Coalition Formation

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra

Elsevier

Photo: Elsevier

Chapter in:

Petyon Young and Shmuel Zamir (eds), Handbook of Game Theory Volume 4, Elsevier North Holland, 2014.

Abstract:

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes a variety of solution concepts, using an umbrella model that adopts an explicit real-time approach. Players band together, perhaps disband later and re-form in shifting alliances, all the while receiving payoffs at each date according to the coalition structure prevailing at the time. We use this model to nest two broad approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three themes that receive explicit emphasis are agent farsightedness, the description of equilibrium coalition structures, and the efficiency implications of the various theories.

 

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Elsevier North Holland

Published Apr. 17, 2015 3:58 PM - Last modified Apr. 17, 2015 3:58 PM