University Autonomy and Professorial Recruitment

A Case Study at the Department of Economic and Social History at the University of Vienna

Philipp Emanuel Friedrich

Master of Philosophy in Higher Education
Department of Education, Faculty of Educational Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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IV
Abstract

This master thesis examines professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna from the perspective of the Department of Economic and Social History. Starting point and theoretical assumption is based on the concept of living autonomy. This concept states that university autonomy effects cannot be understood by focusing solely on formal reform aspects and thus confronts them with de facto, ‘living’, autonomy. Living autonomy emphasises the importance of the working floor of the university and their interpretation of autonomy. The research question of the master thesis is how practices of institutional autonomy concerning the recruitment of professors change in the backdrop of the latest university reforms in Austria. In order to answer this question a document review of policy papers was made in combination with key expert interviews at different levels of the university. The study reveals that departmental influence still provides substantial input on the recruitment process and that university reforms have constrained the input of the working floor with regards to professorial recruitment only to a limited extent. However, by strengthening the executive structure, a coherent university strategy in terms of quality- and international-oriented appointment policy became possible which stands in contrast to former recruitment practices.
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Thanks to my beloved Eva, for all her support and the wonderful time we share.

Thanks to my family for your support and your encouragement.

Thank you, Tusen takk & Danke schön!

Philipp Emanuel Friedrich

Oslo, 10.12.2013
# Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>Centre for Higher Education (Centrum für Hochschulentwicklung)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>European University Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEIK</td>
<td>Higher Education: Institutional dynamics and Knowledge Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMU</td>
<td>Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OG 2013</td>
<td>Organisational Plan 2013 (Organisationsplan 2013)</td>
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<td>SPL</td>
<td>Directorates of Studies (Studienprogrammleitungen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UfQA</td>
<td>Unit for Quality Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td>Universities Act 2002 + Amendment 2009 (Universitätsgesetz 2002 + Universitätsgesetz-Änderungsgesetz 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG 2009</td>
<td>Amendment 2009 of the Universities Act 2002 (Universitätsrechts-Änderungsgesetz 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UOG 1975</td>
<td>University Organisation Act 1975 (Universitäts-Organisationsgesetz 1975)</td>
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<td>UOG 1993</td>
<td>University Organisation Act 1993 (Universitäts-Organisationsgesetz 1993)</td>
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<td>US</td>
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1 REFORMING GOVERNANCE AND PERSONNEL POLICIES IN THE UNIVERSITY

This chapter will present the introduction to our topic and elaborates what we are going to deal with in this thesis. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is going to give us information on the context of our thesis. It will lead stepwise to our actual research problem, from university reforms and personnel policies in general, to university reforms and personnel policies in Austria specifically, always with emphasis on the professorial recruitment. The second section will tie on the research problem by proposing research question and presenting our case. The third section is going to point out the relevance of the master thesis. The fourth section will round off this chapter by presenting an overview of the thesis structure.

1.1 The impact of reforms on university personnel policies

1.1.1 Personnel policies¹ and recruitment in academia

Personnel policies and recruitment in academia is structured and defined by the unique character of academic work and the related profession, and thus follows its own patterns. In order to understand recruitment in this field, one has to take the special nature of academic work and academic profession into account.

The remarkable feature about academic work is that its intrinsic nature is very specific. Various studies on higher education and academic activities came to the conclusion that academic work is more of an intellectual craft (Musselin 2006) dependent on unclear

¹ There are different labels describing matters related to personnel/staff (human resource management, personnel affairs, etc.) In order to avoid definition problems, we will only use ‘Personnel Policies’ unless mentioned differently.
technologies (Cohen et al. 1972) and hence difficult to describe, categorise and reproduce. (Musselin 2006) This holds especially true when looking at the core profession within higher education, namely the professorate\(^2\). Undoubtedly, the rank of a professor plays a central role in academia. Professorial status and related privileges are the desired destination of an often long and stony academic career, and eventually being appointed as professor is the highest appreciation one can get from the scientific community and the academic reward system. (Enders 2006)

In former times - and in a stylised way - the academic profession and its recruitment and appointment logics, as mentioned above, were characterised by a high level of self-management and self-control in Europe, dependent on reward and respect by the peers. These control mechanisms led to a system that was quite disconnected from markets and therefore prevented the emergence of an institutional level. One of the common statements is that professional control nowadays is becoming weaker while institutional control appears to be stronger. Still, with regards to reproduction configurations in terms of access to the profession, recruitment and career stages, professional control further on plays an important role. The informal evaluation through peers plays a decisive role in excluding or including colleagues and granting them access to academia. (Musselin 2009)

However, while self-evaluation and reward mechanisms through peers and the academic community still are a main factor in academic labour markets and thus in recruitment processes, new forms of regulation and non-academic standards are becoming increasingly important. With changing conditions through university reforms, one can not solely observe the nature of academic work but also has to take the institutional/organisational dimension of the university into consideration when looking at the reproduction logics of academic recruitment. (Musselin 2008)

Independently, we have to be aware that those categorisations and descriptions are always snapshots in time, and that academic work and profession as well as academic labour market and recruitment processes are always in a state of flux. The important question is to which extent change is happening and what the reasons and main drivers behind this change are. In

\(^2\) National higher education systems and immanent career structures and posts can vary widely according to rights and duties and the definition of a position. In this thesis the term ‘professor’ usually refers to the rank of a full professor.
In this respect let us take a look in the next paragraph on recent reform trends and what the impacts on personnel policies and eventually academic recruitment are.

1.1.2 University reforms - university governance and personnel policies on trial

Various studies on higher education conclude that universities are in a state of dramatic change against the backdrop of their long history. (see e.g. Enders 2006; Gornitzka et al. 2007; Amaral 2008) Especially in Europe, despite national characteristics, the continental European model of the university is undergoing major changes in recent decades due to various environmental forces. Phenomena like financial constraints, diversity and massification of higher education systems, accountability, and market mechanisms (Enders 2006) have a distinct impact on the academic profession and how the university is organised nowadays. Gornitzka et al. (2007) e.g. concluded that a new pact between university and society is needed. A popular argument is that universities are not adapting and responding flexible and fast enough to social changes and needs. It is important that universities are well integrated into society and match societal and economical demands. This attitude corresponds to new expectations that politics, economy and eventually society have, and which are translated into new forms of governance within universities. In order to be competitive, European universities have to improve, which means that new ways of organisation are needed. A solution is seen in more autonomy for universities and - at a first glance - less governmental interference since universities know best what is needed in order to fulfil their mission. (Maassen & Olsen 2007) In this respect, a general definition of university autonomy is made by Berdahl (1990) who distinguishes between substantive and procedural autonomy:

“Substantive autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate form to determine its own goals and programmes - if you will, the what of academe.

Procedural autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate form to determine the means by which its goals and programmes will be pursued - the how of academe.” (Berdahl 1990: 172)

As a consequence a new layer in European university governance is emerging in terms of gaining more power, namely the institutional management. According to Maassen (2008), one
of the central issues in modernising the university is the “[p]rofessionalisation of institutional leadership and management, and the subsequent adaptation of the institutional governance structures.” (Maassen 2008: 100) This issue becomes especially important due to the fact that one distinct characteristic of the European university in terms of authority and university governance - especially in contrast to the US model - has been a model of weak autonomous levels of university/faculties, with dean and rector acting as primus inter pares, and a distant ministry. In other words, in personnel policies for example, senior professors at the lower level usually have negotiated directly with state officials at the higher level and have skipped the institutional level of the university. Thus, this procedure has kept down the rise of an institutional administration and prevented the uprise of a level between basic scientific units/academic oligarchy and the government. (Clark 1983) One central idea of strengthening the institutional level, i.e. withdrawal of (direct) state influence and raise of institutional autonomy at the university, is that universities should now acquire more strategic control over human resources. (Maassen & Olsen 2007) They should be able to act unified and not fragmented, especially when dealing with important internal and future-oriented matters like personnel policies.

But how are impacts of reform attempts on personnel policies occurring especially with respect to a growing importance of the institutional level of the university? More institutional autonomy in personnel policies and management has led to different outcomes in different countries (Maassen 2008). Let us therefore take a closer look on the characteristics of changing personnel policies and academic recruitments in some European countries in order to identify common patterns and to classify our case.

**Characterising changing personnel policies and recruitment**

Although certain tendencies of convergences and attempts of unification of higher education systems and universities in Europe occur e.g. like in the Bologna process, reforms always include distinct national patterns. This holds especially true for academic labour markets and their immanent mechanisms of recruitment processes which are strongly characterised by their national policies and system patterns. (Musselin 2005)

A comparative study on higher education reforms in Western European countries (Paradeise et al. 2009) could observe the following outcomes in the field of personnel policies and recruitment practices: reforms and developments in the recent decades have shown an overall
tendency from professional bureaucracy to public organisations (which now have to act and be accountable) but with different national outcomes and characteristics. The outcomes in the field of recruitment processes (here with a special focus on professorial recruitment) comprise the development from the 1980s until 2000s, and were in general as follows:

In France, the formal creation and regulation of academic positions was in the hands of the ministry. The selection and hiring process was conducted and approved by elected academic bodies based on disciplinary authority. An important change has been the growing importance of central leadership and university bodies which make recommendations to the ministry, and also have limited power in creating positions on their own, despite the fact that they play central roles in employment and recruitment processes. In Germany, university faculties had the right of self-recruitment and to set up commissions for the recruitment. Approval was made by the state ministry. Internal appointments were usually forbidden. In the recent decades there has been some formal shift to the institutional level (management, leadership, boards of trustees) which has gained influence in the recruitment process of professors. In some states an approval by the ministry has become obsolete. In Italy, requests on positions were established by the faculty and sent via the rector to the ministry. The system was characterised by a strong influence of full professors. Change occurs in the creation of positions according to development plans which are approved by the ministry. A number of new positions are fixed in negotiations between rector and university senate. Hiring is made by the rector, based on propositions form the faculty; full professors and disciplines still play a central role. In the Netherlands, full professors were formally appointed by the crown. The number of positions was based according to student numbers which was funded by the government. The recent years are characterised by the fact that now the university decides on positions regarding budget but with the possibility to delegate this decision to the faculty. In Norway, the ministry had formal decision power; recruitment and new positions were assigned to the particulars institutions, and here usually in the hands of disciplinary units. Recruitment is now dependent on faculty funds; these are allocated within faculty based on demand formulas. Disciplinary commissions send suggestions; the institute board makes formal decisions when dealing with full professor recruitment. In Switzerland, the responsible canton or the federal government recruited full professors suggested by academic commissions. There has not been an overall change, except from some universities which
received more autonomy and now are able to appoint all their staff. In the UK\textsuperscript{3}, the recruitment procedure has not changed significantly. The particular university creates faculty positions. Decisions on recruitment are then made by senior panel members of the university who receive advice from external senior academics. (Paradeise et al. 2009: 270-272)

In summary it can be said that especially in matters of personnel policies an authority shift in terms of hiring processes and decision making towards the university as organisation has been observable in the light of these reforms. At least in formal terms, the influence of the academic profession has been pushed back in favour of an emerging executive structure and central leadership. (ibid) For our case it will be of interest how the Austrian higher education system and especially the Austrian university corresponds to these Europeans developments and where to locate it in the bigger picture. As a result, the next paragraph will take a brief look on the Austrian way of transition including relevant university reforms.

1.1.3 University reforms in Austria - university governance and personnel policies on trial

University governance in the time before the Universities Act 2002

The Humboldtian model was established at Austrian universities in the 19th century. In terms of governance structures, universities at that time were

\begin{quote}
“characterised by a dualism between political and academic authority: with respect to all aspects of public interest, the university was a state agency and subject to centralised decision making by legislation and state bureaucracy; all issues regarding teaching and research were in the hands of the academic oligarchy - each chair holder being in charge of his/her own specialised field of research.” (Pechar 2005: para. 1)
\end{quote}

Internal governance structures were also subject to this dualism (academic staff $\leftrightarrow$ administrative staff) each following their own leadership structures. But academic hierarchy was less marked; rector, dean and head of department were rather representative than

\textsuperscript{3} According to various studies and literature in higher education, the university model of the UK displays an own model besides the US university and (Continental) European university model. (see e.g. Clark 1983)
executive in terms of academic leadership. The true power lay within the chairs as being the unit where research and teaching was concentrated. The professor was the authority in his/her field and in questions of academic expertise placed over non-academic staff and junior academics. With regards to the organisational structure within the university, professors and state bureaucracy were often negotiating directly. University management as such was less developed and rather symbolic. Paired with civil servant status including lifelong tenure, this system produced a relatively free, autonomous and strong academic oligarchy defining academic freedom on the one side and a state which is protecting this system on the other side. (Pechar 2005)

The beginning 1960s are characterised by a paradigmatic shift. State as well as society began to expand their influence in university matters. Universities were increasingly perceived as contributing to the economic growth of the country, and new policies were recommending to develop human capital and to raise student numbers. As a consequence the higher education system and the universities were modernised. The rising student numbers were followed by growing staff numbers who were assigned to teaching and not solely to assist the chair. As a consequence of this increasing independence, the non-professorial teaching staff (Mittelbau) demanded appropriate representation. This lead to internal power struggles between them and full professors, who opposed this development. The government had to intervene also with regards to securing the new economic importance of universities. The University Organisation Act 1975 (UOG 1975) was “[a] fundamental reform of governance and the internal organisation of universities” (Pechar 2005: para. 2) which strengthened the position of the non-professorial teaching staff and by beginning to replace the chair structure by an institute structure4. (ibid)

The reform of the UOG 1975 was basically aiming at transforming a university towards a democratic university. The professorial university (Ordinarienuniversität) - oligarchically organised and based on the Humboldtian model - turned into a university of committees including commissions, conferences, curiae and parities. In this university model, applications

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4 In a chair system (in Austria called Ordinarienuniversität) power is in the hand of (few) full professors who govern the university. Junior faculty is dependent and assigned to the particular full professor, research and teaching organised around the chair. The institute system actually comprises several chairs and thus is the basic organisational level. In this system junior faculty is not as dependent as in the chair system. It obtained a new status with the UOG 1795 and hence represented a new group of academics at the Austrian universities (non-professorial staff, in German Mittelbau). (Pechar 2005) The Institute is actually representing the department/the departmental level.
from the university were still approved by the ministry who had decisional authority in personnel and budgetary matters. (Winckler 2003)

After a time of low pressure in higher education policies, the end of the 1980s was characterised by a change that questioned the traditional steering mechanisms between state and universities and thus went beyond the internal regulations of the universities. The complexity of the Austrian higher education system questioned the appropriateness of the way of steering universities centrally with the ministry having the final say. Ministerial distance and state bureaucracy were dealing not sufficiently with university matters, an argument which finally forced key actors to reassess steering models in higher education. Despite that, cuts in public spending led to tensions between state actors and the higher education community. From a political and administrative perspective, a solution here was seen in increased university autonomy. (Pechar 2005)

The University Organisation Act 1993 (UOG 1993) was confronted with a number of problems during the implementation phase and had to be revised several times before being accepted finally. From the professorial perspective, autonomy should rely on academic freedom in the Humboldtian sense, and (re-)strengthen the professorial position in contrast to non-professorial staff and state. Students and non-professorial staff favoured the collegial/democratic model with governance and participation structures in the university through collegial bodies. The ministry perceived autonomy as institutional autonomy with university self-governance and management structures. The ministerial approach was resisted heavily in the following time. Students and junior faculty feared a strong academic leadership and therefore the redemption of achievements concerning democratic participation which were granted by the UOG 1975. Professors feared that managerial structures would endanger traditional forms of academic self-organisation. Until the UOG 1993 came into play in the mid/end 1990s it was weakened several times during its formulation phase. Still, it opened the gateway for reforms with regards to institutional autonomy as we will see in the Universities Act 2002 (UG 2002). (ibid)
University governance and personnel policies in the light of the Universities Act 2002 and the Amendment 2009

Although the path of the UOG 1993 eventually led to the UG 2002, this law is not perceived as a legal continuation but rather equated as a caesura in Austrian university history. The university laws UG 2002 and the Amendment 2009 (UG 2009) are described as the beginning of a new era or as a cultural change which clears off the remaining legal structures of the previous university laws. (Novak 2009)

The UOG 1993 has lead to the emergence of new and more powerful actors in the university: rectors and deans gained power and influence within the university and are beginning to become important actors between the traditional academic oligarchy and the ministry. This type of ‘new’ leadership had to take both internal (university) as external (society/ministry) perspectives into account. The reforms attempts which eventually led to the UG 2002 were no longer carried out only by the government but also partly supported by powerful actors within academia. (Pechar 2005)

The basic idea behind the new act was to grant “autonomous status for universities while preserving state-ownership” (Neuhäuser 2004: 20). To manage this approach, a new way in terms of organisational autonomy was searched for. This was e.g. especially relevant for the funding mechanisms. Universities in Austria were and still are mainly public funded. But general tasks and objectives of universities are not subject to ministerial orders any longer. The UG 2002 introduced performance agreements between the state/ministry and the particular university. Public funds are now granted based on agreed achievements. These funds constitute around 80-90 % of a university budget. Aim was to reward and steer a university output-oriented, while the university has the autonomy in input-orientation. Only the highest level is determined (university board, senate, rectorate); the organisational structure of each university follows the custom organisational plan (which is proposed by the rectorate, discussed by the Senate, and approved by the university board). The development plan constitutes the scientific profile of the university. (Winckler 2003)

The UG 2009 builds on the UG 2002 and continues the intention of restructuring the relation between state and universities in terms of organisational autonomy. For the moment, this adjustment is seen as the last step of this comprehensive reform process. Flexible internal organisation, monocratic decision structures, and performance orientation are continued and enlarged. In general, direct state control has been replaced by new mechanisms, like
transparency, accountability, performance and demand orientation, output related steering and efficiency. (Novak 2009)

These effects are displayed by a continuous disentanglement of important university issues like personnel policies where the university is supposed to gain more influence and act independently from direct ministerial intervention. (Novak 2009) For example, one feature of this development which will confront us regularly in the course of the thesis is the fact that personnel policies and management are now in the hands of the university which is an important change for the organisational autonomy of the university. (see e.g. Pechar 2004 and Gantner 2013) For our case it will be important to see other impacts of the reforms with regards to personnel policies and especially professorial recruitment. Let us therefore point out some general characteristics of changing personnel policies at the Austrian university in the next paragraph in order to narrow down our field of interest.

**Change in personnel policies and recruitment in Austrian universities**

The tendency in the employment situation has been decentralisation, i.e. a shift from the ministry to the lower levels of authority in higher education. Strengthening the institutional side in personnel policies has become a major issue at European universities as well as in Austria, and is a great challenge for academic management. (Enders & de Weert 2004)

A study of the Centre for Higher Education (CHE) from 2010 on career promotion in European academic management assesses European universities high autonomy in personnel policies, i.e. selection and recruitment. The same applies to Austria, where autonomy in personnel policies is rated high (both concerning academics and administrators) and only slightly below European average. (Nickel & Ziegele 2010: 148-157) The European University Association (EUA) assesses and categorises university autonomy in European countries according to organisational, financial, staffing and academic autonomy. In Austria, autonomy in personnel policies is classified as medium high, and slightly above average when compared to other European countries. Relevant factors in personnel autonomy are recruitment procedure, salaries, dismissal, and promotion procedure both for academics and administrative staff. Austria is being assessed to have high recruitment procedure autonomy, above average salary autonomy, below average dismissal autonomy, and high promotion procedure autonomy. (Estermann et al. 2011: 38-44) Although these studies and rankings are an interesting starting point, they are of limited use for the thesis since they only display the
institutional dimension of autonomy but very limited the underlying and internal university dynamics that might lead to such results.

The important issue here for us is that the UG 2002 provided the possibility for universities to choose their own organisational setup. Thus, the organisational autonomy of the university has led also to autonomy in personnel policies i.e. that universities are now directly responsible for their staff. A new feature in this respect is the new employment situation; staff is now employed directly by the university and does not have civil servant status any longer. As a consequence of the governance power shift from ministry to university, management styles in steering based on New Public Management become more important. A fear of traditional academics and basic academic units is that the institutional management comes nearer now, and as a consequence impacts their work to a greater extent than a distant ministry e.g. in personnel policies. The new principals in general are now the rector/vice rector and the deans, dependant on the organisational layout of each Austrian university. They work as connecting link between ministry and basic academic units with regards to performance agreements. (Pechar 2010)

Legal settings, organisational autonomy and layout, strengthened leadership and the rise of the managerial class undoubtedly play a major role in the restructuring process of universities and personnel policies but how does this e.g. affect the recruitment of professors especially in interaction with the traditional academic oligarchy?

**Professorial recruitment**

National characteristics play a central role in how the profession of the professor is shaped. Enders (2006) e.g. stresses the fact that although international trends seem to lead to common global patterns of the academic profession, national responses will make an major input on how these patterns will eventually occur in the national systems. In addition, as pointed out before, national characteristics and the university models (in our case the Continental European model) clearly seem to play an important role in the recruitment process.

Personnel policies in Austria are in the hands of the university. Of interest are the possible implications for the recruitment of professors. To give an example: the formal dimension of the professorial recruitment is e.g. displayed by the Professorial Appointment Procedure of the University of Vienna. This process is characterised by different phases and stages and
follows certain rules, and is clearly an interesting topic of its own. But our focus has to go beyond these formalities and has to examine the informal inputs or the influence of the department at different stages of the recruitment process. Thus, both perspectives have to be analysed together.

We have now come to the core topic of our research and have localised it as far as possible. Let us therefore proceed to the next paragraph and propose our research question in order to see what we are dealing with in this thesis.

1.2 Research question and case

1.2.1 Research question

Taking the underlying assumptions i.e. findings from other European countries into account, the important question for us - when looking specifically at professorial recruitment - is actually: what happens when new executive structure and academic oligarchy rooted in disciplines meet in the recruitment process of professors in the backdrop of changing university frameworks? In other words and more generally, the thesis wants to explore:

HOW ARE PRACTICES OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY CHANGING CONCERNING THE RECRUITMENT OF PROFESSORS?

In order to answer our overall question and to satisfy our research interest, the following two sub-questions are going to be raised:

- What has changed formally in the recruitment process of professors?
- What has changed informally in the recruitment process of professors?

Taking the preceded arguments and findings into account, the following considerations for our research question are given: the field of academic management and personnel policies is characterised by new challenges when it comes to university reforms. (Enders & de Weerts 2009) The important question is: who may enter how? According to different studies (e.g. Amaral 2008; Maassen 2008; Krücken & Meier 2006) universities are confronted with an emerging executive and hierarchical structure which also affects different university areas like
personnel policies and the professorial recruitment. However, universities are also bottom-heavy institutions (Clark 1983) robust and resilient to (external) change (Olsen 2007) and therefore frame, embed and constrain university processes. Studies in other countries have pointed out that academics and in special full professors still play an important role when looking at their influence on the recruitment process of new professors. (Musselin 2005)

So how is this phenomenon occurring at Austrian universities? Various authors stress the fact that the institutional dimension is becoming more and more important with the fear that executive structures are or will become too powerful with regards to academic freedom. (e.g. Neuhäuser 2004 and Novak 2009) However, it seems that those perspectives are too focused on legal impacts and hence might overrate the influence of legal changes, without looking at the interpretative power or the (new) room to manoeuvre of the different actors inside academia.

The UG 2002 in Austria is still debated intensively especially with regards to the situation of the University of Vienna. From a general point of view this might have two reasons. First, the University of Vienna is an old and prestigious university, by far the biggest one in Austria comprising a very traditional environment, and thus of national importance. Secondly, the UG 2002 in Austria has been assessed as quite radical in comparison to other European university reforms. (Pechar 2010) An executive structure, feared and perceived as exceptional strong would limit professorial and departmental influence on the recruitment process severely.

On the other side, resistance from the academic community is almost a natural reaction to reforms. (Amaral 2008) Hence, the inner life of departments is preserved and protected by being quite resilient and robust to change (Olsen 2007). Although personnel policies and professorial recruitment are facing constantly new constraints, Musselin (2005) has also shown in her cases that - although it would be legally possible - leadership seldom questioned department decisions in hiring processes. (ibid: 146; 152) The university is a bottom-heavy institution and central executive structure is (still) dependent on influence and opinions of the academic oligarchy/the department who give important input from the bottom. (Pechar 2004)

1.2.2 Case

The reason for making this study was given by the considerations of the FLAGSHIP project of the HEIK research group at the University of Oslo. The project wants to research how old
and prestigious universities in small Western European countries respond to recent reforms and a changing environment. The underlying assumption is that although several reform attempts have been made, the effect on daily and internal response-related operations has so far brought little evidence-based knowledge on these changes. (Fumasoli et al. 2012) Despite that, due to the complexity of higher education systems and universities in particular, including various actors and stakeholders, research on this topic has to be carried out on different levels and in different fields of the university.

One part of the project that receives special attention is the departmental level and how this organisational level responds to the mentioned changes. In this thesis departmental level refers basically to the departmental leadership and the academics in the department. This approach was seen as appropriate for the scope of a master thesis. From this initial point, further consideration could be made and connected to the field of personnel policies and how changes would eventually occur against the backdrop of university reforms. Limiting personnel policies to professorial recruitment in one department was the last and logic step to deal appropriately with a research topic in a master thesis. The question was which department to choose; one possibility was given by the project which selected historical disciplines/fields as objects of interests among other disciplines in order to provide variation and validity. Another reason linked to this one was seen in the importance of humanities at the University of Vienna in international comparison: humanities at this institution enjoy international reputation and thus the Department of Economic and Social History was chosen as being one of the humanities departments. At that point personal affinity came into play: I have been affiliated to this department in the past as a student myself.

As already introduced, the case of interest is the University of Vienna and the Department of Economic and Social History which is part of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies. Within this framework, personnel policies and the recruitment of professor are examined according to the presented situation and research question. For this reason legal and policy documents of the University of Vienna and on higher education in Austria are reviewed. The challenge of getting insight information on the internal dynamics of the University of Vienna and the Department of Economic and Social History is handled with expert interviews. Our

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time frame is focused on the recent decade, especially the years after the implementation of the UG 2002.

1.3 Thematic relevance of master thesis

Growing complexity of university functioning and the rising number of members have led to a situation where a new steering modus is being perceived as necessary. It is of peculiar interest for any organisation or institution to have competent staff. The same holds true for academia: securing academic junior should be of vital interest for future research. A positive scientific contribution of the thesis would be located within the question of how universities interact with their environment on a system level or how system level reform attempts ultimately affect university dynamics. Underlying assumption is that reform attempts have been promised but still have given little evidence on e.g. vehemence and pace. (Fumasoli et al. 2012) The thesis and its topic are only a stone in the mosaic of university changes but nevertheless try to enlighten the picture, especially when it comes to the interaction between different university levels in the field of professorial recruitment.

Notwithstanding the above, there is the phenomenon of a scientific reproduction and specialisation mechanism. Clark (1983) for example describes knowledge and the strive for it as the core on which everything else in academia is dependent and based on. Weber in addition in his remarkable work on ‘Science as a vocation’ (Wissenschaft als Beruf\(^6\)) points out that the intrinsic nature of science consists of growing accuracy and specialisation. We are standing on the shoulders of giants, building on former scientific results and adding gradually new pieces to it. This is especially important for research on and theory building of higher education since

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“research work of most career higher education scholars relies on previous higher education publications, and rarely applies more general, basic disciplinary approaches. Thus, higher education research hardly contributes to the theoretical development of the disciplines it claims to rely upon, while the field as such does not have - nor does it seem to aim at - developing a coherent paradigm of its own.”
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(Maassen 2000: 59-60)

\(^6\) see for example German version of ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ published by Reclam, 1995
For the thesis it would be presumptuous to claim a significant input for theory building in research on higher education. Still, this thesis will leave nothing untried and wants at least contribute in particular to 1) a better understanding of academic recruitment logics in higher education and specifically the university 2) a better understanding of university autonomy and 3) give insight on practices at the working floor of the university.

1.4 Thesis outline

Chapter 1 has presented the introduction of our thesis by looking at reforms in university governance and personnel policies, and their occurrence at Austrian universities. Further we have proposed our research question and our case followed by the thematic relevance of our thesis. 

Chapter 2 now explores our underlying theories (authority in the university, tensions between formal and living university autonomy, and academic recruitment) and defines our analytical scheme according to which we want to research our case. The last major part of this chapter will outline the research methodology.

Chapter 3 presents our empirical setting by providing facts and figures about the University of Vienna, the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies, and the Department of Economic and Social History. In the end some general statistics on the professorships at the university will be presented.

Chapter 4 is characterising professorial recruitment in our case. Starting with the regulatory framework, we will focus on the recruitment of professors at three different levels: the preliminary level deals with the creation of posts, the intermediate level with search and selection mechanisms (incl. the Professorial Appointment Procedure of the University of Vienna), and the final level will discuss the employment conditions.

Chapter 5 analyses and discusses professorial recruitment in our case. We will assess professorial recruitment according to centralisation, formalisation/standardisation, and flexibility aspects.

Chapter 6 is our conclusion where we will come to a résumé of our research question and thesis.
2 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter we are going to provide the theoretical and analytical framework, and how research questions have been operationalised and implemented. The first section is a discussion on the underlying theories, beginning with Clark’s notion of authority in the university system, tensions between formal and living autonomy, and Musselin’s notion of academic recruitment in the university. Aim of this section is to provide a solid basis for our research topic, and an orientation within the university system. In addition, the setup of this theory section leads us gradually to the core topic of our research. The way of how we will structure and look on it, is subject matter of the second section. Starting point is the concept of living autonomy in the university. This is followed by characterising professorial recruitment in the first step, and presenting the variables in order to analyse professorial recruitment in the second step. The third and final section of this chapter deals with our research methodology. Here we will outline considerations on our case study design, sources of evidence, analytic strategy and approach, and conclude with remarks about the disadvantages and limitations of our approach.

2.1 Exploring underlying theories

2.1.1 Clark’s notion of authority in the university system

In general, Clark (1983) distinguishes three overall levels in a university system: 1) the under-structure which comprises the basic scientific units of a university, 2) the middle structure, the university/institutional level i.e. leadership and central administration, and 3) the super-structure, the system level with superior bodies and actors. The levels are important for understanding the decision structure in academia. For the thesis the under-structure and the middle structure are of special interest or - to be more precise - the interaction between these two. A closer look reveals that the under-structure is divided again into a bottom which is the department or chair-institute combination in continental Europe, and a layer above which is
the faculty. The middle structure is the university as a whole consisting of all its faculties. (Clark 1983: 108-110) The authoritative forms of interest for us are as follows:

- One is based on a personal/professorial rulership, characterised by the immanent expertise for the field and thus related with dominance and privileges. Professors in this context are protected by (informal) laws and codes which grants them power without accountability. This model appears in chair based systems where regulation by colleagues is only pro forma and the actual regulative power - the ministry - too distant.

- The next form is characterised by stronger forms of collegial supervision, namely collegial rulership. Here, power is regulated and balanced by a group of peers, all of the same (professorial) status and with an elected head who is a primus inter pares. This is a form that appears often in departments and which is identified by a consensual tradition executed in regular meetings and therefore also highly dependent on the personality of the participating members (i.e. that some persons are more influential than others).

- The model which is prevalent at the bottom is a mixture between the preceded forms: guild authority is personal/professorial rulership weakened by collective rule in which each professor is the master over subordinates, but among and balanced by other colleague professors with their subordinates. (ibid: 110-115)

Let us further take a brief look on Clark’s categorisation of those bureaucratic/administrative authorities which are relevant for our case:

- The last authoritative form where power is discipline rooted is called professional authority. This form is based on technical competence protected by its bureaucratic position but still dependent on the profession it serves rather than the formal context in which it is situated. The immanent nature of professional authority allows it to act either more particularistic in terms of personal profit and clients oriented (taking care of what is important for the department and its members), or universalistic in terms of societal standards and ideals (taking care of what is uniform with a superior societal perception even if it clashes with departmental needs). (ibid: 115-116)

- Another form of administrative authority derives from enterprise-based authority, so to say authority at institutional/university level, and is marked as bureaucratic authority. Its structure and character is based on formal power and rules, consisting of
hierarchy and delegation. It forms a contrast to personal and collegial rule since it is impersonal in its nature. (Clark 1983: 118-119)

For the sake of completeness and since this will be also to a certain extent relevant for our case, an introduction of what has been indicated already but is very difficult to grasp due to its nature: individual-dependent authority or as Clark said, charisma. In this form personal qualities gain exceptional power, a form which is neither predictable nor stable but context dependent and varying from case to case. Its unpredictable character however is damped by stable constellations and positions (e.g. being professor/hold a chair). (ibid: 123-124)

The reason why we look at these different forms of authority is that they are interacting with each other when it comes to professorial recruitment. These interactions can either be more harmonic or more contradictory. The reason for it is that authority in its nature is expansive. (ibid: 110) Every form or level has different rationales and ideas of how professorial recruitment should take place and thus tries to exert influence. This becomes more obvious if we take a step back and look at the specific nature of universities and explore why reform attempts are difficult to handle in the university.

### 2.1.2 Tensions between formal and living university autonomy

**The specific nature of universities**

A reason why reform attempts in the university are difficult to handle is provided by Musselin (2006) and her research on the specific nature of universities. She stresses the fact that the nature of academic work limits influence and eventually the effects of formal change at universities. Reform attempts are introducing more rules and more formalisation, but they are more influential on frame and structure. They have limited influence on content due to the specific nature of academic work. The same holds true for cooperation of the members because “[a]cademics remain autonomous in shaping their own activity and the way they prefer to develop them.” (ibid: 75) The formal layout and its unity - according to a neo-institutionalist perspective - is an approach to perceive the university as an organisational whole. This approach is an explanation “why universities are organised in colleges or faculties, and then in departments. Once an organisation presents this kind of characteristics,
it is identified as a higher education institution.” (Musselin 2006: 76) The importance of rules and structures becomes visible (for departments) when boundaries are defined and delimitations are made. The introduction of rules enables the “defensive capacity [...]and [...] while trying to increase cooperation and coordination, they generally exacerbate the defensive potential of the already existing rules and structures.” (ibid: 76)

Therefore, struggles are of specific quality when hitting the university directly in form of university reforms. An explanation for this phenomenon is provided by March and Olsen (1989). Based on an institutional approach, the university is with respect to its environment a robust institution (March and Olsen 1989, Olsen 2007) which has survived numerous changes throughout its long history and with immanent internal structures that are relatively resistant to changes and reform attempts (Maassen & Stensaker 2011). Indeed, the university has a very special relation to change. Clark (1983) brings it to the point by quoting the American educator Hesbergh who states that “the university is among the most traditional of all the institutions of our society and, at the same time, it is the institution most responsible for the changes that make our society the most changing in the history of man.” (ibid: 182) The ability to change is incremental and is also a result of the struggle between different interest groups where the grade of acceptable change is dependent on culture and (contradictory) beliefs: “[t]he struggle between stability and change appears operationally within systems as a clash of old vested interests and groups seeking to vest new interests.” (ibid: 217)

**Reform tensions in university autonomy**

As Enders et al. (2013) have pointed out, the understanding of university autonomy and the search of finding a common meaning and concept is accompanied by changes and tensions. For the concerned actors, autonomy itself has always been a high valued issue but has also been contested consistently. It is within the nature of autonomy to define itself also by distinction with regards to its environment. This applies especially to the right of the university to govern itself as well as to the rights of academics and their academic freedom in research, teaching and self-governance (Enders 2006). The university in modern times is an institution of special status with a distinctive model of autonomy and freedom. In the recent centuries the university could shape and strengthen its high degree of autonomy, being the
institutions for science, and creating its own organisational culture. (Bourdieu 1988) But it had difficulties to develop as an organisation due to

“very limited authority and capacity to regulate itself, e.g. in terms of its organisational boundaries, related entry and exit requirements, its size and shape, its broader character and functions. In consequence, universities were ‘bottom-heavy’ with low potency for collective action. Organizational leadership was weak compared to other organisations.” (Enders et al. 2013: 8)

The transformation of universities is characterised by defining and perceiving them increasingly as organisations. Recent changes have introduced a new era of university autonomy or a different understanding of university autonomy especially with regards to the relation between autonomy and accountability. (ibid) Formally seen, universities have become more autonomous and independent from ministries concerning decision-making and management as “governments have announced attempts to step back from the traditional regime of state control and to take a more distant framework setting role in the relationship with their universities.” (ibid: 9) At the same time influence and dependency are shifting: universities have to act more accountable and are subject to (quality) control systems and financial incentives that are performance related. (Christensen 2011, Gornitzka & Maassen 2000) In other words, the state/ministry wields its power through control systems, financial incentives and performance management systems.

However, when looking at the reform attempts one has to bear in mind that universities are not responding to reforms as other public administration units. (Christensen 2011) The structure and organisation is dependent on the core characteristics of higher education and has to regard the division of power, the support of variety and legitimating disorder. (Cohen et al. 1972) Universities are specific organisations which are loosely coupled (Weick 1976) with regards to their core activities research and teaching, i.e. for example that coordination and cooperation is more defined by the discipline than by the university as such. In addition, research and teaching are unclear technologies which are difficult to grasp. (Musselin 2006)

So transforming universities into organisations with a non-academic approach and without considering its special nature will raise some problems and limited success. One important issue in this respect is the question about the effects of the reforms and the new autonomy. As Olsen (2009) has pointed out one has to distinct between formal autonomy and actual, de
facto autonomy: there is a difference between autonomy on the paper and autonomy in daily practice. Latter is the possibility for an institution to interpret open spaces and room for manoeuvre within the legal framework. (Olsen 2009)

This circumstance - a gap between formal and actual autonomy - has been conceptualised as living autonomy. (Fumasoli et al. 2012) This concept assumes that senior academic staff still has considerable possibilities to manoeuvre (e.g. in primary teaching and research activities) although formal final decision is now up to the executive structure. Since university reforms are applying to every part of the university, also the field of personnel policies and professorial recruitment are contested. This issue is of significant relevance since professors play a key role in the university.

2.1.3 Musselin’s notion of academic recruitment in the university system

Academic recruitment follows and is dependent on different logics. One is the professional perspective defined by disciplinary norms and values, and decided in the department. Another perspective is the institutional one where other objectives come into play. In addition, academic labour markets still are mainly dominated by national patterns. Characteristics and patterns in terms of “[s]alaries, status, recruitment procedures, workloads, career patterns, promotion rules” (Musselin 2005: 135) vary from country to country and limit the influence of emerging international convergences. Still, a certain trend has become visible: academic labour markets are increasingly regulated internally. In other words, change occurs in this respect in “the development of individual assessment and incentive devices in universities; and the increasing role of higher education institutions in the issues previously in the domains of the academic profession.” (ibid: 136)

In conclusion, after given some theoretical considerations on the levels of authority, tensions between formal and practical university autonomy, and academic recruitment/labour markets, it is now time to connect them to our case. In order to elaborate in detail intra-university tensions within professorial recruitment evoked by reform attempts, it is necessary to proceed to the next section, and to take a look at our analytical scheme and how to measure and classify the outcomes of the case study.
2.2 Analytical scheme

2.2.1 Starting point: living autonomy

The autonomy of units and their integration within a system is also shaped by having established their own norms and rules of behaviour throughout history and tradition. This perspective questions the effect of formal changes and influence of the system on its units which in our case would be limited effects of system reform changes on universities. At least in order to understand practices of university autonomy it is important to examine how they are occurring besides formal terms. The consolidation of formal reform changes and the interpretation by the university is here defined as a concept of living autonomy. (Fumasoli et al. 2012) The success of reforms is therefore dependent on the learning capacity of the university as institution, and whether these changes are compatible with the institutional identity and thus accepted or rejected in practice. In order to measure structural changes as well as changes in organisational culture and values as a result of university reforms, following set of variables are defined by the concept of living autonomy:

- **Centralisation:** This variable is connected to the question of authority, and distinguishes between formal and informal (dependant on personal authority rooted in expertise) authority. In order to assess the dispersion of authority, questions of interest are e.g. where decision making is taking place, which of the persons is in charge, or what the constraints are.

- **Formalisation:** This variable is about the extent of written and filed communications and procedures. Special attention has to be given concerning the source of formalisation (legal requirement vs. individual ideas). It is to assume that a more in autonomy and accountability leads to a more in formalisation: managerialism as a product of increased autonomy claims formalisation of internal communication and procedures. In addition, accountability (performance and result orientation) is dependent on formalisation in order to present measurements to third parties.

- **Standardisation:** Deals with making certain procedures (e.g. concerning decision-making, information procedure, implementation) repeatable after a given set of rules. Despite that, roles are related to and dependant on these procedures (qualifications, performance, status, reward) and thus not based on personality characteristics.
Formalisation and standardisation are correlated since practices, procedures, etc. first need to be formalised before becoming standardised.

- Flexibility: Describes the ability to change in terms of organisational structures and procedures. One special feature is related to the ability of absorbing environmental influences. The ability is measured according to vehemence and pace.

Additionally, it is important to keep contextual variables in mind when examining university changes according to the variables presented above. Contextual variables may be history, size and disciplinary profile.

2.2.2 Adaptation: structure and variables of professorial recruitment

The thesis draws on these approaches and preliminary findings by taking them as a starting point. In fact, this paper wants to go a step further or - to be more precise - a step deeper. The university as an institution has to claim its autonomy externally (towards the system) as well as internally (towards its sub-units). Basic assumption is that norms and values originally emanate from the basic units of the university and that university/institutional identity is eventually the sum of all the sub-unit norms and values. Therefore the thesis wants to emphasise especially the intra-university tensions and focus on this tension on the basis of the professorial recruitment as part of university personnel policies. Aim is to research professorial recruitment practices and the room to manoeuvre between department - i.e. departmental leadership and academic staff - and the executive structure of the university.

First analytic stage: characterising professorial recruitment

In order to characterise professorial recruitment and to categorise our case, this paragraph will begin with identifying some general considerations on what the important patterns and stages in professorial recruitment are before specifying how we will look on it. This will lay the fundament of our first analytic stage - characterising professorial recruitment - before analysing this recruitment process according to our variables in the second analytic stage.
To sum up again, the most important and relevant assumption on academic labour markets made by Musselin (2005) for this case is that these markets are still nationally shaped. However, they share and face a common trend: increasing focus on individual assessment and stimulation, and growing importance of the institution in a field traditionally regulated by the profession. The four mechanisms (see Musselin 2013: 33-34) in characterising and analysing academic labour markets are:

1. Selection
2. Pre-tenure period
3. Balance between internal and external labour markets
4. Price determination

Coming back to the findings of the comparative study on higher education reforms in Western European countries - as presented in the introductory chapter - following categories within the field of recruitment processes according to the thematic charts of the study (Paradeise et al. 2009: 267-274) could be identified and summarised:

- the influence of different actors on recruitment decision and regulation
- positions creation and funding of positions
- call and announcements
- internal appointments vs. mobility
- employment contract of (new) professors and salaries/negotiations

Further, Fumasoli and Goastellec (forthcoming 2014, para. 1) in their work on academic recruitment in Switzerland have characterised recruitment as follows:

1. The first stage refers to the question of how positions are created. Is a position e.g. open because of replacement or is it a complete new creation, and is it staffed by public or individual call?
2. The second stage refers to the determination of the openings i.e. what are the underlying reasons and where is demand for what kind of position, as well as if and how these are made public.
3. The third stage deals with the selection procedures, and the question of who is contributing to decision-making and with what kind of influence-taking based on prerogatives.
4. The fourth stage looks at the negotiations on employment conditions with focus on actors and their radius of operation.

5. The fifth stage has to take formal rules into account and what kind of authority in the appointment procedure exists.

The special feature of this recruitment procedure is that all stages implicate various actors/groups with different perspectives and prerogatives. Of special interest for our case as well is the group of professors and university management (executive structure, management, delegates) in the recruitment process. Despite that, public authorities could also have a substantial influence on recruitment e.g. by determining salaries. Finally, one has to keep in mind that different logics (i.e. disciplinary, institutional, national, and global) are coming into play when dealing with recruitment. (Fumasoli & Goastellec forthcoming 2014)

In combining and comparing these different approaches, following recruitment perspective and categorisation has emerged and represents our first analytic stage, when characterising professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna/Department of Economic and Social History (see Chapter 3):

Table 1: Characterising professorial recruitment (own categorisation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulatory framework</th>
<th>At this stage formal power authority is defined by law and constitution. This level can be seen as the formal basis for recruitment processes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Which laws constitute the recruitment process?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the formal power sources?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preliminary level</th>
<th>At this level, the actual recruitment process is launched. Consideration is given to the creation and the funding of positions. Of interest is to find out what the underlying rationales are e.g. reason, demand, and emergence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How is a position created and funded?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26
Intermediate level

- How is the position announced?
- Who are the possible candidates?
- How is selection taking place and under what aspects is it executed?
- Who are the relevant actors?
- How is authority (influence and power) dispersed?

This level can be seen as core level of the recruitment process. At this level several logics and mechanisms - which are connected to each other - come into play.

One aspect concerns the way of how a position is announced (call); an issue that is related to and defined by it, is the candidate pool which is based on considerations about pre-tenure phases or the balance between internal and external markets (e.g. internal appointments vs. mobility)

The next aspect then concerns the selection procedures and is linked to the aspect of power and influence of the relevant actors.

Final level

- Who is negotiating?
- How do negotiations look like?
- What are the employment conditions?

This level represents a phase where the recruitment process/cycle is coming into an end. This phase is characterised by negotiations between employer and employee. Special focus is given to the employment conditions and price determination in general, and resources, salaries and contract in particular.

A structural and linguistic consideration shall be given here especially with regards to our case. As we will see in the following it is important to distinguish strictly between ‘recruitment process’ and ‘appointment procedure’. According to our presented model above, the meaning of recruitment is more stretched than the meaning of appointment. The term recruitment is referring to a process that spans all our levels, including the actual appointment. In other words, appointment refers to a special mechanism within the recruitment process; this will become obvious in our case as we will see in the following chapters. Here for example, the official term/procedure for recruiting/appointing a professor at the University of Vienna is the ‘Professorial Appointment Procedure’ which covers certain fields within our analytic levels. But we are interested in more than the actual ‘Professorial Appointment Procedure’
namely a recruitment process and a broader coverage of this topic; hence, it is necessary to keep a structural and linguistic distinction between these two terms in mind.

Figure 1: Recruitment process (own graphic)

In other words, what we are examining here is the concrete university-specific formation of an appointment procedure (=> Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of Vienna) based on the statutory provisions of the UG.

In addition, one should be aware of the time aspect in the recruitment process or a particular recruitment cycle respectively. The time aspect (e.g. how long is a recruitment cycle, what can happen in the meantime, etc.) can produce and lead to new circumstances, and thus unveil certain tensions and different outcomes when it comes to professorial recruitment. (Cohen et al. 1972)

After having introduced this first analytic fundament, we will now proceed to the second one. Firstly, we will examine and assess formal autonomy and the executive structure at the University of Vienna with emphasis on the professor’s recruitment. Secondly, we are focused on the concept of living autonomy in the academic domain represented by the Department of Economic and Social History also with emphasis on professorial recruitment. As already mentioned, the assumption is that in the light of this constellation a vacuum emerges, where executive structure and academic domain (department) meet and explore their room to manoeuvre. The variables are important for our analysis and discussion of findings i.e. after having characterised professorial recruitment of our case in the first analytic stage (Chapter
4), the second analysis will analyse this professorial recruitment according to our variables (Chapter 5).

**Second analytic stage: assessing professorial recruitment**

- Centralisation

  *Centralisation: This variable is connected to the question of authority, and distinguishes between formal and informal (dependant on personal authority rooted in expertise) authority. In order to assess the dispersion of authority, questions of interest are e.g. where decision making is taking place, which of the persons is in charge, or what the constraints are.*

  **Table 2: variable ‘Centralisation’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptation professorial recruitment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In this case, the question of importance is to evaluate how authority in the recruitment process is dispersed i.e. who is in charge or who are the relevant actors. Since we assume a strengthened executive structure and management, it is of interest to keep the power balance between new structures and the department in mind. | • Identify where decision-making is taking place  
• Identify who controls (human) resources  
• Identify who controls the recruitment process |

- Formalisation

  *Formalisation: The extent of written and filed communications and procedures. Special attention has to be given concerning the source of formalisation (legal requirement vs. individual ideas). It is to assume that a more in autonomy and accountability leads to a more in formalisation: managerialism as a product of increased autonomy claims formalisation of*
internal communication and procedures. In addition, accountability (performance and result orientation) is dependent on formalisation in order to present measurements to third parties.

Table 3: variable ‘Formalisation’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptation professorial recruitment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Here it is important to assess how the recruitment process has been formalised, and how formalisation has emerged. In other words, what is the frame of the professorial recruitment and under which circumstances has it developed? | • Extent of written and filed procedures  
• Underlying reasons of establishment  
• Identify source of formalised recruitment process |

○ Standardisation

Standardisation: Deals with making certain procedures (e.g. concerning decision-making, information procedure, implementation) repeatable after a given set of rules. Despite that, roles are dependant and related to these procedures (qualifications, performance, status, reward) and thus not based on personality characteristics.

Table 4: variable ‘Standardisation’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptation for professorial recruitment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| With this variable we want to assess a standardised recruitment process with the Professorial Appointment Procedure as crucial point. Of interest is how standardisation and its mechanisms occur, and to identify possible characteristics. | • Occurrence of standardisation and its mechanisms  
• Characteristics of standardised recruitment process |
Flexibility

Flexibility: Describes the ability to change in terms of organisational structures and procedures. One special feature is related to the ability of absorbing environmental influences. The ability is measured according to vehemence and pace.

Table 5: variable ‘Flexibility’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptation professorial recruitment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of central interest is to identify how the recruitment process has changed in the course of the university act and to what extent traditional ways of handling professorial recruitment have been damped or absorbed by the practices of its actors.</td>
<td>• Possible counteractions against and/or different approaches in relation to the centralised/formalised/standardised recruitment process • How the recruitment process can adapt to specific conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having now presented the analytical approach for answering our research question, it is now time to proceed with some technical considerations in order to strengthen the validity of our assumptions and findings.

2.3 Research methodology

2.3.1 The nature of our single case study

Yin (2009) makes following definitions about case studies as research methods:

“1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that

   o investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when
   o the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” (ibid: 18)
Eligibility of the case is given by Bryman (2008) who points out that in “a case study, the case is an object of interest in its own right, and the researcher aims to provide an in-depth elucidation of it.” (ibid: 54) Further, the nature of a case study is defined by the fact that it focuses on the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of social phenomena in real life where the researcher has little influence on the case itself. (Yin 2009: 2) While the ‘how’ may be nearer to an explanatory approach - how are practices in the professors recruitment changing - the sub-questions ‘what changes?’ which are our actual core interest are more of exploratory nature.

In order to identify how practices in the recruitment of professors in our case change (or precisely not), we first have to identify what might lead to that change. We will satisfy this interest by looking on formal changes (e.g. legal framework, organisational setting of the professors recruitment) but also on informal changes (e.g. how are new leeways implemented and new manoeuving rooms filled in the professors recruitment) always keeping in mind that changes might not have the output as originally intended.

Hence, our case is mainly located within the boundaries of being a ‘critical case’ (ibid: 47) since it tries to test the theory and considerations provided by the FLAGSHIP project in the beginning. In addition, it is overlapping with being a ‘revelatory case’ (ibid: 48) since we try to approach a dimension which is well-known by its immanent actors but relatively unknown from a scientific perspective. Internal university dynamics of the European universities in general and the Austrian university in special (Vienna), and their responses and reactions to latest reform attempts are still more assumed and as result rather unknown than being proved.

In order to summarise and round off this paragraph, some additional theoretical considerations on case studies made by Yin (2009) should be outlined here:

“1. The case study inquiry
   - copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
   - relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
   - benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.” (ibid: 18)
Let us discuss these issues more in-depth in the next paragraphs: the multiple sources of evidence of our case, analysing them by triangulation and concluding with an elaboration of the disadvantages and limitations for a single case study approach.

2.3.2 Sources of evidence

In order to identify and analyse formal and informal change, the thesis is going to examine two sources of evidence. The first one will be documents, examining mainly the formal change of institutional autonomy and the organisational setting with regards to the recruitment process of professors. The second one is conducting interviews with key members in university organisation, especially with members of the Department of Economic and Social History in order to grasp the more hidden and underlying effects of the reform effects in the professorial recruitment. Statistical data as an additional source of evidence was used and collected in order to contextualise the case. (see Chapter 3)

Concerning the data collection it might be needless to say that in the times of increasing (online) interconnectedness, the internet played a substantial role in producing this paper. Therefore, it should be at least mentioned that a lot of fundamental research was made by the use of it; this refers to the collection of basic information and numbers about the case, gathering related policy papers, identifying relevant actors in university structure, and finally contacting them.

Documents

Documents are a common source in case studies. Their advantage is that they can be reviewed continuously, provide technical information in terms of names or references, and can cover a broad field of interest. In addition, they are a valuable source prior to field visits. On the other hand, their accessibility can be limited, and they can be a biased source when collection was made too selective. (Yin 2009)

The documents that have been used in our study - presented in the figure below - are as follows:
Table 6: Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of document</th>
<th>Published by</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Page number</th>
<th>Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities Act 2002</td>
<td>Austrian Federal Chancellery (Legal information system, RIS)</td>
<td>21.11.2013 (German, English 12/2007)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment 2009*</td>
<td>Austrian Federal Chancellery (Legal information system, RIS)</td>
<td>18.08.2009 (German)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Plan 2004/2013**</td>
<td>University of Vienna (Internal university information system: Mitteilungsblatt)</td>
<td>9.11.2006 (2004 plan, German) 14.11.2012 (2013 plan, German)</td>
<td>13/13</td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Plan 2015</td>
<td>University of Vienna (Rectorate of the university)</td>
<td>January 2012 (German version)</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document on the ‘Professorial Appointment Procedure’</td>
<td>University of Vienna (Professorial Appointment Procedure: Berufungsverfahren)</td>
<td>date of version unknown, latest access: 21.11.2013 (German)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The current, updated Universities Act 2002 includes the changes of the Amendment 2009. The version presented here is the separate version of the Amendment 2009.

**A special comment should be given here concerning the Organisational Plan 2013; this plan became formally active in January 2013. However, our time of interest mostly spans the recent decade when the 2004 plan was active. Therefore, findings and argumentations are mostly based on this version, taking variations of the 2013 plan into account when necessary.
Concerning the assessment of the documents quality, following four criteria are outlined by Scott (1990):

“1. Authenticity. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?

2. Credibility. Is the evidence free from error and distortion?

3. Representativeness. Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its untypicality known?

4. Meaning. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?” (ibid: 6)

In general, all our documents meet the quality requirements. The authenticity of all documents can be rated as high, especially concerning genuineness and origin. All documents are available as an online-pdf and thus an online-copy of the ‘original’. The legal information system of Austria generates pdf-files at the date of access. The documents are revised or have been revised constantly. Since they are of public interest for the concerned members, error and distortion rate can be assumed low, and representativeness high. The language style is oriented towards legal writing, especially with regards to the law documents. All have in common that they provide legal and structural information on the recruitment process. Of special interest in this respect is the last document on the ‘Professorial Appointment Procedure’.

**Interviews**

The interviews should reveal mainly how the recruitment process is taking place in practice: within legal boundaries, a place that is only visible for those who act in it. The explorative character of the thesis led to the assumption that persons in key positions - with regards to institutional change and the professors recruitment at the university - would be of relevance. The persons were identified through the documents and website research. Therefore different levels and different groups were involved: university level (3), faculty level (3) and departmental level (7). They were active as academics (9) and as administrators (3) or to be more precise, the ratio between professorial/non-professorial staff/administrative staff was 6:3:3, the ratio male-female 7:5.

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7Holding positions at different levels (e.g. faculty and department) was counted twice here.
In order to catch a possible ‘cultural’ and ‘mental’ change of the transition period, interviews with persons who have already been active around the year 2002 were extremely valuable. Each potential interview partner was contacted by email with comprehensive information about the research and the research questions. In cases where no response came, phone calls were made as well. The respond rate was relatively high: 17 persons were contacted, in the end 12 persons agreed to participate.\(^8\) All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and in German. During the interview notes were taken, and a recording device was used when the interview partner agreed on it. The interviews normally took 45-60 min. Right after having conducted the interviews an interview report was written (see Gläser and Laudel 2009: 192) including notes about interview features and situation. After all interviews had been conducted they were transcribed (in German) and then summarised (in English).

- **Questionnaire**

The interviews should reveal information that lies beyond the available and accessible material. (Gläser and Laudel 2009: 151) Due to the exploratory nature of our approach and the unknown topic it was necessary to conduct semi-structured interviews with open ended questions. This means that certain issues/subject fields were already pre-defined but with

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\(^8\) Refusing to participate in the interviews was based on following reasons: at the departmental level, some contacted persons assumed that it would be enough if another representative of the department would answer on the interview questions. In general (at university, faculty, and departmental level) it was difficult to interview persons with administrative functions. Either they delegated the request, thought they were not the ‘right’ contacts, or strictly denied to participate (also after having emphasised the importance of their participation).
enough room for leaving the scheduled track, and focus spontaneously on issues that would attract interest. (Bryman 2008) Still, it was important not to drift too far away, and to come back to a common thread. Fields of interest in the questionnaire (excerpt\(^9\)) were as follows:

- Power relations within professorial recruitment
- Room to manoeuvre within professorial recruitment
- Limitations/Constraints within professorial recruitment
- ‘Advantages/Disadvantages’ within professorial recruitment

Concerning the above presented questions of interest it was important to keep the position of the particular respondent in mind (e.g. management, faculty, department, etc.) Thus, generally the same interview guide was used for all respondents with modifications concerning influence possibilities of the different levels (university/management, faculty, department). Nevertheless, common thread was always exploring the room to manoeuvre between executive structure and the department, requesting related information on the department and with a stronger emphasis on their influence possibilities.

- Language and translation

One of the major challenges in handling the interviews was the language issue. In order to receive comprehensive information without language barriers it was important to conduct the interviews in the native/common language of the university (German\(^{10}\)). But this translocated the problem, as the language problem certainly occurred at another point namely when transferring the content and meaning of the interviews into English. The first step was to transcribe the interviews in German. On this basis it was possible to summarise the interviews directly into English. The step in-between could have been to fully translate (re-transcribe) the German transcription into an English transcription and then to summarise it. But this would have been a) even more time-consuming and b) expensive if done professionally, both not appropriate when looking at the available time and framework conditions of this master thesis. Another consideration to skip this step in the end was that the study is not dependent on linguistic nuances but on university reform effects; in order to grasp the effects it was sufficient enough to understand them in German, and having a German transcription as reference text.

\(^9\)See Appendix for compact interview guide
\(^{10}\) The author is a German native-speaker
For translating the interviews (and as a general help for the whole writing process) two sources were used when necessary: firstly, the online dictionary dict.cc\textsuperscript{11} to get a direct translation or a synonym of a particular German word. Secondly, the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary\textsuperscript{12} was used in order to conceive the meaning of an English word by understanding it through the English notion.

- Confidentiality issues

The master thesis is written within the master programme ‘Higher Education’ at the Department of Education which is part of the Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Oslo, and therefore subject to Norwegian law. Research that is dealing with sensitive personal information has to be reported to The Data Protection Official for Research (Norwegian Social Science Data Services). Interview recordings exist on three devices: working place at the University of Oslo, personal laptop, and securing (recording) device. Persons with insight on interview transcripts and summaries were the author and the supervisor of the thesis. Anonymisation was then made by labelling audio files, transcripts (German), and summaries (English) with INT-1 to INT-12 (‘interview one’ to ‘interview twelve’) based on an own encrypted system. Audio recording was only made upon request; the first request was made when the interview partner was contacted, the second request was made before the actual interview session began. It was always possible to pause audio recordings when demanded.

2.3.3 Analytic strategy and triangulation of data

Analytic strategy

The most common analytic strategy which was used here mainly was to rely on the theoretical assumptions prior to conducting the case study. (Yin 2009: 127-136) These were in the very beginning considerations on university reforms and changes in institutional autonomy, and eventually project findings. These considerations served as an important guide through literature and for defining our case interest. And while they were more general and shallow at

\textsuperscript{11}dict.cc is an Austrian online-dictionary, mainly for German-English translations, see Dict.cc (2013) Deutsch-Englisch-Wörterbuch, \url{http://www.dict.cc/}, Accessed: 13.11.2013

the starting point they became narrower during the course of the thesis i.e. questioning the reform effects, and looking at the sphere of influence between executive structure and department in the professorial recruitment. In parallel, a case description has been developed in order to get the case study going and to collect data. (Yin 2009: 79-82) Despite that, sometimes the first analytic strategy ‘got stuck’. As we will see in the following, it is in the nature of such an approach to adjust and revise theoretical positions.

To rely on theoretical intentions becomes especially important when dealing with our analytic technique. Our questions address a lot of descriptive and exploratory research. In the end however, they should also contribute to a little extent to explanation building. This technique is described as being “a special type of pattern matching” (ibid: 141) and the goal is to deliver an explanation of how and why something happened. The most common form to do this is a narrative form. However, because narratives in nature are not a precise method, it is important that “the explanations have reflected some theoretically significant propositions.” (ibid: 141) in order to improve the quality of the case study.

Our theoretical propositions are in general to question university reforms attempts according to their indented output. This becomes visible through an emerging executive structure which has formal power, meeting an academic domain which has informal power. Hence, breaking our theoretical propositions down into our case, the first analytic technique is the descriptive and exploratory analysis of the recruitment process (Chapter 4) followed by an evaluation/location of it according to our variables (Chapter 5). The aim is to make sense of our research question and to assess university change in professorial recruitment evoked by reforms. But - and this is the major limitation when it comes to explanation building - it is important to keep in mind that we are only researching how the recruitment is changing according to our variables but not why they are changing; this would namely go beyond the scope of our case study.

**Triangulation of data**

In order to improve the quality of sense-making, explanation has to be based on multiple sources, an approach which is called triangulation. According to Bryman (2008) triangulation is “[t]he use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon
so that findings may be cross-checked.” (Bryman 2008: 700) Also Yin (2009) describes this approach (relying on multiple sources) as a major strength of case studies. Special attention has been given to the convergence of evidence i.e. analysing the sources according to the same fact (triangulation).

In order to cope with this approach, documents and interviews were analysed according to our dualistic approach: 1) the recruitment process of professors (regulatory framework, preliminary level, intermediate level, and final level) and 2) analysing this process in terms of centralisation, formalisation, standardisation, legitimisation, and flexibility. In conclusion, figure and table below summarise our general analytic approach and outline the frame for the following chapters.

![Data Analysis Spiral by Creswell (2007)](image)

Figure 2: Data Analysis Spiral by Creswell (2007)
Table 8: Data Analysis and Representation, Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Analysis and Representation</th>
<th>Research approach (Case Study)</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data managing</td>
<td>Create and organise files for data</td>
<td>Data professorial recruitment University of Vienna/Department of Economic and Social History (literature, statistical data, documents, interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading, memoing</td>
<td>Read through text, make margin notes, form initial codes</td>
<td>Data extraction and assignment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Describing                      | Describe the case and its context | 1) Context (Case): University/Faculty/Department/Professorship (CHAPTER 3)  
2) Case: Recruitment process of professors => Regulatory framework Preliminary level Intermediate level Final level (CHAPTER 4) |
| Classifying                     | Use categorical aggregation to establish themes or patterns | Centralisation Formalisation Standardisation Flexibility (CHAPTER 5) |
| Interpreting                    | Use direct interpretation Develop naturalistic generalisations | Relate data extracts and case/context descriptions to categories (CHAPTER 5) |

13 Based on Creswell (2007, pp. 156-157) Table 2 Data Analysis and Representation, by Research Approaches
Representing, visualising
Present in-depth picture of the case (or cases) using narrative, tables, and figures
Development and effects of university reforms on the basis of the recruitment process, presentation of the case according to categories, overall changes in the recruitment process of professors and extent of change (CHAPTER 5 + CHAPTER 6)

2.3.4 Disadvantages and limitations of our single case study approach

Let us now assess the quality of our research design according to construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin 2009) and reveal the disadvantages and limitations that emerge with discussing them.

- Construct validity

In order to ensure construct validity of this study main emphasis was given as follows: firstly, to rely on previous concepts and studies while focusing simultaneously on current and ongoing research findings. These were - as already pointed out in our ‘analytic strategy’ passage - considerations on university reforms and changes in institutional autonomy. Concerning our very special topic, it was also important to receive stimuli from the project and to have insight into other researchers’ work. Secondly, multiple sources of evidence have been used in order to substantiate the argumentation line (e.g. university documents and interviews with key members).

- Internal validity

Because internal validity concerns explanatory studies this does not apply to ‘characterising professorial recruitment’ (first analytic stage) since in this part our focus is more of descriptive and exploratory nature rather than being explanatory. Like we have described this in our ‘analytic strategy’ passage, we are not explaining specifically why professorial recruitment is changing (or not) but how. Explanation building within our scope refers only to ‘analysing professorial recruitment’ according to our specified variables (second analytic stage) and at best it can provide indicators for explaining a general change. Within this scope
we can try to point out elements that would eventually lead to causal inferences but the thesis itself is not providing such.

- **External validity**

Limits or concerns about case studies are based - among others - on the argument that case studies might have little ability to make generalisations or draw general conclusions. Undoubtedly this would apply also to our case since it is limited to professorial recruitment at one university/department. However, purpose of a case study is “to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” (Yin 2009: 15) In addition, although singular case studies can be dangerous in terms of general validity, the risks for the approach of this thesis are dampen by the fact that it is conducted within the boundaries of the FLAGSHIP project which will carry out research at different departments and universities. In other words, when it comes to the generalisation of university reform effects, our case is rather a part of a multiple case study approach than being a single case study of its own.

- **Reliability**

The question of reliability concerns in general in which ways a study is repeatable. The objective is “to minimize the errors and biases in a study.” (Yin 2009: 45) However, even if this issue applies more to quantitative than qualitative studies (Bryman 2008) it is still an important criterion for a qualitative approach. One possibility to solve this problem according to Yin (2009) is to develop a database which is done here in the end of data collection by structuring and organising all sources and evidences in a replicable way according to the research development. In addition the case study was to a certain extent embedded in the project and followed a similar research and data collection approach while being reviewed by project researchers (i. a. supervisor) which in sum is an important feature of improving the reliability of an (explorative) case study. (Riege 2003)

Having now outlined in detail underlying theories, analytical schemes, and methodological considerations of our case, we will now proceed with the empirical setting of our research in the next chapter. In this way the reader should get a better understanding of how our case of interest looks like and where our research has been conducted.
3 EMPIRICAL SETTING

In this chapter we want to present and outline our case context and find out where our research questions are located. The first section presents the University of Vienna by providing information on profile, facts and figures, and the organisational structure. The second section provides some information on organisational structure and profile of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Sciences. In the third section information on the Department of Economic and Social History is given concerning academic profile and key numbers. The fourth section outlines the current situation of the professorship by providing key numbers on professors and professorships.

The data and statistics that are collected here will also be of importance when analysing and discussing our findings. Basically, most of the data was extracted from the websites of the particular institutions. After collection, they were paraphrased here. In order to ensure transparency, the particular web-links are quoted directly in the footnotes (in addition to their appearance in the reference list). Some figures were created on the basis of numbers of the statistical Austrian online-tool for higher education uni: data14. Unfortunately, this database only includes overall university numbers which means no data on faculty or departmental level. Despite that, most of the data was only available since 2005, except from some student numbers (reference period/date: winter term/ 31.12. of the particular year). In general, these information are supplied without liability; the only purpose is to reveal an overall trend.

3.1 University of Vienna

3.1.1 Profile

In 1365 the University of Vienna was funded by Duke Rudolph IV, being the oldest university in the German-speaking area. It is nowadays one of the biggest universities in Europe with over 92,500 students and around 9,500 employees (hereof 6,700 scientific staff)

and the biggest research and educational institution in Austria. The University of Vienna offers a broad spectrum of studies with a total of over 180 programmes. Research and teaching is conducted in the 15 faculties and in the 4 centres of the University. Due to its size and the expansion in the recent decades (educational boom in the 1970ies, increasing student number), the university today has over 60 locations with the main building on the Universitätsring as the centre of the University of Vienna. In this respect two important events took place in the recent history of the university: the university campus was established 1998 on the site of the former General Hospital, and the Medical Faculty became a separate university in 2004.\(^{15}\)

### 3.1.2 Facts and figures

Staff and student numbers at the present moment (November 2013) are outlined as follows on the university’s website:\(^{16}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic university staff</td>
<td>3.097</td>
<td>3.635</td>
<td>6.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-academic university staff</td>
<td>1.730</td>
<td>1.233</td>
<td>2.963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total university staff</td>
<td>4.734</td>
<td>4.758</td>
<td>9.492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status quo: 31 December 2012 (adjusted headcount; without persons on leave; persons with more than one employment counted once)

---

\(^{15}\) University of Vienna, History of the University of Vienna (2013)  

\(^{16}\) University of Vienna, Figures and Facts (2013)  
Table 10: Students at the University of Vienna

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrians</td>
<td>42.962</td>
<td>24.548</td>
<td>67.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International students</td>
<td>15.374</td>
<td>9.602</td>
<td>24.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58.336</td>
<td>34.150</td>
<td>92.486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status quo: winter semester 2012/13

Table 11: Composition of the university revenues

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global budget</td>
<td>379 Mio EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study fees</td>
<td>6 Mio EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (e.g. Further education at the University, research)</td>
<td>137 Mio EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>522 Mio EUR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status quo: end of 2012
The overall evolution at the university occurs as follows (data based on own calculations):

Figure 3: Staff numbers - Development\textsuperscript{17}, NB: The total number is not exactly the summary of academic university staff and non-academic university staff.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year       & Academic university staff & Non-academic university staff & Total university staff \\
\hline
2005       & 5154                      & 2004                          & 7040                      \\
2006       & 5693                      & 2082                          & 7624                      \\
2007       & 6219                      & 2311                          & 8327                      \\
2008       & 6480                      & 2295                          & 8586                      \\
2009       & 6747                      & 2301                          & 8864                      \\
2010       & 6660                      & 2901                          & 9369                      \\
2011       & 6755                      & 2916                          & 9496                      \\
2012       & 6732                      & 2963                          & 9492                      \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{17} Auswertungen => Personal => Universitäten => Personal an Universitäten - Kopfzahl (Universität Wien)
Both figures show that the number of members grew constantly during the recent years. Total number of staff is almost reaching 10,000. Especially the student numbers increased in the recent decade, there are around 25,000 (!) students more compared to 2002.

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=> Auswertungen => Statistisches Taschenbuch => Studierende => 2 - 4 Studierende nach Universitäten
3.1.3 Organisational structure

University management with the University Board, the Rectorate and the Senate is on the top level. Research and teaching is taking place in 15 faculties and 4 centres. With regards to the organisational plan faculties and centres are also described as scientific organisational units of the university with research and teaching tasks. Research Platforms are organisational units between the faculties and comprise innovative and interdisciplinary research. The Studienpräses and the 48 Directorates of Studies are dealing with the organisation of studies and issues that arise from law matters concerning studies. Organisation of administration is carried out by 11 University Offices, 5 Administrative Departments and the Office for Quality Assurance. Special bodies are the Equal Opportunities Working Party, the Ethics Committee, and the Arbitration Commission. The Civil Service Associations are: the Works Council for the Scientific Staff, the Works Council for the General University Staff, and the Austrian National Union of Students at the University of Vienna. Subsidiaries of the university are the innovation centre (Innovationszentrum Universität Wien GmbH) (100 %) with the subordinated Innovation into Business GmbH (37 %) and the Vienna University Children’s Office (100%). Further the career centre (UNIPORT Karriereservice Universität Wien GmbH) (74. 99%), Max F. Perutz Laboratories GmbH (60 %) and the WasserclusterLunz GmbH (33. 33 %).

Figure 5: Organisation University of Vienna (snapshot of interactive pdf)\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{27} University of Vienna, Overview (2013)
3.2 Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies

3.2.1 Organisational structure

The Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies comprises 13 departments and 3 sub-units, including a total of 46 professorships.\(^28\) The faculty is led by one dean and two vice deans, supported by the dean’s office. The Departments are:

- Department of Egyptology
- Department of Ancient History, Papyrology and Epigraphy
- Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies
- Department of European Ethnology
- Department of History
- Department of Jewish Studies
- Department of Classical Archaeology
- Department of History of Art
- Department of Numismatics and Monetary History
- Department of East European History
- Department of Prehistoric and Historical Archaeology
- Department of Economic and Social History
- Department of Contemporary History

The Sub-units of the faculty are:

- Vienna Institute for Archaeological Science
- Dean’s office of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies
- Studies Service Center Historical and Cultural Studies

\(^28\) Number of professorships has been collected directly from the departmental websites (this information is supplied without liability!):
University of Vienna, List of Departments (Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies) (2013)
3.2.2 Profile

Research focus$^{29}$ of the faculty is divided into four categories: area, society, knowledge, and media. Within the category ‘area’ emphasis is given to the cultures of the Euro-Mediterranean area and classical studies - historical and cultural European studies - Austria and its environment - and global history. The category ‘society’ focuses on community concepts, identity, and political integration - dictatorships, violence, genocides - economy and society - and women and gender history. Focus within the category ‘knowledge’ is given to history of science, culture of science, and societies of science - teacher education and subject didactics - historical and cultural studies on e-research and teaching. The last category ‘media’ focuses on text and edition - material culture - and visual and media history of culture.

Interfacultary research platforms are:$^{30}$

- Repositioning of women’s and gender history
- Center for Interdisciplinary Research and Documentation of Inner and South Asian Cultural History
- Vienna Institute for Archaeological Sciences
- Wiener Osteuropaforum
- Theory and Practice of Subject Didactics/Teaching Methodologies
- Cognitive Science
- Research platform Elfriede Jelinek: texts - contexts - perception

The Directorates of Studies ($\textit{Studienprogrammleitungen, SPL}$) at the University are responsible for the studies, each comprising different study programmes. Following Directorates of Studies are assigned to the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies: SPL 6: Prehistoric and historical archaeology, egyptology and Jewish studies, SPL 7: History, SPL 8: Art history and European ethnology, SPL 9: Classical studies, and SPL 41: Doctoral programme of historical and cultural studies. The SPL 7 History e.g. includes all history studies/lectures also the ones mainly conducted by the Department of Economic and Social History (see profile of the department). The total number of students enrolled in the Directorates of Studies SPL 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the recent years is as follows:

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Figure 6: SPL at the faculty - Student development\textsuperscript{31} (st = summer term, wt = winter term)

Both graphics correspond to the general rise of student numbers at the university; student numbers at the faculty and the SPL 7 History have grown as well in the recent years. However, on closer examination it becomes apparent that especially the SPL 7 History attracted more students.

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3.3 Department of Economic and Social History

3.3.1 Profile

The Department of Economic and Social History was founded in 1922 and reopened in 1959. It is characterised by its unique scientific and institutional position within its discipline: it is the only department in Austria where economic and social history is rooted in a historical/cultural faculty. Other departments of economic and social history are located in economic and social science faculties.

The academic profile of the department is marked by multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. Research and teaching are integrated within the fields of social history, economic history and cultural history and in addition within the didactics of history. The Department of Economic and Social History holds a special position within the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Sciences due to its interdisciplinary character and its dissemination of socio-economic history. Research and teaching contribute to other parts of the university respectively academia, e.g. by being connected to the fields of history, social studies, and political education or by teaching tasks at the Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics. By the nature of its discipline, research and teaching are also focusing on processes and development in a broader picture. Global history and interdependencies are becoming increasingly important in the understanding of socio-economic trends and developments, which - for the department - leads to close cooperation with other fields like area studies, geography, political science, and sociology.

Teaching of the department is taking place within the undergraduate and graduate degree courses in history. Professors and lecturers contribute with general and specialised lectures in (European) socio-economic history and with an increasing focus on global socio-economic history. Further, staff members of the department are also involved in further and adult education.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33}University of Vienna, Department of Economic and Social History, Department profile (2013) \url{http://wirtschaftsgeschichte.univie.ac.at/en/home/department-profile/}, Accessed: 13.11.2013
3.3.2 Key numbers

Table 12: Staff at the department

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full professors</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.O. professors ('associate professors')</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University docents</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant professors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees in research projects and/or scientific programmes</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest researchers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication and documentation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total scientific staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total administrative staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Lecturers</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of staff (22.11.2013):</strong></td>
<td><strong>57 (110)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Professorship

This paragraph wants to provide some key data on the overall development of professors and professorships at the University of Vienna. Some of the findings of these data will be of interest for the following chapters. Based on the statistical Austrian online-tool uni:data, following numbers could be gathered and edited concerning the development of the numbers of professors at the University of Vienna, unfortunately only from 2005 until 2011. As indicated before, the information is supplied without liability and with the purpose of examining an overall trend.

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34 Data collected from departmental website and adjusted according to information of the department: University of Vienna, Department of Economic and Social History, Staff (2013) [http://wirtschaftsgeschichte.univie.ac.at/en/staff/](http://wirtschaftsgeschichte.univie.ac.at/en/staff/), Accessed: 22.11.2013
Current professorships at the Department of Economic and Social History\textsuperscript{35}

2005 Professorship Economic and Social History (*Professur für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*)

2007 Professorship International Economic History with special emphasis on Global History (*Professur für internationale Wirtschaftsgeschichte mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Globalgeschichte*)

2011 Professorship Economic and Social History (*Professur für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*)

2011 Professorship of Medieval Economic and Social History (*Professur für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters*)

2013 Professorship of Economic and Social History (*Professur für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*)

Number of full professors at the University of Vienna

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winter term</th>
<th>Full professors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8: Full professors - Total number\textsuperscript{36}

Prior figure displays the total number of full professors. As the graph shows, the number of professors has grown substantially in the recent years. This was mainly because additional funds were granted which the university used in order to establish new professorships. However, in consideration of the size and the overall growth of the university, the number of full professors remains relatively low.

![Full professors - Length of employment](image)

**Figure 9: Full professors - Length of employment**

This figure shows the total number of full professors, divided into unlimited employments (regular professors according to the appointment law § 98, UG) and limited employments. Basically, the 5-year limitation applies to professors who have absolved the shortened

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appointment procedure (§ 99, UG) whereas the limitation of 6 years refers to professors who have been recruited in a one-time initiative (§ 99, par. 3, UG)

**Appointments at the University of Vienna**

![Appointments - Total number](image)

This figure shows the total number of appointments beginning from 2006. The overall number of appointments is declining, possibly 1) because additional funds for the creation of new professorships are now coming to an end 2) because the generation change (re-staffing professorships) is weakened (see following chapters for more information).

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=> Auswertungen => Bologna Monitoring => Universitäten => Berufungen an die Universität (Universität Wien)
This figure shows the origin of the professors. Appointments from the University of Vienna are low compared to external appointments. Data for 2007 until 2009 were not available. The high number of 34 appointments is probably due to the one-time possibility of recruiting a.O. professors (see appointment law § 99, par. 3 of the UG and the following chapters). Most of the appointments are from the European countries (with a substantial number from Germany).

In this chapter we have presented our case by delivering some background information and key data. We could see e.g. that the University of Vienna is growing continuously concerning students and staffs. This growth is also displayed by the increasing number of professorships. Another aspect refers to a high number of appointments from outside Austria. With having these few examples in mind let us now proceed to the next chapter in order to examine professorial recruitment more in-depth.

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39 Appointments - Origin, own Excel table, data collected at:
=> Auswertungen => Bologna Monitoring => Universitäten => Berufungen an die Universität (Universität Wien)
This chapter explores the professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna from the perspective of the Department of Economic and Social History within the boundaries of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies.\textsuperscript{40}

Our first section deals with the regulatory framework and the determination of formal power authority in the professorial recruitment. Main emphasis in the beginning is given to the Universities Act 2002 and the Amendment 2009. Here we will introduce the legal framework, the appointment procedure for university professors according to the university laws, concluding with some comments and additional aspects. Finally, we will examine how the legal dimension has been translated via the Organisational Plan 2004 of the University of Vienna, and explore the power balances between executive structure and department. In so doing, we will find out under which circumstances the appointment procedure (recruitment cycle) will ‘take off’.

In the second section - our preliminary level - we are concerned with the creation and general funding situation of professorships. In this respect we have to discuss the development planning of the university and the Development Plan 2015 in order to understand the overall strategies. A passage on leeway and dynamics in the creation process of professorships between department and executive structure follows afterwards. Eventually, we will enter the pre-phase of the official appointment procedure of the University of Vienna, the Professorial Appointment Procedure.

The third section which is our intermediate level explores mostly the search and selection processes of future professors at the University of Vienna. Here we will introduce the Professorial Appointment Procedure by providing background information and defining the different stages of the procedure. We will focus on the interaction between the relevant

\textsuperscript{40} Usually, all facts refer to the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies and the Department of Economic and Social History unless mentioned differently.
academic actors in the search and selection processes mostly from the perspective of our department. Conclusively, brief comments on the role of the administrative actors will round off this level.

The fourth section represents our final level. Here we are dealing with the post-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure and bring the exploration of the appointment procedure (recruitment cycle) to an end. In so doing, we will also discuss the employment conditions before proceeding to the next chapter.

4.1 Regulatory framework: formal power authority

We have identified this level as regulatory framework which displays the legal basis of the recruitment process not only at the University of Vienna/Department of Economic and Social History but in general at Austrian public universities. Our questions are: which laws constitute the recruitment process? And what are the formal power sources? In this respect, we shall first take a closer look on the legal basis as defined by the UG 2002 with the amendment UG 2009 (UG)\textsuperscript{41} including the legal setup of the appointment laws, and followed by some related comments and additional legal aspects regarding the appointment procedure. In the second paragraph we will discuss the Organisational Plan 2004 especially with focus on executive structure and department in the light of a university-specific appointment procedure. In this way we will lay the groundwork for a ‘recruitment cycle’ of candidates, before dealing with this ‘recruitment cycle’ more in-depth in the following three levels.

\textsuperscript{41} NB: When refereeing to the Universities Act 2002 (\textit{Universitätsgesetz} 2002, abbreviated: UG 2002) including the changes of the Amendment 2009 (\textit{Universitätsrechtsänderungsgesetz} 2009, abbreviated: UG 2009), only the abbreviation ‘UG’ (\textit{Universitätsgesetz}) will be used, unless we are referring explicitly to one of them.
4.1.1 Professorial recruitment under the Universities Act 2002 and the Amendment 2009

The appointment procedure for university professors

The implementation of the law occurred gradually; most of the laws became active in October 2002 or January 2004. Some of the main changes in the new university law are that universities are now legal entities under Austrian public law (§ 4, UG), not dependent on direct ministerial influence and orders, and able to decide on their own statutes (§ 5, UG). They are mainly public funded by the state/ministry through performance agreements (§ 12, UG).

The legal requirements for the appointment procedure are described in chapter 3 of the UG. While § 97 concerns more the nature of university professors, § 98 is determining the regular appointment procedure and § 99 the shortened appointment procedure of university professors. The following passages presented here have been paraphrased on the basis of the official German version and partly on the English translation of the UG concerning § 98 (Appointment Procedure for University Professors) and § 99 (Shortened Appointment Procedure for University Professors).

§ 98 constitutes the official and regular appointment procedure for university professors. A position that is to be filled on permanent basis has to be specified by the development plan. (par. 1) The announcement of the positions has to be advertised by the rectorate, nationally and internationally. Candidates who have not applied actively may also be included after having agreed on this. (par. 2) It is up to the professorial members of the senate to appoint two

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42 In order to ensure readability of following pages, quotes from the university law have been kept as simple as possible. The same applies to the selection of relevant paragraphs; aim has been to focus on the most relevant ones for an appropriate introduction since we will face many of the legal aspects again when examining e.g. organisational plan or the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of Vienna (see 4.3.1). In this way we avoid double entries and have a more focused perspective.


assessors, nominated by professors in the respective department, including at least one external assessor. The professorial members of the senate can also delegate this task to the professors of the respective department or a subject-related department. The rector can appoint an additional assessor. (par. 3) The senate has to appoint an authorised appointment committee. Professors have to represent more than half of the members, students at least one. (par. 4) The appointment committee has to prove whether the applications meet the requirements or not, and dismiss those which are not meeting the requirements. The remaining applications are to be transferred to the assessors who have to assess the candidates according to the announced position. (par. 5) The rector has to give suitable candidates the opportunity to introduce themselves to the departments and subject-related departments. (par. 6) The appointment committee creates a shortlist of three most suitable candidates (terna-list⁴³) based on the assessments and comments. If the list does not include three candidates it is has to be justified. (par. 7) The rector then selects a candidate from the shortlist or sends it back to the appointment committee, if the candidates are not suitable. (par.8) Before initiating appointment negotiations the rector has to notify the Working Group on Equal Opportunities of his/her decision. The working group has the right to object the decision; the arbitration commission approves/rejects this objection (par.9) If the arbitration commission rejects the objection, the rector initiates appointment negotiations, if not, a new selection decision has to be made. (par. 11) After successful negotiations the professors receives a venia docendi⁴⁴ for his/her subject, (par. 12) the venia docendi of a professor with limited contracts expires when the employment contract ends. (par. 13)

§ 99 constitutes the shortened appointment procedure for university professors. The paragraphs 1, and 3 to 8 of the regular § 98 procedure do not apply, if the professor is to be appointed for a period up to five years. The prolongation of the appointment can only be granted after having completed the regular appointment procedure according to § 98. (par. 1) The rector has to appoint the candidate after consulting the professors of the respective subject area (par. 2) The rectorate can enact an ordinance - which needs the approval of the university board - and create one time only university professor-positions for a period of not more than six years, open only to university docents according to § 94 par. 2 Z 2. The number can comprise 20 % of the positions according to § 122 par. 2 Z 4. § 98 par. 1 to 8 do not apply. The positions shall be announced in the newsletter of the university. The rector has to

⁴³ A list containing three names/candidates.  
⁴⁴ A license to teach.
staff the positions based on a selection process which meets international competitive standards. An unlimited prolongation of the appointment by the rector is only admissible after a quality assessment. This assessment measures the quality of scientific performances and teaching performances of the last five years. The quality assessment has to be based on international competitive standards. Application on prolongation can be filed after having completed the fifth year. (par. 3)

Comments and additional aspects of the appointment procedure

With regards to the former university law (UOG 1993) an important change in the appointment procedure has been the suspension of ministerial influence. The rector/ate and senate, and not the particular faculty, are now conducting the appointment procedure formally. Despite that, the appointment procedure consists now of a standard procedure (§ 98, UG) and a shortened one (§ 99, UG). (Novak 2007) The UG 2009 has revised both procedures due to emerging problems in handling them. Concerning the § 98 procedure, four assessors were mandatory formerly, now there are two. In the shortened § 99 procedure the duration of professorships was extended from two to now five years. In addition, the one-time creation of professorships - only open to university docents and for a period of not more than six years (§ 99 par. 3, UG) - was introduced. (Novak 2010)

Another aspect that should be considered here especially is the new employment status of university professors. They have become employees who sign private job contracts with the university, and thus are no longer civil servants. In this respect the transition period has brought along some problems, e.g. concerning the completion of old appointment procedures and establishing new ones; § 97 - § 99 applied to university professors and appointment procedures from 01.01.2004. Appointment procedures before that date had to be finished based on former statutes but with new legal status for the newly appointed professor. This would have had been regulated in the Salaried Employees Act (as pointed out in § 108 par. 1, UG) but not until the Collective Agreement came into effect. Despite that, civil servant university professors would keep their legal status. (Perthold-Stoitzner 2009)

In the now following pages, our main focus lies on the regular appointment procedure (based on § 98, UG) and its occurrence in the Professorial Appointment Procedure of the University
of Vienna since certain legal and formal steps are excluded in the shortened appointment procedure. As a consequence of the overall topic, we will not exclude completely the shortened procedure from our discussion. However, referring to the shortened procedure will only occur occasionally.

When discussing the Professorial Appointment Procedure more in-depth, we will eventually see that legal principles for appointment procedures are defined by university law but with the possibility for the universities of adjusting and modifying them with regards to their organisational structure. It is important to keep in mind that the appointment procedures can be developed individually on the basis of the UG, and hence can be different from university to university and their organisational outcome. In our case it is therefore necessary to focus on the Organisational Plan 2004 of the University of Vienna.

4.1.2 Defining formal power in the university

The Organisational plan 2004

With an organisational plan the University of Vienna has established its own developed organisational structure for the first time. The Organisational Plan 2004 (OG 2004) and the reorganisation of the university became active gradually e.g. concerning the University Offices in January 2004 and with regards to the internal structure (Binnenstruktur) of the faculties in January 2005. Up to that date the department/institute structure was organised according to the UOG 1993. After being formally approved, the OG 2004 has been revised slightly several times. A major revision of the OG 2004 became active through the new OG 2013 which is active since January 2013.

Although many legal aspects are determined by the UG, it grants organisational autonomy for the respective university as well. This includes the definition of the organisational plan, the development plan and the university statutes. Direct ministerial interference has been abolished and replaced by performance agreements (Leistungsvereinbarung) between

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university and state. Ensuring this overall agreement is done by internal university negotiations on target agreements (Zielvereinbarung), e.g. between rectorate and organisational units. (OG according to UG 2002: 7) Major change concerns the restructuring and internal organisation of the university. There is now a leadership level (Leitungsebene) and a level of organisational units (Ebene von Organisationseinheiten).

- Leadership level

The legal status of the leadership level - which includes the highest bodies university board, senate, rector/ate - is determined in the UG and not in the OG 2004. These bodies are responsible for final implementation and approval of the organisational plan and development plan. Of specific interest for our case are senate and rector/ate. The senate is a body on the highest level where the participation rights of the university members are concentrated. Only the senate can pass its competences to other collegial bodies (Kollegialorgane) which can decide in its name. Despite that, the senate makes substantial contributions to appointment procedures. Rector and rectorate (rector + four vice rectors) are two sides of the same coin and represent one of the highest bodies in university. Especially the rector plays a crucial role in the appointment procedure regarding control, selection and negotiation. (OG according to UG 2002: 4-5)

- Faculties and centres

The faculties are the organisational units of the university with research and teaching objectives (§ 3 of OG 2004); centres are also organisational units but with special tasks, and being more focused on either research or teaching (§ 4 of OG 2004). With the reorganisation, faculties and centres - with regards to their structure and organisation - were newly established or carried over. They are perceived as optimal partners in the negotiations on target agreements (OG according to UG 2002: 7). The faculties and centres are led by the dean. One of their major tasks is elaborating suggestions on internal structure and development plan of the faculty and the distribution of resources.

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• Internal structure of faculties

The new internal structure was constructed based on suggestions by the deans according to evaluations and suggestions of faculty scientists and the former faculty structure, and a statement of the faculty conference. Afterwards, rector/ate and deans have determined the internal structure of the faculties in negotiations on target agreements. It was up to the faculties to decide on the names of their sub-units (institute, division, working groups, subject areas, departments, etc.) In general, all faculties - as well as the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Sciences - decided to choose the former German description Institut.⁴⁷ The heads of the sub-units are appointed by the dean after consultation of the scientific members of the particular sub-unit. (OG according to UG 2002, p. 15)

Executive structure and Department

From the perspective of the department - in simplified terms and concerning the appointment procedure - we have to perceive the executive structure of the university as rector/ate and the faculty/dean.

Concerning the power balance within the university, the University of Vienna was long time characterised by a high (organisational) fragmentation with regards to its departments. (Winckler 2003) In this situation the departments were strong and the faculties weak. On the surface, the new law presents a kind of a new era for several reasons. Firstly, a substantial authority shift from ministry to rector/ate took place - also with regards to the appointment procedure - which means a broader room to manoeuvre at least for the rector/ate. (see laws of the UG and OG) Secondly, a two-level system has been established with university leadership and the faculties, and a coherent university strategy introduced in contrast to the single strategies of the departments. Tensions within this occur through the different socialisation of old members of the university (INT-5) which partly have resentments against new trends and developments (e.g. evaluation culture, technical developments, management aspects, etc.).

⁴⁷ In English ‘department’; actually the English word ‘institute’ would refer to the German description Institut as well. However, the official translation and description in English - at least in our specific case - is ‘department’. For more information see the archive of the former university online magazine about the internal structure: Universität Wien, Archiv der Online Zeitung Uni Wien - Binnenstruktur der Universität (2004) http://www.dieuniversitaet-online.at/beitraege/news/binnenstruktur-der-universitat-wien/10/neste/311.html, Accessed: 23.11.2013
Thus, in the beginnings of the transition period, “when the new law was introduced and began to gain traction, it was possible and common practice to limit the impacts of new law, not legally but in an interpretative sense.” (INT-9, own translation) However, this period of just perceiving the constraints but not the possibilities changed due to the fact that constantly old members retired. (INT-9)

When it comes to the power balance between department and faculty, we have to bear in mind that departments never had formal rights. (INT-7) The departments - including the Department of Economic and Social History - are not powerful in a formal sense. They are a sub-unit of the faculty and are deprived of own legal status. Formal power centre is the dean of the faculty (INT-8) who can be a powerful actor. (INT-11) So basically tensions at the bottom are taking place in the faculty, and it is up to the faculty to handle this. (INT-5) Therefore, the strength and weakness of departments is also dependent on the power of the dean (INT-7) and how he/she balances and acts within this field. The faculties have undergone a different development in this respect. (INT-7) The Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies was characterised by autonomous departments which had a lot of room to manoeuvre. They were autonomous because of their overall heterogeneity and their consequent fragmentation. De jure, the faculty was always powerful, but when the structure was heterogenic - like in the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies - the departments were powerful (in contrast to e.g. the Faculty of Law which was quite homogeneous). (INT-7) An issue that is related to this fragmented structure of the university is referring to the specialisations of departments and the professorships. Appointments at that time were made because of previous acquaintance and not based on a coherent profile/strategy which presents an important factor concerning the fragmentation of the university. (INT-9)

In conclusion, the Department of Economic and Social History is not powerful in a formal sense. However, it has informal power and is an important initiator in university strategies. An advantage and a positive factor in this respect is the small size of the department when it comes to the coherent articulation of departmental interests towards faculty and university. (INT-10) At the point of intersection between department and faculty/rector/ate is the head of department. The role of the head e.g. is characterised by being a coordinator and a moderator for all issues and problems within the department. Informal power is based on the fact that this position is an important interface for dean and rector at the departmental level. The head has more access to information and is involved in the preparation of decisions. Generally the
head communicates and reports to higher hierarchies on the mood within the department. (INT-8) The department itself is characterised by its direct democratic tradition, e.g. once a week there is a meeting of scientific staff taking place (jour fixe), where normally all participate. (INT-8) Several respondents have confirmed that the jour fixe is working well. As a consequence, consensual opinion-forming and communication are and have been good for staffing vacant positions. (INT-4)

So how is this opinion-forming process articulated when it comes to the creation of new professorships? In this section we have introduced the legal basis of the university in general and the recruitment process in particular. We have explored how power is balanced internally besides ‘formalities’ within faculties and the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies/Department of Economic and Social History. These dynamics are providing important information on the circumstances under which new professorships are installed. But first we have to take a closer look on how positions are actually created and funded; in general, and from the perspective of our department. As we will see in the following, organisational autonomy and the aim of having a coherent strategy on the scientific profile is expressed by development planning and eventually articulated and registered in the Development Plan 2015.

4.2 Preliminary level: creation and funding

In this section we are discussing the preliminary level of our recruitment process. In so doing, we explore the underlying reasons of creation, and eventually pose the questions: how is a position created? And how is it funded? Structurally, this section is divided into information and findings on development planning and the Development Plan 2015, the possibilities and dynamics in the creation process, and the pre-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure. In conclusion - before focusing on the actual appointment procedure - it is first necessary to elaborate how positions are defined and created, and especially by whom.
4.2.1 Development planning and the Development Plan 2015

According to the UG, universities have to make an important contribution to society and fulfil certain tasks in teaching and learning within the boundaries of instruction-freedom and university autonomy. In order to do this efficiently, there has been a change from ministerial decrees to performance-oriented agreements. Performance agreements are an instrument which should measure success and progress in negotiation between ministry and the university. Based on these measurements resources are distributed and budgets defined for a period of three years (the current period is 2013-2015). While performance agreements are negotiated between leadership level and ministry, the internal achievement of specified objectives is written down and negotiated between rector/ate and organisational units in target agreements. This is followed by particular internal negotiations on achievement between organisational units (faculties/centres) and sub-units (departments), and sub-units and members. Based on the target agreements, budgets and resources are distributed, the methods of how achieving the targets are up to the organisational units. (OG according to UG 2002: 7)

Target agreements are defined in the rolling development plan of the university. Both agreement and plan are an important indicator for results and thus an important instrument for the performance assessment of the university. Development planning outlines the principles for future development of the university and how strategies are being implemented. Central objectives are to define principles in teaching and research which especially are improvements in teaching, defining a research profile with focus areas, and the dedication of professorships. Development planning has been constantly revised since 2004 and has been established in a complex top-down and bottom-up procedure (Winckler 2003) and in cooperation with all members of the universities via the organisational units/faculties and centres.

After approval by the leadership level, the university could present the first development plan in 2005 which was the first documented overall strategy of the university. The current plan is the Development Plan 2015, a 112 page long document which has been approved in January 2012. This plan was the basis for the performance agreement between ministry and

49 Please note - also with regards to following citations - that the German version of the Development Plan 2015 was used here: Universität Wien, Entwicklungsplan 2015 (2013) http://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/public/pdf/Entwicklungsplan_interaktiv.pdf, Access: 23.11.2013
university of the period 2013-2015. The development plan is mandatory and cannot be changed fundamentally; only small adjustments are possible. (INT-4) Special emphasis in the plan is given to strengthening and shaping the scientific research profile of the university in which appointments will play a crucial role. (Entwicklungsplan 2015: 22) Consequently, a major part of the development plan is concerned with faculty focus areas and the subject dedication of professorships. (ibid: 53-109)

4.2.2 Leeway and dynamics in the creation process

From the point of view of the department, there are two constraints occurring in the personal policy of professorships. One constraint is given by tradition, i.e. a major part of appointments is re-staffing these vacant positions. It is only possible to change these positions gradually but there is a strong will on all levels to change them. Another constraint is given by financial restrictions i.e. extension is only possible with external funds. (INT-8)

The rise of the overall number of professorships at the university was due to an increase of federal revenues in the recent years. These additional revenues in a large part were used for funding new professorships. (INT-5) Related to this occurrence is the paragraph § 99, par. 3 which enabled the university to create 29 new professorships in 2011.\textsuperscript{50} However, this period where additional funds were available will be different from the time that will follow. (INT-5)

Usually, staff positions are assigned to the faculty. After the UG was introduced it was necessary to work on the profiles of the professorships of our faculty with defined names and structures. The underlying reason was to create a scientific profile that would allow finding a candidate who matches the scientific requirements (INT-9), an issue that will be of importance when discussing the effects of internal appointments. According to the subject dedication of professorships (\textit{Fachliche Widmung der Professur}) in the Development Plan 2015, the general possibilities for the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies in

\textsuperscript{50} These posts are initially limited to six years and were available for a.O. professors (in the law § 99, par. 3 of the UG described as university docents). For more information see the performance report of 2011: 30: Universität Wien, Leistungsbericht und Wissensbilanz (2011)\textsuperscript{51} \url{http://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/public/various/Leistungsbericht_WiBi_2011_interaktiv.pdf}\textsuperscript{52}. Accessed: 23.11.2013

For the sake of completeness, the model of endowed professorships should be mentioned here as well since this might be of growing relevance at the University of Vienna/Austrian universities in the years to come. These professorships are usually for a limited period of time and with a start-up funding. After the resources have been used the university can consider taking over the professorship.
establishing professorships are by a) following vacancy of a professorship at the faculty b) funding via a vacant professorship at the faculty c) funding via vacant academic positions at the faculty. Despite that, it is considered to create one professorship in cooperation with another faculty. (Entwicklungsplan 2015: 67-70)

This means in other words that the creation of complete new posts is not the rule. Creation is rather dependent on the creative ‘destructing’ of existing posts and on creating new ones out of them. Tensions occur due to the fact that faculties usually want more professorships while funds are limited. As a consequence, there is in fact limited room to manoeuvre in this matter. The strength of a dean for example can be measured according to his/her ability of moving professorships within the faculty. (INT-5) Another constraint at the moment is given by the fact that many posts at our faculty are occupied by a.O. professors51 which limit the room to manoeuvre with regards to staff planning and composition. Before the new law became active it was reasonable to write the habituation/to become a.O. professor in order to obtain civil servant status before this status under the new law would not be granted any longer. (INT-10, INT-9, INT-4)

Important in this respect is the internal university administration system, the personnel-point-system: the position of a full professor cost 4 points, a.O. professor 3, post-doc 2, and prae-doc 1 points. The personnel points of the Department of Economic and Social History amounts to over 100 points. The amount is determined which means that it is not changeable or only changeable in negotiations with the rector with regards to a new professorship (incl. extra prae-/post-doc positions). The dean of our faculty has the possibility to redistribute some points between the departments, “but de facto no one does it because it is very conflictual”. (INT-8, own translation)

4.2.3 The pre-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure

The room to manoeuvre for our department with regards to personnel policy occurs as follows: it is possible to make recommendations with regards to dissolving prae- and post-doc positions in benefit of professorships (or the other way round). However, this step is unlikely

51 a.O. professors (Außerordentlicher Professor) have civil servant status which is usually granted after writing the habilitation. However, this is an expiring function/title; as a consequence of the new law it is no longer granted. A.o. professors are members of the non-professorial group (Mittelbau).
because all existing positions fulfil a certain task. Practice in recent years was to re-staff vacant positions which de facto meant that there was no opportunity to create new professorships. It was only possible to change the profiles and to emphasise specific aspects which in the case of the department profile was an emphasis on global studies. (INT-8)

These negotiations on the profile start in the department, and usually every scientific member is involved in the discussions. Due to different status and seniority, some opinions are informally more important than other opinions but nevertheless it is tried to achieve consensus. These departmental discussions are followed by a meeting with the dean and the attempt of convincing him/her about the modifications on the profile. If it is approved by the dean, modifications would enter the negotiations on target agreements between faculty and rector/ate, and if approved by the rector/ate, it would be written down in the target agreements and eventually in the development plan. Thus, the profile of a professorship is dependent on scientific traditions of and the modifications by the department. In other words, a strong influence of the department occurs in these matters. (INT-8)

So far we have elaborated how positions are created, and figured out possible rooms to manoeuvre within the overall university policy and within the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies. By having investigated how the internal faculty manoeuvring rooms occur with regards to the Department of Economic and Social History and their influence, it is now time to focus on their influence in the search and selection phase. By doing this, we have now approached our intermediate level and the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of Vienna.

4.3 Intermediate level: search and selection

This section describes our intermediate level and deals with the search and selection mechanisms in the recruitment process. The questions of interest are: How is the position announced? Who are the possible candidates? How is selection taking place and under what aspects is it executed? Who are the relevant actors? And finally, how is authority (influence and power) dispersed? This section is about the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of Vienna with emphasis on the departmental point of view. Our main focus is to
explore how the university implemented the statutory provisions and how the relevant actors interact with each other.

4.3.1 The Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of Vienna

Background information

The Professorial Appointment Procedure is outlined by several university groups and websites of the University of Vienna, with slight differences in the formal description. In order to provide a better overview, information on the appointment procedure can be found as follows at the University’s websites:

- Administrative implementation of appointment procedures
- Appointment procedure at the University of Vienna
- Chart Appointment Procedure

These documents/information are not presenting alternative versions of the appointment procedure, they are rather complementary. Nevertheless, our two relevant sources here are the official document ‘Appointment procedure at the University of Vienna’ and the chart ‘Appointment procedure’. The document on the process description (which is five pages long) shall be presented here abbreviated but nevertheless detailed enough for analysis (for full German version see web-link below). Despite that, the chart on the appointment procedure will serve as an additional help by visualising the described phases and formal steps of the Professorial Appointment Procedure.

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52 Administrative implementation of appointment procedures:
Universität Wien, Neue Professuren an der Universität Wien, Administrative Durchführung von Berufungsverfahren (2013)

53 Appointment procedure at the University of Vienna (German), official document, based on resolution by rectorate, source:
Universität Wien, Berufungsverfahren an der Universität Wien (2013)

54 Chart Appointment Procedure:
Universität Wien, Berufungsverfahren - Graphische Darstellung Ablauf Berufungsverfahren (2013)
[https://berufungsverfahren.univie.ac.at/home/?no_cache=1](https://berufungsverfahren.univie.ac.at/home/?no_cache=1), Accessed: 23.11.2013
The different stages of the Professorial Appointment Procedure

I. Arrangement and overview

Purpose of the first stage is structuring the whole procedure. Rectorate and faculty leadership are responsible for elaborating the profile on basis of the development plan, determining the relevant subject areas (i.e. it includes also determination of professors who can make suggestions for assessors), discussing process and documentation of the procedure (incl. time plan), considerations on communication paths between committee/rectorate/senate, discussing announcement and search (strategies, potential candidate pool), and discussing purpose as well as possibilities of external members in the committee.

II. Announcement and search

Purpose of the second stage is the announcement, potential search agents, (responsibility: rectorate, faculty leadership) and the presentation of a complete candidate list incl. actively searched candidates (responsibility: faculty leadership, committee). Announcements are made in international and subject-related newspapers/magazines. Active candidate search is made through international networks/partners/search agents. Documentation on the procedure by the faculty leadership and the committee has to include: information on profile, announcement text, time frame and frequency of announcement, description on active search, information on candidates.

III. Appointment of committee and assessors

Purpose of third stage is the appointment of the committee and assessors by the senate, as well as the appointment of an assessor by the rector. Suggestions for assessors are made by professors of the subject area. Despite that, suggestions for members of the committee are made by professors, non-professorial staff, and students. The senate appoints the committee, if possible with external members. Appropriate representation of women in the committee has to be considered. Assessors are appointed based on suggestions of professors of the subject area. The senate informs all members and assessors on their appointment and provides information about process and rules of the Professorial Appointment Procedure. The Working Group on Equal Opportunities receives information on composition of the committee; the rector is to be informed. Normally, the rector can appoint an external assessor (not member of

55The term ‘rectorate’ in the following pages refers to the responsible member of the rectorate according to the assignment of tasks.
the appointment committee) considering suggestions of professors of the subject area. Senate, assessors, and selectee are to be informed. Documentation on the procedure by the committee has to include: senatorial notice on appointment of committee and assessors, appointment of assessor by the rector, information for the Working Group on Equal Opportunities.

IV. Task of committee and assessment

Purpose of the fourth stage is that the committee produces a pre-selection list and an invitation list. Invitations are sent by the committee/faculty leadership. If necessary, an active candidate search can be enabled. The committee creates a pre-selection of candidates, divided into different groups: not suitable candidates (group 3), limited suitable candidates (group 2), and suitable candidates (group 1). The assessors receive applications of suitable (group 1) and limited suitable candidates (group 2), and make well-founded suggestions with emphasis on group 1. Proposals for the hearings are made on basis of the assessments (invitation list). The Unit for Quality Assurance (UfQA) comments the invitation list, and makes a formal examination of the pre-selection list. The rectorate approves/complements pre-selection list and invitation list. Documentation on the procedure by the committee has to include: assessments of candidates, reasons for invitation list and excluded candidates.

V. Hearings and appointment proposal

Purpose of the fifth stage is to make an appointment proposal, and to submit documentation on the whole procedure to rectorate and UfQA. At this stage the presentation (hearings) of the candidates takes places. Relevant subject areas are invited. The committee makes an appointment proposal on basis of assessments and comments, considering presentation of and discussion with the candidates. Documentation on the procedure by the committee has to include: final report including overview of procedure, reasons for decisions on candidates (pre-selection, hearings, and appointment proposal), voting results, timetable, comment of the dean with regards to the procedure and the proposal.

VI. Assessment and selection decision

Purpose of the sixth stage is to open the appointment negotiations (responsibility: rector). The personnel division makes a formal examination according to laws and rules. The UfQA gives an opinion in terms of content. After consulting the rectorate, the rector makes a general examination of the procedure, and decides whether to approve or to reject the appointment
proposal. Both senate and faculty are to be informed in this matter. Documentation on the procedure has to include: formal examination of procedure (by the personnel division), contentual statement concerning appointment proposal (by the UfQA), and potential additional assessments (by the rectorate).

According to our sources and this first examination, following actors have been identified in the Professorial Appointment Procedure; basically, we can split them into two categories:

Table 13: Group 1 - Academic actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Department/Subject area <em>(Fachbereich)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Faculty/Centre, Dean <em>(Fakultät/Zentrum, Dekan/Zentrumsleiter)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rector/ate <em>(Rektor/at)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senate <em>(Senat)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Appointment committee <em>(Berufungskommission)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ University professors <em>(Universitätsprofessoren)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Non-professorial staff <em>(Mittelbau)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Student(s) <em>(Studenten)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assessors <em>(GutachterInnen)</em>, appointed by senate and/or rector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Candidates <em>(Berufungskandidaten)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Working Group on Equal Opportunities <em>(AK Gleichbehandlungsfragen)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arbitration Commission <em>(Schiedskommission)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14: Group 2 - Administrative actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unit for Quality Assurance, UfQA (<em>Besondere Einrichtung für Qualitätssicherung, BEfQS</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human Resources and Gender Equality (<em>DLE Personalwesen und Frauenförderung</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Professors' Appointment Consulting Service (<em>Stabstelle Berufungsservice</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By looking at these groups it becomes apparent that we have divided them roughly into academic and administrative actors. Group 1 is mainly dealing with the search and selection process while Group 2 is more concerned with controlling the procedure according to formal rules and supporting the academic actors in this respect. Our main focus clearly lies more on the actors of Group 1 rather than Group 2, since we try to examine the leeway and dynamics that occur during the appointment procedure. In this respect we will exclude mostly the Working Group on Equal Opportunities as well as the Arbitration Commission from our discussion since these actors are mainly concerned with anti-discrimination issues according to their legal status. They and group 2 are rather attending control-actors than being actual decision making bodies.

In the now following passage we are trying to explore the different academic actors of the Professorial Appointment Procedure according to the interplay between them from the perspective and influence of our department. However, it is more important to provide a reconstruction of the processes rather than producing a factual report.
The influence of the department on the appointment procedure

- Nomination

In the beginning, the scientific members of the Department of Economic and Social History reflect on possible assessors and members of the committee and make suggestions. These suggestions are sent to the next level which are the groups of the faculty (Kurien, e.g. professorial group and non-professorial group) and usually approved by the groups. There may be changes in the composition; diversity is important which means the committee should have members from different departments but as a general rule, this is often anticipated by the
department. (INT-8) Aim in the composition is not to be too narrow with regards to the discipline. It is important to involve the surroundings/other disciplines, which is discussed between the head of department and dean in the forefront. In this way it is also discussed which persons are available. (INT-4) The suggestions are sent to the professors of the senate and are usually approved by them but not always. One issue in this respect is that one assessor should be an external one, but ‘external’ is not defined by law. There is a different understanding of it, e.g. it could imply from another university, within Austria, or abroad. Sometimes the senate accepts the suggestions/definition and sometimes not, which leads to conflicts and rejection.

- Composition

As a rule, the committees are staffed as follows: professors have a majority with five members, non-professorial staff has three members, and students have one member. (INT-4) The chairman of the committee - who is most influential - is naturally a member of the department of the particular professorship. (INT-10) A problem in the compositions emerges because of the gender quota (40% have to be female). Because of their limited number at the faculty it happens often that the same women are participating in the appointment committees. (INT-4)

The question of who participates in the committee is generally of importance because different personalities and attitudes have a distinct influence on the decision. Some people are more active and more convincing than others, and as a consequence more influential. (INT-11, INT-12) For example, not everyone studies or can study the documents/applications intensively i.e. some are well informed while others are not, and thus have better/poorer arguments. This leads sometimes to situations where “single opinions have more importance than others, more importance than actually allowed”. (INT-8, own translation) Despite that, members can sometimes be categorised according to national-oriented vs. international-oriented. (INT-11) Since there have been many international appointments, more international professors are now sitting in the committee having a different attitude than locals. (INT-4)

- Assessors

In general, the reports of the (external) assessors are very important since the committee makes its decision based on the reports. As mentioned above, the department makes suggestions and determines the choice of the assessors in the forefront. (INT-4) An important
power factor with regards to the assessors is that the rector can nominate an additional extern assessor (nominated by the quality agency). This happens occasionally in order to control certain procedures. Usually, it does not happen if procedures are correct and consensual. But if the rector explores dissent and inconsistencies in the final reports, an additional external assessor is introduced. This is a possibility for the rector to get a better overview/an additional perspective of the procedure and to come to an own conclusion. However, this is not publicised internally and most likely did not happen in the department procedures. (INT-8)

- Selection

When it comes to the assessment of the candidates the habilitation is not that important anymore, and there is an increasing focus on external funding. (INT-10) Based on the applications, the committee makes a pre-selection of the candidates and ranks/divides them into three groups. These categories are sent to the assessors who assess the candidates. The candidates are then discussed in the committee on basis of assessments made by the assessors, and invited for a lecture/presentation. At this stage there are also discussions between the candidates and the appointment committee about different matters (e.g. staff, when to start, demands, etc.) Afterwards they are ranked (first, second, third) and this proposal is sent to the rector. (INT-11) Formally, these three positions are equal but informally/traditionally they are ranked, and the rector usually accepts this ranking. But in this respect, professors now have less power because the rector still could choose anyone on the list to negotiate with and not necessarily the first position (despite that, he/she could also reject the complete list). (INT-8)

- Appointments of the department

In comparison to other appointment procedures at the university, the Department of Economic and Social History did not have to deal with major problems regarding their appointments. (INT-7) Minor limitations had to be made according to the demanded profile of the professorships which were not always carried over 1:1 into the development plan. Occasionally, the focus on global studies could have been even stronger. (INT-10) Another specific problem was that the application lists were imbalanced in terms of gender. There were not many (suitable) female applicants. (INT-8, INT-10) Despite that, the appointments of the department were assessed as being ‘harmonic’ which means that no intense disputes in the forefront or in the faculty groups took place. (INT-4) In addition, it is likely that no

56 In German described colloquially as Vorsingen, ‘to sing to somebody.’
additional external assessors were introduced in the departmental procedures. (INT-8) The department did well in staffing the professorship i.e. all posts are staffed and feedback from other members/parts of the university was positive. (INT-12)

Comments on the administrative actors of the appointment procedure

The administrative actors who are supporting the appointment procedure in terms of quality and process are mainly the Human Resources and Gender Equality division, the UfQA and the Professors’ Appointment Consulting Service due to their cooperation between each other.

The Human Resources and Gender Equality division is responsible for the formal examination of the appointment procedure and whether the procedure was conducted within the framework of existing legislation. The UfQA supports rector/ate, senate and committee in the assessment and evaluation of candidates. The UfQA fulfils certain service- and quality-related aspects. On the one hand - as outlined in the process description - it provides various templates for procedure documents/documentation. On the other hand, it functions as a control actor in quality terms. It provides comments on invitation list, examination of pre-selected candidates (groups one, two, three), and commenting the appointment proposal. Finally, it assesses candidates and can make suggestions for additional assessments. Hence, at this stage it is an important supporting actor for the rector/ate by providing information and evaluations on the particular appointment procedure. (INT-8) The Professors' Appointment Consulting Service gets active when the appointment committee is sending the terna-list to the rector/ate and prepares the appointment negotiations between candidates and rector/ate. (INT-6) The preparations include e.g. collecting and editing the necessary data of the candidate. Before the actual negotiations start the dean/faculty will be contacted and asked about possible contributions of the dean/faculty. On this basis, the rector/ate can propose an offer to the candidate concerning salary, demands, and equipment. (INT-6) Another important task of the service is the personal assistance of the candidates. This includes various issues, having the purpose of supporting the integration of candidates/appointees (e.g. apartment search, family related assistance, dual-career aspect). (INT-6)
4.4 Final level: employment conditions

We have now come to our final level of our recruitment process. Structurally, we link tightly to the intermediate level and focus on the last stage of a (successful) recruitment cycle. In so doing, we are looking at the post-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure: Who is negotiating? And how do negotiations look like? Finally, we deal with employment conditions and lead to our analysis and discussion chapter.

The rector plays a special role in this section because he/she concludes the Professorial Appointment Procedure. Since this is by nature a sensitive topic, this paragraph does not include sensitive information on employment conditions of departmental professors (neither have these information been requested nor have they been revealed). As a consequence, following information are more related to negotiation dynamics and employment conditions in our faculty within the polity of the university; still, they have some impact on our department. As we have already mentioned we are more interested in the reconstruction and in getting an idea of the procedure rather than document past events.

4.4.1 The post-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure

- Appointment negotiations

Usually, the rector begins to negotiate with number one on the list but in fact he/she does not have to. For the dean it is necessary to convince the rector and to show the will to provide equipment and support from the faculty if a specific candidate is favoured. If engagement is absent (incl. not providing equipment and extras), this is usually a signal for the rector that the respective candidate is not that important which means that these appointments are likely to fail. (INT-9)

Thus, for successful negotiations it is of relevance that dean and rector agree between each other. Especially with regards to equipment and support the contribution by the dean/faculty is important; the rector can be helpful with respect to salaries and providing extras. (INT-9)

Our department has no insight view or influence in the negotiations between rector and candidate except from granted extras for the professor that are passed to the department. (INT-8)
• Problems

Failed or extended negotiations occurred because of disagreements (e.g. on salary, staff, equipment, etc.), if a rector did not accept the list, or if members of a committee have different opinion on the candidates. (INT-11) A problem that occurred in the past and that seemed to continue to a certain extent was that usually the ‘best’ candidate was wanted but it was unlikely that he/she would agree. For example, apparently it occurred that candidates (mainly from Germany) wanted to strengthen their position at their home university but actually seemed to have had no intentions to come. (INT-6, INT-11) In other words, candidates only used the negotiations with the university to improve their situation (salary, equipment, etc.) at their home university. (INT-10)

A related problem of the former recruitment practices was e.g. if the third candidate on the proposal was chosen ‘sloppy’ by the committee. For example, it occurred that proposal lists were created where the first two candidates were excellent candidates but very unlikely. Or negotiations with the first and second candidates took a long time, and eventually failed which meant that the third candidate almost had the post for sure; someone with an insufficient profile-match. Therefore it was sometimes better to call for new proposals, also because the candidate situation has changed. However, here it was again necessary to talk and to discuss with the related subject areas. (INT-7, INT-9) Consequently, appointments can be a time intensive matter. A department specific problem in this respect occurred due to the fact that one certain appointment negotiation took a long time (over one year). (INT-11)

• Recruitment strategies

The recruitment policy of the university was in former times characterised by internal/local appointments and/or non-transparency. (INT-12) Recruitment in own circles - which was highly dependent on internal acquaintances - was the traditional career path i.e. it was quite common to stay at the university and climb up the academic career ladder. (INT-9) However, an active internationalisation strategy was pursued in the recent decade. (INT-4) Internationalisation - including international appointments - is an explicit policy of the university. (Entwicklungsplan 2015: 9) As a result, internal appointments have become -

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57 At this point it is necessary to point out that the term ‘internal/local’ is not strictly limited to internal appointments. For example in our case it applies also to appointments within the disciplines (i.e. under circumstances also beyond university borders), an issue which will be discussed when looking at internationalisation and quality issues in our analysis.
although officially possible - very unlikely in the recent decade. (INT-4) Special attention is
given when a.O. professors apply (INT-7) and since applications from internals are not
‘welcome’, they are approved only in exceptional cases i.e. one has to be significantly better
than other applicants. (INT-8) Due to this policy, resistance emerged at the level of non-
professorial staff who began to feel disadvantaged (INT-4, INT-9) and developed reservations
against newcomers.\(^{58}\) (INT-1, INT-4, INT-8, INT-9)

An important strategic instrument for the university presents the shortened appointment
procedure. However, this procedure was too limited (short) before the UG 2009 and thus has
been extended through this amendment. In simplified terms, the procedure takes place as
follows: there is no appointment committee, the dean collects the applications and asks the
professors of the related subject areas about their opinion. The dean forms an appointment
proposal which will be sent to the rector. Both can, but do not have to appoint assessors;
however, involvement of assessors is usually practice. An advantage of this instrument is that
it is possible to appoint/headhunt candidates right after they receive important grants. On the
other side it can prevent ‘good’ scientists to go abroad if they received an offer from other
universities. (INT-7) Despite that, it is possible to convert short appointments to permanent
positions after candidates have been undertaken the appointment procedure § 98 (INT-7). It is
therefore also an opportunity for the university to look at candidates more precisely before
they obtain a permanent position at the university. (INT-5)

### 4.4.2 Employment conditions

The old salary scheme was structured in fixed categories, teaching and exams for example
were paid additionally. Now the salary for professors became negotiable, with ‘all-in-
contracts’ (e.g. including teaching) with performance-based incentives, i.e. loan adjustments
and agreements on evaluation. (INT-6) By discussing employment conditions we want take
up on an issue which has been introduced in our section on legal changes (regulatory
framework): the change from civil-servant to employee status of future professors. Associated
with this change was also the problem of bringing different legal and pension aspects with
regards to the appointment procedure into accordance during the transition period. (INT-7)

\(^{58}\) This seems to be a problem which does not only apply to the department and the faculty, but to the whole
university.
An issue which apparently continues to exist is the appointment of German candidates. Salary and pensions schemes of civil servants are different than in Germany (INT-12) and thus leads to some problems in the negotiations. (INT-6, INT-9)

In general, the new (organisational) autonomy of the university led to more autonomy in financial matters as well. (INT-5) In combination with the transition from civil servant into employee status, a higher salary spectrum for professors became possible (INT-3, INT-8) also in comparison with Germany. (INT-9, INT-12) This led to competitive advantages in appointment negotiations in comparison e.g. to the universities of Zurich and Munich. (INT-7) On the other hand the new minimum salary of professors was perceived as quite low. (INT-3, INT-8) However, it seems that with regards to our department, the (local) average salary structure is taken into consideration before salary negotiations with new candidates/appointees are conducted. (INT-8) Nevertheless, due to this change a broader spectrum in terms of loans emerged which hence is characterised by non-transparency and limited knowledge about earnings of (other) professors in general and at the department. (INT-10, INT-12)

After having explored the recruitment process and the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the university from the perspective of the department, it is now time to come to an overall assessment. Let us therefore analyse and discuss our findings more detailed in the next chapter. There we will bring in our variables and try to categorise and elaborate the development of the recruitment process with regards to our case.
5 ANALYSING PROFESSORIAL RECRUITMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

This chapter represents our second analytic stage and is in fact our analysis and discussion of findings chapter. Here we will position and evaluate professorial recruitment according to our variables. In other words, this chapter is analysing and discussing our findings from the proceeded chapter by classifying them within the variables centralisation, formalisation and standardisation, and flexibility.

Our overall question was how practices of institutional autonomy are changing with regards to the professorial recruitment. We have divided these questions into two sub-categories: what has changed formally and what has changed informally. Having these two sub-questions in mind, we will look at our variables and analyse and discuss the findings according to them. The idea behind this is to assess outcomes and effects of the professorial recruitment by focusing on the interaction between executive structure and department.

The two general assumptions were as follows: university reforms lead to the emergence of an executive structure that would limit departmental influence severely. But on the other side the university is a bottom-heavy institution, and the executive structure is dependent on substantial impulses from the bottom.

5.1 Centralisation

This variable is connected to the question of authority, and distinguishes between formal and informal (dependant on personal authority rooted in expertise) authority. In order to assess the dispersion of authority, questions of interest are e.g. where decision making is taking place, which of the persons is in charge, or what the constraints are.

The important question in our case is to estimate how authority is dispersed, by identifying relevant actors and their responsibility. Our specific questions are: where does decision-
making take place? Who controls (human) resources? And who controls the recruitment process?

5.1.1 Influence from a heavy bottom: departmental authority

As our findings have shown the department still has substantial influence on the recruitment process. Defining and modifying (own) professorships is highly dependent on the input from the department. Despite that, suggestions on assessors and appointment committee are emerging mainly at the departmental level. This means that to a certain extent departmental influence on candidates is translated by the appointment committee via the senate. Even if it concerns the shortened appointment procedure, input originally emanates from the bottom after being requested by the dean and before sending it to the rector. A reason for this bottom-heavy authority might be that superior authorities only have rejecting power, in practice

"it is impossible for superior authorities to staff the commissions or nominate assessors without being suggested by the departments first. Thus, the departments have a broad manoeuvring with regards to decide on assessors and members of the committee." (INT-8, own translation)

5.1.2 Representation of interests and power centre: senate, appointment committee and assessors

Senate, appointment committee and assessors together are the power centre when it comes to the search and selection phase of the recruitment process. Latter - committee and assessor - become especially important at the end of this phase. Reason is that the senate empowers the appointment committee; de jure the appointment committee will be the power centre then. Concerning the composition of the committee, professors are now more influential at the cost of non-professorial staff and students because they have a majority. The decision of the committee on candidate selection is usually approved if the selection process was consensual.
In terms of interest-representation, assessors can be closer either to the bottom or to the executive structure. In other words, dependent on the particular situation they can be an important instrument for both sides when it comes to decision-making in the appointment procedure. It seems that the growing emphasis on external and independent assessors/assessments acknowledges their suggestive power. They play an important role when making suggestions on candidates. And as long as there is consensus, the committee decides without interference in terms of that no additional assessors come into play. However, when decision-making and power is unbalanced it is common that additional assessors are introduced. Their reports on candidates are therefore of important evaluative power, and are actually more influential than just ‘tipping the scales’. 59 (INT-6)

5.1.3 Powerful intermediary: dean and faculty

The faculty has formally power over the professorships but de facto internal faculty power balance is characterised by non-interference which means that traditional paths are continued. The same holds true for the faculty groups when it comes to the composition of committee and assessors: these (departmental) pre-decisions are usually approved. However, as we have seen the dean can be a powerful actor and it is usually also dependant on his/her notion whether the dean wants to perceive his/her role more creative or more administrative. In other words, the faculty has the opportunity to be either more perceived as executive structure or as an extension of departmental interests. This issue applies especially to the pre- and post phases of the appointment procedure.

Here the influence is given by deciding on the profile of the professorship in negotiations with department and rector/ate. In addition, influence becomes visible when it comes to the final selection of a candidate. The dean can make an appointment more likely when signifying the rector that he/she favours the candidate. The reason why dean/faculty are or can be powerful at the endpoints of the appointment procedure is that posts and resources are assigned to the faculty. As a result, the dean can be supportive by providing them. Still, in this respect - and this refers to his/her intermediary role - the dean is dependent on impulses from the

59 An important fact in this respect is that the hearings of the candidates are rather assessments than getting to know each other. Final rankings/appointment proposals are made after having assessed the candidate more detailed. (see especially Novak 2007: 23)
department (scientific input, proposals and suggestions, traditional paths) and on the acknowledgement of the rector/ate (approval, cooperation).

5.1.4 Counterbalance and strategic actor: the rector/ate

A crucial change is that the last decision in the appointment procedure is now up to the rector and not the ministry any longer. Because the rector has more power and is ‘closer’ to the academic domain, he/she can be an important counterbalance in the appointment procedure. This applies e.g. to a coherent university strategy in contrast to particular department strategies. In the centre of this contest is e.g. the internationalisation and quality strategy. There has been a growing focus on internationalisation and appointing from abroad in contrast to appoint locally or only on suggestions of the academic domain. The rector possesses in addition two useful tools with the shortened appointment procedure and the higher salary spectrum in order to pursue such strategy.

The main power source is the rejection on which the rector can build his/her decisions. This becomes clearer when looking at internal appointments or appointments which would not meet quality standards in terms of the most suitable candidate for a particular professorship. The fact that they have become unlikely is because of an active strategy and the possibility of interference at important stages of the selection process. For example, the rector only has to accept the list partly. This means he/she can only negotiate with candidate number one and two but not with candidate number three. This puts him/her into a powerful position e.g. if a special candidate is favoured or even not. This is an important counterbalance and a visible limitation of bottom power with regards to the final selection. (INT-7, INT-9) However, we have to insert a limitation of his/her power right here; this strategy can only function when senate and faculty cooperate i.e. being aware of relevant criteria (e.g. internationalisation, quality aspect) at their stages of influence since the actual power centre at a certain stage remains the appointment committee.
5.1.5 Informative power: control mechanisms

The actors dealing with anti-discrimination issues ensure equal treatment and are informed after selection processes have been made. Their power emerges on basis of procedural errors mainly in terms of not having considered (or anticipated) non-discrimination issues. As a consequence, they only have limited rejecting power. The administrative actors are mainly concerned with the assessment of formal procedures and administrative support especially at the end of the appointment procedure. However, the influence especially of the UfQA should not be underestimated because the rector can get ‘valuable’ support from it. Because qualitative mechanisms get active at several later stages of the selection process (UfQA comments on invitation list/pre-selection list and appointment proposal) the rector receives information and better access to the committee’s work, and can come to a (different) conclusion on this basis. Hence, although this agency is neither a decision-making nor a rejecting power, it is an informative power which means that it reveals and opens the procedures.

5.2 Formalisation and standardisation

Formalisation: The extent of written and filed communications and procedures. Special attention has to be given concerning the source of formalisation (legal requirement vs. individual ideas). It is to assume that a more in autonomy and accountability leads to a more in formalisation: managerialism as a product of increased autonomy claims formalisation of internal communication and procedures. In addition, accountability (performance and result oriented) is dependent on formalisation in order to present measurements to third parties.

Standardisation: Deals with making certain procedures (e.g. concerning decision-making, information procedure, implementation) repeatable after a given set of rules. Despite that, roles are dependant and related to these procedures (qualifications, performance, status, reward) and thus not based on personality characteristics.

The reason why we combine formalisation and standardisation in this section is that they are correlated since standardised procedures need to be formalised before working properly. As a consequence it is easier to evaluate the recruitment process when discussing these two issues together since they relate to the same elements of interest that shall be examined here.
Concerning formalisation it is important to look at the extent of written and filed procedures at the recruitment process. In simplified terms, it is important to focus on what kind of information, to what purpose, and for whom. With Standardisation we want to evaluate a standardised dimension (occurrence, characteristics) of the recruitment process with the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the centre of discussion.

5.2.1 Formalisation: strategy, accountability and transparency

Long term planning or - in other words - development planning has become an important factor at the University of Vienna. Especially the current Development Plan 2015 is representative for a coherent university strategy. Since professorships play a special role within research and teaching, their role and appointment matters especially in terms of the research profile of the university. The chapters of the development plan about subject dedications at the different faculties attest this circumstance. They are the consequence of (long) preceded negotiations between different levels within the university (=> target agreements) e.g. about future profiles of (new) professorships. The accomplishment of own set goals becomes e.g. visible in the performance reports which are published annually since 2010.

If we take development plan and performance report exemplary, they stand for a university development which can be characterised by strategy and accountability. Textualisation in this respect is necessary for two reasons. First, it is relevant to document defined goals and future plans in order to refer to them at a later point if they have been achieved or not. Second, the distribution of resources is made conditional on their achievement (=> accountability). These two issues lead to a circumstance which coincidently is the precondition for successful accomplishment according to their measurement: transparency. In order to evaluate and adjust strategies and procedures it is necessary that these are unfolded. But the underlying rationale is actually much more trivial: in order to measure something, it first has to be made measurable. In other words, before evaluating procedures it is generally necessary to create them.

If we look at the Professorial Appointment Procedure this becomes apparent by the official procedure document and the documentations that have to be made according to it. The stages
(I-VI) are outlined and the documentation on information at the different stages emphasised. Thereby several issues are concretised and to a certain extent regulated. One reason for this might be that information on the different stages and issues in the appointment procedures have to be forwarded to different actors and have to be comprehensible over extended periods of time. However, the accuracy of information displays the quality of transparency and thus leads to an aspect which is in the centre of all the efforts: the quality of appointments. This quality can only be ensured if transparency and information flow exist, and therefore documentation is emphasised. The importance of quality and its formalisation becomes obvious by the statement of one respondent who points out that there were no incentives for quality under the old appointment polity. (INT-7)

5.2.2 Standardisation: ensure quality

The standardisation of the appointment procedure is necessary to ensure the quality aspect continuously and to guarantee iteration once an appropriate mechanism is found. The fundamental question in this respect must then be: how is quality defined? As long as it concerns the recruitment process, the most apparent answer is internationalisation. This issue becomes clearer when relating it to the issue of internal or - from the quality perspective - unwanted appointments.

International orientation as a determinant of quality seems to permeate the recruitment in many respects. With regards to a general benchmark and the structure of the appointment procedure, Zurich (with the University of Zurich) and Munich (LMU) are mentioned as role models. (Development Plan 2015: 13, INT-7) The underlying rationale seems reasonable: due to size, national importance, history and profile the comparison with other (research) universities has to go beyond Austria. Zurich and Munich both have universities of international reputation with similar (research) profile. In order to compete with them an international recruitment policy is crucial for the international profile and the reputation of the university.

Of interest in this respect is the equation of internationalisation and quality. In order to receive the best persons for one discipline the candidate pool has to be broader than the own junior staff, unless they are exceptional better than other candidates. The reverse side of internal
appointments - from the perspective of the executive structure - are appointments which do not meet quality criteria. This applies to appointments which in former times usually defied control from other (superior) bodies. In other words, appointment committees have been a “world of their own” (INT-6, own translation) where superior bodies accepted the decision without questioning them or without having the possibility to question them. If quality and transparency are perceived as two sides of the same coin, then these appointments were and are unwanted because their realisation has not been comprehensible. Since this practice usually applied to internal and local networks\(^{60}\), the scope of possible candidates had to go beyond these and their selection had to be according defined mechanisms that would assure quality. The gender aspect of candidates in this respect is just an intensifying factor.

The mechanisms that assure quality are as follows: active search has to ensure that the ‘right’ candidates are to be found, and thus also candidates who have not applied actively are included.\(^{61}\) (see e.g. Development Plan 2015: 33) This is connected with the fact that announcements are now open/public and international. Another mechanism applies to the need of external and ‘independent’ assessors. They are perceived as ensuring objectivity and make (past) situations in the appointment procedures comprehensible. Administrative and legal actors are supportive and to a certain extent control agents so that relevant decision makers can make their decision on this basis. Their common aim is to ensure a balance between male and female candidates or quality in terms of an international search of candidates.

However, even if standardised mechanisms support such an approach, this approach is also dependent on the relevant (decision-making) actors. In this respect it should be mentioned that it took - according to the interviews - some time until the senate appreciated its role as relevant control body; de jure the senate is the decision-maker of the appointment committee. However,

“\(\text{r}ight \text{a}fter \text{ther} \text{e} \text{m}plementation \text{of} \text{ther} \text{UG} \text{2002}, \text{the} \text{senate} \text{decided} \text{not} \text{to} \text{intervene} \text{a}nd \text{to} \text{leave} \text{this} \text{task} \text{to} \text{the} \text{faculty} \text{to} \text{assemble} \text{the} \text{appointment} \text{committee} \text{which} \text{meant} \text{that} \text{old} \text{traditions} \text{were} \text{continued.}\)” (INT-7, own translation)

\(^{60}\) Local networks with this regards applies to disciplinary connections/acquaintance within or beyond Austria; suggestions and decision making on candidates for professorships were often not comprehensible for higher approval bodies. One objective of recruitment practices was - as one candidate said - to limit the power of the ‘academic oligarchy’. (INT-7)

\(^{61}\) See stage ‘II Announcement and search’ of the Professorial Appointment Procedure.
Only recently, with the changes in the UG 2009, the senate seemed to appreciate increasingly its role as a

“quality counterbalance in contrast to former practices: it proves proposals, quota, internal/external assessors, takes a broad representation of disciplines into account, involves competent scientists, and is cautious with regards to internal candidates.”

(INT-11, own translation)

5.3 Flexibility

Flexibility: Describes the ability to change in terms of organisational structures and procedures. One special feature is related to the ability of absorbing environmental influences. The ability is measured according to vehemence and pace.

Finally, how are the actors dealing with the professorial recruitment framework, e.g. how has the university but especially the department absorbed the influences from its environment especially with regards to (internal) university reforms? What are the outcomes/practices of a changed professorial recruitment?

5.3.1 Absorption

With regards to professorial recruitment and appointment procedure the university reforms seem to have limited impact on departmental influence. The university is still a bottom-heavy institution and this is especially true in our case with regards to the departmental possibilities of shaping the profile of their professorships as well as staffing the committees. An intensifying factor in this regard is apparently the respect and acceptance behaviour of the departments within the faculty and between the departments. There are traditional ways of handling certain issues, e.g. re-staffing professorships and dissolving positions as an exception. In addition, it has been confirmed that there are no tensions to a certain extent with the faculty or within the faculty. It seems to be common accepted practice not to intervene in other department matters: “[t]he changes look more severe in the law than in practice.” (INT-8, own translation)
Another possible explanation why departmental influence in the appointment procedure is only limited to a certain extent seems to be the fact that changes occur at the level above, the level where final decisions are approved. Acceptance in this respect is ambivalent. On the one side it is accepted that there are traditional ways of ‘doing something’ and to leave things to a certain extent as they are. On the other side it is also acknowledged that new mechanisms (internationalisation, quality) in the recruitment process are needed in order to develop and to meet the challenges of a new *zeitgeist*. With regards to the recruitment process in general and the appointment procedure in particular one issue should serve as an example of how things can be balanced within the university: anticipation. The practice of having a broad composition (gender balance, including other subject-related areas, etc.) with regards to appointment committee and assessors is - as one respondent said - often anticipated and therefore at higher levels approved. This anticipation is eventually an acknowledgement of new practices, whereas the formal approval from higher authorities is an acknowledgment of the departmental room to manoeuvre.

5.3.2 Confrontation

The reverse side of flexibility is resistance. In other words, resistance dampens flexibility and is an expression of reluctance. Problems in terms of resistance and missing acceptance occur due to the outcomes of some new recruitment practices. Although this issue is very difficult to grasp it has been thematised constantly in the interviews: the special relation between Austria and Germany or the relation between locals and newcomers. Indeed, many members of the university are Germans and the number of members of international origins grows constantly. As we have found out, the traditional path of an academic career was to obtain hopefully a professorship at the own university. Every professor who came from abroad has limited this opportunity. Resentments have therefore mainly occurred at the level of non-professorial staff, and seem to permeate to a certain extent until the present day.

However, due to the fact that internal appointments are de facto not possible, newcomers are per se not direct rivals of local non-professorial staff any longer but the outcome of an unwanted trend. This latter issue refers to a more general and social phenomenon. Former practices might be softened or changed with new generations of academics. But even if many traditional paths are perpetuated in academic life, the internationalisation and gender factor
will surely have an important impact on local structures. In simplified terms, there has been a traditional milieu characterised by mass education and local recruitment practices which continuously has to face international, meritocratic and more competitive shaped elements. The question of whether this cultural change is - like a respondent said - a “clash of cultures” (INT-11) or a merging of tradition and modernity will be dependent on the notion and the arguments of the particular members of the university.
6 CONCLUSIVE COMMENTS

6.1 Starting point

Our starting point in Chapter 1 was to look at reform impacts on university personnel policies. When it comes to the recruitment of professors, professional control played a substantial role. However, universities have been facing several reform attempts which have also targeted personnel policies. University reforms are transforming the organisational structure of the universities. Thus, in order to understand the reproduction logics of academic recruitment, one has to consider the institutional and organisational dimension of the university as well. Reasons for changes or the main drivers behind this are growing societal expectations towards the university. A solution was seen in a new university autonomy that would allow universities more room to manoeuvre while emphasising the need for accountability. In this respect, the institutional leadership and management (executive structure) of the university should get more strategic control over university matters like e.g. personnel policies.

One question of interest was how this phenomenon would occur at Austrian universities. The university system in Austria was characterised by a strong academic oligarchy, a weak institutional leadership and a distant ministry. Several reforms in the recent decade have dissolved this relationship gradually. The reforms of the UOG 1975 took massification and participation rights of the non-professorial staff into account and transformed the university into a democratic university. In the following time ministerial distance and state bureaucracy were questioned increasingly. With the UOG 1993 different autonomy concepts and the influence of rector and dean became increasingly important, and laid the foundation for the UG 2002. The new institutional autonomy of the UG 2002 emphasised a strong institutional leadership, and the relation between state and accountability issues is regulated by performance agreements. How would these university reforms eventually impact personnel policies and professorial recruitment in the university?
6.2 Research question and answer

Our research question was how practices of institutional autonomy are changing regarding the recruitment of professors, and we were concerned with the formal and informal changes of the recruitment process. The question of interest was, what would happen when new executive structure and academic oligarchy, rooted in discipline and displayed by the departmental level, meet in the professorial recruitment in the backdrop of a changing university framework. The initial assumption was that a strong executive structure would constrain departmental influence. On the other side it was also assumed that departmental influence is further important and that the executive structure is dependent on it. In order to satisfy our research interest, we have been focused on the professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna and the interaction between executive structure and departmental level, represented by the Department of Economic and Social History.

Our findings have shown that the executive structure constrained departmental influence only to a certain extent but nevertheless with important outcomes. This applies especially when it comes to the final selection of candidates. An appointment procedure has been established where quality mechanisms interfere and where the executive structure can intervene if it comes to the conclusion that appointments would not meet quality criteria in terms of the best candidate. However, the executive structure and actors in the appointment procedure only have rejecting power. De facto, it is not possible for them to ‘craft’ the recruitment; the selection of candidates might constrain departmental influence but not the input that arises from it. The department wields its authority by sending important impulses in defining profiles and staffing decision making bodies like the appointment committee. This two-folded occurrence of change and continuity becomes apparent when looking at our categorisations: in order to classify the extent and ‘quality’ of change, we assessed professorial recruitment according to centralisation, formalisation and standardisation, and flexibility.

Centralisation in the professorial recruitment exists in the sense that law provided rector/ate and senate with more power. Despite that, appointment procedures are not only accepted but increasingly reviewed from different actors and by different (quality) mechanisms. But, as a matter of fact, it seems to be more appropriate to refer to the recruitment process as a system of checks and balances. In other words, the department keeps its influence from below. When it comes to the final selection though, this influence has to be seen in the light of a coherent university strategy which can interfere correctively according to a preferable outcome (e.g.
internationalisation, no internal/non-transparent appointments, transparency). To put it simply, change in the recruitment process then occurs as follows: decisions from the department in former times were accepted unquestioned, now they are accepted after being questioned occasionally by the superior authorities.

This becomes especially visible when looking at the conditions of why they are being questioned. As we have seen, the reasons behind formalisation and standardisation are that internal/non-transparent appointments are generally of ‘bad’ quality whereas international appointments are of ‘good’ quality. Executive structure and quality mechanisms can function as a filter which filters departmental input until a desired outcome stays over. (External) assessors, active (international) search, and international announcements are eventually instruments for one specific purpose: to support a strategy where the last consequence is to submit a fragmented development - carried by the particular interests of the departments - to a coherent university strategy.

The department but also the university as such meet these new circumstances by anticipation. This anticipation has an ambivalent occurrence: the department accepts new power balances in decision making when it comes to a coherent university strategy. Superior authorities acknowledge the fact that traditional paths are to a certain extent continued. Damped flexibility refers more to the outcomes of a general and cultural change that the evolving recruitment modus produces. Since internationalisation and new definitions of quality lead to a changing composition of university staff, different perspectives and new practices are introduced which clash and/or merge with former traditions. However, when looking at vehemence and pace of university reform changes, it can be at least questioned if it was not more appropriate to classify them as evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

6.3 Further research

Since this was a case study at one department of a university it was possible to research professorial recruitment more in-depth. However, the advantage of such an approach could be more valuable if being compared to several cases or several departments respectively. In this regard, it will be of interest to see the results of the FLAGSHIP project and what their constant research reveals.
This approach could be either related to departments within one faculty or between several ones, as well as within one university or between several. In so doing, it could be possible to identify common disciplinary patterns when it comes to professorial recruitment. Since university reforms are an ongoing topic it could be also of scientific interest to see how other fields, like e.g. research and teaching policies on the departmental level and in the university would respond to reform changes. This would improve the understanding of university functioning in general, and provide valuable insight on the working floor of a university.
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Appendix

Interview guide (abstract, translation)

Introduction

Overview of thesis and research project

Research: practices of institutional autonomy concerning professorial recruitment (from the perspective of the Department of Economic and Social History)

Confidentiality issues

Interview

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  • Agenda, time schedule, funding | • Development planning  
  • Practices under new appointment laws § 98 and § 99 of the UG |
| Interpretation/possibilities of the faculty/institute/university/particular actor within the recruitment process  
  • Subject dedication/profile, appointment committee, etc. | • Tradition vs. reform  
  • Internationalisation  
  • Gender quota  
  • Internal appointments  
  • Nepotism  
  • Terna-list  
  • Personnel policy |
| Power balance within professorial recruitment  
  • Special focus: within the faculty and the department, room to manoeuvre between the departments, in interaction with other university groups/actors of in the recruitment | |
| Change  
  • outcome/improvements/disadvantages of the current recruitment process | |

Conclusion

Additional information of respondent

Information from interviewer, next steps of work

62 Dependant on particular actor/interview partner