Abstract:
Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of the rules of welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We address this question studying the Bolsa Familia Program in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in benefit suspension and ultimately exclusion from the program. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance and find that in the 2008 municipal elections the vote share of candidates aligned with the President is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties before the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement: Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. Finally, we provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance before elections, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in politically-connected schools.
Host: Halvor Mehlum