Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation

Publisert i

Journal of Public Economics 95 (9-10), 2011, p. 1111-1118


Are some individuals generally more pro-social than others? If so, socially beneficial commitments could serve as a costly screening device helping the pro-social to match. We present a public good game experiment in which subjects choose between two group types: in blue groups, subjects receive a fixed extra payoff; in red groups, this extra payoff is donated, instead, to the Red Cross. A substantial share of our subjects chose red groups. Contributions in red groups were initially higher and stayed high, while contributions in blue groups displayed the well-known declining pattern.


By Kjell Arne Brekke, Karen Evelyn Hauge, Jo Thori Lind and Karine Nyborg
Published Aug. 18, 2011 10:00 AM - Last modified Aug. 18, 2011 10:05 AM