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Ambiguous
Interests. Norway and the West-European Market Formations
1959-62*
Hans Otto Frøland**
Department of History,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Why have West European
nation-states in principle accepted a partial surrender
of sovereignty to a supranational organisation and thus,
legally, committed themselves to future policy
harmonisation? The question is implicitly influenced by
Alan Milward`s vigorous attack on teleological
explanations of European political integration. The West
European states, he argues, have not been functional
prisoners of interdependence, but �have actively sought
to limit its consequences. Their will and capacity to do
so grew after 1945.� [1]
Decisions whether to integrate or not were a result of
political choice, and generally reflected the nature of
national policies: �...the choice between
interdependence and integration as international
frameworks for advancing national policy choices depended
on the nature of national policies.� [2] As to prediction
therefore he argues that �the only predictive value of a
theory derived from historical research would be that
once national policies were specified, their
international consequences for the nation-state could be
specified.� [3]
Detailed historical research has led him to conclude that
West-European integration in the 1950s was �... the
creation of the European nation-states themselves for
their own purposes, an act of national will.� [4] Milward regards
governments as agents of the national will as �...in all
the member-states of the successive European Communities
government has been in its essentials government by
consent� and �...democracy in which political parties
have been the main conduits between public opinion and
government policy has been the rule.� [5] The empirical basis
for Milward`s encompassing theory is basically collected
among nation-states which decided to integrate. As for
Norway this overriding perspective may appear irrelevant
as she never took up membership in a supranational
organisation. Still, by means of Milward`s conceptual
framework, I shall elaborate on Norwegian policy towards
the West-European market formations from around 1959,
when EFTA was negotiated, until de Gaulle vetoed a
British entry into the EEC in January 1963.
I suggest that EFTA was the ideal solution for Norway
as this was an international framework in which
ambiguities and contradictions in national policies could
be maintained. These ambiguities basically reflected
socio-political cleavages within Norwegian society.
Because traditional ambiguities could be maintained
within the framework of EFTA, the Government was able to
establish national consent. Treaty conditions did not
shove the domestic socio-political balance. There was
only marginal domestic opposition when the EFTA treaty
was negotiated and ratified, and the corporatist
arrangements were strong enough to internalise
oppositional voice. On 10 August 1961, however, Britain
and Denmark applied for membership negotiations with EEC.
This put Norway in an awkward dilemma as the treaties of
Rome would imply a far more profound encroachment upon
the socio-political balance than the Stockholm
convention. Should Norway join the EEC along with Britain
and Denmark, and thus allow for future surrender of
sovereignty and policy harmonisation, and on which
conditions? The situation lasted until de Gaulle vetoed
British entry in January 1963 and thus removed the
question of Norwegian EEC-membership from the political
agenda. I suggest that this interregnum is characterised
by policy confusion. A new national policy choice was
never taken, nor was a national will surmounting the
EFTA-solution established. The decision to approach EEC
was actually taken by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange on
an EFTA Ministerial meeting in London 27 - 28 June 1961
in order to maintain EFTA as a bargaining coalition. It
was not taken by any well considered government and
parliamentary vote. Having decided to approach EEC in
June 1961 the domestic discussion about the basis of
negotiation with the EEC lasted for about ten months. On
28 April 1962, more than five months after the neutral
EFTA-countries had applied for association, the
Parliament decided to apply for negotiations. Formally
Norway applied for full membership under � 237 as
opposed to association under � 238. In that sense I
accept there was a symbolic bias in government policy
towards full membership. The decision can, however, not
be interpreted as a policy choice for membership, but
simply as a choice to include membership as an option.
The short application of 2 May 1962 signalled nothing
more than a will to take up negotiations in order to
clarify conditions for possible membership. It neither
excluded association nor any other relation with the EEC.
Perceptions of national interests certainly had evolved
within the Norwegian polity in this period. Access to EEC
would surely provide generalised economic and political
benefits. This was, on the other hand, balanced by
considerable domestic restructuring costs. Hence, the
idea that Norway as a member would have to be redeemed
exceptions from treaty obligations was strong within
Government, Parliament as well as corporate interest
organisations. This attitude was clearly disclosed by the
Norwegian position paper presented for the Council of
Ministers on 4 July 1962. No conclusions had been drawn
and, consequently, perceptions of national interests had
not been converted into clear policy. Moreover, the
Government did not develop any consistent bargaining
policy. No policy choice was ever taken before de Gaulle
restored the ideal solution in January 1963. If there was
a policy, it was to keep options open as long as
possible. Consequently, in terms of seeking framework for
the advancement of national policy this period of one and
a half years must be regarded an interregnum of almost
paralysing national policy confusion.
What explains this? The policy confusion reflected
basically that EEC-membership, as opposed to
EFTA-membership, would challenge existing ambiguity in
national policies and therefore the existing
socio-political balance in Norwegian society. The
Government was aware of this from the very beginning. As
the idea prevailed during the summer of 1961 that the
issue should be subjected to an advisory referendum, the
Government had to give domestic political considerations
extra weight. Delaying the decision to apply was a
deliberate choice by the Prime Minister in order to avoid
domestic opposition. In terms of parliamentary support
this was met with success. However, the public debate had
increasingly focused on domestic costs by joining EEC,
and from spring 1962 the critics became more articulate
and started organising themselves. This, of course, made
the Government more reluctant to formulate clear policy.
Surely, the lucid and unsettled international situation
also compromised the capacity of the Government to
establish a well-defined policy. Firstly, the joint
position of the Six could not be fully anticipated as
there were considerable disagreements among them.
Secondly, vague perceptions existed that the British
negotiations would establish some sort of principle
pattern for the others. Thirdly, Norway queued up in
Brussels after Britain and Denmark and was therefore
never forced to take a final stand.
Referring to Milward`s conceptual framework, however,
I emphasise the domestic constraints.
As my interpretation fit well to more shallow long
term observations of Norway's relation to the core
institutions of European integration, I shall shortly
elaborate on these before providing the more detailed
evidence of the interregnum.
I. Norway's Relation to the Core Institutions of European
Integration
Four times Norwegian governments have considered to
bring Norway into the EEC/EC/EU and subsequently applied
for membership negotiations - in 1962-63, 1967, 1970-72
and 1992-94. However, on neither of these four occasions
were the applications an implementation of a consistent
and well considered policy developed within the framework
of domestic policy and politics. As international
relations beyond the influence of Norwegian policies
confronted Norway with radical new situations the
membership issue was each time pulled on the domestic
political agenda. On the three first occasions Norway
followed Britain and in 1992 she followed Sweden. On all
four occasions the new situation confronted governments
with awkward policy dilemmas, which grew out of
contradictions and ambiguities in national policies.
The rather ambiguous nature of
national policies aimed simultaneously at international
interdependence and national control. This is a well
established interpretation in terms of foreign and
security policies, [6]
but does also fit to commercial and economic policies.
Already from the late 1940s exports contributed a lot to
the national income, and policies always aimed at
exploiting economies of scale, comparative advantages,
division of labour and market extension. Incomes from
exports have always been vital in financing ambitious
modernisation plans, and attracting foreign investment
capital for industrial modernisation was always regarded
a crucial part of the policy-mix. The logical advancement
of these policies was to participate in transnational
commercial and market arrangements. This makes the
general sensitivity towards changes in the international
political environment, and eventually inclination to
negotiate on conditions for membership in the EEC/EC/EU,
understandable. Nonetheless, parallel to this outward
orientation policies have also aimed at maintaining
national control over domestic production and avoid
foreign competition in specific sectors, in particular
the primary and service sector, which both contributed
far more to employment than those sectors exposed to
international competition. The logical advancement of
these policies was to remain outside transnational market
arrangements in order to shelter the sectors from
uncontrolled foreign challenges and domestic
restructuring costs. Consequently, the benefits of
foreign market access always had to be carefully balanced
against the costs of opening up domestic markets. The
best solution would be arrangements like the
EFTA-solution, which would extend markets for
manufactured goods almost without touching upon
agriculture and services.
The contradictions and ambiguities in
national policies reflected profound socio-political
cleavages in Norwegian society, often referred to as a
cleavage between the political and cultural centres,
which tend to accept modernisation, and the political and
cultural periphery, where traditionalism is more strongly
rooted. Opinion polls and research on electoral behaviour
confirm a profound and remarkably stable socio-political
cleavage which have become transparently dividing, in
particular when the issue of whether to integrate or
deepen international interdependence has been part of the
political agenda. [7]
Since the mid 1930s social democratic governance, whether
in the labour or centre-right fashion, has rested upon a
will to integrate the non-urban areas into the national
policy horizon by means of ambitious regional policies,
including protection of the primary sector. Gradually,
and particularly from the 1970s, the creation of welfare
state arrangements became part of these policies. The
impact of this policy-mix has been a decentralised
pattern of settlement. This policy horizon has been a
precondition for electoral support, and thus political
power. Interest organisations, whether in the primary
sector or in public services, have been well organised
and pursued political rent-seeking. They have generally
opposed liberalisation of the fishery and agricultural
regime as well as the restrictive concession regulations
which allowed for extensive political control of
investments. They have also opposed relaxation of
regional policies. Consequently, whenever the question of
Norwegian participation in wider market arrangements
which would challenge the traditional policy-mix has been
raised, such participation has been regarded a threat.
This was the situation during the discussions on whether
to take part in the Marshall-plan, whether to establish a
Nordic customs union in the 1950s as well as during all
discussions concerning membership in EEC/EC/EU. Thus,
surmounting dilemmas caused by these national policies,
for instance a decision to integrate, would imply
considerable political costs.
The socio-political cleavages
have run right through most political parties. This has
been revealed by some thorough quantitative
content-analyses of parliamentary debates. [8] It is also
displayed indirectly by party programs, which have
generally been rather vague about Norway`s relation with
EEC/EC/EU. Among party programs before the parliamentary
election in 1961, only the communists, the radical
socialists and the conservatives had taken a stand on
Norway's relation to EEC. [9]
Little attention was paid to the issue during the
election campaign although it was held after the British
and the Danes had applied for membership. The exceptions
of course are the campaigns preceding the referenda in
1972 and 1994, when parties were forced to take a stand.
In 1972 one party (Venstre) split on the issue [10], and the Labour
Party was seriously wounded because it had taken a clear
choice in favour of Norwegian membership. The cleavage
has run right through the centre-right coalition
governments, which on both occasions disintegrated on the
matter. As to the last coalition it broke up on the EEA
issue in 1990. When it comes to the application in 1967
we can even conclude that it had nothing to do at all
with the EEC. It is a well established interpretation
that the 1967 application, aiming at negotiations in
order to clarify conditions for accession and handed in
by a centre-right coalition government confused by the
ambiguity, primarily was intended to maintain the
coalition and reflected no policy choice at all. The
Government anticipated the French veto against British
entry, and consequently feared no practical impact at
all. Had there been a British and Danish entry, the
Government would have disintegrated, as it actually did
on the matter in 1971.
In 1972 and 1994 the governments surmounted the
ambiguity in national policies and clearly recommended
membership after negotiations concerning access
conditions had been concluded. Thus, on these occasions
the governments certainly also developed a well
considered perception of national interests, from which a
national policy choice was to be taken. However, on
neither of these two occasions were the government`s
perceptions and recommendations sufficiently accepted by
the electorate in referendums. 53,3 % of the electorate
voted against membership in 1972 and 52,2 % in 1994.
Accordingly, the governments had in fact a national
policy, but not the capacity to establish a national will
which accepted that policy choice.
On the two first occasions, in 1962 and 1967,
negotiations with the Community were never initiated and
perceptions among the electorate were never really
tested. On both occasions, however, there is reason to
assume, counterfactually, quite some reluctance and
organised resistance even if Britain and Denmark had
become members. Opinion polls do certainly not give clear
direction for interpretation. Still, as there on both
occasions would have been advisory referenda and thus
popular mass mobilisation, no-vote majorities on both
occasions are not only imaginable, but quite likely.
Moreover, on both occasions there would have been
problems in attaining the sufficient _ majority in
parliament, which was required to transfer sovereignty
according to � 93 in the Constitution. 38 votes would be
enough to block membership. In 1962 a minority of 35
members voted against amending the Constitution with
article 93, and 37 members voted against the application.
In 1967 only 13 voted against application. This vote is,
nevertheless, of no significance as Parliament
anticipated the French veto. A far bigger number of MPs
had during the debate expressed doubts and reservations.
Based on these premises I do not hesitate to suggest that
on neither of the two first occasions did the
applications reflect a national concord or will to
integrate.
Hence, as all attempts to induce a sufficient majority
of Norwegian citizens to submit their loyalties to
organisations being or aiming at a supranational
character failed, the really interesting question, viewed
from a Norwegian perspective, is not how national
interests have been perceived by governments, but why
government perceptions never have been sufficiently
accepted by the public. Any answer must take into account
the socio-political cleavage sketchily outlined above.
Nevertheless, any account of Norway's relation to the
core institutions of West European integration should
start with identifying government perceptions of national
interests. Aware of the basic reference point - ambiguity
in national policies as a result of and maintaining
profound socio-political cleavages - one must
hypothesise, firstly, that perceptions of national
interests would be ambiguous and, secondly, that
converting perceptions of national interests into a
consistent policy choice would necessarily take place
under serious domestic constraints. When adding to this
domestic situation the difficulties of formulating policy
in a lucid and unsettled international situation as in
1962, it is no surprise that policy confusion and blurred
objectives were the outcome.
II. The EFTA-solution in 1960:
Ambiguity Maintained
Throughout the 1950s the Norwegian government had
generally supported intergovernmental trade schemes which
promoted Norwegian exports and net capital imports and
still allowed for protection of domestic sectors, such as
the Trade Liberalisation Program and the European
Payments Union within OEEC. But within these schemes
government attitudes were unstable. The Government
adjusted to the imperatives of the schemes rather
ambiguously. [11]
However, as to participation in formalised market
formations, such as customs unions or common markets,
Norway always took a negative stand in the last resort. [12] Still, the
ambiguity in national policy encouraged the Government to
maintain a Nordic market formation as an option
throughout the 1950s. Parliament and corporate interest
organisations were, however, far more sceptical than the
Government and restrained any government inclination to
opt for a Nordic market formation. Until the late 1950s,
therefore, the international commercial framework in
which Norway participated, was compatible with
ambiguities in national policies and the socio-political
cleavages.
For economic as well as foreign policy reasons, the
Government had feared the impact of a market schism in
Western Europe. Tension between trading blocks would
jeopardise the highly important export income, cause
political tension and weaken cohesion within NATO.
Consequently, after the Six had signed the treaties of
Rome the Government supported the British endeavour for
an OEEC wide industrial free trade area (FTA), which
would also comprise the EEC, and which ran parallel with
the ever lasting discussions concerning a Nordic market formation. [13] Parties,
Parliament as well as organised interests were on the
other hand, initially far more sceptical, and the
government negotiators were submitted a restricted
mandate when negotiating within the OEEC Working Party
17. Certainly, no change in the character of the national
will had taken place before that. This seems, though, to
have happened during the negotiations on the Free Trade
Area as the Labour government, Parliament as well as
organised interests became more sympathetic towards
participation in the FTA. [14]
Crucial mediators of this new sympathy were former and
current cabinet members such as Arne Skaug, Erik Brofoss
and Halvard Lange. [15]
The sympathy rested basically upon perceptions of
national interests. Firstly, there were the obvious
foreign policy arguments in case the British and the
Nordic countries also became members. Secondly, there
would be obvious economic benefits in terms of increasing
market access for manufactured goods, including processed
fish, and increasing options for import of investment
capital. As participation would, after all, also include
considerable domestic costs, the Government tended to
accept these in order to reach a compromise [16] - also in terms
of changing the domestic agricultural regime. [17] Actually, and
surprisingly, the Government was somewhat embarrassed by
British unwillingness to include foodstuffs in the FTA,
as this would jeopardise prospects for Norwegian fish
exports. [18]
The remarkable change in Norwegian perceptions did,
nonetheless, never develop into a consistent and well
considered policy choice as France in November 1958
vetoed the project. Thus, we can never know how far the
Government would have moved in terms of accepting
perceived costs and, moreover, whether it would have had
the capacity to establish national consent on the issue.
Opinion polls do not give any suggestions.
Difficult negotiations in 1959
preceded the creation of EFTA in 1960. [19] The Norwegian
bargaining policies were once again influenced by the
ambiguity in national policies. Again the benefit of
market access would have to be balanced against the
opening up of domestic markets. Nevertheless, when the
British FTA endeavour failed, the establishment of EFTA
was in several respects regarded a better solution than a
Nordic customs union. [20]
Several factors explain this. Firstly, there had been
profound domestic opposition against a Nordic customs
union. Due to Danish agricultural strength and Swedish
industrial strength this would have caused considerable
restructuring costs in the sheltered sectors of the
economy. Interest organisations representing industry as
well as agriculture had therefore opposed the plans, so
had most political parties. Secondly, EFTA had brought
the discussion on a Scandinavian customs union, which had
more or less dragged on since 1947, out of the dead-lock,
and thus accommodated Norwegian concerns for a joint
Nordic solution. Despite the opposition against a customs
union the sentimental affinity towards �Norden� was
strong. Thirdly, EFTA would take the bulk of Norwegian
exports and would under any circumstance allow for
increasing trade in manufactures within a framework of
intergovernmental co-operation. This benefit could be
obtained without having to pay profound domestic
restructuring costs as there would be only small impacts
on the primary sector. By means of bilateral negotiations
with Britain a satisfactory solution concerning market
access for fish was found without having to change the domestic fishery
regulations. [21]
Agriculture remained untouched by the treaty despite
Danish efforts to include it. In terms of domestic costs
the EFTA solution had less implications than the FTA
solution probably would have had. Fourthly, EFTA would
give the seven member countries increasing bargaining
strength towards the six EEC countries. This was
important as the anxieties concerning a West European
split still existed.
The EFTA convention was compatible with the
socio-political cleavages and the ambiguity in national
policies. The most controversial problems had been
omitted or left open to future treatment. Hence, the
Government had no problems establishing a national will
behind that choice. Parliament had encouraged the
Government to negotiate the treaty [22]
and only one MP voted against ratification. [23] Reluctance within
industry was kept within the organisations, so on the
whole no serious opposition was articulated among
organised interests. [24]
Thus, on this occasion the institutionalised corporatism
proved instrumental in establishing national consent.
Moreover, there is no reason to assume any opposition
from `the silent majority' of public opinion. An opinion
poll from October 1959 displayed that 28 % considered
membership advantageous for Norway, while only 10 %
considered it a disadvantage. 62 % however had no opinion
at all. [25] This
general absence of interest is clearly revealed by
another poll, in which 2000 people were asked to name
which countries belonged to the Six and which to the
Seven. Only 4 % got it right. [26]
The only interpretation possible on the basis of the
opinion polls is that the EFTA membership was not
regarded any threat. The EFTA framework was compatible
with the ambiguity in national policies and therefore a
national will could easily be established.
However consistent, the
perception of a good solution rested on the wishful
premises that EFTA, with American support and possibly
also the support of Benelux and West-Germany, would
succeed in reaching a trading agreement with the EEC
within the framework of a reorganised OEEC, what in 1961
was to become OECD. [27]
This is one reason why Norway had become such a committed
defender of the OEEC Code of Liberalisation and the
European Monetary Agreement. In January 1960 the Cabinet
believed that the 'Dillon-conference' in Paris would lead
to a multilateral arrangement between EEC and EFTA. [28] Norwegian
optimism is indicated by the fact that the Foreign
Affairs Committee in Parliament in May 1960 asked the
Government to start preparing a constitutional amendment
which would allow for a limited transfer of sovereignty
to some future OECD institution. [29]
Parliament enacted � 93 on 8 March 1962. Debate on a
constitutional amendment had, however, dragged on since
1951. [30]
Very soon the premises for Norwegian policy crumbled.
The EEC displayed reluctance to reach a trade solution
with EFTA and accelerated the process towards a common
external tariff. The Fouchet plan manifested willingness
to establish a political centre among the Six which could
dilute NATO cohesion. The Americans demonstrated
reluctance towards EFTA and did not go for the kind of
OECD that Norway wanted. Contrary to Norwegian policy the
Americans wanted to strengthen the IMF and GATT at the
expense of OECD. The British evinced inclination to go
for EEC membership and the Government was convinced that
the Danes would follow suit. By
April 1961 officials in the Foreign Office strongly
believed that Britain now was drifting towards membership
in EEC. [31] The
idea that Britain and possibly Denmark would find
solutions for themselves at the expense of EFTA
solidarity certainly frightened the Government. Before
the EFTA Council meetings in London on 27 - 28 June
therefore, it developed a diplomatic strategy to maintain
a joint EFTA approach which would modify British and
Danish eagerness. [32]
Interests and policies of the EFTA countries were,
however, too divergent to be firmly united. The Norwegian
strategy therefore failed. On 31 July both the British
and the Danes announced they would apply for membership
negotiations. No firm EFTA commitment was ever
established. Each country was to handle the issue on its
own. EFTA ministers did, nevertheless, sign two joint
EFTA statements in which they expressed will to reach a
satisfactory solution for all countries and maintain
liaison when negotiating individually with the EEC. [33] During these EFTA
discussions Foreign Minister Lange had clearly worked
from the premise that Norway would seek some kind of
formal relation with the EEC, a mandate which, however,
only implicitly had been given by Parliament. [34] Parliament had
never taken a formal position on the issue.
III. The Interregnum July 1961 - January
1963: Advancing Ambiguity.
Parliament, in fact, never annulled the joint EFTA
statements. Thus, when Norway took up discussions about
the adequate response to the British decision, the
question was whether to negotiate on the basis of full
membership under � 237 or some kind of looser
association under � 238. Remaining outside, hopefully
with some kind of trade agreement, represented a third
option. By signing the joint EFTA declaration,
notwithstanding, the Government had signalled that the
third option would not be preferred. As for all options
national benefits had to be delicately balanced against
national costs. The many public reports produced during
the late 1950s as well as experience during the FTA and
EFTA negotiations worked as substantial guiding
principles for such balancing. [35]
The economic arguments in favour of membership were
linked to the generalised benefits of market access. As
already mentioned, the Government had developed a policy
to restructure the economy by increasing industrial
exports. Increased export income and capital imports were
to pay for the expansion of export industry, the
modernisation of the sheltered sectors, including
agriculture, as well as the welfare state. Industrial
growth rates had decreased during the late 1950s and the
Government had decided to increase investments. Remaining
outside the EEC tariff walls would hit Norwegian
exporters. The Government assumed that maintaining the
composition and volume of Norwegian exports to EEC on the
level of 1959 would increase tariff duties about 100 %.
Moreover, with Britain, Denmark and Sweden (Sweden under
� 238) participating in an enlarged EEC would comprise
about 70 % of traditional Norwegian export markets, and
remaining outside the tariff walls would impede access
for Norwegian manufacturing industry to these markets,
which also included the booming German market. It would
furthermore be increasingly difficult to attract foreign
capital for future investment purposes. In sum, remaining
outside the EEC would jeopardise this modernisation
policy and negatively affect economic growth, employment
and ultimately national welfare.
Association under � 238 was not regarded sufficient
in this respect. Experience during the negotiations on
the Free Trade Area as well as the EFTA negotiations had
led the Government to assume that an association
agreement would allow EEC member countries such as
Belgium, France and Italy, but possibly also the British,
to demand regulations which would impede the exports of
pulp and paper, aluminium and ferrous alloys - those
sectors which exploited the comparative advantage of
cheap Norwegian energy. Moreover, an association would
make it far more difficult to include fish exports in the
common market.
There were also strong security arguments in favour of
membership. Firstly, because the US had come out in
favour of EEC-enlargement, and the British and Danes now
seemed to become members, Norwegian participation would
help reinforce an Atlantic profile. Secondly, the
Government saw Norwegian prospects within NATO being
marginalised. The risk of being considered a
semi-neutral, thus loosing influence and ultimately
security, would definitely increase by remaining outside.
This argument was also applied to an association
solution, as the neutral EFTA countries were opting for
association. The counterargument that Norwegian
membership would break up Nordic solidarity had lost
weight as the Danes so eagerly wanted membership.
These generalised benefits were balanced against
generalised costs. Neither a political party nor any
influential non-governmental organisation had ever argued
in favour of European federalism. The most significant
generalised cost was therefore the danger of drifting
into a supranational structure. Elements of
supranationality was certainly written into the treaties
of Rome. EEC was to become a common market implying
policy harmonisation, and CAP was already in its embryo.
The fear of supranationalism was, however, somewhat
counterbalanced by the belief that France, along with the
possible new members, would block any further development
towards supranationalism. Another generalised cost was
the weakening of Nordic identity. As Sweden and Finland
would not become full members due to security
considerations, the perceived Nordic foreign policy
solidarity would be challenged. The Government also saw
that the EEC endangered the Nordic labour market and the
tendency towards harmonisation of Nordic social policy,
properly speaking social democratic policy. Still, the
Nordic argument was weakened by the eagerness of the
Danes to become a member along with the British. This
already challenged the image of Nordic identity.
In addition to these generalised costs there were the
more serious domestic costs. The highly protectionist
agricultural system and probably also the fishery system
would hardly survive membership. But for some years the
Government had discussed a possible change of the
agricultural system, and in that perspective CAP
regulations were not regarded so costly. Evidence
indicates that maintenance of the existing fishery system
was given priority to agriculture, but we can not be
sure. Still, there was a tendency to balance the benefits
of maintaining the existing fishery system against the
benefits of access to export markets for fish.
Restructuring costs in the fishery sector could be
minimised by joining, as Norway then would gain influence
on a future EEC fishery policy. The possible
disintegration of domestic concession regulations, which
allowed the Government to give preference to Norwegian
investors, was also perceived as a major problem. This
would give foreign companies access to cheap energy, the
comparative advantage on which the modernisation policy
rested. The possibility that foreign capital could
penetrate the economy without political control did not
at all accord with the social democratic mind.
To sum up, the substantial perceptions of costs and
benefits were very much the same as during the FTA- and
EFTA-negotiations, but the implications regardless of
choice were more profound. Archival evidence certainly
displays no enthusiasm at all. One can definitely argue
that the fear of being left outside the Community and not
an autonomous wish for membership was the underlying
concern of the Government. Full membership would provide
generalised benefits, but imply considerable domestic
restructuring costs. Association would reduce domestic
costs, but also benefits in terms of reduced market
access and access to centres of political decision
making. The awkward situation allowed for advancement of
traditional stereotypes. There was reluctance towards
German and French power in general, German economic
policy and French colonial policy in particular. Still,
one can see how cabinet members as well as government
bureaucracy, implicitly assuming that Norway would have
to follow Britain, allowed wishful arguments to prevail.
With British and Scandinavian membership one would
probably resist any unwelcome development of
supranationalism as well as buttress the forces of
democracy, and social democracy, among the continental
member states. Policy makers realised of course that that
the optimal solution would be full membership, but with
exemptions, long transitionary periods and the
possibility to invoke escape clauses.
On 28 April 1962 Parliament decided to apply for
negotiations for full membership. On 2 May, about nine
months after Britain and Denmark, the Government handed
in the so called membership application. The application
did, however, not reflect any consistent policy choice.
In one paragraph the Government stated it would
contribute to the implementation of the Treaty. In the
next it stated that satisfactory solutions to national
problems would have to be reached. In plain speech this
meant exemptions from the Treaty. By the spring of 1962
neither clear priorities nor consistent policy, and far
from any bargaining policy, had been produced by the
Norwegian polity. Actually, the Labour Party, Cabinet and
Parliament had never taken a stand, not even en
principe. They all announced they wouldn't do so
until an agreement had been negotiated with the Six.
Parliament decided not to apply for membership, only for
membership negotiations as a means to clarify Norway's
future relation with the EEC. To conclude, the seemingly
consensus observed within the Norwegian polity was simply
a consequence of the rather vague perceptions that had
developed.
Having produced no policy choice at all, why should
the Norwegian application be delayed for almost ten
months? Balancing the substantial arguments was in itself
surely awkward. It occurred during a situation where
neither the policy of the Six could be fully anticipated,
nor could the future composition of EFTA. The Government
was of course well aware of the British-French
disagreements, the subsequent veto could, on the other
hand, not be anticipated. Still, the delay was not a
result of the Government being unable to identify and
balance substantial arguments of costs and benefits. As
argued, similar balancing had increasingly been done
within the polity since the mid 1950s. A corporatist
body, Frihandelsutvalget, frequently discussed
market issues, and recommended on 15 September 1961 that
Norway as a bargaining strategy should negotiate for full
membership. This was also the attitude among cabinet
opinion leaders like Halvard Lange and Arne Skaug. The
delay was, nevertheless, a result of deliberate
calculations by the Government as the issue carried
considerable potential for escalating domestic political
conflicts. Basically, the potential for conflicts
reflected the socio-political cleavages and the
traditional ambiguity of national policies.
Reluctance and ambivalence existed
within the Cabinet, in all political parties, among
interest organisations and amidst the electorate. Prime
Minister Gerhardsen for instance, argued on several
occasions in favour of association. Members of the
Foreign Affairs committee in Parliament criticised
Halvard Lange for having committed Norway too strongly by
the joint EFTA declaration. The declaration was, however,
sanctioned, but on the basis of a variety of diverging
premises. The reaction revealed the fact that
parliamentary support was fragile. [36]
Domestic political considerations had to be given extra
weight as the idea prevailed during the autumn of 1961
that the issue had to be decided by a referendum in the
last resort. Yet this was formally decided by Parliament
in April 1962. Simply because the cleavages split most
parties, they tended to argue in favour of referendum. [37]
The Government could certainly have avoided this
threat had it at an early stage chosen to opt for
association agreement. This act, though, would have
excluded the possibility of full membership with
exemptions from treaty obligations. Strategies to keep
the options open and establish sufficient discursive
consent were therefore regarded a political necessity.
Prime Minister Gerhardsen in particular, who also was
generally sceptical about Norway being too deeply
integrated in West European organisations, feared that
political tension could be evoked before the coming
parliamentary election in September 1961. The cleavages
ran right through the Labour Party, which had recently
split up due to foreign policy issues. Against the will
of the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Commerce, who
both quickly wanted to queue up in Brussels with the
British, the Government decided to establish domestic
consent before presenting the
issue to Parliament. On 13 October the Government
presented Parliament a report on the issue which
presented no policy conclusions at all. [38] Consequently, for
the time being government policy did not surmount the
joint EFTA declaration. A prime objective was to avoid
any oppositional voice within the labour movement which
could restrict future options.
In early October 1961, a joint meeting of the Cabinet,
the party leadership, the party group in parliament as
well as the trade union leadership accepted a proposal by
the Prime Minister to allow for decentralised party
treatment of the issue. [39]
The party subsequently decided that government policy
should not be formulated until the party had dealt
thoroughly with the issue. A party meeting scheduled on
15 February 1962 was to decide whether to negotiate on
the basis of membership or association. The decision was
taken despite the Foreign Minister Halvard Langes
argument that such a delay would weaken Norwegian
bargaining strength. [40]
Subsequently, the majority of the Foreign Affairs
Committee in parliament also favoured to delay the
decision that was to be taken by Parliament. [41] Not only the
Labour Party saw prospects of internal tension.
In anticipation of the Labour party decision in mid
February an increasing number of Labour leaders favoured
negotiation on the basis of full membership. This seems
to have been the opinion of a majority of the cabinet
members by the end of October 1961. The fact that the Minister of Industry, Kjell
Holler, joined forces with Halvard Lange and argued in
favour of membership appears to have made an impact. [42] This was
furthermore recommended by the central board of the Party
by the end of November. Within the party group in
parliament, though, there was a majority in favour of
negotiating for association. In a cabinet meeting on 2
February 1962 all cabinet members clarified their
position. Only one member (Gunnar B�e), who later left
the Cabinet, argued against membership negotiations. [43] In accordance
with this gradual settlement, government information was
increasingly biased in favour of membership negotiations.
It focused on the generalised economic benefits following
access to EEC markets. A close reading of government
speeches and public papers also reveal a tendency to
reduce the political implications of membership. [44] Arguments state
it was primarily a framework for economic co-operation
and it would in practice work as an intergovernmental
machinery. Information did not focus on the possibility
of loosing sovereignty to community institutions. This
biased presentation was probably a deliberate choice. And
it turned out to be successful. On 15 February the Labour
Party came out in favour of membership application. A
majority of the corporate interest organisations agreed
with the government conclusion. Having attained this
consent the Government in March presented its final
report to Parliament, where it argued for negotiations on
the basis of membership. [45]
A majority of 113 out of 150 MPs supported this. [46] The character of
the parliamentary debate clearly indicates that domestic
restructuring costs were considered more important than
foreign policy costs such as weakened Nordic identity. [47]
The main government objective during
this period had been to avoid restriction of the options,
and to reach this no coherent policy choice had been
signalled. Actually, policy had been so vague that public
opinion during the autumn of 1961 had remained almost
untouched. A poll revealed that 46 % had not yet taken a
stand to the issue. [48]
36 % favoured Norwegian participation and 18 % were
against. With increasing public interest during the
spring of 1962 there was, however, a slight turn against
participation. In March a poll revealed that 37 %
favoured participation. The number against had, on the
other hand, increased to 31 %, implying that 32 % had not
taken a stand. The trend was therefore increasing
opposition. Those who had not taken a stand were,
nevertheless, still more numerous than those who were
against.
In terms of avoiding
strong parliamentary opposition the Government certainly
had succeeded. However, during the spring of 1962
organised extra-parliamentary opposition had been
established. [49]
Organised interests within the primary sector had 'woken
up'. These had during the FTA- and EFTA-negotiations been
inclined to accept some domestic change. [50] By 14 January,
nevertheless, the EEC countries had agreed on principles
for CAP. Calculations concluded that Norwegian
participation in CAP would imply an immediate income
reduction for farmers of at least 20 %. [51] From now on
agricultural interest organisations increasingly voiced
opposition against membership [52]
and the Agrarian Party had become increasingly reluctant.
[53] From April
1962 the Agrarian Party and agricultural interest
organisations established an �information council� (Opplysningsutvalget
av 1962) to campaign against membership. Parallel to
this also intellectuals and radical socialists organised
against Norwegian participation (Aksjon mot
Fellesmarkedet - de 143). The organisations did,
however, never coalesce. Intentions to do so existed, and
a meeting was scheduled for January 1963, some few days
after de Gaulle`s veto. They did, notwithstanding, inform
the public and organise demonstrations in the streets. In
the course of 1962 therefore there was an increasing
focus on arguments against Norwegian participation. It
is, nonetheless, hard to assess the implications on
public opinion. No reliable polls were taken. The
increasing voice against membership did, however,
certainly embarrass the Government.
The interesting question is whether the Government in
negotiations with EEC would have been willing to accept
treaty bound conditions to attain membership. Would it
have taken the costs in a situation where the Government
had minimised the possible impacts of accession when
informing the public, where the opponents of membership
organised themselves on an extra-parliamentary basis, and
where it realised that parliamentary support was indeed
fragile? Remember that the
final decision was to be taken by a referendum. We can`t
know for sure. Substantial negotiations were never taken
up and the Government never developed a consistent
bargaining strategy. Papers on the coming bargaining
process are vague. [54]
Neither the application of May 2 nor the 16 pages
position paper handed in to the Council of Ministers on 4
July [55] provide
an answer. The Norwegian position paper certainly
outlined the wide spectre of domestic costs following
Norwegian membership, and indicated the need for special
treatment. Still, the position paper was so vague that
the Council of Ministers responded that the Norwegian
government ought to clarify its position further. [56] Discussions
within the Government, and with the Foreign Affairs
Committee in parliament as well as with organised
interests before the application was sent, do not give
any answer. The lack of a strategy is revealed by Foreign
Minister Lange`s discussions with the Council of
Ministers and EEC officials in the course of 1962. He
seems to have been drifting in all kinds of directions. [57] If there was a
policy guideline, it was still to keep the options open
and, when eventually forced, to assess matters in wider
context.
One might, firstly, interpret this vagueness as a
rational adaptation to the future French veto.
There is, however, no evidence that
the Government anticipated the veto in the course of
1962. When Edward Heath on 22 October 1962 informed the
EFTA Council about the British negotiations, he signalled
optimism. [58] I
will therefore exclude this interpretation. Secondly, one
might interpret the vagueness as reflecting the idea that
Britain negotiated on behalf of the other EFTA countries.
The EFTA Agreement from late June 1961 certainly could
give such an impression. The Government realised, on the
other hand, that Norwegian interests diverged too much
from British and Danish ones, so under any circumstance
there would have to be carried out separate negotiations.
Consequently, this interpretation can also be excluded.
Thirdly, one may interpret the vagueness as a consistent
policy to bring Norway in as member by domestically
pleading the gravity of external forces. Such an
interpretation is compatible with advice given by Foreign
Ministry officials, which said that Norway should
accommodate the Six and not take a firm position with
regard to exceptions from the treaty. Still, as long as
there is no archival evidence that Government actually
developed such a strategy, and this definitely would have
been an extremely risky strategy before a referendum, I
will also exclude this interpretation.
Having excluded the above interpretations, we can
conclude that the absence of a consistent bargaining
policy during the autumn of 1962 fits very well with the
observed ambivalence and confusion within the Norwegian
polity before Parliament decided to take up negotiations.
As argued, this policy confusion reflected basically
that EEC-membership, as opposed to EFTA-membership, would
challenge existing ambiguity in national policies and
therefore the existing socio-political balance. Thus, the
awkward decision of how to approach EEC had been delayed
for months, and nevertheless signalled no clear policy
choice at all. Consequently, in terms of seeking a
framework for the advancement of national policy this
period of one and a half years must be regarded an
interregnum of almost paralysing policy confusion.
Footnotes
* This is a revised
version of a paper presented at a seminar on national
interests and European Integration, The Royal Norwegian
Society of Sciences and Letters, Trondheim, September 22,
1997.
** I am thankful to
cand.philol. Guttorm Fevang, who genrously has provided
some of the primary sources on which this study is based.
[1]
Alan S. Milward: The European Rescue of the
Nation-State, London 1992 p. 10.
[2]
Alan S. Milward and Vibeke S�rensen: Interdependence or
integration? A national choice, in Milward et al.: The
Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and theory
1945-1992, London-New York 1993 p.12.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Alan S. Milward: The European Rescue of the
Nation-State, London 1992 p.18.
[5]
Alan S. Milward: �Allegiance-The Past and the Future�, Journal
of European Integration History vol. 1, No.1, 1995
p.14, cfr. also Alan S. Milward: The Spring of
Integration, in P. Gowan and P. Anderson (eds.): The
Question of Europe, London-New York 1997.
[6] Cfr.
Geir Lundestad: �Nasjonalisme og internasjonalisme i
norsk utenrikspolitikk: Et faglig-provoserende essay�, Internasjonal
Politikk, temahefte 1, 1985; Rolf Tamnes: Integration
and Screening. The two faces of Norwegian alliance
policy, 1945-1986, Forsvarsstudier nr.6, 1987.
[7] Cfr.
Johan Galtung: �Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of
Social Position�, Journal of Peace Research
Vol.1, 1964; Ottar Hellevik et al: �The Common Market in
Norway: A Conflict between Center and Periphery�, Journal
of Peace Research Vol.12, 1975; Henry Valen:
�National Conflict Structure and Foreign Politics: The
Impact of the EC Issue on Percieved Cleavages in
Norwegian Politics, European Journal of Political
Research No.4, 1976; Beate Husebye and Ola Listhaug:
�Identifications of Norwegians with Europe: The Impact
of Values and Centre-Periphery Factors�, in Rued de Moor
(ed.): Values in Western Societies, Tilburg 1995;
Anders Todal Jensen et al: �Betydningen av gamle og nye
skillelinjer�, in Anders Todal Jenssen and Henry Valen
(eds.): Br�ssel midt imot. Folkeavstemningen om EU,
Oslo 1995. The classical comprehensive analysis of the
cleavages is Stein Rokkan: �Geography, Religion and
Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian
Politics�, in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan: Party
Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-national Perspectives,
New York 1967.
[8]
See contributions in Nils �rvik (ed.): Fears and
expectations. Norwegian attitudes toward European
integration, Oslo 1972.
[9]
Theo Koritzinsky: Velgere, partier og
utenrikspolitikk. Analyse av norske holdninger 1945-1970,
Oslo 1970 p.131.
[10]
Erik Holst-J�ger: Venstre og EF-striden 1963-1972,
unpublished cand.philol.thesis, Oslo 1997.
[11]
Helle Pay Eriksen: I baktroppen. Den norske frilistingen
innenfor OEEC 1949-1952, unpublished cand.philol. thesis,
Trondheim 1996; Elisabeth Lie: Pride and Prejudice.
Norway and the European Payments Union 1950-1955,
unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1997; Hans Otto
Fr�land: Norway in OEEC 1948-1961. Challenges and
adjustments. Unpublished manuscript.
[12]
Ingeborg Lie: Forhandlingene om nordisk tollunion/nordisk
fellesmarked 1954-1956, unpublished cand.philol. thesis,
Oslo 1973; Ingrid Sogner: Norges holdning til nordisk
�konomisk samarbeid 1947-1959, unpublished cand.philol.
thesis, Oslo 1992.
[13]
National Archive (Riksarkivet, Oslo): Cabinet minutes
07.02.1957; Foreign Office Archive
(Utenriksdepartementet, Oslo): UD 44.25/56: �Det
europeiske frihandelsomr�det�, 07.02.1957; UD 44.25/56:
�Arne Skaugs redegj�relse for Den utvidede
utenrikskomit�, Finanskomiteen og industrikomiteen om
det europeiske frihandelsomr�det�, 06.02.57.
[14]
Parliamentary Report (stortingsmelding).nr.45, 1957 Om
planene for et europeisk frihandelsomr�de) p. 24 ff.;
Svein Olav Hansen: Det norske EFTA-sporet i 1950-�ra. En
studie av Norges Europa-politikk, med s�rlig vekt p�
perioden 1956-1960, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo
1990.
[15]
Hans Otto Fr�land: Det Norske Arbeiderparti og
Vest-Europa 1945 - 1995: Om effekter av internasjonalt
samarbeid p� utsyn. Arena Working Paper no.4, 1997.
[16]
Cabinet minutes 11.10.1957.
[17]
Erik Riste: Reformasjon gjennom integrasjon - fra
fascinasjon til aversjon. Norske landsbrukspolitiske
posisjoner ved forhandlingene om Stor-EFTA og den f�rste
s�knaden om medlemskap i EEC (1956-1963). unpublished
cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1997 p. 31 ff.
[18]
Parliamentary Report nr.45, 1957 p. 11.
[19]
Mikael af Malmborg and Johnny Laursen: The Creation of
EFTA, in Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.): Interdependence
Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western
Europe 1945-1960, Odense 1995; Tormod Utne:
Brobygging d�mt til � feile. EFTA i britisk
Europa-politikk 1958-1961, unpublished cand.philol.
thesis, Trondheim 1996.
[20]
Foreign Office: UD 44.33.1, Bd.18: �Handelsminister
Skaugs redegj�relse i den utvidede utenrikskomite�,
09.12.1958; Cabinet minutes 23.4.59; Cabinet minutes
03.02.1959.
[21]
Utne 1996 p. 72 ff.
[22]
Cabinet minutes 29.05.1959.
[23]
Parliamentary proceedings (Innst. S. nr. 157, 1959-60;
St.tidende 7b, 1959-60 s. 2400 ff.).
[24]
Thomas Evensen: Under tvil sier vi ja. Norges
Industriforbund og sp�rsm�let om Stor-EFTA og EFTA
1956-1960, unpublished cand.philol. thesis 1996 p. 174
ff.
[25]
Bj�rn Alstad (ed.): Norge, nordmenn og verden. Norske
meninger 1, Oslo 1969 p.165.
[26]
Ibid. p. 164.
[27]
Cabinet minutes 12.12. 1959; parliamentary proceedings
(Stortingstidende 7b 1959-60) p.2414 ff; Anniken
Huitfeldt: Fra OEEC til OECD. Norges holdninger til
reorganiseringen i 1960, unpublished cand.philol. thesis,
Oslo 1996.
[28]
Cabinet minutes 05.01.1960, 14.01.1960, 19.01.1960.
[29]
Trygve Ramberg: Sovereignty and Co-operation, in Nils
�rvik (ed.): Fears and expectations. Norwegian
attitudes towards European integration, Oslo 1972
p.57f; Foreign Office: UD 25.2.101 Bd.4: �Redegj�relse
i forbindelse med Utenrikskomiteens behandling den 28.
september 1960 av stortingsmann Finn Moes forslag til ny
� 93 i Grunnloven�, 28.09.1960.
[30]
Cfr. Parliamentary Report nr. 89, 1951: Om Grunnloven og
Norges deltakelse i internasjonale organisasjoner.
[31]
Foreign Office: UD 44.26/6.84.Bd1: �Storbritannias
forhold til De Seks�, 15.04.61.
[32]
Cabinet minutes 20.06.1961 and 22.06.1961; Foreign
Office: UD 44.36.5 Bd.7: �M�tet i EFTAs Ministerr�d
28. juli i Geneve�, 29.07.61; Guttorm Fevang:
Norge-nissen p� lasset. En studie av
beslutningsprosessen som fant sted forut for Norges
f�rste s�knad om medlemskap i EEC, unpublished
cand.philol. thesis, Trondheim 1995 p. 36 ff.
[33]
Declarations enclosed Parliamentary report nr.15,
1961-62.
[34]
Parliamentary proceedings 7b, 1960-61 p. 3042 ff, 3419,
3375 ff.
[35]
The basic pros and cons are revealed in the parliamentary
reports nr.15, 1961-62, nr. 67, 1961-62, and
Innst.S.nr.165, 1961-62.
[36]
Cabinet minutes 01.08.1961.
[37]
Tor Bj�rklund: �The Demand for Referendum: When Does It
Arise and When Does it Succeed?�, Scandinavian
Political Studies No. 3, 1982.
[38]
Parliamentary Report nr.15, 1961-62.
[39]
On the Labour Party, see Nils A. R�hne: De f�rste
skritt inn i Europa. Norsk europa-politikk fra 1950, Forsvarsstudier
5, 1989; and Fevang 1995.
[40]
Cabinet minutes 28.11.1961.
[41]
Cabinet minutes 05.12.1961.
[42]
Cabinet minutes 07.11.1961.
[43]
Cabinet minutes 02.02.1962.
[44]
Se e.g. parliamentary proceedings 7b,1960-61 p.3046.
[45]
Parliamentary Report nr.67, 1961-62.
[46]
Parliamentary proceedings 7b,1961-62 p.3010.
[47]
Parliamentary proceedings 7b, 1961-62 pp.2674-3011.
[48]
B. Alstad (red.): Norske meninger 1946-93. Bd.1: Norge
og verden, Oslo 1993 p. 160.
[49]
Tor Bj�rklund: Mot str�mmen. Kampen mot EF 1961-1972,
Oslo 1982.
[50]
Riste 1997 p. 47 ff.
[51]
Parliamentary Report nr.67, 1961-62, Innst.S.nr.165,
1961-62.
[52]
Riste 1997 p. 82 ff.
[53]
Jostein Tr�ite and Jan Erik Vold: B�nder i EF-strid:
Senterpartiet og landbruksorganisasjonene 1961-1972,
Oslo 1977 p.73; Roar Madsen: I tru og tvil om samarbeid i
Europa, unpublished manuscript.
[54]
Foreign Office: UD 44.36/6.84. Bd.13: �Det norske
opplegg til forhandlinger med EEC. Notat til statsr�d
Gundersen av Langeland�, 20.05.62.
[55]
Foreign Office: UD 44.36/6.84 Bd.14 �Den Norske
Regjerings erkl�ring overfor Det Europeiske �konomiske
Fellesskap.�
[56]
Foreign Office: UD 44.36/6.84: �Henvendelse om n�rmere
opplysninger rettet til den norske regjering fra
medlemsstatene i CEE som f�lge av ministerm�tet 4.juli
1962�, 12.12.1962.
[57]
Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge �. Pharo: The Common Market
Issue in Norway, in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward:
Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to
Enlarge The European Community 1961-1963, London 1996
p. 238 ff.
[58]
Bjarne Lie: A Gulliver among Lilliputians. A History of
the European Free Trade Association 1960-1972,
Unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1995 p. 170.
[Date of publication in the ARENA
Working Paper series: 15.12.1998]
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