Ambiguous tipping points

Christian Traeger and Derek Lemoine.

Photo: Elsevier

Published in:

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , volume 132, Part B,  pp. 5-18, December 2016.

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.009

Abstract

We analyze the policy implications of aversion to Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the possibility of tipping points. We demonstrate two channels through which uncertainty aversion affects optimal policy in the general setting. The first channel relates to the policy's effect on the probability of tipping, and the second channel to its differential impact in the pre- and post-tipping regimes. We then extend a recursive dynamic model of climate policy and tipping points to include uncertainty aversion. Numerically, aversion to Knightian uncertainty in the face of an ambiguous tipping point increases the optimal tax on carbon dioxide emissions, but only by a small amount.

 

 

 

 

Published Feb. 23, 2017 3:50 PM - Last modified Feb. 23, 2017 3:50 PM