ARENA Working Papers
WP 98/18

 

 


Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU´s External Policy?*



Helene Sjursen
ARENA, University of Oslo



 


Abstract

Little attention has been paid to the relationship between enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. Discussions about the widening of the EU refer largely to its implications for the Community pillar (the `'irst pillar'). However, eastern enlargement also poses important challenges to the CFSP or `second pillar'. Not only does it raise questions about the CFSP's ability to function effectively, but also, by redefining the EU's borders, it promises to introduce new issues and new tasks into the scope of the CFSP. This paper starts out by highlighting different approaches to understanding the CFSP. Secondly, it turns to look at enlargement as a specific form of foreign policy. Thirdly, the paper examines the various issues raised by the prospect of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The final section discusses the implications of enlargement for longer term trends in the development of the CFSP.


Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy

It has often been pointed out that the CFSP, as well as its predecessor European Political Cooperation, is `poorly served by theory' (Holland 1991:2). Students of international relations have not yet succeeded in developing concepts and theories that allow us fully to understand foreign policy cooperation within the EU and the EU's role in the international system. Much of the literature on this dimension of European integration identifies itself as `pre-theoretical' (Hill 1994). Also, the focus is often on the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP: it is seen, at best, as little more than the sum of the foreign policies of the Member States. In addition, given its limited capabilities in security and defence (if they exist at all), the CFSP is considered to be much less influential in foreign affairs than individual Member States. The failure of the CFSP to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia gave renewed ammunition to its critics. The wave of optimism about the European Community's ability to forge a new and more influential place for itself at the international arena at the end of the Cold War died down. Although traditional security and defence capabilities were seen to matter less, the EU's dependence on the United States in situations of crisis did not seem to have declined. Furthermore, by 1995 NATO had started to develop the kind of collective security mechanisms that many had expected to see emerge within the EU framework. The more ambitious CFSP of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which replaced the old European Political Cooperation (EPC), had increased expectations of a strengthened performance in foreign policy (Hill 1994). What had previously been a relatively modest attempt at co-ordinating the foreign policies of EC states within EPC was supposed to develop into a common foreign policy for the new European Union in the context of the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the EU continued to be divided on foreign policy issues, and the development of a common, cohesive European foreign policy seemed to remain remote. Jacques Poos' exclamation on the eve of the Yugoslav war that the `hour of Europe' had arrived, seemed mostly to indicate a considerable lack of realism in the EU's foreign policy ambitions. [1]

If we draw exclusively on realist assumptions about international relations, the difficulties of the CFSP are unsurprising: in an anarchical world 'national interests' will inevitably clash and co-operation will remain the exception to the rule. However, there is also an increasing body of literature that points to the influence exerted by the EU, if not in the international system, then at least in Europe. Despite the EU's obvious difficulties in handling international crises, it is often seen as a key force in the longer term reshaping of international politics in Europe after the end of bipolarity. The vast number of applicants wishing to join the EU is a further sign that external actors perceive the EU as an influential actor in the region. In other words, the empirical `reality' does not seem to fit entirely with theories available in international relations literature. There is a risk that, in assessing the CFSP, the pendulum has swung too far the other way after the enthusiasm at the end of the Cold War. Political cooperation has actually proved extremely durable.

According to Allen and Smith, the difficulty in studying Western Europe's international role is that `the notion of a `foreign policy' carries with it a conceptual framework which is inseparable from the state-centric view of world politics' (Allen and Smith 1991: 95). We tend to get stuck in this state-centric view when analysing European foreign policy, and therefore find it difficult to account for the growing significance of the EU's international role. They suggest that by using the concept of international `presence', it is possible to study the impact of the EU in different policy areas of the international system, and to show that the EU `has considerable structure, salience and legitimacy in the process of international politics' (Allen and Smith 1991: 116). Building on the notion of the EU's `presence' in the international system, as well as Sjøstedt's (1977) analysis of the EC's international actorness, Hill has suggested that the EU is best seen as a system of external relations in which `the Europeans represent a sub-system of the international system as a whole... a system which generates international relations - collectively, individually, economically, politically - rather than a clear-cut `European foreign policy' as such' (Hill 1994:120). This European sub system has three dimensions to which we should pay attention: the national foreign policies of the Member States, the CFSP and the `external relations' of the first Community pillar.

Such interpretations of the EU's international role are often based on `non-rationalistic' assumptions about politics and international relations (Matlary 1997). Rather than defining states as `billiard-ball' actors whose interests are defined exogenously, and regarding the decision-making process within the EU as one of bargaining between conflicting interests, the possibility that states' interests are shaped through interaction is considered. This `non-rationalistic' literature includes factors such as ideas, values and identities which are often set aside in the rationalist analytical tradition. It is suggested that states can gradually become socialised into a shared community of values. Applied to the EU, such approaches indicate that foreign policy making within the CFSP is a dynamic process where interests and objectives emerge as a result of interaction at the domestic, national and European level. Consequently, the clear distinction between the `national' and the `European' might gradually be blurred, even in the area of `high politics'. A process of `Europeanisation' of foreign policy in which shared norms and rules are gradually accumulated might be closer to describing accurately the CFSP than the image of rational bargaining leading to agreement on a policy of the lowest common denominator (Hill 1996b).

Some evidence of a `Europeanisation' of foreign policy can be found in the literature on national European foreign policies. Tonra (1997: 197) has found that, in the cases of Ireland, Denmark and Holland, `political cooperation improved the effectiveness, broadened the range and increased the capabilities of foreign policy making'. Hill and Wallace (1996) refer to an engrenage effect in foreign policy cooperation: they point out that the preparation of foreign policy now takes place in the context of European consultation and that, as a result, `Officials and Ministers who sit together on planes and round tables in Brussels and in each others' capitals begin to judge «rationality» from within a different framework' (Hill and Wallace 1996: 12). A classic example would be the so-called `co-ordination reflex' between Political Directors so often mentioned even in the early literature on EPC.

However, this does not mean that the CFSP is a common foreign policy in the sense prescribed by the Treaty of Maastricht. According to the Treaty, the CFSP shall be `supported actively and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity'. Furthermore, the CFSP is supposed to cover `all areas of foreign and security policy'. Yet it would be naive to pretend other than that national foreign policies remain strong and that reaching a consensus, in particular in situations of crisis which require rapid responses, remains difficult. Identifying shared interests and reconciling different national foreign policy traditions is a challenge. Thus, this literature does not confirm traditional assumptions about integration. It does not see an automatic link between economic integration and the development of a common foreign policy. Neither does it suggest, in neo-functionalist fashion, that it is only a matter of time before control of foreign policy is moved from the national to the supranational level. It merely points out that it is possible to detect a gradual process of change even in foreign policy making. Furthermore, it suggests that we need to pay closer attention to the dynamic interaction between the national and the European levels in order to understand political cooperation. We do not know the end station of this process and we must reflect on the possibility that it may never lead to one single European foreign policy in the traditional sense of the word.

This literature is not directly concerned with enlargement. However, the different approaches are likely to lead us to different conclusions about the impact of enlargement on political cooperation. If one takes an intergovernmentalist perspective, it seems probable that enlargement will `atomise' the CFSP. Successful inter-state bargaining is more difficult with twenty or twenty-five Member States than with fifteen. However, if one considers foreign policy-making within the EU to be a process where national and European levels interact and mutually influence each other different conclusions may be reached. The neo-functionalist perspective does address the relationship between enlargement and foreign policy co-operation. Schmitter uses the concept of externalisation to suggest that integration has negative effects on actors outside the EU, and that their application for membership should be seen as a direct response to a fear of exclusion from European cooperation. In turn, he expects increased membership to strengthen activities in external relations as a result of the new trade and diplomatic relationships brought into the EU's `orbit' by the new Member States. Hence, the concept of externalisation `partially explains why non-members press the EC to act as a unit; what effects this outside charge has on the EC; and the outcome of EC foreign policy actions that are executed in response to outside pressure' (Ginsberg 1989: 25). As we shall see later, the notion of externalisation and spillover does seem to have some relevance for enlargement. One does nonetheless have to be careful to avoid the sense of inevitability of such developments. Whatever the external pressure to enlarge, it did not lead to a strengthening of the CFSP framework in the Amsterdam Treaty. Before looking more closely at this issue it is useful to examine how the enlargement process in itself is an important foreign policy instrument for the EU.


Enlargement as foreign policy

Enlargement of the European Union is, in itself, a form of EU foreign policy. It puts the EU in a position to shape large parts of applicant states' domestic and foreign policies. Traditional principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states seem to be set aside in this process. At the same time, because enlargement aims at including external actors, it is ultimately only a passing phase in a longer process which `domesticates' what were previously foreign relations. In turn, enlargement is often then seen to threaten the very foundations of the policy that made it possible. As Karen Smith notes, after the Eastern enlargement it is possible that `the logic of integration will stall, having produced the very policy that now renders uncertain its future vitality' (Smith 1995: 404).

Despite the fact that it was only officially put on the EU's agenda at the Copenhagen European Council summit in 1993, the issue of enlargement became the predominant theme in the EU's policies towards Central and Eastern Europe immediately after the end of the Cold War. As the communist regimes collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, the new governments made the `return to the West' one of their principal foreign policy objectives. Assessments of the EU's policies in response to these demands diverge. To many, EU policies towards Central and Eastern Europe confirm the general failure of the EU's foreign policy and demonstrate the EU's inability to play a central and positive role in constructing a `new' Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. Such criticisms come in particular from the applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe (MacManus 1998) but also from the academic community in the West (Kramer 1993, Allen 1998). Critics point to the EU's initial reluctance to accept the idea of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, and to the fact that, after accepting it in principle, the EU dithered in the face of demands for a timetable for the opening of membership negotiations. Early versions of the Europe Agreements have been criticised for focusing too much on protecting EU markets and not enough on helping Central and East European economies improve their competitiveness (Kramer 1993). Changes have since been made to these agreements, but restrictions to trade in so-called sensitive sectors such as textile and agriculture still exist, and are often taken as indications of the EU's reluctance (or inability) to adapt its present structures and policies to a new political context. Perhaps unfairly, the EU and its Member States are accused of being more interested in ensuring the continued success of economic integration within the existing EU than in expanding its benefits to the rest of Europe, and of merely reacting to external events rather than developing a clear strategy towards Central and Eastern Europe.

Others see the EU's policies towards Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 as evidence of the EU's ability to construct a common, coherent external policy in situations where it shares common interests (K. Smith 1995, Pelkmans and Murphy 1994). They highlight the importance of the Commission in formulating an external policy for the EU as a whole, as well as the interplay between the CFSP pillar and the external relations of pillar one. According to Karen Smith, EU policies towards Central and Eastern Europe are not the result of agreement on a `minimum common denominator'. Rather, by representing the middle ground, the Commission successfully upgraded the Community interest in the EU's policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, thus partly confirming neo-functionalist expectations about a connection between external pressure and further integration (Smith 1995: 399). The G7 decision in 1989 to give the European Commission the task of co-ordinating Western aid to Poland, Hungary and later also the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, is often considered as the event that propelled the Commission forward in this area. It certainly led to a considerable strengthening of the Commission's international status. In the words of Nuttall: `for the first time [the Commission] was a foreign policy actor in its own right' (Nuttall 1996: 142). In turn, this helped reinforce the Commission's role inside the EU and gave it a central role in developing the EU's own policy responses to the rapidly changing political landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The difficulties that the EU has experienced in developing coherent, long term strategies towards Central and Eastern Europe are logical, given the general surprise in the West at the collapse of communism and the need for time to readjust to new political realities. In this sense, the problems encountered by the EU in relations with Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War are not radically different from those that national foreign policies had to grapple with.

The divergent assessments of the EU's policy towards Central and Eastern Europe are in part the result of conflicting views on how the EU should balance the choice between what it ought to do and what it is able to do. The Commission argues that enlargement is both costly and time consuming and that not only the EU but also the applicant states would lose out economically as well as politically by starting the process too soon. Yet, at the same time, the key role played by the Commission in moving the enlargement issue forward on the EU's agenda should not be underestimated. The Commission has not, however, been able effectively to communicate its views to prospective Member States and to convince them of the legitimacy of its approach. Furthermore, Member States have given somewhat contradictory signals to Central and Eastern Europe about their positions on enlargement (MacManus 1998). This has at least contributed to create the large gap that now exists between the way in which the applicant states perceive the EU's initiatives and the way in which the EU itself views the same issues. This is a general problem in the EU's external policies. It has been captured in Christopher Hill's (1994) concept of a `capabilities-expectations gap' in the EU's foreign policy. In its relations with Eastern Europe the EU has a tendency to talk up its capabilities in foreign policy, and thus to create expectations that it can not live up to. This reinforces the heavy historical baggage of East-West relations in Europe: the image of the West abandoning Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War - however inaccurate it may be-remains powerful and continues to colour East European perceptions of Western policies.

On the positive side, the experience in Central and Eastern Europe does seem to suggest that the economic and political dimensions of the EU's foreign activities are better integrated than is often assumed. Finding institutional mechanisms to ensure coherence and consistency between the Community's external relations and the CFSP were a central concern in the negotiations leading to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. It is only recently that Member States have become more relaxed about the possibility of using external relations instruments to support the CFSP. Relations with Eastern Europe have principally been handled through the Europe Agreements. They are so-called mixed agreements which means that the first pillar rather than the second pillar has most of the initiative. However, the CFSP has also been involved in the development of the EU's policies towards Central and Eastern Europe through the Stability Pacts. As one of the first so-called `joint actions' of the CFSP, aimed at promoting peaceful mechanisms for dispute settlement, the Stability Pacts became a means of bringing new life into the CFSP after what was considered a dismal performance in the former Yugoslavia. Originally ridiculed as a futile attempt at conference diplomacy with little real impact, the Stability Pacts have since been considered a fairly successful enterprise (Sedelmeier and Wallace 1996).

To what extent is this experience applicable to other areas of the EU's foreign relations? Karen Smith suggests that Eastern Europe is a special case where the production of a common policy with supranational elements was feasible due to Eastern Europe's geographic proximity, the sense of a shared history between East and West in Europe and a belief that the EU has a particular responsibility for events in Central and Eastern Europe. These particular circumstances can not easily be reproduced in other areas of the EU's external activities. Michael Smith (1998) has given this a different interpretation by suggesting that the CFSP is in fact marginal to the EU's external policies. Against the backdrop of the wider process of globalisation, the `special status' of foreign policy is being reduced. What matters increasingly in the international system are economic and trade issues. Consequently, according to Smith, it is through its external economic relations that the EU develops its presence in the international system and it is here, rather than at the CFSP, that we should be looking when examining the EU's external role.


The challenge of enlargement: internal and external actors

The prospect of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe presents the CFSP with a number of challenges. Developing a cohesive foreign policy will be far more difficult at twenty or twenty-five than at fifteen. As a result of their geographic location and different historical experiences, the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe will bring new foreign policy perspectives and interests into the EU. Together with different foreign policy interests also come new neighbours and different relations with third states. [2]

We do not as yet know enough about how interests are formed at the EU level, and we need to reflect further on how the interests and ideas of new Member States affect, and are affected by, the overall dynamic of foreign policy co-operation. Experience from previous enlargements seems to suggest that Member States' perceptions of their interests undergo change as a result of membership. Consequently, taking presumed `national interests' as a starting point for examining possible effects of enlargement on the CFSP may not be satisfactory. Before the 1995 enlargement to Sweden, Austria and Finland, there was much concern about the consequences of the inclusion of three neutral states for the EU's plans to develop a common security policy. The expectation that the inclusion of these states would prevent further initiatives by the EU in the security field was, in part, misguided. Sweden and Finland contributed to the strengthening of the security dimension in the 1996-97 IGC by proposing the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the new Treaty. For these states the meaning of neutrality has changed with the end of the Cold War and with their membership in the EU. In Finland, the status of neutrality was seen as irreconcilable with EU membership given the nature of the EU and its implicit assumptions of solidarity between Member States. In Sweden similar debates on the country's traditional stance of neutrality have emerged, with former Prime Minister Carl Bildt supporting the idea of Swedish membership in NATO. However, if the CFSP were to move towards a `common defence' these states might still have difficulties.

Security issues are also likely to come into focus as a result of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. Security concerns are often cited as an important factor in motivating these states to join the EU. What this will mean for the EU's ambitions to develop a security and defence policy is nonetheless uncertain. It is possible that membership in the EU as it stands is considered a sufficient security guarantee, and that there will be no particular desire on the part of the Central and East European states to strengthen European security policy. It is equally possible that the Central and East European states - in particular those who will also become members of NATO - will see the United States and NATO as the most useful guarantors of security in Europe. In terms of increased interaction with third states, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe will bring relations with Russia and its former Republics to the fore. So far, the EU has only taken limited initiatives towards Russia and the former Soviet Republics, concentrating instead on relations with applicant states. Despite their focus on relations with the West, the Central and East European states' connection with their Eastern neighbours remain an inescapable factor in their external relations, and this will be brought into the EU.

The classic solution within the EU to the dilemmas of increased diversity after enlargement has been to try to strengthen central institutions. So far, the EU has not managed to tighten decision-making in the CFSP substantially. The 1996-7 IGC which resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty did little to change the fundamentals of the institutional set-up. A timid attempt was made at expanding qualified majority voting by writing into the Treaty that, after unanimous agreement on common strategies, the Council may proceed with majority voting for `joint actions' and `common positions'. This provision is further restricted by a provision allowing Member States `for important and stated reasons of national policy' to oppose the adoption of a decision by qualified majority voting. Hence, the French interpretation of the Luxembourg `compromise' of 1966 has for the first time been formally included in the Treaty. The principle of flexibility, which has sometimes been presented as a solution to the difficulties and complications resulting from increased membership, does not cover the CFSP. Nonetheless, the possibility of `constructive abstention' does in practice allow a limited number of states to take initiatives in foreign policy without the full participation of all member states. How, and whether or not, this will be practised remains, in early 1998, an open question.

The ability of the EU to act cohesively could also be strengthened by reinforcing the role of the Commission. From being almost completely excluded from the former EPC, the Treaty of Maastricht increased the Commission's influence in the CFSP. Although the changes fell short of the Commission's own ambitions in foreign policy, it did for the first time become `fully associated' to all aspects of the EU's foreign policy and was given the right to propose policies (Nuttall 1996). In response to this increased recognition, the Commission's services were reorganised. A group composed of the six Commissioners with involvement in external affairs (popularly referred to as the `Relex Group') was established and began to meet regularly under the chairmanship of the new Commission President Jacques Santer (Cameron 1998). A new Directorate General was also established to deal specifically with the CFSP and to prepare the Commission for participation in foreign policy co-operation. However, this trend was not taken any further with the Amsterdam Treaty. It has even been suggested that Amsterdam represented a setback for the Commission in foreign policy, after a period of gradual encroachment on the territory of the Council and the Political Directors (Allen 1998). It is possible that the Commission's active role in the early 1990s has produced a backlash, with the Member States again being more reluctant to increase its influence in foreign policy (K. Smith 1995: 398, Allen 1998). The ability of the Commission to play an effective role in foreign policy is also hampered by problems of legitimacy. With no real democratic accountability for the Commission and little sense of clear EU foreign policy interests, it becomes difficult to justify the Commission taking centre stage (Nuttall 1996).

There is also some concern that the Presidency will become an even more inefficient institution with a larger number of smaller member states. It is difficult to ensure consistency in the EU's external representation when leadership rotates every six months. Furthermore, there are some signs that the larger Member States have reservations about subordinating their foreign policy to the successive leadership of the small member states. It was not possible for member states to agree on a reform to the Presidency at the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference. An effort to strengthen the cohesion in the EU's external representation, and to give the EU a single visible voice in the international system, was made by the decision to nominate a `High Representative' of the EU (a Mr. or Ms. CFSP) in the person of the Secretary General. This reform is considered, by the Commission as well as France and Britain, to be potentially the most important change to the CFSP.

Overall, it is too early to give certain predictions about the impact of the reforms introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty. One should not exclude the possibility that the Treaty will allow an enlarged Europe to develop a more cohesive foreign policy. Much will depend on the way in which the institutional changes proposed are implemented, as well as on the political commitment of member states to use the new provisions. Regelsberger and Wessels (1996: 42-3) consider many of the problems of the CFSP to stem from the Member States' reluctance to `play by the rules of the game which they themselves established'. The authority and influence of the new `Mr. or Ms. CFSP' will, for example, have much to do with the personality nominated. Some member states, such as the UK, wish to see the post filled by a civil servant, whereas others, such as France, would like a senior politician to take the lead. Likewise, the efficiency of the new Planning Unit, which is intended to help provide the EU with a long term perspective in foreign policy, will in part depend on the willingness of Member States to share information with representatives from the Commission and the West European Union (WEU).

Even if the EU were to succeed in strengthening the institutional network of the CFSP, this may not in itself be enough to ensure a common foreign policy - and particularly not in a larger EU. The CFSP already has difficulties identifying common interests, and it is not at all certain that institutional provisions, on their own, would suffice to change this. A coherent foreign policy would also require some basis in a common identity. In this respect the challenge of the Eastern enlargement is larger than with previous enlargements that took place in the context of fixed political borders: Europe was neatly divided into two opposing military blocs. Comfortably within one camp, certain fundamentals, such as the EU's identity as `Western' and the geographical limits to the EU's extension, were unproblematic. As the EU enlarges eastwards in the beginning of the next century, it will contribute to draw new institutional, political and economic boundaries in Europe. The EU will find itself at the front-line in the on-going process of redefining the structures of the international system after the end of the Cold War. The idea that enlargement is simply a matter of moving the borders of the West further East will not necessarily be helpful. There is a risk that the new borders of the EU will be more fragile and contested than what they have previously been. There may also be disappointment amongst those that remain outside. Dealing with this issue will be one of the principal tasks of the EU's external policies. The challenge is no doubt partly `material' in the sense that it will be important to develop economic and policy instruments to strengthen relations across the new borders. Nonetheless, the perennial issues of `what is Europe' and who the EU can legitimately claim to represent will inevitably arise. They go to the core of the EU's efforts to develop a foreign policy. What type of borders will the EU have, how permeable will they be in economic and human terms, and how will they be perceived on the outside? Ideally, answers to such questions should emerge as a result of systematic debate, but nonetheless, the EU's tradition for incrementalism seems likely to prevail.


The CFSP, enlargement and the transformation of European political space

According to Allen (1998) the CFSP suffers from an inherent contradiction: `the determination to preserve national foreign policy is ultimately at odds with the ambition to create a European foreign policy' (Allen 1998: 64). He suggests that two `cultures' compete for control of European foreign policy - one representing the desire to preserve national autonomy in foreign policy (institutionalised in the Council) and one aiming to create a common foreign policy (represented institutionally by the Commission). The possibilities of strengthening the EU's performance in international relations while maintaining what is essentially an intergovernmental framework are considered limited. Nonetheless, neither the Maastricht nor the Amsterdam Treaty made serious attempts at moving beyond intergovernmentalism. The changes introduced to the institutions can be characterised as further `tinkering' with an essentially intergovernmental framework. Against this backdrop, logic would suggest that the CFSP will become more ineffective after the Eastern enlargement, and that it might even be brought to a complete standstill. The struggle to identify shared interests in foreign policy will be even more complicated at twenty or twenty-five than at fifteen. Likewise, the basis for a common `identity' will be further diluted.

We have suggested that the relationship between enlargement and the CFSP is more complex than what is suggested by the widening-deepening dichotomy. There are also indications of change in European foreign policy that cannot be captured by concentrating exclusively on the institutional characteristics of the CFSP, and which suggest that enlargement does not have to atomise political cooperation. One dimension to the changes taking place in European foreign policy is what Allen (1998) has referred to as the process of `Brusselisation' of European foreign policy. Although foreign policy remains in the control of the nation state and has not been transferred in any substantial way to the European Commission, it has become more difficult for the foreign ministries of the Member States to control the foreign policy process. Foreign policy is increasingly made in Brussels, by national representatives. This gradual transfer of decision-making from national capitals to Brussels has developed in parallel with efforts in the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam to increase cohesion between the first and the second pillar. One consequence has been that rivalries have developed between the Political Directors (who traditionally deal with the CFSP) and the Permanent Representatives. In terms of enlargement, this tendency towards Brusselisation suggests that centrifugal forces within the EU are quite strong and that the foreign policies of new member states are likely to undergo important changes after enlargement, rather than that the CFSP will break down.

Without the corresponding development of a shared identity, the `Brusselistation' of foreign policy is unlikely to lead to a cohesive foreign policy. In this area, the signals are mixed. There is no European foreign policy identity. Nevertheless, the identities of Europe's `nation states' seem increasingly ambiguous. Laffan (1996) has suggested that issues of identity have re-emerged at three levels in Europe: within states, in the European Union and at the wider European level. It is often argued that the nation state is too small to handle the consequences of economic globalisation on its own. According to Laffan's thesis there is a parallel development according to which the nation state is too large for issues of identity, that now emerge at regional level. We must at least reflect on the possibility that the very fundament of national foreign policy is changing. Still, it is not clear that this will lead to a transfer of loyalty to `Europe' or to an effective `European' identity that may underpin the CFSP. At the height of the war in Yugoslavia, public opinion called for Europe to `do something' to stop the war, thus suggesting a view, in the public at large, of the EU as a community of values with a right and duty to take initiatives in foreign policy. At the same time, the support for further European integration seems fragile and the domestic foundations for a European foreign policy are limited (Forster and Wallace 1996). Traditionally, the EU's external identity has been built around the notion of a civilian power (Duchene). According to Waever (1996), the efforts to build a European identity are now given a slightly different meaning. He argues that efforts to build a European identity are increasingly being linked to the issue of security. This, according to Waever gives a sense of urgency to integration: its alternative - fragmentation - is presented as destructive to the whole European project (Waever 1996: 123).

Efforts to build an identity based on the idea of integration as a process of securitisation seem close to the perspectives of the applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, enlargement will not necessarily hinder efforts to build a European identity on this basis. They might, nonetheless, provoke less desirable counter-effects outside the EU. After enlargement, one of the principal tasks of the CFSP and the EU's external relations will be to develop external policies that do not create a sense of exclusion in the rest of Europe.

It may still be that enlargement will provoke new divisions between existing Member States and thus lead to changes and even blockages within the CFSP. Francoise de la Serre (1996: 32) has pointed to such concerns in France. She argues that there are two `contradictory fears' in French EU policy: `seeing Germany dominating the Community and/or distancing herself from the EC in order to have a very active policy in Central and Eastern Europe'. The Stability Pact, or the Balladur plan as it was originally known, is often seen as an expression of such concerns and as a French attempt to regain the initiative in policies towards Eastern Europe, in particular in comparison with Germany.

The CFSP is unsettled. It is being `constructed' against the backdrop of a broad and complex process of change in European inter-state relations (Peterson and Sjursen 1998). Inside the EU, it is becoming more difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign policy. Increasingly large parts of what was traditionally under the control of foreign ministries is now taken care of by `technical' ministries. In this context, it is often suggested that a system of `multilevel governance' is developing in Europe, but such analyses are rarely extended to cover the EU's foreign relations. It is nonetheless difficult to imagine that the CFSP can remain totally immune to the broader process of Europeanisation. Although, with enlargement, more states will be brought into the CFSP, the process of foreign policy cooperation is unlikely to break down altogether.


Conclusion

This paper has highlighted the different ways in which the CFSP is assessed, both by policy-makers and in the academic literature. It has suggested that although Europe does not have a common foreign policy in the traditional sense, foreign policy co-operation within the EU has a significant impact both on the foreign policies individual member states and on the world outside. Consequently, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe certainly promises to influence the content of the EU's external policies and raise important challenges to the CFSP for example in terms of how to manage relations with new neighbours, but it does not need to be seen as a threat to the continued functioning of the CFSP. Indeed, the applicant states themselves have an interest in keeping the CFSP going.


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Footnotes

* Paper presented at "Re-thinking the Common Foreign and Security Policy: the State of the Theoretical Art", Aberystwyth, the University of Wales, May 1998.

[1] Jacques Poos is quoted in Andreas G. Kintia, `The EU's foreign policy and the war in former Yugoslavia' in Martin Holland (ed) Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms, London, Pintern, 1997.

[2] For example, after the 1972 enlargement, Britain's former colonies were brought into the EC's external relations framework. This led to a reorganisation of the EC's trade agreements with the third world. The so-called Yaoundee agreements, which mainly covered France's former African colonies, were replaced by the Lome agreements






[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper series: 15.10.1998]