

Intra-Party Diversity and Ministerial Selection in Coalition Governments*

Hanna Bäck

Department of Political Science, Lund University

Hanna.Back@svet.lu.se

Marc Debus

School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim

marc.debus@uni-mannheim.de

Wolfgang C. Müller

Department of Government, University of Vienna

Wolfgang.Mueller@univie.ac.at

Paper for presentation at the workshop 'The Importance of Constitutions', in Istanbul, October 23–25.

* Marc Debus is grateful for the support from the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* and Hanna Bäck is grateful for the support from *Riksbankens Jubileumsfond*.

Abstract

The literature of cabinet governance differentiates between various models of decision-making in coalition cabinets. This is not only for the reason that the interests of plenty political actors from parties and parliaments play a role in the political process, but also due to different constitutionally provided institutional settings. In this paper, we focus on the allocation of politicians to cabinet offices in various settings. On the basis of the principal agent-approach, we argue that cabinet ministers are appointed with the aim of minimizing the policy distance to the most important principal, which could be the Prime Minister, the coalition, or the individual parties that form the coalition. We select Austria, Germany, Ireland and Sweden as political systems where coalition governments are common, but where the head of government either has strong (Germany), medium (Ireland and Sweden) or only weak (Austria) legal means to exercise influence on the ministers. We thus expect that the appointment of cabinet members in Germany, but potentially also in Ireland and Sweden should be more in line with the policy preferences of the PM, whereas Austrian parties should focus on the policy position of the coalition when deciding which politician should become a minister. We evaluate our hypotheses by estimating the policy positions of Austrian, German, Irish and Swedish MPs and cabinet members on the basis of a computerized content analysis of their speeches given in parliament. The results, derived from a logit model predicting cabinet membership, support our argument, and show that when controlling for a number of important variables, the policy distance towards the most important principal is important for becoming a cabinet member.

Introduction

Influential studies made in comparative politics in recent decades (see e.g. Laver & Shepsle 1996) suggest that ‘a crucial intervening link between party policy and government action is the control of relevant ministries in the government’ (Bäck et al. 2011: 441), which stresses the importance of understanding how ministers are selected in parliamentary democracies. Much of the previous literature on portfolio allocation has assumed that parties can be seen as unitary actors, and researchers have focused on predicting either how many ministerial posts each party receives (e.g. Warwick & Druckman 2006), or which portfolios each party receives (see e.g. Laver & Shepsle 1996; Bäck et al. 2011). However, it is clear that intra-party groups exist with programmatic viewpoints that diverge from the one of the party core, and previous research shows that these groups play an important role in coalition bargaining processes in general and in portfolio allocation in particular (see e.g., Luebbert 1986; Maor 1995; Debus & Bräuningner 2009; Giannetti & Benoit 2009).

In this paper we follow this literature and assume that intra-party politics matter when determining how portfolios are allocated. The main aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of why specific politicians are appointed to specific ministerial posts. To make this contribution, we draw on the previous literature on ministerial selection and de-selection or turnover (see e.g. Dowding & Dumont 2008). This literature relies heavily on principal-agent theory and takes its starting point in the so called ‘parliamentary chain of delegation’ (see e.g. Strøm 2000). The focus here lies on the third step in this chain, where the PM is seen as the principal delegating power to the individual ministers as department heads. One way of minimizing problems of ‘moral hazard’ – that line ministers act in a way that does not coincide with the wishes of the principal – is to try to appoint ministers whose interests do not clash with the principal’s interest (Kam et al. 2010: 2). Our main hypothesis draws on this idea and says that politicians are more likely to be appointed to ministerial office the closer their own policy position is to that of the principal. What complicates matters is that politicians may have several, competing principals (Carey 2007), and we suggest that who is the ‘dominant’ principal depends on the institutional setting where portfolio allocation takes place. In settings where the PM has strong agenda-setting powers, he or she is likely to be the dominant principal, whereas other actors are likely to take this part in settings where the PM has few competencies.

To evaluate these arguments we select Austria, Germany, Ireland and Sweden as political systems where coalition governments are frequent, but where the head of government either has strong agenda-setting power, as is the case in Germany, ‘medium’ power (Ireland and Sweden) or only few competencies, as is the case in Austria (see, e.g., O’Malley 2007; Strom et al. 2008). We thus expect that the appointment of cabinet members in Germany, but also in Ireland and Sweden should be guided by the policy preferences of the Chancellor, whereas Austrian parties focus on the policy position of the coalition when allocating portfolios. We evaluate our hypotheses by estimating the policy positions of MPs and cabinet members on the basis of a computerized content analysis of their speeches given in parliament. The results, derived from a logit model predicting cabinet membership support our argument: even when controlling for a number of important variables, we find that the policy distance towards the most important principal is important for becoming a cabinet minister.

Theory and previous research

The literature on portfolio allocation and ministerial selection

Both the theoretical and empirical relevance of coalition formation explain why it has been a favorite subject for political scientists for over half a century. Most studies have typically focused on predicting which parties form government or which government type will emerge. A smaller body of literature focus on how payoffs are distributed amongst partners (see e.g. De Winter & Dumont 2006). Most of the studies that aim at explaining portfolio allocation more specifically have focused on the ‘quantitative’ aspect of portfolio allocation, and several authors have asked the question of ‘how many ministerial portfolios does each party receive?’ These authors have followed in the footsteps of Browne and Franklin (1973) who found an almost perfect one-to-one proportionality between the share of portfolios received by a party participating in a governing coalition and the share of that party’s coalition parliamentary seats, a relationship dubbed ‘Gamson’s Law’ (see Gamson 1961; Warwick & Druckman 2006).

Some authors have focused on the more ‘qualitative’ aspect of portfolio allocation, or the question of ‘who gets what in terms of ministerial payoffs, and why?’. The assumption is that parties may have specific portfolio preferences since ‘each party has a particular set of policy concerns, seeing control over a specific portfolio as an instrumental means of advancing these’ (Laver & Schofield 1990: 183), given a certain degree of ministerial autonomy (see e.g., Budge & Keman 1990; Bäck, Debus & Dumont 2011; Laver & Shepsle 1996). Most of these studies have in common that they are based on the assumption that parties can be seen as unitary actors. The importance of relaxing the unitary-actor assumption has been stressed in the literature on government formation (see e.g. Bäck 2008; Giannetti & Benoit 2009). Laver and Schofield (1998: 16) draw on the work of Luebbert (1986) and argue that intraparty tensions systematically influence bargaining, more specifically, tensions should negatively affect parties’ ability to enter government. Laver and Shepsle (1996: 250) theoretically illustrate the importance of intra-party politics for the allocation of ministerial portfolios among the coalition parties, suggesting that the ‘party is not a unitary actor, since there is a diversity of policy preferences among its senior politicians.’ Hence, a number of policy positions could be proposed as credible bargaining outcomes depending on which specific senior politician is selected as minister. We here build on this literature focusing on the role of intra-party politics.

We also draw on the growing literature on ministerial selection and de-selection or turnover (see e.g. Dowding and Dumont 2008). Whereas portfolio allocation studies have focused mainly on the role of political parties, research on the selection of ministers has instead focused on individual-level characteristics, such as the age, education and parliamentary background of ministerial personnel (see e.g., Blondel & Thiébault 1991). One of the main results in this literature is that a parliamentary background is the main career path for becoming a minister (De Winter 1991). Recently, the field of ministerial turnover or cabinet reshuffles has become a popular topic, focusing on explaining why certain ministers sit longer on their posts while other ministers are moved to different posts or ‘fired’ (e.g. Dewan & Dowding 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008). Predictions in this field have for example been made about what type of cabinets should produce more turnover, and empirical research shows that reshuffles are less likely to occur in coalition governments (see e.g. Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2008), due to the fact that the PM is constrained by his or her coalition partners when making personnel decisions.

The study that comes closest to what we aim to do in this paper is the one by Kam, Bianco, Sened and Smyth (2010). In this article, the authors promote a characterization of intra-party politics that explains how rank-and-file party members control the delegation power to their cabinet ministers. More specifically, they frame ministerial selection as a principal-agent problem where principals have to ‘work to ensure that their ministers [...] are behaving as faithful agents behind closed doors of the cabinet office’ (Kam et al. 2010: 1). The authors stress the importance of determining who is the principal in the ministerial appointment process. Focusing on the British case, the authors suggest that this process could either be under the control of the party leader, making the leader the main principal, or party backbenchers could function as a ‘collective principal’ to the ministerial agents.

Hypotheses about ministerial selection in various institutional settings

In this part of the paper we derive specific hypotheses about ministerial selection in various institutional settings. As mentioned above, we here take our starting point in the so called ‘parliamentary chain of delegation’, which suggests that power-relationships in a parliamentary democracy can be described as a chain, where citizens in a first step delegate power to representatives, who in turn delegate power to a cabinet and a PM, who delegates power to line ministers (see e.g. Strøm 2000). The focus here lies on the third step, where the PM is typically seen as the principal delegating power to the individual ministers as department heads.

More generally, PA theory has identified two main threats to the principal’s ability to control the agent: ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’. The problem of adverse selection arises when the principal does not have access to relevant information about potential agents. Moral hazard problems, on the other hand, arise when agents, once they have been selected, have motives to act in ways that are contrary to the principal’s interests (Strøm 2000: 270-271). Applied to ministerial selection, the PM faces a problem of adverse selection because at the time of appointment, the PM does not have complete information about a minister’s abilities and preferences to run a department effectively and in accordance with the wishes of the PM. Moral hazard problems can arise in this relationship because, as described by Indridason and Kam (2008: 624), ‘all ministers have motive and opportunity to use their portfolios in a manner that runs against the PM’s interests’. One reason for this is if ministers become too aligned with their portfolio and the sectoral interests associated with it (‘going native’) (Bäck et al. 2012). While ministers can ‘go native’ in any system, one reason specific to coalition systems is that ministers adhere to individual parties and their interests rather than to the collective goals of the coalition (Müller & Meyer 2010).

According to PA theory, there exist a number of mechanisms to mitigate the threat of agency loss (Strøm et al. 2011). PA theory usually distinguishes between *ex ante* mechanisms, that apply before power is delegated (efforts to sort out good agents), and *ex post* mechanisms which represent ways to contain agency loss after delegation. Parliamentary democracies often lack *ex post* mechanisms providing credible oversight, while the *ex ante* control mechanism of screening and selecting candidates plays a central role for aligning the preferences of the candidates for key political offices (Strøm 2000). This extensive screening of prospective parliamentarians as well as potential cabinet members is often assumed to be performed by centralized, cohesive, policy-oriented political parties (cf. Müller 2000). Dismissals of ‘bad’ ministers or ‘rematching’ of portfolio and talent serve to mitigate problems of adverse selection

ex post (e.g. Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2008). ‘Rematching’ ministers and portfolios can also be seen as an instrument to deal with moral hazard problems (see Indridason & Kam 2008).

Our focus on ministerial selection rather than de-selection implies that we do not concentrate explicitly on such *ex post* mechanisms. Instead, we frame ministerial selection as a delegation problem where the aim of the principal is to mitigate problems of agency loss, more specifically moral hazard, by relying on *ex ante* screening mechanisms. The question is how can the principal, here assumed to be the PM, be sure that the line ministers act in accordance with the wishes of the PM? One answer is to select those individuals for cabinet membership whose policy preferences are as close as possible to the PM’s own preferences (Kam et al. 2010). Our main hypothesis draws on this simple idea and stipulates that *politicians are more likely to be appointed to ministerial office the closer their own policy position is to that of the principal’s*.

As indicated above, the story has to be somewhat modified since it is not certain that the PM is the main principal in the ministerial appointment process, and – as stressed by Kam et al. (2010: 1) – it hence becomes very important to determine *who is the principal* in this process. We here elaborate on an argument that is based on the idea that politicians may have several, competing principals. Such arguments have, for example, been made in research on parliamentary voting unity. Carey (2007: 93) argues that ‘all legislators are subject to the influence by at least one principal: their legislative party leadership’, and whether they are influenced by other, competing principals depends on the institutional context in which they act.

We suggest, applying this argument to ministerial selection, that even though the minister as an agent has to face several, competing principals, it is likely that we can identify one actor (individual or ‘collective’) who can be characterized as the main or ‘dominant’ principal. Just as Carey (2007) argues about party unity, which competing principals are at hand (and who is the ‘dominant’ one) depends on the institutional setting where ministerial selection takes place. Such an argument has also been made by Kam et al. (2010: 1), who present two competing hypotheses about ministerial selection, where the first one, the so called ‘leadership hypothesis’ characterizes the party leadership as the main principal, and the second one, the ‘party government hypothesis’ portrays the party backbenchers as a ‘collective’ principal. The Kam et al. (2010) study however focuses on the British case of single-party majority governments and does not develop an argument about the various principals that ministers face in coalition cabinets and how different coalition governance ‘regimes’ as institutional settings influence which actor is the ‘dominant’ principal in the ministerial appointment process.

Andeweg (2000) discusses the various principals that cabinet ministers face and argues that ministers may be seen as ‘double-agents’, in the sense that they act on behalf of two principals: both the minister’s own party and the government as a whole (or the PM) can be seen as delegating power to the individual ministers, who are then accountable to both of these principals in return.¹ Similarly, Müller and Meyer (2010: 1070) identify two broad delegation relationships within coalition governments. First, parties (as principals) delegate power to party leaders and MPs (as agents), who are assumed to pursue the goals of their parties in government and parliament. Second, the coalition (i.e. the parties in government as a ‘collective’ principal)

¹ We recognize, of course, that many PMs are also party leaders. Yet in the position of PM they have to keep the coalition together and for that purpose must tame their party political inclinations. Such moderation can also be useful electorally if it makes them appear as statesmen rather than mere party politicians.

delegates power to the cabinet and the individual ministers (as agents), who are expected to realize the goals of the coalition. Hence, what makes things more complicated in coalition governments is that the ministers do not only face their own party (leaders and ‘backbenchers’) as a principal, but also a PM who may not be their party leader but still has some institutional prerogatives, and the coalition as a whole.

Already simplifying things, we argue here that a cabinet minister faces three different principals. First, following the work by Carey (2007) and Kam et al. (2010), we suggest that, in representative democracies, ministers always face their own party as a principal. In some situations, such as the British single-party cabinets, the party (leaders or backbenchers) may be the main principal of the ministers. Therefore, this ‘collective’ actor should guide ministerial selection. Relying on such an argument, we can specify a ‘party government’ hypothesis: *politicians are more likely to be appointed to ministerial office the closer their own policy position is to the party’s position.*

In other situations, for example in coalition governments, the minister may, as suggested above, instead face several competing principals, where we can specify two alternative hypotheses. First, the coalition as a ‘collective’ actor consisting of several parties may act as a dominant principal. We therefore specify a ‘coalition government’ hypothesis, saying that *politicians are more likely to be appointed to ministerial office the closer their own policy position is to the coalition’s position.* Second, the Prime Minister as a leader of the government may be characterized as the main principal in the ministerial selection process. Accordingly, we specify a ‘prime ministerial government’ hypothesis saying that *politicians are more likely to be appointed to ministerial office the closer their own policy position is to the PM’s position.*

The question is, when should we expect that these various principals ‘beat’ the other principals and become the dominant one? Andeweg (2000: 380) suggests that we can take the rules surrounding cabinet government as a starting point when assessing whether the institutional design of various governments meets the requirement of ‘being more than the sum of its ministers’. In the case of low hierarchy in the cabinet, Andeweg (2000: 381) argues that the minister faces no superiors, but we should of course not forget that the minister always faces the party as a principal, suggesting that we may here be dealing with a case of ‘party government’. Strong hierarchy in terms of a Prime Minister with extensive formal (and informal) powers would instead imply that the PM acts as the main principal. Hence, we are here dealing with a case of ‘prime ministerial government’.

However, Andeweg (2000: 383) also suggests that even in the absence of extensive prime ministerial powers there may be a functional equivalent of a powerful Prime Minister in the form of a collective coalition leadership. One manifestation of this would be the inner cabinet, usually composed by the PM and the leaders of the other governing party/parties if they are also members of the cabinet. Another manifestation is the so called ‘coalition committee’ which usually brings together the leaders of the parties in government and the governing parties in parliament, and other members of the parties’ leadership. A mechanism that could potentially constrain ministerial agenda-setting powers, also discussed by Andeweg (2000: 384), is the government or ‘coalition programme’, typically drafted by the parties at the time of government formation. Previous research has shown that most coalitions write coalition contracts or agreements, and even though they are difficult to enforce ‘they establish what the coalition requires the ministers to do’ (Müller & Meyer 2010: 1074). Research has also shown that the

length and detail of coalition agreements varies widely across countries (see e.g. Müller & Strøm 2008), and that we can expect that the more detailed the policy agreements are, the lower the probability that ministers pursue policies not acceptable to the other parties in the coalition (Müller & Meyer 2010). We will here, for simplicity, label all cabinets where the coalition imposes some sort of hierarchy (e.g. through a coalition committee or a comprehensive coalition agreement) as examples of ‘coalition government’. Yet, nominating ministers for designated cabinet posts typically remains a privilege of the individual parties in the coalition. Having a coalition agreement and a coalition committee that can enforce coalition authority on individual ministers does not automatically lead parties to nominate ministers that take positions close to the one of the coalition. However, it could be the anticipation of the individual parties what might work: Nominating relatively centrist ministers could help keeping at bay unproductive conflict and serve both the individual parties and the entire coalition.

Methods and data

Research design: a comparative case study of four governments

In order to test our hypotheses, we build on the typology developed by Andeweg (2000). We need, first and foremost, variation across the constitutionally provided power of the Prime Minister, which we argue that we achieve by studying ministerial selection in four countries: Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden. In addition, information is required that allows for identifying the policy positions of potential cabinet members, which are, in most cases, the MPs and elected officials on the sub-state level (see below how such information is derived).

In particular the constitutionally provided power of the head of the cabinet, or Prime Minister, varies between countries. The datasets by Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008) and O’Malley (2007) allow for identifying the power of PMs inside the cabinet in a quantitative manner. While the PM of countries such as the United Kingdom or Germany receive very high scores on an index that indicates a strong power of the head of the cabinet in terms of agenda-setting and cabinet decision-making, the different indices provided by Strøm et al. (2008) and by O’Malley (2007) show that, by contrast, the power of the Austrian, Belgian, Dutch or Icelandic PM is rather weak, and countries like Ireland, and Sweden in later years, have a ‘medium-powered’ PM (Bergman et al. 2003).² These findings are in line with qualitative analyses of cabinet decision-making, which not only take institutional, constitutionally provided features into account, but also focus on contextual approaches and the historical development of patterns of decision-making in the executive of a political system (see, e.g., Blondel & Müller-Rommel 1993; Andeweg 2000; Andeweg et al. 2011). In the following, we focus on four states that (in the time period studied here, 1997–2007) allocate different degrees of power to the PM, with Germany having the strongest PM (an ‘institutional power’ score of 14 according to

² Some authors who have studied the Irish *Taoiseach* have stressed the powers of the PM office, for example Farrell (1994: 79) calls the PM the ‘master of the Cabinet’ and according to O’Leary (1991), the Irish PM is potentially more powerful than any other European PM (Bergman et al. 2003: 193). However, we here focus on the institutional powers of the PM, where according to Bergman et al. (2003) the Irish PM does not have powers that come close to the UK or German PMs.

Bergman et al. 2003), Ireland coming in second (score=8), Sweden having the third strongest PM (score=6), and Austria, with the weakest PM in our sample (score=4).

Taking a closer look at the more extreme cases, Germany and Austria, it also becomes clear that other reasons than the different strength the constitution assigns to the head of the cabinet supports this argument. In the case of Germany, for instance, Niclaß (2004) emphasises the strong position of the Chancellor when it comes to the decision-making process inside the cabinet and the formulation of future policies. This strong position originates not only from the content of article 65 of the German constitution, which emphasizes the so-called 'Richtlinienkompetenz' of the Chancellor in terms of policy-making (Saalfeld 2000: 37), but also from the precedent in government style set by the first Chancellor of Germany since the Second World War, Konrad Adenauer (CDU). While cabinet decision-making in Germany could thus be described as close to the ideal type of 'prime ministerial government', the Austrian constitution, by contrast, hardly allocates any specific powers to the Chancellor that go beyond the 'doomsday devices' of appointment and dismissal (or, to be precise, making such proposals to the head of state). The first and third section of article 69 of the Austrian constitution simply say that the Chancellor is the head of the government; the government can make decisions if more than the half of all cabinet members are present in a meeting. The latter implies that it is not necessary that the Chancellor is present when the cabinet decides on, for instance, a law proposal. Hence, we expect that the PM is an important principal in the German case, and potentially in the Irish and the Swedish cases, but this is not likely in Austria.

Within these institutional contexts we are studying four coalition governments: the government that formed between the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) in 1997 in Austria (*cabinet Klima*), the government that formed between the Greens (*Grüne*) and the Social Democrats (SPD) in 2002 in Germany (*cabinet Schröder*), the cabinet formed between the Conservatives (*Fianna Fáil*, FF), the Greens (*Comhaontas Glas*), and the Progressive Democrats (PD) in 2007 in Ireland (*cabinet Ahern*), and the non-socialist cabinet consisting of the Centre party (C), the Liberals (FP), the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Conservatives (M) in 2006 in Sweden (*cabinet Reinfeldt*). Hence, in all of the cases studied here, the coalition as a 'collective actor' constitutes a potential dominant principal. We suggest, however, that the dominance of this collective actor is likely to vary across contexts, and that certain indicators, such as a detailed and comprehensive coalition agreement, a clear collective actor such as a coalition committee, or a long tradition of coalition governments, can be used to characterize cases as dominated by the coalition as a principal.

Here, two of our cases stand out as clearly having a long tradition of coalitions and of detailed coalition agreements: Austria and Germany. The Austrian tradition of 'grand coalitions' between Christian Democrats and Socialists, which were in office from 1949 until 1966, from 1986 until 2000 and since 2007, should result in a rather consensual type of cabinet governance, so that not the policy position of the Chancellor should be decisive for the selection of cabinet members, but rather the policy distance of a potential minister towards the all-important and detailed coalition policy agreement (see also Strøm & Müller 2008). In Germany, however, coalition governments are also the norm and play a decisive role in the daily process of cabinet governance with a coalition committee (*Koalitionsausschuss*). As in the Austrian case, German parties also draft long and detailed policy agreements when forming a government, regardless

whether on federal or state level (see Saalfeld 2000; Strøm & Müller 2008). Hence, in Germany, we are likely to be dealing with two important principals: the coalition and the Chancellor.

Irish and Swedish parties have somewhat less experience in terms of coalition governance, suggesting that it is somewhat unclear whether the coalition as a 'collective actor' should be seen as a main principal in ministerial selection. In Ireland the basic question in the government formation game was 'Coalition or Fianna Fáil' (Laver & Higgins, 1986; see also Mitchell 2000) until 1989. Because of FF's electoral strength only a combination of almost all other parliamentary parties would have been able to establish a government without the 'soldiers of destiny' (the English translation of the Gaelic words 'Fianna Fáil'). The changes of the Irish party system – due to the emergence of the Progressive Democrats (PD) in the 1980s and the Green Party in the 1990s – made it, however, necessary for FF to accept and to participate in formal coalition governments. Yet, the formed coalitions between FF and PD in 1989 and between FF and the Labour Party in 1992 did not last for a full legislative term, indicating that Fianna Fáil was still reluctant to govern in coalitions. As a result and because of pre-electoral pacts between Fine Gael (the major opposition party) and the Labour Party, FF formed coalitions with the small and less powerful PD in 1997 and 2002, so that FF could implement its office and policy preferences at best (Debus 2007, 2008). We thus argue that – beside the 'medium-sized' institutional power of the Prime Minister and the existence of detailed coalition agreements – these party-specific contextual features influence ministerial selection in the 2007 coalition government, which was formed between FF, the Progressive Democrats and the Green Party, and that ministers are likely to be selected in a way that they reflect first and foremost the position of the participating parties, in particular in case of Fianna Fáil.

As described by Bäck and Bergman (forthcoming), some features of Swedish cabinets stand out in a comparative perspective, for example, many of the post-war governments have been minority cabinets, often single-party governments where the Social Democrats have ruled with the support of the Left party and the Greens, sometimes even with a written 'policy' agreement between the Social Democrats and its support parties. When coalitions have formed during the past decades (three in the 1970–80s, one in the early 1990s and two after 2006), they have had a clear-cut 'bloc' political character, with the 'socialist' parties in one camp and the 'non-socialist' parties in the other. Hence, before the 2006 coalition studied here, there was no long tradition of coalition governance to 'fall back on', and there is no formal 'coalition committee'. Even so, the more recent coalitions have written relatively detailed and extensive coalition agreements, based on pre-electoral alliances and agreements (see e.g. Allern & Aylott 2009).

To sum up, we thus identify one dominant principal in Austria – the coalition – and two dominant principals in Germany – the coalition and the Chancellor. In Ireland and Sweden, it is less clear which actor is the dominant principal, since there is not an extremely strong PM or a clear tradition of coalition governance. Instead, the individual parties may therefore play a more important role as principals to the ministers. While in Austria cabinet members should be selected according to the policy distance between themselves and the coalition as a whole, in Germany not only the latter should be relevant when it comes to the selection of ministers, but also the policy distance between potential ministers and the position of the head of the cabinet. In Ireland and Sweden, a politician's policy distance to the party where he or she is a member, and potentially also to the coalition as a whole and/or the PM should be minimized in order for the politician to be selected to cabinet.

Measuring individual politicians' policy positions by analyzing speeches

A main challenge for the endeavor of evaluating the role of the policy preferences of various principals in ministerial selection is to determine the policy positions of individual politicians, more precisely of the so called 'pool' of ministerial candidates. Basically, we here face two questions that need to be answered: 1) how do we determine which actors belong to the pool of ministerial candidates?, and 2) how do we estimate the policy positions of these actors?

Kam et al. (2010) answer these questions for the British case. The advantage of looking at the determinants of cabinet membership in the United Kingdom is that ministers should be drawn from parliament, so that there is a fixed set of politicians that are candidates for cabinet offices. Even though the Austrian, German, Irish and Swedish cases differ in this regard, previous research has shown that a majority of ministers in these countries have parliamentary experience. De Winter (1991) finds that on average, about 75 percent of the cabinet members in Western Europe (during the period 1945–1984) were previous MPs. For the cases studied here, the figures were: Austria: 67.7%, Germany: 73.6%, Ireland: 95.9%, and Sweden 61.3% (De Winter 1991: 48).³ We therefore suggest that it is possible to follow the Kam et al. (2010) approach in deciding about the pool of potential ministers and think of politicians that gave at least one speech in the parliament. This definition means that we do not only include MPs in our 'pool of candidates', but also political actors like Prime Ministers or ministers from sub-state levels of the political system (such as the Länder in Germany) who are often seen as potential ministers in the federal government.

Kam et al. (2010) use surveys among candidates for the election of the British House of Commons to measure the policy positions of MPs. One major problem when applying such kind of data is the low response rate, so that – at least in case of the British candidate studies, that are used by Kam et al. (2010) – there is only information on the policy positions of 40 up to 70 percent of all elected candidates. To tackle this problem, Kam et al. (2010) impute the missing policy positions by using multiple imputation methods. Since (identified) survey data among candidates and MPs are not easily available for most countries, we instead draw information on policy positions from a content analysis of parliamentary speeches given in the legislative period *before* the formation of the cabinet that we seek to analyze. Referring to speeches to estimate the policy preferences of political actors also has a number of advantages when comparing to other approaches for estimating policy preferences of individual political actors. First, for many parliaments we have simply more cases available as recorded votes are rare in many parliaments while speeches are not. Second, with regard to the issues covered, we reduce selection bias (Carrubba et al. 2006). Although particularly controversial issues may cause more speeches, even the most uncontroversial ones will attract some. Third, voting is a blunt instrument. There are only three types of behavior: voting in favor of a proposal, rejecting it, or abstaining. Speeches allow for much more fine-grained evaluations of the issue at stake.

To analyze the speeches made in the Austrian, German, Irish and Swedish parliaments, we here rely on so called computerized content analysis. We here use the so called 'Wordscores' technique, developed by Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003), which has been successfully applied in previous studies analyzing parliamentary speeches (see, e.g., Laver & Benoit 2002; Giannetti

³ Looking at the entire post-war period up until 2006, Bäck et al. (2012) find that 91% of the German ministers had previously been MPs, and Bäck et al. (2009) show an average of 65% MPs for Sweden.

& Laver 2009). We here use *all* speeches given in the four parliaments to estimate the policy positions of potential and actual ministers over one legislative period per country – the 20th legislative period from 1995 to 1999 in the Austrian case, 14th legislative period from 1998 to 2002 in the German case, the 29th legislative period of the Irish *Dáil* from 2002 until 2007⁴ and the Swedish *Riksdag* during the time period from 2006 until 2010. Thus, similar time periods are under consideration. We estimate positions of individual MPs on two policy dimensions per country. We here focus on those dimensions that structure party competition according to the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) cleavage theory and that played a major role for patterns of party politics in many countries during the period – an economic and a societal policy dimension. While the speeches of Austrian MPs are allocated according to the nature of the committee of the *Nationalrat* that had jurisdiction over the debated issue, in Germany, Ireland and Sweden we rely on a manual identification of the general topic of the respective debate held in the parliament.⁵ Every speech held during one debate has been assigned to the same policy area.

One central and critical aspect is, however, the selection of reference texts and reference scores when applying the ‘Wordscores’ approach. When analyzing the positions of parties as unitary actors, election manifestos or basic party programs are ideal reference texts, because those kinds of political texts normally cover all policy areas that are decisive for the decision-making in the electoral arena or of competing parties when it comes to the coalition formation game. For the purpose of this paper, only selecting election manifestos as reference texts may result in biased estimates, because the corpus of words used in written political texts is clearly different from the one covered by speeches held during parliamentary debates (see, e.g., Laver & Benoit 2002). Hence, Laver and Benoit (2002), Giannetti and Laver (2005) and Bernauer and Bräuninger (2009) identified speeches given by the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition, the cabinet ministers and by the parliamentary party group leaders on the identified policy dimensions, respectively, and selected them as reference texts.

In addition to the speeches by the parliamentary party group leaders on the identified policy dimensions, we use the election manifestos of the parties for the 1999 elections for the Austrian parliament, the 2002 national elections in Germany, the 2002 elections in Ireland and the 2002 elections in Sweden, and score them with the economic and societal policy position provided by the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey. Because not every MP gives a speech in parliament that belongs to the macro-policy dimensions selected here, we cannot estimate a position of every MP on the two policy dimensions under study.⁶ In these cases, we refer to the mean

⁴ We would like to thank Alexander Herzog and Slava Mikhaylov for giving us their database on the full text of Irish legislative speeches (see Herzog and Mikhaylov 2013).

⁵ In the cases of Ireland and Sweden, we refer to the *Comparative Policy Agendas Coding Scheme* and assigned policy area codes for the respective parliamentary debate on the basis of manual coding (see Bäck et al. 2013).

⁶ In the case of Austria from 1995 until 1999, 178 of the 183 members of the Austrian Nationalrat gave speeches in policy areas that belong to the economic policy dimension, while 155 Austrian MPs gave in debates related to societal issues. The share of German MPs that delivered speeches related to the economic or societal policy dimension is significantly lower when comparing with Austria: 413 of the 669 members of the German Bundestag gave a speech on economic or welfare issues and 388 MPs spoke to issues related to societal affairs. 158 out of 164 Irish MPs gave speeches related to the economic and societal policy dimension in the time period under study. In Sweden, 334 out of 432 MPs gave at least one speech in a debate on economic policy. The number of Swedish MPs that gave a speech in a debate related to societal policy issues is higher (357 out of 432 MPs).

position of all MPs that belong to the same parliamentary party and allocate this score to the MPs that did not give a speech in the economic or the societal policy domain. In a number of cases, by contrast, MPs give at least two speeches on issues that belong to the economic or societal dimension during the legislative period. In those cases, we combine all speeches given by an MP that belong to the economic or societal policy dimension into one document, include this text in the Wordscores analysis and use this score as a proxy for the MP's position on the respective dimension. This procedure has the advantage that we do not estimate the positions of very short speeches, which may produce biased results (see Bernauer & Bräuninger 2009).⁷

On the basis of the collected documents, we can estimate the economic and societal policy position of every MP or other politician, like cabinet members or Prime Ministers, or other governmental officials of sub-national units, who gave at least one speech in parliament. We refer to data from the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey to locate the parties on the two policy dimensions under consideration in this study. On the basis of the policy positions of the government parties, we are able to measure the policy position of the coalition government as a whole. In this regard, we follow the literature on the distribution of cabinet offices in coalition governments and argue that policy payoffs are distributed to the coalition parties according to the amount of seats they bring in to the parliamentary majority of the government. Hence, we create a weighted average of the positions of the coalition parties (see Gross & Sigelman 1984). In so doing, it is possible to estimate the policy positions of two of the three principals considered here – the political party, and the cabinet as a whole. The policy position of the third principal – the Prime Minister – is measured by the content of his or her speeches given in parliament. On the basis of this data, we estimate the Euclidean distance between an MP and the different principals in a two-dimensional policy space.

Alternative predictors of ministerial selection

In order to test our expectations, we not only need data on the policy area-specific positions of each potential cabinet member and of the different principals, that is, the coalition, the individual coalition parties and the PM, but also information on various other factors that influence ministerial selection. Referring to the literature on ministerial selection (see, e.g., Dowding & Dumont 2009; Kam et al. 2010) we identify several variables that may influence the chances for becoming a minister beside the policy distances between MPs and the principals.

We first include a dummy that indicates whether an MP has already served as a member of a cabinet on the national and/or regional level. The required information for this variable was drawn from an analysis of the MP biographies provided by the different parliaments. We expect that this variable has a positive effect on the probability of becoming a minister: If an MP has served as minister in a former government and, thus, has some experience in the administration of a cabinet portfolio (regardless whether on federal or state level), he or she should have a higher chance to be appointed as a member of the next cabinet. Additionally, we take into account that parliamentary experience, measured by the duration of parliamentary membership at the national level, might affect the chances of becoming a minister. The next section presents the results of our analysis in a descriptive and multivariate manner.

⁷ We only incorporate speeches in our analysis that have 500 words or more. We do so to avoid including some short statements by the president of parliament or by other MPs without programmatic content.

Empirical analysis

Descriptive analyses of MPs' and cabinet ministers' policy positions

We begin our analysis by taking a descriptive look at the policy positions adopted by the Austrian, German, Irish and Swedish members of parliament. In addition, we discuss the estimated positions of the three principals under consideration here – the party, the coalition and the Prime Minister – in the descriptive analysis.

Figure 1 and Table 1 below shows the policy positions of all Austrian MPs – separate by party – and principals that gave a speech in the Austrian parliament during the studied period. Both coalition parties – Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the People's Party (ÖVP) – adopted rather opposite policy positions: While the SPÖ is located to the left of the centre on the economic and societal policy dimension according to the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey, the ÖVP is economically more liberal orientated and shows rather conservative positions on societal issues. Thus, the position of the coalition government is located a bit closer to the position of the Social Democrats (the SPÖ was the stronger party in the coalition government with the ÖVP). The policy position of Chancellor Viktor Klima (SPÖ), who succeeded Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in spring 1997, is, yet, surprisingly conservative in terms of societal affairs when comparing Klima's position with the one of his party. Most cabinet members of Austria's last 'grand coalition' before the ÖVP switched coalition partners and formed a government with the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 2000 adopted centrist policy positions on both dimensions under consideration. There is only one cabinet member with a policy position close to the one of Chancellor Klima, whereas the policy positions of most of the cabinet members are located close to the policy position of the 'red-black' coalition government.

Figure 1 and Table 1

Figure 2 and Table 2 below shows the policy positions all German MPs – separate by party – and principals that gave a speech in the German Bundestag during its 14th legislative period. While the 2002 election manifestos of both governing parties (SPD and Greens) are located rather close to each other – both parties adopt a rather centrist economic policy position and a progressive societal policy position (see Table 2) – a number of MPs from both coalition parties deviate significantly from the party line. Thus, there is a rather high degree of intra-party programmatic heterogeneity according to the analysis of speeches given in the parliament. The same is true for the opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP, as Figure 2 demonstrates. The estimated position of the government in terms of the coalition's programmatic 'centre of gravity' is located closer to the Social Democrats, which were by far the strongest party in the 'red-green' coalition government. The position of Chancellor Schröder (SPD) is, however, neither in line with the position of his party nor with the one of the coalition government. In his speeches given in the legislative period between 1998 and 2002, he adopted economically more liberal policy positions and rather centrist policy preferences in societal affairs. The members of the second 'red-green' coalition cabinet, which came into office in October 2002, all show rather centrist positions (see Table 2). This is in particular the case when it comes to the societal policy dimension: Nearly all cabinet members adopted more moderate policy positions in their speeches than their party did in their respective election manifestos. There is not much evidence

for a ‘party government’ model: Cabinet members from the Social Democrats and the Greens are not located close to the position of their party. Instead, their positions are – in particular in terms of societal policy – closer to the one of Chancellor Schröder.

Figure 2 and Table 2

The Irish coalition government formed in 2007 consisted of Fianna Fáil (FF), the Green Party and the Progressive Democrats (PD). FF was with 77 seats by far the strongest coalition party, whereas the Greens (six seats) and PD in particular added only few seats to the parliamentary majority of the coalition government, which was, in addition, supported by four independent MPs (see Figure 3 and Table 3 below). While the economic and societal policy position of Prime Minister Bertie Ahern (FF), which he adopted in his parliamentary speeches from 2002 until 2007, was clearly to the right of his party’s position and to most of the FF parliamentary representatives, the coalition governments programmatic ‘centre of gravity’ was a bit more centrist than Ahern’s policy position on the two dimensions under study. In general, we find that the estimated policy positions of MPs on the basis of their parliamentary speeches reflect the patterns of Irish party competition: Members of the parliamentary party group of Sinn Féin, the Labour Party and the Greens adopt relatively leftist positions, while MPs from Fine Gael (FG), FF and the Progressive Democrats are much more market liberal in speeches that belong to the economic policy domain. There is, by contrast, much more variance within the parliamentary parties on the societal policy dimension. Table 3 shows in addition that the economic policy positions of the 2007 cabinet members are particularly in line with the positions of their parties, i.e. FF, Greens and PD, and the weighted mean on the coalition government’s position. In debates that focus on societal affairs, FF cabinet members are, however, much more progressive than their party and Prime Minister Ahern.

Figure 3 and Table 3

The cabinet by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, which was in office from 2006 until 2010, was supported by a four-party coalition that consisted of the Conservative Party (M), the Christian Democrats (KD), the Agrarian Centre Party (C) and the Liberal party (FP). The Conservatives was the strongest party with 97 seats, whereas C, FP and KD controlled fewer seats in the Swedish Riksdag with 29, 28 and 24 seats, respectively. Likewise to the three other parliaments and cabinets under study, the results of our content analysis of legislative speeches show high face validity with standard placement of parties on key policy dimensions (see Figure 4 and Table 4 below). While in the all-important economic left-right dimension cohesive blocs between the four non-socialist parties M, KD, C and FP, and between the Greens, the Left Party and the Social Democrats (the ‘socialist bloc’), which are, however, less cohesive than the other parliamentary parties, becomes observable, the societal position of MPs are less structured by their partisan affiliation. Yet, Figure 4 shows that MPs from the non-socialist parties – with the exception of MPs representing the Liberal party – are slightly more conservative than social democratic, left party or green MPs.

Turning to the positions of our different principals, we find that PM Reinfeldt adopted a rather market-liberal economic policy position, which was, however, in line with the coalition

government's centre of gravity. In societal affairs, Reinfeldt was, by contrast, clearly more progressive than his own party and two of his coalition parties. This could have made him attractive for the Liberal party, which adopts explicit progressive positions on societal affairs. The members of the Reinfeldt cabinet are, however, more in line with his position and the one of the coalition than with the economic and societal policy position of their respective own party. In particular the ministers from the Liberal party, the Conservatives and the Centre party are more closely located to Reinfeldt's and to the coalition's position on the decisive economic policy dimension than to their own parties. It thus seems that in the Swedish case of 2006 the policy distance towards the Head of the Cabinet and/or to the weighted mean position of the coalition parties was decisive for becoming a minister. To figure out whether these descriptive findings remain robust when controlling for other factors that influence ministerial selection, we turn to our multivariate analysis of cabinet membership in the next subsection.

Figure 4 and Table 4

A multivariate analysis of cabinet membership

We here apply a simple logit model to estimate the determinants of ministerial selection. The dependent variable indicates whether an MP became a minister in the cabinet led by Chancellor Viktor Klima, which lasted from spring 1997 until January 2000, in the second cabinet of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the time period from 2002 until 2005, in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister Bertie Ahern (2007–2008) and in the four-party coalition cabinet led by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (2006–2010). All of the results are presented in table 5 and the most important variables are the ones that reflect the Euclidean distances between the MPs and the three different principals (PM/coalition/party).

In the case of Austria, we expected that – beside the distance towards the MP's political party – the policy distance towards the coalition should be decisive. As the results indicate, only the distance between a potential minister and the coalition has the expected negative impact on the chances to get appointed as a minister in the Klima cabinet. There is, however, no statistical evidence that the policy distance towards the party of the respective MP – SPÖ or ÖVP – has a statistically significant and negative impact on the likelihood to become a minister. We thus find partly support for our argument that highlights the importance of policy distances between different principals when it comes to the selection of ministers in the case of Austria in 1997.

Table 5

Is ministerial selection in Germany influenced by the constitutionally provided strong position of the Chancellor? The results provide some empirical evidence for this expectation. Even when controlling for further variables that should affect ministerial selection, we find that an increasing distance towards the policy position of Chancellor Schröder on the economic and societal policy dimension decreases the chances to get appointed as minister in his cabinet formed after the 2002 federal election. The distance towards the position of the coalition is also negative as expected and reaches standard levels of statistical significance. There is, however, a positive effect of the distance of MPs towards the position their party, indicating that MPs with

a very different position from the SPD or Greens had higher chance to get cabinet office in 2002. While this is in contrast to our theoretical considerations, it might help to explain the high degree of intra-party conflict the German Social Democrats experienced in the 2002–2005 legislative period, in which Schröder stepped down as party chair in 2004 and called for earlier elections of the Bundestag one year later.

Since the Irish Prime Minister has rather ‘medium’ power according to the literature on cabinet governance (e.g., O’Malley 2007; Strom, Müller and Bergman 2008), we expected that in particular the distance to the parties a potential minister belongs to matters for getting a position in the cabinet or not. We also argued that the position of the coalition as a whole should not be particularly decisive since Fianna Fáil has traditionally a ‘special’ position towards coalitions and rejected to participate in any coalition until the beginning of the 1990s. As the results in table 5 indicate, it is indeed the policy distance between an MP and his or her party that is decisive for getting a ministerial position in the Ahern cabinet.

We expected a decisive impact of the policy distances between potential ministers and the position of their party and of the coalition as a whole in the case of Sweden. The results of the regression analysis presented in table 5 shows that the results are in line with our expectations: the larger the Euclidean distance between an MP belonging to either M, KD, FP or C to the position of his/her party and the weighted mean position of the coalition government is, the smaller is the likelihood he or she was to become a member of the Reinfeldt cabinet in 2006. Hence, the result that the position of the PM matters and the position of the party does not matter, which were indicated in the descriptive results are not replicated here.

Looking at the control variables included in our models, we can see at least one more general pattern: in all of the cases, except for the newly formed 2006 Reinfeldt coalition government, previous executive experience matters for ministerial selection. Hence, politicians that had been a member of the previous government are significantly more likely to become cabinet members in the Klima, Schröder and Ahern governments. Parliamentary experience also seem to matter to some extent, where the year variable exerts a positive effect of ministerial selection in three of the cases (Klima, Ahern, Reinfeldt), but this effect is only significant in the Irish case. Hence, Irish politicians are more likely to become ministers the longer their parliamentary career. This is, however, not the case for ‘dinosaurs’ of the Irish parliament, i.e. MPs that were in office for a very long time: the effect of the squared number of years has a negative significant effect, indicating that neither freshman nor long-serving representatives have better chances to get appointed as cabinet members at least in 2007. For Sweden, we also find a significant effect of holding a party leadership position: if a Swedish MP was part of the party leadership of the four coalition parties in the time period between 2002 and 2006, then he or she was much more likely to receive a cabinet post than MPs who did not belong to the party leadership.

To sum up the results, we find some support for our expectations: While in Austria and Sweden the policy distance between MPs and the programmatic ‘centre of gravity’ of the coalition government is decisive for ministerial selection to some degree, in Germany it is the policy distance between a potential minister to the Chancellor which is decisive for becoming a cabinet member. In Ireland, however, only the distance towards the coalition party matters for cabinet membership. The distance towards the party of an MP is, decisive for the selection of ministers in Sweden and Ireland, but surprisingly, not for the selection of ministers in Austria and Germany – in states often described as strong ‘party democracies’.

Concluding remarks

The literature on cabinet decision-making differentiates between numbers of different models that allow for approaching this topic of comparative government in an empirical manner. While the dominant perspective is that in coalition governments each party selects its ministers in a way that the party – as the principal – can enforce its policy positions at best, this point of view ignores that constitutional constraints and coalition *raison* could limit the role of parties in the process of ministerial selection and cabinet decision-making.

In this paper, we argued on the basis of the principal-agent approach that, first, not only political parties are a ‘principal’ when it comes to the selection of ministers in coalition governments, but that also the constitutional powers of the PMs on the one hand, and the institutionalization of policy-making in coalition governments on the other hand can be relevant for the selection of ministers in coalition cabinets (see Müller 2000). Secondly, we build on the growing literature on intra-party policy conflict (e.g., Bäck 2008; Debus & Bräuninger 2009), and argue that coalitions and Prime Ministers make use of the individual policy positions of MPs (as potential ministers) to select ministers that have a policy position closest to the coalition or the head of the cabinet (see Kam et al. 2010).

The findings, which were based on the analysis of ministerial selection and the estimation of policy preferences of Austrian, German, Irish, and Swedish politicians, provide some evidence for our argument: While in Austria, where the Chancellor as the head of the cabinet has rather limited power in cabinet decision-making, ministers are selected in accordance to the policy distance between themselves and the coalition government, in Germany, by contrast, the programmatic position of the Chancellor, who has significant agenda-setting power in cabinet decision-making, plays a very important role when it comes to the selection of ministers. In two of our cases (in Ireland and Sweden), the party also seems to be one of the dominant principals in ministerial selection, supporting the expectation that in these countries, with less of a tradition of coalition governance (and a medium-powered PM), the party may still dominate ministerial selection. However, we also find that in the case of Sweden, the coalition seems to be an important principal, in addition to the party, which is in line with the fact that the so called ‘Alliance’, which had a relatively detailed policy programme and a clear pre-electoral alliance.

These conclusions are, however, based on the analysis of only one cabinet per country, so that we might get different effects when looking at further time periods and different types of coalitions. One might expect that, for instance, the role of the PM is always rather low in coalitions formed between equally strong parties. A further avenue for research combining principal-agent theory, intra-party policy conflict and ministerial selection could lie in the inclusion of a qualitative perspective of portfolio allocation (e.g., Budge & Keman 1990; Bäck et al. 2011). The respective principal could assign a rather unimportant ministry to an MP with a policy preference deviating from the most important, ‘dominant’ principal (e.g., Druckman & Warwick 2005). To find answers to such questions, we have to enlarge our sample so that we increase the variation in terms of institutional arrangements and party competition and coalition politics. The political systems of Western and Eastern Europe and the varying degrees of intra-party heterogeneity offer plenty of possibilities to test ministerial selection and processes of decision-making in single- and multi-party governments, which suggests that research questions related to these topics of comparative politics seem to be a fruitful avenue for future research.


References

- Allern, Elin H., and Nicholas Aylott (2009). 'Overcoming the Fear of Commitment: Preelectoral Coalitions in Norway and Sweden', *Acta Politica*, 44, 259–85.
- Andeweg, Rudy (2000). "Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers. *European Journal of Political Research* 37, 377-395.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont (eds). (2011). *Puzzles of Government Formation: Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Bäck, Hanna. (2008). "Intraparty Politics and Coalition Formation: Evidence from Swedish Local Government." *Party Politics* 14(1): 71–89.
- Bäck, Hanna and Torbjörn Bergman (forthcoming). "The Parties in Government". In Jon Pierre (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bäck, Hanna, Thomas Persson und Henk Erik Meier (2009): Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs. The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 15, 10-34.
- Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Patrick Dumont (2011). "Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 50, 441-478.
- Bäck, Hanna, Henk Erik Meier, Thomas Persson and Jörn Fischer (2012). "European Integration and Prime Ministerial Power. A Differential Impact on Cabinet Reshuffles in Germany and Sweden". *German Politics* 21: 184–208.
- Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Jochen Müller. 2013. Who is allowed to take the floor ? The role of saliency and gender when explaining speech-making in the Swedish Riksdag. Paper presented at the 71st conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, USA, April 11-14, 2013.
- Benoit, Kenneth and Laver, Michael. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Bergman, Torbjörn, Wolfgang C. Müller, Kaare Strøm, and Magnus Blomgren (2003). "Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-National Patterns." In Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109-220.
- Bernauer, Julian and Bräuninger, Thomas (2009). "Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag. A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches." *German Politics* 18 (3): 385–402.
- Blondel, Jean and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.) (1993). *Governing together: The extent and limits of joint decision-making in Western European cabinets*. London: Macmillan.
- Blondel, Jean, and Jean-Louis Thiebault (eds.) (1991). *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*. London: Macmillan.
- Browne, Eric C. and Mark N. Franklin. (1973). "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 67: 453-469.
- Budge, Ian and Hans Keman (1990). *Parties and Democracy. Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carey, John M. (2007). "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 92–107.

- Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Montgomery, and Rebecca Schambach (2006). "Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-call Vote Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (4): 691–704.
- Debus, Marc. 2007. *Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Debus, Marc. 2008. "Office and Policy Payoffs in Coalition Governments." *Party Politics* 14 (5): 515-538.
- Debus, Marc, and Thomas Bräuninger (2009). "Intra-Party Factions and Coalition Bargaining in Germany." In Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit (eds): *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*. London: Routledge, 121-145.
- Dewan, Torun and Keith Dowding (2005). "The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity." *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 46-56.
- De Winter, Lieven (1991). "Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet." In Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiébaud (eds) *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*, pp. 44-69, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- De Winter, Lieven, and Patrick Dumont (2006). "Parties into Government: Still Many Puzzles." In Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.): *Handbook of Party Politics*, London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli: Sage Publications.
- Dowding, Keith, and Patrick Dumont. (eds.) (2009). *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing*. Routledge: London.
- Druckman, James N., and Paul V. Warwick (2005). "The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 17-42.
- Gamson, William (1961). "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review* 26: 373-382.
- Giannetti, Daniela and Kenneth Benoit (eds) (2009). *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Giannetti, Daniela and Michael Laver (2009). "Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Party Factions in Italy." In Daniela Giannetti, and Kenneth Benoit (eds): *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Gross, Donald A. & Sigelman, Lee (1984). Comparing party systems: A multidimensional approach. *Comparative Politics* 16(4): 463–479.
- Herzog, Alexander and Slava Mikhaylov. 2013. *DPSI: Database of Parliamentary Speeches in Ireland*. London: University College London and London School of Economics.
- Huber, John D. and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo (2008). "Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 102, 169-180.
- Indridason, Indridi H. and Christopher Kam (2008). "Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4): 621-656.
- Kam, Christopher, William T. Bianco, Itai Sened, and Regina Smyth (2010). "Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104: 289-306.
- Laver, Michael and Benoit, Kenneth (2002). "Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: Wordscoring Dáil Speeches." *Irish Political Studies* 17: 59–73.


- Laver, Michael, Benoit, Kenneth and Garry, John (2003). "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data." *American Political Science Review* 97: 311–331.
- Laver, Michael; Higgins, Michael D. (1986): Coalition or Fianna Fail? The politics of inter-party government in Ireland. In: Pridham, Geoffrey (ed.): *Coalition behaviour in theory and practice: an inductive model for Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 171-197.
- Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996). *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield (1998). *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: The Michigan University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein (1967). "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York, London: The Free Press, 1–64.
- Liebert, Gregory M. (1986). *Comparative Democracy: policymaking and governing coalitions in Europe and Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Maor, Moshe (1995). Intra-Party Determinants of Coalition Bargaining. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7(1), 65-91.
- Mitchell, Paul (2000): Ireland. From Single-Party to Coalition Rule. In: Müller, Wolfgang C.; Strom, Kaare (eds.): *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 126-157.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. (2000). "Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 309-333.
- Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm (2008). "Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Governance." In Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds). *Cabinet Governance: Bargaining and the Cycle of Democratic Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. and Thomas M. Meyer (2010). "Meeting the Challenges of Representation and Accountability in Multiparty Governments." *West European Politics* 33: 1065-1092.
- Niclaß, Karlheinz (2004). *Kanzlerdemokratie*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- O'Malley, Eoin (2007). The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey. *International Political Science Review* 28 (1): 7-27.
- Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Jonathan B. Slapin (2012). "Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (3), 520-537.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (2000). "Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement." In Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds.): *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 32-85.
- Strøm, Kaare (2000). "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 261-289.
- Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds) (2008). *Cabinet governance: Bargaining and the democratic life cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Warwick, Paul V., and James N. Druckman (2006). "The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship." *European Journal of Political Research* 45: 635-665.

Figure 1. Policy positions of Austrian MPs and different principals, 1995-1999




Comment: Own estimations based on a Wordscores content analysis of MP speeches.

Figure 2. Policy positions of German MPs and different principals, 1998-2002




Comment: Own estimations based on a Wordscores content analysis of MP speeches.

Figure 3. Policy positions of Irish MPs and different principals, 2002-2007



Comment: Own estimations based on a Wordscores content analysis of MP speeches.

Figure 4. Policy positions of Swedish MPs and different principals, 2002-2006



Comment: Own estimations based on a Wordscores content analysis of MP speeches.

Table 1. Policy positions of key political actors in the ‘red-black’ Klima cabinet, 1997-2000

	Mean policy position (N, SD)	
	Economic policy	Societal policy
SPÖ	7.5	6.75
ÖVP	14.69	16.31
Coalition government	10.50	10.74
Chancellor Klima	10.71	20.43
SPÖ ministers	8.62 (5, 2.31)	9.19 (5, 2.56)
ÖVP ministers	9.72 (5, 2.15)	10.52 (5, 1.79)

Comments: Data on the party positions stem from the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey. The position of the Chancellor and the cabinet members are estimated by the Wordscores technique on the basis of the speeches made in parliament.

Table 2. Policy positions of key political actors in the ‘red-green’ Schröder cabinet, 2002-2005

	Mean policy position (N, SD)	
	Economic policy	Societal policy
SPD	9.3	7.3
Greens	11.0	2.4
Coalition government	9.53	6.63
Chancellor Schröder	13.36	10.16
SPD ministers	10.72 (9, 1.01)	8.67 (9, 2.59)
Green ministers	9.26 (3, 2.77)	7.44 (3, 3.19)

Comments: Data on the party positions stem from the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey. The position of the Chancellor and the cabinet members are estimated by the Wordscores technique on the basis of the speeches made in parliament.

Table 3. Policy positions of key political actors in the Ahern cabinet, 2007-2008

	Mean policy position (N, SD)	
	Economic policy	Societal policy
FF	13.8	14.8
Greens	5.5	5.6
PD	17.4	7
Coalition government	13.32	13.97
Prime Minister Ahern (FF)	14.85	16.87
FF ministers	12.37 (11, 2.81)	8.40 (11, 2.69)
Green ministers	3.91 (1, -)	6.03 (1, -)
PD minister	15.38 (1, -)	10.33 (1, -)

Comments: Data on the party positions stem from the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey. The position of the Prime Minister and the cabinet members are estimated by the Wordscores technique on the basis of the speeches made in parliament.

Table 4. Policy positions of key political actors in the Reinfeldt cabinet, 2006-2010

	Mean policy position (N, SD)	
	Economic policy	Societal policy
M	17.7	12.7
FP	13.5	4.6
CP	11.4	11.6
KD	13.7	17.7
Coalition government	15.47	11.92
Prime Minister Reinfeldt (M)	15.20	9.08
M ministers	15.11 (4, 1.45)	9.44 (4, 2.00)
FP ministers	16.07 (1, -)	5.48 (1, -)
CP minister	10.20 (3, 0.92)	12.16 (3, 1.78)
KD ministers	16.26 (3, 1.90)	12.36 (3, 2.35)

Comments: Data on the party positions stem from the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey. The position of the Prime Minister and the cabinet members are estimated by the Wordscores technique on the basis of the speeches made in parliament in the time period from 2002 until 2006.

Table 5. Determinants of ministerial selection in four cases

	Austria <i>Cabinet Klima</i> (1997)	Germany <i>Cabinet Schröder</i> (2002)	Ireland <i>Cabinet Ahern</i> (2007)	Sweden <i>Cabinet Reinfeldt</i> (2006)
<i>Euclidean distances</i>				
Prime Minister	0.62 (0.42)	-0.18* (0.09)	0.26 (0.28)	0.02 (0.21)
Coalition	-0.95* (0.52)	-0.59* (0.32)	0.18 (0.34)	-0.51* (0.29)
Party	-0.07 (0.14)	0.37* (0.21)	-0.48* (0.27)	-0.26* (0.15)
<i>Controls</i>				
Member of a previous government	4.15** (0.94)	2.26** (0.57)	4.26** (0.91)	0.53 (1.39)
Sex (1 = female)	1.00 (1.21)	-0.09 (0.76)	1.61 (1.17)	0.18 (0.75)
Parliamentary experience in years	0.50 (0.75)	-0.56 (0.50)	0.52* (0.28)	0.06 (0.11)
Parliamentary experience in years (squared)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Party leadership position	- -	1.15 (0.82)	-0.63 (2.05)	3.34** (0.91)
Constant	-8.50* (3.84)	-1.56* (0.93)	-8.61** (2.36)	-0.56 (1.03)
<i>N</i>	139	355	91	181
pseudo R^2	0.497	0.196	0.364	0.337
<i>AIC</i>	52.20	102.36	65.48	72.95

Comment: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%