ARENA Working Papers
WP 00/8

 

 


Access, Voice and Loyalty
The Representation of Domestic Civil Servants in the EU Committees*



Jarle Trondal**
ARENA, University of Oslo and

Frode Veggeland**
Norwegian Agriculture Economics Research Institute



 


Abstract

Moving beyond the intergovernmental versus supranational controversy, the current paper asks whether national civil servants, when participating in Commission expert committees, consider themselves mainly as national government representatives, as independent experts, or merely as supranational agents. Studying Norwegian and Swedish government officials attending Commission expert committees reveal that similar institutional affiliations towards the EU accompany the same representative roles amongst these officials. As such, the current study indicates that the membership versus non-membership dichotomy may not necessarily be the most appropriate dividing line in the study of Europeanization of domestic institutions. Despite Norway and Sweden having different affiliations towards the EU, this study shows that access and voice on the same EU committees accompany the enactment of similar role perceptions amongst Norwegian and Swedish civil servants


Introduction

Students of European integration have become increasingly aware of the need to go beyond the intergovernmentalism versus supranationality controversy (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Moravcsik 1998). One way of doing this is to focus on arenas, where both national and supranational actors participate and interact. The EU committees are such arenas (Joerges 1999, p. 10). The role of committees in the EU decision-making process has been subject to increased academic interest during the last years, partly due to the important role of committees in the operation of the single European market (Van Schendelen 1998; Joerges and Vos 1999). Previous studies have shown that a large number of representatives from national government administrations participate in EU committee work and thus are "fused" together in important decision-making and decision-shaping processes at the European level (Rometch and Wessels 1996; Trondal 1999a; Veggeland 1999a). National officials have gained better access to the EU institutions and play an important role as both voices of national views and positions in the EU and as voices of narrow special interests (Rometch and Wessels 1996; Veggeland 2000). Previous studies have also indicated that participation in EU committees creates a potential for affecting the roles and loyalties of the participants (Christoph 1993; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Kerremans 1996; Egeberg 1999).

These observations lead up to two questions which have attracted less scholarly attention: To what extent do national officials participating in EU committees shift loyalties? Put more precisely, do the representatives, when participating at the EU level, consider themselves mainly as national government representatives, as independent experts, or merely as supranational agents? Because participation in EU committees has been delegated to bureaucrats serving in national administrations, students of European integration have raised the question of the accountability of the committees: Does the committee system represent a bureaucratic nightmare, a technocratic regime or good transnational governance? (Joerges 1999). We do not try to give an exhaustive answer to this question. Nevertheless, we consider whether the problem of delegation might be affected by changes in loyalties and role perceptions of the participants.

National officials participating in EU committees have multiple institutional affiliations that may accompany role-conflicts: Should they represent their national governments, particular professional interests or supranational interests of the EU when attending EU committee-meetings? The current study thus confronts one classical problem in public administration of the inherent conflict between political loyalty and professional autonomy built into the domestic government apparatus (Jacobsen 1960 and 1966; Christensen 1991). The EU level may add a new dimension to this classical conflict: supranational allegiances. In intergovernmental perspectives, where the EU is looked upon as mainly an arena for bargaining between national government representatives, the possibility of role conflicts is not acknowledged, or at least not taken into consideration. Implicit in the intergovernmental perspective is a notion of `imperative representation' (see below) where the civil servants are expected to behave solely as national representatives. As asserted by neo-functionalists on the other hand, civil servants may over time shift loyalties from a national to a supranational level (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Egeberg 1999). Additionally, because national government officials are primarily employed in sectoral ministries and agencies nationally, and participate in specialised expert committees and networks at the EU level, they may put more weight on professional autonomy than on political loyalties.

We argue in the current paper that an institutional perspective is warranted in order to pay adequate heed to the potential conflicts between political loyalty, professional autonomy, and supranational allegiance. Nevertheless, an institutional perspective presupposes that the civil servants' main loyalty will remain at the national level, as long as their primary affiliation is to national government institutions. Implicit in this perspective is a notion of `ambiguous representation' (see below), where the civil servants act upon multiple roles and allegiances. The ambiguity lies in the fact that it is not always clear who the representative should represent. Which of the role conceptions evoked most strongly - government representative, independent expert or supranational agent - depends arguably on the specific institutional setting embedding the civil servants. A situation of ambiguous representation makes the question of maintaining strict national control over committee activities more problematic than in the situation of imperative representation.

To test the notion of ambiguous representation, we apply empirical data on Norwegian and Swedish civil servants participating in committees under the EU Commission. First, however, we spell out in more detail some conceptions of representation that are of relevance for analysing the above hypothesis.


The concept of representation

The concept of representation is poorly understood and has meant different things to those who have studied it (Pitkin 1972). At the etymological level, representation means ?making present again? (Pitkin 1972, p. 8). Thus, representation means ?the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact? (Pitkin 1972, pp. 8-9; original emphasis). As such, representation depends completely on how it is conceived by the representative and by the represented. One vital question is how people come to perceive of this conception. In this paper we suggest that role perceptions evoked by national civil servants may be vital for their conception of their representational status. The representative quality is measured not so much by procedures for selecting the representatives, their demographic characteristics, or by the output of action pursued by the representatives, as by the role perception evoked by them. [1] An individual is representative in a symbolic sense `by what he is or how he is regarded' (Pitkin 1972, p. 113).

Representation always involves a relationship between the representative(s) and those they represent. This relationship may be based on trust or enmity, on formal or informal rules, on shared notions of representative quality or on different notions of true representation. Moreover, the symbolic relationship between representatives and their constituents may vary between two extremes: On the one extreme, representation means evoking role conceptions that are closely and solely knit to constituents (an imperative notion of representation). On the other extreme, representation means having the free will to evoke roles that deviate from this constituent (a liberal notion of representation). Between these extremes, representation means having multiple role conceptions, thus embarking upon a notion of role-conflict (an ambiguous notion of representation). A more thorough elaboration of these three models of representation is provided in the next section.

Role perceptions are important to study because they may have ?a significant influence on human behaviour? (Sen 1998, p. 5). Studying roles as the actors themselves conceive them, ?we will be in the best possible position to explain the behaviour? of these actors (Searing 1994, p. 14; Wish 1980, p. 535). One further rationale for studying the symbolic aspects of representation is the lack of such research in general, and the lack of such research in studies of EU committees in particular. ?Over forty years after the European project began, it is striking how little we know about its socialization and identity-shaping effects on national agents? (Checkel 1999, p. 545; cf. also Coporaso, Cowles and Risse 2000; Szakolczai 1998, p. 1). Finally, studying EU committees may also show how multiple institutional affiliations trigger role conflicts amongst domestic government officials attending these committees.


Three models of representation

In the following, three different models of representation are outlined. However, these models have different analytical status in the study. The notion of imperative representation and the notion of liberal representation are treated as ideal types outlined in an effort at presenting three different representational roles: one `government representative' role, one `independent expert' role, and finally one `supranational agent' role. The notion of ambiguous representation is outlined primarily in an effort to show how the potential mix of these three representational roles may be different under different institutional conditions.

At one extreme, a notion of imperative representation maintains that ?true representation occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from their constituents? (Pitkin 1972, p. 146). As seen from a symbolic viewpoint, true representation occurs only when representatives evoke roles tightly knit to their constituents. Defenders of this concept tend to see representatives as uni-dimensional servants and delegates with respect to institutional affiliations and allegiances (Olsen 1988, p.162).

As seen from an imperative notion of representation, domestic civil servants solely evoke the role as `government representative' when attending EU committees. As such, this role conception is pictured as highly fixed and stable, impossible to mould or remould during EU committee-meetings. EU committees are seen as intergovernmental arenas for a give and take between sovereign nation states, mediated through their delegates. Thus, participation within EU committees is seen as having no significant impact on the role perceptions evoked by the delegates. If the representative, on the other hand, evokes roles that deviate significantly from the `government representative' role, the representative may be recalled, either permanently or temporarily (Christophersen 1986). The delegates, thus, have clear incentives not to deviate from the `government representation' role when attending EU committees.

At the other extreme is the idea of ?complete independence? of the representative (Pitkin 1972, p.146). True representation emerges only when the representative has the leeway to evoke role perceptions which may deviate from the `government representative' role. Defenders of this notion of representation tend to see political questions as difficult and complex and beyond the capacities of ordinary individuals. Representatives are seen as experts with a great deal of behavioural discretion. Decisions are reached on the basis of arguments (Olsson 1993). As such, the liberal concept of representation builds on a deliberative perspective where free individuals act to reach the `best' solutions (Christophersen 1986, p. 37; Eriksen and Fossum 1999).

The liberal concept of representation implies that weak links may exist between representatives and whom they represent. As one example, frequent interaction with representatives from other EU member states within EU committee meetings may increase the likelihood for processes where the representatives `go native'. Frequent participation in EU committees may also increasingly affect the role perceptions evoked by the participants (Joerges and Neyer 1997). The EU committees considered in this study, Commission expert committees, deal with highly complex and technical dossiers, are mainly organized according to sectoral principles, and involve domestic civil servants with high technical expertise (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Trondal 2000; Veggeland 2000). Hence, EU committees may be seen as transformative entities, contributing to the enactment of supranational, sectoralized role perceptions. A supranational role involves conceiving of one self as an `EU participant', or more accurately as an `EU committee participant'. Even more, intensive and protracted participation within Commission expert committees increases the likelihood that the representatives evoke supranational and sectoralized role perceptions amongst the participants. In the current paper, the liberal notion of representation thus attributes two role perceptions that transcend the `government representative' role: (i) the `independent expert' role, and (ii) the `supranational agent' role. Intensive and sustained participation within Commission expert committees is assumed to increase the likelihood that the officials evoke the two later role perceptions. As such, the liberal notion of representation highlights a delegation problem. The delegation of responsibility may create what in principal-agent literature is called a delegation problem (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Pollack 1997). The crucial point of this problem is the degree to which civil servants (agents) act on their own preferences, rather than on those of the government (principals). In the context here, this problem may occur in those instances where committee participants develop loyalties that are in conflict with their role as national government representatives. The delegation problem and the problem of representation, therefore, are different sides of the same coin (Mayntz 1999).

A middle ground between the imperative and the liberal model of representation has been seized by a notion of ambiguous representation (Olsen 1988). Whereas the basis for representation is fairly clear and uncontested in the former two models, representative quality is seen as having no clear basis in this third model. Rather, the representative is seen as having multiple obligations, institutional affiliations and allegiances. The uni-dimensional model of representation is superseded by a multiple concept of representation, introducing role conflict as a constitutive aspect of self (Elster 1986). The notion of role conflict introduced by the ambiguous notion of representation might be visualised as follows:

An ambiguous concept of representation introduces institutional factors as scope conditions affecting the relative validity of the two extreme notions of representation presented above. As such, institutional factors give momentum to the model presented in figure 1: Under different institutional conditions each extreme is arguably more or less likely to come about. Hence, the possible mix of different role perceptions evoked by each official is assumed to be different under different `institutional conditions'. Representatives are seen as embedded within formal organizations that pay heed to only selected aspects of the reality (Olsen 1988, pp. 167-168; Schattschneider 1960). Representatives have multiple memberships, with true representation being a function of the mix of different role perceptions stemming from these memberships. The representative quality is a result of the interplay and conflict between various conceptions of role (March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 1988, p. 169). As such, being exposed to contending role expectations from different institutions, representatives may take on a partially conflicting set of roles. The notion of representative ambiguity therefore views government systems as fragmented and with multiple representative channels (Rokkan 1966). It becomes increasingly difficult to determine who the representatives are and who they represent (Olsen 1988, p. 170). Still, identifying the institutional contexts in which the representative(s) are embedded may reduce representative ambiguity (Aggestam 1998, p. 7). In the following, some probability conditions, or independent variables that are "switching points? in figure 1, are suggested.

Firstly, the role perceptions evoked by EU committee participants are likely to be affected by the EU committees on which they are members and by the domestic government institutions in which they have permanent positions. Committee members may thus be seen as wearing a modern Janus face (Lewis 1998, p. 483): When domestic government officials participate within EU committees, ?they must understand the perceptions and preferences of their interaction partners as well as those of their own organization ...? (Mayntz 1999, p. 84). Generally, we may expect that the more frequently and the more intensively they attend EU committees, the more likely are officials to take on supranational role perceptions. Moreover, assuming that Commission expert committees are largely sectoral in character (Egeberg and Trondal 1999), officials frequently attending Commission expert committees are likely to evoke supranational roles that are largely sectoralized in character. These officials may thus evoke a mixture of `independent expert' roles and `supranational agent' roles. As such, the likelihood of enacting role perceptions that are tightly linked to their own domestic government institution may be weakened. Hence, officials devoting a great deal of time and energy on attending Commission expert committees are likely to evoke roles as `independent experts' and as `supranational agents' more extensively than roles as `government representatives' (Egeberg 1999; Trondal 1999b; Veggeland 2000).

An ambiguous concept of representation emphasises that, in addition to their EU affiliation, domestic government officials have permanent positions in domestic ministries and agencies. One may expect these primary institutional affiliations to affect role perceptions more extensively than EU committee affiliations (Egeberg 1999; Trondal 1999b). Role perceptions attached to nation state administrations may be seen as highly institutionalised, rendering a redefinition of role perceptions relatively difficult. Moreover, domestic civil servants have different institutional affiliations at the domestic arena. They are employed at the ministry level or at the agency level [2]; they are employed in medium rank positions or in top rank positions; they are senior officials or have served for only shorter periods of time within the domestic central administration; they have different educational backgrounds; they have different degrees of behavioural discretion at their disposal, etc. Generally, all these primary institutional factors are likely to hamper processes whereby the representatives enact supranational role perceptions (Mayntz 1999, pp. 84-85). However, these primary institutional affiliations are likely to impact differently on the `independent expert' role and the `government representative' role. As will be illustrated empirically in the next section, sectoral role perceptions are likely to be evoked more extensively by domestic officials at the agency level than amongst officials at the ministry level; more by officials in medium rank positions than by officials in top rank positions; more by officials with a great deal of behavioural discretion than by officials with less behavioural discretion at their disposal; and more by officials educated in technical disciplines like physics and engineering than by officials educated in law (specialists versus generalists) (Trondal 1999b).

The scope or probability conditions outlined above are not exhaustive, they are only suggestive. Important for this paper, however, is that multiple institutional affiliations may affect the relative validity of the imperative and liberal concept of representations, thus rendering representation largely ambiguous to the representative. Moreover, an institutional perspective introduces ?switching points? in the role-conflict-model presented in figure 1. In the following, the notion of ambiguous representation is tested empirically. The general question illustrated is whether access to EU committees affects the loyalties (read: role perceptions) of the participants. The null-hypothesis is: the loyalties of these representatives are mainly of domestic origin (the `government representative' role), and only marginally affected by their EU affiliations. The alternative hypothesis is: particular domestic institutional affiliations, and intensive and protracted participation within Commission expert committees (read: access and voice), results in loyalty shifts and loyalty transfers (read: the enactment of `independent expert' roles and/or `supranational agent' roles).


Data and methodology

Assuming that ?membership in the European Union is not necessarily the most appropriate dividing line? (Usher 1998, p. 184), the current study aims at statistically controlling for different forms of affiliation to the EU. With the objective of uncovering similarities between EU membership states and EEA membership states, this study analyses Norwegian and Swedish government officials attending preparatory Commission expert committees (EC's). The Swedish and Norwegian civil servants studied here have similar institutional affiliations on EU committees. Moreover, the officials studied have similar institutional affiliations at the national level. Furthermore, both the Norwegian and the Swedish civil servants work in highly technical policy areas. Finally, Norway and Sweden became EEA members at the same time with the enactment of the EEA agreement in 1994. In 1995, however, Sweden joined as a full-fledged member of the EU. We would expect officials attending EC's with similar institutional affiliations at the domestic level of governance to evoke similar role perceptions, irrespective of the EU/EEA affiliation of the two countries.

The overall rationale behind comparing Norwegian and Swedish officials is to test whether the assumed effects stemming from particular institutional affiliations are robust in countries having different forms of affiliation with the EU. Moreover, aiming at controlling for possible noise stemming form other potential casual factors, Norway and Sweden are close to ideal comparable cases due to similarities as regards political-administrative systems, social-demographic characteristics, ideological domination, etc. These two countries are, thus, sufficiently equal on many variables to warrant comparison.

The Swedish data involve two major components: (i) Survey data of 70 government officials attending EC's, and (ii) face-to-face interviews with 11 of these officials. These data were collected during 1998. The survey data result from a standardised questionnaire distributed by post to a systematic collected sample of respondents. As a follow-up to this survey, a small sample of officials from this sample was selected for face-to-face qualitative interviews. Moreover, an empirical circumscription of this study is done which covers government officials from the environment sector and the health and safety at the workplace sector. In the current study, however, these two sectors are lumped together.

The Norwegian data have been collected on a somewhat similar basis as the Swedish data, though the respondents are not from the same policy sectors and the data are not of the same magnitude. 28 officials are included in the Norwegian study. These officials were selected on the criteria that they were participating in EU committees in the area of foodstuffs and veterinarian policies, i.e. food regulations. They all responded to a standardised questionnaire. In addition, 24 officials from this sample were interviewed. The data were collected during 1998 and early 1999. Because the Norwegian sample is relatively small, the results are more based on interviews and less on statistical tests, as compared to the Swedish case. Nevertheless, we think that an overall assessment of the results from the two country studies may give some valuable insights into the notion of ambiguous representation.


The representation of Norwegian officials in Commission expert committees

The EEA agreement allows the EFTA countries [3] to participate in committees under the Commission, but not on committees under the Council. Admittance to expert committees is regulated by article 99.1 of the agreement. EFTA countries may also fully participate in other committees (article 81 and 101), in addition to being allowed as observers in some of the standing committees (article 100) (Statskonsult 1999).

Our sample of EU committees has been drawn from the area of food regulations. These committees are primarily concerned with harmonising technical rules and standards, for example through directives concerning official control of animal products and through directives concerning food additives. Even though a common set of rules and regulations has reduced barriers to trade in the single European market, high tariffs on a number of products remain important trade barriers between Norway and the EU countries. Nevertheless, there are several reasons for focusing on committees concerned with food regulations. First, when it comes to these regulations, Norway is more or less fully integrated into the single European market, due to both the number of EU committees where Norway is represented, and to the number of harmonised sets of rules (Statskonsult 1999; Veggeland 1999b). Secondly, these committees deal with issues that are becoming increasingly politicised (Joerges 1999, p. 6). In Norway, the responsibility for participating in EU committees has to a large degree been delegated from ministries to agencies (Statskonsult 1999; Trondal 1998; Veggeland 2000). Therefore, in our sample only four respondents were employed at the ministry level. Almost all of the participants in the Norwegian sample have more than one year of experience from working with EU/EEA issues (96 per cent) and a large majority have attended three or more meetings a year (82 per cent). Of course they do not spend nearly as much time in EU committees as they do in national administrations. Nevertheless, although Norway is not a member of the EU, many civil servants now participate in EU institutions on a regular basis due to the EEA agreement (Trondal 1998). The question then, is whether they go to meetings in Brussels solely as government representatives, or are they influenced by other concerns?

Table 1: Proportion of officials evoking a `government representative' role when participating in EC's. (%)
Feel allegiance to own governmental institution(a)...................
89
Feel allegiance to my own government.................................
35
Pay heed to signals from colleagues from my own country.........
82
Mean N.....................................................................
25
(a)These three variables concern officials feeling allegiance to, and paying heed to, these
government institutions and signals to a fairly great extent, or more. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).

We see from table 1 that when participating in EU committees, most of the representatives to a large or very large extent feel an allegiance to the national governmental institution in which they are employed. In personal interviews some of the participants strongly expressed the view that they first and foremost should represent Norway and Norwegian interests in the committees. Nevertheless, only 35 per cent say that they to a large or very large extent feel an allegiance to their national government. Compared to the proportion of officials feeling allegiance to national government institutions, this low percentage may reflect the fact that the issues on the agenda often are of a technical nature and therefore not considered as politically salient. Besides, due to few instructions from the political and administrative leadership and weak co-ordination efforts before committee meetings (Trondal and Veggeland 1999), Norwegian civil servants have leeway to evoke different representative roles. Our study show that about two thirds of the civil servants seldom or ever have instructions - formal or informal - that give directions to the positions they should take during committee meetings. Over 80 per cent say the position is seldom or ever co-ordinated with the Foreign Office or other central co-ordinating bodies. Thus, there are only weak control mechanisms in place to assure that the civil servants act as governmental representatives. As long as the mandate for the participation is uncertain, it doesn't seem to be a realistic assumption that the representatives always attend committee meetings with fixed and stable national preferences.

Nevertheless, most of the civil servants feel that representing Norway is of great importance when participating in EU committees, and some even want more governmental instructions and a better national follow-up concerning their activity on the EU committees. There is a notion among the civil servants that they should represent some kind of national interest when going to Brussels for committee meetings (Source: interviews). This notion implies that nationality does make a difference for the role perceptions of the representatives. In addition, national ties are strengthened by the fact that the national administration both appoints the committee-participants and pay for their travel expenses. In contrast, the Commission pays the travel expenses for the participants from EU countries. At the same time, as table 2 illustrates, there are indications in the data that these officials perceive themselves as independent experts.

Table 2: Proportion of officials evoking an `independent expert' role when participating in EC's. (%)
Feel allegiance to my own policy-area(a)........................................
52
Feel allegiance to my own profession............................................
28
Pay heed to signals from special interest groups in your own country.......
22
Pay heed to signals from colleagues from other countries with special expertise..............................................................................


82

Mean N...............................................................................
25
(a) These four variables concern officials feeling allegiance to, and paying heed to, these government institutions and signals to a fairly great extent, or more. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).

We see that allegiance to a certain policy area or profession is of less importance than allegiance to a governmental institution. This may indicate that affiliation to a national government institution is the most important factor regarding who and what the participants represent. The existence of strong ties to a government institution is confirmed by the civil servants in interviews. At the same time, it is worth noticing that 82 per cent of the civil servants to a large or very large extent pay heed to signals from colleagues from other countries with special expertise. This is the same proportion as for those who pay heed to signals from colleagues in their own country. Also, table 1 and 2 show that allegiance to one's own policy area is more important than allegiance to the national government. These results may be seen in connection with the tendency in committees to put more weight on processes of arguing than processes of bargaining (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Joerges and Vos 1999). Independent of nationality, experts with the best arguments are taken into consideration by the other participants and may, therefore, have a great influence on committee decisions. One of the respondents in our study describes the situation in the following way:

Many of the discussions in the committee take the form of discussions between people with special expertise. I have the impression that the participants mainly act upon their role as experts (author's translation).

When asked from which countries the most reliable experts come from, Norwegian civil servants, depending on the issue concerned, name a whole range of countries. Often what matters, is identifying the best expertise independent of nationality. Therefore, it is of no surprise that as few as 29 per cent of the Norwegian participants perceive colleagues from other countries as mainly government representatives (see table 3).

Table 3: Civil servants' perception of the roles of colleagues from other countries (%)
Mainly independent experts......................................
52
Mixed roles........................................................
28
Mainly government representatives.............................
22
N....................................................................
25

Once again we see from our figures that the expert role is of utmost importance. Also, other studies of national civil servants' participation in EU committees report the same tendency (Jacobsson and Sundstr�m 1999; L�greid 1999). These studies have shown the development of extensive professional networks among civil servants from both EU and EFTA countries (cf. the next section). The impression of professionalism in the committees is strengthened when we look at how the participants perceive the role of the EU Commission (table 4).

Table 4: Civil servants' perception of the Commission being independent of particular national interests (%)
Mainly independent...................................
82
Mixed...................................................
11
Mainly dependent.....................................
7
N........................................................
28

As we can see from the figures in table 4, the Commission is mainly perceived as independent of national interests. Many of the respondents say they are impressed of the professional qualities of the Commission-officials heading the committees. Hence, we might infer from our data that both the role as government representative and the role as independent expert are considered important. Civil servants enjoy a certain degree of professional autonomy at the same time as they maintain strong ties to the national institutions.

Finally, as indicated in table 5, new allegiances towards the EU level have also emerged amongst Norwegian officials.

Table 5: Proportion of officials evoking a `supranational agent' role when participating in EC's. (%)
Who the representatives feel allegiance to and pay heed to signals from:
Feel allegiance to the EU(a).............................................................
8
Feel allegiance to the EU committee...................................................
16
Pay heed to signals from the Commission...........................................
48
Pay heed to signals from the European Parliament..................................
22
Pay heed to signals from the European Court of Justice............................
30
Mean N...................................................................................
26
Attitudes towards European integration:
Yes
In favour of strengthening co-operation with the EU within my own policy area?.......................................................................................

93
In favour of generally strengthening the co-operation with the EU?..............
50
Have become more positive to EU integration.......................................
35
Mean N...................................................................................
28
(a) These five variables at the top of this table concern officials feeling allegiance to, and paying heed to, these government institutions and signals to a fairly great extent, or more. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).

We see that signals from the Commission are perceived as important, which is not surprising considering that the Commission chairs the committee meetings. Some of the participants, especially those who have participated for a long time, say that they to a large or very large extent feel allegiance to the EU and the EU committee. One of the more experienced participants expressed this feeling in the following way:

Of course, you are affected by frequent participating in the EU system. You get to know people, you establish new contacts, and you learn about how things are done. In this way, I experience a kind of "europeanisation" of the soul. You meet a lot of people with essential things to say. Therefore, by participating you easily become enthusiastic about the EU (...). There are situations where I find myself representing the views of the EU committee when I go back to Norway. (author's translation)

35 per cent say they have become more positive to European integration over time. Nearly all the participants, even those sceptical to European integration, are in favour of strengthening co-operation with the EU within their own policy area. This indicates an overlap between the role as independent expert and supranational agent. Getting to know people on EU committees and listening to what they have to say is generally considered to be a good thing. In this way, there are signs of civil servants developing allegiances to networks of experts in the EU. Although we can not say that these allegiances necessarily create a serious delegation problem, they nevertheless represent a challenge to the government's ability to control and monitor what goes on. [4]

The figures presented above, in combination with the qualitative interviews, show that ambiguous representation is indeed an important feature of the participation of Norwegian officials in EU committees. Illustrating this ambiguity is the following observation from one of the participants:

In committee meetings, the dividing line between politics, economics and professional autonomy was not always clear. I then had to ask myself the following question: Am I now a professional, a politician, or is it all about economy? (author's translation)

The results from the Norwegian data indicate that Norwegian officials enact multiple roles when attending Commission expert committees. Still, different scope conditions may affect the enactment of role perceptions among the participants. One condition is the lack of control mechanisms, which creates loose couplings between civil servants serving in EU committees and the political and administrative leadership in Norway. These loose couplings lead to more leeway for civil servants in enacting different role perceptions. Another important factor is the length and intensity of participation. There is a tendency for officials who have participated for long periods of time to feel strongly about their role as independent expert. In addition, long experience seems to relate positively with the enactment of the role as supranational agent. These factors are indications that socialisation and learning are important in determining how the participants perceive their own roles. Yet another important factor is the attitude towards European integration in general. The more negative to integration the participants are before getting involved in EU committees, the less inclined they are to enact the role as supranational agent. Nevertheless, both EU sceptics and EU enthusiasts seem to develop a positive attitude towards co-operation within their own policy area, which is what might be expected as long as the committees are organised according to sector principles (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). At the same time this way of organising implies that the participants are supposed to act as professionals. Moreover, meeting other people who possess much of the same knowledge and who are working on many of the same issues, seem to contribute to the creation of new loyalties. Therefore, we see a simultaneous enactment of supranational and sectoral role perceptions among Norwegian officials. This tendency illuminates the problem of empirically separating the role of supranational agent from the role of independent expert.

As may be expected from an institutional perspective, Norwegian civil servants evoke different representational roles, depending on their institutional affiliations. Even though ties to national administration remain strong, we also find that civil servants act upon roles in EU committees that may be in conflict with their role as a government representative. Although we do not observe strong tendencies by the civil servants to "go native" in the EU, several Norwegian officials seem to be in the process of developing new loyalties at the European level. The strongest indication of these new loyalties is the feeling of allegiance and belonging to expert networks in EU committees, which is expressed among a large proportion of the officials. Henceforth, the development of loyalties to these committees may create problems for the government in assuring that the actions of Norwegian officials at the EU level are in accordance with national goals and interests.


The representation of Swedish officials in Commission expert committees

After Sweden joined the EU in 1995, the workload stemming from EU dossiers has increased significantly in the Swedish central administrative apparatus (SOU 1996:6). Since 1995, government officials have increasingly taken part in the work of various Commission expert committees (EC's). What are the demographic characteristics and institutional affiliations of the Swedish participants? Due to the formal autonomy of Swedish agencies, EC participants are mostly agency personnel (cf. Jacobsson and Sundstr�m 1999, p. 13; Statskontoret 1996:7, p. 133). Moreover, past studies reveal that when Swedish agency officials attend EU committees, their positions are only poorly co-ordinated in advance (Jacobsson and Sundstr�m 1999; Statskontoret 1996:7; Trondal 1999b). Additionally, most EC participants are employed in medium rank positions, and have educational backgrounds from technical disciplines (Trondal 2000). These observations lead us to expect the enactment of `independent expert' roles amongst Swedish officials attending EC's. Moreover, Swedish officials attend mostly between 0 to 2 EC's per year, participate in 0 to 3 formal EC meetings per year, and have informal contacts with other EC participants only rarely (Trondal 2000). Due to lack of intensive participation at the EU level, we may expect officials to evoke `government representation' roles more frequently than `supranational agent' roles. In sum, therefore, we would expect Swedish civil servants attending EC's to evoke a mixture of `independent expert' roles and `government representative' roles. The `supranational agent' role may be expected to be less frequently enacted amongst Swedish EC participants.

Before testing the explanatory power of different institutional affiliations at the national level and at the EU level, let us look at the univariate frequencies unveiled from the three representative roles studied. Tables 6, 7 and 8 show that Swedish EC participants evoke the roles of `government representative' (table 6), of `independent expert' (table 7), and of `supranational agent' (table 8). However, the relative importance of each role seems different.

Table 6 Proportion of officials evoking a `government representative'-role when participating in EC's. (%) [5]
Feel allegiance to my own ministry/agency(a)............................
85
Feel allegiance to my own political leadership............................
72
?Participation in EC's is important in order to pursue our national interests?(b)...................................................................

83
Paying heed to signals from the political leadership(c)..................
54
Paying heed to national interests of my own country....................
54
Mean N........................................................................
59
(a) This variable, and the following two variables, concern officials having these allegiances to a fairly strong degree, or more. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).

(b) This variable concerns officials agreeing fairly much, or more, on this assertion.

(c) This variable, and the following variable, concerns officials paying fairly much heed, or more, to these signals.

Table 7: Proportion of officials evoking an `independent expert' role when participating in EC's. (%)
Feeling allegiance to my own profession(a)........................................
47
Feeling allegiance to my own policy sector.........................................
61
?Participation in EC's is important in order to reach decisions based on scientific standards? (b)...............................................................

100
Paying heed to professional considerations(c)......................................
86
Mean N..................................................................................
54
(a) This variable, and the following variable, concerns officials having these allegiances to a fairly strong degree, or more. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).

(b)This variable concerns officials agreeing fairly much, or more, on this assertion

(c) This variable concern officials paying fairly much, or more, heed to professional considerations

Table 8 Proportion of officials evoking a `supranational agent' role when participating in EC's. (%) [6]
Who the representatives feel allegiance to and pay heed to signals from:  
Feeling allegiance to the EC's attended(a).............................................
44
Feeling allegiance to the EU............................................................
38
Paying heed to signals from the EU Commission(b).................................
29
?An esprit de corps emerges in the EC's over time(c)...............................
32
Mean N....................................................................................
47
Attitudes towards European integration:
Yes
In favour of strengthening co-operation with the EU within my own policy area?.......................................................................................
92
In favour of generally strengthening the co-operation with the EU?.............
63
Have become more positive to EU integration......................................
38
Mean N....................................................................................
55
(a) This variable, and the following variable, concerns officials having these allegiances to a fairly strong degree, or more. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5). (b) This variable concerns officials paying fairly much, or more, heed to these signals. (c) This variable concerns officials agreeing fairly much, or more, on this assertion.

When looking at the percentages presented in these three tables, the largest percentages are revealed in tables 6 and 7, and somewhat lower percentages are unveiled in table 8. The sheer difference between the magnitude of the percentages in these three tables indicates that these officials mostly evoke the `independent expert' role and the `government representative' role. Whereas Jacobsson (1997 and 1999) mainly observes Swedish civil servants acting as `Swedish representatives' at the EU level, we observe a modern Janus face amongst these officials, evoking dual role perceptions. Despite the `government representative' role being evoked fairly frequently, there are few strong co-ordination mechanisms at the domestic level to assure that the civil servants actually evoke this role perception towards the Commission expert committees (Trondal 1999b). Nevertheless, most of the civil servants feel that this role is of great importance when participating. These observations are supported in the qualitative interviews: ?I feel strongest allegiance to the Environmental Protection Agency. No strong allegiances emerge within the EU? (interview ? author's translation). Still, the figures presented in table 7 are considered larger than the corresponding figures presented in table 6, indicating that the `independent expert' role is evoked somewhat more frequently than the `government representative' role. In the qualitative interviews many officials report that they represent independent expertise and/or their own policy sector to a larger extent than the Swedish government. Moreover, table 8 indicates the overlap between `independent expert' roles and `supranational agent' roles: Swedish officials feel more allegiance towards the EC's attended than to the EU in general. Moreover, when asked about their attitudes towards EU integration, most officials are in favour of strengthening integration within their own policy area (92 per cent). Fewer officials are in favour of strengthening EU integration more generally (63 per cent). Even fewer report that they have become more positive towards European integration at large (38 per cent). This may reflect the fact that 57 per cent of the Swedish officials studied were originally fairly positive or more towards the EU. Notwithstanding these efforts at deciding the relative primacy of different role perceptions, the most general observations suggest that Swedish officials attending EC's tend to enact a mixed role repertoire.

Next, the following two tables unveil how Swedish officials perceive of the role of other colleagues from other countries, as well as the role of the EU Commission. Table 9 reveals to what extent Swedish government officials perceive of their colleagues from other countries as merely `independent experts' or mainly `government representatives' when participating in EC's. Table 10 shows to what extent Swedish civil servants perceive of the Commission as dependent on national interests.

Table 9 Civil servants' perceptions of the role of colleagues from other countries. (%)
Mainly independent experts....................................
41
Mixed roles.......................................................
27
Mainly government representative.............................
31
N...................................................................
64

 

Table 10 Civil servants' perceptions of the Commission as being independent of particular national interests. (%)
Mainly independent..............................................
68
Mixed role........................................................
19
Mainly dependent................................................
13
N...................................................................
63

As seen in table 10, Swedish officials attending EC's mostly perceive of the EU Commission as mainly independent of national interests. Only a small proportion of the officials perceive the Commission as mainly dependent on national interests. These figures support the impression of professionalism and national independence of the Commission at large, and the participants within Commission expert committees more particularly. However, 19 per cent of the officials perceive this institution as having a mixed role. This may reflect the fact that national civil servants attending EU committees have their primary institutional affiliations at the national level of governance. Table 9 reveals that most Swedish officials perceive their colleagues from other countries as mainly `independent experts', or as having a mixed role. Still, 31 per cent of the officials perceive their colleagues as mainly `government representatives' (cf. Egeberg 1999, p. 469; Jacobsson 1999, p. 119; SOU 1996:6, p. 47). Table 9, thus, unveils the mixed loyalties evoked by government officials attending EU level institutions, oscillating between `government representative' roles and `independent expert' roles. This conflict thus reflects the classical conflict in national bureaucracies between political loyalty and professional autonomy.

In order to show how institutional affiliations may affect the enactment of role perceptions, the following tables include institutional variables at the domestic and the EU level. Owing to the low N, and because the aim is to study only fairly robust relationships, only correlations significant at the 95 per cent or 99 per cent level, or correlations higher than .25, are presented in the following tables. On this basis, focusing on only fairly strong relationships reduces the likelihood for random errors. [7] Table 11 correlates the three representative roles presented above and the intensity of participation in EC's. The question asked in table 11 is whether, and to what extent, the intensity of participation within EC's affects the role perceptions evoked by the participants.

Table 11 Bivariate correlations between intensity of participation in EC's, and the three representative roles. (Pearson's r)
  Number of EC's (a) Number of formal EC-meetings (b) Number of informal EC-meetings (c)
`Government representative' role:
Paying heed to signals from the political leadership(d)..
.24
.15
.08
`Independent expert' role:
Feeling allegiance to own profession(e)...................
.04
.20
.39*
Feeling allegiance to own policy sector....................
.10
.13
.27
`Supranational agent' role:
Feeling allegiance to the EU.................................
.17
.28
.27
?An esprit de corps emerges in the EC's over time(f)...
.06
.03
.27
Have become more positive to EU integration............
.32*
-.10
.23
Mean N........................................................
54
54
53
*) p .05 **) p .01

(a) This variable compares officials attending many EC's (3 committees or more) (coded 1) and officials attending few committees (0-2 committees) (coded 2)

(b) This variable compares officials attending many formal EC-meetings during the last year (5 meetings or more) (coded 1) and officials attended few formal EC-meetings (0-4 meetings) (coded 2).

(c) This variable compares officials attended many informal EC meetings last year (contacts with other committee members outside formal meetings to a fairly great extent, or more) (coded 1) and officials attended few informal EC meetings (contacts with committee members outside formal meetings to a somewhat great extent, or less) (coded 2).

(d) This variable compares officials paying heed to these considerations fairly much, or more, and officials paying less heed to these considerations.

(e) This variable, and variable 3 and 4 compares officials feeling allegiance to a fairly large extent, or more (coded 1) and official feeling allegiance to a less extent (coded 2).

(f) This variable compares officials agreeing fairly much, or more, on this assertion, and officials agreeing less.

As seen from this table, most of the figures support the empirical expectations derived from the theoretical section of this paper: Officials attending many informal EC meetings feel allegiance to their own profession and policy sector more strongly than do officials attending few informal EC meetings (r .39* and r .27, respectively). Thus, Commission expert committees are arenas for the development of expert knowledge and epistemic networks and communities. Similarly, officials attending many informal EC meetings feel allegiance towards the EU in general, and feel that an esprit de corps emerges in the EC's over time (r .27 and r .27, respectively) (cf. Egeberg 1999, p. 465). Furthermore, officials attending many formal EC meetings tend to feel allegiance towards the EU in general. Finally, officials attending many EC's tend to become more in favour of European integration (r .32*). Thus, officials interacting fairly intensively within EC's tend to evoke `independent expert' roles and `supranational agent' roles more frequently than officials interacting less intensively within the EC's. ?We have extremely many meetings. We turn into a club?. (Interview ? author's translation.) ?We eat dinner together. A plump atmosphere emerges?. (Interview ? author's translation.) Deviating from this pattern, we observe that officials attending many EC's tends to pay heed to signals from the political leadership more extensively than officials attending fewer EC's (r .24). Thus, the intensity of participation within EC's also increases the likelihood that `government representative' roles are evoked. ?One develop a certain loyalty to the committee. However, this loyalty never exceeds the loyalty towards the domestic Occupational Safety and Health Administration?. (Interview ? author's translation.) Still, the more general picture seems to be that intensity of participation within EC's increases the relative primacy of the `independent expert' role and the `supranational agent' role.

Finally, table 12 tests the effects stemming from different domestic institutional affiliations:

Table 12 Bivariate correlations between domestic institutional affiliations, and the three representative roles. (Pearson's r)
  Ministry/
Agency
(a)
Rank(b) Education(c) Discretion(d)
`Government representative' role:
Paying heed to signals from the political leadership(e)...................................

.40**

-.06

.35*

-.27*
?I take the positions which I believe is to the interest for my country?(f)...............

.25

.12

.12

-.07
`Independent expert' role:
Feeling allegiance to my own policy sector(g)........................................

-.34

.04

-.29

-.04
?The positions I take is based upon my professional expertise?.......................

-.34**

.19

-.07

.27*
`Supranational agent' role:
Feeling allegiance to the EC's attended.....
-.34*
-.24
-.37
.08
Feeling allegiance to the EU..................
-.01
-.01
-.30
-.27
In favour of strengthening co-operation with the EU within my own policy area....

.06

-.08

-.25

-.12
Mean N.........................................
54
53
28
54
*) p .05 **) p .01

(a) This variable compares officials employed at the ministry level (coded 1) and officials employed at the agency level (coded 2).

(b) This variable compares officials in top rank positions (director general, deputy director general, head/deputy of unit/division) (coded 1) and officials in medium rank positions (head of section, senior advisor, advisor) (coded 2).

(c) This variable compares officials educated in social sciences and law (coded 1) and officials educated in economics and technical disciplines ? like biology, engineering, etc. (coded 2).

(d) This variable compares officials having great amount of behavioural discretion (coded 1) and officials having less discretion (coded 2).

(e) This variable compares officials paying heed to these considerations fairly much, or more, and officials paying less heed to these considerations.

(f) This variable, and variable 4 compares officials reporting that these assertions are always, or almost always true, and officials reporting that these assertions are less true.

(g) This variable, and variable 5 and 6 compares officials feeling allegiance to a fairly large extent, or more (coded 1) and official feeling allegiance to a less extent (coded 2).

Comparing tables 11 and 12, more correlations are shown to be strong and/or significant in table 12 than in table 11. This comparison indicates the relative primacy of domestic institutional affiliations regarding the enactment of role perceptions amongst EU committee participants. Using some details from table 12, the ministry-agency nexus is observed to correlate most strongly with the role perceptions evoked. Formal education follows as the second most important variable. When it comes to the ministry-agency nexus, table 12 reveals that officials at the ministry level pay heed to signals from the political leadership more extensively than do officials at the agency level (r .40**), ?take interests which I believe are in the interest of my country? to a larger extent than do officials at the agency level (r .25), feel less allegiance to their own policy sector than do officials at the agency level (r -.34), pay less heed to professional considerations than do agency personnel (r -.24), etc. While falling short of doing justice to all the details in table 12, the following general observations may be emphasised: `Government representation' roles are mostly evoked by officials at the ministry level, officials educated in social sciences or law, and officials having little behavioural discretion at their disposal. Officials evoking the `independent expert' role tend to be employed at the agency level, and educated in economics or technical disciplines. Finally, officials enacting the `supranational agent' role are mostly employed at the agency level, are in medium rank positions, educated in economics or technical disciplines, and have little behavioural discretion at their disposal. Table 12, thus, clearly indicates that the theoretical propositions outlined above are empirically supported. The data from table 11 underscore this conclusion. Moreover, this analysis indicates, as mentioned above, the relative primacy of domestic institutional affiliations when it comes to moulding the role perceptions of government officials attending EC's.

Since we are left with some statistically significant bivariate relationships, where some of the independent variables are related, multiple regression analysis is provided in an effort to unveil spuriousness. The following independent variables are significantly inter-correlated in the current analysis: The ministry agency variable correlates significantly with (i) the number of EC's attended (r -.26*), with (ii) the number of formal EC meetings attended (r .31*), with educational background (r .54**), and finally with behavioural discretion (r .31**). The following two tables reveal the relative explanatory power of the independent variables tested:

Table 13 Factors related to whether or not officials pay heed to signals from the political leadership. Pearson's r and multiple regression (beta) (a)
  Pearson's r Beta
The ministry-agency nexus (b)...................................
.40**
.60**
Educational background...........................................
.35*
-.05
Behavioural discretion.............................................
-.27*
.14
Mean N..............................................................
52
 
*) p .05 **) p .01

Adjusted R2 = .30 (R2 = 36) [8]

(a) This variable has the following values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

(b) This variable is dichotomised: ministry (1), agency (2); variable 2 is also dichotomised: law and social sciences (1), economy and technical disciplines (2); variable 3 has the following values: clear rules/practises (1), fairly clear rules/practises (2), both/and (3), fairly much discretion (4), very much discretion (5).

 

Table 14 Factors relating to the following assertion: ?The positions I take are based on my professional considerations?. Pearson's r and multiple regression (beta) (a)
  Pearson's r Beta
The ministry-agency nexus......................................
-.34**
-.27*
Behavioural discretion............................................
.27*
-.21
Mean N.............................................................
61
 
*) p .05 **) p .01

Adjusted R2 = .12 (R2 = 15)

(a) This variable has the following values: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3). The dependent variables have the same values as in table 13.

These tables indicate that the ministry-agency nexus is most relevant for determining the role perceptions evoked by government officials attending EC's. Officials at the agency level tend to evoke `independent expert' roles more frequently than `government representative' roles. [9] However, this analysis does not determine the relative explanatory power of domestic institutional affiliations on the one hand, and intensity of participation within EC's on the other. No multiple regression analysis has been conducted on the latter because this dimension does not relate significantly with the domestic institutional affiliations dimension. Hence, these two dimensions seem to have an independent casual impact on the enactment of representative roles.


Concluding remarks

In the mid 1990's, Norway and Sweden decided on different paths when it comes to the EU. Whereas Norway and Sweden joined the EEA agreement in 1994, Sweden joined the EU the year after. Despite having different formal affiliation forms towards the EU, however, Norwegian and Swedish national civil servants have approximately the same formal rights of attending the preparatory work of the EU Commission. Thus, Norwegian and Swedish officials attending Commission expert committees have mostly the same institutional affiliations towards the EU, irrespective of the differences between Norway and Sweden's formal affiliations towards the Union.

As the current study shows, foremost similar institutional affiliations towards the EU Commission accompany the same role perceptions amongst Norwegian and Swedish officials. These officials tend to evoke a mix of different role perceptions, albeit the `government representative' role and the `independent expert' role are mostly enacted. The `supranational agent' role is evoked less strongly amongst these officials. A strong loyalty to the national level by representatives in EU committees is one factor indicating that national goals and interests are secured. However, mirroring the mixed set of roles evoked by these officials, colleagues from other countries are also pictured as having mixed sets of roles. Thus, the current study unveils that ambiguity underpins the representative role of domestic government officials attending EU institutions and committees. These officials have several institutional affiliations, and different cues for action and role enactment. The classical conflict in public administration between political loyalty and professional autonomy are thus reflected in this study, albeit adding a new supranational dimension.

The current study indicates that domestic institutional affiliations seem most influential on processes of role enactment. We have indicated two factors that may explain why this is so. One factor is that national institutions remain the primary affiliation of the national civil servants, even after they have attended committee meetings at the EU level. Another factor, which is strongly related to the first, is based on the fact that representatives are socialised nationally. For that reason, trust is created between the political leadership and civil servants. This trust reduces the need for strict direct control in order to secure that civil servants act upon official government preferences. Finally, the frequency and intensity of national civil servants' participation in Commission expert committees are shown to impinge on the likelihood of evoking `supranational agent roles and `independent expert' roles.

As such, the current study shows that ?membership in the European Union is not necessarily the most appropriate dividing line? (Usher 1998, p. 184). As the EU becomes increasingly differentiated, allowing for various forms of affiliation, the membership versus non-membership dichotomy is getting less interesting, analytically speaking. This study reveals that Norwegian and Swedish government officials attending Commission expert committees evoke approximately the same set of representative roles. Hence, representative quality is revealed to be not a fixed property, as asserted by the notion of imperative and liberal representation, but rather a dynamic and flexible feature. The representative quality of committee participants at the EU level is ambiguous and affected by the multiple institutional affiliations embedding them.

Further, the location of regulatory functions at the EU level has contributed to a debate about whether administrative policy making ought to be insulated from political control (Egan and Wolf 1999, p. 240). We have observed the development of new supranational loyalties that may undermine the trust between the political leadership and civil servants. The formative effect of EU committees on the loyalties of national officials may represent a delegation problem. Of course, the representatives must have some professional autonomy in order to make use of their special expertise and to learn from colleagues in the committees. Nevertheless, shifts of loyalties represent a challenge to the ability for national governments to control that national representatives attending EU committees act in accordance with the interests of their government.


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Notes


Footnotes

[*] This study is financially supported by the ARENA progamme (The Norwegian Research Council ), University of Oslo, and by the Agricultural research programme "Levek�r, utvikling og omstilling i landbruket" (The Norwegian Research Council). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 8th national conference in political science, 10-12 january, Troms�, 1999. Thanks to the participants of the conference, and to Morten Egeberg and Johan P. Olsen for valuable and valid comments. The title of the paper is inspired by Albert O. Hirschman's seminal work 'Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States' (1970). Still, whereas loyalty is an intervening variable in Hirschman's analysis, this variable is a dependent variable in the current study.

[**] Jarle Trondal: Department of political science and the ARENA programme, University of Oslo
Frode Veggeland: Norwegian Agriculture Economics Research Institute

[1]At least four concepts of representative quality may be identified in the literature. First is representation as `acting for' (Pitkin 1972: 112). This notion of representation claims that `true representation entails responsiveness to the represented, attention to his wishes or needs' (Pitkin 1972: 113). Representation, thus, means acting in accordance with the wishes and interests of whom they represent. Second, demographic representation `depends on the representative's characteristics, or what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing something' (Pitkin 1972: 61; original emphasis). Third, formalistic representation `defines representation in terms of a transaction i.e. election that takes place at the outset, before the actual representing begins' (Pitkin 1972: 39). Fourth, symbolic representation means representation `by what he is or how he is regarded' (Pitkin 1972: 113). The loyalties and identities enacted by the representatives determine whom they are representing (cf. Birch 1971: 15; Olsen 1988: 157-158).

[2] In the Scandinavian countries agencies are formally separated from cabinet level departments. Thus, agencies are organized at a lower hierarchical level, and agency personnel are expected to evoke more intra-sectoral role perceptions and identifications than are personnel at the ministry level.

[3] The EEA (European Economic Area) agreement is an international agreement between EU and EFTA, which was put into force on January 1, 1994. The agreement allows the EFTA countries into the Single European Market on equal terms as the member countries. Some policy areas are never the less excluded from the agreement (i.e. fisheries and agriculture). The only EFTA countries left in the EEA, after Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the EU in 1995, are Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (the last EFTA country, Switzerland, said no to the EEA agreement in a referendum in 1993).

[4] Because much of the committee work is delegated to experts at lower administrative levels, there may arguably be a need for mechanisms to secure that civil servants actually act in accordance with the preferences of the government (Pitkin 1972:112; Pollack 1997). Few instructions and weak co-ordination efforts indicate that there are few formal mechanisms to assure this (Trondal 1999b). The system, thus, to a large extent is based on the government's trust in civil servants remaining loyal to national goals and interests (where these exist, we may add) (Kramer and Tyler 1996).

[5] Multicollinearity exists between two sets of variables: Officials feeling allegiance towards the political leadership tend to pay heed to signals from the political leadership (r .38**), and pay emphasis to national interests when participating in EC's (r .31*).

[6] Multicollinearity exists between only two variables in table 8: Officials feeling allegiance towards their own EU committee also tend to feel allegiance towards the EU in general (r .59**).

[7] Owing to systematic selection of data underpinning this study, significance tests do not reveal any information about any theoretical universe. On the contrary, however, significance may tell us something about the robustness of the relationships tested.

[8] Due to a low N, we use the adjusted R2 in order to correct for possible skewness in the data.

[9] One reason for the low beta as to educational background and behavioural discretion in table 13 relates to the high level of multicollinearity with the ministry agency variable (r .54** and r .31**, respectively). One indicator of multicollinearity is the change in the sign on the variable when other independent variables are added to the analysis. These inter-correlations might render multiple regression analysis needless. Still, in an effort at unveiling the relative explanatory power of the ministry-agency variable, such analysis has been conducted. This procedure may be defended due to no bivariate correlations exceeding .80 (Lewis-Beck 1980: 60).




























[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper series: 15.03.2000]