules of the game’. That shows that the ‘new urban middle class’ are probably intellectually and mentally prepared to consider European integration as disconnected from egoisms: either national or European. They not only used such measures as geographical, racial, or religious distinctions, but
highlighted certain standards, which had nothing to do with Europeanism conceived in an essentialist way.

It is also very important to underline that, in contrast to other social categories researched within the RECON project in Poland, European integration was never reduced only to pragmatic and economic cooperation between states. It does not mean that this dimension was not indicated in the interviews, but it was rather seen as a certain aspect, sometimes even most important, of a more complex phenomenon. This neglect of economic issues stood in stark contrast with those views, very common in Poland, which considers the European Union through the prism of utilitarian benefits. In case of the ‘new urban middle class’ it very rarely boiled down to a binary opposition: Poland versus the EU. Most of the ‘new middle urban class’ are very glad that they live in a world where different kind of borders disappear, but they do not necessarily want them to be rebuilt on the higher European level. Neither do they feel that there is a real basis for the creation of a European super state.

Taking all these findings into consideration, it seems that the logic of change in the social identities of the ‘new urban middle class’ in Poland resembles these mechanisms of identity-building in Europe which are described in the third model of the RECON project. It is based, inter alia, on assumptions of individualisation and fragmentisation on the one hand and universalisation on the other.
References


Chapter 8

‘Leave me alone’
Civic disengagement of the intelligentsia

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Introduction
Polish society is adrift. Fragmented, polarised, suspended between the imagined past and an European future it does not fully grasp, it is caught in arguments without resolutions. Its preferences shift from democracy to mild authoritarianism and general apathy. The alarmingly low quality of Polish public discourse is opening a search for a remedy against the sensationalist tabloid slander which replaced seriousness and civility. There is a search for an elite that can raise the substance and manner of public debate and break the cycle of brutishness and vulgarity, for an elite that will offer a coherent and socially acceptable vision of the future in the European context.

Scholars and opinion-makers are looking at the intelligentsia to see if, as when the country found itself at critical junctures in the past, the intelligentsia has retained a potential to represent wider societal interests, define the path of further integration of Poland with Europe and inspire some ‘common good.’ The members of the intelligentsia have done well in the transition. On the individual level, they adjusted quickly to market economy, embraced political pluralism, adapted western patterns of consumption and secular lifestyle.
However, the intelligentsia as a distinguishable social stratum is fading away. It has fragmented and splintered and no longer shares a common identity. It has distanced itself from the embodiment of national identity. The intelligentsia’s discourse, of historically deterministic romantic sacrifice for the freedom of Poland with an emphasis on Poland’s special place in Europe, is now an ideology of populists and those who feel deprived by the transition.

It is unlikely that the intelligentsia can, or that it wants to, remain a leading elite, a standard bearer of patriotism and of exemplary behaviour. The intelligentsia, out of a sense of duty (noblesse oblige) and in the absence of other elites competing for leadership, served Poland and the nation as a moral, cultural and social elite. It provided a common thread, a narrative of Polish struggles for independence, autonomy, dignity and otherness. For over a century, the intelligentsia embodied ‘a particular phenomenon signifying a shared experience of the community’ (Nałęcz 1994). The process of withdrawal of the intelligentsia from national and social responsibility coupled with its increased diversification and individualisation predates the changes of 1989 and Poland’s accession to the European Union. The process that started in the Polish People’s Republic illustrates a broader social transformation – a transition from a collective identity to staunch individualism. At the same time, the contemporary heirs of the intelligentsia – the specialists, the culture-makers, the clerks, the middle class,1 or, as this author proposes, the extelligentsia2 – remain a vanguard of change. They, individually not collectively, are at the forefront of the transformation, thrive professionally, support market and state reforms and benefit from the European integration. Although Poland is far from becoming a post-national state, the patterns of identity are changing.3

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1 The classification of the contemporary intelligentsia proposed through a title of a book about it (Domariski 2008).
2 The people formerly known as the intelligentsia.
3 In a recent opinion poll, three per cent declared to feel only European, 45 per cent declared their identity be Polish and the European, and 52 per cent feel exclusively Polish (CBOS research conducted 28 June 2009, results published in Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 July 2009).
The case of the intelligentsia presented in this chapter illustrates a pattern of changing identity in a society that experienced a shift in most of its frames of reference – political, social, economic, local and international. The ongoing and inter-related processes of systemic transformation and Europeanisation continue to influence the perception of selves as well as the perception of the external environment. The findings of field research presented in the chapter, along with an analysis of contemporary secondary sources, allow for a cautious inquiry into the diversification of the intelligentsia’s identity. The chapter examines intelligentsia’s departure from a collective self and the emergence of highly individualised identities among its (former) members. The chapter also discusses the implication of intelligentsia’s identity change on social capital and civic culture in the context of the three RECON models.

Social role: inventing tradition and guiding the change

A statement made by Nowak (2009), ‘I think about myself as a member of the intelligentsia but I have no passion for social work. I despise the masses, I am afraid of them. My belonging to the intelligentsia is a mark to differentiate myself from the outbursts of general boorishness,’ illustrates a change in the self-perception of the intelligentsia. To think about oneself as a member of the intelligentsia is to express an aesthetic, a lifestyle preference not a duty or an action.

Nowak shows how far the intelligentsia has departed from its original aspiration: ‘it is an indisputable fact that the intelligentsia (or at least its representative, opinion-making part) aimed to play a social role of a (national) vanguard steering the course of changes that were to take place in Poland’ (Chojnowski and Palska 2008: 27). The social history of the intelligentsia was explicitly linked to national history and the imagined community (Anderson 1983) of the Polish nation that the intelligentsia invented. The intelligentsia imagined a community, a symbolic home for a stateless nation. It defined its boundaries through language, mystical Catholicism and memory of

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the European/Western past. The myth of Europe lies at the foundation of Polish national identity: It signified Poland’s otherness and difference from the East – the Russian partition was the most repressive. Poland never allowed itself to feel like a country of the East, although at times it behaved like one.

Accepting the pluralism of definitions of the intelligentsia, which applies primarily to the scale of the phenomenon and internal divisions within the intelligentsia, there is agreement as to the social function the intelligentsia played. The intelligentsia was an agent of change and a social stratum distinguished from others by a self-declared mission of work for the common good called ‘the ethos.’ It was composed of individuals who were recruited to (through advancement to) and from (for the reproduction of) the educated urban class. Although the members of the intelligentsia were the makers and the consumers of higher culture and had a lifestyle built around professional interests, these were secondary characteristics. The primary and distinguishing attributes were its commitment to change and the guardianship of national identity, collective memory and the romantic myth of freedom.

Contentment: the life of privilege
The intelligentsia was both an ideal to aspire to and a living object: people who shared a common understanding of values, roles, commitments, responsibilities and interests. The closest the two ever came together was for the generation of intelligentsia that saw the independence of Poland, built the country for twenty years, and (almost) died defending it in World War II. After the war, a debate started over whether the country needed the intelligentsia. Considered anachronistic, it was criticised by its own members (Chałasiński 1946) and by the regime as non-socialist and bourgeois. However, as the regime faced low legitimacy because of its Soviet roots, among other liabilities, it needed to control a common national Polish discourse. It needed a new national myth for which it created its own vehicle – a new intelligentsia that would assist in building the regime, be loyal to the Polish People’s Republic, and legitimate the national and the socialist regime. This new intelligentsia was drawn from the peasant class and, while it eventually developed the attributes of a cultural and intellectual elite, it never fully identified
Civic disengagement of the intelligentsia

with the ethos of freedom or showed a willingness to sacrifice the living comforts (let alone life), which it owed to its privileged position in the People’s Republic (Palska 1994).

A dividing line between the new intelligentsia and the ideal archetype was not as sharp or evident at the end of communism as it was in the 1950s. The emphasis shifted from social responsibility and service to the nation to sharing a social status (Landau-Czajka 2008). The intelligentsia, once again, was a ‘substitute elite [...] in absence of true and own political and economic elites, it took over at least one of the fundamental roles of elites, to serve as a model’ (Palska 2008: 325). The intelligentsia represented an aspirational stratum distinguished by higher education, creation and consumption of culture, personal refinement, and professionalism. The elite status also came from its small size: only eight-nine per cent of the Polish population could be classified as intelligentsia at the end of the 1980s.

The generation of the intelligentsia that reached adulthood around 1989 inherited the status but not necessarily the ethos of the intelligentsia. It was well equipped to adjust to changes but did not identify uniformly with the traditional values of the intelligentsia – honour, public service, a sense of the common good. Its own experience with community was predominantly negative. The Polish People’s Republic at its end was a parody of communitarian values. The ideology of the leading role of the Communist Party for the protection and promotion of social harmony and well-being of society, class struggle and fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union were so disgraced that even party elites did not believe in them. The only power left to the state was the apparatus of repression, but even that could not contain society’s anger over economic crises and low quality of life. Anyone who experienced the failing Polish state in the 1980s remembers its ineffectiveness, inefficiency and predatory administration. This experience accounts for the general lack of nostalgia for socialism, manifested, for example, by the present weakness of left-wing parties and the rise of right-wing conservative movements that look for state models in Poland’s pre-1945 history. Whether these models are historically accurate or imaginary is a different story. What matters is that the experience and memory of the People’s Republic explains the contemporary reluctance,
bordering on hostility, in entering into any relationship with the state, and the disillusionment with authority.

**Satisfaction: the intelligentsia and capitalism**

The process of individualisation and lifestyle values replacing social commitment accelerated after 1989. Political and economic reforms initiated in 1989 and continued through the EU accession period brought radical changes to the design of the state and stimulated a gradual, progressive transformation of political culture. Coming into the transition, the intelligentsia was already in a privileged position as it had assets enabling it to take advantage of market opportunities and pluralist politics: it had education, professional experience, urban residence and a conviction that the country was going in the right direction. These gave the intelligentsia more opportunities to engage early and find its place in a changing environment. For example, the rising market value of education as the economy shifted from production to services created a demand for more educators, who responded by working multiple jobs at public and private institutions of higher education. The newly formed private sector needed specialists who migrated there from the poorly-paid state sector. The intelligentsia not only did not experience job losses, but gained job security which, in turn, translated into higher incomes and improved standards of living.

While education always carries an income premium, it has increased significantly in recent years. Domański (2005: 23) shows that, in 2002, the higher education premium was 46 per cent above the national average income, an increase from 18 per cent in 1992. Higher education is a significant factor in social diversification. In 1982, the income of university graduates was only 14 per cent higher than the national average, with people with primary school education making only 10 per cent below the national average, thus accounting for an income difference of 24 points; this difference increased to 92 points in 2002 (Domański 2005: 23; Boarini and Strauss 2007).

Education and high(er) income facilitates the exploration of different lifestyles that, in turn, can translate into higher satisfaction with one’s social position. In a study of self- and life-satisfaction among different socio-economic classes, the intelligentsia and upper management
were at the top of the scale (Domański 2005: 55). Public opinion studies show that the prestige granted to the traditional professions of the intelligentsia – academic, medical doctor, teacher, journalist, upper manager – requiring specialisation and often graduate level education, continued to hold. The top position in the hierarchy of social prestige, that of university professor, has not changed since 1958 (Domański 2008: 309). This, however, should not be equated with the support or respect for the intelligentsia but as a sign of value recognition of certain professions that modern societies praise for the educational commitment and high level of individual responsibility required to pursue them.

Economically and professionally satisfied, and socially respected, the intelligentsia supports the political changes that have taken place in Poland (Domański 2005: 50). For the intelligentsia, the democracy they experienced and supported on ethical grounds in the Solidarity movement in the 1980s turned into tangible benefits in the 1990s and 2000s. The democratic system opened unprecedented opportunities for professional advancement and self-expression. This explosion of selves, the individualisation and atomisation of society, is the profound change that happened in post-1989 Poland. It has a significant and formative impact on political and social culture and the identity of the country. It also changed the identity of the intelligentsia.

Is there a common ground? A view from the field
Scholars agree that the intelligentsia is changing. How is it changing, whether it has retreated, declined or withered away are interesting questions in their own right, but they are not as relevant as whether there is an emerging consensus as to how the contemporary Polish society may look and behave in the European context. Poland has a way to go before it becomes an open society that not only tolerates but celebrates cultural and social diversity. Can the energy and creativity expanded in the processes of pursuing individual goals be re-directed toward building an open (and European) society?
To gain first-hand views and opinions, the author conducted primary empirical research\(^5\) among the contemporary Polish urban professionals who share characteristics of the intelligentsia in terms of education, lifestyle and cultural consumption habits. The findings of the interviews support the conclusions about the fragmentation and diversification among the intelligentsia reached by other scholars (e.g. Palska 2008; Domaniński 2005, 2008a), the lack of identification with the ethos of the intelligentsia (e.g. Snopek 2008; Krzemiński 2009) but expand the range of inquiry to consider attitudes and views about Europe and the European Union.

The objective was to determine whether these educated urban professionals, who, following the traditional patterns of Polish social stratification might be called the intelligentsia, would self-identify as intelligentsia. Do the attributes of ‘otherness’ that set the intelligentsia apart still hold? While education and active participation in culture (reading habits, theatre attendance, cultivating interests in film, music, art) defined an intelligentsia lifestyle, it was its sense of social awareness and responsibility for others that earned it a leadership role. Mission, the ethos that defined the intelligentsia’s collective identity, was the essential element of its ‘otherness’. The study enquired whether this – or any other mission or vocation – is relevant or even present in the construction of contemporary identities. The second objective was evaluation of evidence for the development of a European identity among the group, either collectively or individually. In short, is there a new real or imagined community? The interviews were designed to collect information about identity – the perceptions of self, group associations, symbols and authority figures, and perceptions and experiences of Europe.

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\(^5\) Nineteen in-depth interviews were conducted by the author (in Polish) in Kraków, Lublin and Warsaw between November 2008-January 2009 with various professionals including academics, editors, graphic designers, medical doctors, engineers turned business owners, and upper-level managers. All but two held advanced university degrees, MA or higher. With one exception, all were 35-49 years old. Age is important because people over 35 have a memory of the Polish People’s Republic and the experience of Polish post-communist transition. The study was a follow-up to research on the Polish intelligentsia at the beginning of the transition (Czajkowska 1999). Six persons interviewed in 1993-1995 were interviewed again in 2008-2009.
Who am I? A self-identification
The striking findings of the interviews, especially in contrast to those of fifteen years ago (Czajkowska 1999), were the variety of identities and a strong sense of self-satisfaction and self-assurance. Although the intelligentsia’s fragmentation and diversification was expected, the degree of departure from a collective identity was not – no one in the group described him/herself as belonging to the intelligentsia (inteligent). This is consistent with Domański (2008a) who advanced a hypothesis that the absence of group identification – a common group identity – is evidence of the disappearance of the intelligentsia. Palska (2008), Jedlicki (2008), and Śpiewak (2005) note that there is a distinguishable remnant (intellectuals, academics, people in the NGO sector and other self-declared members) that shares a common identity, a common social conscience and a responsibility to engage in some form of social work and public debate. This study, however, has not found any person clearly identifying with the ethos of the intelligentsia.

People described themselves in terms of professions or jobs they held, and when asked to identify a group or social class they might belong to most often mentioned middle class. People in the interviews shared the opinion that money was the single most important signifier of one’s position and status. But they did not seem unhappy about this: ‘Money is what matters now. No, not other things, really [...] But at least it is all clear now.’ Education is no longer sought for personal growth and for intellectual satisfaction; rather it is seen as a necessary step for achieving professional objectives and for drawing a higher income. The instrumentalisation of education was noticed particularly by the academics. Contrary to the research findings about prestige, they felt that the prestige of their profession has eroded but were willing to accept it for the higher incomes that come with wider job opportunities. Several people in the group held jobs that were not related to their formal education and training.

‘We were ready to run but our feet were glued to the starting blocks’, is how an interpreter now working for the European Commission

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6 Author’s dissertation research, 1993-1995, conducted on the intelligentsia in Poland.
7 All quotes in this section are from interviews conducted by the author during the period from November 2008 to January 2009.
described the late 1980s in Poland. His recollection of the past twenty
described the late 1980s in Poland. His recollection of the past twenty
years is a story of following professional opportunities, experiencing
the energy and the joy of change: ‘Warsaw in the 1990s ... everything
exploded, moved, lived, got colours,’ and ‘involved working
unimaginable hours’. The sentiments of not letting opportunities slip,
a willingness to take risks and to adjust to open job market norms,
were echoed in many interviews. The new professional class of
Poland is well aware of the chances it received and proud of not
wasting them. The interviews brought stories of individuals who
credit their own abilities and efforts for what they have achieved.
While they acknowledge that political and systemic changes made it
possible for them to thrive, they show little interest in politics and the
state. They treat the current state of affairs – that Poland is a
democratic country and member of NATO and the European Union –
as a given, and do not perceive any real threat that could change its
status.

Indifference toward government with a tendency to mistrust any
grand narratives or ideologies causes people to refrain from public
activism and remain within the private sphere. The group in the
study followed this pattern. Professionally satisfied and economically
secure, they sought comfort with friends, music, film, reading, active
recreation – biking, yoga, and travel. Surprisingly, more people in the
study found friends to be more important than the family. It is
perhaps a function of this particular group, which, by chance not
design, had a higher than average number of people who were
divorced, single and childless. It may, however, be symptomatic of
changing stratification of inter-personal relationships where the
bonds of choice (friends) are replacing the bonds of chance (family).
People in the study were mostly happy with the cities where they
live, although they offered targeted complaints about, among other
things, bad roads and traffic (Warsaw, Kraków, Lublin), ugly public
monuments and crowds of tourists (Kraków), the lack of an airport
and poor quality cinemas (Lublin).

The interviews showed that a lifestyle is becoming an identity:
diversified, crafted to suit individual interests, almost transient when
the surroundings change. But the urban lifestyle and the
consumption patterns focused on high culture, attending the opera,
theatre, interest in art, or reading books, are a function of education
Civic disengagement of the intelligentsia and income, and are not exclusive to the intelligentsia. They are the consumption patterns of the educated urban upper middle class which is developing in Poland. None of the consumption patterns is unique to Poland. It is a global phenomenon shared by urban upper middle/professional classes of (primarily, but not exclusively) developed countries. Where the Polish cohort still falls behind is on public engagement. People with university degrees, professional jobs, and disposable incomes participate more often than others in voting, contributing to charities and becoming members of organisations supporting social welfare. In the group of people interviewed for the study public activity applied almost exclusively to voting.

View of the government and the public sphere
Poles have low opinions of any government, even if they elect it democratically. Overall support for democracy in general and democratic transition in particular – both at over 60 per cent (CBOS 2001) or even at the lowest point, 45 per cent, in 2005 – is always higher than support for a current government. The interviews showed similar findings but with some variations. While most respondents were either indifferent to or mildly supportive of the current centrist pro-European government, they did not have high opinions about its effectiveness. People who run small businesses or are self-employed complained about the myriad of regulations and bureaucracy that hinders the growth of their businesses (for example the prohibitive costs of hiring employees): ‘I don’t want to cheat, but they make it impossible to be fully honest.’ An insurance broker and a graphic designer similarly felt that while they are supposed to be the engine of the economic miracle, their individual decisions are subject to absurd and costly rules imposed by the state.

The majority in the group votes regularly and, after the ‘intelligentsia party’, the Freedom Union, disappeared from the political scene, now choose the centrist, liberal pro-European parties that are market-oriented, socially moderate and promise not to interfere in the private affairs of the citizens. Some admitted to voting for the Christian-right Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) in 2005 because of its stated anti-corruption program, but once this party was in power and revealed an ideological and populist agenda, they grew disappointed and voted against it in 2007. In crafting its populist
agenda, PiS created a stir with the *wykształconych* (pseudo-intellectuals) episode, when it singled out the intelligentsia and blamed it collectively for acting against the interests of the ordinary people, for abandoning traditional Polish values (whatever these might be) for cosmopolitan ones, and for ‘selling-out’ the Motherland to foreign powers and interests. In the interviews people recalled anger, disillusionment, embarrassment, but not a serious sense of threat: ‘I could not believe that what I achieved myself, all this education I got was being dismissed. I was angry but then I concluded it was stupid and laughed’; ‘I knew it would pass but I was ashamed of how others would see us.’

When faced with a threat, especially from the state, the intelligentsia in the past united and mobilised. But the *wykształconych* incident seen from a two-year perspective was remembered only as a nuisance. Rather than bringing a collective identification for people singled out for their education and cosmopolitan views (which, as is often the case with demagogy, were not clearly defined), it reinforced individual value and provoked further dissent from any political option associated with the collective. Several people did note that if the PiS government had retained power after the 2007 elections, they might have left Poland for a while to live in some ‘normal country’. Only one person felt that the authoritarian behaviour of the then Prime Minister and the populist rhetoric of his lieutenants could have provoked a violent confrontation. A professor of law and human rights lawyer, who was an active and public critic of the PiS government, added ‘what really could have happened? We have a constitution, we are in the European Union.’

The Law and Justice party government is now remembered more for its theatrical excesses in attempted authoritarianism than the debate it was trying to initiate, a debate about the foundation of a system to guide Poland into the future. With its historical determinism, conspiracy theories, delusions of national grandeur and a collective national victimhood, Law and Justice crafted itself as a defender of ordinary people, the family, Christian-Catholics and national Polish values against European cosmopolitanism and predatory capitalism. The ideological execution of the debate obstructed its core subject – the identity of Poland in the European Union. Should Poland use its historical experience to strengthen the unitary nation state or should
Civic disengagement of the intelligentsia

it adopt a common European narrative of diversity, human rights and the politics of consensus? Should community or individual rights be the organising principle of the society? Should there be a redistribution of income to build a more egalitarian society?

It is not clear if the current retreat of a strong national state is a reaction against its particular manifestation, a vision advanced by the Law and Justice party, or if it is a move away from a general model of unitary nation-state. What is clear from a study is a desire for a minimal state; the support for a system that does not interfere with an individual’s drive and creativity; a system of clear rules, simple administration, and easy access to public information: ‘I want everything online’. In everyday life, they generally refrained from any form of public or social activism and wanted to be left alone: ‘I do enough. I am creating jobs for others, I pay taxes; ‘I have no time for anything’; ‘Why should I do anything?’ Only one respondent, a university professor, shared her unease about not giving back to the society: ‘I have thought about it a lot. I am busy but I should do something. I tell myself that working with students, giving them all this time and attention, that it is my way to make a difference.’

Diversity? Not in my backyard!
The picture of strong individualism and well-defined selves that emerges from the interviews does not, however, easily translate into support for an open and diverse society. Several people were genuinely ashamed that Poland is not hospitable to a wider variety of views and people. A self-described feminist spoke of self-censorship: ‘I wish it was different. It is changing, of course, but Kraków is not Paris or Berlin. I have to be more careful to whom I tell what I really think because people here assume that you think like everybody else. It is different with friends.’

Although tolerance, openness and inclusion, ‘European values’, were desired – in the opinion of a female academic ‘it would make Poland more European, yes, it would be good’ – there may be limits to them. ‘Kraków is one big festival. All these parades, rights for gays, Jewish festival, tourists […] It is never quiet here any more. You have to celebrate’ – in principle, the author of this opinion was not opposed to others’ having rights, and even assumed that ‘there must be equal
rights already’. But his ‘not in my backyard’ sentiment resonated through other interviews. Thus, tolerance and diversity are desired because they are ‘European’ but, at the same time, how they are applied should not alter one’s immediate surroundings, one’s environment, one’s comfort zone.

**National identity: Polish but not nationalist**

One of the working hypotheses of the study is the weakening of national identity. How shallow it appeared came as a surprise. ‘I am Polish, of course, but I do not feel Polish. I have the language, it is the place I am from, I know our history, but it doesn’t mean I cannot live somewhere else. I don’t have this sense I must be here’; ‘I am happy when a Pole wins in sports … others will know us, it is nice, but other than that […] no, I don’t know’; ‘Authority figures? Not the Pope, I can’t think of one’; ‘Maybe it was the Pope’; ‘Writers, I love it when people can write beautifully. Polish? Yes, some but others too. I don’t discriminate [laughs]’; ‘I don’t really have anyone I admire. I respect people in my field [political science] who are creative and good at it.’

The uneasiness and discomfort, almost embarrassment, when they talked about any national attributes/signifiers was remarkable. Was it an attempt not to be seen as a nationalist? An effort to portray oneself as modern, progressive, as a European? Or simply a very private matter not to be discussed? There was a certain relief not to have to define oneself, not to explain one’s ‘Polishness’.

The weekly magazine *Polityka* published a survey (Żakowski 2008) about Polish authority figures and found that the top three were Jerzy Owsiak, who runs the most popular charity in Poland, the film director Andrzej Wajda, and Kraków’s cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz, a long-time secretary to the Polish Pope. Thus, a larger and more representative sample of Polish society chose men (!) who stand for doing something for others, sick children in particular; an internationally recognised, Oscar-winning artist, who tells beautiful stories about Poland; and the Pope’s companion. These are safe choices. They show a concern about the image of Poland but also express the aspiration as to what a Pole should be: caring for others, celebrating Polish traditions and history, ethical, honest, a decent person.
Some in the group expressed similar aspirational values, a certain longing for the community, for the idealised past, for doing good things (who would oppose a charity raising money for the medical treatment of children?) For some, history and collective memory were beside the point; they were a burden to be forgotten, a nuisance others obsess about: ‘blood-defeat-big words.’ For others, it was the curse of communism that took ‘our’ history away. Most were indifferent. History is a part of tradition, but so is Christmas. Neither is a reason for militancy. Only one person spoke of European history as Polish history: ‘Poland was never separated from the European process. The multiplicity of cultures, the ideas that migrated through Europe made European identity. Poland has the same identity, as it participated in and contributed to these processes for centuries.’

Magical Europe

‘We are in Europe’: the words ‘Europe’, ‘the European Union’ appeared frequently, with relief and delight. These terms were used interchangeably. Although the EU is an organisation, it also functions as a concept, independent of the institutions, common rules and norms. Without exception, all people interviewed voted for accession to the European Union, not necessarily because they identified with the institution but because it signifies belonging to Europe. In fact, some were as distrustful, uninterested and critical about Brussels as they were about their national or local governments: ‘same politics’; ‘bureaucracy’; ‘more useless politicians’; ‘all these programmes for whatever’; ‘protecting some mice or something in Raspuda. We need roads’ [the highly contested environmental issue was protection of marshes and its natural habitat]; ‘you can’t get any funds for normal things. It’s all for the ‘disadvantaged’’ [human capital programmes].

The images of Europe that appeared in the interviews were personal. Europe is a common legacy, membership in the European Union final proof of Poland’s Westernness. Europe is what brought open borders, travel without passports, weekends in Barcelona, children studying in England, nicer looking Polish cities, and the ability to shed inferiority complexes (‘I walk into a store in Paris and find the same shoes I saw in Krakow last week’). Membership in the European Union was seen as a must, a compensation for the years of humiliation, raging economic crisis and the shortages of everything,
for feeling second-rate. Being part of the EU overcomes a feeling of being the intruder from the East. Europe was not perceived as an agglomeration of countries, but as a community of the West: if people expressed country-specific preferences, these were based on personal interests (a skier enjoyed Northern Italy and Austria, a sun-worshipper Greece and Spain). The perception of Europe as an agglomeration – Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Barcelona, Naples and so on – may be a function of language. For the group in the study English is the common European language. Although several people in the group had lived and worked in different European countries in the past, now they are experiencing Europe as leisure – vacations, travel, friends. Overall, Europe has retained its magical quality; it is as a state of mind and, now, a state of ‘our’ mind.

When asked to identify common European values, people were more cautious in their answers, but some talked about ‘not communist’; vaguely ‘the same culture’; ‘Christianity, maybe […]’ The trauma of the divided historical narratives and the European wars appeared as a distant past, as something that is not really relevant here and now. The legacy of the Enlightenment and the protection of human rights, the cornerstones of the common European project, were emphasised only by a lawyer who, incidentally, is a human rights specialist. For others, having rights is a given, including the right to live well in a democratic country in Europe.

With one exception – ‘I am Polish but, of course, I am European’ – individuals in the study often went out of their way not to apply any common labels to themselves and not to identify with any group or party. But it is the responsibility of a researcher to track patterns and similarities. A striking finding is a separation of private and public selves. Private identities are framed strongly, through professions, personal interests and preferences. The public selves are almost non-existent. The people who were interviewed seemed to construct their lives on a parallel track to the rest of the society, the governments they selected and the state whose citizenship they hold. Any traces of common identity, whether Polish, European or both, were ceremonial, ornamental, celebratory and symbolic. They did not appear to come from strong convictions, common values or shared principles. It is as if people understood and accepted the rights and privileges they have, but assumed that these come at no cost, without
any obligations or responsibilities. If there was a common memory, it was one of forgetting.

**Bowling alone**

When the communist system collapsed in 1989, there was widespread optimism about ‘reinventing politics’ (Tismaneanu 1992) and a triumphant return of civil society to East-Central Europe. While expectations might have been raised by the excessive enthusiasm of peaceful transitions, the weakness of civil society and the absence of common civic values twenty years later can astound even sceptics towards civil society. In the Polish case, the intelligentsia was assumed to be a perfect leader for the transition to civil society and for building a new political and civic culture. From the perspective of the intelligentsia’s special mission, 1989 and 2004 were the triumphs: the exit from communism to democracy and, later, entry into Europe fulfilled the intelligentsia’s mission and relieved it of the burden of romantic messianism and sacrifice for the nation. It opened unprecedented opportunities to create a system based on the ideals of human rights, justice, and solidarity.

As in earlier moments of grand systemic change in Polish history, the intelligentsia was supposed to lead after 1989. It was actively involved in the process of regime change in the 1980s; it had education, social status, the ability to adapt to change, experience in public engagement and pro-Western and pro-European viewpoints. It did not take the challenge of leadership for two reasons: the internal cohesion of the group and its ability to lead by example (the ethos function) was in reality much weaker than assumed, and it was not able to negotiate with itself, either collectively or on an individual level, how to overcome its adversarial relationship with the state. This may be a residual of an antagonism inherent in its ethos.

The fading of the intelligentsia is not a reason to grieve. The intelligentsia, by carrying the core values of a society, assured the survival of the society and defended it against the collective trauma of colonisation, the loss of independence and the loss of a state. It looked into the past (to invent) and to preserve the imagined community. The intelligentsia became a surrogate for the nation. It was not a unique Polish phenomenon. In addition to Poland and
Russia, the most often cited examples, intelligentsias developed in other societies suspended between more or less enlightened feudalism and pre-capitalism, where entry into the capital-owning and decision-making elites was restricted, usually for reason of politics – the American South after the Civil War, Southern Italy after reunification or East Pakistan after the partition of the British-ruled India in 1947. Thus, the intelligentsia is an artefact of dysfunctional societies, societies that are, at best, proto-democratic. Once the dysfunction is remedied, the intelligentsia becomes obsolete.

Liberalisation, democratisation, globalisation and all the peripheral processes that transformed Poland in less than twenty years generated a cacophony of narratives along one, well-defined, trajectory – accession and membership in the European Union. Both the multiplicity of sensations and experiences and the ‘return to’ Europe are altering Polish identity at the individual and the collective levels. The extelligentsia finds its place at the intersection of two narratives – the Polish and the European. The consumption and production of lifestyle, which now defines or distinguishes the extelligentsia, results in a satisfied, personally fulfilled and content generation; one that feels secure and does not perceive any serious threat either externally or internally – save for occasional aggravation with Russian anti-European/anti-Polish actions (these are now perceived as one) and occasional annoyance with domestic populism and incompetent authoritarianism. These threats may not be perceived as grave because they are merely political problems and can be managed at state level. Thus, they are perceived as having no direct personal impact.

Is a fracture in a monolithic past-oriented, history-driven Polish national identity a cause for celebration? Not completely. A withdrawal into the private sphere and a concern only with one’s immediate, intimate environment has two opposing outcomes. It weakens national-community identification, but it strengthens the post-national identification with a European self. Both Polish and European identities are defined culturally, through sharing a vaguely defined (sensed? felt?) Western tradition. These are not civic identities: there is active participation in the consumption of culture, but not democracy/civic culture. Democracy, a common fabric of
Western society, cannot function well without engaged, civically minded societies.

Strong democracies are able to withstand occasional storms and forays to restrict the liberty of their citizens by a predatory state (as did the United States under Bush’s presidency), but emerging democracies like Poland will not consolidate without the development of social capital. Its absence will also thwart growth, as ‘to grow further, in addition to the material, financial and human assets, there must be a social capital’ (Czapiński 2009). Putnam (2000) examined the decline of social capital in the American context and named the individualisation of leisure time and atomisation of cultural consumption as causes of the weakening of civic associations and the disengagement from political involvement. For him, a dwindling membership in neighbourhood bowling leagues is symptomatic of a break in the social bonds, a disappearance of a modern-day agora where people gather to interact and deliberate the issues of the day. Introducing bowling to Poland may add another facet to the Western lifestyle but not to the quality and depth of social interactions.

Conclusion

Eriksen and Fossum (2007, 2009) propose three models of Europe based on organisational principles binding societies: audit democracy – supremacy of the sovereign nation state; federal multinational democracy; and regional European democracy where ‘polity sovereignty is multidimensional and shared among levels, subject to cosmopolitan principles of citizens’ (2009). The models structure the institutional design of Europe(s) and the corresponding identities of selves who make Europe a common project of its citizens. The models sketch a relationship of the citizen with the state, the federation and the polity. A perception of community, where and how the self will fit into a community, whose authority s/he will follow, who s/he will trust, are the integral constructs of identity that legitimate any formal institutional design framing the models. Does the atomised, indifferent and uninterested extelligentsia fit into any of the models?

It is not staunchly nationalistic, but there is no evidence of it having any distinct vision beyond a nation state. Despite the withering away
of its ethos, it retains perhaps more than a sentimental commitment to Poland as a state; after all, this generation of the intelligentsia ‘won’ Poland’s final independence and delivered Poland to Europe. At the same time, the Polish state has a limited importance as a set of rules and institutions. There is no positive identification with the state. This may be the scar of the ethos as well as the memory of the People’s Republic.

The European Union is a different matter: 88 per cent of Poles supported Poland’s membership in the European Union in April 2008.8 The benefits of membership are tangible, and the EU is credited for improvements in the economy, the infrastructure, and the environment, as well as raising the self-esteem of Poles. People with higher education and high incomes and holding managerial/professional positions, that is the group whose members were the subject of this study, are at the forefront of support. Over 60 per cent of them see personal benefits from EU membership. When it comes to personal economic benefits, the number increases to 80 per cent.9 Fifty-eight per cent of them declared an interest in participating in the June 2009 elections to the European Parliament, a much higher rate than the 33 per cent for the overall Polish population.10 This likely comes from a better-than-average understanding of the link between the decision-making institutions of the EU and the benefits one receives. But it may also derive from an aspiration to act as a European and to assert one’s place in the European polity. A positive association with the European Union-Europe, perceived as belonging to a common culture and as a personal benefit, enhances the feeling of being European. The consciousness of being European, a civic association with the European polity, is a different story.

A divide between the private and the public spheres observed in this study shows only fragmentary consolidation of the transformation

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8 CBOS: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (2008) Bilans czterech lat integracji Polski z Unią Europejską, Komunikat z badań BS/66/2008, Warszawa: CBOS. CBOS (4129/27.04.2009) is running a similar study after five years of Poland’s membership in the EU but the full results are not yet available. However, press reports of the study indicate that the overwhelming support for the EU continues.

9 CBOS 2008 (see supra, note 8).

Civic disengagement of the intelligentsia and the Europeanisation of Polish society. Some changes – development of strong individualism, self-reliance, professionalism, but also consumerism and lifestyle as signifiers of identity – are well advanced. Others, such as openness toward diversity and multiculturality, are only beginning. The engagement in the public sphere and in the community are in retreat. High degree of satisfaction with the internal and external life environment shared by the group in the study may account for its civic apathy. The choices of issues on which to act are less dramatic than in the past, but there is no shortage of local as well as global problems one might work on. However, the most common choice made is to remain uninvolved.

It is difficult to assess if the life on tracks parallel to the state and any formal or informal organizations is a temporary or a transitory phenomenon. It contributes to low quality of social relations, low levels of trust and hostility that will impair development of a deliberative model of democracy. But it does not appear to pose a risk to the liberal democracy Poland chose as its system twenty years ago. A detachment from the affairs of the Polish state or the formal systems of the European Union may be, paradoxically, an expression of confidence in their viability and the ability to guarantee the security and prosperity without the infringement of individual rights. The state, current national/Polish or potentially the federal/European, is perceived as uninteresting and non-aggressive. It does not elicit emotions or incentives to act. This indifference is likely insufficient to deepen the commitment to democracy and to increase the quality of citizenship but the extelligentsia in retreat shows no signs of behaving or aspiring to behave any other way.
References


The relationship between the process of European integration and external migration of the Polish society

The process of European integration contributes to the intensification of migration movement of Polish society. After the fall of communism a gradual eradication of limitations in freedom of movement between European countries took place. The abolition of the visa system was to some extent related to the idea of building a common Europe, a Europe without boundaries (at least administrative ones). In effect, the 1990s brought about an increase in Polish migration to so-called Western countries. The main goal of migrants was to earn money that would enable them to meet their demands and realise economic aspirations that could not be achieved in post-communist Poland. At the same time, a growth in paid emigration could be observed that led to a transformation in the image of the Polish emigrant. The ‘old’ model of political patriot-emigrant was connected with the time of Martial Law. The concept that an emigrant was a person whose decision to migrate was more a result of persecutions from the communist regime and who was...
leaving the country unwillingly with no long-term living plans began to disappear. In its place emerged a new model of economic emigrant-worker, a person oriented towards material advantages.

The reforms carried out by Leszek Balcerowicz, the finance minister in the first government after the fall of communism in 1989, with their economic and social results, led to many social phenomena that intensified the social diversity which accompanied system transformation (Ziółkowski 1999: 47-59). In effect, decisions about paid emigration were reinforced by the fall of the social security system, increase in unemployment and unjust economic stratification in society. To some extent, this emigrational trend was stimulated by the myth of the ‘Golden West’, deep-rooted in the conventional wisdom of Poles (Buchowski 1997). Emigration to one of the countries of Western Europe was seen as an antidote to most problems connected with the imperfections of the newly built democratic system and free market economy in Poland. In effect, Poles have more and more often decided to migrate to the European Union member states and work illegally during a legal stay.

When we compare those two models, it should be borne in mind that, while patriot-emigrants hesitated about settling in the West, worker-emigrants were in most cases sure that they did not want to stay abroad longer than was necessary from an economic point of view. In those times, the people who were migrating to the countries of Western Europe were mostly those who held two passports (Polish and usually German), thus enabling them to find legal work abroad. In most cases, they wanted to work outside Poland but to spend the money they earned in their country of origin. In this way Polish migration has started to evolve into a model of incomplete, pendulum, reverse migration (Jaźwińska and Okólski 2001; Iglicka 1998).

Polish accession to the EU has instantly increased the number of Polish emigrants, as well as effecting a change in the proportions of migration to the various regions of the world. During the first decade of the 21st century a gradual decrease can be observed in the attractiveness of the United States as a place of migration. Several factors contribute to this situation. The most important are: costs and
difficulties in obtaining a visa, high costs of travel, and the low price of the dollar. All of these cause a particular enlargement of the symbolic distance between Poland and the United States. In effect, Polish emigration to this country was limited to a traditional environment whose members had been migrating to the USA for generations (Podhale). As already mentioned, nowadays Poles perceive the USA as a much more distant area than before, because after Polish accession to the EU the USA’s place has been taken by the ‘EU 15’. In 2004 the governments of Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden decided to open their labour market for Poles. At the same time in Norway (country belonged to the European Economic Area) as well as in Denmark, Italy, Finland and the Netherlands new laws were introduced, including those facilitating access to the labour market. In the case of Germany, France, Spain and Belgium bilateral agreements (concluded before Polish accession) were still in force. Generally speaking, they permitted Poles to work in the three cited countries, but only after fulfilling certain special conditions. In Austria, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein Poles could take up a job after receiving individual administrative work permission. Two years later, in 2006, while limits in access to the labour market in Spain, Portugal, Finland, Greece and Italy were abolished, in Belgium, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg restrictions were lessened but upheld. An increase in permissions, contingents, opening the labour market only in specific sectors – all of these factors led to broader access to legal work and diminished anxiety of migration among Poles. A correlation between the legal status of Poles within the labour market in particular EU countries and the dimension of emigration seems to corroborate this thesis. For now, it seems that only Austria and Germany are able to maintain strict restrictions concerning Polish access to the labour market for the maximum period, i.e. till 2011.

Another important element that has contributed to perceiving the EU 15 as more and more interesting was the development of means of communication between Poland and those countries. The network of land transport connecting particular cities of European countries and Polish regions (from where most emigrants come) has significantly increased. What is more, a fast growth in cheap airlines led to a reduction in flying costs. Progress in communication technologies,
especially in the sector of mobile phones and internet, has caused a situation in which buying a computer is one of the first purchases abroad. In addition, all these factors enable migrants to maintain direct and indirect interactions with members of the reference group left in Poland.

Assumptions of analysis

Discussions on migration point out the influence of the integration process on migration movement in Polish society. This triggers the question: can we find a ‘feedback mechanism’ in the case of Polish external migration caused by the European integration process? To what extent does migration contribute to the reconstruction of migrants’ identity, especially in the interesting context of European integration? The answer to the question whether, to what extent and what kind of influence external migration has on Polish opinion about the European Union and the future of a common Europe is the subject of further examination in this chapter. The analysis is based on the results of fieldwork realised within the RECON project. Research was carried out in the eastern parts of Poland, in the municipalities of Zwierzyniec and Tyszowce. The selection of the places was the result of two factors: on the one hand by the fact, established in other fieldwork, of the occurrence of the strong phenomenon of external migration among inhabitants of these regions (Jaźwińska and Okolski 2001), and on the other by this phenomenon’s influence on the life of the rural communities and provincial regions of eastern Poland.

The essence of the question about the influence of Polish external migration on opinions about the process of European integration relates to the scope and character of identity changes that Polish emigrants experience – especially those ‘incomplete’, pendulum and reversal, who sustain ties with their society of origin. These people, who are direct social actors, are influencing the rest of the society in the way in which they perceive the European Union and its future (at

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1 Field research (summer 2007 and summer 2008) carried out by: Marcin Galent, Maria Molenda, Dariusz Niedźwiedzki and Karolina Rzepecka. Together 35 in-depth interviews were realised.
least potentially). This also takes place on an indirect level through cultural influence on attitudes and behaviour of others.

We define identity on the basis of two theoretical models: a model of interaction and a model of outlook (Bokszański 1989). The former seems to be the most broad and internally diverse type of comprehension of the notion in question. It should be said that it is the effect of a parallel existence of many different ways of understanding interactionism as a theoretical and research perspective. However, there are three issues that are common for representatives of this approach. Firstly, identity is an interactive phenomenon because auto-identification is constructed using symbolic sources (especially language), which are accessible within each particular culture. Secondly, the creation of identity takes place during interactions, by the sending, receiving and interpretation of a transmission. Lastly, identity manifests itself in action. Examination of such phenomena as identity requires not only analysis of current, directing human interactions, but also an answer to the question about the process of such interactions in a biographical dimension and the type of individual participation in culture and society. In the outlook model social identity is understood as ‘a set of permanent properties, which characterises manners of auto-perception constructed among members of a community, whereas manners of perceiving oneself are derived from a features of social structure or from an integrally, anthropologically comprehended culture specific for the considered community’ (Bokszański 1989: 34).

The essence of this approach lies in scrutinising identity within the framework of the psychosocial condition of people living in the contemporary world as well as in the lifestyles, models and norms of conduct which are dominant. This perspective enables researchers firstly to examine people’s attitudes and behaviours, and secondly to analyse declarations and documents of social life, which together constitute substantial proof of identity. What is more, it facilitates the display not only of the internal identity of the analysed group of respondents, but also of the external one.

To sum up, in our analysis we focused on four methods of construction/reconstruction and realisation of identity. Each of these methods stresses different causative actions of the identification process. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish: cultural, temporal,
interactive and psychosocial construction of identity. Apart from their dissimilarities, all these types possess some common features. Each identity creation is based on (Jacobson-Widding 1983):

- Individual experience of interaction in a particular social context
- Values, which are contained in the social structure and culture, and involved in the interactive experience in question
- Sense of a time increasing ‘adaptation’ of the interaction’s participants.

**Analysis conditioning**

Facing the problem of estimating migration’s influence on people’s identity encounters many difficulties, the first of which is related to the scale of the phenomenon. To what extent is Polish society changing under the influence of external emigration? In other words, what is the scope of Polish partial migration at the beginning of the 21st century? Answering this question is not easy. One of the reasons is the problem of determining the exact size of emigration from Poland in the 1990s and the subsequent ever greater after Polish accession to the united Europe (and to the Schengen Area). In effect, researchers have a problem with assessing the influence of emigration on Polish society. Other difficulties are caused by hampered registration of departures (in the context of open borders), abolition of visas and discontinuance of border controls. Carrying a comparative analysis on the basis of different data sources as well as appealing to international statistics meets difficulties, which are mostly caused by the diversity, generality and incomparability of definitions used. In this context, different standards of aggregation and publication of data (Kupiszewski 2007; Okólski 2007) make things even more unclear. In Kupiszewski’s view Polish migration statistics are among the worst in Europe. This is illustrated, for instance, by a visible tendency to overestimate permanent migration while disregarding temporal (long and short-term) migration. In effect, we have access to incomplete data about emigration according to which between 1989 and 2002 around 67,000 Poles were long-term
emigrants (mostly because of family reasons). A consequence of this type of analysis was an overestimation of the population of Poland in the National General Census of 2002 for more or less 600,000 people, who at this time were residing abroad. Another factor which impedes the process of estimating Polish emigration is the evasion of formalisation of migrant status. For instance, pendulum migrants in Germany avoid such formalisation to preserve and extend unemployment status (which allows them to receive national insurance) in Polish employment agencies. What is more, they are ready to travel many hours from Germany to Poland to confirm registration. Thus, some Polish migrants stay in a grey area of the economy, even though legal employment is possible.

In the public debate in Poland we can find a variety of records that estimate the number of Polish emigrants. Many times differences between these records are connected with political manipulation. The numbers that appear in the available data are located around 1 and 2.5 million people. However, an analysis of the sources of the data in question raises doubts, especially in the context of reliability in reflecting the scale of migration. The scale of external migration of Poles can be estimated on the basis of statistics prepared by host countries. For instance, in Great Britain a point of reference could be data from the Workers’ Registration Scheme, according to which around 34,000 legal Polish workers were living in Great Britain before Polish accession to the EU (May 2004). By September 2006 the number of applications for the registration system was increased by more than 300,000 people. However, we should bear in mind that it is possible that the system also contains people who have already left Great Britain, since there is no obligation to remove the names of those who lost their job. Furthermore, following the opening of the British labour market for Poles some migrants still work unofficially on the black market. Estimation of the scale of migration movement in this country can also be based on the International Passenger Survey, which

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registers all foreigners’ visits. According to this source the number of Polish visits in Great Britain increased from 278,000 in 2003 to 646,000 in 2004 and 1.127 million in 2005 (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2006). This sudden growth, then, constitutes a proof of the increase in Polish emigration to Great Britain. On the other hand, it should be stressed that some of the incomers are tourists, businessmen, research workers and students. What is more, a section of the migrants who move between the host society and group of origin cross the British border several times a year.

Our field research did not yield numerical data to illustrate the phenomenon of emigration in the communities of Zwierzyniec and Tyszowce. However, it ascertained that migration processes are a widespread phenomenon in this region. Generally speaking, interviews indicate that migration movements are in practice related to all inhabitants of the municipalities in question. In all cases, he/she is/was a migrant or somebody from members of primary groups (big family, group of neighbours) as well as from secondary groups (colleague circle, friends) where he/she belongs.

Another important context of analysis of the influence of the migration process on the way in which the European Union as well as European integration are perceived is related to the authentic range of identity transformation triggered by emigration. On the basis of interviews it turned out that migration is a phenomenon which in diverse ways influences people. Pendulum migration can be characterised by a desire to stay in direct contact with the host society, but at the same time with the group of origin. Thus, in the case of pendulum migration the problem of which place and which group should be chosen by the migrant to settle down remains unsolved. In effect, if we consider identity transformation and the range of influence of emigration from an identity transformation point of view and the range of influence of emigration on perception of oneself and others we can distinguish two groups of migrants: Formal migrants and real migrants.

‘Formal migrants’ – people who emigrate but whose identity is influenced by migration to a very limited degree. This results from specific, external factors. In the case of these people the success of
migration depends only in a small part on proper social interactions within the new emigrational environment. They have limited contact with the host society and its culture. This situation is experienced by some rural workers whose relations with their surroundings are reduced to interaction with animate nature. They grow plants and take care of farm animals. Their contacts with the host population are confined to rare relations with employers, who organise work, supply food and disburse a salary. In effect, it is difficult to speak about interactions which are shaping identity – especially if some of those workers carry out their everyday duties in the homesteads all alone. Others work in groups, but in most cases their co-workers are members of the same community of origin. The inner factor which contributes to the limitation of migration’s influence on identity is the attitude adopted by some migrants that confines the exterior’s influence on self-identification and identification of the other. In this context, time spent abroad is realised more ‘next to’ the host group than within this group. Work, and its effective practice in particular conditions, are the only things that matter (target workers – Grillo 2007). For migrants members of the host group are interesting only as those who give work in their social and cultural environment. Thus, discovering the social and cultural environment is limited to gaining knowledge that can be instrumentally used in work. It sometimes happens that perception of external surroundings – natural, cultural and social – is also conditioned by this attitude. In this case, migrants are not able to value from an aesthetic point of view the things they are surrounded by, such as nature, architecture or landscape, since they do not even try to observe and estimate elements of the environment which are not directly connected with their role of worker. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that all experiences achieved following emigration influence the personality of migrants. They contribute to changes in the social identity of these people, but this influence is related to acquiring new experiences, which throughout the whole life lead to a reconstruction of social identity. In this aspect the identity of migrants is changing in a similar way to identity of all other people, also those who have never had any experience of migration. To put it simply, biographical time has an inevitable influence on self-identification as well as on identification of others. However, we should bear in mind that it is difficult to talk about the influence of emigration as a process of
cultural diffusion on the identity of formal migrants. After return to the group of origin, migrants make use of knowledge and experience acquired during their stay abroad only if they can be used in everyday life. Therefore, we cannot observe the important and relatively permanent change of attitudes and behaviours caused by emigration. What seems to be interesting is that migrants of this type are close to all those people who take advantage of free movement of labour inside the European Union. They take up a job on the basis of a contract and perceive the European space as a huge, but (from the cultural point of view) coherent entirety, an area which is designated by their professional competences. They do not define themselves as migrants, and they are not considered as migrants by others.

‘Real migrants’ – those for whom emigration was an important benchmark in their everyday life. From interviews it arises that in the case of ‘real migrants’, contact with the different culture and interactions with members of the host society caused a significant transformation/reconstruction of identity. We can say that these people are open to surrounding emigrational reality, coming into relations with others and systematically broadening their network of interactions as far as language competences enable them to do so. Often on the basis of these interactions social ties are constructed, some of which sustain even though the migrant went back to the society of origin or changed their place of emigration. Many ‘real migrants’ have cognitive absorption, which is directed not only towards people but also towards culture, architecture, art, customs, traditions and the natural environment. Also the way in which they relate their emigrational reality is not merely a report on their stay. It can be described much better as an emotional narration with many observations and conclusions. Often, content that regards the society, culture and natural environment (of the place of emigration) is a point of reference in estimating society of origin, its tradition, customs and habitats. Our respondents talk not only about adaptation of models of everyday life following migration but also about the values which they consider worth taking over and grounding in Polish society. Despite staying in the society of origin they comply with new norms, values and habits in everyday behaviours. These norms and values which were experienced and acquired in migration can also be noticed as a point of reference and
opinion-making elements in migrant thinking about Poland and Europe. Among these people we also found representatives of the so-called ‘migrant generation’, for whom the experience of migration is a benchmark/prism for estimation and interpretation of all their further life experiences.

Another issue which conditioned our analysis is connection of our respondents’ declarations (opinions, convictions and attitudes) with their authentic behaviour. This is because some limitations in this field are caused by the nature of the phenomenon. Our reflection is placed in the social world, which is ‘happening’ all the time and is subject to a permanent ‘figuration’ (Elias 1978). Pendulum migration goes on, and each new experience of staying in the host society as well as in the society of origin brings about changes in identification. On the one hand, this reality of partial migration formulates itself ‘potentially’ on the basis of the existing system of social relations, and on the other hand it constructs itself ‘truly’ by taking a certain shape through its realisation in the frame of this particular system of relations. (Touraine 1965). Therefore, it is difficult to analyse this phenomenon in the dimension of reification as well as in the systemic categories. It is also caused by the nature of social identity that can be characterised as dynamic, contextual, variable, and fluent as well as reconstructed and actualised in social interactions (Ardener 1992; Mach 1993; Mach 1998; Niedźwiedzki 2000). Furthermore, analysis of this identity concerns migration’s influence on identity, and in this context the time dimension plays a crucial role. It must be said that transformation of ‘social consciousness’ and ‘social institutions’ (fields of culture) as well as changes in ‘social organisation’ and ‘social hierarchy’, which all together according to Sztompka (2005: 26) form ‘social tissue in a strict sense’, are indissolubly connected with partial migration. Concepts, rules, actions and interests that belong to two culturally and socially different worlds following migration collide with each other, which bears fruit in their permanent reconstruction. Interestingly enough, an important feature of partial migration is that in many situations it is difficult to pinpoint precisely one moment at which the respondent’s migration movement finishes. Many of our interlocutors were not sure if they had come back once and for all, or if their stay in their society of origin is only a stop, a short break in the migration process. For them reality is a labile
construction, whereas the decision about their next departure can emerge at any time. This fact is a crucial issue for the attitudes and behaviours of respondents. Many of them, for instance, declare a will to engage themselves in actions that promote the idea of the European integration process, but only after their final return to the society of origin. They do not want to involve now, because it would require changing the way of working. Are they really going to do this in the future? There is no simple answer to this question.

An important context for the analysis of the influence of emigration on our respondents’ identity in the dimension of opinions, behaviours and attitudes towards the process of European integration relates to the separation of this process from other factors that also shape present-day Polish society. We observe that respondents have difficulties with identifying factors which influence the situation of individuals, as well as the situation of social groups, belonging to many different, simultaneously existing political, social, cultural and economic processes, such as modernisation, globalisation, European integration and systemic transformation. Therefore, it is possible that some of our respondents’ conclusions about Polish accession to the EU and European integration processes influence the situation of the host society, and that the group of origin can be unrelated to the process of building a common Europe. However, they are identified as a part of this process and perceived as its direct outcome. Potentially, such a situation can entail misunderstandings and tensions or even disappointments with a vision for a common Europe, the further development of the European Union and results of the integration process.

Partial migrants to the EU
We will start our analysis of the influence of the experiences of emigration on social identity in the context of the European integration process by examining migrants’ attitudes towards Polish accession to the European Union. Generally speaking, most of our

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4 The problem of identification of different factors responsible for specific transformations of social structure and culture can also be found in other publications about social transformation. See e.g. Mach and Niedźwiedź 2001.
respondents declare support for the state’s functioning within European structures. Moreover, in most cases such an opinion could be found before the beginning of the emigration movement to the West. Those claims are confirmed by the general ‘yes’ for Polish accession to the EU, which was expressed in a national referendum in 2003.

Do the migration experiences contribute to the reconstruction of those opinions and attitudes in the context that we are interested in? Several issues should be mentioned here. Firstly, it seems that migration experiences convince our respondents about the significant potential advantages related to polish participation in the process of European integration. Most of those people have an optimistic attitude towards life and believe that the future will bring about not only an improvement in their situation but also generally speaking an improvement in the situation of the whole Polish society. ‘Well, I think that it is good, but [...] well, now it is only the beginning. I am sure. I believe that one day [...] that it will be better for us’ (R/Z/2/4).\(^5\) Such a conviction arises from noticing changes that have already taken place after the Polish accession to the EU.

It can be seen that the appearance of the countryside is changing and many young people from the neighbourhood have also left, well not for always, they went there to earn some money and then they will come back and they will bring some ideas from there and they will invest here and it is great, it is much better than it was.

(R/Z/2/2)

Interestingly enough, practically all opinions among our respondents about the future of Poland in the United Europe are optimistic. The European Union is perceived as a guarantee for development and that in Poland ‘things will go well’. It should be stressed that this conviction is caused (at least in some part) by observation of

\(^5\) The reference technique used for the citations in this chapter specifies the type of respondent, the respondent’s hometown and which year the interview took place. For further inquiries about the references, please contact the author.
economic growth and civil progress in countries that have belonged to the European Union for years. At the same time, our respondents do not see much danger from the European integration process. Also in this case, the example of harmoniously developing countries, well-known to our respondents because of the time they spent living abroad, plays an important role in the process of formulating opinions. Negative phenomena pointed out by a few are, in the first place, the irretrievable departure of highly skilled specialists (especially doctors) from Poland. ‘Well, maybe because, when all our doctors leave, there will be nobody to treat us. You can hear that on television’ (T/1/1). For some, the problem also lies in Polish submission to the politically stronger EU member states.

What I can see now is that there is no such attitude that Poland is [...] that is in some way important, that can impose its own opinion. Well, even the problem with fishing. It is just such a policy. There they have a surplus so what can you do? It is just that we cannot impose our own opinion. Well, because we are a small country, we have only been in the European Union a few years, so what can we do?

(R/S/2/1)

Another element that can be found in our respondents’ statements is worry about emigrants’ families staying in Poland, and especially about the future and lot of children that were left in their homeland.

People go abroad; children are also neither here nor there, they are brought up without a mother, without a father and they become hooligans. It is not good because the children suffer. There is no father, no mother when they are growing up, and then it is too late to raise them, to adapt. Yet, each child needs parents, their advice and help.

(R/T/2/1)

Some of our respondents cannot imagine the situation of Polish opportunities connected with the process of European integration being lost or wasted. For instance, incomplete use of EU funds is something unacceptable. ‘[…] I deplore the fact that offices are not able to take the opportunity, I do not know how it happens that those
funds are not fully used. I am sure that it could be done better’ (E/Ż/2/1). This is also the reason why some people are trying to mobilise the social leaders responsible for this. Leaders are those who should take up special informative and organisational actions.

If somebody is coming there, somebody who already does something or wants to do, they should ask him: what do you want to do, what do you think, can we as an office help you? And he can say: I would like to do this or that. And the office can choose: we cannot do this but we can do that for you.

(E/Ż/2/3)

Importantly, for many respondents effectiveness in acquisition of money is a measure for estimating authorities on different levels of the political organisation of the state. This popular interest in the appropriate use of EU funds is also related to convictions that up till now all advantages connected with the Polish accession to the EU are just the beginning of the major participation of Poland and Poles in the benefits which are entailed with being a part of the European integration process. Some of our respondents stated that better use of opportunities requires enhancement of the Polish position in the EU and becoming a leading political actor in its structures.

For our respondents the main prism for assessing the European integration process is from the perspective of material benefits. In this context, they noticed and positively assessed three implications of Polish accession to the EU. The first is abolition of borders, which enables travelling without a passport and lack of border control. ‘Now it is much easier, because you know, now you only need your ID card and before you had to travel with a passport, now the communication is easier and so on’ (Z/1/3). Thus, we can say that our respondents, their families and friends exercise the right to free movement within Europe. Secondly, Polish accession to the EU has radically increased the opportunity to find in the West legal as well as illegal work.

Well, a good thing is that now we can go there legally. Since before, when I was going abroad, we were not in the EU yet, I knew that I had to stay longer, because later if they would not
let me in then [...] so I stayed as long as possible. So, these are advantages that now we can go there without problems and earn money. This is an advantage for sure.

(Z/1/1)

Also in this case our interlocutors’ experiences are very similar and concern not only respondents but also members of their families or friends. Thirdly, an extra charge for farmers which enables defrayal of expenses of crop production has crucial significance, especially in the examined societies for their economic characteristics. Generally speaking, after Polish accession to the EU Money came to the countryside, since there was abject poverty. Well, the rate, this 500 zloty per hectare it is a lot. On the one hand it is not much, but on the other hand it is a lot. It is an improvement. In the beginning people did not believe in this, nobody believed that somebody would give us something and so on, but then one person took money, then another one and people understood that they must keep an eye on this and then it will work.

(R/T/2/1)

Migrants’ attitudes towards different forms of European integration

Generally speaking, Poles support Polish participation in European structures. What should, then, a common Europe look like according to our respondents? How should the process of European integration proceed? The answers to those questions require an approximation of some variants of the further functioning of the EU, which can serve as frameworks for analysis of identity’s changes of pendulum migrants. In the literature on the subject we can find three different models of European integration (Eriksen and Fossum 2007; Góra et al. 2009). The first can be described as a consistent realisation of the concept called the ‘Europe of homelands’, which is especially well known in de Gaulle’s vision of building European communities. This model describes the European Union as a structure composed of national states, which are initiating the integration process (principally in the economic field). European institutions in part initiate, in part coordinate introducing and obeying the mechanisms of a common
market, which regulate the economic cooperation of countries. In this vision European citizenship has a more instrumental dimension, and as a supplement to the citizenship of a member country it awards some rights in the common market space. Moreover, in this model Europe is a source of concrete services (legal, organisational and political solutions). Its efficiency of working in these fields is a condition of the further existence of the European Union. Thus, the EU is understood as one of the social institutions whose reason for action is its functionality towards the needs and expectations of subjects that brought it into existence. Institutions do not see the reason for their own transformation to a broader extent that is needed for realisation of equal enjoyment of the EU’s operations and structures.

The federation model is based on the assumption that the nation state belongs to the past, whereas the future holds Europe as the main and most important political structure. Thus, in this conception a target form would be a United Nations of Europe – the main representative of Europeans’ interest in foreign affairs. The ‘internal’ work of the United Nations of Europe would be based on the European institutions’ activities (taking care of citizens’ interests) and on such a construct of citizenship which permits Europe to be looked upon in categories of fatherland. The second institutional level of the federation’s functioning would be a level of regional and local self-government. Realisation of this model requires the establishment of European justice administration and existence of redistributive policies based on principles of solidarity and equality among Europeans.

The third model assumes that a universal public sphere will arise on a broader scale than only European. The effect of the existence of such a sphere would be extinction of internal frontiers connected with full decentralisation of the decision-making system, which would be based on a process of deliberation (placed within the frames of established law regulations). As a consequence, management can be characterised as multilevel, net, horizontal and devoid of any centre. The probable effect of such a model would be the arising of some form of atomising, polycentric social order
(Karpiński 1985). In that case, the common action would be taken up by an interference of decisions.

Delineated models of European integration direct our attention to so-called political identity, which is constructed in political actions. It should be borne in mind that political actions are based on cultural sources, which are linked to the sphere of institutional and non-institutional policy. Hence, it appears that an examination of identity transformation (caused by the partial migration) in the context of different understanding of civil society (Magoska 2001) is valuable. From a structural perspective civil society is a unit of organisations, associations and social movements. The common feature for all of them is their formation as an effect of a grassroots initiative. Moreover, they are beyond the direct control of the state’s institutions, whereas they stay under the surveillance of the legal system. What seems to be most interesting in this perspective is people’s involvement (its origin, course and justification) in different NGOs actions. In a formal-procedural approach stress is placed on rules which are important for the functioning of a civil society, especially in the situation of conflict, when mediation and negotiation are essential for reaching a compromise. A public discourse that takes place in civil society is constructed in a public debate and uses forms of socially accepted procedures of making opinions. Therefore, in this paradigm, most important in analysing identity seems to be our respondents’ involvement in public debate as well as using in practice the manners existing in a particular community of settling disputes and making decisions concerning the public good by them. An ethical approach perceives civil society not only as a scene of obeying and affirmation of particular values, norms and beliefs, but also as a place of existence of symbolic actions which corresponds to these values and attitudes. Among the most important values we can specify: pluralism, tolerance, trust, responsibility, solidarity and rule of law. In our analysis of the respondents' identity we were interested in opinions, attitudes and behaviours promoting the axio-normative elements in question in everyday life.

Examination of the transformation of pendulum migrants’ identity in the context of behavioural, structural and ideological aspects of the functioning of their community of origin enables us to recreate
schemes of identification, which can be referred to the models of European integration described previously. The national identification expressed in the declaration ‘I am Polish’ dominant among our respondents means that particular social identity answers to a model of Europe which consist of national states. A point of reference for people’s actions is in this case the nation state. An important role is also played by the way in which the nation is understood: in ethnic or civic terms. This distinction influences the delineation of the line between ‘homeliness’ and ‘estrangement’, which has a great impact on determining social order and defining social interests. In the context of Europe we are able to indicate two attitudes: pro-European and anti-European. The former can be characterised by perceiving common Europe as an instrument that contributes to a reinforcement of state, mainly in the economical and political dimension but sometimes in the socio-cultural one as well. In contrast, the latter points to threats for the nation state which are derived from integration process, especially in the context of the political independence and cultural uniqueness of the nation. This type of identity is expressed in stressing the importance of the national identification level, loyalty towards the state and belonging to the national community. The dominant European identification expressed in the declaration ‘I am European’ can be related to a federal model of European integration, in which people think of themselves as citizens of Europe and in which the political and social order is based on the values perceived as European, originating from the common cultural heritage of the ‘old continent’. In this case Europe is not only a level of emotional reference but also a subject of social identification. Such identification has a much more civic than ethnic dimension, since it is difficult to delineate European borders based on an ethnic model. This is because it must take the shape of an imagined community (Anderson 1983), not a real existing one. Moreover, the identification of ‘us Europeans’ towards ‘other non-Europeans’ dominates, and it is first before identification with the nation state. A visual sign of such identity is people’s involvement in actions that have an international character. A declaration of ‘I am European’ can also mean that the respondent does not feel part of the community of values, but a member of a political structure based on European citizenship created in the constitutional process (Habermas 1993). Next to the level of ‘political’ European identification,
'European' in most cases possesses also a 'cultural' identity at the national, regional or local level.

Identity expressed in the opinion/attitude 'I am a human being' suggests inveteracy in a model of international, deliberative democracy (Habermas 2009). Here, the point of reference is humanity, whereas axiological references are contained in an attributive understanding of culture. In this model identity is to the broadest extent labile, which is caused by modality, fluctuation of reality and the lack of any stable structures and institutions. Recognition of the domination of the individual above the group in community life is pivotal. The most important value is an individual, unique human being, whereas the main rule of common life is obeying of human rights. For identification seen from this perspective a superior type of community would be mankind, the main principle of operation striving for a balanced development, symbolical integration would be achieved by realisation of individual rights and a specific type of social organisation would be a society of regional communities (Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk 2004: 338). Identity deep-rooted in this model manifests itself in action, in being active and in solving problems of collective life by using democratic deliberation.

A characteristic feature of the models of the presented identities is that they are non-contradictive. There are no contraindications for somebody to feel 'Polish', 'European' or 'human' in different moments. It is the context that determines if in the specific situation a person will identify himself with the nation, the region of the world or with mankind. In many situations it was complicated to state clearly which of the levels of identification is leading, and which one is determining their desires and expectations towards the future model of common Europe. On the other hand it is possible to point to the connections between the declared opinions, views, attitudes or even partially observed behaviours and migration experiences.

For our respondents national identification is a crucial component of identity also in the context of their situation of migration. This can be observed since our respondents' decisions about migration were led by economic, not ideological reasons. Thus their migrations were mostly caused by financial difficulties, and had nothing in common
with contestation or rejection of the Polish character. ‘I appreciate that I am a Pole’ (Z/1/1). The more so because a maintenance of ties with group of origin (in this case with Poles), with a regional or local community in Poland is a constitutive element of pendulum migration. ‘[…] for sure Poland is roots, it is something that you always miss, because this is our place […]’ (C/1/1). In effect, in most cases our respondents can be characterised as those who think of the European Union as an organisation of national states which are the main actors and subjects of integration processes. The idea of a ‘Europe of fatherlands’ is also consistent with their integration experience. They found themselves in the common Europe because of their own fatherland’s accession to the EU. Answering the question about the meaning of being European one of our respondents says:

Sometimes, especially after emigration, maybe because when we were there Poland was already in the European Union, they treated as differently from those emigrants who came from countries that did not belong to the EU, who had to apply for resident status to be able to stay for some time.

(Z/1/1)

It is to be supposed that such attitudes are enhanced by some information heard from mass media about ‘member states’, ‘old fifteen’, ‘new ten’ and establishing states’ coalitions within the EU that are supposed to railroad states’/national interests. Our Members of the European Parliament, our commissioners, our clerks – these are references to polish representatives working in common institutions. All those people, even if they are said to be representatives of the interests of all the EU’s citizens, in a public discourse are perceived as those who in the first place should protect Polish interests in common Europe. Such narration concerning the everyday reality of the EU’s functioning consecutively entails enhancement of the national model of European integration in our respondents’ consciousness.

The situation of migration in many aspects favours maintenance of strong national identity. Almost all respondents pointed to different drawbacks of emigration that caused their bad disposition during their stay abroad. One of the most often mentioned difficulties was homesickness. They missed family, friends, their village of origin,
'small homeland', sometimes also Poland, and the Polish language even when their material status was very low. ‘And I will work in a factory for one thousand zloty?! Like this I will never make much money. They can kiss my ass. [...] But abroad I feel bad, because I was born here, I was brought up here’ (O/1/1). In their statements tension between satisfactions caused by financial situation and psychological costs of contact with foreign culture is clearly marked. ‘Because this life there, I felt like somebody cut it out from my biography. So empty, focused only on one thing [money – author’s note]’ (S/1/1). The low cultural competences of migrants (characteristic of most of our respondents) make it difficult to understand the new situation, its acquisition and use in everyday life. This new cultural reality of the host group was a strong background for reflection about Polish national culture. In this context nostalgia for Polish language and customs as well as establishing contacts with other emigrant Poles emerged.

Mostly when you work you arrange with your family, with grandparents of a child that for example on this day Polish women go out and in most cases families adapt so that they can meet all together. We were going to the park. What do you do in the wide world? Sit and listen to the Polish language, talk.

(T/1/1)

This is also the reason why so many of our respondents talked of longing for the landscape or architecture which they know from their life in the group of origin.

According to most of our interlocutors Poles are good migrants, which means that they meet the requirements, they can work hard and efficiently, and they do not strike in with the employers. Poles are simply good workers: ‘they praise us there. We work well’ (Z/1/1). The respondents often stressed that employers prefer Poles to other nationalities.

We, as Polish women, we are perceived in Italy as most clean. We, Poles. And for example many Italians want only Polish woman to work, nobody else. From this side we are [...] maybe we do not show so much solidarity [...] but if we talk about
European identity of Polish pendulum migrants

cleaning, taking care of old people, thefts, well Polish women are ranked among those most cultured people. Also we as [...] I mean if we talk about cleaning, taking care we are appreciated in Italy’.

(T/1/1)

Others praise Poles for reliability, simply ‘[...] they prefer Poles, Ukrainians are less responsible.’ (T/1/2). At the same time, from our interviews it emerges that Poles after emigration behave awfully to each other, often exploiting economically those fellow countrymen who do not have experience of emigrant life (for example by subletting apartments at double the price). Poles deceive each other (for instance by collecting pre-payment for employment that does not really exist), they compete with each other in a way that is for our respondents unacceptable (for instance some take a job by slandering others or take up a job for significantly smaller money just to oust somebody from work). Many of these stories illustrating relations between Poles in emigration were simply terrible.

I did not have any friends there; I had nobody to talk to. Everybody went there because they believed that everything would be all right, it would be fun [...] but if somebody would earn those 50 cents more, or 1 euro more, than all those women would start to fight against each other. For 50 cents they would kill Poles, one another. They would put a knife to their necks.

(Ż/1/2)

Generally speaking, the interlocutors express a sorrow for the lack of solidarity among Poles, not only migrants, but also the lack of migrants’ solidarity with their family back in the homeland. A few respondents stressed that emigrants are not faithful to their life partners back in Poland. Moreover, they claim that in this aspect Poles are much worse than other nationalities, who are much more faithful. ‘Polish women not, generally speaking Polish women are jealous one about other that [...] And there are also women who are looking for guys. They are looking for guys and this is really unbelievable.’ (M/1/1). Some Polish migrants lead a consumer or even dissipated life, which means that the money they earn is not allocated for common, family goals. Many times, these people are
looking for a casual relationship abroad, which sometimes has the effect of breakup of their family. In the opinion of more than half of our respondents emigrant Poles corroborate the stereotype of drunkard and carouser. The combination of this stereotype and the aforementioned image of the Pole as scrupulous worker is also extremely interesting. It seems that the existence of these two elements in the outlook of one person gives voice to perceiving social reality in national categories, possessing strong national identity and being convinced that the fact of being a Pole (even a drunkard) is ennobling.

Thinking in national categories was enhanced in the case of those migrants who were badly treated by members of the host group, and those who had to live or work in hard or bad conditions.

When I hurt my hand […] He said oh dear. My hand was already red by then and he did not even give any bandages. I came; my rib was broken because cattle did this to me. And he said: erm […] And now, a Dane wants me to come to work for him. I said [he gives a gesture that indicates that he will not go – author’s note].

(T/1/3)

On this basis a bitterness emerged among our respondents. For instance, in the case of Germans it can be observed in the strengthening of the stereotype that Germans will never treat Poles well. In fact Germans say ‘I think that Poles are discriminated here. A Pole, this migrant, because he is poor, he does not have this or that and if he does not have it then he will probably try to steal something’ (Ż/1/2).

In fact, all our respondents declare that they feel European. Some of them were even surprised that such a question was asked. In declaring their being European many times they also talk about their patriotism. Answering question about feeling European, one of our respondents said: ‘Of course I do. I am quite conscious who I am. I always felt this way.’ But: ‘Well, of course being Pole is more important for me. Or maybe not being a Pole but more being a part of Polish culture. This is almost the same as being a Pole’ (Ż/1/2).
Actually everybody declares a strong Polish identity, and additionally most of them are proud of being Pole. It is characteristic, though, that in most cases their patriotism is understood from the perspective of emotional ties with a ‘small homeland’ (Ossowski 1966). Emigration in the declarations of our respondents did not disturb or break their attachment to their ‘large’ or ‘small homeland’. On the contrary, in case of the latter many interlocutors talk about some kind of revalorisation and rediscovery of the beauty of their place of origin.

Yesterday I went to Zamość, and I have not been there for a few years, and I was really pleasantly surprised how everything is beautifully renovated in the old town. I went to high school there, and in those days many places were just close to building sites. And now, everything looks really beautiful.

This perspective of Polish identity seen through the prism of region and local community can be a core element for identifying oneself with the federal model of common Europe.

Migration is in fact a set of different experiences which reinforce a sense of belonging to one European community. Polish accession to the EU for many respondents meant not merely an opportunity to get a job in other country, but also an increasing sense of freedom of travelling and staying in the single European space. Some of our respondents were able to draw a conclusion from this fact:

We as members of the EU can participate in a local election in England, in a general election we cannot, but in a local elections, we took part in electing the mayor of London. If somebody was interested he could vote, if not, he did not have to. I voted.

Travelling movement and especially pendulum migration bear witness to the territorial unity of Europe, where travelling between ‘work’ (host community) and ‘home’ (community of origin) is possible.
Migration is an intercultural contact which for many respondents is cognitively fascinating. Their narration in this context has a threefold character. First, they try to convey objective description.

I think I will go for a walk, because normally at midday Italians just sit and eat spaghetti. When you are walking you can hear dishes and spoons jingle. And if somebody is walking it is rather a Pole’. There everybody is on familiar terms with each other. And it does not matter if somebody is sixty. There is no ‘sir’, no ‘madam’. There all Poles and all Italians are on familiar terms.

(M/1/1)

In this context they describe models of attitudes and behaviours of their other habits (e.g. cooking) and customs (e.g. in family relations) and as a conclusion they estimate and evaluate those elements of culture from the point of view of their personal preferences.

How they pick up mushrooms there, and for instance porcini mushrooms they eat raw. They cut them into small pieces, they put on vinegar, a little bit of salt, they add a lot of lemon juice and they leave it for an hour, and than they eat it raw with meat. They make tasty sauces with cream, they stew those mushrooms and then stir with pasta.

(M/1/1)

In effect, some of our respondents have accepted the described elements of culture and try to adopt them in everyday life. Others are reluctant, and some are not able to take a view in this issue. The next type of narration can be characterised as an attempt of generalisation of cultural confrontation on a national level. The respondents try to confront Poland and Poles with the country of emigration and its habitants. ‘Poles are a very nervy nation, whereas Irish people are very chilled out, they do not have so much stress, they hardly get worked up at all. I really like that’ (Ż/1/1). Analysing this problem we noticed that in most cases foreign culture is valued more. ‘And what is the difference between a Pole and an Englishman or between Pole and somebody else? But here there is dirt and mess’ (O/1/1). The only exception is Polish hostility, which was mentioned many
times as a characteristic Polish feature. Nevertheless, here the Pole is a drunkard and Poland is a badly organised country ruled by thieves. In effect ‘I really do not know how people live here?! When I compare prices here and there and how much people earn here and there and how much you have to spend here and there to live, then I really have no idea how people are able to live here’ (E/Z/2/2). Probably in this narration a key aspect is the respondent’s grudge towards his own country and nation for being ‘forced’ to emigrate. On the other hand a kind of gratitude towards the host state (which enables an improvement in the respondent’s financial status) can be noticed. Thus, the state of emigration is seen as well organised and taking care of its habitants as well as one that offers well-paid work. This gap in quality of life between Poland and Western countries strikes our respondents especially in the case of older people. ‘All old people here, OK maybe not all, but most of them are embittered, unhappy, look bad, and there it is different. There, people who are retired really start to live’ (E/Z/2/1). A great part of our respondents believe that it is much easier to live following emigration than in Poland. The last type of narration has a specific character, since it reduces reflection on culture to comprising individual features among people. In this model in Poland as well as in Italy, in Germany and in many other countries live good people and bad people, rich and poor, those who behave in an appropriate way and inappropriate way, hardworking individuals and idlers.

There are families in Poland or in Italy or in Germany, there are. There are good families and bad ones. And it is the same with individuals, there are good people and bad. It is difficult to generalise that somebody is like this or that. We complain about our politics, they complain about theirs.

(C/1/1)

Symptomatic is that this type of narration can be found in most interviews regardless of the fact that the same respondents also formulate other types of narration.

We would argue that all these types of narration are evidence that our emigrant respondents have acquired awareness of pluralism of the cultural world, of the world of the human. They are also
witnesses of growing tolerance for dissidence and increasing trust in people even if they speak a different language, have different customs and behave in an incomprehensible way. What is more, some of our respondents have no difficulties in considering staying forever in the state of emigration. ‘[…] no, I do not think so. There is only a language barrier but not a cultural barrier […]’ (C/1/1). This pluralism, tolerance and trust can be a sign of belonging to a common system of values characteristic of a European heritage. This is particularly the case as such an attitude is mostly followed by a conviction about the necessity of European solidarity. Most of our respondents believe that the future of Poland is connected with common Europe and that European integration is more important than contacts and relations with non-European countries including the United States of America.

The last of the types of narration mentioned, concerning the world of culture of the host society, is placed in the schema of identity ‘I am a human being’. This is regardless of the fact that I can be a translocalist (Werbner 1997), a ‘person without properties’ (‘homme des confines’, see Nowicki 2001), cosmopolitan and in the same time a patriot of the particular nation, because nowadays nationalism exists next to cosmopolitanism (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 8). The values that are stressed here are individualism, uniqueness, good and dignity of each human being, regardless of the culture to which he belongs. No, I cannot say if there are [people] like this or like that. Here are people like this but there also’ (T/1/4).

No, it is not possible to interchangeably describe people in a particular region, village, city as tolerant or not. The same is true with country. We all have a tendency, in each country that we are better and that Germany is bad, Russia is bad and so on. In each country there are good people and bad people. In each country I have met those who are better and those who are worse. It is the same here. There are good people, very good people and less good people.

(E/Z/2/3)

Culture is hence understood by respondents as an attribute of each person to induce people to respect his existence. This discovery of
individualism is seen by some of the interlocutors as a crucial migration experience. ‘Well, I have just learned to distinguish good people from bad. Mostly. It was a most important experience. That here are some mean people and in Italy also’ (M/1/1). In this type of identity we were able to observe in our respondents a kind of desire to meet other people and discuss the world or even to deliberate on important subjects connected with individual and common goals and life aspirations.

In many situations the respondents claim that time spent abroad did not changed them, which proves their affirmation for the reality of the community of origin. Nevertheless, it is possible to find in what they say many elements that prove personality transformation among migrants. In the first place, those changes have a psychological character: they are more open to other people, more self-confident and more independent. ‘For sure it leads to gaining independence and I think that to be there you must be a person with a strong character to survive’ (C/1/1). Secondly, we can observe changes that have a cultural character: new habits as well as higher cultural competences. ‘I get used to [olive oil – author’s note] because my husband, he says it stinks. And this is this best one, extra virgin. My daughter sometimes brings it, I get used to it’ (Cz/1/1).

Just check households of those who went to Germany, there you will see that outside the house it is aesthetic, some flowers, before it was different. And now they care about the outside look, something that looks nice and some different satisfaction. (S/1/1)

Thirdly, we can talk about changes in social dimension such as a new point of view on the relations with others and in many cases, transformation of social ties and interaction networks as well as an increase of social activity and interest in community life in the place of origin.

Many times you can hear that no investors will come here because we do not have roads. That’s bullshit. In Ireland there were really no roads at all. Now there are and they are better and better. But five years ago, more than five – when I went
there, it was similar to here. And in Ireland investors were everywhere, in each part of Ireland. There were companies … there are to give people work. It all depends on the government […] Why is it not like this here? […] I will ask this question with pleasure during a Communal Board meeting.

(E/Z/2/3)

Well everybody thinks that if somebody goes to Italy he will earn a lot of money […] So, well […] But normally I do not talk about it because when I hear about Italy I start to feel sick. Especially when I hear this from people who have never been there and who have no idea what are they talking about. I do not talk with such people at all. I will say something, anything and change subject.

(T/1/1)

This is the effect of emigration as a school of life stressed by respondents.

Conclusions
Emigrant experiences influenced our respondents’ identity in such a way that we are able to clearly mark local, national, European and universal levels of identification. The cultural complexity of pendulum migration entails a reinforcement of various levels of identification in different situations. Local – as an effect of longing for homeliness of everyday life lost after moving to a foreign social space in emigration. In theory, it can contribute to support for the national order of the social system, especially when the ‘large homeland’ is perceived in categories of cultural, social and political continuity of the ‘fatherland.’ On the other hand, it can also be connected with support for a federal form of social order, mainly when the nation state is seen as a potential threat for self-governing and autonomy of the local community. The level of national identification is reinforced by facing other ethnic culture and other languages. Potentially, it can contribute to reinforcement of understanding common Europe as one entirety which consists of national states. We have observed that the European identity of migrants is developed as an effect of adopting cultural elements from other national groups and by the emergence of a sense of belonging to one big cultural entirety. Obviously, this
type of identity can contribute to support for the European integration process in the shape of the federal model of Europe to the highest degree. Last but not least, universal (common to all mankind) identity, especially in the case of those whose experiences result from staying in different countries and communities, can be said to arise from migrants’ contact with cultural variety. It emerges as a reflection that people are simply different. Such identification can favour acceptance of a supranational model of deliberative democracy in the future.

Their exposure in a practice of everyday life, also in the context of vision of process and aim of European integration, mostly depends on the situation, social context and institutional identification. It can be said that migrants are potentially followers of all three models of the future European Union. Which one they support in the situation of making decisions will depend on the conditions in which such decisions are made.
References


European identity of Polish pendulum migrants


In every language community meanings are common for its members. The same meanings for all members of a given community constitute the base of communication and the foundation for culture. To a large degree it is due to them that culture is transmitted between generations.

(Wierzbicka 2006)

Introduction

Democracy is a key word and value in the process of European integration. In the transformation in Poland the word played a

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1 Despite its classic etymology and tradition going back many centuries, democracy has become a key word of the public debate in Europe only during the two last decades of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th century. At that time European newspapers began using words which represented the essence of socio-political and economic transformations - apart from democracy the following words followed suit: industry, industrialist, class, middle class, ideology, intellectual, rationalism, humanitarian, atomistic, masses, commercialism, proletariat, collectivism, equalitarian, liberal, conservative, scientist, utilitarian, bureaucracy, capitalism, and crisis - pointing to the Enlightenment heritage of the approaching, modernising social change (Dahl 2009, Encyclopaedia Britannica on-line, entry: ‘democracy,’ Available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/)
fundamental role – not only as a technical term for political system, decisional procedures or governing formulas, but most of all as the core of symbolic conflict around possible paths of system development. The word appeared in almost every intersection of the main persuasion lines: that of the communist regime and that of the opposition before 1989.

The Communist authorities legitimised the then political regime by trying to petrify the arbitrary system and its governing practices with the names of socialist democracy or people’s democracy, in order to maintain a coherent propaganda vision of a centralised and mono-party state. On the other hand, the opposition tried to deconstruct the notion of a socialist democracy by revealing its fundamental contradictions between propaganda constructions together with inadequate names,\(^2\) and ‘democracy without adjectives’ – ‘the Western one’, understood as a real (not manipulated) political mechanism which goes hand in hand with freedom and human rights, social commonness and subjectness and, generally, a better life (Pietrucha 2003: 305).

A distinguishing trait of the transformation of Polish consciousness in the 1980s was the process of ascribing to democracy a whole range of consecutive (usually quite emotional and evaluative) connotations – so the semantic field started to broaden: firstly by inclusion of abstract meanings (‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘solidarity’, ‘fairness/justice’), and then of concrete associations, usually strongly determined by the very conditions of everyday life (Pietrucha 2003: 305). Bartol-Jarosińska notes that democracy (as a word) happened to be ‘the witness of the Polish events of August 1980’; the ‘language photography of those times’ (Bartol-Jarosińska 1986: 71-2; Pietrucha 2003: 305). Thus, in the 1980s apogee of symbolic conflict between the power and opposition in Poland, democracy (without adjectives) was functioning as a synonym (and a symbol) of a new, dreamt-up, social and political reality, as well as the backbone of the most desirable hierarchy of values. However, at the same time this construction of democracy started to miss its processual feature – it used to be

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\(^2\) This hypocrisy was represented, e.g., by the following joke which was popular in the 1970s and 1980s: ‘In what sense is ‘democracy’ different from ‘socialist democracy’? In the same sense as a chair is different from an electric chair.’
treated as ‘a golden gate’ guarded by the Communist regime, so after 1989, when the guards disappeared, suddenly ‘democracy seemed to be reached’ according to a rash assumption that democracy and freedom are exactly the same. Misztal, describing the growing democracy and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, comes to the conclusion that the majority of Poles, shortly after the fall of the system, expressed the conviction that the eruption of freedom automatically guarantees a sound democracy in its full shape. However, he goes on,

[...] it had not been time spent on democracy-building, it was only the period of opening the political system. [...] Democracy-building is a quite arduous as much as long-lasting process of constructing multilevel interdependencies and self-restrictions in such a way that no social group could gain too much benefit in comparison to the other social groups.

(Misztal 2009)

Obviously, the peculiarity of the Polish road to democracy leaves its stamp on the semantic field of the notion, as can be noticed in the changing, accumulating and connotatively complex semantic profiles of this lexeme. Under the influence of the 1980s (the meaning of democracy negotiated in the context of the conflict: Communist regime vs. the society) and the 1990s (the meaning of democracy negotiated in the context of the clash between an idealistic vision and the reality of capitalism accompanied with the growing social price for transformation) the Polish notion of democracy has taken its current language shape, with positive connotations overall but still missing its stability and harmony.

The way in which democracy is understood and linguistically constructed as a key word of the Polish transformation is special. On the one hand it is used as a declared political value which paves the way for the most important elements of political consciousness. On the other, however, it is not only vague and ambiguous, but constantly put to the test of setting new semantic limits and connotative ideas. One of the reasons is that democracy is unceasingly being defined at the crossroads of parliamentary and party discourses and mainstream media culture. As it is primarily of a political and social nature (Bartmiński 2006: 76), it is natural that the main meanings of democracy are carried by political discourse,
transmitted, transformed and interpreted by journalists and political commentators, and only then absorbed by common language users. As a result, it is not always clear where the border lies between politics and democracy in their serious sense, and politics and democracy constructed as an attractive topic for mediated public debate. The word democracy therefore falls victim to certain language practices, e.g. it is easily instrumentalised for political or sensational reasons, it is overused in secondary meanings and, last but not least, it is appropriated for the sake of discrediting other people.

Another aspect of instrumentalisation of democracy by the media and politicians is that the notion mirrors the tension between norm and reality in such a way that the language of democracy is substantially marked with normative definitions and, at the same time, is full of defining practices typical of colloquial meanings and persuasive, populist intensions. The real problem is not the multiplicity of defining perspectives, but the fact that they are intermingled and seem to be interchangeable.

Language representations of democracy
The indices for Polish collective identity
The focus of all identity phenomena and processes is on meaning. This means that identity has most of all a communicative dimension, and language is the main tool for constructing or reconstructing identity. ‘Identity is created by naming’ – argues Foote (1951), and Hałas (2006: 252) adds that ‘Identity is the manifestation and effect of language influence within an interaction. […] However, both partners have to come to an agreement on these classifications.’

In this chapter we make two assumptions crucial for further analysis: (a) using language in many situations makes it a social action itself (Wierzbicka 1987), and (b) the ways we perceive and interpret the world can be determined by the language we are using. The second assumption, called a ‘soft version’ of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (Sapir 1978; Whorf 1982), means that we allow for a possibility that language usage in grammar, lexical, semantic or phraseological aspects can be crucial for understanding other people. The meanings are created within social relations and during interpretation acts which are determined by culturally preserved and transmitted conventions of language usage. These assumptions have practical
influence on the methodology: due to the hypothetical role of language (its ability to give names and direct interpretations), in collective identity research one should include – if at all possible – knowledge on linguistic aspects of meaning, including most of all a pragmatic approach to language in social relations (Peirce 1934; Austin 1962; Leech 1983; Grice 1989).

Henceforth, the important questions are: what is the meaning of democracy for members of a given political community? In what ways does the understanding of democracy influence our collective identity? Is democracy a value, and if it is so, what is the context of its social meaningful functioning? What qualities are specific to the Polish understanding of democracy? Is our construction of democracy contextually combined with Europe – is it a ‘European value’? European integration together with other dynamic social, economic and political changes stemming from globalisation and post-modern impulses as an overall context of change bear the next crucial questions: do the constructions of democracy in the Polish language reveal any reference to the normative projects of the new, post-national Europe and European demos? Do the specific features of the notion of democracy somehow include the driving processes we all witness: the decomposition of traditional, state-centred models of governance, change of understanding politics and the essence of being European – becoming part of a new common polity? Is the European Union defined and understood as the status quo, or as a multi-national federation with a common identity and capacity for political actions, or as the realistic vision of a post-national net of global, horizontal relations based on ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 27)?

The understanding of values represented in language is subject to systematic linguistic research in Poland. In the context of transformation and European integration most interesting is comparative research covering the period 1989-2008, \(^3\) and let us note

\(^3\) Ethno-linguistic projects run by the Jerzy Bartmiński group in Lublin include the completion of the Axiological Dictionary of Polish Language, organisation of a Polish Culture Congress in Lublin entitled Values in Polish Culture, and systematic research on the language of values and axiological pictures of the world. See: Dyczewski 2001; Bartmiński 2006; as well as invaluable input by Polish linguists from other centres: Jadwiga Puzymina, Tomasz P. Krzeszowski, Anna Dąbrowska – to confine ourselves to the most outstanding few.
and describe the dynamic context of social and political change. The meaning of democracy as a single notion has been subject to such research at least twice.

In his research Bartmiński described the evolution of semantic aspects of the notion of democracy in 1990–2000. In questionnaire-based reviews respondents were asked to explain the meanings they ascribe to it. In his conclusions the author points out some characteristics of the Polish understanding of democracy. First, it was confirmed that the concept is perceived by Polish students mostly in its social and political aspects. It thus works as a universal socio-political value and as such keeps high stability within the value system. Ethical aspects appear quite rare, but they are worth stressing because they are subject to significant change. Bartmiński (2006) writes:

After 10 years our way of perceiving democracy has increasingly been narrowed. While thinking about democracy, young Poles are focused mainly on social, political, psychological and socio-psychological issues. The connection between democracy and ethics or religious aspects has been put aside.

(Bartmiński 2006: 76)

Ethical aspects of democracy, however scarce, are mentioned in three cases: as the execution of the principle of justice (majority rule), as the respect for human rights and dignity and – in a negative sense – as the trigger for corruption practices. Another interesting and evolving feature of perceiving democracy is the existential aspect, which marks the growing knowledge and care for political system as the structure responsible for our everyday living standards.

Bartmiński’s analysis of the semantic aspects of democracy helps to validate popular expectations: it confirms that democracy is basically

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4 The project was based on a sample of 2000 students from five universities in Lublin – so they basically represent students’ opinions and declarations. See Bartmiński 2006.

5 By what the authors mean using expressions concerning: our living situation and standards, attitudes to everyday problems, goods and property, prosperity or poverty, public order, jobs, redistribution of goods, punctuality, addictions, food and cuisine. See Bartmiński 2006: 40-1.
Democracy as part of Polish collective identity

profiled by social and political contexts and is being increasingly narrowed within this field (Bartmiński 2006: 76). However, it does not corroborate the idea expressed earlier, according to which democracy during the last 20 years of transformation in Poland was subject to a quite energetic and chaotic process of broadening meaning and cumulating divergent evaluative connotations. On the contrary, the analysis showed that in students’ perception of democracy there is a sort of ‘invariable core’, semantic invariant – a stable set of features immune to modifications. Bartmiński’s (2006: 77) analysis reveals the most stabilised ones: freedom (most of all ‘freedom of speech’, not so much ‘freedom of thought, religion, conscience’), equality, fair and free elections and civic participation in governance. The last feature should be highlighted, since it marks the perception of democracy in the context of rising law abidingness (the highest difference between 1990 and 2000). Both features show signs of perceiving democracy together with civil society. On the other hand, the rising importance of civic involvement and participation in governance leads (so far, hypothetically) to the model of ‘deliberative democracy’.

In his conclusions Bartmiński tries to reconstruct the picture of ‘the agent and participant of democracy’ by comparing the results from 1990 and 2000. It seems that these reconstructions are an important premise for describing Polish identity in the context of democratisation. Bartmiński (2006) claims that:

According to data from 2000, [the subject of democracy in Poland] is a person with strong feeling of freedom, active, aware of his/her democratic rights, ready to make use of them. This conclusion is justified by the features which characterise the psychological aspect (its role in 2000 significantly increased, which was statistically confirmed) and the political one. In 2000 both aspects made a coherent set, of a quite stable nature, which can be used to portray the agent–participant of democracy; the agency is characterised by: freedom of thought, freedom of opinion and beliefs, freedom of choice, ability to make decisions, ‘the desire to be on top’ (ambition) and self–realisation, responsibility, and civic conscience with involvement, participation in state governance. Ten years earlier the respondents did not point so much to the above features. (Emphasis by author)

(Bartmiński 2006: 77)
After all, the optimistic conclusions show the great potential of the well-educated youth who seems to understand the idea of democracy in an open and modern way, devoid of negative connotations which appear in different socio-demographic strata.

In another analysis Pietrucha aimed to reconstruct cognitive definitions of democracy in Polish language. She points out that the word democracy has two basic meanings: the first is pure technical, narrowing, usually neutral, and the second is additional, specificative, broadening, giving some axiological flavour to democracy (Pietrucha 2003: 282). This is the reason why the language of democracy contains so many evaluative predicates. The most popular are adjectives showing that:

- ‘Western’, ‘liberal’, ‘European’ democracy is a prototype for Polish democracy
- Democracy itself constantly undergoes the process of development and change (‘modern’, ‘current’)
- Democracy needs particular concern and awareness (‘fragile’, ‘flawed’, ‘immature’)
- The previous, socialist form of ‘peoples’ democracy’ was not real (Pietrucha 2003: 282)

In her subsequent analysis Pietrucha focuses on the collections of nouns functioning together with democracy, to reach a conclusion that is interesting from our point of view. She concludes that democracy

   Makes co-ordinated, double syntactic connections with civilisation, Europeanness and Europe, perceived not as the continent, but as a special type of culture. This syntactic connection mirrors the mind of a speaker, who treats these elements as equivalent and mutually similar.

   (Pietrucha 2003: 287)

It is worth stressing, then, that in Polish language families of words which recall democracy and Europe belong to the same category, and both produce positive connotations. Moreover, Pietrucha (2003: 287) gives evidence that the primary collection of linguistic expressions for democracy is strictly associated with certain values, such as: ‘freedom’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘independence’, ‘justice’, ‘law abidingness’
Democracy as part of Polish collective identity

...and 'peace'. The remaining collections are also meaningful. Firstly, a profile of ‘citizens’ attitude to a state’ can be reconstructed. In the author’s opinion, democracy is used here in the context of conscience, assertive and based on trust activity for the good of the polity. It may lead to a conclusion that normative premises of ‘deliberative democracy’ (at least at the level of civil society) match the pragmatics of understanding democracy (Pietrucha 2003: 299). Secondly, the findings show that – contrary to Bartmiński’s conclusion – Polish understanding of democracy has changed in the sense that capitalism, which has approached with all its consequences (including negative connotations), has replaced equality and egalitarian values. If this were so, the Enlightenment democratic triad of ‘freedom-equality-fraternity’ would be reduced to the duo of ‘freedom’ and ‘solidarity’.

The language of democracy
Connotations, roles, arenas and goals

The following analysis of linguistic maps of democracy is based on the text corpora gathered by four institutions within the project of the National Corpus of Polish Language. The gathered collection of diverse, written and spoken utterances now numbers 350 million words and is constantly being enriched, making the most substantial and representative sample of modern Polish language. In many cases the recorded utterances (paragraphs) represent participants of social, discursive situations: e.g. Cabinet discussions, parliamentary debates, TV programmes, conversations – so the interactive context of meaning production is kept.

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6 These institutions are: Institute of Computer Science of the Polish Academy of Science (Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN), Institute of Polish Language of the Polish Academy of Science (Instytut Języka Polskiego PAN), National Publishing House PWN (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN) and the Institute of Computer and Corpus Linguistics of the University in Łódź (Zakład Językoznawstwa Komputerowego i Korpusowego Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego).

7 The sample consists of Polish literature, newspapers and magazines, periodicals, recorded conversations, Internet texts, advertising materials etc. The authors claim that ‘it was equally important for them to collect utterances which would be topically diversified, representing different genres, representing language users of both sexes and all ages, coming from all regions of Poland – as well as substantial in the number of words.’ See: Narodowy Korpus Języka Polskiego, <http://www.nkjp.pl/>. 
The National Corpus of Polish Language was searched by Pelcra software\(^8\) in order to make initial arrangements and categorisation of data. The lexeme *democracy* appears 11905 times in the corpus. The random-interval representative sample of all occurrences was then limited 10 times – to 1191 records, following the rule that every occurrence of *democracy* had to be accompanied by a broad context of 200 words (approx. one standard page).\(^9\) The aim of the subsequent content analysis was, in the first part, the reconstruction of the evaluative connotation of *democracy*, as well as systematic description and explanation of selected indices of our political collective identity in the context of democracy. Particularly, it was crucial to reconstruct: the roles people play in communication while discussing democracy issues (both for ‘us’ and for ‘significant partners’), the explicit and implicit arena of social activities, the explicit and implicit goals of activities, and the level of consensus during communication.

The results show that *democracy* is overwhelmingly treated as a clearly positive value (Table 10.1). Apart from neutral expressions (of a purely descriptive character), every fourth expression has positive connotations (and the level of negative ones does not exceed 1.6 per cent). Moreover, the lexeme *democracy* becomes a frequent, thus functional, part of collective nouns, mostly the names of political parties, foundations, organisations etc. – with the obvious assumption of generating positive connotations.

\(^8\) PELCRA software was developed by the PELCRA group from the Institute of English Language of the University in Łódź. See: <http://212.191.73.200:8080/WebNKJPDemo/help.jsp>.

\(^9\) Completion of this task was possible with the help of the software Poliqarp – the universal concordancer developed by the Institute of Computer Science of the Polish Academy of Science – see:<http://www.ipipan.waw.pl/>.
Table 10.1: Connotations of democracy in Polish language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>per cent</th>
<th>Valid per cent</th>
<th>Cumulative per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable, other</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral, descriptive</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, explicit</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, implicit</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, explicit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, implicit</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answering the question of what democracy means for us – the members of a discursive political community – and in what way these meanings reveal as well as influence our collective identity, we used the data to reconstruct linguistic maps of typical roles played by people who talk or interact in the area of democracy issues, which can be inferred from attitudes expressed by the language captured in the corpus, together with additional characteristics such as the scope of activities (arena) as well as the explicit and implicit goals. Tables 10.2 and 10.3 show the prevailing roles.

The findings seem to correspond with the semantics of democracy. It can be observed that democracy, apart from the technical and neutral, procedural meaning, means at the same time a certain discursively shaped ‘reality’ which is subject to incessant disputes and instrumentalising, rhetorical endeavours. This remark goes from the most typical roles played by the actors who deal with democracy.
Table 10.2: Identification of the roles played according to democracy: we (main agents)\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit or implicit role</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Column per cent</th>
<th>Valid per cent</th>
<th>Cumulative per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy defender (advocate)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy hero</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy builder</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy repairer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy teacher</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy benefiter (profiter)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good prophet of democracy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy for the common good actor</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy glorifier; panegyrist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy enemy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy villain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy deconstructionist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy damager</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy pupil</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy victim</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad prophet of democracy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynical egoist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy critic</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy as rhetorical argument in different matter</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{10} The lists do not contain categories with no frequency.
Table 10.3: Identification of the roles played according to democracy: they (significant partners)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit or implicit role</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Column per cent</th>
<th>Valid per cent</th>
<th>Cumulative per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy defender</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy hero</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy builder</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy teacher</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy benefiter (profiter)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy enemy</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy villain</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy deconstructionist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy damager</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy pupil</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad prophet of democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cynical egoist</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy critic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy as rhetorical argument in different matter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, the roles played by the subjects (active actors who take action) are different from the roles ascribed to the significant partners in interactions (Turner 2001). Agents’ roles are more positive and constructive (‘builder’, ‘defender’) or based on the assumption of high competence and practical knowledge, paving the way to construct the role relation ‘teacher–pupil’. The data also lead to a hypothesis that democracy as a topic works in Polish political culture as a catalyst of conflict relations based on zero-sum game: not only do ‘we’ take productive actions in the context of democracy, but also we ascribe to our significant partners clear-cut negative roles: of ‘democracy damagers’, ‘enemies’ or ‘cynical egoists’ who make use of democracy as a topic only for their own benefit. Table 10.4 shows the mutual juxtaposition of roles (confined to the most outstanding ones).
Table 10.4: Crossing roles played according to democracy: subjects vs. significant partners (N=149)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>We (agents) – typical roles according to democracy</th>
<th>They – typical roles according to democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy defender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy enemy</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy damager</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynical egoist</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy teacher</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from Table 10.4 can be read as a premise for reconstruction the four most typical scripts for roles which represent divergent ways of perceiving democracy. It is diagnostic that some of the positive roles are missing – such as ‘democracy hero’, ‘democracy benefiter (profiter)’ or ‘good prophet of democracy’ (the latter being the sign of the lack of future orientation). In the following section, four role-scripts are listed:

**Democracy educator vs. enemies and threats**

Interestingly, textual data show that this scheme is about not so much transmitting knowledge (a teacher’s role in the ‘teacher-pupil’ relation) as the function of instructing and patronising partners in interaction. Thus, such a patronising rhetoric assumes revealing (defining) the significant partner as ‘democracy enemy’ or ‘destructor, damager’, which must be based on discursive practices of gaining domination in the communication situation. One of the possible schemes is meaningful in this context: the ‘teacher-teacher’ relation, where both partners in the interaction try to force upon the other the favourable definition of the situation.
Democratic demagogue vs. cynical egoists and democracy destructors
This script works as a variation on the previous one. However, the demagogue role goes far beyond the educator’s script, which was mostly confined to democracy procedures. Here the scheme is based on arguments concerning any aspect of social life in such a way that its successfulness is based on attributing to one’s partner discrediting labels of ‘cynical person’, ‘egoist’, or somebody who destroys democracy. The remaining two scripts have a more positive dimension.

Democracy builder vs. explicit or implicit enemies
Almost every conscious member of a political community wants to be seen as a democracy ‘builder’ or ‘defender’, so this script is very functional, and the metaphors of a building-place and construction process are also frequently in use. Typically, the scheme is balanced by the figure of defining the partner as an ‘enemy of democracy’ or, at least, as a potential threat to the democratic process.

Democracy defender vs. carriers of divergent menace to democracy
In order to play the role of ‘democracy defender’ one has to define the possible dangers first. This is the scheme of building a positive image by unmasking the practices of opponents.

The four role scripts were supplemented by checking to what extent the actors who are involved in communication acts in the context of democracy present an open and trustful approach to one another. Table 10.2 showed that in more than half the utterances democracy was neutrally constructed, and in a quarter of them it has positive connotations. Table 10.5 demonstrates that in more than 70 per cent of cases the actors’ approach to their partners is also neutral; moreover, 17 per cent of them show signs of an attitude to consensual communication.
The relatively high level of consensus means that democracy as a topic has great potential to strengthen mutual trust between partners of interaction. This is for sure the prevailing tendency. It might be slightly in contrast with the main role scripts – particularly the first two (‘democracy educator against enemies’ and ‘democratic demagogue against cynical egoists’) where democracy is instrumentalised. Thus it is worth bearing out the proportions: these roles, however distinct and discursively attractive, were observed in not more than one fifth of all communication situations and, moreover, their scripts are much more complex and complicated than those of negative rhetoric. To give an example, the implicit aim of ‘democracy educator’ is mainly to legitimise one’s own behaviour (approx. 29 per cent), but also ‘civic interests’ (more than eight per cent). In the case of the ‘demagogue’s role’ the main implicit aim is the same (self-legitimisation, 29.5 per cent), and only then political discreditation of partner (24.1 per cent). Table 10.6 demonstrates these complexities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude to consensus and trust (scaled -3 to +3)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Column per cent</th>
<th>Valid per cent</th>
<th>Cumulative per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ritual conflict, approach to ‘kill the enemy’ (-3)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discreditation and defacing, approach to maintain conflict (-2)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve, some distrust (-1)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral approach (0)</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight consensual approach (+1)</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict negotiations, approach to make out agreement (+2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1191</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above findings show once more that people who talk/write about democracy in Poland do it on one fifth of occasions in order to justify their own behaviour, in less than one tenth the aim is to discredit or deface a partner, and in one twentieth they do it for the sake of the community. But the most important information here is that in almost half of the sample the main goal of conversation/interaction is the democracy itself. It is also meaningful that Polish language-users in their communication practices concerning democracy are at the same time oriented towards freedom, dignity and human rights, pluralism and justice.

In conclusion to the first part of the research it was decided to describe the (explicit or implicit) arena of social activities concerning democracy. It turned out that in almost half of the sample the national state dominates as a context (Table 10.7). Europe and the EU as a context for democracy appear in less than 10 per cent of all utterances, and a beyond-European context is evident in not more
than six per cent. It was also clear that an important arena of democracy discourse is the level of local communities as well as political institutions of that level (almost eight per cent).

Table 10.7: Explicit and implicit arena of social activities concerning democracy and democratisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Column per cent</th>
<th>Valid per cent</th>
<th>Cumulative per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual as arena</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social primary group, relatives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social surroundings – ‘little homeland’, commune, poviat, local government</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation or institution – political party, parliament, formal association, company</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, homeland</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, European Union</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The world – my place</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linguistic representations of three scenarios of European democratisation

At the onset of the second part of the research three specific scenarios of democratisation in Europe were hypothetically assumed (Trenz and Liebert 2008: 8; Eriksen and Fossum 2007; Eriksen and Fossum 2009). For the sake of our socio-linguistic approach they could be expressed in the following way:

**Scenario 1**

The national state determines the meaning of democracy, it imposes the overall context of using language, grammar and lexis of framing and understanding democratic processes, works as a collective subject for every utterance, plays the role of the sovereign of every form of political communication, is the main author of definitions of European integration processes, and forms the only arena of public debate, which is constructed within designates and connotations of national borders. Thus political integration of Europe is based here on the national state working as a strong agent, and the European Union and others as (direct or indirect) objects.
**Scenario 2**
Federal Europe is a community of shared meanings, traditions, cultural diversity and common values – European *demos* and European sense of identity. The European Union is here the collective subject of communication: it defines democracy alone or in parallel with the state perspectives, the picture of the world is collectively created and states’ communication competences are separated. Transnational actors are privileged in defining the common arena for political debates, which can develop due to European institutions, a common political culture and European public sphere. European civil society becomes an important subject of communication, defining itself according to European institutions. The most relevant argument here is Europeanness as a factor in shaping collective rationality of common social practices.

**Scenario 3**
European citizens, ‘considering themselves as self-legislating citizens’ through a *polity* that is not a state and is without agreement on a *demos*, become the important agents of political communication as part of the horizontal net of divergent entities. Democracy and democratisation are defined in the context of *cosmopolis* – the system of shared universal norms and values. Cosmopolitan identity organises and explains the divergence of actors and multidimensionality of sovereigns, based on the principles of equality and of consensual and rational deliberation as the procedure for governing. General elections give rise and legitimisation for the system of rationally limited and hierarchical communication competencies – Europe as a regional democracy takes part in political debate as one of the similar network of regional subjects. Communication activity is motivated by higher and universal principles under the condition of a developed consensual approach and a practical aim to cooperate with other democratic entities.

The three scenarios were juxtaposed with the corpus texts by four questions with the idea to check the textual presence of the crucial issues: sovereignty, legitimisation, authoritative decision-making and EU membership border-setting. These four topics were assumed to be indices for the three scenarios, depending on the perspective taken. Practically, it was hypothesised that if in a broadly defined unit of text any topical designate or connotation occurs in a meaningful
connection to one of the four contexts, then such a case would be coded as the instance of the argument, and put forward for further analysis.

As the analysis was being developed it became clear that despite the fact that the corpus sample was quite substantial and representative of the Polish language of democracy, and although in quite a sizeable number of units the specialist political discourse was highly represented, there would be major problems with completing material copious enough to carry out more detailed and deeper analysis. The documentation for the second and the third scenarios proved to be so scarce that the reasoning based on it could lead, at the most, to checking the presence of premises which could mean that one of the scenarios is statistically, thus also meaningfully, represented in the corpus sample.

It turned out that such premises were present in 11 per cent of all texts on democracy. In other words, in almost nine out of 10 random utterances on democracy (representing 90 per cent of the whole sample) the actors involved in communication on democracy did not express any meaning which could be used to analyse the visions of European democratisation expressed here by the three scenarios. This number might be shocking, but it is not so difficult to explain. One of the possible reasons is that it is common in Poland to look back in order to define the present. The past is therefore a very influential and functional context, limiting the possible scope of speculations and predictions. Another reason might stem from the textual data under analysis. It appears that in the Polish language of democracy the most apparent scripts for social roles concern the defence of democracy as well as the process of building or reconstructing the political system – which again must be based on past experiences – and the scripts for future activities are meaningfully absent (Table 10.2). Another possible reason is the fact that the symbolic forum of European integration debates – the agorae of the specialist politicians and political scientists – has practically been cut off from the rest of public discourse (included in the corpus). So, the only inspiration for democratic mass awareness as well as for everyday democracy-conscious cultivation and visionary improvement might be the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios of democratisation of Europe – presence of selected aspects and their connotations</th>
<th>sovereignty</th>
<th>legitimisation</th>
<th>authoritative decision-making</th>
<th>membership border setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not represented</td>
<td>neutral concern</td>
<td>positive, descriptive</td>
<td>negative, explicit</td>
<td>neutral concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>model I</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>model II</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>model III</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.8: Three scenarios of democratisation of Europe – presence of selected aspects and their connotations.
stream of pieces of ideas and arguments, usually in political conflict format, which seep through very specific media filters.

Table 10.8 shows the percentage and connotations for the four selected indices: ‘sovereignty’, ‘legitimisation’, ‘authoritative decision-making’ and ‘EU membership border-setting’. Due to the unproportional distribution of data it was decided to look more closely at the premises and scenarios (models) by limiting the data to the positive answers (without the ‘not represented’ cases). Table 10.9 shows the data in the limited form.

Table 10.9: Presence of the three scenarios of democratisation of Europe (accumulated data for texts concerning the future of European integration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices of democratisation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Column per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative decision-making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership border-setting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 10.9 give evidence for the domination of the national state as the context of democratisation in all texts qualified as ‘concerning the future of European integration.’ Moreover, it can cautiously be argued that the cognitive model of a national state as subject is overwhelmingly bound to the aspect of sovereignty, and vice versa. In other words, when sovereignty appears as an argument or topic, there is very little chance of finding evidence that scenarios 2 or 3 are assumed. One finds a slightly different situation in the case of legitimisation as a topic or argument – here there is a certain space open for scenario 2, which means that Poles start to accept European federation as a possible source of political rationale. This tendency
Table 10.10: The roles of democracy teacher (educator) and demagogue in the light of the three scenarios of democratisation of Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices of democratisation</th>
<th>We – typical roles played according to democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>democracy educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legitimisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritative decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership border-setting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10.11: The roles of democracy builder and defender in the light of the three scenarios of democratisation of Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices of democratisation</th>
<th>We – typical roles played according to democracy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>democracy builder</td>
<td>democracy defender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Column percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legitimisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritative decision-making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership border-setting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario I</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario II</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scenario III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reveals that the closer we get to a decision-making process, and then to European Union future border-setting, the more visible cognitive models of European community of meanings (scenario 2) and post-national, cosmopolitan political awareness (scenario 3) become. However, for the time being the optimism should be tempered by the very limited representations.

It was interesting, then, to observe in what sense the indices for the three scenarios of democratisation in Europe are distributed among the main role scripts (Table 10.2-10.4). The results are shown in Tables 10.10 and 10.11.

Tables 10.10 and 10.11 can be read both vertically and horizontally. By horizontal distribution one can infer the proportions between role scripts within each scenario. By vertical layout one can supplement hypothetical reasoning on the typical roles, this time played in the narrowed context of the three scenarios. Again, low frequency does not permit us to go beyond the level of hypothetical thinking.

**Democracy educator in the European context (Table 10.10)**
This script rests on a very strong focus on national sovereignty – the national state seems to be the main and only agent. It is likely that the loss of sovereignty is framed as a fundamental rhetorical argument in political debates by the radical defenders of the homeland and Polish nation. Democracy educator is a straight-liner – it understands legitimisation of common actions in the form reduced to the national state as a source, yet discerns (limited) delegation of prerogatives at the European Union level. Therefore, Europe as a federation is acceptable as a common agent which can also make decisions on common affairs. The educator is rather inclusive as regards the Union’s borders, representing a lack of reservations about new EU members that is typical of Poles.

**Democracy demagogue in the European context (Table 10.10)**
This script is founded on democracy instrumentalisation, which is used as an argument to reach one’s communication goals easier, and/or to defame political opponents. Generally, the tendency to base reasoning on national state argumentation is here even stronger than in the previous script, and the remaining scenarios are not so much represented, leading to the conclusion of great rhetorical
functionality of the state national arguments as part of political discourse.

**Democracy builder in the European context (Table 10.11)**

In this script we find a different situation, since it can be distinguished by a clear opening into – most of all – the second scenario. It is interesting that this tendency concerns all four topical aspects: not only ‘membership border-setting’ and ‘legitimisation.’ We might conclude that people who express their attitudes on European integration and democratisation processes, and who prefer to use the metaphorical field of building a new house, simply must go beyond national contexts because of the common belief in ‘Western’, ‘liberal’, and ‘European’ prototypes of Polish democracy (Pietrucha 2003). Therefore, the European Union as a source of legitimisation is almost equally important as the nation state, and even in more than one fifth of texts one finds representations of the European sovereign. This all means that there are premises for the federational perspective, and even for ‘cosmopolitan identity’ for imaging new, ‘softer’ borders of Europe. This rhetoric is much about the future, and much more constructive than just an argument in national political discussions, as seems to be the case in scenarios one and two.

**Democracy defender in the European context (Table 10.11)**

The functional determinant of this script seems to be exposing all threats for our ‘young’, ‘immature’, ‘fragile’ and ‘flawed’ democracy, but it is again constructed mostly by calling the national repertoire. The national state rhetoric used against all alleged enemies seems to be the most convenient and easiest method of political argumentation. Apparently, Europe is not seen as a real instance of defending our freedom and democracy. Thus, the practice of ‘exposing threats for democracy’ proves to be another discursive tool in the populist approach to politics – rather than a way to polish up the political system. It might be understood, then, that politicians play the highest notes – including the alleged loss of sovereignty, lack of political self-determination or the authority to make crucial decisions.
Conclusions

Democracy remains for Poles a notion that is important and of special significance. It is so important because without it one could not describe the process of social and political change we have been undergoing to meet our hopes for living in a better world. It is of particular significance, because language expressions for democracy are part of a special terminology which relates to power and the political system, and is constantly defined and modified by politicians, political scientists and media commentators. So the semantics of democracy is always exclusive, the very term cannot be expressed by the ‘natural semantic metalanguage’ (Wierzbicka 2007: 239) and always bears the local aspects of meaning and connotations. In the Polish transformation democracy has been something more than a political term – it has become a value – one which was declared, felt and followed by people, one which has been a crucial part of political culture and Polish memory since the times of the gentry democracy of the First Republic of Poland. So it became a word for expressing different contents, the semantic field of political debates and symbolic conflicts. But above all, democracy – as generally perceived as a value, key word and part of Polish collective identity – is at the very centre of discursive social mobilisation.

The aim of the analysis of linguistic representations of democracy (based on the ‘national corpus’ representative of the Polish language) was to capture and describe our specifics of understanding democracy in a pragmatic sense. After the initial stage of research we realised that there are substantial ambiguities in its meanings among: (a) dictionaries, (b) socio-linguistic surveys on the meaning and connotations of democracy, and (c) patterns of discursive, pragmatic usage. These ambiguities stem from a tendency to use democratic expressions in a functional, instrumental sense, where democracy goes beyond its terminological meaning, and becomes an argument, or a frame for political communication. Thus the function for which we use ‘democratic vocabulary’ comes to be the crucial factor, so language users, following the political suit, tend to overuse the term in purely manipulative goals (Pietrucha 2003). Therefore, persuasion and manipulation – the indigenous features of political communication – are responsible for the way common people understand democracy. The analysis showed that every fifth utterance on democracy is justified by the legitimisation of a
speaker’s own interests, every tenth by the intent to injure the reputation of an opponent, and every twentieth is made in the interest of citizens. In half of all texts people focus on the democracy itself, not on their partners or opponents.

*Democracy* is construed as a clearly positive value. Qualitative research of the contexts shows that democracy is structurally combined with: ‘freedom’, ‘dignity’, ‘human rights’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘justice’. This list has been verified by quantitative phraseological analysis of democracy collocations in all corpora – where phraseological connectiveness (the statistical probability of appearing together within a phrase) was compared with the frequency of occurrence in the whole corpus. The results are shown in an abridged version in Figure 10.1.

Figure 10.1. The system of democratic values in the Polish language (democracy in the centre)

Figure 10.1 expresses the most frequent and phraseologically stable values which occur together with the family words of *democracy*. One can see that ‘law-abidingness’ has replaced ‘justice’, and there is no single explicit name for ‘dignity’ and ‘human rights’. That means that these two values are more implicit, or expressed by many different lexemes. On the other hand, ‘tolerance’ and ‘independence’ are
Democracy as part of Polish collective identity

included in the system, as the *expressis verbis* parts of it. The differences come from the two methodologies implied, convergent to the difference between the values which are declared – thus usually explicit in language, and the values which are realised and followed – thus not necessary explicit.

Nevertheless, the reconstructed system of democratic values means that for Poles democracy forms a cognitive structure together with: freedom, pluralism, dignity, justice/law-abidingness, independence and human rights. One can also observe in Figure 1 that ‘freedom’ is the value which accompanies democracy most frequently. This can be explained by the fact that we tend to be oriented towards freedom as the absolute (highest) value, which is followed by building democracy. On the other hand, the strongest phraseological connection between ‘democracy’ and ‘pluralism’ makes a clear discursive scheme, confirming that we treat both of the values in a parallel way (often as synonyms).

European integration and dynamic social, economic and political change combined with globalisation processes specify a new context for democratisation, which affects our picture of the world, so it has to be mirrored in language. The analysis was intended to show whether, and to what extent, the language of democracy in Poland represents the normative projects for a new, post-national Europe and European demos. It was crucial to check in what sense the political awareness of Poles is being shaped: whether the specific, local ways of understanding, defining and evaluating democracy are going beyond the national state rhetoric, in which a state remains the main sovereign, dominating political agent, and subject which defines the meaning and context of European transformation.

It was confirmed that age and education proved to be significant variables – the systematic and comparative surveys with students helped to reconstruct the picture of ‘the agent of democracy’ (Bartmiński 2006) – it is a young person representing a clear tendency of the sense of freedoms and responsibility, civic conscience, trust and involvement in decisional processes, aware of his/her democratic rights – going hand in hand with an open attitude. Another semantic analysis, by Pietrucha (2003), gave evidence that the meaning and connotations of democracy in the Polish language ‘make double syntactic connections with civilisation, Europeanness
and Europe’, paving the way for the cognitive script with ‘Europe’ and ‘democracy’ joined into one civilisational category.

However, whereas these aspects are positive and promising, analysis of the national corpus of the Polish language gives a gloomier picture of the ways linguistic representations of democracy function in our political culture. The results show that democracy, because of its positive connotations, is often instrumentalised, and used in so many divergent meanings that it becomes utterly ambiguous. Moreover, the ‘media-democracy’ performance of the last 20 years (Brants and van Praag 2006; McQuail 2000), due to the low level of competence of its main performers (both political and media actors), tendency to infotainment and particular news-worthiness factors, produces the popular belief that ‘we are all experts on democracy’, so we can all be ‘professional democracy teachers.’ The typical roles played by people who are involved in communication on democracy are practically limited to those which have nothing in common with constructive and rational debate on democratisation for the public good. The prevailing role scripts were called: ‘democracy educator’ (patronising, rather than teaching), ‘democracy demagogue’ (using democratic vocabulary for one’s own interests), ‘democracy defender’ and ‘democracy builder’. Only the last one contains elements of constructive and rational activity for the common good.

The results also show that Polish discourse on democracy (in all aspects) revolves most of all around a national state argumentation (Table 10.7). Europe and the European Union provide the context for democratisation in less than 10 per cent of all utterances, and universal contexts appear in six per cent. The three hypothetically assumed scenarios of democratisation of Europe could hardly be traced in the corpus data. Looking for them by four specific indices for democratisation proved that even in highly specialist discursive bodies (parliament, government, news media etc.) represented in the corpus, the level of debate on European future is significantly low. Namely, the scenarios appear only in 0.9 per cent of texts with ‘sovereignty’ as the topic, 1.8 per cent with ‘the problem of legitimisation’, 3.9 per cent with ‘authoritative decision-making’, and 2.6 per cent in the case of ‘membership border-setting’. This all means that in Poland it is not commonplace to widely discuss the possible scenarios of democratisation of Europe, nor to deliberate on our potential role in the common European polity. It seems that such a
visionary mission has still been delegated to a group of specialists, practically narrowed to social scientists and selected media commentators.

The premises on the three scenarios could be traced in 131 paragraphs. Taking them for granted (as 100 per cent) one can go further into the more detailed, however statistically not very significant, conclusions. It turns out that sovereignty – out of the four topical indices – is the one that is not subject to any negotiations: there is simply no option of explicit talk on a positive scenario to shift part of sovereignty into the European institutions. The only instance of including sovereignty in the discourse is the negative context: when e.g. a politician or a commentator wants to discredit his opponent. On the other hand, ‘legitimisation’ is constructed as a more balanced notion, in certain cases the Europeanness (culturally, civilisationally, politically or economically defined) becomes a source for justified processes. As far as ‘decision-making’ and the ‘EU membership border-setting’ go, the debate seems to be slightly open for post-national scenarios, and even for the ‘cosmopolitan’ perspective defined by universal human rights norms.

Looking from a socio-linguistic perspective it is worth noting that the national perspective of the democratic discourse is functional in many aspects. It is the main platform for everyday discreditation practices when, for instance, the democracy educator’s role is switched on, in order to make reference to a national state sovereignty as the threatened value. Even ‘democracy defenders’ prefer to unmask exterior enemies as well as their internal agents who can endanger the ‘new’ and ‘fragile’ Polish democracy. It is meaningful that along with increasing the democratisation perspectives onto the European or global space, the representations of the two belligerent roles (of ‘demagogue’ and ‘democracy defender’) seem to disappear, the rhetoric of political debates seems to soften and the temperature of conflicts falls down – as if European integration and globalisation were only hypothetical scenarios which do not concern our future.
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This report brings together contributions on the changing nature of collective identity formation processes in the enlarged and enlarging Europe. The point of departure is a broad reconsideration of the concept of identity in the context of completed and future EU enlargement. The authors investigate the changes of established identities in old, new and prospective EU member states, and ask how ongoing political processes affect who the Europeans are; what is the content of their reconstructed identity; and what are the consequences of changes in collective identity formation for political processes in Europe?

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