Mikhail Safronov: Coalition-Proof Full Efficient Implementation
Job talk. Mikhail Safronov is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Cambridge-INET Institute. He will present a paper entitled "Coalition-Proof Full Efficient Implementation".
The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and d’Aspremont–Gerard-Varet mechanisms implement efficient social choice by compensating each agent for the externalities that his report imposes on all other agents. Instead of aggregate compensations, which may lead to profitable coalitional deviations, this paper provides an alternative mechanism, in which each pair of agents directly compensate each other for the pairwise externalities they impose. Under the assumption of independent private types, any agent is guaranteed to receive his ex ante efficient payoff by reporting truthfully, regardless of others’ strategies. This absence of ex ante externalities makes the mechanism coalition-proof, and makes all equilibria efficient.
Host: Bård Harstad