ARENA Working Papers
WP 98/25

 

 


Ambiguous Interests. Norway and the West-European Market Formations 1959-62*



Hans Otto Frøland**
Department of History, Norwegian University of Science and Technology




Why have West European nation-states in principle accepted a partial surrender of sovereignty to a supranational organisation and thus, legally, committed themselves to future policy harmonisation? The question is implicitly influenced by Alan Milward`s vigorous attack on teleological explanations of European political integration. The West European states, he argues, have not been functional prisoners of interdependence, but �have actively sought to limit its consequences. Their will and capacity to do so grew after 1945.� [1] Decisions whether to integrate or not were a result of political choice, and generally reflected the nature of national policies: �...the choice between interdependence and integration as international frameworks for advancing national policy choices depended on the nature of national policies.� [2] As to prediction therefore he argues that �the only predictive value of a theory derived from historical research would be that once national policies were specified, their international consequences for the nation-state could be specified.� [3] Detailed historical research has led him to conclude that West-European integration in the 1950s was �... the creation of the European nation-states themselves for their own purposes, an act of national will.� [4] Milward regards governments as agents of the national will as �...in all the member-states of the successive European Communities government has been in its essentials government by consent� and �...democracy in which political parties have been the main conduits between public opinion and government policy has been the rule.� [5] The empirical basis for Milward`s encompassing theory is basically collected among nation-states which decided to integrate. As for Norway this overriding perspective may appear irrelevant as she never took up membership in a supranational organisation. Still, by means of Milward`s conceptual framework, I shall elaborate on Norwegian policy towards the West-European market formations from around 1959, when EFTA was negotiated, until de Gaulle vetoed a British entry into the EEC in January 1963.

I suggest that EFTA was the ideal solution for Norway as this was an international framework in which ambiguities and contradictions in national policies could be maintained. These ambiguities basically reflected socio-political cleavages within Norwegian society. Because traditional ambiguities could be maintained within the framework of EFTA, the Government was able to establish national consent. Treaty conditions did not shove the domestic socio-political balance. There was only marginal domestic opposition when the EFTA treaty was negotiated and ratified, and the corporatist arrangements were strong enough to internalise oppositional voice. On 10 August 1961, however, Britain and Denmark applied for membership negotiations with EEC. This put Norway in an awkward dilemma as the treaties of Rome would imply a far more profound encroachment upon the socio-political balance than the Stockholm convention. Should Norway join the EEC along with Britain and Denmark, and thus allow for future surrender of sovereignty and policy harmonisation, and on which conditions? The situation lasted until de Gaulle vetoed British entry in January 1963 and thus removed the question of Norwegian EEC-membership from the political agenda. I suggest that this interregnum is characterised by policy confusion. A new national policy choice was never taken, nor was a national will surmounting the EFTA-solution established. The decision to approach EEC was actually taken by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange on an EFTA Ministerial meeting in London 27 - 28 June 1961 in order to maintain EFTA as a bargaining coalition. It was not taken by any well considered government and parliamentary vote. Having decided to approach EEC in June 1961 the domestic discussion about the basis of negotiation with the EEC lasted for about ten months. On 28 April 1962, more than five months after the neutral EFTA-countries had applied for association, the Parliament decided to apply for negotiations. Formally Norway applied for full membership under � 237 as opposed to association under � 238. In that sense I accept there was a symbolic bias in government policy towards full membership. The decision can, however, not be interpreted as a policy choice for membership, but simply as a choice to include membership as an option.

The short application of 2 May 1962 signalled nothing more than a will to take up negotiations in order to clarify conditions for possible membership. It neither excluded association nor any other relation with the EEC. Perceptions of national interests certainly had evolved within the Norwegian polity in this period. Access to EEC would surely provide generalised economic and political benefits. This was, on the other hand, balanced by considerable domestic restructuring costs. Hence, the idea that Norway as a member would have to be redeemed exceptions from treaty obligations was strong within Government, Parliament as well as corporate interest organisations. This attitude was clearly disclosed by the Norwegian position paper presented for the Council of Ministers on 4 July 1962. No conclusions had been drawn and, consequently, perceptions of national interests had not been converted into clear policy. Moreover, the Government did not develop any consistent bargaining policy. No policy choice was ever taken before de Gaulle restored the ideal solution in January 1963. If there was a policy, it was to keep options open as long as possible. Consequently, in terms of seeking framework for the advancement of national policy this period of one and a half years must be regarded an interregnum of almost paralysing national policy confusion.

What explains this? The policy confusion reflected basically that EEC-membership, as opposed to EFTA-membership, would challenge existing ambiguity in national policies and therefore the existing socio-political balance in Norwegian society. The Government was aware of this from the very beginning. As the idea prevailed during the summer of 1961 that the issue should be subjected to an advisory referendum, the Government had to give domestic political considerations extra weight. Delaying the decision to apply was a deliberate choice by the Prime Minister in order to avoid domestic opposition. In terms of parliamentary support this was met with success. However, the public debate had increasingly focused on domestic costs by joining EEC, and from spring 1962 the critics became more articulate and started organising themselves. This, of course, made the Government more reluctant to formulate clear policy. Surely, the lucid and unsettled international situation also compromised the capacity of the Government to establish a well-defined policy. Firstly, the joint position of the Six could not be fully anticipated as there were considerable disagreements among them. Secondly, vague perceptions existed that the British negotiations would establish some sort of principle pattern for the others. Thirdly, Norway queued up in Brussels after Britain and Denmark and was therefore never forced to take a final stand.

Referring to Milward`s conceptual framework, however, I emphasise the domestic constraints.

As my interpretation fit well to more shallow long term observations of Norway's relation to the core institutions of European integration, I shall shortly elaborate on these before providing the more detailed evidence of the interregnum.


I. Norway's Relation to the Core Institutions of European Integration

Four times Norwegian governments have considered to bring Norway into the EEC/EC/EU and subsequently applied for membership negotiations - in 1962-63, 1967, 1970-72 and 1992-94. However, on neither of these four occasions were the applications an implementation of a consistent and well considered policy developed within the framework of domestic policy and politics. As international relations beyond the influence of Norwegian policies confronted Norway with radical new situations the membership issue was each time pulled on the domestic political agenda. On the three first occasions Norway followed Britain and in 1992 she followed Sweden. On all four occasions the new situation confronted governments with awkward policy dilemmas, which grew out of contradictions and ambiguities in national policies.

The rather ambiguous nature of national policies aimed simultaneously at international interdependence and national control. This is a well established interpretation in terms of foreign and security policies, [6] but does also fit to commercial and economic policies. Already from the late 1940s exports contributed a lot to the national income, and policies always aimed at exploiting economies of scale, comparative advantages, division of labour and market extension. Incomes from exports have always been vital in financing ambitious modernisation plans, and attracting foreign investment capital for industrial modernisation was always regarded a crucial part of the policy-mix. The logical advancement of these policies was to participate in transnational commercial and market arrangements. This makes the general sensitivity towards changes in the international political environment, and eventually inclination to negotiate on conditions for membership in the EEC/EC/EU, understandable. Nonetheless, parallel to this outward orientation policies have also aimed at maintaining national control over domestic production and avoid foreign competition in specific sectors, in particular the primary and service sector, which both contributed far more to employment than those sectors exposed to international competition. The logical advancement of these policies was to remain outside transnational market arrangements in order to shelter the sectors from uncontrolled foreign challenges and domestic restructuring costs. Consequently, the benefits of foreign market access always had to be carefully balanced against the costs of opening up domestic markets. The best solution would be arrangements like the EFTA-solution, which would extend markets for manufactured goods almost without touching upon agriculture and services.

The contradictions and ambiguities in national policies reflected profound socio-political cleavages in Norwegian society, often referred to as a cleavage between the political and cultural centres, which tend to accept modernisation, and the political and cultural periphery, where traditionalism is more strongly rooted. Opinion polls and research on electoral behaviour confirm a profound and remarkably stable socio-political cleavage which have become transparently dividing, in particular when the issue of whether to integrate or deepen international interdependence has been part of the political agenda. [7] Since the mid 1930s social democratic governance, whether in the labour or centre-right fashion, has rested upon a will to integrate the non-urban areas into the national policy horizon by means of ambitious regional policies, including protection of the primary sector. Gradually, and particularly from the 1970s, the creation of welfare state arrangements became part of these policies. The impact of this policy-mix has been a decentralised pattern of settlement. This policy horizon has been a precondition for electoral support, and thus political power. Interest organisations, whether in the primary sector or in public services, have been well organised and pursued political rent-seeking. They have generally opposed liberalisation of the fishery and agricultural regime as well as the restrictive concession regulations which allowed for extensive political control of investments. They have also opposed relaxation of regional policies. Consequently, whenever the question of Norwegian participation in wider market arrangements which would challenge the traditional policy-mix has been raised, such participation has been regarded a threat. This was the situation during the discussions on whether to take part in the Marshall-plan, whether to establish a Nordic customs union in the 1950s as well as during all discussions concerning membership in EEC/EC/EU. Thus, surmounting dilemmas caused by these national policies, for instance a decision to integrate, would imply considerable political costs.

The socio-political cleavages have run right through most political parties. This has been revealed by some thorough quantitative content-analyses of parliamentary debates. [8] It is also displayed indirectly by party programs, which have generally been rather vague about Norway`s relation with EEC/EC/EU. Among party programs before the parliamentary election in 1961, only the communists, the radical socialists and the conservatives had taken a stand on Norway's relation to EEC. [9] Little attention was paid to the issue during the election campaign although it was held after the British and the Danes had applied for membership. The exceptions of course are the campaigns preceding the referenda in 1972 and 1994, when parties were forced to take a stand. In 1972 one party (Venstre) split on the issue [10], and the Labour Party was seriously wounded because it had taken a clear choice in favour of Norwegian membership. The cleavage has run right through the centre-right coalition governments, which on both occasions disintegrated on the matter. As to the last coalition it broke up on the EEA issue in 1990. When it comes to the application in 1967 we can even conclude that it had nothing to do at all with the EEC. It is a well established interpretation that the 1967 application, aiming at negotiations in order to clarify conditions for accession and handed in by a centre-right coalition government confused by the ambiguity, primarily was intended to maintain the coalition and reflected no policy choice at all. The Government anticipated the French veto against British entry, and consequently feared no practical impact at all. Had there been a British and Danish entry, the Government would have disintegrated, as it actually did on the matter in 1971.

In 1972 and 1994 the governments surmounted the ambiguity in national policies and clearly recommended membership after negotiations concerning access conditions had been concluded. Thus, on these occasions the governments certainly also developed a well considered perception of national interests, from which a national policy choice was to be taken. However, on neither of these two occasions were the government`s perceptions and recommendations sufficiently accepted by the electorate in referendums. 53,3 % of the electorate voted against membership in 1972 and 52,2 % in 1994. Accordingly, the governments had in fact a national policy, but not the capacity to establish a national will which accepted that policy choice.

On the two first occasions, in 1962 and 1967, negotiations with the Community were never initiated and perceptions among the electorate were never really tested. On both occasions, however, there is reason to assume, counterfactually, quite some reluctance and organised resistance even if Britain and Denmark had become members. Opinion polls do certainly not give clear direction for interpretation. Still, as there on both occasions would have been advisory referenda and thus popular mass mobilisation, no-vote majorities on both occasions are not only imaginable, but quite likely. Moreover, on both occasions there would have been problems in attaining the sufficient _ majority in parliament, which was required to transfer sovereignty according to � 93 in the Constitution. 38 votes would be enough to block membership. In 1962 a minority of 35 members voted against amending the Constitution with article 93, and 37 members voted against the application. In 1967 only 13 voted against application. This vote is, nevertheless, of no significance as Parliament anticipated the French veto. A far bigger number of MPs had during the debate expressed doubts and reservations. Based on these premises I do not hesitate to suggest that on neither of the two first occasions did the applications reflect a national concord or will to integrate.

Hence, as all attempts to induce a sufficient majority of Norwegian citizens to submit their loyalties to organisations being or aiming at a supranational character failed, the really interesting question, viewed from a Norwegian perspective, is not how national interests have been perceived by governments, but why government perceptions never have been sufficiently accepted by the public. Any answer must take into account the socio-political cleavage sketchily outlined above. Nevertheless, any account of Norway's relation to the core institutions of West European integration should start with identifying government perceptions of national interests. Aware of the basic reference point - ambiguity in national policies as a result of and maintaining profound socio-political cleavages - one must hypothesise, firstly, that perceptions of national interests would be ambiguous and, secondly, that converting perceptions of national interests into a consistent policy choice would necessarily take place under serious domestic constraints. When adding to this domestic situation the difficulties of formulating policy in a lucid and unsettled international situation as in 1962, it is no surprise that policy confusion and blurred objectives were the outcome.


II. The EFTA-solution in 1960: Ambiguity Maintained

Throughout the 1950s the Norwegian government had generally supported intergovernmental trade schemes which promoted Norwegian exports and net capital imports and still allowed for protection of domestic sectors, such as the Trade Liberalisation Program and the European Payments Union within OEEC. But within these schemes government attitudes were unstable. The Government adjusted to the imperatives of the schemes rather ambiguously. [11] However, as to participation in formalised market formations, such as customs unions or common markets, Norway always took a negative stand in the last resort. [12] Still, the ambiguity in national policy encouraged the Government to maintain a Nordic market formation as an option throughout the 1950s. Parliament and corporate interest organisations were, however, far more sceptical than the Government and restrained any government inclination to opt for a Nordic market formation. Until the late 1950s, therefore, the international commercial framework in which Norway participated, was compatible with ambiguities in national policies and the socio-political cleavages.

For economic as well as foreign policy reasons, the Government had feared the impact of a market schism in Western Europe. Tension between trading blocks would jeopardise the highly important export income, cause political tension and weaken cohesion within NATO. Consequently, after the Six had signed the treaties of Rome the Government supported the British endeavour for an OEEC wide industrial free trade area (FTA), which would also comprise the EEC, and which ran parallel with the ever lasting discussions concerning a Nordic market formation. [13] Parties, Parliament as well as organised interests were on the other hand, initially far more sceptical, and the government negotiators were submitted a restricted mandate when negotiating within the OEEC Working Party 17. Certainly, no change in the character of the national will had taken place before that. This seems, though, to have happened during the negotiations on the Free Trade Area as the Labour government, Parliament as well as organised interests became more sympathetic towards participation in the FTA. [14] Crucial mediators of this new sympathy were former and current cabinet members such as Arne Skaug, Erik Brofoss and Halvard Lange. [15] The sympathy rested basically upon perceptions of national interests. Firstly, there were the obvious foreign policy arguments in case the British and the Nordic countries also became members. Secondly, there would be obvious economic benefits in terms of increasing market access for manufactured goods, including processed fish, and increasing options for import of investment capital. As participation would, after all, also include considerable domestic costs, the Government tended to accept these in order to reach a compromise [16] - also in terms of changing the domestic agricultural regime. [17] Actually, and surprisingly, the Government was somewhat embarrassed by British unwillingness to include foodstuffs in the FTA, as this would jeopardise prospects for Norwegian fish exports. [18]

The remarkable change in Norwegian perceptions did, nonetheless, never develop into a consistent and well considered policy choice as France in November 1958 vetoed the project. Thus, we can never know how far the Government would have moved in terms of accepting perceived costs and, moreover, whether it would have had the capacity to establish national consent on the issue. Opinion polls do not give any suggestions.

Difficult negotiations in 1959 preceded the creation of EFTA in 1960. [19] The Norwegian bargaining policies were once again influenced by the ambiguity in national policies. Again the benefit of market access would have to be balanced against the opening up of domestic markets. Nevertheless, when the British FTA endeavour failed, the establishment of EFTA was in several respects regarded a better solution than a Nordic customs union. [20] Several factors explain this. Firstly, there had been profound domestic opposition against a Nordic customs union. Due to Danish agricultural strength and Swedish industrial strength this would have caused considerable restructuring costs in the sheltered sectors of the economy. Interest organisations representing industry as well as agriculture had therefore opposed the plans, so had most political parties. Secondly, EFTA had brought the discussion on a Scandinavian customs union, which had more or less dragged on since 1947, out of the dead-lock, and thus accommodated Norwegian concerns for a joint Nordic solution. Despite the opposition against a customs union the sentimental affinity towards �Norden� was strong. Thirdly, EFTA would take the bulk of Norwegian exports and would under any circumstance allow for increasing trade in manufactures within a framework of intergovernmental co-operation. This benefit could be obtained without having to pay profound domestic restructuring costs as there would be only small impacts on the primary sector. By means of bilateral negotiations with Britain a satisfactory solution concerning market access for fish was found without having to change the domestic fishery regulations. [21] Agriculture remained untouched by the treaty despite Danish efforts to include it. In terms of domestic costs the EFTA solution had less implications than the FTA solution probably would have had. Fourthly, EFTA would give the seven member countries increasing bargaining strength towards the six EEC countries. This was important as the anxieties concerning a West European split still existed.

The EFTA convention was compatible with the socio-political cleavages and the ambiguity in national policies. The most controversial problems had been omitted or left open to future treatment. Hence, the Government had no problems establishing a national will behind that choice. Parliament had encouraged the Government to negotiate the treaty [22] and only one MP voted against ratification. [23] Reluctance within industry was kept within the organisations, so on the whole no serious opposition was articulated among organised interests. [24] Thus, on this occasion the institutionalised corporatism proved instrumental in establishing national consent. Moreover, there is no reason to assume any opposition from `the silent majority' of public opinion. An opinion poll from October 1959 displayed that 28 % considered membership advantageous for Norway, while only 10 % considered it a disadvantage. 62 % however had no opinion at all. [25] This general absence of interest is clearly revealed by another poll, in which 2000 people were asked to name which countries belonged to the Six and which to the Seven. Only 4 % got it right. [26] The only interpretation possible on the basis of the opinion polls is that the EFTA membership was not regarded any threat. The EFTA framework was compatible with the ambiguity in national policies and therefore a national will could easily be established.

However consistent, the perception of a good solution rested on the wishful premises that EFTA, with American support and possibly also the support of Benelux and West-Germany, would succeed in reaching a trading agreement with the EEC within the framework of a reorganised OEEC, what in 1961 was to become OECD. [27] This is one reason why Norway had become such a committed defender of the OEEC Code of Liberalisation and the European Monetary Agreement. In January 1960 the Cabinet believed that the 'Dillon-conference' in Paris would lead to a multilateral arrangement between EEC and EFTA. [28] Norwegian optimism is indicated by the fact that the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament in May 1960 asked the Government to start preparing a constitutional amendment which would allow for a limited transfer of sovereignty to some future OECD institution. [29] Parliament enacted � 93 on 8 March 1962. Debate on a constitutional amendment had, however, dragged on since 1951. [30]

Very soon the premises for Norwegian policy crumbled. The EEC displayed reluctance to reach a trade solution with EFTA and accelerated the process towards a common external tariff. The Fouchet plan manifested willingness to establish a political centre among the Six which could dilute NATO cohesion. The Americans demonstrated reluctance towards EFTA and did not go for the kind of OECD that Norway wanted. Contrary to Norwegian policy the Americans wanted to strengthen the IMF and GATT at the expense of OECD. The British evinced inclination to go for EEC membership and the Government was convinced that the Danes would follow suit. By April 1961 officials in the Foreign Office strongly believed that Britain now was drifting towards membership in EEC. [31] The idea that Britain and possibly Denmark would find solutions for themselves at the expense of EFTA solidarity certainly frightened the Government. Before the EFTA Council meetings in London on 27 - 28 June therefore, it developed a diplomatic strategy to maintain a joint EFTA approach which would modify British and Danish eagerness. [32] Interests and policies of the EFTA countries were, however, too divergent to be firmly united. The Norwegian strategy therefore failed. On 31 July both the British and the Danes announced they would apply for membership negotiations. No firm EFTA commitment was ever established. Each country was to handle the issue on its own. EFTA ministers did, nevertheless, sign two joint EFTA statements in which they expressed will to reach a satisfactory solution for all countries and maintain liaison when negotiating individually with the EEC. [33] During these EFTA discussions Foreign Minister Lange had clearly worked from the premise that Norway would seek some kind of formal relation with the EEC, a mandate which, however, only implicitly had been given by Parliament. [34] Parliament had never taken a formal position on the issue.


III. The Interregnum July 1961 - January 1963: Advancing Ambiguity.

Parliament, in fact, never annulled the joint EFTA statements. Thus, when Norway took up discussions about the adequate response to the British decision, the question was whether to negotiate on the basis of full membership under � 237 or some kind of looser association under � 238. Remaining outside, hopefully with some kind of trade agreement, represented a third option. By signing the joint EFTA declaration, notwithstanding, the Government had signalled that the third option would not be preferred. As for all options national benefits had to be delicately balanced against national costs. The many public reports produced during the late 1950s as well as experience during the FTA and EFTA negotiations worked as substantial guiding principles for such balancing. [35]

The economic arguments in favour of membership were linked to the generalised benefits of market access. As already mentioned, the Government had developed a policy to restructure the economy by increasing industrial exports. Increased export income and capital imports were to pay for the expansion of export industry, the modernisation of the sheltered sectors, including agriculture, as well as the welfare state. Industrial growth rates had decreased during the late 1950s and the Government had decided to increase investments. Remaining outside the EEC tariff walls would hit Norwegian exporters. The Government assumed that maintaining the composition and volume of Norwegian exports to EEC on the level of 1959 would increase tariff duties about 100 %. Moreover, with Britain, Denmark and Sweden (Sweden under � 238) participating in an enlarged EEC would comprise about 70 % of traditional Norwegian export markets, and remaining outside the tariff walls would impede access for Norwegian manufacturing industry to these markets, which also included the booming German market. It would furthermore be increasingly difficult to attract foreign capital for future investment purposes. In sum, remaining outside the EEC would jeopardise this modernisation policy and negatively affect economic growth, employment and ultimately national welfare.

Association under � 238 was not regarded sufficient in this respect. Experience during the negotiations on the Free Trade Area as well as the EFTA negotiations had led the Government to assume that an association agreement would allow EEC member countries such as Belgium, France and Italy, but possibly also the British, to demand regulations which would impede the exports of pulp and paper, aluminium and ferrous alloys - those sectors which exploited the comparative advantage of cheap Norwegian energy. Moreover, an association would make it far more difficult to include fish exports in the common market.

There were also strong security arguments in favour of membership. Firstly, because the US had come out in favour of EEC-enlargement, and the British and Danes now seemed to become members, Norwegian participation would help reinforce an Atlantic profile. Secondly, the Government saw Norwegian prospects within NATO being marginalised. The risk of being considered a semi-neutral, thus loosing influence and ultimately security, would definitely increase by remaining outside. This argument was also applied to an association solution, as the neutral EFTA countries were opting for association. The counterargument that Norwegian membership would break up Nordic solidarity had lost weight as the Danes so eagerly wanted membership.

These generalised benefits were balanced against generalised costs. Neither a political party nor any influential non-governmental organisation had ever argued in favour of European federalism. The most significant generalised cost was therefore the danger of drifting into a supranational structure. Elements of supranationality was certainly written into the treaties of Rome. EEC was to become a common market implying policy harmonisation, and CAP was already in its embryo. The fear of supranationalism was, however, somewhat counterbalanced by the belief that France, along with the possible new members, would block any further development towards supranationalism. Another generalised cost was the weakening of Nordic identity. As Sweden and Finland would not become full members due to security considerations, the perceived Nordic foreign policy solidarity would be challenged. The Government also saw that the EEC endangered the Nordic labour market and the tendency towards harmonisation of Nordic social policy, properly speaking social democratic policy. Still, the Nordic argument was weakened by the eagerness of the Danes to become a member along with the British. This already challenged the image of Nordic identity.

In addition to these generalised costs there were the more serious domestic costs. The highly protectionist agricultural system and probably also the fishery system would hardly survive membership. But for some years the Government had discussed a possible change of the agricultural system, and in that perspective CAP regulations were not regarded so costly. Evidence indicates that maintenance of the existing fishery system was given priority to agriculture, but we can not be sure. Still, there was a tendency to balance the benefits of maintaining the existing fishery system against the benefits of access to export markets for fish. Restructuring costs in the fishery sector could be minimised by joining, as Norway then would gain influence on a future EEC fishery policy. The possible disintegration of domestic concession regulations, which allowed the Government to give preference to Norwegian investors, was also perceived as a major problem. This would give foreign companies access to cheap energy, the comparative advantage on which the modernisation policy rested. The possibility that foreign capital could penetrate the economy without political control did not at all accord with the social democratic mind.

To sum up, the substantial perceptions of costs and benefits were very much the same as during the FTA- and EFTA-negotiations, but the implications regardless of choice were more profound. Archival evidence certainly displays no enthusiasm at all. One can definitely argue that the fear of being left outside the Community and not an autonomous wish for membership was the underlying concern of the Government. Full membership would provide generalised benefits, but imply considerable domestic restructuring costs. Association would reduce domestic costs, but also benefits in terms of reduced market access and access to centres of political decision making. The awkward situation allowed for advancement of traditional stereotypes. There was reluctance towards German and French power in general, German economic policy and French colonial policy in particular. Still, one can see how cabinet members as well as government bureaucracy, implicitly assuming that Norway would have to follow Britain, allowed wishful arguments to prevail. With British and Scandinavian membership one would probably resist any unwelcome development of supranationalism as well as buttress the forces of democracy, and social democracy, among the continental member states. Policy makers realised of course that that the optimal solution would be full membership, but with exemptions, long transitionary periods and the possibility to invoke escape clauses.

On 28 April 1962 Parliament decided to apply for negotiations for full membership. On 2 May, about nine months after Britain and Denmark, the Government handed in the so called membership application. The application did, however, not reflect any consistent policy choice. In one paragraph the Government stated it would contribute to the implementation of the Treaty. In the next it stated that satisfactory solutions to national problems would have to be reached. In plain speech this meant exemptions from the Treaty. By the spring of 1962 neither clear priorities nor consistent policy, and far from any bargaining policy, had been produced by the Norwegian polity. Actually, the Labour Party, Cabinet and Parliament had never taken a stand, not even en principe. They all announced they wouldn't do so until an agreement had been negotiated with the Six. Parliament decided not to apply for membership, only for membership negotiations as a means to clarify Norway's future relation with the EEC. To conclude, the seemingly consensus observed within the Norwegian polity was simply a consequence of the rather vague perceptions that had developed.

Having produced no policy choice at all, why should the Norwegian application be delayed for almost ten months? Balancing the substantial arguments was in itself surely awkward. It occurred during a situation where neither the policy of the Six could be fully anticipated, nor could the future composition of EFTA. The Government was of course well aware of the British-French disagreements, the subsequent veto could, on the other hand, not be anticipated. Still, the delay was not a result of the Government being unable to identify and balance substantial arguments of costs and benefits. As argued, similar balancing had increasingly been done within the polity since the mid 1950s. A corporatist body, Frihandelsutvalget, frequently discussed market issues, and recommended on 15 September 1961 that Norway as a bargaining strategy should negotiate for full membership. This was also the attitude among cabinet opinion leaders like Halvard Lange and Arne Skaug. The delay was, nevertheless, a result of deliberate calculations by the Government as the issue carried considerable potential for escalating domestic political conflicts. Basically, the potential for conflicts reflected the socio-political cleavages and the traditional ambiguity of national policies.

Reluctance and ambivalence existed within the Cabinet, in all political parties, among interest organisations and amidst the electorate. Prime Minister Gerhardsen for instance, argued on several occasions in favour of association. Members of the Foreign Affairs committee in Parliament criticised Halvard Lange for having committed Norway too strongly by the joint EFTA declaration. The declaration was, however, sanctioned, but on the basis of a variety of diverging premises. The reaction revealed the fact that parliamentary support was fragile. [36] Domestic political considerations had to be given extra weight as the idea prevailed during the autumn of 1961 that the issue had to be decided by a referendum in the last resort. Yet this was formally decided by Parliament in April 1962. Simply because the cleavages split most parties, they tended to argue in favour of referendum. [37]

The Government could certainly have avoided this threat had it at an early stage chosen to opt for association agreement. This act, though, would have excluded the possibility of full membership with exemptions from treaty obligations. Strategies to keep the options open and establish sufficient discursive consent were therefore regarded a political necessity. Prime Minister Gerhardsen in particular, who also was generally sceptical about Norway being too deeply integrated in West European organisations, feared that political tension could be evoked before the coming parliamentary election in September 1961. The cleavages ran right through the Labour Party, which had recently split up due to foreign policy issues. Against the will of the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Commerce, who both quickly wanted to queue up in Brussels with the British, the Government decided to establish domestic consent before presenting the issue to Parliament. On 13 October the Government presented Parliament a report on the issue which presented no policy conclusions at all. [38] Consequently, for the time being government policy did not surmount the joint EFTA declaration. A prime objective was to avoid any oppositional voice within the labour movement which could restrict future options.

In early October 1961, a joint meeting of the Cabinet, the party leadership, the party group in parliament as well as the trade union leadership accepted a proposal by the Prime Minister to allow for decentralised party treatment of the issue. [39] The party subsequently decided that government policy should not be formulated until the party had dealt thoroughly with the issue. A party meeting scheduled on 15 February 1962 was to decide whether to negotiate on the basis of membership or association. The decision was taken despite the Foreign Minister Halvard Langes argument that such a delay would weaken Norwegian bargaining strength. [40] Subsequently, the majority of the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament also favoured to delay the decision that was to be taken by Parliament. [41] Not only the Labour Party saw prospects of internal tension.

In anticipation of the Labour party decision in mid February an increasing number of Labour leaders favoured negotiation on the basis of full membership. This seems to have been the opinion of a majority of the cabinet members by the end of October 1961. The fact that the Minister of Industry, Kjell Holler, joined forces with Halvard Lange and argued in favour of membership appears to have made an impact. [42] This was furthermore recommended by the central board of the Party by the end of November. Within the party group in parliament, though, there was a majority in favour of negotiating for association. In a cabinet meeting on 2 February 1962 all cabinet members clarified their position. Only one member (Gunnar B�e), who later left the Cabinet, argued against membership negotiations. [43] In accordance with this gradual settlement, government information was increasingly biased in favour of membership negotiations. It focused on the generalised economic benefits following access to EEC markets. A close reading of government speeches and public papers also reveal a tendency to reduce the political implications of membership. [44] Arguments state it was primarily a framework for economic co-operation and it would in practice work as an intergovernmental machinery. Information did not focus on the possibility of loosing sovereignty to community institutions. This biased presentation was probably a deliberate choice. And it turned out to be successful. On 15 February the Labour Party came out in favour of membership application. A majority of the corporate interest organisations agreed with the government conclusion. Having attained this consent the Government in March presented its final report to Parliament, where it argued for negotiations on the basis of membership. [45] A majority of 113 out of 150 MPs supported this. [46] The character of the parliamentary debate clearly indicates that domestic restructuring costs were considered more important than foreign policy costs such as weakened Nordic identity. [47]

The main government objective during this period had been to avoid restriction of the options, and to reach this no coherent policy choice had been signalled. Actually, policy had been so vague that public opinion during the autumn of 1961 had remained almost untouched. A poll revealed that 46 % had not yet taken a stand to the issue. [48] 36 % favoured Norwegian participation and 18 % were against. With increasing public interest during the spring of 1962 there was, however, a slight turn against participation. In March a poll revealed that 37 % favoured participation. The number against had, on the other hand, increased to 31 %, implying that 32 % had not taken a stand. The trend was therefore increasing opposition. Those who had not taken a stand were, nevertheless, still more numerous than those who were against.

In terms of avoiding strong parliamentary opposition the Government certainly had succeeded. However, during the spring of 1962 organised extra-parliamentary opposition had been established. [49] Organised interests within the primary sector had 'woken up'. These had during the FTA- and EFTA-negotiations been inclined to accept some domestic change. [50] By 14 January, nevertheless, the EEC countries had agreed on principles for CAP. Calculations concluded that Norwegian participation in CAP would imply an immediate income reduction for farmers of at least 20 %. [51] From now on agricultural interest organisations increasingly voiced opposition against membership [52] and the Agrarian Party had become increasingly reluctant. [53] From April 1962 the Agrarian Party and agricultural interest organisations established an �information council� (Opplysningsutvalget av 1962) to campaign against membership. Parallel to this also intellectuals and radical socialists organised against Norwegian participation (Aksjon mot Fellesmarkedet - de 143). The organisations did, however, never coalesce. Intentions to do so existed, and a meeting was scheduled for January 1963, some few days after de Gaulle`s veto. They did, notwithstanding, inform the public and organise demonstrations in the streets. In the course of 1962 therefore there was an increasing focus on arguments against Norwegian participation. It is, nonetheless, hard to assess the implications on public opinion. No reliable polls were taken. The increasing voice against membership did, however, certainly embarrass the Government.

The interesting question is whether the Government in negotiations with EEC would have been willing to accept treaty bound conditions to attain membership. Would it have taken the costs in a situation where the Government had minimised the possible impacts of accession when informing the public, where the opponents of membership organised themselves on an extra-parliamentary basis, and where it realised that parliamentary support was indeed fragile? Remember that the final decision was to be taken by a referendum. We can`t know for sure. Substantial negotiations were never taken up and the Government never developed a consistent bargaining strategy. Papers on the coming bargaining process are vague. [54] Neither the application of May 2 nor the 16 pages position paper handed in to the Council of Ministers on 4 July [55] provide an answer. The Norwegian position paper certainly outlined the wide spectre of domestic costs following Norwegian membership, and indicated the need for special treatment. Still, the position paper was so vague that the Council of Ministers responded that the Norwegian government ought to clarify its position further. [56] Discussions within the Government, and with the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament as well as with organised interests before the application was sent, do not give any answer. The lack of a strategy is revealed by Foreign Minister Lange`s discussions with the Council of Ministers and EEC officials in the course of 1962. He seems to have been drifting in all kinds of directions. [57] If there was a policy guideline, it was still to keep the options open and, when eventually forced, to assess matters in wider context.

One might, firstly, interpret this vagueness as a rational adaptation to the future French veto.

There is, however, no evidence that the Government anticipated the veto in the course of 1962. When Edward Heath on 22 October 1962 informed the EFTA Council about the British negotiations, he signalled optimism. [58] I will therefore exclude this interpretation. Secondly, one might interpret the vagueness as reflecting the idea that Britain negotiated on behalf of the other EFTA countries. The EFTA Agreement from late June 1961 certainly could give such an impression. The Government realised, on the other hand, that Norwegian interests diverged too much from British and Danish ones, so under any circumstance there would have to be carried out separate negotiations. Consequently, this interpretation can also be excluded. Thirdly, one may interpret the vagueness as a consistent policy to bring Norway in as member by domestically pleading the gravity of external forces. Such an interpretation is compatible with advice given by Foreign Ministry officials, which said that Norway should accommodate the Six and not take a firm position with regard to exceptions from the treaty. Still, as long as there is no archival evidence that Government actually developed such a strategy, and this definitely would have been an extremely risky strategy before a referendum, I will also exclude this interpretation.

Having excluded the above interpretations, we can conclude that the absence of a consistent bargaining policy during the autumn of 1962 fits very well with the observed ambivalence and confusion within the Norwegian polity before Parliament decided to take up negotiations.

As argued, this policy confusion reflected basically that EEC-membership, as opposed to EFTA-membership, would challenge existing ambiguity in national policies and therefore the existing socio-political balance. Thus, the awkward decision of how to approach EEC had been delayed for months, and nevertheless signalled no clear policy choice at all. Consequently, in terms of seeking a framework for the advancement of national policy this period of one and a half years must be regarded an interregnum of almost paralysing policy confusion.


Footnotes

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at a seminar on national interests and European Integration, The Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters, Trondheim, September 22, 1997.

** I am thankful to cand.philol. Guttorm Fevang, who genrously has provided some of the primary sources on which this study is based.

[1] Alan S. Milward: The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London 1992 p. 10.

[2] Alan S. Milward and Vibeke S�rensen: Interdependence or integration? A national choice, in Milward et al.: The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and theory 1945-1992, London-New York 1993 p.12.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Alan S. Milward: The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London 1992 p.18.

[5] Alan S. Milward: �Allegiance-The Past and the Future�, Journal of European Integration History vol. 1, No.1, 1995 p.14, cfr. also Alan S. Milward: The Spring of Integration, in P. Gowan and P. Anderson (eds.): The Question of Europe, London-New York 1997.

[6] Cfr. Geir Lundestad: �Nasjonalisme og internasjonalisme i norsk utenrikspolitikk: Et faglig-provoserende essay�, Internasjonal Politikk, temahefte 1, 1985; Rolf Tamnes: Integration and Screening. The two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945-1986, Forsvarsstudier nr.6, 1987.

[7] Cfr. Johan Galtung: �Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position�, Journal of Peace Research Vol.1, 1964; Ottar Hellevik et al: �The Common Market in Norway: A Conflict between Center and Periphery�, Journal of Peace Research Vol.12, 1975; Henry Valen: �National Conflict Structure and Foreign Politics: The Impact of the EC Issue on Percieved Cleavages in Norwegian Politics, European Journal of Political Research No.4, 1976; Beate Husebye and Ola Listhaug: �Identifications of Norwegians with Europe: The Impact of Values and Centre-Periphery Factors�, in Rued de Moor (ed.): Values in Western Societies, Tilburg 1995; Anders Todal Jensen et al: �Betydningen av gamle og nye skillelinjer�, in Anders Todal Jenssen and Henry Valen (eds.): Br�ssel midt imot. Folkeavstemningen om EU, Oslo 1995. The classical comprehensive analysis of the cleavages is Stein Rokkan: �Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics�, in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan: Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-national Perspectives, New York 1967.

[8] See contributions in Nils �rvik (ed.): Fears and expectations. Norwegian attitudes toward European integration, Oslo 1972.

[9] Theo Koritzinsky: Velgere, partier og utenrikspolitikk. Analyse av norske holdninger 1945-1970, Oslo 1970 p.131.

[10] Erik Holst-J�ger: Venstre og EF-striden 1963-1972, unpublished cand.philol.thesis, Oslo 1997.

[11] Helle Pay Eriksen: I baktroppen. Den norske frilistingen innenfor OEEC 1949-1952, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Trondheim 1996; Elisabeth Lie: Pride and Prejudice. Norway and the European Payments Union 1950-1955, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1997; Hans Otto Fr�land: Norway in OEEC 1948-1961. Challenges and adjustments. Unpublished manuscript.

[12] Ingeborg Lie: Forhandlingene om nordisk tollunion/nordisk fellesmarked 1954-1956, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1973; Ingrid Sogner: Norges holdning til nordisk �konomisk samarbeid 1947-1959, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1992.

[13] National Archive (Riksarkivet, Oslo): Cabinet minutes 07.02.1957; Foreign Office Archive (Utenriksdepartementet, Oslo): UD 44.25/56: �Det europeiske frihandelsomr�det�, 07.02.1957; UD 44.25/56: �Arne Skaugs redegj�relse for Den utvidede utenrikskomit�, Finanskomiteen og industrikomiteen om det europeiske frihandelsomr�det�, 06.02.57.

[14] Parliamentary Report (stortingsmelding).nr.45, 1957 Om planene for et europeisk frihandelsomr�de) p. 24 ff.; Svein Olav Hansen: Det norske EFTA-sporet i 1950-�ra. En studie av Norges Europa-politikk, med s�rlig vekt p� perioden 1956-1960, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1990.

[15] Hans Otto Fr�land: Det Norske Arbeiderparti og Vest-Europa 1945 - 1995: Om effekter av internasjonalt samarbeid p� utsyn. Arena Working Paper no.4, 1997.

[16] Cabinet minutes 11.10.1957.

[17] Erik Riste: Reformasjon gjennom integrasjon - fra fascinasjon til aversjon. Norske landsbrukspolitiske posisjoner ved forhandlingene om Stor-EFTA og den f�rste s�knaden om medlemskap i EEC (1956-1963). unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1997 p. 31 ff.

[18] Parliamentary Report nr.45, 1957 p. 11.

[19] Mikael af Malmborg and Johnny Laursen: The Creation of EFTA, in Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.): Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe 1945-1960, Odense 1995; Tormod Utne: Brobygging d�mt til � feile. EFTA i britisk Europa-politikk 1958-1961, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Trondheim 1996.

[20] Foreign Office: UD 44.33.1, Bd.18: �Handelsminister Skaugs redegj�relse i den utvidede utenrikskomite�, 09.12.1958; Cabinet minutes 23.4.59; Cabinet minutes 03.02.1959.

[21] Utne 1996 p. 72 ff.

[22] Cabinet minutes 29.05.1959.

[23] Parliamentary proceedings (Innst. S. nr. 157, 1959-60; St.tidende 7b, 1959-60 s. 2400 ff.).

[24] Thomas Evensen: Under tvil sier vi ja. Norges Industriforbund og sp�rsm�let om Stor-EFTA og EFTA 1956-1960, unpublished cand.philol. thesis 1996 p. 174 ff.

[25] Bj�rn Alstad (ed.): Norge, nordmenn og verden. Norske meninger 1, Oslo 1969 p.165.

[26] Ibid. p. 164.

[27] Cabinet minutes 12.12. 1959; parliamentary proceedings (Stortingstidende 7b 1959-60) p.2414 ff; Anniken Huitfeldt: Fra OEEC til OECD. Norges holdninger til reorganiseringen i 1960, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1996.

[28] Cabinet minutes 05.01.1960, 14.01.1960, 19.01.1960.

[29] Trygve Ramberg: Sovereignty and Co-operation, in Nils �rvik (ed.): Fears and expectations. Norwegian attitudes towards European integration, Oslo 1972 p.57f; Foreign Office: UD 25.2.101 Bd.4: �Redegj�relse i forbindelse med Utenrikskomiteens behandling den 28. september 1960 av stortingsmann Finn Moes forslag til ny � 93 i Grunnloven�, 28.09.1960.

[30] Cfr. Parliamentary Report nr. 89, 1951: Om Grunnloven og Norges deltakelse i internasjonale organisasjoner.

[31] Foreign Office: UD 44.26/6.84.Bd1: �Storbritannias forhold til De Seks�, 15.04.61.

[32] Cabinet minutes 20.06.1961 and 22.06.1961; Foreign Office: UD 44.36.5 Bd.7: �M�tet i EFTAs Ministerr�d 28. juli i Geneve�, 29.07.61; Guttorm Fevang: Norge-nissen p� lasset. En studie av beslutningsprosessen som fant sted forut for Norges f�rste s�knad om medlemskap i EEC, unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Trondheim 1995 p. 36 ff.

[33] Declarations enclosed Parliamentary report nr.15, 1961-62.

[34] Parliamentary proceedings 7b, 1960-61 p. 3042 ff, 3419, 3375 ff.

[35] The basic pros and cons are revealed in the parliamentary reports nr.15, 1961-62, nr. 67, 1961-62, and Innst.S.nr.165, 1961-62.

[36] Cabinet minutes 01.08.1961.

[37] Tor Bj�rklund: �The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and When Does it Succeed?�, Scandinavian Political Studies No. 3, 1982.

[38] Parliamentary Report nr.15, 1961-62.

[39] On the Labour Party, see Nils A. R�hne: De f�rste skritt inn i Europa. Norsk europa-politikk fra 1950, Forsvarsstudier 5, 1989; and Fevang 1995.

[40] Cabinet minutes 28.11.1961.

[41] Cabinet minutes 05.12.1961.

[42] Cabinet minutes 07.11.1961.

[43] Cabinet minutes 02.02.1962.

[44] Se e.g. parliamentary proceedings 7b,1960-61 p.3046.

[45] Parliamentary Report nr.67, 1961-62.

[46] Parliamentary proceedings 7b,1961-62 p.3010.

[47] Parliamentary proceedings 7b, 1961-62 pp.2674-3011.

[48] B. Alstad (red.): Norske meninger 1946-93. Bd.1: Norge og verden, Oslo 1993 p. 160.

[49] Tor Bj�rklund: Mot str�mmen. Kampen mot EF 1961-1972, Oslo 1982.

[50] Riste 1997 p. 47 ff.

[51] Parliamentary Report nr.67, 1961-62, Innst.S.nr.165, 1961-62.

[52] Riste 1997 p. 82 ff.

[53] Jostein Tr�ite and Jan Erik Vold: B�nder i EF-strid: Senterpartiet og landbruksorganisasjonene 1961-1972, Oslo 1977 p.73; Roar Madsen: I tru og tvil om samarbeid i Europa, unpublished manuscript.

[54] Foreign Office: UD 44.36/6.84. Bd.13: �Det norske opplegg til forhandlinger med EEC. Notat til statsr�d Gundersen av Langeland�, 20.05.62.

[55] Foreign Office: UD 44.36/6.84 Bd.14 �Den Norske Regjerings erkl�ring overfor Det Europeiske �konomiske Fellesskap.�

[56] Foreign Office: UD 44.36/6.84: �Henvendelse om n�rmere opplysninger rettet til den norske regjering fra medlemsstatene i CEE som f�lge av ministerm�tet 4.juli 1962�, 12.12.1962.

[57] Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge �. Pharo: The Common Market Issue in Norway, in Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward: Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to Enlarge The European Community 1961-1963, London 1996 p. 238 ff.

[58] Bjarne Lie: A Gulliver among Lilliputians. A History of the European Free Trade Association 1960-1972, Unpublished cand.philol. thesis, Oslo 1995 p. 170.






[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper series: 15.12.1998]